Olympic Security
Better Planning Can Enhance U.S. Support to Future Olympic Games Gao ID: GAO-06-753 June 30, 2006The 2006 Winter Games in Turin, Italy, were the second Olympic Games to take place overseas since September 11, 2001. The United States worked with Italy to ensure the security of U.S. citizens, and it expects to continue such support for future Games, including the 2008 Games in Beijing, China. GAO was asked to (1) discuss the U.S. approach for providing security support for the 2006 Winter Games and how such efforts were coordinated, (2) identify the roles of U.S. agencies in providing security support for the Games and how they financed their activities, (3) review lessons learned in providing security support and the application of prior lessons learned, and (4) identify U.S. efforts under way for providing security support to the 2008 Beijing Games.
In 2004, the United States began planning to provide a U.S. security presence in Italy and security support to the Italian government, and based much of its security strategy on its understanding of Italy's advanced security capabilities. The United States provided Italy with some security assistance, mostly in the form of crisis management and response support. To coordinate U.S. efforts, the U.S. Mission in Italy established an office in Turin as a central point for security information and logistics, and to provide consular services to U.S. citizens during the Games. The U.S. Ambassador to Italy, through the U.S. Consulate in Milan, coordinated and led U.S. efforts in-country, while the Department of State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C., coordinated domestic efforts. While the interagency working group has been a useful forum for coordinating U.S. security support to overseas athletic events, State and Department of Justice (DOJ) officials have indicated that formal guidance that articulates a charter; a mission; and agencies' authorities, roles, and responsibilities would help in planning for security support to future Games. Nearly 20 entities and offices within several U.S. agencies provided more than $16 million for security support activities for the Turin Games. The roles of these agencies--which included the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, Defense, and Energy--included providing crisis management and response support through personnel, equipment, and training and providing security advice and other assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors. The U.S. Embassy in Rome initially paid for lodging and other administrative support needs, which were reimbursed by the participating agencies, although it struggled to do so. State and DOJ officials indicated that an interagency mechanism for identifying costs and addressing potential funding issues would be useful in providing U.S. security support to future Games. For the Turin Games, agencies applied key lessons learned from the 2004 Athens Games and identified additional lessons for future Games. Key lessons identified from the Turin Games included, the importance of establishing an operations center at the location of the Games, establishing clear roles and responsibilities for agencies in event planning and crisis response efforts, and planning early for several years of Olympic-related expenditures. These lessons learned were communicated by Washington, D.C.- and Italy-based personnel to their counterparts who are preparing for the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. The United States is currently taking steps to identify the types of security support that agencies may provide to support China's security efforts for the 2008 Summer Games and to ensure the safety of U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-753, Olympic Security: Better Planning Can Enhance U.S. Support to Future Olympic Games
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-06-753
entitled 'Olympic Security: Better Planning Can Enhance U.S. Support to
Future Olympic Games' which was released on June 30, 2006.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2006:
Olympic Security:
Better Planning Can Enhance U.S. Support to Future Olympic Games:
Olympic Security:
GAO-06-753:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-753, a report to the Committee on International
Relations, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The 2006 Winter Games in Turin, Italy, were the second Olympic Games to
take place overseas since September 11, 2001. The United States worked
with Italy to ensure the security of U.S. citizens, and it expects to
continue such support for future Games, including the 2008 Games in
Beijing, China.
GAO was asked to (1) discuss the U.S. approach for providing security
support for the 2006 Winter Games and how such efforts were
coordinated, (2) identify the roles of U.S. agencies in providing
security support for the Games and how they financed their activities,
(3) review lessons learned in providing security support and the
application of prior lessons learned, and (4) identify U.S. efforts
under way for providing security support to the 2008 Beijing Games.
What GAO Found:
In 2004, the United States began planning to provide a U.S. security
presence in Italy and security support to the Italian government, and
based much of its security strategy on its understanding of Italy‘s
advanced security capabilities. The United States provided Italy with
some security assistance, mostly in the form of crisis management and
response support. To coordinate U.S. efforts, the U.S. Mission in Italy
established an office in Turin as a central point for security
information and logistics, and to provide consular services to U.S.
citizens during the Games. The U.S. Ambassador to Italy, through the
U.S. Consulate in Milan, coordinated and led U.S. efforts in-country,
while the Department of State-chaired interagency working group in
Washington, D.C., coordinated domestic efforts. While the interagency
working group has been a useful forum for coordinating U.S. security
support to overseas athletic events, State and Department of Justice
(DOJ) officials have indicated that formal guidance that articulates a
charter; a mission; and agencies‘ authorities, roles, and
responsibilities would help in planning for security support to future
Games.
Nearly 20 entities and offices within several U.S. agencies provided
more than $16 million for security support activities for the Turin
Games. The roles of these agencies”which included the Departments of
State, Justice, Homeland Security, Defense, and Energy”included
providing crisis management and response support through personnel,
equipment, and training and providing security advice and other
assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors. The
U.S. Embassy in Rome initially paid for lodging and other
administrative support needs, which were reimbursed by the
participating agencies, although it struggled to do so. State and DOJ
officials indicated that an interagency mechanism for identifying costs
and addressing potential funding issues would be useful in providing
U.S. security support to future Games.
For the Turin Games, agencies applied key lessons learned from the 2004
Athens Games and identified additional lessons for future Games. Key
lessons identified from the Turin Games included, the importance of
establishing an operations center at the location of the Games,
establishing clear roles and responsibilities for agencies in event
planning and crisis response efforts, and planning early for several
years of Olympic-related expenditures. These lessons learned were
communicated by Washington, D.C.- and Italy-based personnel to their
counterparts who are preparing for the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing.
The United States is currently taking steps to identify the types of
security support that agencies may provide to support China‘s security
efforts for the 2008 Summer Games and to ensure the safety of U.S.
athletes, spectators, and commercial investors.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the Secretary of State, in consultation with
members of the interagency working group, (1) develop written guidance
for providing U.S. government security support to future Games and (2)
develop a finance subgroup within the interagency working group to help
agencies plan and prepare for future support. State concurred with
GAO‘s findings and recommendations and stated that it has begun taking
steps to implement them.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-753].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
U.S. Security Support Was Based on Italian Security Capabilities,
Supported by Coordinated U.S. Government Effort:
Several U.S. Agencies Contributed to Security Support for 2006 Winter
Games; United States Spent Millions on Security Support Activities, but
Lacks Formal Mechanism for Coordinating Financial Requirements:
Security Planning Lessons Learned Were Applied in Turin and Additional
Lessons Were Identified for the Beijing and Other Future Games:
Planning Efforts Are Under Way to Identify U.S. Security Support for
2008 Beijing Games; Efforts Face Unique Challenges:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: U.S. Agencies' Roles and the Activities Provided for the 2006
Winter Games:
Figures:
Figure 1: Venue Locations of 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy:
Figure 2: Timeline of U.S. Security Support Activities for the 2006
Winter Games:
Figure 3: Key Agency Expenditures for the 2004 Summer Games and the
2006 Winter Games:
Figure 4: Venue Locations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics:
Abbreviations:
DCI: data collection instrument:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOE: Department of Energy:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
DS: Bureau of Diplomatic Security:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
OSAC: Overseas Security Advisory Council:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 30, 2006:
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde:
Chairman:
The Honorable Tom Lantos:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on International Relations:
House of Representatives:
The 2006 Winter Games[Footnote 1] in Turin, Italy, were the second
Olympic Games to take place overseas since September 11, 2001, in a
climate of heightened concerns about international terrorism. A variety
of factors created a challenging threat environment for the 2006 Winter
Games, including increased security tension worldwide due to the Iraq
war; the known presence of Italy-based international terrorist cells;
past al-Qaeda threats to coalition partners, of which Italy is one; and
recent terrorist incidents in Europe. Despite such security concerns,
Italy hosted a safe and secure event with no terrorist incidents.
Although the host government is responsible for the overall security of
the Olympic Games, the United States worked with the Italian
government, in advance of and throughout the Games, to ensure the
security of U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial investors. The
U.S. government expects to continue working with host governments to
ensure the security of U.S. citizens and interests at future Games,
including the upcoming 2008 Summer Olympics and Paralympics in Beijing,
China.
This report (1) discusses the U.S. approach for providing security
support for the 2006 Winter Games and how such security efforts were
coordinated, (2) identifies the roles of U.S. agencies in providing
security support to the 2006 Winter Games and reviews how they financed
their activities, (3) reviews lessons learned in providing security
support and the application of prior lessons learned, and (4)
identifies U.S. efforts under way for providing security support to the
2008 Beijing Games.
To accomplish our objectives, we obtained and reviewed all available
interagency and agency-specific operations plans for the 2006 Winter
Games and documentation on the U.S. support provided for the 2006
Winter Games. In addition, we interviewed officials at the Departments
of State (State), Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Defense
(DOD), and Energy (DOE), and at certain intelligence agencies, and
attended interagency coordination meetings. Also, we traveled to Italy
in November 2005 to observe U.S. planning efforts for providing
security support to the 2006 Winter Games. While in Italy, we
interviewed U.S. officials in Rome, Milan, and Turin and met with
Italian officials in Rome to obtain their perspective on the security
support provided by the United States. Lastly, we also interviewed an
official of a U.S. corporate sponsor of the Olympics and participated
in a security briefing for corporate sponsors to gain their
perspectives on the security support provided by the United States.
Appendix I contains additional details on our objectives, scope, and
methodology. We conducted our review between September 2005 and May
2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.
Results in Brief:
The U.S. government, led by State, assisted in the protection of U.S.
athletes, spectators, and commercial investors during the 2006 Winter
Games in Turin through a U.S. security presence in Italy and security
support to the Italian government. In October 2004, the United States
began planning its approach for providing security support to the 2006
Winter Games. The United States based much of its security strategy on
its understanding of Italy's security capabilities, gained through its
counterterrorism and military partnership with the country. On the
basis of this understanding, the United States provided the Italian
government with an offer of security assistance in the spring of 2005,
and the Italian government accepted some of this assistance--mostly in
the form of crisis management and response support. To support U.S.
efforts at the 2006 Winter Games, the U.S. government established a
coordination office in Turin as a central point for security
information and logistical support, and to provide consular services to
U.S. citizens during the Games. Security support for the 2006 Winter
Games was coordinated by the U.S. Embassy in Rome, which delegated the
coordination of many interagency efforts in-country to the U.S. Consul
General in Milan. Moreover, these efforts in Italy were supported by a
State-chaired interagency working group--the International Athletic
Events Security Coordinating Group--in Washington, D.C., which
conducted the domestic side of coordinating agencies' contributions to
the U.S. effort. While the interagency working group has been a useful
forum for coordinating U.S. efforts in providing security support for
overseas athletic events, State and DOJ officials have indicated that
formal guidance that articulates a charter; a mission; and agencies'
authorities, roles, and responsibilities would help in planning for
security support to future Games.
Approximately 20 entities and offices within several U.S. agencies
provided more than $16 million in fiscal years 2005 and 2006 for
security support activities for the 2006 Winter Games. The roles of
these agencies--which included State, DHS, DOD, DOE, and DOJ--included
crisis management support through personnel, equipment, and training
and providing security advice and other assistance to U.S. athletes,
spectators, and commercial investors. U.S. government agencies
identified specific costs for the Turin Games, including more than $5
million for travel and lodging expenses for U.S. personnel who were
temporarily assigned to Turin and about $720,000 for activities
associated with joint U.S. agency operations, including the
establishment of an interagency operations center in Turin. Funds
providing security support to the 2006 Winter Games came from agencies'
existing accounts over a 2-year period, and agencies did not receive
specific Olympic-related appropriations. In addition, the reported
costs do not capture the entirety of costs for supporting the 2006
Winter Games, particularly the salaries of many U.S. officials who
worked to support the U.S. effort. The U.S. Embassy in Rome initially
paid for agencies' shared costs, such as those associated with the
establishment of a U.S. operations center in Turin, which were later
reimbursed by the participating agencies. Although the U.S. Embassy in
Rome paid for lodging and administrative support, it struggled to do
so, particularly as costs rose due to changing requirements. The
interagency working group coordinates agencies' support to U.S. efforts
at these Games, but the group does not have a mechanism for identifying
costs, coordinating budget requests, and addressing potential funding
issues for U.S. security support to future Games. State and DOJ
officials indicated that an interagency mechanism for identifying costs
and addressing potential funding issues would be useful in providing
U.S. security support to future Olympic Games.
Key lessons learned from the 2004 Athens Summer Games were applied in
the planning efforts for Turin, and additional lessons were identified
for future Games. These lessons from Athens included the importance of
planning early for U.S. security support activities; designating key
U.S. officials to serve as point persons for political, security, and
logistics arrangements and for the delivery of unified messages; and
establishing a colocation of intelligence and interagency operations.
Following the 2006 Winter Games, the U.S. agencies involved with
providing security support identified a number of additional lessons
learned, such as establishing a fully equipped, temporary operations
center at the location of the Olympics if no embassy or consulate is
nearby; establishing clear roles and responsibilities for U.S. agencies
in event planning and crisis response efforts; and planning for Olympic-
related costs over several fiscal years. Washington, D.C.-and Italy-
based personnel communicated these lessons learned to their
counterparts who are preparing for the 2008 Summer Games in Beijing.
State, through the U.S. Mission in Beijing, is taking steps to identify
the types of security support that the United States may be able to
provide to support China's security efforts for the 2008 Beijing Games
and to ensure the safety of U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial
investors. For example, in January 2006, a U.S. official was appointed
to the U.S. mission in Beijing to serve as a U.S. government point
person on Olympic security with the Chinese government. As of April
2006, the United States and China were discussing a possible joint
assessment to identify security needs for the 2008 Beijing Games.
To enhance future planning for U.S. security support for overseas
Olympic and Paralympic Games, we are recommending in this report that
the Secretary of State, in consultation with members of the interagency
working group--the International Athletic Events Security Coordinating
Group, develop written guidance for providing U.S. government security
support to future Games. We are also recommending that the Secretary of
State, in consultation with members of the interagency working group,
develop a finance subgroup within the working group to help agencies
identify and plan for anticipated resource needs, coordinate their
budget requests, and address potential funding issues for U.S. security
support to future Games.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State agreed with our findings
and recommendations and stated that it is taking steps to begin
implementing them. State, DOD, and DOJ also provided technical
comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
Background:
Since the first Winter Olympic Games in 1924, the event has grown from
258 athletes representing 16 countries to, in the case of the 2006
Turin Olympics, approximately 5,000 athletes and coaches from 85
countries. In addition, an estimated 1.5 million spectators and 10,000
media personnel attended the 2006 Winter Olympic Games. While the
stated goal of the Olympic movement is "to contribute to building a
peaceful and better world," its history includes tragedy and terror as
well. At the 1972 Munich Games, Palestinian terrorists attacked the
Israeli Olympic team, resulting in the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes.
The 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games were marred by a pipe-bomb explosion
that killed 1 person and injured 110 others.
One of the International Olympic Committee requirements for countries
bidding to host the Games is to ensure the security of the
participating athletes and spectators, which is an increasingly
challenging task in today's environment of terrorist threats. According
to State documents, Italy spent approximately $110 million on security
operations for the 2006 Winter Games. In addition, the Italian
government designated 15,000 law enforcement personnel, along with
military and intelligence support, to provide for overall security for
the Winter Games. Italy's Ministry of Interior designated the Prefect
of Turin as the local government authority responsible for providing
security inside the official venues of the Winter Games.
Italy faced the challenge of hosting an Olympics amid a heightened
terrorist threat environment. Al-Qaeda has made threats to coalition
partners in Iraq and Afghanistan in the past. Moreover, in March 2004,
a terrorist attack on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, killed nearly
200 people, and, in July 2005, a terrorist attack on commuter trains
and a bus in London, England, killed over 50 people and injured more
than 700. In addition, there is a known presence of Italy-based
international terrorist cells and domestic anarchist groups that
actively target multinational corporations, critical infrastructure,
and government facilities. Italy has highly advanced antiterrorism
capabilities and has recently taken additional antiterrorism measures,
such as enactment of improved antiterrorism laws and increased physical
security measures. Since 2001, several extremist plots in Milan and
Rome have been detected and prevented. In addition to these explicit
terror threats, Italy has faced difficult security challenges at other
recent major events, such as the meeting of the Group of Eight in Genoa
in 2001, at which activists clashed violently with Italian police
forces, and the funeral of Pope John Paul II in April 2005.
In planning for the 2006 Winter Games, winter conditions presented
another set of challenges. The Winter Games were located in the remote,
northwest corner of Italy, with venues spread over an extensive land
area. Although smaller in scale than the 2004 Athens Summer Games, the
2006 Winter Olympic venues included mountain locations that were as far
as 60 miles away from Turin, with limited access routes to these
mountain sites. (See fig. 1 for locations of venues for the 2006 Winter
Olympic Games in Turin, Italy.) Locating suitable lodging for U.S.
security and support personnel near key venues was necessary.
Furthermore, the distance from the nearest U.S. presence--the U.S.
Consulate in Milan, which is located about a 90-minute drive from
Turin--required the establishment of a temporary U.S. post in Turin to
support U.S. security efforts and serve as a platform for U.S.
activities.
Figure 1: Venue Locations of 2006 Winter Olympics in Turin, Italy:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Although the host government has the ultimate responsibility for
providing security for the Olympics, the United States has a vested
interest in ensuring the safety of its citizens in all Olympic
locations. In 2001, the United States began planning its security
assistance for the 2004 Athens Summer Olympics, responding both to the
heightened worldwide anxiety following the September 11 attacks and to
Greece's request for international advice on its security plan. Despite
widespread fears of a potential terrorist attack on the Olympics,
Greece hosted a safe and secure event with no terrorist incidents. With
the conclusion of the Athens Games, the United States began planning
for security support to the 2006 Turin Winter Olympic and Paralympic
Games. This security support is provided by the United States under
general executive branch policy guidance and individual agency
authorities. For example, State officials cited the use of Presidential
Decision Directive 62, which extends the U.S. counterterrorism policy
in Presidential Decision Directive 39 to the protection of Americans
overseas. State is the lead agency for ensuring the protection of
American citizens overseas. According to U.S. officials in Italy, up to
20,000 Americans attended the 2006 Turin Olympics daily.
The next Olympics will be the Summer Games in Beijing, China, August 8
to 24, 2008; followed by the Paralympics, September 6 to 17, 2008.
Venues for these Games will be spread out across seven cities in China,
presenting unique logistical and coordination challenges for security
support efforts. According to State officials, over 1 million
spectators are expected to attend the 2008 Beijing Games, including a
large number of Americans. The next Winter Olympic Games will be held
in Vancouver, Canada, February 12 to 28, 2010, followed by the
Paralympics on March 12 to 21, 2010. The close proximity of these Games
to the United States presents distinctive challenges, such as border
security issues. In 2012, the United Kingdom will host the Summer
Olympic and Paralympic Games in London. Past terrorist incidents in
London and an ongoing terrorist threat climate are likely to present
security challenges for these Games.
U.S. Security Support Was Based on Italian Security Capabilities,
Supported by Coordinated U.S. Government Effort:
The security support that the United States provided for the 2006
Winter Games was largely based on an understanding of Italy's advanced
security capabilities gained through a long-standing, U.S.-Italian
counterterrorism and military partnership. The U.S. Embassy in Rome led
the coordinated governmentwide effort--delegating responsibility for
the coordination of U.S. activities in Turin to the U.S. Consulate in
Milan--and was supported by a Washington, D.C.-based interagency group.
U.S. Security Support Informed by an Understanding of Italian Security
Capabilities, but without a Formal Assessment of Italy's Olympic
Security Plans:
Following the Athens Games in the summer of 2004, the United States
began planning for (1) the security support it would provide to the
Italian government and (2) the protection of U.S. citizens who would be
participating in or attending the 2006 Winter Games. In October 2004,
the United States held a 3-day interagency conference in Milan for
Italy-and U.S.-based officials who would be working on the 2006 Winter
Games to share lessons learned from the U.S. effort in Athens and to
begin determining U.S. security support for Turin.
The United States largely based its security support approach on its
understanding of Italian security capabilities, gained from long-
standing counterterrorism and military relationships with Italy. In
particular, the United States and Italy have an established partnership
as members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, more
recently, as coalition partners in Iraq. According to U.S. officials,
the Italian government's sensitivities about formally sharing certain
information limited the United States' ability to formally assess
Italy's operational plans for providing security for the 2006 Winter
Games. Agency officials noted that this made U.S. efforts to plan
security and emergency contingencies during the Games more difficult.
However, the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator and other key officials
were able to use established relationships with their Italian
counterparts to develop a working knowledge of Italy's plans and
capabilities for providing security to the 2006 Winter Games and to
plan U.S. security efforts. For example, U.S. officials met with their
Italian security and law enforcement counterparts to receive
information on Italy's security structure and Olympic security
integration plan.
In addition, over several months in 2005, State reported that more than
20 technical meetings were held between Italian authorities and U.S.
representatives from the U.S. Mission in Italy and various federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies to coordinate bilateral
cooperation during the Games. Moreover, Italian government
representatives held meetings in 2005 with representatives from the
United States and other interested governments to discuss Italy's
security plans for the Games. For example, in September 2005, the
Italian government hosted an international seminar on security concepts
for the management of major sporting events, with law enforcement
representatives from 11 countries. Furthermore, in October 2005, U.S.
representatives were invited by the Italian government to observe its
antiterrorism drills testing the efficiency and response capability of
the local law enforcement, emergency, and rescue systems in four
Italian cities.
On the basis of its understanding of Italy's security capabilities, the
United States identified specific training and security support that
could be provided to support Italy's security efforts. In March 2005,
the Italian government requested a consolidated list of the offers of
U.S. security assistance, and the interagency working group in
Washington identified the available sources and capabilities among the
represented agencies to prevent duplication of efforts. In the spring
of 2005, this interagency working group provided a comprehensive offer
of security support for the 2006 Winter Games, comprising a variety of
specific offers from several U.S. agencies. Italy accepted a number of
these offers, including crisis management expertise, an assessment of
Turin's international airport, and mapping assistance.
In addition to direct security assistance to Italy, the United States
conducted several exercises to test its own strategies for supporting
Italy's security efforts and ensuring the protection of U.S. citizens
during the 2006 Winter Games. In November and December 2005, the United
States conducted several tabletop exercises to test strategies for
ensuring the protection of U.S. citizens, including a joint crisis
management exercise that focused on a theoretical terrorist attack in
Italy and a crisis management exercise held over several days in Rome,
Milan, and Turin to test U.S. crisis planning and execution in
preparation for the Games. Figure 2 provides a timeline of U.S.
security support activities for the 2006 Winter Games.
Figure 2: Timeline of U.S. Security Support Activities for the 2006
Winter Games:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
U.S. Olympic Security Support Was Coordinated by the U.S. Embassy in
Rome and Supported by Interagency Efforts:
The U.S. Embassy in Rome--under the leadership of the U.S. Ambassador
to Italy--led the coordinated interagency efforts in Italy under one
centralized U.S. government mission. The U.S. Ambassador delegated the
responsibility for coordinating and overseeing U.S. interagency efforts
in Turin to the U.S. Consul General in Milan. Located approximately 90-
minutes away from Turin, the Consulate in Milan oversaw the
establishment of a temporary U.S. presence in Turin to centralize U.S.
agency operations and the efforts of key U.S. officials serving as
designated point persons for coordinating security and logistical
arrangements.
To centralize all U.S. activities in Turin leading up to and during the
Games, the U.S. Mission in Italy established a U.S. Olympic
Coordination Office in Turin to coordinate U.S. security support
activities. Under the direction of the U.S. Ambassador and through the
U.S. Consul General in Milan, this office served as the center for U.S.
security operations and other activities. In particular, during the
Games, this office housed a U.S. Olympic command group, comprising
senior representatives from State, DOD, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). The U.S. command group was responsible for
providing--in the event of a request for assistance by the Italian
government--specialized expertise in a variety of areas, including
security operations, crisis operations, terrorism investigations,
consequence management, and intelligence collection and dissemination.
In addition, this office provided limited consular services to American
citizens and included a public diplomacy office to liaison with press
and support VIP visits during the Games.
U.S. efforts in Italy were supported by a Washington, D.C.-based
interagency working group--the International Athletic Events Security
Coordinating Group--which included representatives from the
intelligence community, State, DHS, DOD, DOE, and DOJ, among
others.[Footnote 2] Specifically, State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(DS) and Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism serve as
cochairs of this interagency working group. Chaired by State, the
interagency working group facilitated and coordinated, on the domestic
side, agencies' contributions for the 2006 Winter Games. While this
interagency working group has been a useful forum for coordinating the
domestic side of U.S. efforts in providing security support to overseas
athletic events, it operates without written operational guidance and
without the authority for tasking participating agencies in planning
for future Olympic Games, according to State and DOJ officials.
Specifically, the interagency working group does not have a charter or
mission statement that establishes the roles and responsibilities of
this group and its members.
U.S officials from State and DOJ indicated that, although U.S. support
for Turin was coordinated through the interagency working group, the
group's lack of clear authority presents confusion over what direction
and guidance it can provide for U.S. operations in support of future
Olympic Games. This confusion has impacted the efforts of some
subgroups formed, in late 2004, by the interagency working group to
provide guidance in several key areas. For example, of the subgroups
that focus on logistics, transportation security, law enforcement, and
intelligence support, only the intelligence support subgroup meets on a
regular basis. The subgroup for law enforcement support met only a few
times, in part due to the lack of clearly defined roles and
responsibilities of participating members. According to a State
official from DS, the interagency working group relied on U.S.
officials in Italy to inform the group of what support was needed. The
same official indicated that clearly defined authorities and
responsibilities for the group's participating agencies may support the
implementation of effective subgroups in the future. In addition, DS
established a major events coordination unit after the 2004 Athens
Summer Games, in part to coordinate U.S. security support for major
sporting events overseas, according to a State official. However, this
unit does not have written guidance for implementing coordination
responsibilities for future Olympic events and other major sporting
events.[Footnote 3] Without formal guidance, planning for future
Olympic events could be complicated, as roles and responsibilities will
have to be redefined on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, given the
regular turnover of key staff, such written guidance could facilitate
the continuity of future planning efforts.
To plan and coordinate U.S. security support operations, State and DOJ
officials in Turin worked closely with representatives from the
interagency working group. However, these officials in Turin
experienced difficulties in planning for interagency operations, in
part due to problems in obtaining timely information and decisions from
the agencies. For example, State and DOJ officials had difficulty
identifying requirements for operations, such as space and
classification requirements, due to communication challenges with the
interagency community in Washington. According to State officials in
Italy and Washington, the lack of proper communication capabilities in
the U.S. Olympic Coordination Office in Turin made it difficult to
obtain timely information from the agencies. The interagency working
group worked to coordinate responses to these officials in Turin.
However, State and FBI officials in Turin indicated that many of the
agencies did not fully understand the communication infrastructure and
logistical requirements until they sent representatives to Turin in the
fall of 2005. FBI officials have stated that although the interagency
working group works to support the needs of the U.S. effort overseas,
it has no authority to task agencies to meet deadlines, which leads to
confusion over what direction and guidance should be followed or given
by this group.
Several U.S. Agencies Contributed to Security Support for 2006 Winter
Games; United States Spent Millions on Security Support Activities, but
Lacks Formal Mechanism for Coordinating Financial Requirements:
Several U.S. agencies contributed to the U.S. security support effort
in Turin, identifying more than $16 million in costs--over fiscal years
2005 and 2006--to arrange and provide for this support. State initially
paid for agencies' shared costs, which were reimbursed by funds from
the participating agencies; however, no formal mechanism exists for
coordinating financial requirements associated with providing security
support.
Several U.S. Agencies Provided Security Support for the 2006 Winter
Games:
Approximately 20 U.S. agencies, or their component entities,
contributed to security efforts for the 2006 Winter Games. These
contributions ranged from crisis management and investigative expertise
to the provision of equipment, training, and communications and
logistical support. Key agencies that contributed to the U.S. effort in
Turin included State, DHS, DOD, DOE, DOJ, and intelligence agencies.
State coordinated the U.S. interagency efforts in both Italy and
Washington, D.C., and also provided security advice and other
assistance to U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial
investors.[Footnote 4] See table 1 for key contributions of U.S.
agencies for the 2006 Winter Games.
Table 1: U.S. Agencies' Roles and the Activities Provided for the 2006
Winter Games:
Agency/Entity or office: Department of State: Bureau of Diplomatic
Security (DS);
Role/ Security support activity: Protects U.S. personnel and missions
overseas, advising U.S. ambassadors on all security matters and
providing a security program against terrorist, espionage, and criminal
threats at U.S. diplomatic facilities;
For the Games, DS planned, developed, implemented, and coordinated with
the Italian government to ensure that the appropriate assistance and
protection was provided to U.S. athletes and all U.S. interests during
the Games. DS assigned agents to serve in a liaison role at each of the
major sporting venues and at each official and nonofficial Olympic
site, and provided a security liaison official to work with the Italian
government.
Agency/Entity or office: Department of State: Office of the Coordinator
for Counterterrorism;
Role/Security support activity: Heads U.S. government efforts to
improve counterterrorism cooperation with foreign governments;
The office led the Foreign Emergency Support Team, which is an
interagency rapid-response team, to assist the Italian government
should it request such support in the event of a terrorist attack.
Agency/Entity or office: Department of State: Consular Affairs;
Role/Security support activity: Assists American citizens traveling or
living abroad;
Consular Affairs increased its outreach to American spectators
attending the Games and provided various services, such as replacing
lost passports. Consular Affairs also provided support to Mission
Italy's crisis preparedness measures.
Agency/Entity or office: Department of State: Overseas Security
Advisory Council (OSAC);
Role/Security support activity: Facilitates the timely exchange of
information between the U.S. government and the U.S. private sector on
security issues;
OSAC served as the lead agency for all actions concerning private
sector sponsors. During the Games, OSAC served as the primary U.S.
government point of contact for the U.S. private sector on security
concerns.
Agency/Entity or office: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI);
Role/ Security support activity: Conducts investigations and
intelligence collection commensurate with the FBI's roles and
responsibilities to identify and counter the threat posed by domestic
and international terrorists and their supporters within the United
States, and to pursue extraterritorial criminal investigations to bring
the perpetrators of terrorist acts to justice;
The FBI provided training, as requested by the Italian government.
During the Games, FBI agents were prestaged in Turin to provide crisis
management assistance in the event of a terrorist attack.
Agency/Entity or office: Department of Justice: Criminal Division;
Role/Security support activity: Provides training and assistance to
foreign law enforcement and develops and prosecutes cases against
perpetrators of extraterritorial terrorist acts;
The Criminal Division offered training, coordinated with the lead
terrorism prosecutor/magistrate for the Turin area, and prestaged a
prosecutor in Turin during the Games to provide assistance and fulfill
case development responsibilities in the event of a terrorist act.
Agency/Entity or office: Department of Homeland Security:
Transportation Security Administration (TSA);
Role/Security support activity: Aims to prevent and deter terrorist
attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the
nation, including safeguarding the American people;
their freedoms, critical infrastructure, and property;
and the economy;
During the Games, TSA ensured compliance to federal aviation security
regulations, conducted Federal Air Marshal missions, and acted as an
advisory body both to the Italian and the U.S. governments for
transportation security issues.
Agency/Entity or office: Department of Homeland Security: Federal Air
Marshal Service;
Role/Security support activity: Protects U.S. air carriers and
passengers against hostile acts;
For the Games, the service provided additional air marshals to
accompany U.S.-based carriers traveling to and from Italy for the
Games.
Agency/Entity or office: Department of Homeland Security: U.S. Secret
Service;
Role/Security support activity: Provides protection services for its
protectees;
During the Games, the Secret Service provided protection for their
protectees that attended.
Agency/Entity or office: Department of Defense: European Command;
Role/Security support activity: Protects and advances U.S. national
interests, such as the safety of U.S. citizens at home and abroad and
the security and well- being of allies;
Provided personnel and equipment to support U.S. security efforts in
Turin.
Agency/Entity or office: Department of Defense: National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency;
Role/Security support activity: Provides imagery, imagery intelligence,
and geospatial data and information for planning, decision making, and
action in support of national security;
This agency, in collaboration with Italy, provided detailed geospatial
information to Italian and U.S. government agencies to assist with
their security, consequence management, and emergency response planning
efforts.
Agency/Entity or office: Department of Energy: National Nuclear
Security Administration;
Role/Security support activity: Promotes international nuclear safety
and nonproliferation to reduce global danger from weapons of mass
destruction;
Provided personnel in support of the Foreign Emergency Support Team, a
State-led interagency rapid-response team.
Agency/Entity or office: Other agencies;
Role/Security support activity: The National Counterterrorism Center,
the Central Intelligence Agency, among others, provided additional
security support for the 2006 Winter Games.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
State operated under Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 39, which
extend U.S. responsibility for protection of Americans overseas and
direct State as the lead agency to ensure the protection of American
citizens overseas. Furthermore, the Omnibus and Diplomatic Security and
Antiterrorism Act of 1986 directs DS to develop and implement policies
and programs for the security of U.S. government operations, including
the protection of all U.S. government personnel (other than those under
military command) on official duty abroad, and the establishment and
operation of security functions at all U.S. government
missions.[Footnote 5] DS is responsible for the establishment and
operation of post security and protective functions abroad,[Footnote 6]
and for liaisons with host nation officials to ensure the safety of
official U.S. citizens. The Bureau of Consular Affairs is responsible
for assisting private Americans traveling and residing abroad. Under
State's leadership, other agencies' individual authorities were used to
provide specific assistance to the Italian government. For example, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has the authority under
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act to deploy federal air
marshals on all select flights from the United States to Italy, and TSA
did so for the 2006 Winter Games.
United States Spent Millions, but Lacks a Formal Mechanism for
Coordinating Financial Requirements for Security Support:
We surveyed the U.S. agencies identified as contributing security
support in advance of and during the 2006 Winter Games. These agencies
identified more than $16 million in costs in fiscal years 2005 and 2006
to arrange and provide security support activities for the 2006 Winter
Games,[Footnote 7] with funds from multiple accounts.[Footnote 8] U.S.
agencies did not receive specific Olympic-related appropriations during
this period. Of the $16 million, agencies reported to us that they
spent more than $5 million in travel costs, including airfare, lodging,
and per diem costs for staff who traveled overseas in 2005 and 2006 to
provide security support for the 2006 Winter Games. The reported costs
during this period do not capture the entirety of costs for activities
in support of the 2006 Winter Games. For example, while reported costs
include the salaries of key personnel who filled Olympic-related
coordination roles, they do not capture the salaries and benefits of
other U.S. officials who worked to support the U.S. effort for the
Games, as part of their regular duties.
State paid for lodging and other administrative support needs
associated with establishing U.S. operations in Turin in advance, often
to secure limited housing at a lower rate, and these costs were later
reimbursed by the participating agencies. Specifically, the U.S.
Embassy in Rome paid for initial deposits on hotels because some
agencies in Athens had struggled to identify available funding--often,
several years in advance of the Games--for their housing and logistics
needs. For Turin, some agencies provided funds to State in advance of
the Games, particularly for lodging deposits, while additional
reimbursements were made after the Games. According to a State finance
official in Rome, State provided $140,000 on lodging contracts and
$720,000 on joint administrative services associated with U.S.
interagency operations in Turin.[Footnote 9] The U.S. Embassy in Rome
was later reimbursed by participating agencies, including State, for
their portion of these joint administrative services.
According to State officials in Italy, although the U.S. Embassy in
Rome was able to fund these expenses, it struggled to cover them,
particularly as costs rose due to the changing requirements of the
agencies in outfitting suitable space for their operations. These
changing requirements made it difficult for budget personnel at the
U.S. Embassy in Rome to identify total joint administrative costs in
order to obtain funds from State and other agencies in a timely manner.
Although the interagency working group coordinates the domestic side of
agency support for U.S. efforts at major international sporting events,
it does not have a formal mechanism for addressing funding issues
associated with providing this support. State and DOJ officials told us
that it would be easier to plan and budget for future Olympic-security
support activities overseas, which often begin several years in advance
of the Games, if a framework were available for identifying costs and
determining how these costs will be funded as early as possible. Such a
framework would also be useful for anticipating resource needs,
coordinating budgetary requests, and addressing potential funding
issues associated with providing U.S. security support to future
overseas Games.[Footnote 10]
Agencies have reported their expenditures associated with providing
security support for both the 2004 Summer Games in Athens and the 2006
Winter Games in Turin.[Footnote 11] Although the total reported
expenditures for providing security support to these overseas Games are
not directly comparable, in part due to the differing sizes of the
Games and the differing nature of U.S. security support, they can be
helpful in identifying future costs.[Footnote 12] For both Games, State
and DOD reported the two largest portions of costs associated with
providing U.S. security support. For the 2004 Summer Games, State and
DOD spent $15 million and $12.2 million, respectively. For the 2006
Winter Games, State and DOD spent $6.9 million and $6.6 million,
respectively. See figure 3 for key agencies' reported expenditures for
security support to the 2004 Summer Games and the 2006 Winter Games.
Figure 3: Key Agency Expenditures for the 2004 Summer Games and the
2006 Winter Games:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The nature of U.S. security support provided by key agencies differed
between the 2004 Summer Games in Athens and the 2006 Winter Games in
Turin. For the Athens Games, the majority of costs identified by the
agencies were travel costs for U.S. personnel supporting the Games and
for training programs provided to Greek officials and security
personnel. Agencies reported that they spent more than $9 million on
training programs provided to Greek officials and security personnel,
including the costs for building and executing the consequence
management military exercises and FBI forensics training as well as for
translating training materials and providing translators at the
training sessions. For the Turin Games, U.S. agencies reported that
they spent $95,000 on training programs for Italian officials and
security personnel. As previously mentioned, the majority of the Turin
Games costs identified by the agencies were for U.S. personnel travel
and salary, benefits, and related expenditures for staff who were hired
to fill Olympic-related coordination roles.
Security Planning Lessons Learned Were Applied in Turin and Additional
Lessons Were Identified for the Beijing and Other Future Games:
Key lessons learned from the 2004 Summer Games were applied in the
planning efforts for Turin, including (1) planning early for U.S.
security support, (2) designating key U.S. officials to lead and
deliver unified messages, and (3) centralizing U.S. resources and
interagency operations. U.S. agencies are currently collecting lessons
learned from the Turin Games, for distribution to agencies involved in
security planning for the Beijing Games and other future Olympic Games.
According to U.S. officials involved in the Turin Games, these lessons
include the importance of (1) establishing a fully equipped, temporary
operations center at the location of the Olympics when a U.S. presence
is not nearby; (2) establishing clear roles and responsibilities for
U.S. agencies in event planning and crisis response efforts; and (3)
planning for Olympic-related expenditures over several fiscal years.
U.S. Government Agencies Applied Key Lessons Learned from the Athens
Games to the Turin Games:
As we reported in 2005, key lessons learned from the Athens Games that
were highlighted in numerous agency after-action reports and in an
interagency "lessons learned" conference in Milan were applied to the
security planning for the Turin Games.[Footnote 13] These lessons
included the importance of (1) planning early for U.S. security
support, (2) designating key U.S. officials to lead efforts and deliver
unified messages, and (3) centralizing U.S. agency operations and
intelligence activities.
Planning Early for U.S. Security Support Activities:
Many agency after-action reports from Athens and U.S. officials'
comments indicated the importance of planning early--for providing
crisis response support, counterterrorism and intelligence support, and
other capabilities--coupled with an understanding of host country
security capabilities that an existing and cooperative bilateral
relationship affords. Such early insight enables advance planning of
baseline support, including logistics as well as training and military
exercises to enhance the host country's capabilities. Furthermore,
early planning of baseline U.S. support enables agencies to coordinate
their efforts and plan more efficiently and effectively, including
arranging accommodations, vehicle rentals, and communications
infrastructure. For example, advance notification of the expected U.S.
agency presence would allow for planning of support infrastructure,
including the operations and intelligence center. U.S. officials
planning for the Turin Games identified the importance of this lesson
and began planning immediately after the Athens Games, almost 1½ years
in advance of the Turin Games.
This lesson is being applied to the 2008 Beijing Games as the United
States has already begun its planning efforts over 2 years in advance
of the Games. According to U.S. officials in Beijing, U.S. officials in
Greece; Italy; and Washington, D.C., have shared this lesson with their
counterparts in Beijing. The U.S. Mission in Beijing is taking steps to
plan for baseline support and identify the types of security support
that the United States may provide for the Beijing Games. While U.S.
agencies are focusing on the Beijing Games, they also are beginning to
assess potential roles for U.S. security support for the 2010 Vancouver
Winter Games. These plans are still in the early stages, although
bilateral U.S.-Canada state and federal security and transportation
officials have already met to discuss Canada's Olympic planning
process. The Vancouver Games, located in close proximity to the U.S.
border, will present new and different challenges for U.S. security
support, such as cross-border security issues.
Designating Key U.S. Officials to Lead Efforts and Present Unified
Message:
The designation of certain U.S. officials to serve as point persons for
U.S. security support efforts is another key lesson from Athens that
was applied in Turin. In Athens, the U.S. Embassy had designated
individuals to be responsible for political, security, and logistics
arrangements, which helped to avoid separate requests for assistance
from U.S. agencies and minimized overlap among and overreach by
participating U.S. agencies. Athens-and Washington-based officials
recommended this strategy for future use. In September 2004, the U.S.
Ambassador to Italy delegated organizational responsibility and overall
coordination authority for U.S. efforts in Turin to the U.S. Consul
General in Milan. In November 2004, State appointed an U.S. Olympic
Security Coordinator to serve in Turin as a U.S. focal point for
contacts with the host government and to work with the Consul General
to develop and communicate a coordinated U.S. message, specifically on
matters related to security support. This individual was tasked with
crafting and ensuring a consistent message and setting consistent
expectations for the host country and multilateral community regarding
planned U.S. security support efforts. In addition, in January 2005, an
FBI liaison arrived in Italy to serve as the FBI's point of contact for
its security support efforts in Turin. According to State and FBI
officials, the U.S. Olympic Security Coordinator and FBI liaison worked
closely together in Turin to plan for and coordinate U.S. security
support operations in Turin.
To coordinate the logistical arrangements and needs for U.S. operations
in Turin, State appointed a U.S. Olympic Coordinator who arrived in
April 2005. This individual served as a U.S. focal point for contacts
with the host government, the Turin Olympic Organizing Committee, and
the U.S. Olympic Committee and worked with the U.S. Consul General in
Milan to develop and communicate interagency information in a
coordinated and understandable way. In addition, a dedicated Web site
was developed as a ready source of information for Americans on
security matters, while also offering helpful advice on other matters,
such as how to replace lost passports and locate English-speaking
pharmacies.
This lesson is being applied to the 2008 Beijing Games through State's
appointment of an Olympic Coordinator in June 2005, a Minister
Counselor for Olympic Coordination in December 2005, a Deputy Olympic
Security Coordinator in January 2006, and the U.S. Ambassador's
designation of an Olympic Coordination Office at the U.S. Mission in
Beijing to coordinate all arrangements--including political, security,
and logistical--for U.S. security support to the 2008 Summer Games.
According to U.S. officials involved in planning for the 2008 Summer
Games, providing consistent, clear, and targeted information for
Beijing is needed to avert possible confusion within the Chinese
government regarding which U.S. agency to speak with to obtain specific
assistance. The strategy also will help ensure that U.S. citizens and
interests receive consistent information on security and other critical
issues.
Centralizing U.S. Activities in One Location:
Many U.S. officials noted that the key lesson from Athens that was
applied in Turin was the centralization of all U.S. activities in one
location. U.S. officials involved in the Athens Games recommended that
operations and intelligence centers for future Olympics be colocated to
ensure the efficient delivery and dissemination of information among
U.S. agencies. U.S. officials planning for Turin identified the
importance of this lesson and planned to better centralize resources by
colocating all participating U.S. agencies and their functions in one
facility in Turin, including operations and intelligence activities and
consular services for U.S. citizens. According to U.S. officials who
worked on the Turin Games, the colocation of all U.S. agencies and
activities in one facility resulted in good coordination, and
eliminated many planning and operations problems that had been
experienced in Athens.
This lesson has been communicated by Washington-, Athens-, and Italy-
based personnel to their counterparts in China and has been
incorporated into planning efforts for the Beijing Games. According to
U.S. officials in Beijing, they are following the Turin model of
centralizing U.S. resources, to coordinate interagency needs that will
be specific to the Beijing Games and to identify any training or
security support that may be provided to the Chinese government. By
July 2006, U.S. officials in Beijing plan to have established a U.S.
Olympic Coordination Office outside of the U.S. Embassy in Beijing to
coordinate U.S. operations leading up to and during the Beijing Games.
U.S. Agencies Identified Additional Lessons Learned in Turin:
U.S. agencies have begun to collect lessons learned from the Turin
Games and disseminate them to their Beijing Games counterparts.
According to U.S. officials involved in the Turin Games, key lessons
from Turin included the importance of (1) establishing a temporary,
fully equipped, operations center at the location of the Olympics when
a U.S. presence is not nearby; (2) establishing clear roles and
responsibilities for U.S. agencies in event planning and operations;
and (3) planning early for Olympic-related costs. Officials at State,
DOJ, and other key agencies are currently completing after-action
reports that are expected to highlight aspects of security support that
went well and should be replicated in the future, where feasible, and
what aspects could be improved upon. At the time of our review, State
and DOJ expected to complete their after-action reports in June 2006.
In addition, the Washington-based interagency working group is
completing an after-action report that is expected to discuss issues
specific to the support provided by this group. According to State, the
interagency working group's after-action report is expected to be
completed later this year.
Establishing a U.S. Operations Center at the Location of Games:
The lack of a U.S. presence in Turin demonstrated the importance of
establishing a fully equipped operations center at the location of the
Games. Acquiring and outfitting suitable space for an interagency
operations center require advance planning, particularly when a U.S.
presence is not nearby. In Turin, which is a 90-minute drive from the
nearest U.S. Consulate, the U.S. Mission faced unique challenges in
establishing a temporary but suitable space for centralizing
interagency operations, particularly those related to logistics,
communications, and resources. For example, the U.S. Consulate in Milan
used its staff to provide logistical support to the U.S. coordinators
in Turin, such as the establishment of work space and other
administrative support services. Since the U.S. Olympic Coordination
Office was not established until July 2005, the U.S. coordinators in
Turin worked from their homes and traveled between Milan and Turin to
coordinate the U.S. efforts.
In addition, proper space and classification requirements of
participating agencies were difficult to identify in early planning
efforts, in part due to the lack of proper communication capabilities
between U.S. officials in Turin and U.S. agencies in Washington, D.C.
Agency officials in Italy and Washington attributed this difficulty, in
part, to this being the first time that the United States had attempted
to establish a temporary U.S. facility to coordinate security support
provided by all participating U.S. agencies. Although these challenges
were resolved in time for the Turin Games, U.S. officials in Italy and
Washington stated that authoritative decision making is necessary for
budgeting and identifying requirements for setting up an interagency
operation center.
Due to the presence of a U.S. Embassy in Beijing and three U.S.
Consulates near other Olympic venues, U.S. operations in Beijing will
not require the establishment of a fully equipped U.S. operations
center. However, shortage of space at the U.S. Mission requires the
establishment of a U.S. Olympic Coordination Office outside of the U.S.
Embassy in Beijing. U.S. officials in Beijing and at the interagency
working group in Washington have begun discussing the communication,
infrastructure, and other logistical requirements for centralizing and
coordinating U.S. agency security support efforts before and during the
Beijing Games. In addition, U.S. officials have held preplanning
discussions for the 2010 Vancouver Games regarding work space and
operating requirements.
Establishing Clear Roles and Responsibilities for U.S. Agencies:
The Turin Games and, to some degree, the Athens Games demonstrated the
importance of establishing clear roles and responsibilities for U.S.
agencies in the planning and operational stages of U.S. security
support efforts. While security support for the Turin Games was
generally well-coordinated, U.S. agency officials at State and DOJ have
stated that the overall U.S. effort lacks a clear strategy for security
support operations at future overseas sporting events. These officials
indicated that clear guidance for U.S. agencies' roles and
responsibilities would identify authorities for decision making and
responsibilities during both the planning and operational stages of the
U.S. efforts. U.S. officials in Turin prepared an operational plan that
was approved by the U.S. Mission in Rome, which outlined the missions
of all participating agencies and identified reporting authorities for
U.S. operations. However, according to State and DOJ officials,
although State is the lead agency for ensuring the protection of
American citizens overseas, the United States does not have a strategy
that clearly outlines the authorities responsible for planning
operations at future Olympic Games.
Planning Early for Several Years of Olympic-Related Costs:
U.S. support for the Turin Games demonstrated the importance of
planning early for Olympic-related costs. In particular, State and DOJ
officials noted the importance of identifying early funding sources to
make advance payments on housing and logistical needs. In Turin, State
struggled to identify funds to secure space, communication, and
transportation arrangements, among other expenses, for interagency
operations. Although U.S. officials in Italy were able to secure
funding for housing and space for U.S. operations, they indicated that
it was difficult to obtain timely decisions from the interagency to
budget and identify requirements for the establishment of a U.S.
presence in Turin. State officials in Italy indicated that they were
unable to address these issues until the fall of 2005, when agency
representatives came to Italy for operational planning meetings.
According to a State finance official in Italy, funds for the joint
administrative costs were easier to obtain once the U.S. coordinators
in Turin and the interagency were able to identify operational
requirements. In addition, several U.S. officials in Italy and
Washington, D.C., stated that, for future overseas Games, it would be
easier for agencies to identify and plan for their portion of Olympic-
related expenditures if a framework were available for identifying
costs and addressing funding issues associated with providing security
support.
U.S. officials in Italy and Washington, D.C., have shared this lesson
with their counterparts in Beijing. According to U.S. officials in
Beijing, they have already begun to address housing and logistics
needs, such as planning to make initial deposits on hotels early to
avoid high costs for accommodations as the Games draw nearer. However,
these officials indicated potential problems with identifying funds
early enough to cover expenditures for this fiscal year.
Planning Efforts Are Under Way to Identify U.S. Security Support for
2008 Beijing Games; Efforts Face Unique Challenges:
The United States is currently taking steps to coordinate a U.S.
security presence and identify the types of security support that the
United States may provide for the 2008 Beijing Games. U.S.-Chinese
counterterrorism cooperation is limited, and U.S. officials have stated
that they lack knowledge of China's capabilities to handle security for
the Olympics. In addition, technology transfer and human rights issues
present new and different challenges for U.S. security support to these
Games.
The U.S. government, led by State, is actively working to identify and
establish a U.S. security presence to support the interests of its
athletes, spectators, and commercial investors during the Games. The
U.S. Ambassador to China has designated a U.S. Olympic Coordination
Office to be responsible for all arrangements--including political,
security, and logistical--of U.S. efforts for the Beijing Games. In
January 2006, State appointed a U.S. Deputy Olympic Security
Coordinator to serve--in this new office--as a U.S. government point
person for U.S. security support for the Beijing Games. In addition,
the U.S. Olympic Coordinator and the Minister Counselor for Olympic
Coordination, appointed by State in June and December 2005,
respectively, serve as the point persons for logistic arrangements of
U.S. efforts. Both the U.S. Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator and the
U.S. Olympic Coordinator were in Turin to participate in U.S. security
support for the 2006 Winter Games and to learn from their counterparts
in Turin. To ensure the safety of U.S. athletes, spectators, and
commercial investors, State has taken steps to identify and secure
logistical support. To help identify necessary housing and mitigate
high prices on accommodations, State has begun to identify housing
options for U.S. personnel, coordinating through the interagency group
for estimates of personnel to be temporarily assigned to Beijing during
the Games.
While China has not yet requested U.S. security assistance as of May
2006, State officials have received inquiries from Chinese officials
regarding Olympic security. As of April 2006, discussions between the
United States and China were under way for an assessment to identify
security needs and U.S. security support for the Beijing Games,
according to U.S. officials in Beijing and Washington, D.C. In
addition, a working group has been established between U.S. and Chinese
counterparts to discuss issues related to the operational and
intelligence side of security. U.S. officials have stated that the
Chinese have recognized the large size of the U.S. team and its
associated security risks and concerns.
Although recent steps have been taken, U.S. officials have stated that
they lack knowledge of China's advanced capabilities to handle security
for the 2008 Summer Games. In addition, U.S. officials from State and
DOJ have stated that they are uncertain about the extent of assistance
China may request or permit from outside sources. Moreover, U.S. and
Chinese counterterrorism cooperation is limited, and military relations
have only recently resumed. In July 2003, China joined the U.S.
Container Security Initiative, and, in November 2005, the United States
and China signed an agreement related to the U.S. Megaports Initiative,
allowing for the installation of special equipment at Chinese ports to
detect hidden shipments of nuclear and other radioactive materials. The
United States has recently resumed, under the current administration,
military-to-military contacts with China.
In planning for the 2008 Summer Games in Beijing, logistical challenges
and technology transfers and human rights issues present unique
challenges for U.S. security support. The location of the Beijing Games
presents unique logistical challenges in coordinating U.S. security
support. Whereas past Summer Games have been centered in and around the
host city, the venues for the Beijing Games will be spread across seven
Chinese cities along the country's eastern border, presenting potential
communication challenges for interagency operations between the U.S.
Embassy Beijing and U.S. Consulates located near Olympic venue sites.
Figure 4 presents the seven venue cities for the Beijing Games--
Beijing, Qingdao, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang, and
Qinhuangdao--and the U.S. embassy and three consulates located at
Olympic venue cities. Unlike the 2004 Summer Games in Athens, U.S.
officials have stated the Chinese are much further ahead in planning
for the 2008 Summer Games, and these officials anticipate that the
venues will be completed on time or ahead of schedule. To prepare for
the 2008 Beijing Games, China is planning to host several events in
2007 to test its preparations for major event operations.
Figure 4: Venue Locations for the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition, any requests for equipment or technology to support
security efforts in China must be addressed under U.S. requirements for
the protection against sensitive technology transfers, because U.S.
sanctions deny the export of defense articles/services, crime control
equipment, and satellites to China. A presidential waiver for exports
of equipment for security of the Beijing Olympics may be
considered.[Footnote 14] U.S. policy makers and human rights groups
have also expressed concern with several human rights issues in China,
including freedom of information, freedom of religion, and protection
of ethnic and minority groups.
Conclusions:
In a climate of increased concerns about international terrorism,
ensuring the protection of U.S. interests at future Olympic Games
overseas will continue to be a priority for the United States. For such
future Games, U.S. agencies are likely to continue providing support to
host governments in identifying potential security threats and
developing strategies to protect U.S. athletes, spectators, and
commercial investors several years in advance of and throughout the
Olympics. Although each Olympic Games has its own set of unique
security requirements, future coordination of U.S. security support
efforts for Games--under the leadership of State--should efficiently
and effectively capture the expertise, knowledge, and resource
requirements of all U.S. agencies. However, there is currently no
formal framework for guiding the development and implementation of U.S.
security support for such Games, particularly the coordinated financing
of U.S. security support and operations.
Recommendations:
To enhance planning and preparations for future overseas Olympic and
Paralympic Games, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in
consultation with members of the International Athletic Events Security
Coordinating Group, take the following two actions:
* Develop written guidance for providing U.S. government security
support to future Games. This guidance should identify key personnel
and target dates for their assignment and roles and responsibilities,
and key steps for the U.S. Mission and regional bureau to undertake in
preparing for and leading the U.S. efforts at future Games. To
formalize the process for providing security support overseas, we also
recommend that State, in consultation with members of the International
Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group, consider establishing a
charter and mission statement for this group that identifies
authorities and responsibilities for coordinating and supporting U.S.
security efforts at future Games.
* Develop a finance subgroup as part of the International Athletic
Events Security Coordinating Group, which would bring together
budgetary personnel from the various agencies or component entities
that contribute to security efforts for overseas Games. A formal
mechanism, such as a finance subgroup with established
responsibilities, would help the agencies plan for anticipated
resources needs, coordinate their budget requests, and address
potential funding issues for U.S. security support at future Games.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense,
Energy, Homeland Security, and State and to the Attorney General for
their review and comment. The Department of State provided written
comments on the draft report, which are reprinted in appendix II. State
said that it agreed with our findings and recommendations, and that it
is working to develop a more efficient plan for coordinating the
planning and implementation of U.S. security support at future major
events overseas--including the development of written guidance and
identified roles and responsibilities for interagency working group
members--through an after-action review of the International Athletic
Events Security Coordinating Group and by working with the National
Security Council, Counterterrorism Security Group. Furthermore, State
said that the interagency working group has expanded its working
subgroups and is considering the inclusion of a budget subgroup to
address potential funding issues for U.S. security support at future
Olympic Games. State also provided technical comments, which we
incorporated where appropriate.
The Departments of Defense and Justice did not provide written comments
on the draft report; however, they provided technical comments, which
we incorporated where appropriate. The Departments of Energy and
Homeland Security did not provide written or technical comments.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, and the
Attorney General. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4128 or ford@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To fulfill our objectives in identifying U.S. security strategies in
providing security support for the 2006 Winter Games, the various roles
and additional costs of the U.S. agencies involved, and the lessons
they learned in supporting the Games, we specifically obtained and
reviewed several documents, such as available operations and mission
plans, security situation reports, and monthly activity reports. In
addition, we interviewed officials at the Departments of State (State),
Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Defense (DOD), and Energy (DOE)
and at certain intelligence agencies. We also conducted fieldwork in
Rome, Milan, and Turin, Italy.
At State, we interviewed officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, Coordinator for Counterterrorism office; Overseas Security
Advisory Council; Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs; Consular
Affairs; and Public Affairs. We also interviewed the U.S. Olympic
Security Coordinator and the U.S. Olympic Coordinator. At DOJ, we
interviewed officials in the Criminal Division and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) Counterterrorism Division, including the FBI's
Olympic coordinator who served as its liaison in Turin through the
operational period of the Games. At DHS, we met with officials from the
Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Secret Service, and
the Federal Air Marshal Service. At DOD, we spoke with officials from
the Office of the Secretary of Defense and European Command. At DOE, we
spoke with officials from the National Nuclear Security Administration.
Finally, we regularly attended and met with the interagency working
group--the International Athletic Events Security Coordinating Group--
that includes all agencies involved in providing support to
international sporting events overseas.
During our fieldwork in Italy in November 2005, we obtained documents
and interviewed key U.S. officials from the previously mentioned
agencies. We obtained and reviewed key documents, such as operational
and mission plans. In Rome, we interviewed U.S. officials, including
the Deputy Chief of Mission, Regional Security Officer, Minister
Counselor for Management Affairs, Financial Management Officer,
Information Management Officer, Legal Attaché, Public Affairs Officer,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Attaché, Transportation and
Security Administration representative, Defense Attaché, and Consular
officer. Additionally, we attended an interagency operations and
capabilities presentation for the Chief of Mission. Also, we met with
representatives from the Italian Ministry of Interior to obtain the
Italian government's perspective on the security support provided by
the United States. During our fieldwork in Milan, we interviewed U.S.
officials, including the Consul General, Milan; Management Officer;
Vice Consul; Public Affairs Officers; and Consular Officer. In Turin,
we interviewed the U.S. Olympic Coordinator and the U.S. Olympic
Security Coordinator. We also visited the U.S. Olympic Coordination
Center in Turin and observed preparations for outfitting the center for
the planned operations and intelligence center. Additionally, to
understand the challenges associated with providing security support to
the distant Olympic venues, we visited several of the Olympics venue
sites in Turin, including in Palavela, Pragelato, Sestriere, and
Bardonecchia, Italy.
To determine cost estimates of U.S. security support to the 2006 Winter
Games, we developed a data collection instrument (DCI), based on the
previous DCI we used to obtain cost estimates for the 2004 Athens
Games, to survey agencies identified as contributing to the U.S.
effort. A draft DCI was pretested on two U.S. government agencies. In
November 2005, we sent a preliminary DCI to agencies identified by
State as being involved in the U.S. security support effort and
obtained 11 responses. In March 2006, we sent a final DCI to the
agencies previously identified and obtained 20 responses. Except for
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the intelligence community
entities did not provide a response to our final DCI on costs for the
2006 Winter Games. Our DCI requested agencies to identify how they
collected and tracked the data on costs. We conducted follow-ups with
the agencies to clarify information in their responses. We observed
that not all agency components collect and track data in a consistent
manner. Furthermore, the DCI did not attempt to gather information on
the costs of personnel salaries, which are presumed to be a significant
outlay for the agency components involved. To assess the reliability of
the estimates provided, we compared the preliminary results with the
final results and compared this year's 2006 results with those for
2004. In addition, we considered the cost factors cited by the agencies
in relation to the sums they reported and conducted follow-ups with the
agencies to clarify any questions that arose. We determined that these
data were sufficiently reliable to be reported in aggregated form,
rounded to millions, and attributed to the agencies, as estimated cost
outlays and by category of expenditure, but not in precise, detailed
form.
To assess how lessons learned in supporting Greece were applied to the
Turin Games, we gathered information from the various agencies
previously mentioned; reviewed operations plans; attended meetings of
the State-chaired interagency working group in Washington, D.C; and
conducted fieldwork in Rome, Milan, Turin, and mountain areas of Italy.
To identify lessons learned from the Turin Games, we gathered
information from the various agencies and attended meetings of the
interagency working group. Although after-action reports were not
completed and available at the time of our audit, to identify lessons
learned, we interviewed key officials at State, DOJ, the U.S. Consulate
Milan, and the U.S. Coordination Center in Turin and attended the
interagency working group meetings. To identify how lessons learned in
Turin are being applied to the 2008 Beijing Games, we interviewed U.S.
officials from State and DOJ and the U.S. Olympic Coordinator and U.S.
Deputy Olympic Security Coordinator at the U.S. Mission in Beijing.
To identify efforts under way for providing support to the 2008 Summer
Games in Beijing, we gathered information from the various agencies
previously mentioned; reviewed China's Mission Performance Plan;
attended meetings of the State-chaired interagency working group in
Washington, D.C; and interviewed the Deputy Olympic Security
Coordinator and Olympic Coordinator at the U.S. Mission in Beijing.
We conducted our work from September 2005 to May 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
June 6, 2006:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office 441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Olympic
Security: Better Planning Can Enhance U.S. Support to Future Olympic
Games," GAO Job Code 320381.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Mike
VanBuskirk, Division Chief, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, at (202) 895-
3644.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO - John Brummet:
DS - Richard Griffin:
S/CT - Henry Crumpton:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Olympic Security: Better Planning Can Enhance U.S. Support to Future
Olympic Games (GAO-06-753, GAO Code 320381):
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the report entitled Olympic
Security: Better Planning Can Enhance U.S. Support to Future Olympic
Games. We appreciate the GAO's recognition of the USG's Inter-Agency
planning and coordination designed to enhance the Government of Italy
(GOI) Olympic Security programs and to ensure the security of U.S.
athletes, spectators and commercial investors. We are pleased that
while GAO worked to accomplish its objectives to (1) discuss the
approach for providing USG Security support; (2) identify the roles and
responsibilities of contributing agencies; (3) review lessons learned
in previous games; and (4) identify efforts underway for providing
support to the 2008 Beijing Games; it provided two recommendations to
better the Department of State's International Athletic Events Security
Coordinating Group (IAESCG) planning for future events.
Our responses to the GAO's specific recommendations follow:
Recommendation 1: That the Secretary of State, in consultation with
members of the interagency working group, develop written guidance for
providing U.S. Government security support to future games.
IAESCG is currently undertaking an in depth After Action Review (AAR)
designed to develop a more efficient and concise plan for coordinating
future major events overseas. Among the areas to be addressed include
the development of written guidance for IAESCG members, further
identifying the roles and responsibilities of each agency in the
planning and implementation of security during international major
events. Additionally, the Department of State continues to work closely
through the National Security Council, Counterterrorism Security Group
(CSG) in addressing all aspects of USG support for these events. The
Department will look favorably on further guidance from the CSG in
formalizing USG support to international major events.
Recommendation 2: That the Secretary of State, in consultation with
members of the interagency working group, develop a finance sub-group
within the interagency working group to help agencies plan and prepare
for future support.
The IAESCG has already taken on the responsibility of expanding its
working sub-groups. Among consideration is expansion to include a
budget sub-group. The group would be comprised of budget analysts from
each of the agencies lending support or assistance to the IAESCG, whose
role would be to address potential funding issues for U.S. security
support at Olympic Games.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford, Director, (202) 512-4268:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Key contributors to this report included Diana Glod, Monica Brym, and
Dorian L. Herring. Technical assistance was provided by Jason Bair, Joe
Carney, Martin de Alteris, Etana Finkler, Ernie Jackson, Jena
Sinkfield, George Taylor, and Mike TenKate.
FOOTNOTES
[1] For the purpose of this report, the term "2006 Winter Games" refers
to the 2006 Turin Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games. The 2006 Turin
Winter Olympic Games were held February 10 to 26, 2006, and the 2006
Turin Paralympic Games were held March 10 to 19, 2006, in Turin, Italy.
[2] Established in December 2001, the interagency working group serves
to coordinate U.S. government security support efforts to U.S.
embassies and host governments sponsoring major international sporting
events. The interagency working group aims to keep all participating
agencies informed and prevent duplicative or conflicting efforts by
those involved.
[3] The major events coordination unit within DS is responsible for
drawing on resources throughout State to coordinate overseas security
support provided to foreign governments and U.S. missions for major
events and State's support provided to domestic events, according to a
State official and agency documents.
[4] Other U.S. assistance for U.S. athletes, spectators, and commercial
investors included protection services, consular and public diplomacy
services, and security-related information.
[5] 22 U.S.C. 4802 (a)(1)(2).
[6] Department of State Delegation of Authority No. 214, 59 FR 50790; 1
Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 261.1 - 261.3; 12 FAM 011, 012.
[7] This total includes National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency costs
for security support provided for the 2006 Winter Games, but does not
include the costs incurred by other entities of the U.S. intelligence
community.
[8] Entities within each agency used their program accounts to fund
their specific activities.
[9] U.S. joint operations included the following: rental fees,
commissioning and decommissioning of the U.S. operations center,
vehicle rentals, facility maintenance services, administrative support,
communication and other equipment, and medical supplies.
[10] Pursuant to an annual appropriations restriction enacted by
Congress, agencies may not contribute to the interagency financing of
boards, committees, or similar groups that do not have prior and
specific statutory approval to receive financial support from multiple
agencies. See section 810 of Public Law 109-115. This provision,
however, would not preclude agencies from providing reimbursement to
State for goods and services provided to those agencies under the
authority of the Economy Act, or other appropriate authority, such as
section 23 of State's Basic Authorities Act 22 U.S.C. 2695.
[11] GAO, Olympic Security: U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides
Lessons for Future Olympics, GAO-05-547 (Washington, D.C.: May 31,
2005).
[12] Except for the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, costs from
the intelligence community entities were not included in the reported
costs for U.S. security support to the 2006 Winter Games.
[13] GAO-05-547.
[14] The President recently signed a waiver for an one-time shipment of
equipment and technology for the construction of the new U.S. Embassy
in Beijing.
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability,
integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other
graphics.
Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order
GAO Products" heading.
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street NW, Room LM
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Public Affairs:
Jeff Nelligan, managing director,
NelliganJ@gao.gov
(202) 512-4800
U.S. Government Accountability Office,
441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, D.C. 20548:
