Contingency Contracting
DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan Gao ID: GAO-09-19 October 1, 2008The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors to carry out a range of services in Iraq and Afghanistan. While recognizing the benefits of using contractors, GAO and others have noted the challenges and risks associated with an increased reliance on contractors and the ability of agencies to manage their growing number of contractors. As directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, GAO analyzed DOD, State, and USAID data on contracting activities in Iraq and Afghanistan for fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008 including (1) the number and value of contracts and the extent they were awarded competitively; (2) the number of contractor personnel, including those performing security functions; and (3) the number of contractor personnel who were killed or wounded. GAO also reviewed the status of the three agencies' memorandum of understanding (MOU) related to maintaining data on contracts and contractor personnel. GAO reviewed selected contract files and compared personnel data to other available sources to assess the reliability of the data reported by the agencies. GAO provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, USAID, and the Department of Labor for comment. State and USAID provided technical comments that were incorporated where appropriate.
For the 18-month period GAO reviewed, DOD, State, and USAID reported obligating at least $33.9 billion on almost 57,000 contracts for efforts such as construction, capacity building, security, and a range of support services for U.S. forces and other government personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. About three-fourths of the reported obligations were for contracts with performance in Iraq. Of the total obligations, DOD accounted for almost 90 percent. Most of the three agencies' active contracts were awarded during GAO's review period and of these, about two-thirds were competed to one extent or another. However, during its file reviews in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO found that DOD may have understated the extent to which it competed some contracts. Complete and reliable data were not available for GAO to determine the total number of contractor personnel who worked on DOD, State, and USAID contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to DOD's quarterly census, there were 197,718 contractor personnel working on its contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan as of April 2008. However, DOD did not routinely evaluate the data for accuracy and the number of local nationals working on contracts may be underreported. Neither State nor USAID had systems in place during our review period to track the number of contractor personnel. As a result, they could not provide complete personnel data. For example, while State and USAID had information from their contractors on the number of personnel performing security and demining functions in Afghanistan, they did not have similar information on personnel performing other functions in Afghanistan. According to DOD and State officials, information on killed and wounded contractor personnel was not systematically tracked, which left them unable to provide reliable or complete data. While USAID could not provide specifics on its contractor personnel, USAID informed us that 206 individuals working on its projects, including contractor personnel, had been killed or injured in Iraq and Afghanistan during GAO's review period. Data available from Labor provides insight into the number of contractor personnel killed or injured as a result of hostile actions, accidents, and other causes while working on U.S. government contracts. Based on data provided by Labor, there were 455 reports received of contractors killed in Iraq and Afghanistan during the period of our review and 15,787 reports of injuries. However, there may be additional contractor deaths or injuries that were not reported to Labor. In July 2008, the three agencies signed an MOU in which they agreed to use a DOD database to collect and maintain information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to DOD officials, as the agencies work together to implement the MOU, the agencies' ability to report on the number and value of contracts and the number of contractor personnel should improve.
GAO-09-19, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2008:
Report to Congressional Committees:
Contingency Contracting:
DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan:
GAO-09-19:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-19, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on
contractors to carry out a range of services in Iraq and Afghanistan.
While recognizing the benefits of using contractors, GAO and others
have noted the challenges and risks associated with an increased
reliance on contractors and the ability of agencies to manage their
growing number of contractors.
As directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, GAO analyzed DOD, State, and USAID data on contracting activities
in Iraq and Afghanistan for fiscal year 2007 and the first half of
fiscal year 2008 including (1) the number and value of contracts and
the extent they were awarded competitively; (2) the number of
contractor personnel, including those performing security functions;
and (3) the number of contractor personnel who were killed or wounded.
GAO also reviewed the status of the three agencies‘ memorandum of
understanding (MOU) related to maintaining data on contracts and
contractor personnel. GAO reviewed selected contract files and compared
personnel data to other available sources to assess the reliability of
the data reported by the agencies.
GAO provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, USAID, and the
Department of Labor for comment. State and USAID provided technical
comments that were incorporated where appropriate.
What GAO Found:
For the 18-month period GAO reviewed, DOD, State, and USAID reported
obligating at least $33.9 billion on almost 57,000 contracts for
efforts such as construction, capacity building, security, and a range
of support services for U.S. forces and other government personnel in
Iraq and Afghanistan. About three-fourths of the reported obligations
were for contracts with performance in Iraq. Of the total obligations,
DOD accounted for almost 90 percent. Most of the three agencies‘ active
contracts were awarded during GAO‘s review period and of these, about
two-thirds were competed to one extent or another. However, during its
file reviews in Iraq and Afghanistan, GAO found that DOD may have
understated the extent to which it competed some contracts.
Complete and reliable data were not available for GAO to determine the
total number of contractor personnel who worked on DOD, State, and
USAID contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to DOD‘s quarterly
census, there were 197,718 contractor personnel working on its
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan as of April 2008. However, DOD did
not routinely evaluate the data for accuracy and the number of local
nationals working on contracts may be underreported. Neither State nor
USAID had systems in place during our review period to track the number
of contractor personnel. As a result, they could not provide complete
personnel data. For example, while State and USAID had information from
their contractors on the number of personnel performing security and
demining functions in Afghanistan, they did not have similar
information on personnel performing other functions in Afghanistan.
According to DOD and State officials, information on killed and wounded
contractor personnel was not systematically tracked, which left them
unable to provide reliable or complete data. While USAID could not
provide specifics on its contractor personnel, USAID informed us that
206 individuals working on its projects, including contractor
personnel, had been killed or injured in Iraq and Afghanistan during
GAO‘s review period. Data available from Labor provides insight into
the number of contractor personnel killed or injured as a result of
hostile actions, accidents, and other causes while working on U.S.
government contracts. Based on data provided by Labor, there were 455
reports received of contractors killed in Iraq and Afghanistan during
the period of our review and 15,787 reports of injuries. However, there
may be additional contractor deaths or injuries that were not reported
to Labor.
In July 2008, the three agencies signed an MOU in which they agreed to
use a DOD database to collect and maintain information on contracts and
contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to DOD
officials, as the agencies work together to implement the MOU, the
agencies‘ ability to report on the number and value of contracts and
the number of contractor personnel should improve.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-19]. For more
information, contact John Hutton at (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Scope and Methodology:
Summary:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: DOD Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Appendix III: State Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Appendix IV: USAID Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Appendix V: Defense Base Act Cases for Contractor Personnel Killed or
Injured in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Appendix VI: Memorandum of Understanding on Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: DOD Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan,
Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008:
Table 2: DOD New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008:
Table 3: DOD's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts (excluding
task orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2008:
Table 4: CENTCOM Quarterly Census of DOD Contractor Personnel
Performing Duties in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Table 5: State Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008:
Table 6: State New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008:
Table 7: State's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(excluding task orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half
of Fiscal Year 2008:
Table 8: USAID Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008:
Table 9: USAID New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008:
Table 10: USAID's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(excluding task orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half
of Fiscal Year 2008:
Table 11: Defense Base Act Cases for Deaths and Injuries in Iraq and
Afghanistan by Fiscal Year of Death or Injury, Fiscal Year 2007 and the
First Half of Fiscal Year 2008:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 1, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
As of July 2008, the Congress has approved a total of about $859
billion for the military and diplomatic operations launched since 2001
as part of the Global War on Terror. The majority of this amount has
been provided for Department of Defense (DOD) military operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of the remaining funds have gone to DOD,
Department of State, and United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) efforts to develop Iraq and Afghanistan's
infrastructure, improve their security forces, and enhance their
capacity to govern.[Footnote 1] DOD, State, and USAID have relied
extensively on contractors to support troops and civilian personnel and
to oversee and carry out reconstruction efforts. Contractors provide a
range of services--including but not limited to--
interpretation/translation, security, weapon systems maintenance,
intelligence analysis, facility operations support, and road
construction--that relate to practically every facet of U.S. efforts in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
The use of contractors to support U.S. military operations is not new,
but the number of contractors and the work they are performing in Iraq
and Afghanistan represent an increased reliance on contractors to carry
out agency missions. While recognizing the benefits of using
contractors--such as increased flexibility in fulfilling immediate
needs--we and others have noted the risks associated with the increased
reliance on contractors and the challenges that federal agencies have
in managing the growing number of contractors and overseeing their
performance.[Footnote 2] Having reliable and meaningful data on
contractors and the services they provide is critical for agencies to
effectively manage and oversee their contractors. The Congress has
taken a number of actions to increase oversight of contracts. Among
these, section 861 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008[Footnote 3] required DOD, State, and USAID to sign a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) by July 1, 2008, regarding matters
relating to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, including maintaining
common databases that will provide the three agencies and the Congress
with information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq or
Afghanistan.
The Act also directs that we annually review DOD, State, and USAID
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan and report on this review each year
through 2010.[Footnote 4] The Act specifies that for each reporting
period we provide (1) the total number and value of contracts[Footnote
5] that were active and those that were awarded[Footnote 6] for
performance in Iraq or Afghanistan and the extent to which those
contracts used competitive procedures, (2) the total number of
contractor personnel that worked on those contracts, including those
performing security functions,[Footnote 7] and (3) the number of
contractor personnel killed or wounded. This first report provides the
results of our analyses of agency-reported data for fiscal year 2007
and the first half of fiscal year 2008. We are also providing
information on the status of the agencies' MOU as it relates to
maintaining data on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Scope and Methodology:
To address our first objective, we obtained data from DOD, State, and
USAID on the number of active contracts with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year
2008 and the amount of funds obligated on those contracts.[Footnote 8]
We also obtained data on the extent to which contracts were
competitively awarded during the 18-month period covered by this
review. After taking steps to standardize the data, such as removing
duplicates, we compared the reported data to selected contract files in
the United States, Iraq, and Afghanistan to assess the reliability of
what was reported. We determined that the reported contract data were
sufficiently reliable to establish the minimum number of active and
awarded contracts and obligation amounts, as well as the minimum number
of competed contracts, for the period of our review.
To address our second objective, we obtained data from the three
agencies on the number of contractor personnel for the period of our
review and discussed with them how they collected and tracked these
data. To the extent that the agencies were able to provide contractor
personnel data, we compared that data to other sources, such as
contract data and information from contracting officers, to determine
data consistency and reasonableness. We concluded that the personnel
data were underreported. However, we are presenting the reported data
along with their limitations as they establish a minimum number of
contractor personnel and provide insight into the extent to which the
agencies had information on the number of contractor personnel during
the period of our review. Given the limitations we found, the data
presented should not be used to reach conclusions about the total
number of contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan.
For our third objective, we requested that agencies provide us with
data on the number of contractor personnel who had been killed or
wounded during the period of our review and we discussed with agency
officials how they collected these data. However, not all of the
agencies were able to provide complete data, but they did provide what
data they had available, which for one agency included data on
individuals other than contractor personnel. We are presenting the
agencies' data as they provide insight into the extent to which the
agencies had information on the number of personnel killed or wounded.
Because of the limitations associated with agencies' data, they should
not be used to reach conclusions about the total number of contractor
personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan. Given the
shortcomings in the three agencies' data, we obtained data from the
Department of Labor[Footnote 9] on the number of Defense Base Act cases
for contractor personnel deaths and injuries that occurred in Iraq and
Afghanistan during our review period to provide further insights on
contractor casualties.[Footnote 10] To assess the reliability of
Labor's data, we reviewed existing information about how the data are
collected and cases are processed and interviewed knowledgeable agency
officials. We determined that Labor's data were sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of this report, but the data should not be relied on
to determine the total number of DOD, State, or USAID contractor
personnel killed or wounded in Iraq or Afghanistan.
To provide information on the status of DOD, State, and USAID's MOU as
it relates to maintaining data on contracts and contractor personnel in
Iraq and Afghanistan, we obtained and reviewed a copy of the MOU. We
also met with officials from the three agencies to discuss plans for
implementing the MOU.
A more detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in
appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from March 2008 through
August 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
DOD, State, and USAID reported that they obligated at least $33.9
billion during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008
on 56,925 contracts with performance in either Iraq or Afghanistan.
Almost three-fourths of the reported obligations were for contracts
with performance in Iraq, with DOD having significantly more
obligations than the other two agencies combined. The three agencies'
contracts were for services and supplies related to efforts such as
construction and capacity building, as well as a range of support
services for U.S. military forces and other government personnel. Of
the agencies' active contracts, almost 97 percent were awarded during
the 18-month review period. The extent to which the agencies were
required to compete these contracts depended on where the contract was
awarded and performed, its dollar value, and the contracting method
used. For all of the contracts awarded during the review period, the
agencies reported that about two-thirds were competed to one extent or
another. Competitively awarded contracts accounted for almost 85
percent of the obligations on new awards. The agencies reported using
various competitive procedures, including full and open competition and
simplified acquisition procedures, such as competitions among
prequalified companies. However, DOD may have understated the extent to
which it competed new awards. Of the 85 files we reviewed in Iraq and
Afghanistan, we found 14 instances in which DOD reported that the
contract had not been competitively awarded but the files indicated
that competitive procedures were used to award the contract.
Complete and reliable data were not available for us to determine the
total number of contractor personnel, including those performing
security functions, who worked on DOD, State, and USAID contracts in
Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of
fiscal year 2008.[Footnote 11] During our review period, DOD initiated
systems to track contractor personnel at the prime and subcontract
levels in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to its quarterly census,
there were 197,718 contractor personnel working on DOD contracts in
Iraq and Afghanistan as of April 2008. However, DOD officials explained
that data obtained from the census were not routinely evaluated for
accuracy or completeness and there was reason to believe that the
number of local nationals working on contracts was underreported.
Additionally, DOD reported almost 25,000 individuals working on
security contracts, but based on information from DOD and our analyses,
that number also appears to be inaccurate with both duplicate and
missing personnel. Unlike DOD, State and USAID did not have systems in
place during the period we reviewed to track the number of contractor
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan and therefore could not provide
complete data on their contractor personnel. However, based on queries
made to their contractors, State reported that 7,192 contractor
personnel were working in Iraq and Afghanistan as of July 2008, while
USAID reported 5,150 contractor personnel as of early 2008. These
numbers understate the number of State and USAID contractor personnel.
For example, State's numbers for Afghanistan only included personnel
performing security and demining functions. Similarly, USAID's numbers
for Afghanistan only included personnel performing security functions,
with a USAID official acknowledging that not all contractors had
responded to the request for personnel data. Contractor personnel
performing other functions, such as police training, in Afghanistan
were not included in State or USAID's numbers.
DOD, State, and USAID were unable to provide complete or specific
information on the number of contractor personnel who had been killed
or wounded in Iraq or Afghanistan during the period of our review. DOD
and State officials told us that information on killed or wounded
contractor personnel was not systematically maintained or tracked in a
manner that would allow the agencies to provide us reliable or complete
data. Despite the lack of systems for tracking such data, DOD and State
provided what information they had available on killed or wounded
contractor personnel. For example, State informed us that based on an
inquiry of its contractors, it was aware of 23 personnel who were
killed in Iraq and Afghanistan during 2007, but it did not have
information on the number wounded. USAID did have a process for
tracking contractor personnel who were killed or wounded. USAID
informed us that 105 individuals working on USAID programs in Iraq and
Afghanistan had been killed and 101 individuals had been wounded or
injured. However, USAID was unable to specify how many of these
individuals were contractor personnel as opposed to individuals working
on grants or otherwise working to implement USAID programs. Department
of Labor data provide additional insight into the number of contractor
casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. Labor maintains data on cases
reported to it under the Defense Base Act for contractor personnel
killed or injured while working on U.S. government contracts overseas,
including those in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to data provided by
Labor, there were 455 cases of contractor personnel killed and 15,787
cases of injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period.
[Footnote 12] Deaths or injuries not reported to Labor would not be
included in its data, so according to Labor officials, it is possible
that the actual number of deaths or injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan is
higher than the number of Defense Base Act cases.
DOD, State, and USAID signed a MOU in July 2008, agreeing to use the
Synchronized Pre-Deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) database
[Footnote 13] to collect and maintain information on contracts and
contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Although the Act did not
specify a minimum dollar value threshold above which contracts should
appear in the database, the MOU established a $100,000 threshold.
Pursuant to the MOU, DOD is responsible for maintaining the SPOT
database, but it is the responsibility of each agency to ensure that
information is accurately entered into SPOT. DOD is already using SPOT
to track information on some contractor personnel. State has also
started ensuring that its contractors enter data on their personnel
into SPOT and USAID is making plans to do so. Because SPOT does not
currently capture all contract and contractor personnel data specified
in the MOU, DOD officials informed us that they have planned a number
of upgrades over the next several months. These include adding a field
to indicate whether a contractor has been killed or wounded and linking
SPOT to an existing government wide database on contracts so that data
on contract value and competition do not have to be entered separately
into SPOT. According to DOD officials, as the agencies work together to
implement the MOU provisions and upgrades are made to facilitate SPOT's
use and track required information, such as contractor casualties, the
agencies' ability to report on the number and value of contracts and
the number of contractor personnel should improve.
We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, USAID, and Labor for
review and comment. State and USAID provided technical comments, which
we incorporated into this report where appropriate, while DOD and Labor
had no comments.
Specific information on DOD contracts and contractor personnel can be
found in appendix II, on State contracts and contractor personnel in
appendix III, and on USAID contracts and contractor personnel in
appendix IV, while data from Labor on Defense Base Act claims can be
found in appendix V. Additional information regarding the agencies' MOU
can be found in appendix VI.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, the Administrator of the United States Agency for
International Development, the Secretary of Labor, and interested
congressional committees. Copies will also be made available to others
on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix VII.
Signed by:
John Hutton:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV:
Chairman:
The Honorable Christopher S. Bond:
Vice Chairman:
Select Committee on Intelligence:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter Hoekstra:
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Section 863 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008[Footnote 14](Act) directs GAO to review and report on specific
elements related to Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State,
and United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In response to that mandate, we
analyzed agency-reported data for fiscal year 2007 and the first half
of fiscal year 2008 regarding (1) the number and value of DOD, State,
and USAID contracts with work in Iraq and Afghanistan and the extent to
which that work was awarded competitively, (2) the number of DOD,
State, and USAID contractor personnel, including those performing
security functions, that worked on those contracts, and (3) the number
of contractor personnel that were killed or wounded. We also reviewed
the status of the agencies‘ memorandum of understanding (MOU) as it
relates to maintaining data on contracts and contractor personnel in
Iraq and Afghanistan.
Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan:
To address our first objective, we obtained data from DOD, State, and
USAID on the number of active and awarded contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year
2008, the extent to which those contracts were competitively awarded,
and the amount of funds obligated on those contracts during the 18-
month period covered by our review.[Footnote 15] As we explain below,
after we assessed the contract data provided by each agency, we
determined the data were sufficiently reliable to determine the minimum
number of active and awarded contracts and obligation amounts,[Footnote
16] as well as the minimum number of competed contracts, for the period
of our review. We could not rely on queries of the Federal Procurement
Data System – Next Generation (FPDS-NG), which is the federal
government‘s current system for tracking information on contracting
actions, as the primary source of data for our review. This was the
case, in part, because in a prior related review we found that needed
data were not always available from FPDSNG due to the way individual
agencies were and were not reporting individual contract actions.
[Footnote 17] We found that this continued to be the case. For example,
individual contract actions by DOD‘s Joint Contracting
Command”Iraq/Afghanistan, as well as some USAID actions, were not
entered into FPDS-NG. Also, we and others have reported on limitations
associated with FPDS-NG data.[Footnote 18]
As the agencies provided us with their contract data, we took steps to
standardize their data to facilitate our analyses. This included
removing contracts with no obligations or deobligations during our
period of review,[Footnote 19] obligations that occurred outside the
period of our review, and duplicate contract actions. In some cases we
excluded values when the agencies reported the total estimated cost of
the contract instead of obligations to limit overstating the amounts
obligated during the period of our review.[Footnote 20] Since the
agencies used various numbering conventions to identify contracts,
orders, and modifications, we reformatted the data so we could identify
the unique contracts and orders and any associated modifications.
Additionally, we categorized the competition information reported on
contracts awarded during our review period. In many cases, the agencies
simply reported ’yes“ or ’no“ as to whether the contract was competed,
but in other cases they reported additional data on the extent of
competition, such as whether full and open competition occurred. If the
agencies reported any type of competition, such as full and open
competition or simplified acquisition procedures as defined in the
Federal Acquisition Regulation, we categorized the contract as
’competed.“[Footnote 21] We categorized contracts for which agencies
reported that competition did not occur, such as those reported as sole
source contracts, as ’not competed.“ We categorized contracts for which
the agencies either provided no competition information or provided
information that was not sufficient to determine whether competition
occurred as ’not reported.“
In analyzing the reported contract data from the three agencies, we
identified the total number of contracts by counting the unique
contracts that had obligations each fiscal year. Since some contracts
had obligations in both fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal
year 2008, the number of active contracts for the entire period of our
review is lower than the number of active contracts in fiscal year 2007
plus the number active in the first half of fiscal year 2008. In
counting the number of contracts, we excluded the base contracts under
which task orders were issued. This was done, in part, because such
base contracts do not have obligations associated with them as the
obligations are incurred with the issuance of each task order. All
other contracts, task orders, delivery orders, and purchase orders were
included in the count along with their associated obligations. The
agencies were unable to provide data on the number or value of
individual subcontracts and we were therefore unable to report
these totals as required by the Act.
To assess the reliability of the contract data each agency reported, we
matched the data on selected contract actions to information in the
agencies‘ contract files. While we identified some discrepancies between
what the agencies reported and what appeared in the files, we determined
that the reported data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes when
presented with the appropriate caveats. The following is a summary of
the review of contract data and files conducted at each agency and our
results:
* DOD”Because DOD‘s reported data came from multiple DOD components, we
selected actions for review from the components that collectively
represented 99 percent of the contracts and 98 percent of the
obligations reported to us.[Footnote 22]
- For contracts awarded by the Joint Contracting Command”
Iraq/Afghanistan, we limited our random sample to contract actions
with contract files identified as being physically located in Baghdad or
Kabul. During the course of our file review in Baghdad, we learned that
some of the randomly selected actions could not be found or
accounted for, but we were able to review 44 actions. We were also
able to complete our review of 41 randomly selected files in Kabul. For
the 85 actions reviewed, we identified relatively few discrepancies
between the information in the files and the data reported to us, with
the exception of the competition data. As discussed in the report, we
identified cases in which competition was underreported.
- For contracts awarded by the Air Force and Navy, we randomly
selected 30 contract actions for each service and reviewed the
associated files on-line using DOD‘s Electronic Document Access
(EDA) system to validate all of the information except that pertaining
to competition. Air Force and Navy officials sent us selected portions
of contract files so we could validate the reported competition
information. We identified some discrepancies pertaining to the
modification number and the obligation amounts but determined that
they were not significant enough to affect our count of contracts and
their associated obligations.
- For contracts awarded by the Army, we reviewed 30 randomly selected
contract actions in EDA and reviewed the associated on-line
documentation. We identified minor discrepancies between the
information in EDA and the information reported to us. However, we
did not separately assess the Army‘s reported competition information.
- For contracts awarded by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), we
took a different approach due to how DLA reported its data to us. We
assessed the reliability of DLA's data by reviewing information about
its data systems and interviewing an agency official knowledgeable
about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable
for our purposes.
On the basis of our comparison of the reported data to the information
contained in DOD‘s files, we determined that the DOD-reported data were
sufficiently reliable to determine the minimum number of active and
awarded contracts and obligation amounts, as well as the minimum
number of competed contracts.
* State”We reviewed files for 30 randomly selected contract actions
performed by State‘s Office of Acquisition Management. This office
performed 20 percent of the contract actions and 80 percent of the
obligations reported to us. We identified very few discrepancies between
what was reported and what appeared in the files. As a result, we
determined that State‘s reported data were sufficiently reliable to
determine the minimum number of active and awarded contracts and
obligation amounts, as well as the minimum number of competed
contracts.
* USAID”For contracts awarded in Iraq, we compared 36 randomly
selected contract actions to information in files located at the USAID
mission in Baghdad. We identified very few discrepancies between what
was reported to us and what was in the files. For contracts awarded in
Afghanistan, we compared 56 randomly selected contract actions to
information in the files located at the USAID mission in Kabul. In
reviewing those files, we determined that 6 were outside the scope of
our review. For the remaining 50 actions, we identified very few
discrepancies. Based on our comparison of the reported data to the
information contained in USAID‘s files, we determined that USAID‘s
reported data were sufficiently reliable to determine the minimum
number of active and awarded contracts and obligation amounts, as well
as the minimum number of competed contracts.
Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan:
To address our second objective, we obtained data from DOD, State, and
USAID on the number of U.S. nationals, third country nationals, and
local nationals working on contracts with performance in Iraq or
Afghanistan during the period of our review.[Footnote 23] These data
included individuals reported to be performing security functions.
[Footnote 24] DOD provided us with data from the U.S. Central Command‘s
(CENTCOM) quarterly census and the Synchronized Predeployment and
Operational Tracker (SPOT) databases. We also reviewed relevant DOD
orders and guidance related to the census and SPOT. As we discuss in
the report, State and USAID officials told us they did not have data
systems to track the number of personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan during
our review period. However, they provided us with data available from
periodic inquiries they had sent to their contractors.
To the extent the agencies were able to provide contractor personnel
data for the period of our review,[Footnote 25] we compared that data
to other sources, such as contract data and information from
contracting offices, to determine data consistency and reasonableness.
All three agencies reported more active contracts than they provided
personnel data for, which led us to conclude that the personnel data
were underreported. We also identified discrepancies between the
agencies‘ reported data and the data available from other sources.
Furthermore, we discussed with agency officials the limitations and
challenges they experienced in obtaining information on the number of
contractor personnel, particularly for the period of our review. We are
presenting the reported data along with their limitations as they
establish a minimum number of contractor personnel and provide insight
into the extent to which the agencies had information on the number of
contractor personnel during the period of our review. Given the
limitations we found, the data presented should not be used to reach
conclusions about the total number of contractor personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan during our review period.
Killed or Wounded Contractor Personnel:
To address our third objective, we requested data from DOD, State, and
USAID on the number of contractor personnel killed or wounded during
the period of our review. After informing us they did not have a
reliable system for tracking contractor casualties, DOD officials
directed us to use the Department of Labor‘s data on Defense Base Act
(DBA) cases to determine the number of killed or wounded contractor
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, some DOD components
provided us with data they had available on killed or wounded
contractor personnel, but we could not independently verify the data
they provided. Similarly, State officials told us they did not have a
data system to track contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and
Afghanistan during the period of our review, but they provided what
information they had available based on contractor reports. USAID
provided us with information on deaths and injuries it had compiled
from its implementing partners, including contractors, in Iraq and
Afghanistan but did not distinguish between contractor personnel and
others. While we did not establish the reliability of the numbers
provided to us by the agencies, we are nevertheless providing them as
they provide insight into the extent to which the agencies had
oversight of the number of personnel killed or wounded during the
period of our review. Because of the limitations associated with the
agencies‘ data, they should not be used to reach conclusions about the
total number of DOD, State, or USAID contractor personnel killed or
wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan.
We also obtained data from Labor on cases reported to it for contractor
injuries or deaths that occurred in Iraq or Afghanistan during fiscal
year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008. Labor provided us
with data on cases as of August 7, 2008, for injuries and deaths that
occurred during the period of our review.[Footnote 26] We assessed the
reliability of Labor‘s data by reviewing existing information about the
data and interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for providing
insight into the number of contractor casualties when presented with
the appropriate caveats. In tracking DBA cases, Labor officials told us
they do not collect information on the agency or contract that
claimants worked under and, therefore, could not identify which
injuries or deaths were sustained by contractor personnel working on
DOD, State, and USAID contracts. As a result, the data presented are
for contractor personnel, regardless of nationality, working under all
U.S. government agencies‘ contracts”not just DOD, State, or USAID
contracts. Labor officials also explained that they do not track how
deaths or injuries occurred, so it is not possible to determine whether
a death or injury was the result of hostile actions, accidents, or
natural and other causes. Labor‘s data, therefore, should not be relied
on to determine the total number of DOD, State, or USAID contractor
personnel killed or wounded in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Memorandum of Understanding:
To provide information on the status of DOD, State, and USAID‘s MOU as
it relates to maintaining data on contracts and contractor personnel in
Iraq and Afghanistan, we obtained and reviewed a copy of the MOU. We
also met with senior DOD, State, and USAID officials to discuss plans
for implementing the MOU and making changes to the SPOT database.
Additionally, we talked with officials from all three agencies
regarding the use of SPOT and how they are or are not currently
tracking the information that will eventually be captured in SPOT.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2008 through August 2008
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit
objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: DOD Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan:
This appendix provides information on the Department of Defense‘s (DOD)
contracts, contractor personnel, and contractor personnel killed or
wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first
half of fiscal year 2008. The first section of this appendix presents
our analyses of DOD-reported data on the number and value of contracts
and the extent to which these contracts were competed. In the second
and third sections, we present DOD-provided information on contractor
personnel and the number of killed or wounded contractor personnel, as
well as some of the limitations associated with that information.
DOD Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan:
DOD reported at least $30.3 billion in obligations on 55,603 contracts
active in Iraq or Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first
half of fiscal year 2008.[Footnote 27] As shown in table 1, there were
nearly twice as many contracts with performance in Iraq as in
Afghanistan, and more than four times more obligations on contracts
performed in Iraq as in Afghanistan.
Some DOD contracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan also
included work outside those two countries. For example, the Navy
reported multiple contracts with work in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
United States. Similarly, the Air Force reported that a number of its
contracts included performance in both Iraq and Kuwait. However, in
such cases, it was not possible based on the data reported to us to
determine what portion of the obligated amount was for work in Iraq or
Afghanistan. As a result, we counted contracts with performance in
multiple countries and their associated obligations with the Iraq
contracts if DOD identified the place of performance as including Iraq,
but not Afghanistan. Similarly, we counted contracts and their
associated obligations with the Afghanistan contracts if the place of
performance included Afghanistan, but not Iraq. For contracts with
performance in both Iraq and Afghanistan as well as contracts where DOD
indicated that performance was in Iraq or Afghanistan but did not
specify which country, we counted the contracts and their associated
obligations as ’other.“
Table 1: DOD Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan,
Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008:
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of active contracts: 12,743;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $3,192.2;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 6,543;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions):
$1,903.6;
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active
contracts: 18,889[A];
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount
(in millions): $5,095.7.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of active contracts: 24,667;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $14,182.2;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 12,553;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions):
$8,541.5;
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active
contracts: 36,485[A];
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount
(in millions): $22,723.7.
Other:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of active contracts: 149;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $1,621.7;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 123;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions):
$861.5;
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active
contracts: 229[A];
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount
(in millions): $2,483.2.
Total:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of active contracts: 37,559;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $18,996.0;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 19,219;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions):
$11,306.6;
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active
contracts: 55,603[A];
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount
(in millions): $30,302.6.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2007 and the first
half of fiscal year 2008. As a result, the total number of active
contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the
number that were active each year added together. Obligation amounts
are unique to each fiscal year so total obligations for the entire
period are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year.
[End of table]
DOD‘s contracts, which were awarded by contract offices in the United
States and abroad, were for a variety of goods and services including
maintenance of DOD facilities, reconstruction, security, and supplies.
These goods and services were obtained using different contracting
methods. The majority of DOD contracts were purchase orders,[Footnote
28] but purchase orders represented a relatively small amount of the
reported obligations. In contrast, DOD reported relatively few active
task orders, but nearly 70 percent of DOD‘s obligations were for task
orders. These included orders against DOD logistic support contracts,
such as the Army‘s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)
contract that provides food service, housing, and other services for
U.S. military personnel in southwest and central Asia. The Army
obligated more than $6 billion for a single LOGCAP task order during
the period of our review.
While we were mandated to identify the total number and value of all
DOD contracts, which is defined to mean prime contracts, task orders,
and subcontracts at any tier, DOD was unable to provide data on the
number of subcontracts or information on the value of individual
subcontracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the period
of our review,
DOD officials informed us that they did not track or maintain data on
the extent to which DOD contractors subcontracted portions of their
work. Furthermore, there was no requirement to do so. Although the
number and value of individual subcontracts cannot be determined from
the data DOD reported, the value of the subcontracted work is captured
within the amounts DOD obligated to its prime contractors.
Of the DOD contracts that were active in Iraq and Afghanistan during
fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, almost all of
them were awarded during that 18-month period (see table 2). These
newly awarded contracts accounted for approximately 60 percent of DOD‘s
obligated funds. DOD‘s remaining obligations were made on contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2006 or earlier.
Table 2: DOD New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008:
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of new awards: 12,335;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $1,946.9[A];
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of new awards: 6,091;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions):
$820.4.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of new awards: 23,559;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $8,417.4[A];
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of new awards: 11,675;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions):
$3,257.9.
Other:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of new awards: 113;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $1,072.0[A];
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of new awards: 69;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions):
$123.2.
Total:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of new awards: 36,007;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $11,436.2[A];
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of new awards: 17,835;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions):
$4,201.5.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] In addition to the obligations in fiscal year 2007, DOD obligated
$2,474.8 million in the first half of fiscal year 2008 on contracts
that were awarded in fiscal year 2007.
[End of table]
The extent to which DOD was required to compete a contract depended on
where and for what purpose the contract is awarded and performed, its
dollar value, and the contracting method used. The level of competition
required for contracts (other than task orders) was determined based on
dollar thresholds established in the Federal Acquisition Regulation
(FAR). For contracts valued in excess of $1 million to be used in
support of a contingency operation and to be awarded and performed
outside the United States,[Footnote 29] DOD was required to conduct
full and open competition.[Footnote 30]
FAR policy called for the use of simplified acquisition procedures,
such as standing price quotations and source lists, below that
threshold.[Footnote 31] For contracts valued below $25,000 to be used
in support of a contingency operation and to be awarded and performed
outside the United States,[Footnote 32] the FAR provided that award may
be made without soliciting competitive quotations if the price was
determined to be reasonable.[Footnote 33] Pursuant to the FAR,[Footnote
34] statutory and regulatory competition requirements did not apply to
the process of issuing task orders. However, where there were multiple
awardees under the underlying indefinite delivery contract, the FAR
required the contracting officer to provide each awardee a fair
opportunity to be considered for each order exceeding $3,000.[Footnote
35]
Of the DOD contracts awarded in fiscal year 2007 and the first half of
fiscal year 2008, about two-thirds were competed to one extent or
another. DOD reported that of the 12,978 task orders issued, almost 95
percent were issued competitively, which accounted for about 91 percent
of obligations on new task orders. For all other contracting methods,
DOD reported using competitive procedures about 57 percent of the time
(see table 3). These competitively awarded contracts (excluding task
orders) accounted for almost 78 percent of the obligations for new
contract awards. However, for the majority of the newly awarded
contracts, DOD simply indicated whether or not competition occurred
without further specifying the competitive procedures used. This is
partially due to the fact that, according to DOD contracting officials
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the system used to track contracts only allows
them to select yes or no to indicate competition.
Table 3: DOD‘s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts (excluding
task orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2008:
Competed:
Number of contracts: 23,478;
Percentage of contracts: 57.3;
Obligation amount (in millions): $5,909.1;
Percentage of obligations: 77.6.
Not competed:
Number of contracts: 15,474;
Percentage of contracts: 37.8;
Obligation amount (in millions): $1,501.2;
Percentage of obligations: 19.7.
Not reported:
Number of contracts: 2,002;
Percentage of contracts: 4.9;
Obligation amount (in millions): $203.1;
Percentage of obligations: 2.7.
Total:
Number of contracts: 40,954;
Obligation amount (in millions): $7,613.3.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[End of table]
During the course of our file reviews in Iraq and Afghanistan, we found
evidence that, in some cases, DOD underreported the number of contracts
it had competitively awarded. Of the 85 files we reviewed, we found 14
instances in which DOD reported that the contract had not been
competitively awarded but the files indicated that competitive
procedures were used to award the contract. For example, for one
contract that DOD reported as not being competitively awarded, the file
indicated that a solicitation had been sent to multiple Afghani firms
to compete for the contract. DOD contracting officials attributed this
underreporting to multiple factors, including the lack of clear
guidance on how to report limited competition awards in their
contracting system. Also, some DOD contracting officials may have
identified these competitively awarded contracts as not competed
because they were low value contracts for which competition was not
required.
DOD Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan:
In June 2007, DOD‘s Central Command (CENTCOM) issued orders to initiate
a quarterly census of contractor personnel within its Area of
Responsibility, which includes Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 36] This
was done to provide CENTCOM commanders with greater visibility over
deployed contractors and assist them in planning for protection,
medical, and other support for contractors. At the end of each quarter,
DOD components are to provide CENTCOM with contractor personnel
information on active service and construction contracts that have a
period of performance greater than 45 days. Information to be provided
for each contract includes services being provided by the contractor
(such as security, training, and transportation) and the numbers of
U.S. citizens, third country nationals, and local nationals employed on
the contract at all tiers.
DOD officials informed us that data from the quarterly census
represented the best and most complete data available on DOD contractor
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan for the period of our review. As
shown in table 4, DOD reported that as of April 2008, 197,718
contractor personnel worked on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[Footnote 37]
Table 4: CENTCOM Quarterly Census of DOD Contractor Personnel
Performing Duties in Iraq and Afghanistan:
As of November 2007:
Afghanistan: 29,473;
Iraq: 154,825;
Total: 184,298.
As of January 2008:
Afghanistan: 36,520;
Iraq: 163,591;
Total: 200,111.
As of April 2008:
Afghanistan: 48,340;
Iraq: 149,378;
Total: 197,718.
Source: CENTCOM census.
[End of table]
The census relies on contractor firms to self-report their personnel
data. According to DOD officials, when they receive the data they
review it to ensure that there are no obvious errors, but they do not
routinely evaluate the accuracy or completeness of the reported data. A
senior DOD policy official explained that conducting such an evaluation
would be extremely labor and time intensive. Additionally, DOD
contracting officials in Iraq and Afghanistan informed us that they
have a limited ability to assess the reported data, in part, because
security concerns hinder their ability to make on-site assessments.
They told us they had reason to believe the data on local nationals
were more likely to be incomplete because the number of local nationals
working on contracts tends to fluctuate daily and local firms do not
always keep precise track of the number of individuals working on their
projects. In contrast, they explained that the number of U.S. citizen
and third country national contractor personnel was likely to be more
accurate as there tend to be fewer turnovers, which allows the firms to
more easily track those employees.
CENTCOM initiated the census as an interim measure for obtaining data
on contractor personnel until DOD‘s Synchronized Predeployment and
Operational Tracker (SPOT) was fully implemented. SPOT is a Web-based
system that facilitates the monitoring and control of contractor
personnel movement throughout a contingency area. SPOT enables the
validation of contractor personnel associated with specific contracts
and subcontracts by users of the system. In January 2007, SPOT was
designated as DOD‘s primary system for collecting data on contractor
personnel, regardless of nationality, for contractor personnel deployed
with U.S. forces. The requirement to enter data into SPOT excluded
personnel hired under contracts less than $25,000 and for which the
period of performance was less than 30 days. Under the phased
implementation of SPOT, contractor firms were to enter personnel data
for contracts performed in Iraq and Afghanistan by:
* November 1, 2007, for DOD security and translator/linguist service
contracts;
* March 15, 2008, for DOD-funded construction, as well as external and
system support contracts; and;
* May 1, 2008, for other DOD-funded contracts.
According to the SPOT data provided by DOD, there were 24,499
individuals working on contracts identified as providing security
services in Iraq and Afghanistan as of July 2008. However, according to
a senior DOD official familiar with the data, this number could include
personnel performing functions other than armed security, such as
information technology security. Also, in providing us with the data,
DOD informed us that the number of individuals identified on these
security contracts in SPOT may be inflated by up to 19 percent due to
duplicative reporting, particularly for local and third country
nationals.[Footnote 38] However, in our analyses of the SPOT data, we
found instances in which contractor personnel performing security
services appeared to be underreported. Specifically, we identified 47
contracts categorized by CENTCOM as security contracts that did not
appear in SPOT but were listed in the census as having at least 5,924
personnel during the second quarter of fiscal year 2008.
Killed or Wounded DOD Contractor Personnel:
Senior DOD officials informed us that the department does not track the
number of contractor personnel who have been killed or wounded. As a
result, the department was unable to provide us with comprehensive data
on the number of contractor personnel who were killed or wounded in
Iraq or Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of
fiscal year 2008. DOD directed us to the Department of Labor‘s data on
cases filed under the Defense Base Act to obtain data on contractor
casualties (see app. V for data on these cases, which include deaths
and injuries sustained by DOD and other contractor personnel).
For most of the period of our review, DOD did not have a requirement to
track the number of contractor personnel killed or wounded. In January
2008, DOD issued a revised instruction[Footnote 39] directing DOD
components to submit casualty reports on all DOD contractor personnel
outside the continental United States who are injured, missing, or
killed as the result of hostile or nonhostile action or while
accompanying armed forces in the field.[Footnote 40] Information from
the casualty report is to be entered into DOD‘s Defense Casualty
Information Processing System. Additionally, in November 2007, DOD‘s
Joint Staff updated its personnel manual to require the combatant
commands to submit casualty reports for overseas contractor personnel
who are declared dead, whereabouts unknown, missing, ill, or injured.
[Footnote 41] Information from these reports is to be entered into the
Joint Personnel Status Report. However, according to DOD officials
within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, the
requirements in the instruction and manual are being phased in and
neither the casualty system nor the personnel reports currently contain
useful information for determining the overall number of DOD contractor
personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally,
neither the quarterly census nor the current version of SPOT has a
field for recording information on killed or wounded contractor
personnel.
Despite the lack of departmentwide data on the number of contractor
personnel killed or wounded, some DOD components provided us with
limited information. According to data provided by the Defense
Logistics Agency, 147 of its contractor personnel were killed, wounded,
or missing in Iraq and Afghanistan during the period of our review.
However, the Defense Logistics Agency noted that these data are based
on correspondence from the contractors and it does not maintain a
database on killed or wounded contractor personnel. Similarly, the Navy
informed us that based on inquiries to its contractors, none of its
contractor personnel had been killed or wounded. The Defense
Intelligence Agency also informed us that none of its contractor
personnel had been killed or wounded.
Appendix III: State Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan:
This appendix provides information on the State‘s contracts, contractor
personnel, and contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and
Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year
2008. The first section of this appendix presents our analyses of State-
reported data on the number and value of contracts and the extent to
which those contracts were competed. In the second and third sections,
we present State-provided information on contractor personnel and the
number of killed or wounded contractor personnel, as well as some of
the limitations associated with that information.
State Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan:
State reported at least $1.9 billion in obligations on 1,046 contracts
with performance in Iraq or Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the
first half of fiscal year 2008.[Footnote 42] As shown in table 5,
approximately 60 percent of both the contracts and their associated
obligations were for performance in Iraq. While most of the remaining
contracts and obligations were for performance in Afghanistan, State
also reported three contracts that had performance in multiple
countries, including Iraq and Afghanistan.
State‘s contracts, which were primarily awarded by its headquarters
contracting office and posts in Iraq and Afghanistan, were for a
variety of goods and services, such as construction and poppy
eradication. To obtain these goods and services, State used different
contracting methods. Most of State‘s active contracts”nearly 80
percent”were purchase orders. In contrast, task orders accounted for 85
percent of State‘s obligations during our review period. Most notably,
State obligated over $500 million for a single task order, which
accounted for more than one-quarter of its obligations.
Table 5: State Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008:
Afghanistan;
Fiscal year 2007: Number of active contracts: 319;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $562.5;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 111;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions):
$215.0;
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active
contracts: 422[B];
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount
(in millions): $777.4.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of active contracts: 452;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $986.3;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 191;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions):
$148.1;
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active
contracts: 621[B];
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount
(in millions): $1,134.4.
Other[A]:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of active contracts: 2;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $1.7;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 2;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions): $1.0;
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active
contracts: 3[B];
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount
(in millions): $2.7.
Total:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of active contracts: 773;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $1,550.4;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 304;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions):
$364.1;
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Number of active
contracts: 1,046[B];
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount
(in millions): $1,914.5.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] ’Other“ includes contracts that State reported as having
performance in multiple countries, including Iraq and/or Afghanistan.
[B] Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2007 and the first
half of fiscal year 2008. As a result, the total number of active
contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the
number that were active each year added together. Obligation amounts
are unique to each fiscal year so total obligations for the entire
period are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year.
[End of table]
While we were mandated to identify the total number and value of all
State contracts, which is defined to mean prime contracts, task orders,
and subcontracts at any tier, State was unable to provide data on the
number of subcontracts or information on the value of individual
subcontracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the period
of our review, State officials informed us that they did not track or
maintain data on the extent to which State contractors subcontracted
portions of their work. Furthermore, there was no requirement to do so.
Although the number and value of individual subcontracts cannot be
determined from the data State reported, the value of the subcontracted
work is captured within the amounts State obligated to its prime
contractors.
Of the State contracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan during
fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, most were
awarded in that 18-month period (see table 6). However, these newly
awarded contracts accounted for a small percentage of State‘s
obligations. Of the newly awarded contracts, 75 percent had obligations
of less than $25,000 during our 18 month review period. Obligations on
contracts awarded in fiscal year 2006 or earlier accounted for more
than 82 percent of State‘s obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan during
fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008.
Table 6: State New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008:
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of new awards: 299;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $53.6[B];
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of new awards: 101;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions): $1.9.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of new awards: 419;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $223.5[B];
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of new awards: 153;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions): $21.6.
Other[A]:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of new awards: 0;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $0.0[B];
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of new awards: 1;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions): $0.2.
Total:
Fiscal year 2007: Number of new awards: 718;
Fiscal year 2007: Obligation amount (in millions): $277.1[B];
First half of fiscal year 2008: Number of new awards: 255;
First half of fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount (in millions): $23.7.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] ’Other“ includes contracts that State reported as having
performance in multiple countries, including Iraq and/or Afghanistan.
[B] In addition to the obligations in fiscal year 2007, State obligated
$31.3 million in the first half of fiscal year 2008 on contracts that
were awarded in fiscal year 2007.
[End of table]
The extent to which State was required to compete a contract depended
on where and for what purpose the contract was awarded and performed,
its dollar value, and the contracting method used. The level of
competition required for contracts (other than task orders) was
determined based on dollar thresholds established in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). For contracts valued in excess of $1
million to be used in support of a contingency operation and to be
awarded and performed outside the United States,[Footnote 43] State was
required to conduct full and open competition.[Footnote 44] FAR policy
called for the use of simplified acquisition procedures, such as
standing price quotations and source lists, below that threshold.
[Footnote 45] For contracts valued below $25,000 to be used in support
of a contingency operation and to be awarded and performed outside the
United States,[Footnote 46] the FAR provided that award may be made
without soliciting competitive quotations if the price was determined
to be reasonable.[Footnote 47] Pursuant to the FAR,[Footnote 48]
statutory and regulatory competition requirements did not apply to the
process of issuing task orders. However, where there were multiple
awardees under the underlying indefinite delivery contract, the FAR
required the contracting officer to provide each awardee a fair
opportunity to be considered for each order exceeding $3,000.[Footnote
49]
Of the State contracts awarded in fiscal year 2007 and the first half
of fiscal year 2008, almost 61 percent were competed to one extent or
another. State reported that of the 110 task orders issued, 24 percent
were done so competitively. However, State did not report the extent of
competition for almost 52 percent of the orders issued during our
review period, which accounted for nearly 80 percent of its obligations
on new task orders. For all other contracting methods, State reported
using competitive procedures about two-thirds of the time (see table
7). For the 569 new contracts (excluding task orders) that State
reported as competed, the department generally reported using full and
open competition. However, for 5 percent of its contracts, State either
did not provide competition information or the information provided was
not sufficient to determine whether competition occurred.
Table 7: State‘s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(excluding task orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half
of Fiscal Year 2008:
Competed:
Number of contracts: 569;
Percentage of contracts: 65.6;
Obligation amount (in millions): $61.1;
Percentage of obligations: 55.7.
Not competed:
Number of contracts: 252;
Percentage of contracts: 29.1;
Obligation amount (in millions): $39.4;
Percentage of obligations: 35.9.
Not reported:
Number of contracts: 46;
Percentage of contracts: 5.3;
Obligation amount (in millions): $9.3;
Percentage of obligations: 8.4.
Total:
Number of contracts: 867.
Obligation amount (in millions): $109.7.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[End of table]
State Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan:
During fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, State
did not have a centralized system for tracking the number of contractor
personnel. As a result, State was unable to provide us with
comprehensive data on contractor personnel, including those performing
security functions, in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period.
However, in response to our request for data, State provided limited
personnel data it had received through inquiries made to its
contractors. State reported that as of July 2008, 6,341 contractor
personnel were working in Iraq and an additional 851 were working in
Afghanistan. State‘s contractor personnel are likely understated.
According to the information provided by State, these contractor
personnel were working on approximately 40 contracts in Iraq and 3 in
Afghanistan, which is considerably less than the number of active
contracts State reported to us. Of the contractor personnel State
reported to be working in Iraq, 73 percent were reported to be
performing security functions. However, of the contractor personnel in
Afghanistan, 650 were reported to be performing security functions
while the remainder was supporting demining efforts, which means that
contractor personnel performing other services in Afghanistan, such as
construction and translation, were not reported to us. We previously
reported that for one contract in Afghanistan, there were 540
contractor personnel training and mentoring the Afghan national police
as of April 2008”these personnel were not included in the numbers State
reported to us.[Footnote 50]
Killed or Wounded State Contractor Personnel:
For the period of our review, State did not have a system to track the
number of contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq or
Afghanistan. State officials noted that they were not required to track
such information, but they were able to provide partial data on the
number of contractor personnel who had been killed or wounded. They
indicated that the information provided to us was the best available.
In 2007, State sent an inquiry to its contractors to obtain information
on contractor deaths. In response, State‘s contractors reported that
during fiscal year 2007, 23 contractor personnel had been killed in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Of these, 19 were reported to have been killed in
Iraq. State officials explained that they did not verify the
information provided by contractors. Additionally, they explained that
they have not requested information on the number of contractor deaths
or the number of contractor personnel wounded in fiscal year 2008.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: USAID Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan:
This appendix provides information on United States Agency for
International Development‘s (USAID) contracts, contractor personnel,
and contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan
during fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008. The
first section of this appendix presents our analyses of USAID-reported
data on the number and value of contracts and the extent to which those
contracts were competed. In the second and third sections, we present
USAID-provided information on contractor personnel and the number
killed or wounded, as well as some of the limitations associated with
that information.
USAID Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan:
USAID reported at least $1.7 billion in obligations on 276 contracts
active in Iraq or Afghanistan during fiscal year 2007 and the first
half of fiscal year 2008.[Footnote 51] As shown in table 8, the number
of contracts and obligations were relatively equal for both Iraq and
Afghanistan over the 18-month period of our review. These contracts,
which were primarily awarded by USAID contract offices overseas, were
for a range of goods and services, such as building roads and
supporting local governance programs. These also include contracts for
individuals to work as personal services contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan.[Footnote 52] Eighty-three percent of USAID‘s active
contracts were stand-alone contracts, which made up approximately 43
percent of USAID‘s obligations. In comparison, task orders made up 12
percent of USAID‘s active contracts but accounted for 45 percent of its
obligations.
Table 8: USAID Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008:
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2007, Number of active contracts: 99;
Fiscal year 2007, Obligation amount (in millions): $427.5;
First half of fiscal year 2008, Number of active contracts: 82;
First half of fiscal year 2008, Obligation amount (in millions):
$529.8;
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008, Number of active
contracts: 154[A];
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008, Obligation amount
(in millions): $957.3.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2007, Number of active contracts: 91;
Fiscal year 2007, Obligation amount (in millions): $767.4;
First half of fiscal year 2008, Number of active contracts: 35;
First half of fiscal year 2008, Obligation amount (in millions): $43.5;
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008, Number of active
contracts: 122[A];
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008, Obligation amount
(in millions): $810.9.
Total:
Fiscal year 2007, Number of active contracts: 190;
Fiscal year 2007, Obligation amount (in millions): $1,194.8;
First half of fiscal year 2008, Number of active contracts: 117;
First half of fiscal year 2008, Obligation amount (in millions):
$573.3;
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008, Number of active
contracts: 276[A];
Fiscal year 2007 and first half of fiscal year 2008, Obligation amount
(in millions): $1,768.1.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2007 and the first
half of fiscal year 2008. As a result, the total number of active
contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the
number that were active each year added together. Obligation amounts
are unique to each fiscal year so total obligations for the entire
period are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year.
[End of table]
While we were mandated to identify the total number and value of all
USAID contracts, which is defined to mean prime contracts, task orders,
and subcontracts at any tier, USAID was unable to provide data on the
number of subcontracts or information on the value of individual
subcontracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. USAID officials,
who noted that there was no requirement to do so, explained that they
did not track or centrally maintain data on the extent to which USAID
contractors subcontracted portions of their work. However, they noted
that some individual contract files contain information on subcontracts
but that information is not readily available. Although the number and
value of individual subcontracts cannot be determined from the data
USAID reported, the value of the subcontracted work is captured within
the amounts USAID obligated to its prime contractors.
Of the USAID contracts that were active in Iraq and Afghanistan during
fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, two-thirds
were awarded during that 18-month period (see table 9). However, the
majority of USAID‘s obligations were made on contracts awarded in
fiscal year 2006 or earlier. In fiscal year 2007, newly awarded
contracts accounted for one-quarter of the obligations, while newly
awarded contracts accounted for only 17 percent of the obligations in
the first half of fiscal year 2008.
Table 9: USAID New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2008:
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2007, Number of new awards: 66;
Fiscal year 2007, Obligation amount (in millions): $70.9[A];
First half of fiscal year 2008, Number of new awards: 46;
First half of fiscal year 2008, Obligation amount (in millions): $56.8.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2007, Number of new awards: 43;
Fiscal year 2007, Obligation amount (in millions): $227.0[A];
First half of fiscal year 2008, Number of new awards: 21;
First half of fiscal year 2008, Obligation amount (in millions): $38.1;
Total: 109 $297.9a 67 $94.8
Fiscal year 2007, Number of new awards: 109;
Fiscal year 2007, Obligation amount (in millions): $297.9[A];
First half of fiscal year 2008, Number of new awards: 67;
First half of fiscal year 2008, Obligation amount (in millions): $94.8;
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] In addition to the obligations in fiscal year 2007, USAID obligated
$100.2 million in the first half of fiscal year 2008 on contracts that
were awarded in fiscal year 2007.
[End of table]
The extent to which USAID was required to compete a contract depended
on where and for what purpose the contract is awarded and performed,
its dollar value, and the contracting method used. The level of
competition required for contracts (other than task orders) was
determined based on dollar thresholds established in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR). For contracts valued in excess of $1
million to be used in support of a contingency operation and to be
awarded and performed outside the United States,[Footnote 53] USAID was
required to conduct full and open competition.[Footnote 54] FAR policy
called for the use of simplified acquisition procedures, such as
standing price quotations and source lists, below that threshold.
[Footnote 55] For contracts valued below $25,000 to be used in support
of a contingency operation and to be awarded and performed outside the
United States,[Footnote 56] the FAR provided that award may be made
without soliciting competitive quotations if the price was determined
to be reasonable.[Footnote 57] Pursuant to the FAR,[Footnote 58]
statutory and regulatory competition requirements did not apply to the
process of issuing task orders. However, where there were multiple
awardees under the underlying indefinite delivery contract, the FAR
required the contracting officer to provide each awardee a fair
opportunity to be considered for each order exceeding $3,000.[Footnote
59]
Of the USAID contracts awarded in fiscal year 2007 and the first half
of fiscal year 2008, almost 97 percent were competed to one extent or
another. USAID reported that it competitively issued all six of its
task orders with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. For all other
contracting methods, USAID reported using competitive procedures 97
percent of the time (see table 10). For the new 175 contracts
(excluding task orders) that USAID reported as competed, 12 were
reported as awarded under full and open competition and 2 were awarded
under simplified acquisition procedures. For the rest of the competed
contracts, USAID only indicated that the contracts were competed
without indicating the extent.
Table 10: USAID‘s Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(excluding task orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2007 and the First Half
of Fiscal Year 2008:
Competed:
Number of contracts: 175;
Percentage of contracts: 96.7;
Obligation amount (in millions): $474.4;
Percentage of obligations: 99.5.
Not competed:
Number of contracts: 6;
Percentage of contracts: 3.2;
Obligation amount (in millions): $2.6;
Percentage of obligations: 0.5.
Total:
Number of contracts: 181;
Obligation amount (in millions): $476.9.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[End of table]
During fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year 2008, USAID
did not have a centralized system for tracking the number of contractor
personnel. However, USAID officials explained they had made efforts to
collect data on contractor personnel performing security functions in
Iraq and Afghanistan. USAID made periodic inquiries of its contractors
to obtain personnel information. As a result, USAID was able to provide
us with some data on the number of security contractors but could only
provide limited data on personnel performing other functions. USAID
reported that, as of February 2008, 1,975 contractor personnel worked
on contracts in Iraq and 840 of those individuals performed security
functions. For Afghanistan, USAID reported that as of April 2008 there
were 3,175 contractor personnel, all of whom performed security
functions.
USAID contractor personnel data are likely underreported as they
reflect contractor personnel working on 50 contracts, which is less
than the 276 active contracts USAID reported to us. Also, USAID
officials identified a number of limitations associated with the data
provided to us. According to a senior USAID official in Afghanistan,
not all of the contractor firms responded to USAID‘s request for data
on contractor personnel and no effort was made to verify the
information that was reported. Nevertheless, he explained that these
data were the best available. Similarly, USAID officials in Iraq told
us they were unable to verify the completeness or accuracy of the
number reported to us.
Killed or Wounded USAID Contractor Personnel:
For the period of our review, USAID relied on reports from its
implementing partners, which include contractors, to maintain a count
of the number of individuals that had been killed or wounded while
working on USAID programs. In providing us with the information from
those reports, USAID was unable to specify how many of these
individuals were contractor personnel as opposed to individuals working
on grants or otherwise working to implement USAID programs. USAID
informed us that in fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal year
2008, 22 individuals had been killed in Iraq and 83 had been killed in
Afghanistan. An additional 18 individuals were reported wounded in Iraq
and 83 were reported injured or disabled in Afghanistan. In providing
the information on individuals killed or injured in Afghanistan, USAID
noted that several deaths and injuries were the result of traffic
accidents.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Defense Base Act Cases for Contractor Personnel Killed or
Injured in Iraq and Afghanistan:
The Congress enacted the Defense Base Act (DBA) in 1941 to provide
workers‘ compensation protection to employees of government contractors
working at U.S. defense bases overseas. Subsequent amendments to DBA
extended coverage to other classes of government contractor employees.
The insurance required under DBA provides employees with uniform levels
of disability and medical benefits or”in the event of death”provides
benefits to eligible dependents. Contractors, including subcontractors,
are required to provide DBA insurance to all of their employees
regardless of nationality, working outside the United States on U.S.
military bases or under a contract with the U.S. government for public
works or for national defense. The Department of Labor administers DBA
and, as such, maintains data on the number of deaths and injuries
reported to it.[Footnote 60]
According to Labor, there were 16,242 cases for deaths or injuries that
occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan in fiscal year 2007 and the first half
of fiscal year 2008 (see table 11). Of these, 455 were deaths and
15,787 were injuries. The majority of the injuries reported involved
incidents that did not result in contractor personnel missing work.
Nearly 85 percent of the cases were for deaths or injuries that
occurred in Iraq.
Table 11: Defense Base Act Cases for Deaths and Injuries in Iraq and
Afghanistan by Fiscal Year of Death or Injury, Fiscal Year 2007 and the
First Half of Fiscal Year 2008:
Deaths:
Afghanistan, Fiscal year 2007: 40;
Afghanistan, First half fiscal year 2008: 12;
Iraq, Fiscal year 2007: 337;
Iraq, First half fiscal year 2008: 66.
Injuries:
Afghanistan, Fiscal year 2007: 1,962;
Afghanistan, First half fiscal year 2008: 567;
Iraq, Fiscal year 2007: 9,148;
Iraq, First half fiscal year 2008: 4,110.
Source: GAO analysis of Labor data.
Note: Cases may be for contractor personnel who are under contract with
U.S. government agencies other than DOD, State, and USAID.
[End of table]
DBA cases are likely to represent the minimum number of contractor
deaths and injuries that occurred during our review period. Labor
officials told us that a DBA case record is created in their database
once they are notified of a contractor death or injury. However, they
informed us that there may be contractor deaths or injuries that are
not reported and, as a result, do not appear in Labor‘s data. They
stated it is more likely that injuries to local and third country
nationals, particularly those working on subcontracts, are
underreported. They noted that there have been a number of efforts to
help ensure that all contractor personnel, regardless of nationality,
are aware of their rights under DBA and are encouraged to claim
benefits as appropriate.
In tracking DBA deaths and injuries, Labor does not collect information
on the agency or contract that the contractor personnel worked under
and therefore could not identify which claims were made by contractor
personnel working on DOD, State, and USAID contracts. Labor also does
not maintain data on how deaths and injuries occurred, so it is not
possible to determine whether a death or injury was the result of
hostile actions, accidents, or natural and other causes. Such
information can only be obtained by reviewing individual case files.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Memorandum of Understanding on Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan:
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Act)
directed the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the
Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) to sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) related to
contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 61] The law specified a
number of matters to be covered in the MOU, including the
identification of each agency‘s roles and responsibilities for matters
relating to contracting in Iraq or Afghanistan, responsibility for
establishing procedures for the movement of contractor personnel in the
two countries, and identifying common databases that will serve as
repositories of information on contracts and contractor personnel in
Iraq or Afghanistan. After negotiations between the Department of
Defense (DOD), Department of State, and USAID were completed, the final
signature was added to the MOU on July 10, 2008. No later than 120 days
after signing the MOU, the three agencies are required to issue
policies or guidance and develop regulations, as necessary, to
implement the MOU at their respective agencies.
In the MOU provisions regarding the identification of common databases
for contracts and contractor personnel, the three agencies agreed that
DOD‘s Synchronized Pre-Deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT)
database will be the system of record for the contract and contractor
personnel information required by section 861. The MOU specified that
SPOT will include information on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan with
performance periods of more than 14 days or valued at more than
$100,000 and their associated personnel, as appropriate. While the Act
specified the 14 days or more threshold, it did not specify a minimum
dollar value threshold regarding which contracts should appear in the
database.
According to the MOU, DOD is responsible for all maintenance and
upgrades to SPOT, which it originally designed and used. Each agency
will be responsible for ensuring that data elements related to
contractor personnel, such as the number of personnel employed on
contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan, are entered into the system and for
requiring its contractors to input that information accurately. Other
data elements that are related to the contract, such as the value of
the contract and whether it was awarded competitively, will be pulled
into SPOT from the Federal Procurement Data System – Next Generation
(FPDS-NG), which is the federal government‘s current system for
tracking information on contracting actions.
The three agencies are at various stages in implementing and using
SPOT. DOD has been using SPOT since early 2007 to track its contractor
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD has drafted new instructions
that detail the requirements for the expanded use of SPOT by
contractors to conform with the Act and MOU. DOD officials explained
that as is currently the case, contractors will be required to enter
information on their contractor personnel into SPOT once the DOD
contracting officer enters the contract number into the system. In
terms of ensuring that contract information is pulled into SPOT,
information on individual contracts awarded by DOD in Iraq and
Afghanistan are not currently entered into FPDS-NG. However, DOD
officials told us that there are plans underway to ensure that
information on these contracts is entered into FPDS-NG so their
information can be pulled into SPOT. State officials told us that they
have been using SPOT on a limited basis as part of a pilot program, but
they expect information on State‘s contracts and contractors to be
entered into SPOT by early November 2008. USAID and its contractors
have not started using SPOT. According to USAID officials, they are
currently working to educate contractors on the use of SPOT. USAID is
initially focusing on contractors that have large security subcontracts
and will then focus on all other contractors with security
subcontracts. While USAID officials were uncertain as to when its
contractors will start entering data into SPOT, they stated that they
fully expect to comply with the provisions of the MOU.
DOD has already begun taking actions to have SPOT ready to fulfill the
MOU. Plans have been developed to add new fields to SPOT, specifically
to record information on contractor personnel who have been killed or
wounded. According to DOD officials, as the agencies work together to
implement the provisions of the MOU and upgrades are made to SPOT to
facilitate its use and track required information, such as contractor
casualties, the ability of the agencies to report on the number and
value of contracts, as well as on the number of contractor personnel,
will improve. Similarly, State officials indicated that having a
centralized system for tracking contractor personnel will be beneficial
as it will reduce concerns about limited visibility over contractors
and allow the department to more readily respond to requests for
contract and contractor personnel information.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John Hutton (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov.
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact above, Johana R. Ayers, Assistant Director;
Jessica M. Berkholtz; E. Brandon Booth; Brendan S. Culley; Art James,
Jr.; Lisa A. McMillen; Jean McSween, and Karen Thornton made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimated that about 94
percent of the funds were for DOD and 6 percent were for foreign aid
and embassy operations. CRS also estimated that about 76 percent of the
funds have been for efforts in Iraq and 20 percent for Afghanistan.
CRS, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror
Operations Since 9/11, RL33110 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2008).
[2] See GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive
Reliance on Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and
Oversight, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-572T]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008) and Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq:
Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts
and Investments, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-
568T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008). See also, Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction, Contracting in Iraq Reconstruction,
SIGIR 07-010T (Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2007) and Department of
Defense Inspector General, Challenges Impacting Operations Iraqi
Freedom and Enduring Freedom Reported by Major Oversight Organizations
Beginning FY 2003 through FY 2007, D-2008-086 (Arlington, Va.: July 18,
2008).
[3] Pub. L. No. 110-181.
[4] Pub. L. No. 110-181, §863. While the mandate and our report address
DOD, State, and USAID contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, other
federal agencies such as the Departments of Agriculture, Justice, and
the Treasury have contracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan
that are not included in the scope of the mandate or our report.
[5] For the purposes of our annual report and the three agencies‘ MOU,
section 864 of the Act defines a ’contract in Iraq or Afghanistan“ as
’a contract with the Department of Defense, the Department of State, or
the United States Agency for International Development, a subcontract
at any tier issued under such a contract, or a task order or delivery
order at any tier issued under such a contract (including a contract,
subcontract, or task order or delivery order issued by another
Government agency for the Department of Defense, the Department of
State, or the United States Agency for International Development) if the
contract, subcontract, or task order or delivery order involves work
performed in Iraq or Afghanistan for a period longer than 14 days.“ The
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines a subcontract as a
contract entered into by a subcontractor to furnish supplies or
services for performance of a prime contract or other subcontracts. The
FAR defines a task order as an order for services placed against an
established contract or government sources. For the purposes of this
report, when we use the term contract, we intend it to refer to a
’contract in Iraq or Afghanistan“ as defined in the act. However, due to
limitations in how the agencies track their contracts, we included in
our analyses contracts reported to us regardless of whether they had a
performance period of more than 14 days. Also, the agencies were unable
to provide data on the number or value of individual subcontracts.
[6] Since the Act did not define what constitutes an ’active“ contract,
we considered a contract as active if an obligation or deobligation of
funds was made on that contract in fiscal year 2007 and/or the first
half of fiscal year 2008. There are other contracts that had
performance in Iraq or Afghanistan during that time period but had no
obligations or deobligations; these contracts were not included in our
analyses. Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2007 and the first half of
fiscal year 2008 are a subset of the active contracts.
[7] Section 864 of the Act defines private security functions, in part,
as the ’guarding of personnel, facilities or property of a Federal
agency, the contractor or subcontractor, or a third party“ and ’any
other activity for which personnel are required to carry weapons in
the performance of their duties.“ This definition applies to
contractors under a covered contract in an area of combat operations.
The Act requires us to report ’the total number of contractor
personnel, on average, performing security functions.“ However, the data
were not sufficiently reliable to calculate the average number of
personnel providing security functions.
[8] Amounts obligated in fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal
year 2008 were used to determine value as opposed to a contract‘s total
estimated cost or price ceiling, for example, because obligations
represent a specified sum of money that will require government
expenditures as opposed to estimates.
[9] The Defense Base Act requires all contractors that enter into
contracts with the U.S. government and their subcontractors to secure
workers' compensation insurance for their employees working overseas,
including those who are not U.S. citizens. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651-54. The
Department of Labor administers the Defense Base Act.
[10] Labor initiates a case when it receives a notice of an injury or
death. These notices include reports filed by employers and claims for
benefits submitted by injured workers or by their survivors.
[11] The term contractor personnel, as used throughout this report,
refers to individuals, regardless of nationality, working for a prime
contractor or subcontractor at any tier. Contractor personnel also
include individuals who are working under personal services contracts
with a government agency.
[12] The Act directs that we report on the number of wounded contractor
personnel, but it does not provide a definition of wounded. Defense
Base Act cases may be for injuries that occur while working under a
U.S. government contract performed overseas and are not limited to
injuries that are the result of hostile action.
[13] SPOT is a Web-based system initially created by DOD to provide
greater visibility over contractors deployed with U.S. forces. In
January 2007, DOD designated SPOT as its central repository for
information on deployed contractors.
[14] Pub. L. No. 110-181.
[15] For the purposes of our annual report, section 864 of the Act
defines a ’contract in Iraq or Afghanistan“ as ’a contract with the
Department of Defense, the Department of State, or the United States
Agency for International Development, a subcontract at any tier issued
under such a contract, or a task order or delivery order at any tier
issued under such a contract (including a contract, subcontract, or
task order or delivery order issued by another Government agency for
the Department of Defense, the Department of State, or the United
States Agency for International Development) if the contract,
subcontract, or task order or delivery order involves work performed in
Iraq or Afghanistan for a period longer than 14 days.“ The Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines a subcontract as a contract
entered into by a subcontractor to furnish supplies or services for
performance of a prime contract or other subcontracts. The FAR defines
a task order as an order for services placed against an established
contract or government sources. For purposes of this report, when we
use the term contract, we intend it to refer to a ’contract in Iraq or
Afghanistan“ as defined in the Act. However, due to limitations in how
the agencies track their contracts, we included in our analyses
contracts reported to us regardless of whether they had a performance
period of more than 14 days.
[16] Amounts obligated in fiscal year 2007 and the first half of fiscal
year 2008 were used to determine contract value as opposed to a
contract‘s total estimated cost or price ceiling,
for example, because obligations represent a specified sum of money
that will require government expenditures as opposed to estimates.
[17] GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Competition for Iraq
Reconstruction Contracts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-40] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 6, 2006).
[18] GAO, Improvements Needed to the Federal Procurement Data System-
Next Generation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-
960R] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2005) and Acquisition Advisory
Panel, Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy and the United States Congress (Washington,
D.C.: January 2007).
[19] Since the Act did not define what constitutes an ’active“
contract, we considered a contract as active if an obligation or
deobligation of funds was made on that contract in fiscal year 2007
and/or the first half of fiscal year 2008. There are other contracts
that had performance in Iraq or Afghanistan during that time period but
had no obligations or deobligations; such contracts were not included
in our analyses.
[20] For some obligations, USAID did not indicate the fiscal year in
which the obligation occurred. In several of those cases, after
consulting with USAID officials, we substituted the contract start date
for the obligation date. However, for some of the obligations, we were
unable to determine when they occurred and we, therefore, did not
include those obligations in our totals for either fiscal year 2007 or
the first half of fiscal year 2008. Also, for some of its contracts,
the Navy reported the total obligated amount over the life of a
contract rather than the obligations for our review period. In those
cases using the contract numbers provided by the Navy, we replaced the
obligation amounts and dates provided with more detailed information
from FPDS-NG.
[21] In analyzing the agencies‘ data on competition, we did not
evaluate the acquisition strategy used to award the contract actions,
whether justifications for issuing awards noncompetitively were
adequate, or whether task orders were within the scope of the
underlying contract.
[22] We did not attempt to validate the contract data reported by DOD‘s
Business Transformation Agency, Counterintelligence Field Activity,
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency,
National Geospatial Agency, Special Operations Command, or
Transportation Command as their contracts represented a small portion
of DOD‘s total number of contracts and obligations.
[23] Third country nationals are individuals who are neither U.S.,
Iraq, nor Afghanistan nationals. Local nationals, also referred to as
host country nationals, are Iraqis or Afghanis who are working on
contracts in their respective countries.
[24] Section 864 of the Act defines private security functions as the
’guarding of personnel, facilities, or property of a Federal agency,
the contractor or subcontractor, or a third party“ and ’any other
activity for which personnel are required to carry weapons in
performance of their duties.“ This definition applies to contractors
under a covered contract in an area of combat operations.
[25] The term contractor personnel, as used throughout this report,
refers to individuals, regardless of nationality, working for a prime
contractor or subcontractor at any tier, as well as individuals working
under personal services contracts with a government agency.
[26] According to Labor officials, they typically report data on when
the cases are filed instead of when the incident that caused the death
or injury occurred.
[27] In counting the number of contracts, we excluded the base
contracts under which task orders were issued. This was done, in part,
because the base contracts do not have obligations associated with them
as the obligations are incurred with the issuance of each task order.
All other contracts, task orders, delivery orders, and purchase orders
are included in the count along with their associated obligations. The
count and obligations also do not include small dollar purchases (below
$3,000) made by DOD field ordering officers as information on these
purchases, while maintained in log books, has not been tracked in DOD‘s
contracting systems.
[28] Under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (part 2.101), a purchase
order is an offer by the government to buy supplies or services,
including construction and research and development, upon specified
terms and conditions, using simplified acquisition procedures.
[29] Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the simplified acquisition
threshold. The threshold is lower for contracts awarded and performed
in the United States, which were not in the scope of our review.
[30] Section 6.101 of the FAR implements the Competition in Contracting
Act (CICA) requirement for contracting officers to provide for full and
open competition in awarding government contracts. The FAR also
implements exceptions to CICA that permit contracting without providing
for full and open competition where an appropriate justification
supports the use of such authority. FAR 6.302.
[31] FAR 13.003 (a) and Subpart 13.1.
[32] Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the micro-purchase threshold. The
threshold is lower for contracts awarded and performed in the United
States, which were not in the scope of our review.
[33] FAR 13.201 (g) and 13.202 (a).
[34] FAR 16.505 (b)(1)(ii).
[35] FAR 16.505 (b)(1)(i).
[36] CENTCOM is one of DOD‘s six geographic combatant commands. It is
responsible for overseeing U.S. military operations that take place in
27 nations located in the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Gulf region, and
Central Asia.
[37] Per CENTCOM guidance, this number includes personnel working at
the prime contract level and subcontract levels.
[38] DOD also informed us that for all contractor personnel, not just
those performing security functions, numbers in SPOT may be inflated by
up to 7 percent.
[39] Department of Defense Instruction 1300.18, Department of Defense
Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures, § 6.1.1 (Jan. 8,
2008). This instruction replaced the December 2000 version, which did
not address contractor casualties.
[40] At their own discretion, the services and DOD components may also
submit casualty reports for DOD contractor personnel on travel status.
[41] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3150.13B, Joint
Reporting Structure - Personnel Manual, Enclosure D, para. 10.r (Nov.
1, 2007). This manual replaced the February 2005 version, which did not
address contractor casualties.
[42] In counting the number of contracts, we excluded the base
contracts under which task orders were issued. This was done, in part,
because such contracts do not have obligations associated with them as
the obligations are incurred with the issuance of each task order. All
other contracts, task orders, delivery orders, and purchase orders are
included in the count along with their associated obligations.
[43] Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the simplified acquisition
threshold. The threshold is lower for contracts awarded and performed
in the United States, which were not in the scope of our review.
[44] Section 6.101 of the FAR implements the Competition in Contracting
Act (CICA) requirement for contracting officers to provide for full and
open competition in awarding government contracts. The FAR also
implements exceptions to CICA that permit contracting without providing
for full and open competition where an appropriate justification
supports the use of such authority. FAR 6.302.
[45] FAR 13.003 (a) and Subpart 13.1.
[46] Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the micro-purchase threshold. The
threshold is lower for contracts awarded and performed in the United
States, which were not in the scope of our review.
[47] FAR 13.201 (g) and 13.202 (a).
[48] FAR 16.505 (b)(1)(ii).
[49] FAR 16.505 (b)(1)(i).
[50] GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be
Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain
Capable Afghan National Security Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-661] (Washington, D.C.: June
18, 2008).
[51] In counting the number of contracts, we excluded the base
contracts under which task orders were issued. This was done, in part,
because such contracts do not have obligations associated with them as
the obligations are incurred with the issuance of each task order. All
other contracts, task orders, delivery orders, and purchase orders are
included in the count along with their associated obligations.
[52] USAID is authorized under §636 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 (Pub. L. No. 87-195) to contract for personal services. The FAR
(Part 2.101) defines personal services contracts as contracts that, by
their express terms or as administered, make the contractor personnel
appear to be, in effect, government employees.
[53] Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the simplified acquisition
threshold. The threshold is lower for contracts awarded and performed
in the United States, which were not in the scope of our review.
[54] Section 6.101 of the FAR implements the Competition in Contracting
Act (CICA) requirement for contracting officers to provide for full and
open competition in awarding government contracts. The FAR also
implements exceptions to CICA that permit contracting without providing
for full and open competition where an appropriate justification
supports the use of such authority. FAR 6.302.
[55] FAR 13.003 (a) and Subpart 13.1.
[56] Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the micro-purchase threshold. The
threshold is lower for contracts awarded and performed in the United
States, which were not in the scope of our review.
[57] FAR 13.201 (g) and 13.202 (a).
[58] FAR 16.505 (b)(1)(ii).
[59] FAR 16.505 (b)(1)(i).
[60] Labor initiates a case when it receives a notice of a death or
injury. Notices include reports filed by employers and claims for
benefits submitted by injured workers or by their survivors.
[61] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 861.
[End of section]
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