Nuclear Nonproliferation
IAEA Safeguards and Other Measures to Halt the Spread of Nuclear Weapons and Material Gao ID: GAO-06-1128T September 26, 2006The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system has been a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was adopted in 1970. Safeguards allow IAEA to verify countries' compliance with the NPT. Since the discovery in 1991 of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq, IAEA has strengthened its safeguards system. In addition to IAEA's strengthened safeguards program, there are other U.S. and international efforts that have helped stem the spread of nuclear materials and technology that could be used for nuclear weapons programs. This testimony is based on GAO's report on IAEA safeguards issued in October 2005 (Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, GAO-06-93 [Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005]). This testimony is also based on previous GAO work related to the Nuclear Suppliers Group--a group of more than 40 countries that have pledged to limit trade in nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to only countries that are engaged in peaceful nuclear activities--and U.S. assistance to Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union for the destruction, protection, and detection of nuclear material and weapons.
IAEA has taken steps to strengthen safeguards, including conducting more intrusive inspections, to seek assurances that countries are not developing clandestine weapons programs. IAEA has begun to develop the capability to independently evaluate all aspects of a country's nuclear activities. This is a radical departure from the past practice of only verifying the peaceful use of a country's declared nuclear material. However, despite successes in uncovering some countries' undeclared nuclear activities, safeguards experts cautioned that a determined country can still conceal a nuclear weapons program. In addition, there are a number of weaknesses that limit IAEA's ability to implement strengthened safeguards. First, IAEA has a limited ability to assess the nuclear activities of 4 key countries that are not NPT members--India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. Second, more than half of the NPT signatories have not yet brought the Additional Protocol, which is designed to give IAEA new authority to search for clandestine nuclear activities, into force. Third, safeguards are significantly limited or not applied to about 60 percent of NPT signatories because they possess small quantities of nuclear material, and are exempt from inspections, or they have not concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement. Finally, IAEA faces a looming human capital crisis caused by the large number of inspectors and safeguards management personnel expected to retire in the next 5 years. In addition to IAEA's strengthened safeguards program, there are other U.S. and international efforts that have helped stem the spread of nuclear materials and technology. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has helped to constrain trade in nuclear material and technology that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. However, there are a number of weaknesses that could limit the Nuclear Suppliers Group's ability to curb proliferation. For example, members of the Suppliers Group do not always share information about licenses they have approved or denied for the sale of controversial items to nonmember states. Without this shared information, a member country could inadvertently license a controversial item to a country that has already been denied a license from another member state. Since the early 1990s, U.S. nonproliferation programs have helped Russia and other former Soviet countries to, among other things, secure nuclear material and warheads, detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material, and eliminate excess stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material. However, these programs face a number of challenges which could compromise their ongoing effectiveness. For example, a lack of access to many sites in Russia's nuclear weapons complex has significantly impeded the Department of Energy's progress in helping Russia secure its nuclear material. U.S. radiation detection assistance efforts also face challenges, including corruption of some foreign border security officials, technical limitations of some radiation detection equipment, and inadequate maintenance of some equipment.
GAO-06-1128T, Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Safeguards and Other Measures to Halt the Spread of Nuclear Weapons and Material
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, September 26, 2006:
Nuclear Nonproliferation:
IAEA Safeguards and Other Measures to Halt the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons and Material:
Statement of Gene Aloise, Director Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-06-1128T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-1128T, testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The International Atomic Energy Agency‘s (IAEA) safeguards system has
been a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear weapons
proliferation since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) was adopted in 1970. Safeguards allow IAEA to verify
countries‘ compliance with the NPT. Since the discovery in 1991 of a
clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq, IAEA has strengthened its
safeguards system. In addition to IAEA‘s strengthened safeguards
program, there are other U.S. and international efforts that have
helped stem the spread of nuclear materials and technology that could
be used for nuclear weapons programs. This testimony is based on GAO‘s
report on IAEA safeguards issued in October 2005 (Nuclear
Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear
Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, GAO-06-93
[Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005]). This testimony is also based on
previous GAO work related to the Nuclear Suppliers Group”a group of
more than 40 countries that have pledged to limit trade in nuclear
materials, equipment, and technology to only countries that are engaged
in peaceful nuclear activities”and U.S. assistance to Russia and other
countries of the former Soviet Union for the destruction, protection,
and detection of nuclear material and weapons.
What GAO Found:
IAEA has taken steps to strengthen safeguards, including conducting
more intrusive inspections, to seek assurances that countries are not
developing clandestine weapons programs. IAEA has begun to develop the
capability to independently evaluate all aspects of a country‘s nuclear
activities. This is a radical departure from the past practice of only
verifying the peaceful use of a country‘s declared nuclear material.
However, despite successes in uncovering some countries‘ undeclared
nuclear activities, safeguards experts cautioned that a determined
country can still conceal a nuclear weapons program. In addition, there
are a number of weaknesses that limit IAEA‘s ability to implement
strengthened safeguards. First, IAEA has a limited ability to assess
the nuclear activities of 4 key countries that are not NPT
members”India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan. Second, more than
half of the NPT signatories have not yet brought the Additional
Protocol, which is designed to give IAEA new authority to search for
clandestine nuclear activities, into force. Third, safeguards are
significantly limited or not applied to about 60 percent of NPT
signatories because they possess small quantities of nuclear material,
and are exempt from inspections, or they have not concluded a
comprehensive safeguards agreement. Finally, IAEA faces a looming human
capital crisis caused by the large number of inspectors and safeguards
management personnel expected to retire in the next 5 years.
In addition to IAEA‘s strengthened safeguards program, there are other
U.S. and international efforts that have helped stem the spread of
nuclear materials and technology. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has
helped to constrain trade in nuclear material and technology that could
be used to develop nuclear weapons. However, there are a number of
weaknesses that could limit the Nuclear Suppliers Group‘s ability to
curb proliferation. For example, members of the Suppliers Group do not
always share information about licenses they have approved or denied
for the sale of controversial items to nonmember states. Without this
shared information, a member country could inadvertently license a
controversial item to a country that has already been denied a license
from another member state.
Since the early 1990s, U.S. nonproliferation programs have helped
Russia and other former Soviet countries to, among other things, secure
nuclear material and warheads, detect illicitly trafficked nuclear
material, and eliminate excess stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear
material. However, these programs face a number of challenges which
could compromise their ongoing effectiveness. For example, a lack of
access to many sites in Russia‘s nuclear weapons complex has
significantly impeded the Department of Energy‘s progress in helping
Russia secure its nuclear material. U.S. radiation detection assistance
efforts also face challenges, including corruption of some foreign
border security officials, technical limitations of some radiation
detection equipment, and inadequate maintenance of some equipment.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1128T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the International Atomic
Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards program and other measures to halt
the spread of nuclear weapons and material. Revelations about the
clandestine nuclear programs of North Korea, Iran, and Libya, as well
as clandestine nuclear trafficking networks, have significantly
increased international concerns about the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. Since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) came into force in 1970, IAEA's safeguards system has
been a cornerstone of U.S. and international efforts to prevent nuclear
weapons proliferation. The NPT expanded IAEA's original inspection
responsibilities by requiring signatory non-nuclear weapons states--
countries that had not manufactured and detonated a nuclear device
before January 1, 1967--to agree not to acquire nuclear weapons and to
accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material used in peaceful
activities.[Footnote 1] Most countries have negotiated an agreement
with IAEA, known as a comprehensive safeguards agreement.
Safeguards allow the agency to independently verify that non-nuclear
weapons states that signed the NPT are complying with its requirements.
Under the safeguards system, IAEA, among other things, inspects all
facilities and locations containing nuclear material, as declared by
each country, to verify its peaceful use. However, the discovery in
1991 of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq confirmed the
need for a broader and more effective approach to safeguards. As a
result, IAEA began to strengthen its safeguards system in the mid-1990s
to provide assurance that non-nuclear weapons states were not engaged
in undeclared nuclear activities.
In addition to IAEA's strengthened safeguards program, other U.S. and
international efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation have
included the Nuclear Supplier's Group--a group of more than 40
countries that have pledged to limit trade in nuclear materials,
equipment, and technology to only countries that are engaged in
peaceful nuclear activities--and U.S. assistance to Russia and other
states of the former Soviet Union to, among other things, secure
nuclear material and warheads.
My remarks will focus on our report on IAEA safeguards issued in
October 2005.[Footnote 2] I will also address issues related to
previous GAO work on the Nuclear Suppliers Group's restrictions on
nuclear trade[Footnote 3] and U.S. assistance to Russia and other
countries of the former Soviet Union for the destruction, protection,
and detection of nuclear weapons and material.
Summary:
IAEA has taken steps to strengthen safeguards by more aggressively
seeking assurances that countries have not engaged in clandestine
nuclear activities, but the agency still cannot be certain that
countries are not developing secret weapons programs. In a radical
departure from the past practice of only verifying the peaceful use of
a country's declared nuclear material at declared facilities, IAEA has
begun to develop the capability to independently evaluate all aspects
of a country's nuclear activities by, among other things, conducting
more intrusive inspections and collecting and analyzing environmental
samples to detect traces of nuclear material at facilities and other
locations. Department of State and IAEA officials told us that IAEA's
strengthened safeguards measures have successfully revealed previously
undisclosed nuclear activities in Iran, South Korea, and Egypt. In the
case of Iran, IAEA and Department of State officials noted that
strengthened safeguards measures, such as collecting and analyzing
environmental samples, helped the agency verify some of Iran's nuclear
activities. The measures also allowed IAEA to conclude in September
2005 that Iran was not complying with its safeguards obligations
because it failed to report all of its nuclear activities to IAEA. As a
result, in July 2006, Iran was referred to the U.N. Security Council,
which in turn demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment
activities or face possible diplomatic and economic sanctions. Despite
these successes, a group of safeguards experts recently cautioned that
a determined country can still conceal a nuclear weapons program. For
example, IAEA does not have unfettered inspection rights and cannot
make visits to suspected sites anywhere at any time.
There are a number of weaknesses that hamper IAEA's ability to
effectively implement strengthened safeguards. First, IAEA has a
limited ability to assess the nuclear activities of 4 key countries
that are not NPT members--India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan.
Second, more than half, or 111 out of 189, of the NPT signatories have
not yet brought the Additional Protocol into force, including the
United States. A third weakness in implementing strengthened safeguards
is that safeguards are significantly limited or not applied in about 60
percent, or 112 out of 189, of the NPT signatory countries--either
because they have an agreement (known as a small quantities protocol)
with IAEA, and are not subject to most safeguards measures, or because
they have not concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA.
IAEA cannot verify that these countries are not diverting nuclear
material for nonpeaceful purposes or engaging in secret nuclear
activities. Fourth, while IAEA is increasingly relying on the
analytical skills of its staff to detect countries' undeclared nuclear
activities, the agency is facing a looming human capital crisis. In the
next 5 years, IAEA will experience a large turnover of senior
safeguards inspectors and high-level management officials. Delays in
filling critical safeguards positions limit IAEA's ability to implement
strengthened safeguards.
In addition to IAEA's strengthened safeguards program, there are other
U.S. and international efforts that have helped stem the spread of
nuclear materials and technology. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has
helped to constrain the trade in nuclear material and technology that
could be used to develop nuclear weapons. There are currently 45
countries that participate in this voluntary, nonbinding regime and
they have pledged to limit trade in nuclear materials, equipment, and
technology to only countries that are engaged in peaceful nuclear
activities. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has also helped IAEA verify
compliance with the NPT. For example, it helped convince Argentina and
Brazil to place their nuclear programs under IAEA safeguards in
exchange for international cooperation to enhance their nuclear
programs for peaceful purposes. Since 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group
has required that other countries have comprehensive safeguards
agreements with IAEA as a condition of supply for nuclear-related
items. Despite these benefits, there are a number of weaknesses that
could limit the Nuclear Suppliers Group's ability to curb
proliferation. We found that members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group do
not always share information about licenses they have approved or
denied for the sale of controversial items to nonmember states. Without
this shared information, a member country could inadvertently license a
controversial item to a country that has already been denied a license
from another Nuclear Suppliers Group member state. We also found that
Nuclear Suppliers Group members did not promptly review and agree upon
common lists of items to control and approaches to controlling them.
Without this agreement, sensitive items may still be traded to
countries of concern.
Since the early 1990s, U.S. nonproliferation programs have helped
Russia and other former Soviet countries secure nuclear material and
warheads, detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material, eliminate
excess stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material,[Footnote 4] and
halt the continued production of weapons-grade plutonium.[Footnote 5]
While these programs have had some successes, they also face a number
of challenges which could compromise their ongoing effectiveness. For
example, a lack of access to many sites in Russia's nuclear weapons
complex has significantly impeded the Department of Energy's (DOE)
progress in helping Russia secure its nuclear material. We reported in
2003 that DOE had completed work at only a limited number of buildings
in Russia's nuclear weapons complex, a network of sites involved in the
construction of nuclear weapons where most of the nuclear material in
Russia is stored. While DOE has reported progress on gaining access to
many of these sites, we are currently re-examining DOE's efforts in
this area and the challenges the agency faces in completing its
program. Furthermore, to combat nuclear smuggling, since 1994, the
Departments of Energy, Defense, and State have provided radiation
detection equipment to 36 countries, including many countries of the
former Soviet Union. However, as we reported in March 2006, U.S.
radiation detection assistance efforts also face challenges, including
corruption of some foreign border security officials, technical
limitations of some radiation detection equipment, and inadequate
maintenance of some equipment.
Background:
IAEA is an independent organization affiliated with the United Nations.
Its governing bodies include the General Conference, composed of
representatives of the 138 IAEA member states, and the 35-member Board
of Governors, which provides overall policy direction and oversight.
The Secretariat, headed by the Director General, is responsible for
implementing the policies and programs of the General Conference and
Board of Governors. The United States is a permanent member of the
Board of Governors.
IAEA derives its authority to establish and administer safeguards from
its statute, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and
regional nonproliferation treaties, bilateral commitments between
states, and project agreements with states.[Footnote 6] Since the NPT
came into force in 1970, it has been subject to review by signatory
states every 5 years. The 1995 NPT Review and Extension conference
extended the life of the treaty indefinitely, and the latest review
conference occurred in May 2005. Article III of the NPT binds each of
the treaty's 184 signatory states that had not manufactured and
exploded a nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967 (referred to in the
treaty as non-nuclear weapon states) to conclude an agreement with IAEA
that applies safeguards to all source and special nuclear material in
all peaceful nuclear activities within the state's territory, under its
jurisdiction, or carried out anywhere under its control.[Footnote 7]
The five nuclear weapons states that are parties to the NPT--China,
France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United
States--are not obligated by the NPT to accept IAEA safeguards.
However, each nuclear weapons state has voluntarily entered into
legally binding safeguards agreements with IAEA, and has submitted
designated nuclear materials and facilities to IAEA safeguards to
demonstrate to the non-nuclear weapon states their willingness to share
in the administrative and commercial costs of safeguards. (App. I lists
states that are subject to safeguards, as of August 2006.)
India, Israel, and Pakistan are not parties to the NPT or other
regional nonproliferation treaties. India and Pakistan are known to
have nuclear weapons programs and to have detonated several nuclear
devices during May 1998. Israel is also believed to have produced
nuclear weapons. Additionally, North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 and
briefly accepted safeguards in 1992 and 1993, but expelled inspectors
and threatened to withdraw from the NPT when IAEA inspections uncovered
evidence of undeclared plutonium production. North Korea announced its
withdrawal from the NPT in early 2003, which under the terms of the
treaty, terminated its comprehensive safeguards agreement.
IAEA's safeguards objectives, as traditionally applied under
comprehensive safeguards agreements, are to account for the amount of a
specific type of material necessary to produce a nuclear weapon, and
the time it would take a state to divert this material from peaceful
use and produce a nuclear weapon. IAEA attempts to meet these
objectives by using a set of activities by which it seeks to verify
that nuclear material subject to safeguards is not diverted to nuclear
weapons or other proscribed purposes. For example, IAEA inspectors
visit a facility at certain intervals to ensure that any diversion of
nuclear material is detected before a state has had time to produce a
nuclear weapon. IAEA also uses material-accounting measures to verify
quantities of nuclear material declared to the agency and any changes
in the quantities over time. Additionally, containment measures are
used to control access to and the movement of nuclear material.
Finally, IAEA deploys surveillance devices, such as video cameras, to
detect the movements of nuclear material and discourage tampering with
IAEA's containment measures.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group was established in 1975 after India tested
a nuclear explosive device. In 1978, the Suppliers Group published its
first set of guidelines governing the exports of nuclear materials and
equipment. These guidelines established several requirements for
Suppliers Group members, including the acceptance of IAEA safeguards at
facilities using controlled nuclear-related items. In 1992, the
Suppliers Group broadened its guidelines by requiring countries
receiving nuclear exports to agree to IAEA's safeguards as a condition
of supply. As of August 2006, the Nuclear Suppliers Group had 45
members, including the United States. (See app. II for a list of
signatory countries.)
IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards Program, but Weaknesses Need to Be
Addressed:
IAEA has taken steps to strengthen safeguards by more aggressively
seeking assurances that a country is not pursuing a clandestine nuclear
program. In a radical departure from past practices of only verifying
the peaceful use of a country's declared nuclear material at declared
facilities, IAEA has begun to develop the capability to independently
evaluate all aspects of a country's nuclear activities. The first
strengthened safeguards steps, which began in the early 1990s,
increased the agency's ability to monitor declared and undeclared
activities at nuclear facilities. These measures were implemented under
the agency's existing legal authority under comprehensive safeguards
agreements and include (1) conducting short notice and unannounced
inspections, (2) collecting and analyzing environmental samples to
detect traces of nuclear material, and (3) using measurement and
surveillance systems that operate unattended and can be used to
transmit data about the status of nuclear materials directly to IAEA
headquarters.
The second series of steps began in 1997 when IAEA's Board of Governors
approved the Additional Protocol.[Footnote 8] Under the Additional
Protocol, IAEA has the right, among other things, to (1) receive more
comprehensive information about a country's nuclear activities, such as
research and development activities, and (2) conduct "complementary
access," which enables IAEA to expand its inspection rights for the
purpose of ensuring the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities. Because the Additional Protocol broadens IAEA's authority
and the requirements on countries under existing safeguards agreements,
each country must take certain actions to bring it into force.
For each country with a safeguards agreement, IAEA independently
evaluates all information available about the country's nuclear
activities and draws conclusions regarding a country's compliance with
its safeguards commitments. A major source of information available to
the agency is data submitted by countries to IAEA under their
safeguards agreements, referred to as state declarations. Countries are
required to provide an expanded declaration of their nuclear activities
within 180 days of bringing the Additional Protocol into force.
Examples of information provided in an Additional Protocol declaration
include the manufacturing of key nuclear-related equipment;
research and development activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle;
the use and contents of buildings on a nuclear site;
and the location and operational status of uranium mines. The agency
uses the state declarations as a starting point to determine if the
information provided by the country is consistent and accurate with all
other information available based on its own review.
IAEA uses various types of information to verify the state declaration.
Inspections of nuclear facilities and other locations with nuclear
material are the cornerstone of the agency's data collection efforts.
Under the Additional Protocol, IAEA has the authority to conduct
complementary access at any place on a site or other location with
nuclear material in order to ensure the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities, confirm the decommissioned status of
facilities where nuclear material was used or stored, and resolve
questions or inconsistencies related to the correctness and
completeness of the information provided by a country on activities at
other declared or undeclared locations. During complementary access,
IAEA inspectors may carry out a number of activities, including (1)
making visual observations, (2) collecting environmental samples, (3)
using radiation detection equipment and measurement devices, and (4)
applying seals. In 2004, IAEA conducted 124 complementary access in 27
countries.
In addition to its verification activities, IAEA uses other sources of
information to evaluate countries' declarations. These sources include
information from the agency's internal databases, open sources,
satellite imagery, and outside groups. The agency established two new
offices within the Department of Safeguards to focus primarily on open
source and satellite imagery data collection. Analysts use Internet
searches to acquire information generally available to the public from
open sources, such as scientific literature, trade and export
publications, commercial companies, and the news media. In addition,
the agency uses commercially available satellite imagery to supplement
the information it receives through its open source information.
Satellite imagery is used to monitor the status and condition of
declared nuclear facilities and verify state declarations of certain
sites. The agency also uses its own databases, such as those for
nuclear safety, nuclear waste, and technical cooperation, to expand its
general knowledge about countries' nuclear and nuclear-related
activities. In some cases, IAEA receives information from third
parties, including other countries.
IAEA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Safeguards, but Detection of
Clandestine Nuclear Weapons Programs is Not Assured:
Department of State and IAEA officials told us that strengthened
safeguards measures have successfully revealed previously undisclosed
nuclear activities in Iran, South Korea, and Egypt. Specifically,
* IAEA and Department of State officials noted that strengthened
safeguards measures, such as collecting and analyzing environmental
samples, helped the agency verify some of Iran's nuclear activities.
The measures also allowed IAEA to conclude in September 2005 that Iran
was not complying with its safeguards obligations because it failed to
report all of its nuclear activities to IAEA. As a result, in July
2006, Iran was referred to the U.N. Security Council, which in turn
demanded that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities or face
possible diplomatic and economic sanctions.
* In August 2004, as a result of preparations to submit its initial
declaration under the Additional Protocol, South Korea notified IAEA
that it had not previously disclosed nuclear experiments involving the
enrichment of uranium and plutonium separation. IAEA sent a team of
inspectors to South Korea to investigate this case. In November 2004,
IAEA's Director General reported to the Board of Governors that
although the quantities of nuclear material involved were not
significant, the nature of the activities and South Korea's failure to
report these activities in a timely manner posed a serious concern.
IAEA is continuing to verify the correctness and completeness of South
Korea's declarations.
* IAEA inspectors have investigated evidence of past undeclared nuclear
activities in Egypt based on the agency's review of open source
information that had been published by current and former Egyptian
nuclear officials. Specifically, in late 2004, the agency found
evidence that Egypt had engaged in undeclared activities at least 20
years ago by using small amounts of nuclear material to conduct
experiments related to producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
In January 2005, the Egyptian government announced that it was fully
cooperating with IAEA and that the matter was limited in scope. IAEA
inspectors have made several visits to Egypt to investigate this
matter. IAEA's Secretariat reported these activities to its Board of
Governors.
Despite these successes, a group of safeguards experts recently
cautioned that a determined country can still conceal a nuclear weapons
program. IAEA faces a number of limitations that impact its ability to
draw conclusions--with absolute assurance--about whether a country is
developing a clandestine nuclear weapons program. For example, IAEA
does not have unfettered inspection rights and cannot make visits to
suspected sites anywhere at any time. According to the Additional
Protocol, complementary access to resolve questions related to the
correctness and completeness of the information provided by the country
or to resolve inconsistencies must usually be arranged with at least 24-
hours advanced notice. Complementary access to buildings on sites where
IAEA inspectors are already present are usually conducted with a 2-hour
advanced notice. Furthermore, IAEA officials told us that there are
practical problems that restrict access. For example, inspectors must
be issued a visa to visit certain countries, a process which cannot
normally be completed in less than 24 hours. In some cases, nuclear
sites are in remote locations and IAEA inspectors need to make travel
arrangements, such as helicopter transportation, in advance, which
requires that the country be notified prior to the visit.
A November 2004 study by a group of safeguards experts appointed by
IAEA's Director General evaluated the agency's safeguards program to
examine how effectively and efficiently strengthened safeguards
measures were being implemented. Specifically, the group's mission was
to evaluate the progress, effectiveness, and impact of implementing
measures to enhance the agency's ability to draw conclusions about the
non-diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards and, for
relevant countries, the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities. The group concluded that generally IAEA had done a very
good job implementing strengthened safeguards despite budgetary and
other constraints. However, the group noted that IAEA's ability to
detect undeclared activities remains largely untested. If a country
decides to divert nuclear material or conduct undeclared activities, it
will deliberately work to prevent IAEA from discovering this.
Furthermore, IAEA and member states should be clear that the
conclusions drawn by the agency cannot be regarded as absolute. This
view has been reinforced by the former Deputy Director General for
Safeguards who has stated that even for countries with strengthened
safeguards in force, there are limitations on the types of information
and locations accessible to IAEA inspectors.
A Number of Weaknesses Impede IAEA's Ability to Effectively Implement
Strengthened Safeguards:
There are a number of weaknesses that hamper IAEA's ability to
effectively implement strengthened safeguards. IAEA has only limited
information about the nuclear activities of 4 key countries that are
not members of the NPT--India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan.
India, Israel, and Pakistan have special agreements with IAEA that
limit the agency's activities to monitoring only specific material,
equipment, and facilities. However, since these countries are not
signatories to the NPT, they do not have comprehensive safeguards
agreements with IAEA, and are not required to declare all of their
nuclear material to the agency. In addition, these countries are only
required to declare exports of nuclear material previously declared to
IAEA. With the recent revelations of the illicit international trade in
nuclear material and equipment, IAEA officials stated that they need
more information on these countries' nuclear exports. For North Korea,
IAEA has even less information, since the country expelled IAEA
inspectors and removed surveillance equipment at nuclear facilities in
December 2002 and withdrew from the NPT in January 2003. These actions
have raised widespread concern that North Korea diverted some of its
nuclear material to produce nuclear weapons.
Another major weakness is that more than half, or 111 out of 189, of
the NPT signatories have not yet brought the Additional Protocol into
force, as of August 2006. (App. I lists the status of countries'
safeguards agreements with IAEA). Without the Additional Protocol, IAEA
must limit its inspection efforts to declared nuclear material and
facilities, making it harder to detect clandestine nuclear programs. Of
the 111 countries that have not adopted the Additional Protocol, 21 are
engaged in significant nuclear activities,[Footnote 9] including Egypt,
North Korea, and Syria.
In addition, safeguards are significantly limited or not applied in
about 60 percent, or 112 out of 189, of the NPT signatory countries--
either because they have an agreement (known as a small quantities
protocol) with IAEA, and are not subject to most safeguards measures,
or because they have not concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement
with IAEA. Countries with small quantities of nuclear material make up
about 41 percent of the NPT signatories and about one-third of the
countries that have the Additional Protocol in force. Since 1971,
IAEA's Board of Governors has authorized the Director General to
conclude an agreement, known as a small quantities protocol, with 90
countries and, as of August 2006, 78 of these agreements were in force.
IAEA's Board of Governors has approved the protocols for these
countries without having IAEA verify that they met the requirements for
it. Even if these countries bring the Additional Protocol into force,
IAEA does not have the right to conduct inspections or install
surveillance equipment at certain nuclear facilities. According to IAEA
and Department of State officials, this is a weakness in the agency's
ability to detect clandestine nuclear activities or transshipments of
nuclear material and equipment through the country. In September 2005,
the Board of Governors directed IAEA to negotiate with countries to
make changes to the protocols, including reinstating the agency's right
to conduct inspections. As of August 2006, IAEA amended the protocols
for 4 countries--Ecuador, Mali, Palau, and Tajikistan.
The application of safeguards is further limited because 31 countries
that have signed the NPT have not brought into force a comprehensive
safeguards agreement with IAEA. The NPT requires non-nuclear weapons
states to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA within
18 months of becoming a party to the Treaty. However, IAEA's Director
General has stated that these 31 countries have failed to fulfill their
legal obligations. Moreover, 27 of the 31 have not yet brought
comprehensive safeguards agreements into force more than 10 years after
becoming party to the NPT, including Chad, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia.
Last, IAEA is facing a looming human capital crisis that may hamper the
agency's ability to meet its safeguards mission. In 2005, we reported
that about 51 percent, or 38 out of 75, of IAEA's senior safeguards
inspectors and high-level management officials, such as the head of the
Department of Safeguards and the directors responsible for overseeing
all inspection activities of nuclear programs, are retiring in the next
5 years.[Footnote 10] According to U.S. officials, this significant
loss of knowledge and expertise could compromise the quality of
analysis of countries' nuclear programs. For example, several
inspectors with expertise in uranium enrichment techniques, which is a
primary means to produce nuclear weapons material, are retiring at a
time when demand for their skills in detecting clandestine nuclear
activities is growing. While IAEA has taken a number of steps to
address these human capital issues, officials from the Department of
State and the U.S. Mission to the U.N. System Organizations in Vienna
have expressed concern that IAEA is not adequately planning to replace
staff with critical skills needed to fulfill its strengthened
safeguards mission.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group Has Helped Stem Nuclear Proliferation, but
Lack of Information Sharing on Nuclear Exports Between Members Could
Undermine Its Efforts:
The Nuclear Suppliers Group, along with other multilateral export
control groups, has helped stop, slow, or raise the costs of nuclear
proliferation, according to nonproliferation experts. For example, as
we reported in 2002, the Suppliers Group helped convince Argentina and
Brazil to accept IAEA safeguards on their nuclear programs in exchange
for expanded access to international cooperation for peaceful nuclear
purposes.[Footnote 11] The Suppliers Group, along with other
multilateral export control groups, has significantly reduced the
availability of technology and equipment available to countries of
concern, according to a State Department official. Moreover, nuclear
export controls have made it more difficult, more costly, and more time
consuming for proliferators to obtain the expertise and material needed
to advance their nuclear program.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group has also helped IAEA verify compliance with
the NPT. In 1978, the Suppliers Group published the first guidelines
governing exports of nuclear materials and equipment. These guidelines
established several member requirements, including the requirement that
members adhere to IAEA safeguards standards at facilities using
controlled nuclear-related items. Subsequently, in 1992, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group broadened its guidelines by requiring that members
insist that non-member states have IAEA safeguards on all nuclear
material and facilities as a condition of supply for their nuclear
exports. With the revelation of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, the
Suppliers Group also created an export control system for dual-use
items that established new controls for items that did not
automatically fall under IAEA safeguards requirements.[Footnote 12]
Despite these benefits, there are a number of weaknesses that could
limit the Nuclear Suppliers Group's ability to curb nuclear
proliferation. Members of the Suppliers Group do not share complete
export licensing information. Specifically, members do not always share
information about licenses they have approved or denied for the sale of
controversial items to nonmember states. Without this shared
information, a member country could inadvertently license a
controversial item to a country that has already been denied a license
from another Suppliers Group member state. Furthermore, Suppliers Group
members did not promptly review and agree upon common lists of items to
control and approaches to controlling them. Each member must make
changes to its national export control policies after members agree to
change items on the control list. If agreed-upon changes to control
lists are not adopted at the same time by all members, proliferators
could exploit these time lags to obtain sensitive technologies by
focusing on members that are slowest to incorporate the changes and
sensitive items may still be traded to countries of concern.
In addition, there are a number of obstacles to efforts aimed at
strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export
control regimes. First, efforts to strengthen export controls have been
hampered by a requirement that all members reach consensus about every
decision made. Under the current process, a single member can block new
reforms. U.S. and foreign government officials and nonproliferation
experts all stressed that the regimes are consensus-based organizations
and depend on the like-mindedness or cohesion of their members to be
effective. However, members have found it especially difficult to reach
consensus on such issues as making changes to procedures and control
lists. The Suppliers Group reliance on consensus decision making will
be tested by the United States request to exempt India from the
Suppliers Group requirements to accept IAEA safeguards at all nuclear
facilities. Second, since membership with the Suppliers Group is
voluntary and nonbinding, there are no means to enforce compliance with
members' nonproliferation commitments. For example, the Suppliers Group
has no direct means to impede Russia's export of nuclear fuel to India,
an act that the U.S. government said violated Russia's commitment.
Third, the rapid pace of nuclear technological change and the growing
trade of sensitive items among proliferators complicate efforts to keep
control lists current because these lists need to be updated more
frequently.
To help strengthen these regimes, GAO recommended in October 2002, that
the Secretary of State establish a strategy that includes ways for
Nuclear Suppliers Group members to improve information sharing,
implement changes to export controls more consistently, and identify
organizational changes that could help reform its activities. As of
June 2006, the Nuclear Suppliers Group announced that it has revised
its guidelines to improve information sharing. However, despite our
recommendation, it has not yet agreed to share greater and more
detailed information on approved exports of sensitive transfers to
nonmember countries.
Nevertheless, the Suppliers Group is examining changes to its
procedures that assist IAEA's efforts to strengthen safeguards. For
example, at the 2005 Nuclear Suppliers Group plenary meeting, members
discussed changing the requirements for exporting nuclear material and
equipment by requiring nonmember countries to adopt IAEA's Additional
Protocol as a condition of supply. If approved by the Suppliers Group,
the action would complement IAEA's efforts to verify compliance with
the NPT.
U.S. Bilateral Assistance Programs Are Working to Secure Nuclear
Materials and Warheads, Detect Nuclear Smuggling, Eliminate Excess
Nuclear Material, and Halt Production of Plutonium, but Challenges
Remain:
Reducing the formidable proliferation risks posed by former Soviet
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) assets is a U.S. national security
interest. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States,
through a variety of programs, managed by the Departments of Energy,
Defense (DOD), and State, has helped Russia and other former Soviet
countries to secure nuclear material and warheads, detect illicitly
trafficked nuclear material, eliminate excess stockpiles of weapons-
usable nuclear material, and halt the continued production of weapons-
grade plutonium. From fiscal year 1992 through fiscal year 2006, the
Congress appropriated about $7 billion for nuclear nonproliferation
efforts.[Footnote 13] However, U.S. assistance programs have faced a
number of challenges, such as a lack of access to key sites and
corruption of foreign officials, which could compromise the
effectiveness of U.S. assistance.
DOE's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program has
worked with Russia and other former Soviet countries since 1994 to
provide enhanced physical protection systems at sites with weapons-
usable nuclear material and warheads, implement material control and
accounting upgrades to help keep track of the quantities of nuclear
materials at sites, and consolidate material into fewer, more secure
buildings. GAO last reported on the MPC&A program in 2003.[Footnote 14]
At that time, a lack of access to many sites in Russia's nuclear
weapons complex had significantly impeded DOE's progress in helping
Russia to secure its nuclear material. We reported that DOE had
completed work at only a limited number of buildings in Russia's
nuclear weapons complex, a network of sites involved in the
construction of nuclear weapons where most of the nuclear material in
Russia is stored. According to DOE, by the end of September 2006, the
agency will have helped to secure 175 buildings with weapons-usable
nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet Union and 39 Russian
Navy nuclear warhead sites. GAO is currently re-examining DOE's
efforts, including the progress DOE has made since 2003 in securing
nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other countries and the
challenges DOE faces in completing its work.
While securing nuclear materials and warheads where they are stored is
considered to be the first layer of defense against nuclear theft,
there is no guarantee that such items will not be stolen or lost.
Recognizing this fact, DOE, DOD, and State, through seven different
programs, have provided radiation detection equipment since 1994 to 36
countries, including many countries of the former Soviet Union. These
programs seek to combat nuclear smuggling and are seen as a second line
of defense against nuclear theft. The largest and most successful of
these efforts is DOE's Second Line of Defense program (SLD). We
reported in March 2006 that, through the SLD program, DOE had provided
radiation detection equipment and training at 83 sites in Russia,
Greece, and Lithuania since 1998. However, we also noted that U.S.
radiation detection assistance efforts faced challenges, including
corruption of some foreign border security officials, technical
limitations of some radiation detection equipment, and inadequate
maintenance of some equipment. To address these challenges, U.S.
agencies plan to take a number of steps, including combating corruption
by installing communications links between individual border sites and
national command centers so that detection alarm data can be
simultaneously evaluated by multiple officials.
The United States is also helping Russia to eliminate excess stockpiles
of nuclear material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium). In
February 1993, the United States agreed to purchase from Russia 500
metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) extracted from dismantled
Russian nuclear weapons over a 20-year period. Russia agreed to dilute,
or blend-down, the material into low enriched uranium (LEU), which is
of significantly less proliferation risk, so that it could be made into
fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors before shipping it to the
United States.[Footnote 15] As of June 27, 2006, 276 metric tons of
Russian HEU--derived from more than 11,000 dismantled nuclear weapons-
-have been downblended into LEU for use in U.S. commercial nuclear
reactors. Similarly, in 2000, the United States and Russia committed to
the transparent disposition of 34 metric tons each of weapon-grade
plutonium. The plutonium will be converted into a more proliferation-
resistant form called mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel that will be used in
commercial nuclear power plants. In addition to constructing a MOX fuel
fabrication plant at its Savannah River Site, DOE is also assisting
Russia in constructing a similar facility for the Russian plutonium.
Russia's continued operation of three plutonium production reactors
poses a serious proliferation threat. These reactors produce about 1.2
metric tons of plutonium each year--enough for about 300 nuclear
weapons. DOE's Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production
program seeks to facilitate the reactors' closure by building or
refurbishing two fossil fuel plants that will replace the heat and
electricity that will be lost with the shutdown of Russia's three
plutonium production reactors. DOE plans to complete the first of the
two replacement plants in 2008 and the second in 2011. When we reported
on this program in June 2004,[Footnote 16] we noted that DOE faced
challenges in implementing its program, including ensuring Russia's
commitment to shutting down the reactors, the rising cost of building
the replacement fossil fuel plants, and concerns about the thousands of
Russian nuclear workers who will lose their jobs when the reactors are
shut down. We made a number of recommendations, which DOE has
implemented, including reaching agreement with Russia on the specific
steps to be taken to shut down the reactors and development of a plan
to work with other U.S. government programs to assist Russia in finding
alternate employment for the skilled nuclear workers who will lose
their jobs when the reactors are shut down.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have at this time.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Gene
Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or Joseph Christoff at (202) 512-8979. R.
Stockton Butler, Miriam A. Carroll, Leland Cogliani, Lynn Cothern,
Muriel J. Forster, Jeffrey Phillips, and Jim Shafer made key
contributions to this testimony. Beth Hoffman León, Stephen Lord,
Audrey Solis, and Pierre Toureille provided technical assistance.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Countries' Safeguards Agreements with IAEA, as of August
2006:
Table 1:
Non-nuclear weapon states:
State: Afghanistan;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Albania;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Algeria;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Andorra;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Angola;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Antigua and Barbuda;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Argentina;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Armenia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Australia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Austria;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Azerbaijan;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Bahamas;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Bahrain;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Bangladesh;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Barbados;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Belarus;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Belgium;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Belize;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Benin;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Bhutan;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Bolivia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Botswana;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Brazil;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Brunei Darussalam;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Bulgaria;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Burkina Faso;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Burundi;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Cambodia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Cameroon;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Canada;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Cape Verde;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Central African Republic;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Chad;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Chile;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Colombia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Comoros;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Costa Rica;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Cote d'Ivoire;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Croatia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Cuba;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Cyprus;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Czech Republic;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Democratic People's Republic of Korea[A];
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Democratic Republic of the Congo;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Denmark;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Djibouti;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Dominica;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Dominican Republic;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Ecuador;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Egypt;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: El Salvador;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Equatorial Guinea;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Eritrea;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Estonia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Ethiopia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Federated States of Micronesia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Fiji;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Finland;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Gabon;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Gambia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Georgia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Germany;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Ghana;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Greece;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Grenada;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Guatemala;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Guinea;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Guinea-Bissau;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Guyana;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Haiti;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Holy See;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Honduras;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Hungary;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Iceland;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Indonesia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Iraq;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Ireland;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Islamic Republic of Iran;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Italy;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Jamaica;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Japan;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Jordan;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Kazakhstan;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Kenya;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Kiribati;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Kuwait;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Kyrgyzstan;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Latvia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Lebanon;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Lesotho;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Liberia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Liechtenstein;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Lithuania;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Luxembourg;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Madagascar;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Malawi;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Malaysia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Maldives;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Mali;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Malta;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Marshall Islands;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Mauritania;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Mauritius;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Mexico;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Monaco;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Mongolia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Montenegro;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Morocco;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Mozambique;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Myanmar;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Namibia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Nauru;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Nepal;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Netherlands;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: New Zealand;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Nicaragua;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Niger;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Nigeria;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Norway;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Oman;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Palau;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Panama;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Papua New Guinea;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Paraguay;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: People's Democratic Republic of Laos;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Peru;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Philippines;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Poland;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Portugal;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Qatar;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Republic of the Congo;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Republic of Korea;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Republic of Moldova;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Republic of Yemen;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Romania;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Rwanda;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: St. Kitts and Nevis;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: St. Lucia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: St. Vincent and the Grenadines;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Samoa;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: San Marino;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Sao Tome and Principe;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Saudi Arabia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Senegal;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Serbia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Seychelles;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Sierra Leone;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Singapore;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Slovakia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Slovenia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Solomon Islands;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Somalia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: South Africa;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Spain;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Sri Lanka;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Sudan;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Suriname;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Swaziland;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Sweden;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Switzerland;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Syrian Arab Republic;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Tajikistan;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Thailand;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Timor-Leste;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Togo;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Tonga;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Trinidad and Tobago;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Tunisia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Turkey;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Turkmenistan;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Tuvalu;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Uganda;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Ukraine;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: United Arab Emirates;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: United Republic of Tanzania;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Uruguay;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Uzbekistan;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Vanuatu;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Venezuela;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Vietnam;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Zambia;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
State: Zimbabwe;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: X.
Nuclear weapons states with safeguards agreements in force:
State: China;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: France;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Russian Federation;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: United Kingdom;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: X;
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: United States of America;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: X;
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
States with special safeguards agreements:
State: India;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Israel;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
State: Pakistan;
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: [Empty];
Additional Protocol: [Empty];
Small Quantities Protocol: [Empty].
[A] Although North Korea concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement
with IAEA in 1992, it announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January
2003.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as of June 2006:
Table 2:
Argentina;
Latvia.
Australia;
Lithuania.
Austria;
Luxembourg.
Belarus;
Malta.
Belgium;
Netherlands.
Brazil;
New Zealand.
Bulgaria;
Norway.
Canada;
Poland.
China;
Portugal.
Croatia;
Romania.
Cyprus;
Russia.
Czech Republic;
Slovakia.
Denmark;
Slovenia.
Estonia;
South Africa.
Finland;
South Korea.
France;
Spain.
Germany;
Sweden.
Greece;
Switzerland.
Hungary;
Turkey.
Ireland;
Ukraine.
Italy;
United Kingdom.
Japan;
United States.
Kazakhstan.
Source: Nuclear Suppliers Group Statement, Nuclear Suppliers Group
Strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, Brasilia, June 2,
2006.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Additional Information on U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation
Programs:
Table 3:
Project: Department of Energy Projects: Global Radiological Threat
Reduction;
Description: Secures radiological sources no longer needed in the U.S.
and locates, identifies, recovers, consolidates, and enhances the
security of radioactive materials outside the U.S.
Project: Department of Energy Projects: Global Nuclear Material Threat
Reduction;
Description: Eliminates Russia's use of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
in civilian nuclear facilities;
returns U.S. and Russian-origin HEU and spent nuclear fuel from
research reactors around the world;
secures plutonium-bearing spent nuclear fuel from reactors in
Kazakhstan;
and addresses nuclear and radiological materials at vulnerable
locations throughout the world.
Project: Department of Energy Projects: Elimination of Weapons-Grade
Plutonium Production project;
Description: Provides replacement fossil-fuel energy that will allow
Russia to shutdown its three remaining weapons-grade plutonium
production reactors.
Project: Department of Energy Projects: International Safeguards
project;
Description: Develops and delivers technology applications to
strengthen capabilities to detect and verify undeclared nuclear
programs;
enhances the physical protection and proper accounting of nuclear
material;
and assists foreign national partners to meet safeguards commitments.
Project: Department of Energy Projects: Russian Transition Initiatives
project;
Description: Provides meaningful employment for former weapons of mass
destruction weapons scientists.
Project: Department of Energy Projects: Nuclear Warhead Protection
project;
Description: Provides material protection, control, and accounting
upgrades to enhance the security of Navy HEU fuel and nuclear material.
Project: Department of Energy Projects: Weapons Material Protection
project;
Description: Provides material protection, control, and accounting
upgrades to nuclear weapons, uranium enrichment, and material
processing and storage sites.
Project: Department of Energy Projects: Material Consolidation &
Civilian Sites project;
Description: Enhances the security of proliferation-attractive nuclear
material in Russia by supporting material protection, control, and
accounting upgrade projects at Russian civilian nuclear facilities.
Project: Department of Energy Projects: National Infrastructure &
Sustainability project;
Description: Develops national and regional resources in the Russian
Federation to help establish and sustain effective operation of
upgraded nuclear material protection, control and accounting systems.
Project: Department of Energy Projects: Second Line of Defense &
Megaports Initiative project;
Description: Negotiates cooperative efforts with the Russian Federation
and other key countries to strengthen the capability of enforcement
officials to detect and deter illicit trafficking of nuclear and
radiological material across international borders. This is
accomplished through the detection, location and identification of
nuclear and nuclear related materials, the development of response
procedures and capabilities, and the establishment of required
infrastructure elements to support the control of these materials.
Project: Department of Energy Projects: HEU Transparency Implementation
project;
Description: Monitors Russia to ensure that low enriched uranium (LEU)
sold to the U.S. for civilian nuclear power plants is derived from
weapons-usable HEU removed from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons.
Project: Department of Energy Projects: Surplus U.S. HEU Disposition
project;
Description: Disposes of surplus domestic HEU by down-blending it.
Project: Department of Energy Projects: Surplus U.S. Plutonium
Disposition project;
Description: Disposes of surplus domestic plutonium by fabricating it
into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for irradiation in existing, commercial
nuclear reactors.
Project: Department of Energy Projects: Surplus Russian Plutonium
Disposition project;
Description: Supports Russia's efforts to dispose of its weapons-grade
plutonium by working with the international community to help pay for
Russia's program.
Project: Department of Defense Projects: Personnel Reliability and
Safety;
Description: Provides training and equipment to assist Russia in
determining the reliability of its guard forces.
Project: Department of Defense Projects: Site Security Enhancements;
Description: Enhances the safety and security of Russian nuclear
weapons storage sites through the use of vulnerability assessments to
determine specific requirements for upgrades. DOD will develop security
designs to address those vulnerabilities and install equipment
necessary to bring security standards consistent with those at U.S.
nuclear weapons storage facilities.
Project: Department of Defense Projects: Nuclear Weapons
Transportation;
Description: Assists Russia in shipping nuclear warheads to more secure
sites or dismantlement locations.
Project: Department of Defense Projects: Railcar Maintenance and
Procurement;
Description: Assists Russia in maintaining nuclear weapons cargo
railcars. Funds maintenance of railcars until no longer feasible, then
purchases replacement railcars to maintain 100 cars in service. DOD
will procure 15 guard railcars to replace those retired from service.
Guard railcars will be capable of monitoring security systems in the
cargo railcars and transporting security force personnel.
Project: Department of Defense Projects: Weapons Transportation Safety
Enhancements;
Description: Provides emergency response vehicles containing hydraulic
cutting tools, pneumatic jacks, and safety gear to enhance Russia's
ability to respond to possible accidents in transporting nuclear
weapons. Meteorological, radiation detection and monitoring, and
communications equipment is also included.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy
Radiation Detection Equipment in Other Countries and in the United
States. GAO-06-558T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination
Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection
Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.: March 14,
2006.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and
Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed. GAO-06-
93. Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2005.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign
Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Effort to Close Russia's Plutonium
Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown is Uncertain.
GAO-04-662. Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-03-
482. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003.
Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export
Control Regimes. GAO-03-43. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO-02-
426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S. Purchase of Russian
Highly Enriched Uranium. GAO-01-148. Washington, D.C.: December 15,
2000.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Under the NPT, nuclear weapons states pledged to facilitate the
transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to non-nuclear weapons states,
but not to assist them in acquiring nuclear weapons.
[2] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards
and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, GAO-
06-93 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005).
[3] GAO, Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral
Export Control Regimes, GAO-03-43 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 25, 2002).
[4] Weapons-usable nuclear material is uranium enriched to 20 percent
or greater in uranium-235 or uranium-233 and any plutonium containing
less than 80 percent of the isotope plutonium-238 and less than 10
percent of the isotopes plutonium-241 and plutonium-242. These types of
material are of the quality used to make nuclear weapons.
[5] A listing of relevant U.S. nuclear nonproliferation programs can be
found in appendix III.
[6] Regional treaties, including the Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (the 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga),
the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the 1995 Treaty of
Pelindaba), and the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Treaty (the 1995
Bangkok Treaty) require each participating country to conclude a
comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA. Additionally, in February
2005, five Central Asian states announced that they had reached
agreement on the text of a treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free
zone.
[7] Nuclear materials include source materials, such as natural
uranium, depleted uranium, and thorium, and special fissionable
materials, such as enriched uranium and plutonium.
[8] Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and
the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards.
[9] IAEA defines a country with significant nuclear activities as one
that has declared nuclear material in a facility or a location outside
facilities.
[10] In 2004, the Department of Safeguards had 552 staff members. Of
these, 251 were safeguards inspectors.
[11] GAO, Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral
Export Control Regimes, GAO-03-43 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 25, 2002).
[12] Previously, the Nuclear Suppliers Group control list included
nuclear equipment and material, the export of which would trigger a
requirement that IAEA safeguards apply to the recipient facility.
[13] This includes funding for nuclear security programs, but does not
include funding for parts of DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction program
that work on demilitarization, chemical or biological weapons issues,
or the destruction and dismantlement of weapons delivery systems.
[14] GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation
Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites,
GAO-03-482 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2003).
[15] Formally known as "The Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation
Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from
Nuclear Weapons" (Feb. 18, 1993).
[16] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Effort to Close Russia's
Plutonium Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is
Uncertain, GAO-04-662 (Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004).
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