Stabilizing Iraq
An Assessment of the Security Situation Gao ID: GAO-06-1094T September 11, 2006From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, U.S. government agencies have reported significant costs for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In addition, the United States currently has committed about 138,000 military personnel to the U.S.-led Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I). Over the past 3 years, worsening security conditions have made it difficult for the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq. In this statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security environment in Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as reported by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State. We also present key questions for congressional oversight, including what political, economic, and security conditions must be achieved before the United States can draw down and withdraw? Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate even as Iraq has met political milestones, increased the number of trained and equipped forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for security? If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the administration propose for stemming the violence?
Since June 2003, the overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife, which has grown since the February 2006 bombing in Samarra. As shown in the figure below, attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners reached an all time high during July 2006. The deteriorating conditions threaten the progress of U.S. and international efforts to assist Iraq in the political and economic areas. In July 2006, the State Department reported that the recent upturn in violence has hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi partners and noted that a certain level of security was a prerequisite to accomplishing the political and economic conditions necessary for U.S. withdrawal. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a militias have contributed to growing sectarian strife that has resulted in increased numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals. DOD uses three factors to measure progress in developing capable Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi government: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed responsibility for security in specific geographic areas, and (3) the capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and aggregate Transition Readiness Assessments (TRA). Although the State Department reported that the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces has increased, these numbers do not address their capabilities. As of August 2006, 115 Iraqi army units had assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations in specific areas, and one province had assumed control for security. Unit-level TRA reports provide insight into the Iraqi army units' training, equipment, and logistical capabilities. GAO is working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Such information would inform the Congress on the capabilities and needs of Iraq's security forces.
GAO-06-1094T, Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation
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GAO:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Testimony:
For the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and
International Relations; House Committee on Government Reform:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Monday, September 11, 2006:
Stabilizing Iraq:
An Assessment of the Security Situation:
Statement for the Record by David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the
United States:
GAO-06-1094T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-1094T, a statement for the record to the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International
Relations; Committee on Government Reform; House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
From fiscal years 2003 through 2006, U.S. government agencies have
reported significant costs for U.S. stabilization and reconstruction
efforts in Iraq. In addition, the United States currently has committed
about 138,000 military personnel to the U.S.-led Multinational Force in
Iraq (MNF-I). Over the past 3 years, worsening security conditions have
made it difficult for the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq.
In this statement, we discuss
(1) the trends in the security environment in Iraq, and (2) progress in
developing Iraqi security forces, as reported by the Departments of
Defense (DOD) and State. We also present key questions for
congressional oversight, including:
* What political, economic, and security conditions must be achieved
before the United States can draw down and withdraw?
* Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate even as Iraq
has met political milestones, increased the number of trained and
equipped forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for security?
* If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not
reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the
administration propose for stemming the violence?
What GAO Found:
Since June 2003, the overall security conditions in Iraq have
deteriorated and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers
of attacks and Sunni/Shi‘a sectarian strife, which has grown since the
February 2006 bombing in Samarra. As shown in the figure below, attacks
against the coalition and its Iraqi partners reached an all time high
during July 2006. The deteriorating conditions threaten the progress of
U.S. and international efforts to assist Iraq in the political and
economic areas. In July 2006, the State Department reported that the
recent upturn in violence has hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi
partners and noted that a certain level of security was a prerequisite
to accomplishing the political and economic conditions necessary for
U.S. withdrawal. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi‘a militias have
contributed to growing sectarian strife that has resulted in increased
numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals.
DOD uses three factors to measure progress in developing capable Iraqi
security forces and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi
government: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the
number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed
responsibility for security in specific geographic areas, and (3) the
capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and
aggregate Transition Readiness Assessments (TRA). Although the State
Department reported that the number of trained and equipped Iraqi
security forces has increased, these numbers do not address their
capabilities. As of August 2006, 115 Iraqi army units had assumed the
lead for counterinsurgency operations in specific areas, and one
province had assumed control for security. Unit-level TRA reports
provide insight into the Iraqi army units‘ training, equipment, and
logistical capabilities. GAO is working with DOD to obtain the unit-
level TRA reports. Such information would inform the Congress on the
capabilities and needs of Iraq‘s security forces.
Figure: Enemy-Initiated Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi
Partners, as of July 2006:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: Multi-National Force-Iraq, July 2006.
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1094T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff,
(202) 512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov
[End of Section]
September 11, 2006:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to assist the Subcommittee in its
oversight of U.S. efforts to improve the security situation in Iraq.
The November 2005 U.S. strategy for Iraq states that victory in Iraq is
a vital U.S. interest. Since May 2003, the United States has employed
political, economic, and military measures to stabilize Iraq and help
the country achieve the desired end-state: a constitutional,
representative Iraqi government that respects civil rights and has
security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and keep Iraq
from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. To support these goals, the
United States initially led, and later assisted, Iraq's political
transition from a dictatorship to a democratically elected government.
The United States currently has committed about 138,000 military
personnel to the U.S.-led Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I). The
Department of Defense (DOD) has reported obligations of about $227
billion for U.S. military operations in Iraq for fiscal years 2003
through June 2006. U.S. assistance appropriated for Iraqi security
forces and law enforcement has grown from $3.24 billion in January 2004
to about $13.7 billion in June 2006.[Footnote 1] Over the past 3 years,
worsening security conditions have made it difficult for the United
States to achieve its goals in Iraq.
In this statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security
environment in Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security
forces, as reported by DOD and the State Department. We also present
questions for congressional oversight. To examine trends in Iraq's
security situation, we reviewed reports by DOD, State, the United
Nations (UN), and nongovernmental organizations, as well as transcripts
of MNF-I and U.S. embassy Baghdad press conferences and interviews.
Although we reviewed classified documents during our completed and
ongoing Iraq-related engagements, the information in this statement is
based on unclassified documents only. We also obtained and assessed MNF-
I data on enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi
partners from the Defense Intelligence Agency. We determined that the
data were sufficiently reliable for establishing general trends in the
number of attacks. To assess progress in developing Iraqi security
forces, we reviewed DOD and State reports, as well as MNF-I guidance on
Iraqi readiness assessments. Because of the broad congressional
interest in this issue, we performed this work under my authority as
the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct reviews on my
initiative. The work was performed in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
Since June 2003, the overall security conditions in Iraq have
deteriorated and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers
of attacks and, more recently, the growing Sunni/Shi'a sectarian
strife, which has grown since the February 2006 bombing of the Golden
Mosque in Samarra. Enemy-initiated attacks generally have increased
around major religious or political events, including Ramadan and
elections. Attack levels also follow a seasonal pattern, increasing
through the spring and summer and decreasing in the winter months.
According to MNF-I data, attack levels in July 2006 were the highest to
date. Despite coalition efforts and the efforts of the newly formed
Iraqi government, insurgents continue to demonstrate the ability to
recruit new fighters, supply themselves, and attack coalition and Iraqi
security forces. The deteriorating conditions threaten continued
progress in U.S. and other international efforts to assist Iraq in the
political and economic areas. In July 2006, the State Department
reported to Congress that the recent upturn in violence had hindered
efforts to engage fully with Iraqi partners. State noted that a
baseline of security was a prerequisite for moving forward on the
political and economic tasks essential to achieving the conditions for
withdrawing U.S. forces. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a
militias have contributed to an increase in sectarian strife that has
resulted in large numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced
individuals.
DOD uses three key factors to measure progress in developing capable
Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to
them and the Iraqi government: (1) the number of trained and equipped
forces, (2) the number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments
that have assumed responsibility for security of specific geographic
areas, and (3) the assessed capabilities of operational units, as
reported in unit-level and aggregate Transition Readiness Assessment
(TRA) reports. From July 2005 to August 2006, the State Department
reported that the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces
had increased from about 174,000 to 294,000. However, these numbers do
not provide a complete picture of the units' capabilities because they
do not give detailed information on the status of their equipment,
personnel, training, and leadership. They may also overstate the number
of forces on duty. As of August 2006, 115 Iraqi army units had assumed
the lead for counterinsurgency operations in specific areas, and one
province, Muthanna, had assumed control for security responsibilities.
Information on the readiness levels for Iraqi security forces is
classified. Unit-level readiness reports provide important insight into
the status of Iraqi army units' personnel, training, equipment,
leadership, and sustainment/logistical capabilities. DOD has provided
GAO with classified, aggregate information on overall readiness levels
and more detailed information on Iraqi units in the lead. GAO has been
working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Such information
would inform both GAO and the Congress on the capabilities and needs of
Iraq's security forces.
We present key questions for congressional oversight, including:
* What political, economic and security conditions must be achieved
before the United States can draw down and withdraw military forces
from Iraq?
* Why have security conditions continued to worsen even as Iraq has met
political milestones, increased the number of trained and equipped
forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for security?
* If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not
reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the
administration propose for stemming the violence?
Background:
In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)[Footnote 2]
dissolved the military organizations of the former regime and began the
process of reestablishing or creating new Iraqi security forces,
including the police and a new Iraqi army. Over time, multinational
force commanders assumed responsibility in their areas for recruiting
and training some Iraqi defense and police forces. In October 2003, the
multinational force outlined a multistep plan for transferring security
missions to Iraqi security forces. The plan had the objective of
gradually decreasing the number of coalition forces in conjunction with
neutralizing Iraq's insurgency and developing Iraqi forces capable of
securing their country.
Citing the growing capability of Iraqi security forces, coalition
forces in Iraq began to shift responsibilities to Iraqi security forces
in February 2004, earlier than planned. According to the President,
senior DOD officials, and multinational force commanders, Iraqi forces
were unprepared to assume security responsibilities and responded
poorly to a series of anti-coalition attacks in April 2004. In western
and central Iraq, insurgents attacked the multinational force in
Fallujah, Baghdad, Ar Ramadi, Samarra, and Tikrit, while a radical
Shi'a militia, the Mahdi Army, launched operations to dislodge
multinational forces and occupy cities from Baghdad to Basra in the
south. Although some Iraqi forces fought alongside coalition forces,
other units abandoned their posts and responsibilities and, in some
cases, assisted the insurgency. MNF-I identified a number of problems
that contributed to the collapse of Iraqi security forces, including
problems in training and equipping them.
In May 2004, the President issued a National Security Presidential
Directive, which stated that, after the transition of power to the
Iraqi government, DOD would be responsible for U.S. activities relating
to security and military operations. The Presidential directive
established that the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) would direct all
U.S. government efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi security
forces. In the summer of 2004, MNF-I developed and began implementing a
comprehensive campaign plan, which elaborated and refined the original
strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. In
April 2006, MNF-I revised the campaign plan and, in conjunction with
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, issued a new Joint Campaign Plan that
contains the goal of transitioning security responsibility from MNF-I
to the Iraqi security forces and government. Further details on the
campaign plan are classified.[Footnote 3] In late August 2006, the MNF-
I Commanding General said that the United States is helping Iraq build
a force to deal with its current security threats of international
terrorism and insurgency. He noted, however, that the Iraqi government
is developing a long-term security plan to shape the type of armed
forces that the country will need 5 to 10 years from now.
Trends in Security Conditions:
Since June 2003, overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated
and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks
and more recent Sunni/Shi'a sectarian strife after the February 2006
bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra.[Footnote 4] The deteriorating
conditions threaten continued progress in U.S. and other international
efforts to assist Iraq in the political and economic areas. Moreover,
the Sunni insurgency and Shi'a militias have contributed to an increase
in sectarian strife and large numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and
displaced individuals.
Deteriorating Security Threatens U.S. and International Efforts to
Assist Iraqi Political and Economic Development:
Enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners
have continued to increase through July 2006 (see fig. 1). Since 2003,
enemy-initiated attacks have increased around major religious or
political events, including Ramadan[Footnote 5] and elections. Attack
levels also follow a seasonal pattern, increasing through the spring
and summer and decreasing in the fall and winter months. Overall,
attacks increased by 23 percent from 2004 to 2005. After declining in
the fall of 2005, the number of attacks rose to the highest level ever
in July 2006. Total attacks reported from January 2006 through July
2006 were about 57 percent higher than the total reported during the
same period in 2005. These data show significant increases in attacks
against coalition forces, who remain the primary targets, as well as
civilians and Iraqi security forces. According to a June 2006 UN
report,[Footnote 6] an increasingly complex armed opposition continues
to be capable of maintaining a consistently high level of violent
activity across Iraq. Baghdad, Ninewa, Salahuddin, Anbar, and Diyala
have been experiencing the worst of the violence. Other areas,
particularly Basra and Kirkuk, have witnessed increased tension and a
growing number of violent incidents. In August 2006,[Footnote 7] DOD
reported that breaking the cycle of violence is the most pressing
immediate goal of coalition and Iraqi operations.
Figure 1: Enemy-initiated Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi
Partners, May 2003 through July 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Multi-National Force-Iraq, July 2006.
[End of figure]
The security situation has deteriorated even as Iraq has made progress
in meeting key political milestones and in developing its security
forces. Since the CPA transferred power to the Iraqi interim government
in June 2004, Iraq has held an election for a transitional government
in January 2005, a referendum on the constitution in October 2005, and
an election for a Council of Representatives in December 2005 that led
to the formation of a new government in May 2006 (see fig. 2). However,
according to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the
December 2005 elections appeared to heighten sectarian tensions and
polarize sectarian divides. According to a U.S. Institute of Peace
report,[Footnote 8] the focus on ethnic and sectarian identity has
sharpened as a result of Iraq's political process, while nationalism
and a sense of Iraqi identity have weakened.
Figure 2: Political Milestones in Iraq Compared with Enemy-initiated
Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi Partners, May 2003 through
July 2006:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Multi-National Force-Iraq, July 2006.
[End of figure] - graphic text:
Moreover, according to the Director of National Intelligence's February
2006 report, Iraqi security forces are experiencing difficulty in
managing ethnic and sectarian divisions among their units and
personnel. In addition, the DIA Director reported that many elements of
the Iraqi security forces are loyal to sectarian and party interests.
According to DOD's August 2006 report, sectarian lines among Iraqi
security forces are drawn along geographic lines, with Sunni, Shi'a, or
Kurdish soldiers mostly serving in units located in geographic areas
familiar to their group. Moreover, according to the report, commanders
at the battalion level tend to command only soldiers of their own
sectarian or regional background.
On August 7, 2006, MNF-I and Iraqi security forces began phase II of
Operation Together Forward. The operation is an effort to reduce the
level of murders, kidnappings, assassinations, terrorism, and sectarian
violence in Baghdad and to reinforce the Iraqi government's control of
the city. On August 30, 2006, the MNF-I Commanding General said that he
was pleased with the operation's progress, but that there was a long
way to go in bringing security to the neighborhoods of Baghdad. U.S.
intelligence assessments of this operation's impact are classified.
The State Department reported in July 2006 that the recent upturn in
violence has hindered the U.S. government's efforts to engage fully
with its Iraqi partners and to move forward on political and economic
fronts. State noted that a baseline of security was a prerequisite for
moving forward on these fronts, which are essential to achieving the
right conditions for withdrawing U.S. forces. For example, Iraqi
government efforts to foster reconciliation have become more difficult
with the increase in sectarian divisions and violence during the spring
and summer of 2006. According to DOD's August 2006 report, security
issues--such as the attempted kidnapping of a deputy minister and
threats to personnel who work with embassy teams--have made some
ministers reluctant to have U.S. personnel visit them. The report also
noted that the security situation in some provinces has hampered
interaction between U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams[Footnote
9] and provincial leaders. Moreover, the UN reported that the lack of
security has hampered reconstruction efforts. The UN reported that the
diplomatic community remains under serious threat as embassy staff have
been abducted and killed and facilities attacked. The UN noted that
improved security is central to the normal ability of international
agencies to provide assistance to the government and people of Iraq.
As we reported in July 2006, the poor security conditions have also
hindered U.S. and Iraqi government efforts to revitalize Iraq's economy
and restore essential services in the oil and electricity sectors.
According to a State Department report,[Footnote 10] during the week of
August 16-22, 2006, Iraq was producing 2.17 million barrels of oil per
day. This figure is below the Iraqi Oil Ministry's goal of 2.5 million
barrels of oil per day and the pre-war level of 2.6 million barrels per
day. Over the same time period, electricity availability averaged 5.9
hours per day in Baghdad and 10.7 hours nationwide. Electricity output
for the week was about 9 percent above the same period in 2005. U.S.
officials report that major oil pipelines continue to be sabotaged,
shutting down oil exports and resulting in lost revenues. Current U.S.
assistance is focused on strengthening the Strategic Infrastructure
Battalions, which are Ministry of Defense forces that protect oil
fields and pipelines. Major electrical transmission lines have also
been repeatedly sabotaged, cutting power to parts of the country.
Security conditions in Iraq have, in part, led to project delays and
increased costs for security services. Although it is difficult to
quantify the costs and delays resulting from poor security conditions,
both agency and contractor officials acknowledged that security costs
have diverted a considerable amount of reconstruction resources and
have led to canceling or reducing the scope of some reconstruction
projects.
Sunni Insurgency and Shi'a Militias Contribute to Increased Sectarian
Violence:
Although the Sunni insurgency has remained strong and resilient, the
presence and influence of Shi'a militias have grown and led to
increased sectarian violence. According to a July 2006 State Department
report, the Sunni insurgency remains a pressing problem in Iraq.
However, in recent months, Shi'a militia groups have grown more
prominent and threaten Iraq's stability.[Footnote 11] The increase in
sectarian violence has led to an increasing number of Iraqis fleeing
their homes. According to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, the
demobilization of Shi'a militias requires a corresponding reduction in
the Sunni insurgency.[Footnote 12]
Sunni Insurgency Remains Strong and Resilient:
Despite coalition efforts and the efforts of the newly formed Iraqi
government, insurgents continue to demonstrate the ability to recruit
new fighters, supply themselves, and attack coalition and Iraqi
security forces. According to a July 2006 State Department report, the
Sunni insurgency remains a pressing problem in Iraq, even after the
death of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, in early
June 2006. As DOD recently reported, al-Qaeda in Iraq remains able to
conduct operations due to its resilient, semi-autonomous cellular
structure of command and control. The Sunni insurgency consists of
former Baathists, whose goal is to return to power; terrorist groups
such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, its affiliates in the Mujahadeen Shura
Council, and Ansar al Sunna; and various other groups that rely on
violence to achieve their objectives.
Sunni insurgents have no distinct leader but share the goal of
destabilizing the Iraqi government to pursue their individual and, at
times, conflicting goals. Although these groups have divergent goals,
some collaborate at the tactical and operational levels. DOD has
reported that the relationships among insurgents, terrorists, and
criminal opportunists are blurred at times but that the ideological
rifts between terrorists and other resistance groups remain. DOD also
reports that many insurgent groups employ a dual-track political and
military strategy to subvert emerging institutions and to infiltrate
and co-opt security and political organizations. These groups attempt
to leverage the political process to address their core concerns and
demands while attacking coalition and Iraqi security forces.
Presence and Influence of Shi'a Militias Have Grown:
The presence and influence of Shi'a militia groups have grown in recent
months, as they have become more prominent and acted in ways that
threaten Iraq's stability. According to the CENTCOM Commander, as of
early August 2006, these militias are the largest contributors to
sectarian violence in Iraq. As DOD reported in August 2006, the threat
posed by Shi'a militias is growing and represents a significant
challenge for the Iraqi government. The Shi'a militias that are
affecting the security situation the most are the Mahdi Army and the
Badr Organization.
* Mahdi Army: Led by radical Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, this group
was responsible for attacks against the coalition and two uprisings in
April 2004 and August 2004. The militia committed abuses against Sunni
civilians, which have exacerbated sectarian tensions, and were
implicated in unrest following the February bombing in Samarra.
Evidence exists that the Mahdi Army are supplied by sources outside
Iraq, most notably Iran. As of June 2006, Sadr followers headed four of
Iraq's 40 ministries--the ministries of health, transportation,
agriculture, and tourism and antiquities. As DOD recently reported,
this militia has popular support in Baghdad and Iraq's southern
provinces and is tolerated by elements in the Iraqi government.
* Badr Organization: This Shi'a militia group is the paramilitary wing
of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a prominent
political party in the new government. The party was founded in Iran
during the Iran-Iraq war and retains strong ties to Iran. According to
DOD, the Badr Organization received financial and material support from
Iran, and individuals from Badr have been implicated in death squads.
The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq is one of the
two largest Shi'a parties in parliament. One of Iraq's two deputy
presidents and the Minister of Finance are party members.
According to the CENTCOM Commander, Shi'a militias must be controlled
because they are nonstate actors that have the attributes of the state,
yet bear no responsibility for their actions. In many cases, according
to DOD, militias provide protection for people and religious sites,
sometimes operating in conjunction with the Iraqi police in areas where
the Iraqi police are perceived to provide inadequate support. According
to a May 2006 DOD report,[Footnote 13] Shi'a militias seek to place
members into army and police units as a way to serve their interests.
This is particularly evident in the Shi'a dominated south where militia
members have hindered the implementation of law enforcement. Militia
leaders also influence the political process through intimidation and
hope to gain influence with the Iraqi people through politically based
social welfare programs. In areas where they provide social services
and contribute to local security, they operate openly and with popular
support.
According to the Director of National Intelligence, Iran provides
guidance and training to select Iraqi Shi'a political groups and
provides weapons and training to Shi'a militant groups to enable
anticoalition attacks. Iran also has contributed to the increasing
lethality and effectiveness of anticoalition attacks by enabling Shi'a
militants to build improvised explosive devices with explosively formed
projectiles, similar to those developed by Lebanese Hezbollah. Iranian
support for Shi'a militias reinforces Sunni fears of Iranian
domination, further elevating sectarian violence.
According to the August 2006 DOD report, Sunni Arabs do not have
formally organized militias. Instead, they rely on neighborhood
watches, Sunni insurgents, and increasingly, al-Qaeda in Iraq. The rise
of sectarian attacks is driving some Sunni and Shi'a civilians in
Baghdad and in ethnically mixed provinces to support militias. Such
support is likely to continue, according to DOD's report, in areas
where the population perceives Iraqi institutions and forces as unable
to provide essential services or meet security requirements.
Growing Sectarian Violence Has Led to Increased Civilian Deaths and
Displacement:
According to DOD's August 2006 report, rising sectarian strife defines
the emerging nature of violence in mid-2006, with the core conflict in
Iraq now a struggle between Sunni and Shi'a extremists seeking to
control key areas in Baghdad, create or protect sectarian enclaves,
divert economic resources, and impose their own respective political
and religious agendas. The UN reported in March 2006 that the
deteriorating security situation is evidenced by increased levels of
sectarian strife and the sectarian nature of the violence, particularly
in ethnically mixed areas. Figure 3 shows the ethnic distribution of
the population in Iraq. Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, and southwest of Basra
are key ethnically mixed areas.
Figure 3: Ethnic Distribution in Iraq:
[See PDF for image]
Source: CIA map available on the University of Texas Libraries'
Website, The University of Texas at Austin.
[End of figure]
In June 2006, the UN reported that much of the sectarian violence has
been committed by both sides of the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian divide and
has resulted in increased civilian deaths. The UN reported that the
number of Iraqi civilian casualties continues to increase, with a total
of about 14,300 civilians killed in Iraq from January to June 2006. The
overwhelming majority of casualties were reported in Baghdad, according
to the report. Specifically targeted groups included prominent Sunni
and Shi'a Iraqis, government workers and their families, members of the
middle class (such as merchants and academics), people working for or
associated with MNF-I, and Christians. According to the UN, daily
reports of intercommunal intimidation and murder include regular
incidents of bodies of Sunni and Shi'a men found to be tortured and
summarily executed in Baghdad and its surrounding areas. Violence
against Kurds and Arabs has also been reported in Kirkuk, while the
abduction and intimidation of ordinary Iraqis is a growing problem.
According to the report, repeated bombings against civilians, mosques,
and more recently against churches are creating fear, animosity, and
feelings of revenge within Iraq's sectarian communities.
Moreover, according to a July 2006 UN report,[Footnote 14] the increase
in sectarian violence has resulted in a growing number of Iraqis
fleeing their homes. The UN estimated that about 150,000 individuals
had been displaced as of June 30, 2006. The UN reported that people
left their community of origin primarily because of direct or indirect
threats against them or attacks on family members and their community.
According to the report, displaced persons are vulnerable, lack many
basic rights, and compete for limited services. This in turn can
increase intercommunal animosities and can generate further
displacement.
Shi'a Militia Demobilization Depends on Reduction in Sunni Insurgency:
Although U.S. and UN officials recognize the importance of demobilizing
the militias, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq has stated that the
demobilization of the Shi'a militias depends on a reduction in the
Sunni insurgency. According to the Ambassador, a comprehensive plan for
demobilizing all the militias and reintegrating them into Iraqi society
is needed to ensure Iraq's stability and success. However, the Sunni
insurgent groups now see themselves as protectors of the Sunni
community, and the Shi'a militias see themselves as protectors of the
Shi'a community. As DOD reported in August 2006, Sunni and Shi'a
extremists are locked in mutually reinforcing cycles of sectarian
strife, with each portraying themselves as the defenders of their
respective sectarian groups.
DOD and State Progress Reports Provide Limited Information on the
Development of Iraqi Security Forces:
DOD and State report progress in developing capable Iraqi security
forces and transferring security responsibilities to them and the Iraqi
government in three key areas: (1) the number of trained and equipped
forces, (2) the number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments
that have assumed responsibility for security of specific geographic
areas, and (3) the assessed capabilities of operational units, as
reported in aggregate Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) reports.
While all three provide some information on the development of Iraqi
security forces, they do not provide detailed information on specific
capabilities that affect individual units' readiness levels. Unit-level
TRA reports provide that information. We are currently working with DOD
to obtain these reports because they would more fully inform both GAO
and the Congress on the capabilities and needs of Iraq's security
forces.
Increases in Training and Equipping Iraqi Security Forces and
Transferring Security Responsibilities to Them and the Iraqi
Government:
DOD and State have reported progress toward the current goal of
training and equipping about 325,000 Iraqi security forces by December
2006. As shown in table 1, the State Department reports that the number
of trained army and police forces has increased from about 174,000 in
July 2005 to about 294,000 as of August 2006. According to State, the
Ministries of Defense and Interior are on track to complete the initial
training and equipping of all their authorized end-strength forces by
the end of 2006. The authorized end-strength is 137,000 military
personnel in the Ministry of Defense and about 188,000 in Ministry of
Interior police and other forces. However, as we previously
reported,[Footnote 15] the number of trained and equipped security
forces does not provide a complete picture of their capabilities and
may overstate the number of forces on duty. For example, Ministry of
Interior data include police who are absent without leave. Ministry of
Defense data exclude absent military personnel.
Table 1: Reported Number of Trained and Equipped Ministry of Defense
and Ministry of Interior Forces, July 2005, January 2006, and August
2006:
Ministry and Component: Ministry of Defense Forces: Army;
July 2005: 78,200;
January 2006: 105,600;
August 2006: 127,200[A].
Ministry and Component: Ministry of Defense Forces: Air Force;
July 2005: 200;
January 2006: 500;
August 2006: 700.
Ministry and Component: Ministry of Defense Forces: Navy;
July 2005: 700;
January 2006: 800;
August 2006: 1,100.
Ministry and Component: Ministry of Defense Forces: Subtotal[B];
July 2005: 79,100;
January 2006: 106,900;
August 2006: 129,000.
Ministry and Component: Ministry of Interior Forces: Police;
July 2005: 64,100;
January 2006: 82,400;
August 2006: 115,500.
Ministry and Component: Ministry of Interior Forces: Other forces;
July 2005: 30,700;
January 2006: 38,000;
August 2006: 49,600.
Ministry and Component: Ministry of Interior Forces: Subtotal[C];
July 2005: 94,800;
January 2006: 120,400;
August 2006: 165,100.
Ministry and Component: Total;
July 2005: 173,900;
January 2006: 227,300;
August 2006: 294,100.
Source: State Department Iraq Weekly Status Reports:
Note: Ministry of Defense forces are defined as operational. Ministry
of Interior Forces are defined as trained and equipped.
[A] Army number includes Special Operations Forces and Support Forces.
[B] Unauthorized absence personnel are not included in these numbers.
[C] Unauthorized absence personnel are included in these numbers.
[End of table]
In spring 2005, MNF-I recognized that the number of trained and
equipped forces did not reflect their capability to assume
responsibility for security. MNF-I began to develop and refine the TRA
system as a means of assessing the capabilities of Iraqi security
forces.[Footnote 16] It also started a program to place transition
teams with Iraqi army and special police units.
DOD also assesses progress in the number of Iraqi army units and
provincial governments that have assumed responsibility for the
security of specific geographic areas in Iraq. The joint MNF-I/U.S.
Embassy Campaign Plan calls for the Iraqi army to assume the lead for
counterinsurgency operations in specific geographic areas and Iraqi
civil authorities to assume security responsibility for their
provinces. The transition of security responsibilities concludes when
the Iraq government assumes responsibility for security throughout
Iraq.[Footnote 17]
As shown in table 2, DOD reports that an increasing number of Iraqi
army units are capable of leading counterinsurgency operations in
specific geographic areas. DOD reports more detailed information on
this transition in a classified format. However, when an Iraqi army
unit assumes the lead, it does not mean that the unit is capable of
conducting independent operations since it may need to develop
additional capabilities and may require the support of coalition
forces. According to DOD's May 2006 report, it will take time before a
substantial number of Iraqi units are assessed as fully independent and
requiring no assistance considering the need for further development of
Iraqi logistical elements, ministry capacity and capability,
intelligence structures, and command and control.
Table 2: Reported Progress in Transferring Security Responsibilities to
Iraqi Army Combat Units and Provincial Governments, January 2006 and
August 2006:
Type of Security Transition: Iraqi army units leading counterinsurgency
operations in specific areas: Divisions;
January 2006: 2;
August 2006: 5;
Goal: 10.
Type of Security Transition: Iraqi army units leading counterinsurgency
operations in specific areas: Brigades;
January 2006: 8;
August 2006: 25;
Goal: 36.
Type of Security Transition: Iraqi army units leading counterinsurgency
operations in specific areas: Battalions;
January 2006: 37;
August 2006: 85;
Goal: 114[A].
Type of Security Transition: Number of provinces that have assumed
security responsibilities;
January 2006: 0;
August 2006: 1;
Goal: 18.
Sources: DOD and State Department reports.
[A] Includes Iraqi army and special operations battalions.
[End of table]
Table 2 also shows that one provincial government--Muthanna--had
assumed responsibility for security operations, as of August 2006.
According to a July 2006 State Department report, when a provincial
government can assume security responsibilities depends on the (1)
threat level in the province, (2) capabilities of the Iraqi security
forces, (3) capabilities of the provincial government, and (4) posture
of MNF-I forces, that is, MNF-I's ability to respond to major threats,
if needed. Once the provincial government assumes security
responsibilities, the provincial governor and police are in charge of
domestic security. According to an MNF-I official, MNF-I forces will
then move out of all urban areas and assume a supporting role. In
August 2006, DOD reported that security responsibility for as many as
nine of Iraq's provinces could transition to Iraqi government authority
by the end of 2006.
Unit-level TRA Reports Provide More Insight into Iraqi Capabilities and
Development Needs Than Do Aggregate Data on Overall TRA Ratings:
DOD has provided GAO with aggregate information on the overall TRA
levels for Iraqi security forces and the number of Iraqi units in the
lead for counterinsurgency operations. DOD's aggregate data on the
capabilities and readiness of Iraqi security forces do not provide
information on shortfalls in personnel, command and control, equipment,
and leadership. Unit-level TRA reports provide more insight into Iraqi
army capabilities and development needs in personnel, leadership, and
logistics than do the overall TRA levels that DOD reports in classified
format.[Footnote 18] The TRA rating for individual Iraqi army units is
a key factor in determining the ability of the unit to conduct and
assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations.
According to Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) guidance,[Footnote 19]
the TRA is intended to provide commanders with a method to consistently
evaluate Iraqi units, as well as to identify factors hindering
progress, determine resource issues, make resource allocation
decisions, and determine when Iraqi army units are prepared to assume
the lead for security responsibilities. The TRA is prepared jointly on
a monthly basis by the unit's military transition team chief and Iraqi
security forces commander.
In completing TRA reports, commanders assess the unit's capabilities in
six subcategories--personnel, command and control, training,
sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership (see app. 1). After
considering the unit's subcategory ratings, commanders then give each
Iraqi army unit an overall TRA rating that describes the unit's overall
readiness to assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations. The
overall ratings go from TRA level 1 through TRA level 4. To be able to
assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations, Iraqi army units are
required to obtain an overall rating of TRA level 2 as assessed by
their commanders. Commanders also provide a narrative assessment that
describes key shortfalls and impediments to the unit's ability to
assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations and estimate the
number of months needed for the unit to assume the lead. The purpose of
the narrative is to clarify and provide additional support for the
overall TRA rating. The aggregate data on overall TRA ratings for Iraqi
security forces are classified.
DOD has provided us with classified data on the aggregate number of
Iraqi units at each TRA level and more detailed information on which
Iraqi army units have assumed the lead for counterinsurgency
operations. We are currently working with DOD to obtain the unit-level
TRA reports. These unit-level reports would provide GAO and Congress
with more complete information on the status of developing effective
Iraqi security forces. Specifically, unit-level TRA reports would allow
us to (1) determine if the TRA reports are useful and if changes are
needed; (2) verify if aggregate data on overall TRA ratings reflect
unit-level TRA reports; and (3) determine if shortfalls exist in key
areas, such as personnel, equipment, logistics, training, and
leadership.
Questions for Congressional Oversight:
1. What are the key political, economic, and security conditions that
must be achieved before U.S. forces can draw down and ultimately
withdraw from Iraq? What target dates, if any, has the administration
established for drawing down U.S. forces?
2. The continued deterioration of security conditions in Iraq has
hindered U.S. political and economic efforts in Iraq. According to the
State Department, a baseline of security is a prerequisite for moving
forward on the political and economic tasks essential to achieving the
right conditions for withdrawing U.S. forces.
* Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate in Iraq even as
the country has met political milestones, increased the number of
trained and equipped security forces, and increasingly assumed the lead
for security?
* What is the baseline of security that is required for moving forward
on political and economic tasks? What progress, if any, can be made in
the political and economic areas without a significant improvement in
current security conditions?
* If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not
reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the
administration propose for stemming the violence?
3. In February 2006, the Director of National Intelligence reported
that Iraqi security forces were experiencing difficulty in managing
ethnic and sectarian divisions among their units and personnel. The DIA
Director reported that many elements of the Iraqi security forces are
loyal to sectarian and party interests.
* How does the U.S. government assess the extent to which personnel in
the Iraqi security forces are loyal to groups other than the Iraqi
government or are operating along sectarian lines, rather than as
unified national forces? What do these assessments show?
* How would DOD modify its program to train and equip Iraqi security
forces if evidence emerges that Iraqi military and police are
supporting sectarian rather than national interests?
4. MNF-I established the TRA system to assess the capabilities and
readiness of Iraqi security forces.
* How does DOD assess the reliability of TRAs and ensure that they
present an accurate picture of Iraq security forces' capabilities and
readiness?
* At what TRA rating level would Iraqi army units not require any U.S.
military support? What U.S. military support would Iraqi units still
require at TRA levels 1 and 2?
* How does DOD use unit-level TRAs to assess shortfalls in Iraqi
capabilities? What do DOD assessments show about the developmental
needs of Iraqi security forces?
5. In late August 2006, the MNF-I Commanding General said that the
United States is helping Iraq build a force to deal with its current
security threats of international terrorism and insurgency. However, he
noted that the Iraqi government is developing a long-term security plan
to shape the type of armed forces the country will need 5 to 10 years
from now.
* What are the current resource requirements for developing Iraqi
security forces capable of dealing with international terrorism and
insurgency? What have been the U.S. and Iraqi financial contributions
to this effort thus far? What U.S. and Iraqi contributions will be
needed over the next several years?
* What are the projected resource requirements for the future Iraqi
force? What are the projected U.S. and Iraqi financial contributions
for this effort?
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information, please contact Joseph A. Christoff on (202)
512-8979. Key contributors to this testimony were Nanette J. Barton,
Lynn Cothern, Tracey Cross, Martin De Alteriis, Whitney Havens, Brent
Helt, Rhonda Horried, Judith McCloskey, Mary Moutsos, Jason Pogacnik,
and Jena Sinkfield.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Report:
This appendix provides information on the TRA reports used to assess
the capabilities of Iraqi army units. Commanders provide ratings in
each of 6 subcategories (see fig. 4). For each subcategory, a green
rating corresponds to TRA level 1, yellow to TRA level 2, orange to TRA
level 3, and red to TRA level 4. The commanders consider the
subcategory ratings in deciding the overall TRA rating for each unit.
Figure 4: Transition Readiness Assessment Form for Iraqi Army Combat
Units:
[See PDF for image]
Source: MNC-1 Form Dated 15 Mar 06.
[End of figure]
(320366):
FOOTNOTES
[1] This figure includes $5 billion from the Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund II (IRRF) funds appropriated in the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction
of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106, $5.7 billion to
support Iraqi security forces appropriated in the Emergency
Supplemental Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror and Tsunami
Relief 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, and $3 billion to support Iraqi
security forces appropriated in the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane
Recovery, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-234.
[2] The CPA, established in May 2003, was the U.N.-recognized coalition
authority led by the United States and the United Kingdom that was
responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq. Specifically, the CPA
was responsible for overseeing, directing, and coordinating the
reconstruction effort.
[3] GAO, DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and Security
Indicators to Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq, GAO-06-152C (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 18, 2005) for classified information on MNF-I's original
campaign plan, and Plans for Stabilizing Iraq, GAO-06-673C (Washington,
D.C.: Jul. 27, 2006) for classified information on the new Joint MNF-I/
U.S. Embassy Baghdad Campaign Plan.
[4] GAO-06-673C (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 27, 2006) contains a classified
assessment of recent security trends.
[5] Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. Over the past 3
years, Ramadan began about October 27, 2003; October 16, 2004; and
October 5, 2005. In 2006, Ramadan is expected to begin about September
24.
[6] UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to
Paragraph 30 of Resolution 1546 (New York, N.Y.: Jun. 2006).
[7] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 2006).
[8] Phebe Marr, U.S. Institute of Peace, Who are Iraq's New Leaders?
What Do They Want? (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2006).
[9] Provincial Reconstruction Teams are intended to work with
provincial governors and elected councils to improve execution of
provincial government responsibilities and to increase citizen
participation in governmental decision-making processes, according to
DOD's report. As of August 2006, four U.S.-led Provincial
Reconstruction Teams were fully operational in the provinces of Tamim
(Kirkuk), Ninewa (Mosul), Babil (Hillah), and Baghdad.
[10] Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Report (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 23, 2006).
[11] The Kurdish Peshmerga serve as the primary security force for the
Kurdish regional government in the northern region of Iraq. Although
some Peshmerga forces have joined the Iraqi security forces, other
units remain intact as the de facto security force for the Kurdish
region. The presence of the Peshmerga is a source of contention with
both Sunni and Shi'a leaders.
[12] Transcript: Ambassador Khalilzad Outlines New Security Plan for
Iraq, Aug. 7, 2006.
[13] DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, D.C.:
May 2006).
[14] UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Report, May 1-
June 30, 2006.
[15] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in
Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police,
GAO-05-431T, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2005).
[16] The basic format for the TRA is used for the Iraqi army, National
Police, Department of Border Enforcement, and the Strategic
Infrastructure Battalions, although minor differences in their reports
may exist. Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) is in the process of
finalizing the TRA for Iraqi police.
[17] GAO-06-673C (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 27, 2006) provides classified
information on the April 2006 joint campaign plan.
[18] The Iraqi army readiness assessment system has similarities with
the U.S. Army's readiness assessment system. Both systems measure some
of the same categories but use different criteria for achieving each
readiness level.
[19] MNC-I, MNC-I Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Report
Implementing Instructions Update (Mar. 22, 2006).
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