Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq
Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks Gao ID: GAO-07-1220T September 4, 2007This testimony is intended to discuss our report on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act of 20072 (the Act). The Act requires GAO to report on the status of the achievement of these benchmarks. Consistent with GAO's core values and our desire to be fair and balanced, we also considered and used a "partially met" rating for some benchmarks. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to report on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government actions needed to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of the Iraqi population, provide essential services to the population, and promote economic well-being. To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency and Iraqi documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations. These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq. We made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by approximately 100 Iraq-related reports and testimonies that we have completed since May 2003. We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
The benchmarks were derived from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. The Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces and progress that has been made in several areas, including Anbar Province. The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are protected. The government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased--a key security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure whether the perpetrators' intents were sectarian in nature, and other measures of population security show differing trends. As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and with homeland security goals, foreign policy goals, and other goals of the United States.
GAO-07-1220T, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, September 4, 2007:
Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq:
Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic
Benchmarks:
Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United States:
GAO-07-1220T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to appear today to discuss our report[Footnote 1] on
whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18 benchmarks contained
in the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq
Accountability Appropriations Act of 2007[Footnote 2] (the Act). The
Act requires GAO to report on the status of the achievement of these
benchmarks. Consistent with GAO's core values and our desire to be fair
and balanced, we also considered and used a "partially met" rating for
some benchmarks. In comparison, the Act requires the administration to
report on whether satisfactory progress is being made toward meeting
the benchmarks. The benchmarks cover Iraqi government actions needed to
advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, improve the security of
the Iraqi population, provide essential services to the population, and
promote economic well-being.
To complete this work, we reviewed U.S. agency and Iraqi documents and
interviewed officials from the Departments of Defense, State, and the
Treasury; the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its subordinate
commands; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Central Intelligence
Agency; the National Intelligence Council; and the United Nations.
These officials included Ryan Crocker, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and
General David H. Petraeus, Commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq.
We made multiple visits to Iraq during 2006 and 2007, most recently
from July 22 to August 1, 2007. Our analyses were enhanced by
approximately 100 Iraq-related reports and testimonies that we have
completed since May 2003. We conducted our review in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
In summary, we found:
The benchmarks were derived from commitments first articulated by the
Iraqi government in June 2006.
The Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its
18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence
remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend
$10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the
courageous efforts of coalition forces and progress that has been made
in several areas, including Anbar Province.
The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the
rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are
protected. The government has not enacted legislation on de-
Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty,
and militia disarmament.
It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased--a key
security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure whether the
perpetrators' intents were sectarian in nature, and other measures of
population security show differing trends.
As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance
the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and
with homeland security goals, foreign policy goals, and other goals of
the United States.
Origins of the Benchmarks:
The benchmarks contained in the Act were derived from commitments
articulated by the Iraqi government beginning in June 2006 and affirmed
in subsequent statements by Prime Minister Maliki in September 2006 and
January 2007 (see fig. 1). Iraq's commitments to these benchmarks were
most recently stated in the May 2007 International Compact for Iraq.
Figure 1: Origin of Iraqi Benchmarks:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State, Department of Defense, and
Iraqi government data.
[A] Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of
political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline
in September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on
October 16, 2006.
[B] In December 2006 the Multi-National Force-Iraq and government of
Iraq agreed to establish the Joint Security Stations.
[End of figure]
GAO Assessment of the 18 Benchmarks:
As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and
did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not
been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi
government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds.
Figure 2: GAO Assessment of the 18 Benchmarks:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of UN, U.S., and Iraqi data.
[End of figure]
Most Legislative Benchmarks Have Yet to Be Enacted and Implemented:
The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the
rights of minority political parties in Iraq's legislature are
protected. The government also partially met one benchmark --to enact
and implement legislation on the formation of regions; this law was
enacted in October 2006 but will not be implemented until April 2008.
Six other legislative benchmarks have not been met. Specifically, a
review committee has not completed work on important revisions to
Iraq's constitution. Further, the government has not enacted
legislation on de-Ba'athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial
elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. The administration's
report cited progress in achieving some benchmarks but provided little
information on what step in the legislative process each benchmark had
reached. We provide that information below.
Figure 3: Enactment and Implementation Status of Six Legislative
Benchmarks:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of UN, U.S., and Iraqi data.
Notes:
[A] The Iraqi legislature is considering several competing drafts.
[B] The Iraqi Constitution exempts the law on formation of regions from
following the Presidency Council's ratification process that is set out
in Article 138 of the Constitution.
[C] The draft deals with broader federal versus provincial powers,
according to the United Nations.
[D] According to State, the Iraqi government may not need a law to set
the election date, though to date this is unclear.
[End of figure]
Mixed Results in Achieving Security Benchmarks:
Two of nine security benchmarks have been met. Specifically, Iraq's
government has established various committees in support of the Baghdad
security plan and established almost all of the planned Joint Security
Stations in Baghdad. The government has partially met the benchmarks of
providing three trained and ready brigades for Baghdad operations and
eliminating safe havens for outlawed groups. Five other benchmarks have
not been met. The government has not eliminated militia control of
local security, eliminated political intervention in military
operations, ensured even-handed enforcement of the law, increased army
units capable of independent operations, and ensured that political
authorities made no false accusations against security forces. It is
unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased--a key
security benchmark--since it is difficult to measure perpetrators'
intents, and various other measures of population security from
different sources show differing trends. As displayed in figure 4,
average daily attacks against civilians have remained unchanged from
February to July 2007.
Figure 4: Average Number of Daily, Enemy-Initiated Attacks against the
Coalition, Iraqi Security Forces, and Civilians (May 2003-July 2007):
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of DIA-reported Multi-National Force-Iraq data,
July 2007.
[End of figure]
Comparison of GAO and Executive Branch Assessments:
Public Law 110-28 requires GAO to report to Congress by September 1,
2007,[Footnote 3] on whether or not the government of Iraq has met 18
benchmarks contained in the Act, and the status of the achievement of
these benchmarks. The Act requires the administration to report in July
and September 2007 on whether satisfactory progress is being made
toward meeting the benchmarks. As stated previously, we considered and
used a "partially met" rating in several circumstances. Figure 5
compares the two assessments.
Figure 5: Comparison of GAO Assessment with Administration's July 2007
Initial Benchmark Assessment Report:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of UN, U.S., and Iraqi data.
[A] According to the U.S. State Department, conditions are not present
for these benchmarks.
[End of figure]
Conclusions:
As of August 30, 2007, the Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and
had not met 11 of 18 legislative, security, and economic benchmarks.
The Iraqi government has not fulfilled commitments it first made in
June 2006 to advance legislative, security, and economic measures that
would promote national reconciliation among Iraq's warring factions. Of
particular concern is the lack of progress on de-Ba'athification
legislation that could promote greater Sunni participation in the
national government and comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation that
would distribute Iraq's vast oil wealth. In late August, Iraq's senior
Shi'a, Sunni Arab and Kurdish political leaders signed a Unity Accord
signaling efforts to foster greater national reconciliation. The Accord
covered draft legislation on de-Ba'thification reform and provincial
powers laws, as well as setting up a mechanism to release some Sunni
detainees being held without charges. However, the polarization of
Iraq's major sects and ethnic groups and fighting among Sh'ia factions
further diminishes the stability of Iraq's governing coalition and its
potential to enact legislation needed for sectarian reconciliation.
Reconciliation was also premised on a reduction in violence. While the
Baghdad security plan was intended to reduce sectarian violence, it is
unclear whether violence has been reduced. Measuring such violence may
be difficult since the perpetrators' intents are not clearly known.
Other measures, such as the number of enemy-initiated attacks, show
that violence has remained high through July 2007.
As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance
the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and
homeland security, foreign policy, and other goals of the United
States. Future administration reports on the benchmarks would be more
useful to the Congress if they clearly depicted the status of each
legislative benchmark, provided additional quantitative and qualitative
information on violence from all relevant U.S. agencies, and specified
the performance and loyalties of Iraqi security forces supporting
coalition operations.
Recommendations:
In preparing future reports to Congress and to help increase
transparency on progress made toward achieving the benchmarks, we
recommend that:
1. The Secretary of State provide information to the President that
clearly specifies the status in drafting, enacting, and implementing
Iraqi legislation;
2. The Secretary of Defense and the heads of other appropriate agencies
provide information to the President on trends in sectarian violence
with appropriate caveats, as well as broader quantitative and
qualitative measures of security; and:
3. " The Secretary of Defense and the heads of other appropriate
agencies provide additional information on the operational readiness of
Iraqi security forces supporting the Baghdad security plan,
particularly information on their loyalty and willingness to help
secure Baghdad.
We provided drafts of the report accompanying this testimony to the
relevant U.S. agencies for review and comment, which we incorporated as
appropriate. We received written comments from the Departments of State
and Defense and technical comments from the Central Intelligence Agency
and National Intelligence Council, which are included in the report.
State and DOD concurred with our recommendations but disagreed with our
assessment of certain benchmarks. Although we analyzed classified data,
including the August 2007 National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq, the
testimony and report only contain unclassified information, as of
August 30, 2007. We issued a classified report to supplement the
information discussed in our report.[Footnote 4]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared
statement. I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:
If you or your staffs have any questions about this testimony, please
contact me at (202) 512-5500 or Mr. Joseph A. Christoff, Director,
International Affairs and Trade, at (202) 512-8979. Key contributors to
this testimony include Stephen Lord, David Bruno, Howard Cott, Timothy
Fairbanks, Mattias Fenton, Whitney Havens, Dorian Herring, Bruce
Kutnick, Judith McCloskey, Tetsuo Miyabara, and Kathleen Monahan.
In addition, Ashley Alley, Monica Brym, Lessie Burke-Johnson, Joe
Carney, Miriam Carroll, Debbie Chung, Thomas Costa, Lynn Cothern,
Aniruddha Dasgupta, Martin de Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Muriel Forster,
Patrick Hickey, Michael Jenkins, Sona Kalapura, Jeremy Latimer, Mary
Moutsos, Sidney Schwartz, Jena Sinkfield, Audrey Solis, Cynthia Taylor,
and Christina Werth provided technical assistance.
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Iraqi Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and
Economic Benchmarks (GAO-07-1195) (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2007).
[2] Section 1314 of P.L. 110-28.
[3] GAO provided this report to Congress on September 4, 2007, the
first business day following September 1, 2007.
[4] GAO-07-1223C.
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