Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq
Gao ID: GAO-09-86R October 1, 2008U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) are designed to help improve stability in Afghanistan and Iraq by increasing the host nation's capacity to govern; enhancing economic viability; and strengthening local governments' ability to deliver public services, such as security and health care. PRTs are a means of coordinating interagency diplomatic, economic, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency efforts among various U.S. agencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. PRTs are intended to be interim structures; after a PRT has achieved its goal of improving stability, it may be dismantled to allow traditional development efforts to occur. In Afghanistan, the first PRTs were created in 2002 with the mission of facilitating security and reconstruction by helping the central government extend its authority to the provinces. Since then, PRTs have expanded their purpose to include strengthening local governance and community development. In Iraq, PRTs were initiated in 2005 with the mission to increase the capacity of provincial and local governments to govern effectively and, for newer embedded PRTs (ePRT), to support moderates and assist in the military's counterinsurgency efforts. To accomplish their missions, PRTs engage in and fund a variety of activities, such as developing the capacity of local governments through engagement with local stakeholders; promoting budget execution, business development, agriculture, public health initiatives, and governance; and supporting the delivery of basic social services. This report describes (1) the organization, staffing, and funding for PRTs in Afghanistan and (2) the organization, staffing, and funding for PRTs in Iraq. It excludes information marked "Sensitive but Unclassified" in our September 26, 2008, report on PRTs. Due to broad congressional interest in issues related to Iraq and Afghanistan, we completed this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
Afghanistan, as of May 2008, the United States was leading 12 of 26 PRTs and 13 other coalition countries were leading the remaining 14 PRTs. All PRTs in Afghanistan are under ISAF's operational command, but individual nations, including the United States, lead PRTs and determine their size and structure. U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan are led by DOD and are composed primarily of U.S. military personnel. As of April 2008, 10 of the 12 U.S.-led PRTs included 88 or more military personnel--the majority of whom provide security and other support for the PRTs--and 3 civilian personnel from State, USAID, and USDA. The total number of U.S. government personnel assigned to U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan increased slightly from 1,023 personnel in 2007 to 1,055 personnel in 2008--which includes 1,021 military personnel from DOD and 34 civilian personnel from State, USAID, and USDA. DOD is responsible for paying nearly all of the costs associated with operating PRTs, such as providing their security and life support. However, DOD officials reported that DOD does not track PRT operating costs separately from other operational costs for Afghanistan. State, USAID, and USDA do not reimburse DOD for its support to civilian PRT officials in Afghanistan. PRTs have one source of programmatic funding available for projects in Afghanistan. PRT commanders can approve the use of funds for projects under DOD's Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) up to $25,000 per project. PRTs in Afghanistan may also coordinate with other U.S.-funded programs, including other commanders' CERP projects and USAID programs, such as the Local Governance and Community Development project. In Iraq, as of August 2008, the United States was leading 28 of 31 PRTs and other coalition countries were leading 3 PRTs. As of August 2008, three types of U.S.-led PRTs were operating in Iraq: 11 PRTs at the provincial level of government; 13 ePRTs embedded with U.S. brigade combat teams and operating in local governments in Baghdad, Anbar, Babil, and Diyala provinces; and 4 Provincial Support Teams (PST), which are smaller PRTs that cannot be based in the intended province due to security concerns. According to State and DOD officials, the number of personnel assigned to PRTs and ePRTs in Iraq increased from an estimated 100 to 125 personnel in early 2007 to about 450 in July 2008. This increase was the result of the Administration's decision in January 2007 to create ePRTs and to increase the size of PRTs in support of The New Way Forward. DOD and civilian agencies have staffed the PRTs with a mix of U.S. government employees--permanent and temporary--and contractors. State reimburses DOD for some operating costs of ePRTs and most PRTs, based on a quarterly estimate for each PRT member. State's reimbursements do not cover the costs of PRT security and transportation provided by the U.S. military. According to DOD, as of April 2008, State had reimbursed $11 million to DOD for operating costs--$5.9 million for fiscal year 2007 and $5.1 million for the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. State had also obligated $125 million for PRT movement security from September 2005 through May 2008 for PRTs in Iraq that are not embedded with U.S. military units or do not have access to military movement assets.
GAO-09-86R, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq
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United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 1, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq:
U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) are designed to help
improve stability in Afghanistan and Iraq by increasing the host
nation's capacity to govern; enhancing economic viability; and
strengthening local governments' ability to deliver public services,
such as security and health care. PRTs are a means of coordinating
interagency diplomatic, economic, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency
efforts among various U.S. agencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. PRTs are
intended to be interim structures; after a PRT has achieved its goal of
improving stability, it may be dismantled to allow traditional
development efforts to occur. In Afghanistan, the first PRTs were
created in 2002 with the mission of facilitating security and
reconstruction by helping the central government extend its authority
to the provinces. Since then, PRTs have expanded their purpose to
include strengthening local governance and community development. In
Iraq, PRTs were initiated in 2005 with the mission to increase the
capacity of provincial and local governments to govern effectively and,
for newer embedded PRTs (ePRT), to support moderates and assist in the
military's counterinsurgency efforts. To accomplish their missions,
PRTs engage in and fund a variety of activities, such as developing the
capacity of local governments through engagement with local
stakeholders; promoting budget execution, business development,
agriculture, public health initiatives, and governance; and supporting
the delivery of basic social services.
This report describes (1) the organization, staffing, and funding for
PRTs in Afghanistan and (2) the organization, staffing, and funding for
PRTs in Iraq. It excludes information marked "Sensitive but
Unclassified" in our September 26, 2008, report on PRTs.[Footnote 1]
Due to broad congressional interest in issues related to Iraq and
Afghanistan, we completed this report under the Comptroller General's
authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
To address these topics, we analyzed reports and other documentation
and interviewed officials from the Departments of State (State),
Defense (DOD), and Agriculture (USDA); the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID); the U.S. Central Command, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan; and the Multi-National Force-
Iraq (MNF-I). We received technical comments from DOD, State, and USAID
and incorporated them where appropriate. (See enc. I for a more
complete description of our scope and methodology.)
Summary:
In Afghanistan, as of May 2008, the United States was leading 12 of 26
PRTs and 13 other coalition countries were leading the remaining 14
PRTs. All PRTs in Afghanistan are under:
ISAF's operational command, but individual nations, including the
United States, lead PRTs and determine their size and structure. U.S.-
led PRTs in Afghanistan are led by DOD and are composed primarily of
U.S. military personnel. As of April 2008, 10 of the 12 U.S.-led PRTs
included 88 or more military personnel--the majority of whom provide
security and other support for the PRTs--and 3 civilian personnel from
State, USAID, and USDA. The total number of U.S. government personnel
assigned to U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan increased slightly from 1,023
personnel in 2007 to 1,055 personnel in 2008--which includes 1,021
military personnel from DOD and 34 civilian personnel from State,
USAID, and USDA.[Footnote 2] DOD is responsible for paying nearly all
of the costs associated with operating PRTs, such as providing their
security and life support. However, DOD officials reported that DOD
does not track PRT operating costs separately from other operational
costs for Afghanistan. State, USAID, and USDA do not reimburse DOD for
its support to civilian PRT officials in Afghanistan.[Footnote 3] PRTs
have one source of programmatic funding available for projects in
Afghanistan. PRT commanders can approve the use of funds for projects
under DOD's Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) up to $25,000
per project.[Footnote 4] PRTs in Afghanistan may also coordinate with
other U.S.-funded programs, including other commanders' CERP projects
and USAID programs, such as the Local Governance and Community
Development project.
In Iraq, as of August 2008, the United States was leading 28 of 31 PRTs
and other coalition countries were leading 3 PRTs.
* As of August 2008, three types of U.S.-led PRTs were operating in
Iraq: 11 PRTs at the provincial level of government; 13 ePRTs embedded
with U.S. brigade combat teams and operating in local governments in
Baghdad, Anbar, Babil, and Diyala provinces; and 4 Provincial Support
Teams (PST), which are smaller PRTs that cannot be based in the
intended province due to security concerns. PRTs and ePRTs are a joint
State and DOD mission, operating under the command of both the
Ambassador and the MNF-I Commanding General. All U.S. PRTs and ePRTs in
Iraq are led by the State Department and consist primarily of civilian
personnel. The teams, however, rely heavily on U.S. military forces for
their security, food, housing, and other support. The Office of
Provincial Affairs at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad directs and supports
the operations of PRTs and ePRTs, providing political and economic
direction to team members. The military commander has authority over
the security and movement of ePRTs; many others provide security for
PRTs that are colocated with U.S. military units.
* According to State and DOD officials, the number of personnel
assigned to PRTs and ePRTs in Iraq increased from an estimated 100 to
125 personnel in early 2007 to about 450 in July 2008. This increase
was the result of the Administration's decision in January 2007 to
create ePRTs and to increase the size of PRTs in support of The New Way
Forward.[Footnote 5] DOD and civilian agencies have staffed the PRTs
with a mix of U.S. government employees--permanent and temporary--and
contractors.
* State reimburses DOD for some operating costs of ePRTs and most PRTs,
based on a quarterly estimate for each PRT member. State's
reimbursements do not cover the costs of PRT security and
transportation provided by the U.S. military. According to DOD, as of
April 2008, State had reimbursed $11 million to DOD for operating
costs--$5.9 million for fiscal year 2007 and $5.1 million for the first
quarter of fiscal year 2008. State had also obligated $125 million for
PRT movement security from September 2005 through May 2008 for PRTs in
Iraq that are not embedded with U.S. military units or do not have
access to military movement assets. PRTs in Iraq have two sources of
programmatic funding available--the jointly administered Quick Response
Fund used by State and USAID, which is designed to accelerate economic,
social, and civil society development within the Iraqi provinces, and
State's Provincial Reconstruction Development Council fund, which pays
for small-scale infrastructure projects at the provincial level. PRTs
in Iraq also may coordinate with other U.S.- funded programs, such as
USAID's Local Governance Program.
Background:
In Afghanistan, PRTs were established by the U.S.-led coalition as part
of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). PRTs evolved from humanitarian
assistance teams established by the U.S. military in 2002 after the
overthrow of the Taliban. According to the International Security
Assistance Force Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook,[Footnote 6]
these teams, known as Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells, consisted
of 10 to 12 U.S. military personnel. These teams provided information
to the U.S. military on humanitarian needs and implemented small DOD-
funded projects to build trust and confidence among the local
population. According to a 2005 United States Institute for Peace
report, PRTs expanded the humanitarian liaison cell concept by adding a
force protection component and representatives from U.S. civilian
agencies. The United States established the first PRT in Gardez as part
of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2002.
In 2003, ISAF began to expand its authority throughout
Afghanistan.[Footnote 7] ISAF was formed under a United Nations (UN)
mandate in December 2001 to assist the government of Afghanistan in
creating a secure environment to enable reconstruction. From 2003 to
2006, ISAF created 8 PRTs, while Operation Enduring Freedom established
17 additional PRTs and transferred them to ISAF. All PRTs came under
ISAF's command on October 5, 2006, when ISAF assumed authority over
eastern Afghanistan from the U.S.-led coalition and the United States
assumed command of ISAF's Regional Command East.
As of May 2008, the United States was leading 12 of the 26 PRTs
operating in Afghanistan, and 13 different ISAF nations were leading
the remaining 14 PRTs (see fig.1).[Footnote 8]
Figure 1: Locations of PRTs and Regional Commands in Afghanistan, as of
May 2008:
This figure is a map of locations of PRTs and regional commands in
Afghanistan, as of May 2008.
Source: ISAF and Defense (data); Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
PRTs in Iraq evolved from small State Department-led provincial support
teams located in 15 of Iraq's 18 provinces. In 2005, the U.S. embassy
conducted a comprehensive review of the provincial support teams and
found that they were not able accomplish their mission due to
inconsistent MNF-I support and weak coordination between MNF-I and the
U.S. embassy, among other things. As a result, MNF-I and State
developed a follow-on initiative to (1) ensure coordination between DOD
and State in strengthening the capabilities of provincial governments,
(2) assist in the coordination of U.S. reconstruction and development
efforts, and (3) provide enhanced reporting on political and economic
policy goals. State and MNF-I decided to create large,
multidisciplinary PRTs with revised objectives and a joint DOD and
State mission. In addition, the U.S. embassy and MNF-I established a
National Coordination Team to provide strategic guidance to PRTs,
direct their operational activities, and provide them with logistical
and administrative support. PRTs took on the task of assisting
provincial governments develop the political and economic environment
within the province. In November 2005, State began establishing PRTs in
Ninewa, Babil, Kirkuk, and Baghdad. By the end of 2006, the program
expanded to a total of 7 U.S.-led and 3 coalition-led PRTs.[Footnote 9]
In February 2007, as part of The New Way Forward, State and DOD began
creating 14 ePRTs to support the counterinsurgency operations of U.S.
brigade combat teams, in addition to existing PRT duties. State, DOD,
and other U.S. civilian agencies deployed about 325 personnel to the
ePRTs. The objectives of these teams included bolstering moderates,
promoting reconciliation, and building the capacity of the Iraqi
government. In May 2007, the embassy established the Office of
Provincial Affairs with an ambassador-level coordinator to oversee the
PRT program.
As of August 2008, there were 14 PRTs, 13 ePRTs,[Footnote 10] and 4
PSTs throughout Iraq. Of these, 3 PRTs are led by coalition members in
Irbil, Basra, and Dhi Qar province; the United States leads the
remaining teams. The ePRTs are embedded with U.S. brigade combat teams
and operate at the local level. According to State, PSTs have not
become PRTs because they serve provinces that lack the security
necessary for a permanent PRT presence. Instead, PSTs are located on
military bases and travel to their provinces as needed.
Organization, Staffing, and Funding for PRTs in Afghanistan:
This section provides information on the organization, staffing, and
funding for PRTs in Afghanistan.
Organization:
All PRTs are under ISAF's operational command, but individual nations,
including the United States, lead PRTs and determine their size and
structure. U.S.-led PRTs report through the U.S. military chain of
command. ISAF has a regional command structure, with the United States
assuming command of the eastern region of Afghanistan, Regional Command
East. The U.S. division in charge of Regional Command East is also
within the U.S. military's chain of command (see fig. 2). According to
a DOD official, PRTs report directly to task forces, which are brigade
combat teams. Task forces, in turn, report to the U.S. division at
Regional Command East,[Footnote 11] which then reports to the U.S.
Central Command.[Footnote 12] According to officials from State, USAID,
and USDA, the civilian officials assigned to PRTs report to their
agencies for administrative matters; for example, a State official at
the U.S. embassy conducts performance ratings for State officials
assigned to PRTs.
Figure 2: Chain of Command for PRTs in Afghanistan:
This figure is a chart showing the chain of command for PRTs in
Afghanistan.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis led by Non-U.S. countries in ISAF.
[End figure]
In most cases, U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan are led by a military
commander who works with an interagency management team. These PRTs
consist mainly of military personnel who support PRT operations (see
fig. 3).
Figure 3: Structure of U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan:
This figure is a chart showing the structure of U.S.-led PRTs in
Afghanistan.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense, State, USAID, and USDA
information.
[End of figure]
* Ten of the 12 U.S.-led PRTs are managed by an interagency team
composed of a military officer, who is the PRT commander, and one
representative each from State, USAID, and USDA.[Footnote 13] Military
and civilian officials indicated that the PRT commander is "first among
equals" because the commander has authority over all security
decisions. According to an official at USAID, the three civilian
officials in the leadership team constitute the only U.S. civilians at
most PRTs.[Footnote 14]
* As of April 2008, 10 of the 12 U.S.-led PRTs included 88 or more
military personnel, while the remaining 2 PRTs consisted of 55 and 63
military personnel. According to a DOD official, staffing for each PRT
depends on the security environment. Under DOD's notional staffing
plan, about 80 percent of the military personnel assigned to a PRT are
in a support role--about 50 percent provide security and about 30
percent provide service and operational support. The remaining 20
percent serve as the PRT commander, civil affairs officers, engineers
and non-commissioned officers. In contrast, military personnel who
provide security or other support for PRTs in Iraq are not counted
among the PRT's staff.
* Some PRTs also include four to five Afghan citizens, who may serve as
interpreters, liaisons with the Afghan Ministry of Interior, or
additional USAID staff.
In Afghanistan, PRTs perform development, reconstruction, and
governance activities, and serve a monitoring and reporting function.
Afghanistan has one of the world's highest maternal mortality rates and
a life expectancy at birth of about 44 years. To help meet the
country's significant needs, PRT projects include schools, health
clinics, and roads;[Footnote 15] efforts to build provincial
governments' capacity by helping provincial officials develop basic
management skills; and facilitating communication between the
provincial and central governments. For instance, according to the ISAF
PRT Handbook, the PRT in Zabul province helped arrange a visit to Qalat
by the Minister of Health, which was the first time any minister in the
current national government had visited the province. PRT
representatives also participated in consultations on the Afghanistan
National Development Strategy, the Afghan government's 5-year
development framework. In addition, according to State and USAID
officials, PRTs serve a monitoring and reporting function, as PRT
members report to their agencies on local conditions.
Members of the PRT leadership team have different roles. According to
DOD, the PRT commander is responsible for PRT security, coordination of
interagency efforts, and provincial and district government capacity-
building. The USAID field program officer carries out activities for
USAID's PRT-managed program. The field program officer facilitates,
coordinates, monitors, and reports on all USAID projects in the area,
and identifies local development needs and builds relationships with
local leaders. According to a State official, the State representative
at a PRT reports to the embassy on the political situation in the
province, works with local government officials, and serves as a
political advisor. The USDA official serves as an agricultural advisor,
and trains and mentors Afghan agricultural officials in developing and
implementing agricultural activities.
Staffing Levels and Process:
In Afghanistan, DOD, State, USAID, and USDA provide U.S. staff for PRTs
led by the United States and other countries. DOD provides most of the
staff since U.S.-led PRTs are primarily composed of military personnel
(see table 1). From 2007 to 2008, the number of military personnel at
U.S.-led PRTs increased from 994 to 1021, while the number of U.S.
civilians serving at U.S.-and non-U.S.-led PRTs rose from 45 to 49.
Table 1: Number of U.S. Military and Civilian Personnel Assigned to
PRTs in Afghanistan, 2007-2008:
2008: U.S.-led PRTs;
DOD: 1021;
State[A]: 11;
USAID[B]: 11;
USDA: 12;
Total: 1055.
2008: Other PRTs;
DOD: N/A;
State[A]: 7;
USAID[B]: 8;
USDA: 0;
Total: 15.
2008: Total;
DOD: 1021;
State[A]: 18;
USAID[B]: 19;
USDA: 12;
Total: 1070.
2007: U.S.-led PRTs;
DOD: 994;
State[A]: 11;
USAID[B]: 11;
USDA: 7;
Total: 1023.
2007: Other PRTs;
DOD: N/A;
State[A]: 7;
USAID[B]: 9;
USDA: 0;
Total: 16.
2007: Total;
DOD: 994;
State[A]: 18;
USAID[B]: 20;
USDA: 7;
Total: 1039.
Source: State, DOD, USAID, and USDA data.
Notes:
[A] State staffing data for fiscal year 2007 were as of April 2007.
[B] USAID staffing data are cumulative for fiscal year 2007; thus,
positions that may have been occupied for a portion of the year are
counted as filled.
[End of table]
As of April 2008, DOD had 1,021 military personnel serving in PRTs in
Afghanistan. According to a military official, all PRT commanders are
from the Navy or Air Force, and Navy PRT commanders are selected by the
Chief of Naval Operations, while Air Force PRT commanders are recruited
through a worldwide bulletin. According to a DOD official, DOD obtains
PRT staff through the joint sourcing process, in which the armed
services provide personnel in response to a request for forces from the
U.S. Central Command. According to DOD, as of September 2008, U.S.
military personnel serve in non-U.S.-led PRTs to provide management and
oversight of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), a DOD
program that provides military commanders with funds to allow them to
respond to urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs.
Civilian agencies had 49 personnel assigned to U.S.-led and non-U.S.-
led PRTs in Afghanistan, as of May 2008. All but 1 of the 35 civilian
positions at U.S.-led PRTs were filled as of May 2008.[Footnote 16] In
addition, 15 civilian officials were serving at non-U.S.-led PRTs--7
from State and 8 from USAID.[Footnote 17] Further, State, USAID, and
USDA also had a total of 12 staff assigned to the embassy and mission
in Kabul to support PRTs.[Footnote 18]
* As of May 2008, State had 18 personnel serving on PRTs. According to
a State official, all State representatives in PRTs are Foreign Service
officers, and State relies on the Foreign Service bidding process to
staff officials to PRTs. State offers a variety of incentives to
attract personnel to serve in Afghanistan. For instance, State
officials serving in Afghanistan receive allowances and differentials,
such as danger pay and post differential; they also receive two 1-week
regional rest breaks and two 2-to 3-week rest and relaxation leaves.
* As of May 2008, 19 USAID personnel were serving on PRTs in
Afghanistan. According to USAID officials, USAID representatives at
PRTs are either direct hires--which include Foreign Service officers,
Foreign Service Limited officers,[Footnote 19] and civil service
employees--or personal service contractors.[Footnote 20] To staff
Foreign Service officers to PRTs, a USAID official reported relying on
the annual staff bidding process. For personal service contractors,
USAID posts continuous position announcements, according to a USAID
official. USAID has identified Afghanistan as a critical priority
country and offers incentives for service in Afghanistan, including
allowances and differentials, two regional rest breaks, and two rest
and relaxation leaves. In addition, according to USAID officials,
Foreign Service officers who serve on PRTs in Afghanistan receive
priority consideration on their next assignment.
* As of May 2008, USDA had 12 employees assigned to PRTs. According to
USDA, USDA primarily relies on its civil service employees to fill
positions for agricultural advisors at PRTs; civil service employees
are sent to Afghanistan on 1-year details. In addition, USDA reported
that some positions are filled by USDA Foreign Agricultural Service
staff and temporary term-limited employees. To fill PRT positions, USDA
posts detail opportunities for civil service employees and recruits
temporary term-limited employees. Applicants selected to serve at PRTs
receive a package of allowances and differentials.
In January 2008, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan requested an
additional 16 State and 17 USAID staff to support PRTs in Afghanistan.
In the request, the Ambassador proposed that some of these staff be
placed at regional commands and brigades to provide functional
expertise as needed. According to a USAID official, in fiscal year
2008, USAID plans to add 8 regional PRT officials; in fiscal year 2009,
USAID intends to add 12 regional PRT officials and 3 regular PRT
officials. According to a State official, State plans to request 20 PRT-
related staff in fiscal years 2008 and 2009.
Operating Costs and Programmatic Funding:
DOD is responsible for paying nearly all of the costs associated with
operating PRTs, such as providing security, life support, sustainment,
and housing. According to DOD officials, the department does not track
PRT operating costs separately from other operational costs for
Afghanistan. State, USAID, and USDA do not reimburse DOD for its
support to civilian PRT officials in Afghanistan. USAID provides more
than $23 million to fund the PRT air fleet, which provides air
transportation to PRTs. According to a DOD official, DOD has developed
a rough estimate of $20 million as the cost of establishing a PRT in
Afghanistan. The official informed us that the department provides this
figure to ISAF members interested in starting a new PRT in Afghanistan,
but the figure does not necessarily reflect what it costs the United
States to run a PRT in Afghanistan.
PRTs have one source of programmatic funding available for projects in
Afghanistan. PRT commanders can approve the use of funds for CERP
projects up to $25,000.[Footnote 21] A DOD program, CERP provides
military commanders with funds to allow them to respond to urgent
humanitarian and reconstruction needs. In fiscal year 2007, according
to a U.S. military database, $109 million in CERP funding was obligated
to support PRT projects. Although the PRT commander approves funding,
he or she does not obligate CERP funds; the CERP project purchasing
officer obligates funds through contracts. PRT-funded CERP projects may
include efforts to improve health care, water and sanitation,
transportation, and education.
PRTs in Afghanistan also may coordinate with or provide advice to other
U.S.-funded programs, including other commanders' CERP projects,
USAID's Local Governance and Community Development project, and other
USAID programs.
* Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP): According to
officials, other military commanders within a PRT's area of operations
may also have authority over CERP funds. To prevent duplication of
effort, CERP guidance calls for military commanders to coordinate CERP
projects with PRTs. These military commanders and PRTs may engage in
projects related to water and sanitation, rule of law, and repair of
property damaged by U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations,
among other projects.
* Local Governance and Community Development Program: Funded and
managed by USAID, this nationwide program operates in 20 of
Afghanistan's 34 provinces. Its objectives include building local
governments' capacity to deliver services and address the needs of the
local populace, and encouraging community participation in development
projects. USAID received about $110 million for this program in fiscal
year 2007 and $63 million in fiscal year 2008. USAID field program
officers in PRTs monitor this program's activities in their provinces,
and may design and submit activity proposals to the mission in Kabul,
as long as the proposals are consistent with the program's goals.
However, according to a USAID official, USAID field program officers in
PRTs do not have final authority to decide the program's activities;
rather, USAID officials at the mission in Kabul are responsible for
making such decisions about the program. According to a USAID
representative, USAID field program officers work closely with the PRT
leadership team, provincial government, and implementing partners to
develop and implement program activities. For instance, to help build
local government capacity, one PRT held a 3-day training workshop for
district administrators that focused on basic administrative and
management skills.
* Other USAID programs: PRTs may also coordinate with and advise other
USAID-funded programs. USAID's programs in Afghanistan include the
Alternative Development Program and national development programs in
road construction, democracy, and health. Part of the U.S. government's
counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, the Alternative Development
Program seeks to create a sustainable economic alternative to poppy
cultivation. USAID obligated about $121 million to this program in
fiscal year 2006 and approximately $228 million in fiscal year 2007,
and received $176 million for the program in fiscal year 2008.
Technical officers who manage local program activities are colocated
with 1 U.S.-led PRT and 2 international-led PRTs, using the PRT as a
platform for their work in the field. According to a USAID official,
although Alternative Development Program technical officers are not
considered part of the PRT leadership team, the officers keep the PRT
leadership team apprised of program activities in the area. PRTs also
may influence other USAID national development programs, such as
programs for road construction, democracy, and health.[Footnote 22]
USAID obligated about $638 million in fiscal year 2006 and $1.14
billion in fiscal year 2007 to such national development programs in
Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2008, USAID received $706 million for these
programs.
Organization, Staffing, and Funding for PRTs in Iraq:
This section provides information on the organization, staffing, and
funding of PRTs in Iraq.
Organization:
PRTs and ePRTs are a joint State and DOD mission, operating under the
command of both the Ambassador and the MNF-I Commanding General. In
Iraq, U.S. PRTs are led by the State Department but rely heavily on
U.S. military forces for their security, food, housing, and other
support, particularly the 13 ePRTs and 12 of the 18 PRTs that are
colocated with U.S. military units. All U.S.-led PRTs not located at
the embassy or a regional embassy office rely solely on the military
for their support. The Office of Provincial Affairs at the U.S. embassy
in Baghdad provides guidance and supports the operations of the PRTs
and ePRTs, providing political and economic direction to team members.
The military commander has authority over security and movement of
ePRTs. Many others also provide security for PRTs that are located on
the commander's forward operating base. Other agencies that contribute
personnel to the PRT program include USAID, USDA, and the Department of
Justice. All team members report to the PRT team leader; some non-State
Department team members also report to their home agencies.
As of August 2008, the size of PRTs ranged from 10 to 45 personnel at
each location; ePRTs consisted of 10 to 20 personnel; and PSTs had up
to 10 personnel. PRTs and ePRTs are led by a State Department Foreign
Service officer with a core group of military and civilian personnel.
The deputy team leaders for PRTs are usually military personnel, while
the deputy team leaders for ePRTs are from USAID. The team leader is
responsible for implementing the joint coalition PRT initiative at the
provincial or local level of government. The deputy team leaders are
responsible for assisting the team leader, functioning as the team
leader's chief of staff, and managing day-to-day operations. The
bilingual-bicultural advisor is an expatriate Iraqi contracted by DOD
to advise PRTs and ePRTs and their Iraqi counterparts. Bilingual-
bicultural advisors speak fluent English and either Arabic or Kurdish;
they function as a key interface between PRT members and Iraqi
government officials. The majority of PRTs rely on U.S. military units
for their security; however, a number of PRTs use personal security
contractors for movement security. For perimeter security, PRTs rely on
the U.S. military when located on their bases, on coalition partners
when located on their bases, and on State assets in Irbil.
PRTs and ePRTs also include specialists in specific areas such as city
management, agriculture, banking and finance, and public health. Other
U.S. civilian agencies--USDA and the Departments of Commerce and
Justice--may also assign their personnel to PRTs as technical advisors
in areas such as agriculture, business development, and the rule of
law. PRTs and ePRTs aim to bolster moderates, support U.S.
counterinsurgency strategy, promote reconciliation and shape the
political environment, support economic development, and build the
capacity of Iraqi provincial governments to help transition Iraq to
self-sufficiency. PRTs also advise provincial government officials so
that they can more efficiently spend the provincial government's budget
and implement needed services.
Staffing Levels and Process:
According to State, the number of personnel assigned to PRTs in Iraq
increased from an estimated 100 to 125 personnel in early 2007 to about
450 in July 2008. This large increase in personnel resulted from the
Administration's decision in January 2007 to create ePRTs and to
increase the size of the PRT program in support of The New Way Forward.
In February 2007, State and DOD agreed to add 323 positions to PRTs and
ePRTs in three phases: (1) 40 personnel from State, USAID, and DOD to
create the initial 10 ePRTs by March 31, 2007; (2) 133 personnel,
including 99 military and civilian personnel from DOD, by September 30,
2007; and (3) 150 specialists--mostly civilians from State, USAID, and
USDA--to ePRTs by December 30, 2007 (see fig.4). According to State,
U.S. agencies generally met the time frames for filling the additional
positions.
Figure 4: Phased Increase in PRT and ePRT Personnel in Iraq:
This figure is a line graph showing phased increase in PRT and ePRT
personnel in Iraq. The X axis represents the time frame, and the Y axis
represents the number of personnel.
[See PDF for image]
Source: State Department.
[End of figure]
According to State and DOD officials, DOD agreed to staff temporarily
many of the civilian agency positions during the second phase of the
expansion until State received its supplemental funding in the second
half of 2007. According to State, State has hired personnel to fill the
majority of the 99 positions that DOD had filled during the second
phase.
As of July 2008, the U.S. government had about 450 personnel deployed
to U.S.-led PRTs in Iraq--230 from State; 95 from USAID; 90 from DOD;
and 35 from other agencies, including the Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and Agriculture. DOD also provided a significant number of
military personnel who supported PRT operations but were not counted as
PRT personnel.
* As of July 2008, State has about 230 personnel deployed to PRTs and
ePRTs in Iraq--75 Foreign Service officers, 115 temporary government
employees,[Footnote 23] 30 contractors, and 10 employees in other
capacities. Foreign Service officers fill all team leader positions.
For temporary positions, the Office of Provincial Affairs notifies ITAO
of technical needs at PRTs, and ITAO announces positions for expertise
in areas such as city management, public works, and transportation.
Once hired, these temporary government employees must receive medical,
security, ethics clearances, and training before departure to Iraq.
According to a State official, the contractors are not U.S. government
employees; they provide technical expertise as needed.
* As of July 2008, USAID has about 95 personnel in Iraq--a mix of 35
Foreign Service officers, civilian personnel, and personal services
contractors and 60 institutional contractors. To staff Foreign Service
officers to PRTs, USAID relies on the annual staff bidding process. For
contractors, USAID officials said they post continuous position
announcements for personal services contractors and also rely on
institutional contractors. According to USAID officials, like other
foreign affairs agencies, USAID has identified Iraq as a critical
priority and offers incentives for service in Iraq, including
allowances, differentials, two regional rest breaks, and two rest and
relaxation leaves. In addition, according to State and USAID officials,
Foreign Service officers who serve on PRTs in Iraq receive priority
consideration on their next assignment as do State Foreign Service
officers.
* As of July 2008, DOD had about 90 personnel deployed to PRTs and
ePRTs in Iraq--25 military personnel, 40 DOD civilians, and 25 DOD
contractors who serve as bilingual-bicultural advisors.[Footnote 24]
According to DOD, under the DOD/State support agreement, DOD also
provides the equivalent of 1 ˝ infantry battalions--750 to 900
soldiers--to provide movement security for PRTs. DOD also provides
civil affairs companies of about 40 personnel each to support each
PRT's operations.
* As of July 2008, the Departments of Commerce and Justice and USDA had
about 5, 10, and 20 personnel respectively supporting the PRT program.
For example, the Department of Justice provides Resident Legal Advisors
who help establish programs that establish the rule of law throughout
Iraq.
Operating Costs and Programmatic Funding:
For Iraq, State reimburses DOD for some operating costs of 13 ePRTs and
12 of the 18 PRTs that are colocated with U.S. military units.
According to DOD, the reimbursement amount is based on a quarterly
estimate for each PRT member. State's reimbursements cover DOD support
for such items as facilities, logistics, basic utilities, lodging,
food, water, and sanitation; however, they do not cover the costs of
PRT security and transportation provided by the U.S. military.
According to DOD, as of April 2008, State had reimbursed DOD $11
million for operating costs--$5.9 million for fiscal year 2007 and $5.1
million for the first quarter of fiscal year 2008. State and DOD
estimate a cost of $21.1 million for PRT operating costs for fiscal
year 2008. According to State, in addition to relying on the military,
PRTs may rely on personal security contractors or a combination of the
two to ensure the safety of their movement. According to the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, State obligated about $125 million for PRT
movement security between September 2005 and May 2008.
PRTs in Iraq have two sources of programmatic funding available. First,
PRTs have the authority to obligate funds for projects funded through
the Quick Response Fund jointly administered by State and USAID. The
Quick Response Fund was established to accelerate economic, social, and
civil society development within Iraqi provinces. The fund is
administered by PRT staff who identify projects to build the capacity
of governments to deliver services, empower women and youth, and
support civil society and small businesses. For fiscal year 2007,
according to State, $136 million in Economic Support Funds was
allocated for the Quick Response Fund. Second, PRTs assist in
identifying and executing projects under State's Provincial
Reconstruction Development Council program. According to State, this
fund pays for small-scale infrastructure projects at the provincial
level to strengthen the ability of provincial governments to deliver
essential services and key development projects to their communities.
Projects receive approval from the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and are
executed by the Army Corps of Engineers. For fiscal year 2007,
according to State, $600 million in Economic Support Funds was
allocated for the Provincial Reconstruction Development Council
program.
PRTs in Iraq may also coordinate with other U.S.-funded programs,
including USAID's Local Governance Program, Community Action Program,
and Community Stabilization Program; and DOD's CERP.
* The USAID representative to the PRT is expected to coordinate on
USAID's activities in the province through USAID's Local Governance
Program, which is intended to support PRT initiatives to promote
diverse and representative citizen participation in provincial,
municipal, and local councils. According to State, the Local Governance
Program also strengthens the management skills of city and provincial
administrators, local interim representative bodies, civil society
organizations, and civic institutions in order to improve the delivery
of essential municipal services. According to State, the Local
Governance Program was allocated $90 million in Economic Support Funds
in fiscal year 2007 and $54 million in fiscal year 2008.
* According to State, USAID's Community Action Program works to
strengthen the links between communities and their governments. This
program facilitates formal community coordination with local and
provincial governments, promotes transparency and accountability at all
levels, and encourages local ownership of public goods. According to
USAID, the Community Action Program was allocated $70 million in
Economic Support Funds in fiscal year 2007 and about $105 million in
fiscal year 2008.
* USAID's Community Stabilization Program focuses on reducing the
incentives for young men to participate in sectarian violence and
insurgent activities. USAID selects neighborhoods and districts in
consultation with the PRTs and ePRTs, brigade commanders, and community
leaders. The program selects short-term projects that generate
significant employment in the provision of essential services and
public works. It also provides activities for Iraqi youths, such as
sports tournaments, cultural events, and arts activities. The program
generates long-term employment through business development, including
in-kind grants to Iraqi small businesses and business skills training.
The Community Stabilization Program was allocated $379 million in
Economic Support Funds in fiscal year 2007 and $100 million in fiscal
year 2008.
* In Iraq, the military is required to coordinate the use of CERP funds
with the PRTs.[Footnote 25] CERP is designed to enable local commanders
in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and
reconstruction requirements by carrying out programs to assist the
indigenous population. In fiscal year 2007, DOD obligated $898 million
on CERP projects in Iraq.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees. We will also make copies available to others on request. If
you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Judith McCloskey (Assistant
Director), Valérie Nowak, Daniel Chen, Lynn Cothern, and Susan Tieh
made key contributions to this report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chair:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.:
Chair:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Chair:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel Inouye:
Chair:
The Honorable Thad Cochran:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Chair:
The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Thomas R. Carper:
Chair:
The Honorable Tom Coburn:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Financial Management, Government Information,
Federal Services, and International Security:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chair:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chair:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives:
The Honorable John P. Murtha:
Chair:
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Defense:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Chair:
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman:
Chair:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chair:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
In response to congressional interest in Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRT), GAO examined (1) the organization, staffing, and funding
of U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan and (2) the organization, staffing, and
funding of U.S.-led PRTs in Iraq.
To address these topics, we reviewed prior GAO reports related to
Afghanistan and Iraq.[Footnote 26] We interviewed officials from the
State Department (State), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Washington,
D.C, and the Department of Defense (DOD) at the Pentagon. In addition,
we met with DOD officials at U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida.
To describe the organization and staffing of U.S.-led PRTs in
Afghanistan, we reviewed the International Security Assistance Force
Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook. In addition, we interviewed
USAID and State officials that were currently serving or previously
served in PRTs in Afghanistan. We also interviewed DOD, State, USAID,
and ISAF officials serving in Afghanistan. We obtained staffing data
from DOD, State, USDA, and USAID.
To describe programmatic funding for U.S.-led PRT efforts in
Afghanistan, we reviewed DOD's standard operating procedure for the
Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Afghanistan. We
obtained financial data from DOD on CERP projects managed by PRTs. We
also reviewed budget data from USAID on its programmatic activities in
Afghanistan.
To describe operations funding for PRT efforts in Afghanistan, we
obtained information from DOD, specifically the Department of the Army.
We also obtained information from the:
Department of State, USDA, and USAID regarding their support for PRT
operational costs.
To describe the organization and staffing of U.S.-led PRTs in Iraq, we
reviewed documentation and data from the Department of State and USAID,
and the Center for Army Lessons Learned's PRT Playbook. We also
interviewed officials from DOD, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I),
and State's Office of Provincial Affairs in the U.S. Embassy Baghdad.
In addition, we attended the Department of State's PRT training course.
To describe programmatic funding for PRT efforts in Iraq, we reviewed
budget information and reports from the Department of State. We also
interviewed officials from the Department of State and Office of
Provincial Affairs personnel in the U.S. Embassy Baghdad.
To describe operations funding for PRT efforts in Iraq, we reviewed a
memorandum of agreement between State and DOD and spoke with officials
from both agencies. In addition, to identify the costs of security at
those PRTs without a U.S. military presence, we spoke with and obtained
data from State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
Due to time constraints, we did not travel to Afghanistan, and we did
not visit PRTs in Afghanistan or Iraq. GAO staff stationed in Baghdad,
Iraq, contributed to this review.
We limited our review of the structure and operations funding of PRTs
to those led by U.S. officials in Afghanistan and Iraq; we did not
include PRTs led by other ISAF nations in Afghanistan or coalition
countries in Iraq. However, our review of staffing and programmatic
funding includes U.S. personnel and activities, civilian and military,
assigned to all PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq because appropriated U.S.
funds are involved.
We received technical comments from DOD, State, and USAID, and
incorporated the comments where appropriate.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, GAO-
08-905RSU (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008).
[2] Civilian agencies had filled all but 1 of their 35 positions as of
May 2008.
[3] USAID provides more than $23 million to fund the PRT air fleet,
which provides air transportation to PRTs.
[4] CERP provides military commanders with funds to allow them to
respond to urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs. CERP projects
or activities that require funding above $25,000 must be approved by
the PRT commander's superiors at the level of the task force or the
Commanding General or his designee, depending on the level of funding
requested.
[5] In response to escalating violence in Iraq, the President in
January 2007 announced a new strategy--The New Way Forward--that
established a new phase in U.S. operations in Iraq that would last
until July 2008.
[6] The ISAF PRT handbook provides information, guidance, and best
practices to PRTs in Afghanistan. It also articulates the mission of
PRTs in Afghanistan, which is to assist the government of Afghanistan
in extending its authority to create a stable and secure environment
and enable security reform and reconstruction.
[7] ISAF was initially led by individual nations that volunteered for 6-
month tours of duty. In 2003, NATO assumed leadership of ISAF and the
United Nations extended ISAF's mandate to cover all of Afghanistan.
[8] In addition to personnel from the lead nation, some PRTs also
include personnel from other ISAF nations.
[9] Coalition members who run PRTs are Italy, South Korea, and the
United Kingdom.
[10] According to State, 2 ePRTs in Baghdad merged into 1 ePRT in
January 2008.
[11] The 101st Airborne Division assumed authority for Regional Command
East on April 10, 2008.
[12] U.S. Central Command is the unified command with responsibility
for the area between the European and Pacific commands.
[13] The two exceptions are the PRTs in Bagram and Panjshir. According
to the State Department, the PRT in Bagram does not have a State
position because it is colocated with the 101st Airborne Division, the
U.S. military division in Afghanistan, which has a State official
assigned to it. The PRT in Panjshir is co-led by a State official and
military officer; according to an official at the PRT, this leadership
structure is due to the secure environment and the local population's
preference for civilian leadership.
[14] At 1 U.S.-led PRT and 2 international-led PRTs, USAID has an
additional staff member to implement its Alternative Development
Program.
[15] See GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress Made in Constructing
Roads but Assessments for Determining Impact and a Sustainable
Maintenance Program Are Needed, GAO-08-689 (Washington, D.C.: July 8,
2008).
[16] State had filled all 11 of its positions at U.S.-led PRTs, USAID
had 11 of 12 positions filled, and USDA had filled all 12 of its
positions.
[17] According to USAID and State officials, their agencies provide
staff to international-led PRTs upon the lead nation's request.
[18] State has five U.S. officials, including an official who travels
to PRTs to cover staffing gaps. USAID has six officials, and USDA has
one.
[19] Foreign Service Limited employees perform inherently governmental
functions at USAID missions.
[20] Personal services contractors are generally treated like civil
service employees and often perform the same or similar work as these
employees.
[21] Projects or activities that require funding above $25,000 must be
approved by the PRT commander's superiors at the level of the task
force or the Commanding General or his designee, depending on the level
of funding requested.
[22] USAID officials at PRTs have the authority to approve USAID grants
up to $10,000.
[23] According to State Department officials, State was granted the
authority under 5 USC 3161 to directly hire people to fill positions in
temporary organizations, such as the Iraq Transition Assistance Office
(ITAO).
[24] In September 2008, State updated its staffing figures for
bilingual-bicultural advisors and reported having 69 of these advisors
in PRTs in Iraq.
[25] For information about CERP in Iraq, see GAO, Actions Needed to
Better Guide Project Selection for Commander's Emergency Response
Program and Improve Oversight in Iraq, GAO-08-736R (Washington, D.C.:
June 23, 2008).
[26] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key
Issues for Congressional Oversight, GAO-07-801SP (Washington, D.C.: May
2007); Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government Has
Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks, GAO-07-
1195 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2007); Stabilization and
Reconstruction: Actions Needed to Improve Governmentwide Planning and
Capabilities for Future Operations, GAO-08-228T (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
30, 2007).
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