Embassy Security
Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site Conditions Prevent Full Adherence to Standards Gao ID: GAO-08-162 January 18, 2008Following the 1998 embassy bombings, the Department of State (State) determined that more than 85 percent of diplomatic facilities did not meet security standards and were vulnerable to terrorist attacks. State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has undertaken a program to replace or upgrade the security of these facilities. As of 2007, OBO had constructed more than 50 new embassies and moved nearly 15,000 staff to safer facilities. However, most remaining facilities will not be replaced in the near term. To address these facilities, OBO has obligated about $140 million per year for its Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP). GAO was asked to (1) describe the process that OBO follows to prioritize and plan CSUP projects, including stakeholder involvement; (2) determine the extent to which CSUP projects met contracted cost and time frames and whether OBO has procedures to ensure security upgrades are installed; and (3) assess whether State's CSUP efforts have enhanced posts' abilities to comply with State's physical security standards. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent State documents, met with State officials in Washington, D.C., and overseas, and traveled to 11 posts in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East. State provided written comments on a draft of this report and agreed with our findings.
OBO has a threat- and vulnerability-based process for prioritizing which posts receive CSUP projects and a planning process that utilizes input from State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and post officials. DS assessments are currently based on physical security of each post's main compound, although many posts have facilities located outside the compound. DS is developing a prioritization process that will factor in the number of personnel, threat levels, and vulnerabilities at each facility, including those off compound. OBO has improved its planning processes by conducting a comprehensive survey of posts' physical security needs, including off-compound facilities. GAO found that 96 percent of 47 projects undertaken since fiscal year 2004 were completed within 30 days of their contractual completion date. However, OBO modified 81 percent of the contracts to extend their completion dates. GAO also found that while OBO paid the contractors the amount specified in the contracts, contract modifications resulted in cost adjustments to all but two contracts, which GAO found in prior work is not uncommon in government renovation projects. OBO cited factors outside the contractors' control as the cause of most delays and cost increases, such as lengthy local permitting issues. To help ensure security upgrades contracted for are completed, OBO assigns a project manager who is responsible for the project's completion and relies on regional and post officials to provide additional monitoring. CSUP projects have enhanced posts' compliance with physical security standards by constructing compound access control facilities, safe areas for post personnel, and compound walls and barriers. However, at the 11 posts GAO visited, site conditions prevented them from adhering fully with standards. For example, more than one post's urban location prevented it from achieving a 100-foot setback from the street, a key security standard. As a result, many buildings and their occupants may remain vulnerable to attack.
GAO-08-162, Embassy Security: Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site Conditions Prevent Full Adherence to Standards
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Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2008:
Embassy Security:
Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site Conditions Prevent Full
Adherence to Standards:
Embassy Security:
GAO-08-162:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-162, a report to the Ranking Member, Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Following the 1998 embassy bombings, the Department of State (State)
determined that more than 85 percent of diplomatic facilities did not
meet security standards and were vulnerable to terrorist attacks.
State‘s Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has undertaken a
program to replace or upgrade the security of these facilities. As of
2007, OBO had constructed more than 50 new embassies and moved nearly
15,000 staff to safer facilities. However, most remaining facilities
will not be replaced in the near term. To address these facilities, OBO
has obligated about $140 million per year for its Compound Security
Upgrade Program (CSUP).
GAO was asked to (1) describe the process that OBO follows to
prioritize and plan CSUP projects, including stakeholder involvement;
(2) determine the extent to which CSUP projects met contracted cost and
time frames and whether OBO has procedures to ensure security upgrades
are installed; and (3) assess whether State‘s CSUP efforts have
enhanced posts‘ abilities to comply with State‘s physical security
standards. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed pertinent State
documents, met with State officials in Washington, D.C., and overseas,
and traveled to 11 posts in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East.
State provided written comments on a draft of this report and agreed
with our findings.
What GAO Found:
OBO has a threat- and vulnerability-based process for prioritizing
which posts receive CSUP projects and a planning process that utilizes
input from State‘s Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and post
officials. DS assessments are currently based on physical security of
each post‘s main compound, although many posts have facilities located
outside the compound. DS is developing a prioritization process that
will factor in the number of personnel, threat levels, and
vulnerabilities at each facility, including those off compound. OBO has
improved its planning processes by conducting a comprehensive survey of
posts‘ physical security needs, including off-compound facilities.
GAO found that 96 percent of 47 projects undertaken since fiscal year
2004 were completed within 30 days of their contractual completion
date. However, OBO modified 81 percent of the contracts to extend their
completion dates. GAO also found that while OBO paid the contractors
the amount specified in the contracts, contract modifications resulted
in cost adjustments to all but two contracts, which GAO found in prior
work is not uncommon in government renovation projects. OBO cited
factors outside the contractors‘ control as the cause of most delays
and cost increases, such as lengthy local permitting issues. To help
ensure security upgrades contracted for are completed, OBO assigns a
project manager who is responsible for the project‘s completion and
relies on regional and post officials to provide additional monitoring.
CSUP projects have enhanced posts‘ compliance with physical security
standards by constructing compound access control facilities, safe
areas for post personnel, and compound walls and barriers. However, at
the 11 posts GAO visited, site conditions prevented them from adhering
fully with standards. For example, more than one post‘s urban location
prevented it from achieving a 100-foot setback from the street, a key
security standard. As a result, many buildings and their occupants may
remain vulnerable to attack.
Figure: Key Security measures at a National Embassy:
This figure is an illustration of key security measures at a national
embassy.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO (data); Nova Development (clip art).
[End of figure]
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-162]. For more information, contact
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
CSUP Planning Process Balances Security Needs of Posts and Includes
Input from Stakeholders:
CSUP Projects Generally Completed within Contractual Time Frames and
Costs, and OBO Has Project Management Procedures to Help Ensure
Completion:
CSUP Has Enhanced Physical Security, but Site Conditions at Many Posts
Limit Ability to Adhere to All Security Standards:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Figures:
Figure 1: Key Security Measures at a Notional Embassy Compound:
Figure 2: CSUP Project Timeliness, Cost, and Contract Modifications:
Figure 3: A New CAC Facility:
Figure 4: A New Fence, Bollards, and Concrete Planters:
Figure 5: A Post with Insufficient Setback:
Abbreviations:
CAC: compound access control:
CSUP: Compound Security Upgrades Program:
DS: State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security:
NEC: New Embassy Compound:
OBO: State Department's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 18, 2008:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Davis:
Following the 1998 embassy attacks in East Africa, the Department of
State (State) determined that more than 85 percent of diplomatic
facilities overseas did not meet security standards at that time and
were vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Since then, State has worked with
other agencies that operate overseas to enhance security standards and
State's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) has undertaken a
major program to replace or upgrade these facilities to comply with
security standards. As of the end of fiscal year 2007, OBO constructed
more than 50 new facilities and moved nearly 15,000 staff to safer work
facilities at a cost of more than $5.9 billion.[Footnote 1] However,
most remaining overseas diplomatic office facilities will not be
replaced in the near term. To address security deficiencies at these
facilities, OBO has obligated approximately $140 million per year for
its Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP), which aims to enhance
physical security protection for vulnerable facilities until they are
replaced by improving perimeter security measures and installing forced
entry/ballistic resistant doors and windows, among other security
upgrades.[Footnote 2] At posts where OBO does not plan to replace the
embassy facility, CSUP aims to enhance physical security protection to
the extent possible given the nature of the facility and the risks
identified.
In this report, we (1) describe the process that OBO follows to
prioritize and plan CSUP projects, including stakeholder involvement;
(2) determine the extent to which CSUP projects met contracted cost and
time frames and whether OBO has procedures to ensure security upgrades
are installed; and (3) assess whether State's CSUP efforts have
enhanced posts' ability to comply with State's physical security
standards.
To address these objectives, we reviewed State prioritization and
planning documents concerning the assignment of post threat levels,
assessments of the security vulnerabilities of posts, and project
planning procedures. We also reviewed contracting documentation for
select CSUP projects to assess their timeliness and cost. Our scope
included all 47 projects contracted since fiscal year 2004, completed
by the end of fiscal year 2007, and valued at $1 million or more and,
therefore, excluded smaller projects such as those designed to enhance
the security of schools and other non-U.S. government properties
frequented by U.S. personnel and their dependents.[Footnote 3] We
assessed the impact of these projects on physical security conditions
at posts based on the security standards set forth in State's "Foreign
Affairs Handbook" and "Foreign Affairs Manual." We discussed CSUP with
officials from OBO and State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) in
Washington, D.C., and with post officials and contractors overseas. We
traveled to 11 posts in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East. We
selected these countries to ensure regional coverage, a range of
project types, and a mix of ongoing and completed projects. We are not
naming the specific countries we visited for this review due to
security concerns.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2006 through January
2008, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
based on our audit objectives. (See app. I for a more complete
description of our scope and methodology.)
Results in Brief:
OBO has a threat-and vulnerability-based process for determining which
posts receive a CSUP project each year and a project planning process
to develop each CSUP project, utilizing input from DS and post
personnel. OBO prioritizes which posts will receive upgrades based in
part on assessments from DS of the threat levels and physical security
conditions at each post. However, the DS physical security assessment
is currently based on the physical security needs of the post's main
compound, even though there are hundreds of post facilities located
outside the main embassy or consulate compound. DS is developing a risk-
based prioritization process that will factor in the number of
personnel, threat levels, and vulnerabilities at each facility,
including off-compound facilities. After State receives its budget
appropriation, OBO decides where it will install CSUP upgrades based on
its priority list. As OBO moves into the design and construction phase
of individual projects, it consults with security and facilities
management officials at the posts. In recent years, OBO has improved
its project planning processes by conducting a comprehensive survey of
the physical security needs of posts, including off-compound
facilities, early in the planning phase.
Most CSUP projects have been completed within 30 days of their
contractual completion date and for the contracted cost, and OBO has
project management procedures to help ensure that contractors complete
the work called for in the contracts. However, OBO found it necessary
to modify all but one of the contracts to extend project completion
dates, adjust costs, or both. In reviewing schedule performance data
for 47 projects undertaken since 2004, we found that 96 percent of
projects were completed within 30 days of their contractual completion
date. However, OBO modified 81 percent of the 47 contracts to extend
their completion dates by an average of almost 4 months. In reviewing
cost data, we found that while OBO paid the contractors the amount
specified in the fixed-price contracts, at an average project cost of
$2.6 million, contract modifications resulted in cost adjustments to
all but two of the contracts. OBO increased the total cost of three-
quarters of the projects an average of 17 percent and decreased the
remaining quarter of the projects an average of 5 percent--a net
increase of $10 million for all 47 projects. Past GAO assessments of
government construction projects found that for renovations of existing
facilities such cost variances were not uncommon. OBO cited factors
outside the contractor's control as the cause of most of the delays and
cost increases, such as unusually lengthy local permitting processes
and design changes made during construction work. For example, when OBO
increased the scope of work of a CSUP project to include a new compound
access control (CAC) facility, it modified the contract to compensate
the contractor an additional $874,000. To help ensure that security
upgrades contracted for are completed and enhance posts' compliance
with physical security standards, OBO assigns a project manager who is
responsible for the effective completion of the project and relies on a
mix of regional and post officials to provide additional on-site
monitoring. At the 11 posts we visited, the upgrades contracted for had
been or were being installed.
Completed CSUP projects have generally enhanced posts' compliance with
physical security standards at 47 embassies and consulates, but many of
these posts continue to face physical security deficiencies that cannot
be addressed without building a new facility. CSUP security
enhancements at these posts have encompassed constructing compound
access control facilities at the perimeter of the compounds at 25
posts; building safe areas for post officials in case of attack at 25
posts; and improving compound walls, fencing, and barriers at 22 posts.
At the 11 posts we visited, we found the CSUP projects had enhanced
posts' compliance with State's physical security standards as detailed
in the "Foreign Affairs Handbook" and "Foreign Affairs Manual."
Specifically, the projects replaced perimeter fencing to meet anti-
climb requirements, installed bollards[Footnote 4] and barriers at key
points to meet anti-ram requirements, built safe areas for post
officials in case of attack, and replaced or enhanced pedestrian and
vehicle access points to the posts. However, because of site conditions
that were outside the scope of the physical security upgrade projects,
we found that none of the posts we visited were in full compliance with
all of State's physical security standards.[Footnote 5] For example,
more than one post's location in a dense urban area prevented it from
achieving a 100-foot setback from the street, a key security standard,
while older structures at some posts were not able to support forced
entry/ballistic resistant windows. As a result, many buildings and
their occupants may remain vulnerable to attack.
The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this
report, which are reproduced in appendix II. State agreed with our
findings, noting that the report accurately describes State's CSUP
efforts. State also provided us with technical suggestions and
clarifications that we have addressed in this report, as appropriate.
Background:
In response to various attacks, State has continually assessed and
updated its security standards and physical security measures at posts
around the world. After the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya,
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, State initiated the Capital Security
Construction program (also referred to as the New Embassy Compound
[NEC] program), a multiyear effort to replace approximately 200
facilities with new facilities that meet State's updated security
standards. As of the end of fiscal year 2007, State had obligated more
than $5.9 billion for this program, awarded contracts for the
construction of 78 new embassy and consulate compounds, and completed
more than 50 new facilities. State currently plans to contract for 80
more new facilities through 2014.
To complement its efforts to move overseas U.S. government employees
into more secure facilities, State initiated efforts to enhance
physical security at existing facilities. After the 1998 embassy
bombings, State initiated a new physical security upgrades program
called the World-Wide Security Upgrade Program, which focused on
enhancing perimeter security measures. In response to the September 11
terrorist attacks, State focused on ensuring that embassies and
consulates had adequate safe areas for staff in case of an attack on
the facilities. Since 2004, State has taken a more comprehensive
approach to physical security upgrades by reviewing the entire range of
physical security needs at posts through CSUP. State has identified the
following four goals for CSUP:
* to provide physical security protection to the extent practical for
existing facilities;
* to provide physical security upgrades to meet current security
standards for those facilities that will not be replaced by a NEC in
the near-term;
* to initiate physical security upgrades at facilities that are not
part of the chancery compound, including annexes, public diplomacy
facilities, and warehouses; and:
* to provide security upgrades to nongovernmental facilities ("soft
targets") frequented by U.S. citizens.
From fiscal year 1999 through 2007, State had obligated more than $1.2
billion for security upgrades. Since fiscal year 2004 and the
initiation of CSUP, OBO has undertaken approximately 55 major projects
costing over $1 million that enhance physical security at posts that
are not going to be replaced with a new facility in the near future, if
at all. OBO's Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan calls for it to
undertake an average of 13 major CSUP projects per year through 2012.
CSUP provides several categories of security upgrades to help posts
meet physical security standards, such as perimeter security measures
(including anti-climb walls, fences, compound access control
facilities, bollards, cameras, and security lighting); forced entry/
ballistic resistant doors and windows; safe areas for U.S. personnel in
case of emergency; and stand-alone mail screening facilities. In
addition, OBO has obligated approximately $58 million per year of CSUP
funds for minor post-managed security upgrade projects, such as minor
residential security upgrades, maintenance, repair, and replacement of
existing forced entry/ballistic resistant doors and windows, and
modular mail screening facilities.
The Overseas Security Policy Board, which includes representatives from
more than 20 U.S. intelligence, foreign affairs, and other agencies, is
responsible for considering, developing, and promoting security
policies and standards that affect U.S. government agencies under the
authority of the Chief of Mission at a post. This responsibility
includes reviewing and issuing uniform guidance on physical security
standards for embassies, consulates, and other overseas office space.
State incorporates the board's physical security standards in its
"Foreign Affairs Handbook" and "Foreign Affairs Manual." With respect
to existing office buildings, the standards apply to the maximum extent
feasible or practicable.[Footnote 6]
State has identified five key Overseas Security Policy Board standards
to protect overseas diplomatic office facilities against terrorism and
other dangers (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Key Security Measures at a National Embassy Compound:
This figure is an illustration key security measures at a national
embassy compound.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO (data); Nova Development (clip art).
[End of figure]
First, the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of
1999[Footnote 7] requires that office facilities be at least 100 feet
from uncontrolled areas, such as a street where vehicles can pass
without being checked by security officials. This distance is meant to
help protect the buildings and occupants against threats such as bomb
blasts. Second, State requires high perimeter walls or fences that are
difficult to climb, thereby deterring those who might attack the
compound on foot. Third, State requires anti-ram barriers to ensure
that vehicles cannot breach the facility perimeter to get close to the
building and detonate a bomb. The fourth standard requires blast-
resistant construction techniques and materials. These materials
include reinforced concrete and steel construction and blast-resistant
windows. Coupled with a 100-foot setback, blast-resistant construction
provides the best possible protection against vehicle bomb attack,
according to DS officials. State's fifth security standard is
controlled access of pedestrians and vehicles at the perimeter of a
compound. Compound access control facilities allow guards to screen
personnel and visitors before they enter the compound to verify that
they have legitimate business at the embassy or consulate and that they
bring nothing onto the compound that could be potentially harmful or
used to surreptitiously gather intelligence. Similarly, the facilities
allow guards to search vehicles before they are permitted to enter the
compound.
CSUP Planning Process Balances Security Needs of Posts and Includes
Input from Stakeholders:
OBO has a threat-and vulnerability-based planning process for its CSUP
projects that includes input from DS's analysis of security threats and
vulnerabilities and from post officials. The DS analysis currently
focuses on embassy and consulate compounds, though DS is developing a
risk-based prioritization process that considers the number of
personnel, threats, and vulnerabilities at each facility, including off-
compound facilities. OBO has improved its process for developing
projects by conducting more comprehensive needs assessments of posts,
including off-compound facilities, early in the design phase.
OBO Planning Reflects DS Security Analysis and Input from Post:
OBO prioritizes which posts will receive upgrades based in part on
assessments from DS of the physical security conditions and threat
levels at each post. Each year, DS ranks all 262 posts based on their
threat levels and vulnerabilities. With input from posts' security
officers and the intelligence community, DS determines the threat level
for terrorism and political violence. DS also determines the
vulnerabilities of each post in several categories, including
protection from chemical and biological attack, seismic and blast
resistance, the strength of the construction and façade, and the amount
of setback. Once these determinations are made, DS ranks the
posts.[Footnote 8] The resulting list of rankings is used by OBO and
other stakeholders to plan NEC projects.
For CSUP planning, posts that are scheduled for an NEC project within
the next 2 to 3 years are removed from the list, and DS and OBO
reevaluate the list, factoring in the number of people at post, to
create a priority list for CSUP projects. OBO then modifies the list to
balance various factors. First, OBO removes facilities that cannot be
further upgraded, such as many leased facilities. Second, OBO adds
facilities that may have been removed, such as vulnerable off-compound
facilities at posts where NEC projects are planned. Third, OBO has
security engineers conduct a thorough assessment of each post's needs.
Fourth, OBO alters the list to account for external factors, such as
difficulty getting a host government's approval on a project, which
would move a project down the list. Finally, OBO develops its 6-year
list of CSUP projects based on expected funds and places these projects
in the Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan. If OBO experiences budget
constraints, it will delay projects--moving future projects to
subsequent fiscal years--rather than reduce their scope, according to
State officials.
Once a project is placed on the Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan, an
OBO team undertakes an assessment visit to the post to determine what
the project should include. OBO consults with DS and the post and
reviews Office of Inspector General security inspections in order to
determine the scope of the project. One year prior to a project's start
date, OBO then develops an initial planning survey in which OBO seeks
agreement between its engineers and the post's Regional Security
Officer. The initial planning survey is then sent in draft form for
approval by OBO and post officials, including the Regional Security
Officer, administrative officer, and facilities manager. Once this
process is completed, OBO works with its contract design firm to
develop conceptual design plans. State's contracting offices use these
plans to advertise for bids to complete the design and construct the
improvements using a design-build contract.[Footnote 9] After a firm
has been awarded the contract, it will develop and submit interim and
then final plans for OBO's review. OBO consults with post officials,
including the Regional Security Officer, in reviewing the designs to
help ensure that proposed upgrades meet each post's security needs
before giving the firm authorization to proceed with construction.
DS Priority Assessments Focus on Main Compounds, but Efforts Are Being
Made to Address All Post Facilities:
According to OBO and DS officials, the DS physical security assessment
is currently based on the physical security needs of each post's main
compound but does not factor in the security of facilities located
outside the main embassy or consulate compound, even though hundreds of
such facilities exist. We noted that, in several cases, these off-
compound facilities lacked required physical security measures. For
example, we found that one post compound, following the conclusion of
its CSUP project, met most security standards, but a nearby off-
compound office facility did not have setback, blast-resistant walls
and windows, a controlled access facility for pedestrians and vehicles,
a safe area, and other security features.
OBO and DS are currently working to better address the needs of all
facilities, including the hundreds of annexes located off compound, and
improve CSUP project prioritization. OBO officials commented that newer
projects take into account the needs of all facilities at a post,
whether they are on compound or not. For example, at one post we
visited, we saw a CSUP project for an off-compound office facility.
Moreover, DS is developing a new risk-based process to prioritize CSUP
projects that will rate the vulnerabilities of each overseas building
with office space, including annexes, and factor in the number of
personnel and threat levels to better set priorities. According to a DS
official, the formula needs to be validated and, if successful, staff
needs to be trained on its use before beginning implementation. State
expects to complete these steps by March 2008.
OBO Has Taken Steps to Conduct More Comprehensive Needs Assessments
during Project Design:
OBO is taking additional steps to more comprehensively address post
security needs and improve CSUP planning processes. According to OBO,
CSUP initially focused on perimeter security, but as new standards have
been put in place and perimeter projects completed, the program has
broadened its focus to ensure that posts meet all physical security
standards to the extent feasible. For example, in 2004, terrorists
rushed on foot past the barriers blocking a car being inspected at the
vehicular gate of the consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. In response,
State began to install additional fencing and a secondary gate, called
a man trap, at vehicle entry points at posts to prevent attackers on
foot from accessing the compounds. Moreover, the Overseas Security
Policy Board is currently considering the addition of a new security
standard requiring man traps. In addition, OBO officials noted that
they meet monthly to improve processes for project planning and
execution, including those involving CSUP. One result of these meetings
has been a decision to conduct OBO's initial planning surveys earlier
in the design process to gain a better understanding of post's security
needs. Another result of these meetings is that OBO created a more
comprehensive survey instrument to better identify all vulnerabilities
at the post for consideration in the CSUP project.
CSUP Projects Generally Completed within Contractual Time Frames and
Costs, and OBO Has Project Management Procedures to Help Ensure
Completion:
While most CSUP projects we reviewed have been completed within their
contractual time frames and costs, OBO found it necessary to modify all
but one of the contracts to extend project time frames, adjust costs,
or both. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2004, OBO has contracted
for 47 projects valued at $1 million or more that were subsequently
completed by September 30, 2007. In reviewing schedule performance
data, we found that 96 percent of projects were completed within 30
days of their contractual completion date (see fig. 2). However, we
found that OBO modified the contracts to extend their completion dates
for 81 percent of the projects. On average, OBO extended the contracts
by 4 months--an average increase of 26 percent.[Footnote 10] Many of
these extensions did not result in increased costs to the government.
Figure 2: CSUP Project Timeliness, Cost, and Contract Modifications:
This figure is a combination of pie charts showing CSUP project
timeliness, cost, and contract modifications.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[A] Timeliness was measured against contractual obligations, including
modifications. Total does not equal 100 due to rounding.
[B] Total does not equal 100 due to rounding.
[C] This project has a pending modification for both completion date
and cost.
[End of figure]
For each of the 47 projects, OBO paid the contractor the amount
specified in the fixed-price contracts--an average project cost of $2.6
million. In reviewing cost data, we found that OBO increased the
contract cost for 34 projects, at an average increase of 17 percent,
and decreased the contract cost for 11 projects, at an average decrease
of 5 percent (see fig. 2). The net change in the cost of the 47
projects was an increase of $10 million. Cost increases were generally
due to changes in the scope of the projects, while cost decreases were
generally due to a reduction in expected local tax costs. Our past
assessments of domestic government renovation projects found that work
on existing facilities presented a number of difficulties and
challenges, making renovations especially susceptible to cost increases
stemming from unexpected conditions.[Footnote 11] We found that, for
such projects, government agencies generally budget 5 to 15 percent of
project cost for unexpected changes.
OBO cited factors outside the contractor's control as the cause of most
of the delays and cost increases, such as unusually lengthy local
permitting processes, previously unidentified underground utilities
that needed to be moved, design changes that OBO made during
construction work, and project changes requested by the post. For
example, OBO extended the deadline 10 months for completion of
perimeter fencing upgrades and a new CAC facility at a U.S. consulate
in Asia because of delays in receiving approval from local authorities
to proceed with the work. In addition, in response to a request from
officials at a U.S. embassy in Europe, OBO added to the scope of the
planned CSUP project, including a new CAC facility, and modified the
contract to pay the contractor an additional $874,000 for the added
work. However, in cases where OBO found that contractor error was the
cause of a delay or cost increase, OBO held the contractor accountable.
For example, at a U.S. mission in Europe, OBO found instances where the
contractor's work did not conform to contract specifications and
required the contractor to redo the work. OBO did not compensate the
contractor for the additional costs associated with replacing the
substandard work. Similarly, at a U.S. consulate in Europe, the
contractor was more than 6 months late in completing the security
upgrades; OBO, therefore, assessed the contractor a penalty of almost
$60,000.
OBO has project management procedures to help ensure the security
upgrades it contracted for are completed and have enhanced posts'
compliance with physical security standards. For each CSUP project, OBO
assigns a project manager who is responsible for the effective
completion of the project. However, because CSUP projects are generally
small and OBO has limited resources, project managers are not usually
able to be on site full time during the project. Project managers visit
posts to ensure the work contracted for is being done and, in many
cases, rely on post officials, including the Regional Security Officers
and facility managers, to provide additional monitoring of the work. In
our visits to 11 posts, we found that, in most cases, the work called
for in the projects had been done or was under way. However, at one
location, we found that one component of the project--strengthening the
room where the post's emergency generator is located--was removed from
the scope of the project because, according to post officials, it would
have unexpectedly required creating new office space to relocate people
during the work, adding costs that could not be covered by the CSUP
budget. OBO decided to remove this work from the scope of the project
and initiate a new project in the future to address this physical
security need.
CSUP Has Enhanced Physical Security, but Site Conditions at Many Posts
Limit Ability to Adhere to All Security Standards:
Completed CSUP projects have achieved their objective of enhancing the
security at posts by bringing posts in better compliance with security
standards. Major CSUP projects have enhanced physical security at 47
embassies and consulates since fiscal year 2004, and OBO currently
expects to complete all major CSUP projects, barring extensive changes
to current security standards or expected funding, by 2018. CSUP
security enhancements have encompassed constructing compound access
control facilities at the perimeter of the compounds at 25 posts (see
fig. 3 for an example); building safe areas for post officials in case
of attack at 25 posts; improving compound walls, fencing, and barriers
at 22 posts (see fig. 4 for examples); and strengthening the interior
walls and doors that create a "hard line" that separates American staff
from visitors at 8 posts.
Figure 3: A New CAC Facility:
This figure is a picture of a new CAC facility.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 4: A New Fence, Bollards, and Concrete Planters:
This figure is a combination of pictures showing a new fence, bollards,
and concrete planters.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
At the 11 posts we visited with ongoing or completed CSUP projects, we
found that the projects had enhanced posts' compliance with State's
physical security standards as detailed in the "Foreign Affairs
Handbook" and "Foreign Affairs Manual." The projects we viewed added or
enhanced pedestrian and vehicle access points, replaced perimeter
fencing to meet anti-climb requirements, installed bollards and
barriers at key points to meet anti-ram requirements, built safe areas
for post officials in case of attack, enhanced the hard line separating
post employees from visitors, and installed forced entry/ballistic-
resistant windows and doors.
Nevertheless, without building a new facility, many posts are unable to
meet all security standards for a variety of reasons beyond the scope
of CSUP. We found that none of the posts we visited adhered fully with
current security standards because of conditions that were outside the
scope of CSUP projects.[Footnote 12] For example, most of the posts we
visited were located in dense urban areas that prevented them from
achieving a 100-foot setback from the street, one of the key security
standards (see fig. 5 for an example). OBO and DS officials
acknowledged that, at many locations, it is not feasible to increase
the setback by acquiring land and closing off nearby streets. In other
cases, officials stated the buildings themselves were not structurally
capable of handling heavy forced entry/ballistic-resistant windows or
other upgrades. And in other cases, officials commented that host
nations or cities would not allow certain upgrades to be implemented,
such as removing trees to create a clear zone around the embassy or
changing the facade of historic buildings. Finally, current plans for
the NEC program do not include the replacement of 61 of 262 embassies
and consulates. Several of these facilities were built after physical
security standards were strengthened in response to terrorist attacks
against U.S. facilities in Beirut, Lebanon, in the 1980s. State
officials acknowledged that other facilities may not be replaced due to
cost and political concerns. As a result, many buildings and their
occupants may remain vulnerable to attack.
Figure 5: A Post with Insufficient Setback:
This figure is a picture of a post with insufficient setback.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Department of State provided written comments on a draft of this
report, which are reproduced in appendix II. State agreed with our
findings, noting that the report accurately describes State's CSUP
efforts. State also provided us with technical suggestions and
clarifications that we have addressed in this report, as appropriate.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested Members of Congress and the Secretary of State. We also
will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or
johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.:
Acting Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To discuss the factors that the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
(OBO) considers as it plans and prioritizes Compound Security Upgrades
Program (CSUP) projects, we reviewed Department of State (State)
prioritization and planning documents concerning the assignment of post
threat levels, assessments of the security vulnerabilities of posts,
and CSUP. We discussed CSUP prioritization and planning, as well as
changes to those processes in response to recent attacks, with
officials from OBO and State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) in
Washington, D.C, and overseas, including post officials, including
Deputy Chiefs of Mission, Regional Security Officers, facilities
managers, and General Services Officers, and with contractors overseas.
In addition, we reviewed past GAO audit work on related issues. (See
Related GAO Products at the end of this report.) To help confirm the
accuracy of our analysis, we discussed our findings with State
personnel involved in CSUP.
To assess the extent to which CSUP projects met cost and schedule
projections, we analyzed data that OBO provided specifically for the
purposes of our review. Our scope included all 47 projects contracted
since fiscal year 2004, completed by the end of fiscal year 2007, and
valued at $1 million or more and, therefore, excluded smaller projects
such as those designed to enhance the security of schools and other non-
U.S. government properties frequented by U.S. personnel and their
dependents. For each CSUP project, OBO provided data on the originally
contracted completion date and cost, the modifications to the
contracted completion date and cost, and the actual date of substantial
completion and final contract cost for completed projects. We reviewed
contracting documents to verify that the data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this report. To assess the extent to which
CSUP projects included the security upgrades called for in the
contract, we reviewed OBO's project management procedures. We
interviewed project managers in Washington, D.C., and facilities
managers, administrative officers, and regional security officers at 11
posts to verify the role and responsibilities of the project managers.
We also inspected the ongoing or completed CSUP work at these posts to
verify that the projects encompassed all of the security upgrades
called for under the contract.
To review the extent to which State's CSUP efforts have enhanced posts'
ability to comply with State's physical security standards, we reviewed
the project authorization memoranda, contract modifications, and OBO
summary document on each of the 47 CSUP projects. These documents
allowed us to identify the type of physical security upgrades that were
installed at all 47 facilities. We discussed over 50 completed,
ongoing, and planned projects with OBO officials. To confirm our
initial findings, we traveled to 11 posts in Latin America, Europe, and
the Middle East that had recently completed or ongoing CSUP projects.
We selected these countries to ensure regional coverage, a range of
project types, and a mix of ongoing and completed projects; however, as
this was not a generalizeable sample, our findings do not necessarily
apply to all posts. We are not naming the specific countries we visited
for this review due to security concerns. We developed a physical
security needs checklist based upon State's "Foreign Affairs Handbook,"
"Foreign Affairs Manual," and OBO's own needs assessment documentation.
We applied our checklist consistently at all 11 posts. Our checklist
did not, however, attempt to assess State's procedures for utilizing
physical security upgrades. For example, the checklist did not assess
whether posts use new CACs properly to screen vehicles or people. At
each post, we conducted a review of the security needs and received
briefings on the recently completed, ongoing, or planned CSUP projects.
We met with relevant post personnel, including Deputy Chiefs of
Mission, Regional Security Officers, facilities managers, and General
Services Officers, as well as contractors to discuss the physical
security needs at post, CSUP project management and implementation, and
post-specific limitations to receiving certain physical security
upgrades.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2006 through January
2008, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D, C. 20520:
December 19, 2007:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.:
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Embassy
Security: Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site Conditions Prevent
Full Adherence to Standards," GAO Job Code 320456.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Paula Harrison, Program Analyst, Bureau of Overseas Building
Operations, at (703) 875-5128.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO ” Michael Courts:
OBO ” Gen. Charles Williams State/OIG ” Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft:
Embassy Security: Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site Conditions
Prevent Full Adherence to Standards (GAO-08-162, GAO Code 320456):
Thank you for giving the Department the opportunity to comment on GAO's
report concerning the Compound Security Upgrade Program (CSUP). We
appreciate your interest in the Department's planning and
implementation of CSUP projects.
We agree with the GAO's observations and conclusions in this review.
The report accurately describes the Department's significant efforts to
prioritize, plan, and execute CSUP projects.
The Department, through the Capital Security Construction program (also
known as the New Embassy Construction (NEC) program), continues to
aggressively replace vulnerable, deficient, and functionally obsolete
overseas facilities with new, safe, and secure compounds. Since 2001,
the Department – with excellent support from the Congress -- has moved
nearly 15,000 U.S. Government (USG) employees into new buildings.
However, as noted in this report, the large number of remaining
deficient facilities – in conjunction with the time and cost to
construct new facilities – necessitates interim measures to protect
overseas personnel. Security upgrades since 1998 have prevented or
limited deaths, injuries, and damage caused by terrorist attacks on
U.S. diplomatic facilities in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, and Austria, and have deterred planned attacks at numerous other
posts. The Compound Security Upgrade Program remains a vital component
of the Department's ongoing, high priority efforts to provide safe and
secure facilities.
The Department agrees with the GAO's conclusion that CSUP projects are
limited by existing site conditions and other host nation restrictions.
As stated in one of the report's examples, the Department typically
cannot meet the 100-foot setback requirement at posts located in dense
urban areas. In many cases, the only way to meet all security standards
is to consolidate all post functions within a safe and secure New
Embassy Compound through the Capital Security Construction program.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Acting Director, International Affairs
and Trade, (202) 512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition the individual named above, David C. Maurer, Assistant
Director; Michael J. Courts, Assistant Director; Valérie L. Nowak;
Thomas M. Costa; Martin H. de Alteriis; Michael W. Armes; Leslie K.
Locke; Ramon J. Rodriguez; Joseph P. Carney; Ian A. Ferguson; Etana
Finkler; and Jason L. Bair made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Embassy Construction: State Has Made Progress Constructing New
Embassies, but Better Planning Is Needed for Operations and Maintenance
Requirements. GAO-06-641. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2006.
Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key
Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of
Embassies. GAO-05-688T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2005.
Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key
Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of
Embassies. GAO-05-642. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005.
Embassy Construction: Achieving Concurrent Construction Would Help
Reduce Costs and Meet Security Goals. GAO-04-952. Washington, D.C.:
September 28, 2004.
Embassy Construction: State Department Has Implemented Management
Reforms, but Challenges Remain. GAO-04-100. Washington, D.C.: November
4, 2003.
Overseas Presence: Conditions of Overseas Diplomatic Facilities. GAO-
03-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2003.
Embassy Construction: Better Long-Term Planning Will Enhance Program
Decision-making. GAO-01-11. Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2001.
State Department: Overseas Emergency Security Program Progressing, but
Costs Are Increasing. GAO/NSIAD-00-83. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2000.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] We reviewed OBO's progress with new embassy construction and other
efforts to enhance the security of U.S. personnel overseas in earlier
reports. See Related GAO Products.
[2] State incorporates physical security standards in its "Foreign
Affairs Handbook" and "Foreign Affairs Manual."
[3] We reviewed State's efforts to protect U.S. officials and citizens
outside of embassies in earlier reports, including: GAO, Overseas
Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key Measures to
Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of Embassies, GAO-
05-642 (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005).
[4] A bollard is one of a series of short posts for excluding or
diverting motor vehicles from entering an area.
[5] State's "Foreign Affairs Handbook" and "Foreign Affairs Manual"
recognize that the standards apply to existing office buildings only to
the maximum extent feasible or practicable.
[6] 22 F.A.M. 311.2.
[7] 22 U.S.C. 4865(a)(3)(A).
[8] We did not assess State's methodology for determining posts' threat
levels and vulnerabilities or the formula it uses to determine actual
post rankings, as this was beyond the scope of our assignment.
[9] The design-build contract delivery method reduces project cycle
time by combining design and construction in a single contract award
and may allow contractors to begin construction before the building
design is complete.
[10] For one project, the modification documents are awaiting final
approval; therefore, the completion date and cost modifications are not
factored into this calculation.
[11] GAO, Kennedy Center: Stronger Oversight of Fire Safety Issues,
Construction Projects, and Financial Management Needed, GAO-05-334
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 22, 2005).
[12] When an upgrade project cannot meet security standards due to site
location and other factors, OBO and DS seeks the appropriate waivers
and exceptions to ensure that the process has been fully vetted by
stakeholders.
