Nonproliferation
U.S. Agencies Have Taken Some Steps, but More Effort Is Needed to Strengthen and Expand the Proliferation Security Initiative Gao ID: GAO-09-43 November 10, 2008The President announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2003 to enhance U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In a 2006 classified report, GAO recommended that agencies establish clear PSI policies and procedures and performance indicators. In 2007, Congress enacted a law calling for the administration to expand and strengthen PSI and address GAO's prior recommendations. This report assesses (1) the extent to which the administration issued a PSI directive and submitted required PSI-related reports to Congress; (2) steps U.S. agencies have taken to establish clear PSI policies and procedures, structures, budgets, and performance indicators; and (3) U.S. agencies' efforts to increase cooperation and coordination with PSI countries and develop a strategy to resolve interdiction issues. GAO reviewed and analyzed agency documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), and other agencies with PSI responsibilitie
The administration has not issued a PSI directive that directs U.S. agencies to take actions to strengthen PSI activities, such as establishing clear PSI structures. The administration also has not submitted a required budget report to Congress, describing its funding for past and future PSI-related activities. Five months after the February 2008 mandated issuance date, the administration issued a report describing steps agencies have taken to implement the provisions called for in the law. However, this report does not fully specify the steps taken to implement GAO's previous recommendations or other provisions called for in the law. DOD has taken more steps to address the law's provisions, such as establishing clear PSI policies and procedures, than State or law enforcement agencies. However, none of the agencies has established performance indicators to measure the results of PSI activities. Consistent with internal controls, establishing clear PSI policies and procedures and indicators to measure results will help the agencies better organize their PSI activities. DOD has taken steps to clarify its PSI policies and procedures and has established a support office to improve DOD's participation in PSI exercises. However, uncertainties in DOD's policies and procedures remain about how to incorporate law enforcement agencies into PSI exercises. Even though PSI activities are increasingly focused on law enforcement issues, State and U.S. law enforcement agencies do not all have the policies, procedures, or budgets that would facilitate their participation in PSI. While State and law enforcement agencies, such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Coast Guard, have some PSI structures in place, only CBP has written PSI guidance establishing agency roles and responsibilities; other law enforcement agencies have not taken similar steps. U.S. agencies have made efforts to increase cooperation and coordination with PSI countries through multilateral PSI planning meetings, exercises, and other outreach. However, these efforts have focused mostly on the 19 other leading PSI countries that attend multilateral meetings. U.S. agencies have not built relationships in the same way with more than 70 PSI countries not invited to attend the multilateral meetings. Agency officials acknowledged that more needs to be done to directly engage these countries. In addition, State and DOD have not developed a written strategy to resolve interdiction issues, as GAO previously recommended. To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on GAO-09-43. For more information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-43, Nonproliferation: U.S. Agencies Have Taken Some Steps, but More Effort Is Needed to Strengthen and Expand the Proliferation Security Initiative
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-43
entitled 'Nonproliferation: U.S. Agencies Have Taken Some Steps, but
More Effort Is Needed to Strengthen and Expand the Proliferation
Security Initiative' which was released on November 10, 2008.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2008:
Nonproliferation:
U.S. Agencies Have Taken Some Steps, but More Effort Is Needed to
Strengthen and Expand the Proliferation Security Initiative:
GAO-09-43:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-43, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The President announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in
2003 to enhance U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. In a 2006 classified report, GAO recommended that agencies
establish clear PSI policies and procedures and performance indicators.
In 2007, Congress enacted a law calling for the administration to
expand and strengthen PSI and address GAO‘s prior recommendations.
This report assesses (1) the extent to which the administration issued
a PSI directive and submitted required PSI-related reports to Congress;
(2) steps U.S. agencies have taken to establish clear PSI policies and
procedures, structures, budgets, and performance indicators; and (3)
U.S. agencies‘ efforts to increase cooperation and coordination with
PSI countries and develop a strategy to resolve interdiction issues.
GAO reviewed and analyzed agency documents and interviewed officials
from the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), and other
agencies with PSI responsibilities.
What GAO Found:
The administration has not issued a PSI directive that directs U.S.
agencies to take actions to strengthen PSI activities, such as
establishing clear PSI structures. The administration also has not
submitted a required budget report to Congress, describing its funding
for past and future PSI-related activities. Five months after the
February 2008 mandated issuance date, the administration issued a
report describing steps agencies have taken to implement the provisions
called for in the law. However, this report does not fully specify the
steps taken to implement GAO‘s previous recommendations or other
provisions called for in the law.
DOD has taken more steps to address the law‘s provisions, such as
establishing clear PSI policies and procedures, than State or law
enforcement agencies. However, none of the agencies has established
performance indicators to measure the results of PSI activities.
Consistent with internal controls, establishing clear PSI policies and
procedures and indicators to measure results will help the agencies
better organize their PSI activities. DOD has taken steps to clarify
its PSI policies and procedures and has established a support office to
improve DOD‘s participation in PSI exercises. However, uncertainties in
DOD‘s policies and procedures remain about how to incorporate law
enforcement agencies into PSI exercises. Even though PSI activities are
increasingly focused on law enforcement issues, State and U.S. law
enforcement agencies do not all have the policies, procedures, or
budgets that would facilitate their participation in PSI. While State
and law enforcement agencies, such as Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Coast Guard, have
some PSI structures in place, only CBP has written PSI guidance
establishing agency roles and responsibilities; other law enforcement
agencies have not taken similar steps.
U.S. agencies have made efforts to increase cooperation and
coordination with PSI countries through multilateral PSI planning
meetings, exercises, and other outreach. However, these efforts have
focused mostly on the 19 other leading PSI countries that attend
multilateral meetings. U.S. agencies have not built relationships in
the same way with more than 70 PSI countries not invited to attend the
multilateral meetings. Agency officials acknowledged that more needs to
be done to directly engage these countries. In addition, State and DOD
have not developed a written strategy to resolve interdiction issues,
as GAO previously recommended.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that (1) relevant law enforcement agencies establish
clear policies, procedures, and indicators to support PSI activities,
and (2) DOD and State take steps to increase cooperation and
coordination between the United States and certain PSI countries. DHS
and FBI concurred with our first recommendation, and DOD and State
concurred with our second recommendation.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-43]. For more
information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or
christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The Administration Has Not Issued Two of Three PSI Documents Called for
or Required in Law:
DOD Has Taken More Steps than Other U.S. Agencies to Address the Law's
Provisions, but None Has Established Indicators to Measure PSI Results:
U.S. Agencies Have Made Efforts to Increase Cooperation and
Coordination with Leading PSI Countries but Less So with Other PSI
Countries and Have Not Developed a Written Strategy to Resolve
Interdiction Issues:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Statement of Interdiction Principles:
Appendix III: Chronology and Location of Multilateral PSI Planning
Meetings, 2003 to 2008:
Appendix IV: Bilateral Shipboarding Agreements, 2004 to 2008:
Appendix V: Countries Supporting PSI:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comments:
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense:
GAO Comments:
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Justice:
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figure:
Figure 1: PSI Exercises from September 2003 through September 2008:
Abbreviations:
CARICOM: Caribbean Community:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
COCOM: Combatant Command:
CPI: Office of Counter Proliferation Initiatives:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
GWOT: Global War on Terror:
INA: Office of International Affairs:
ISN: International Security and Nonproliferation:
OEG: Operational Expert Group:
OSD: Office of the Secretary of Defense:
PSI: Proliferation Security Initiative:
WMD: weapons of mass destruction:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 10, 2008:
Congressional Committees:
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery
systems, and related materials poses a serious threat to the peace,
security, and stability of the global community. The threat of WMD
proliferation was underscored in 2002 when the United States and its
allies encountered difficulties in seizing a shipment of North Korean
missiles bound for Yemen. In December 2002, the U.S. administration
released its "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction,"
which called for a comprehensive approach to countering such threats.
The President subsequently announced the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) in May 2003. According to the Department of State
(State), PSI aims to enhance and expand our efforts to prevent the flow
of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials on the ground, in
the air, and at sea, to and from states and nonstate actors of
proliferation concern.
In September 2006, we issued a classified report on the PSI.[Footnote
1] The report found that U.S. agencies did not have the policies and
procedures in place to plan and manage their PSI activities or
performance indicators required to measure the results of PSI
activities. Accordingly, we recommended that the Secretaries of Defense
and State better organize their efforts for performing PSI activities,
including establishing clear PSI policies and procedures and indicators
to measure the results of PSI activities. In addition, we recommended
that the two departments develop a strategy to work with PSI-
participating countries to resolve interdiction issues.[Footnote 2]
In August 2007, Congress passed the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (here and after, "the law"), which
specified that the President and relevant agencies and departments take
a variety of actions to expand and strengthen PSI, including
implementing our recommendations.[Footnote 3] Under a sense of Congress
provision of the law, the President is called upon to issue a directive
to U.S. agencies to take actions to expand and strengthen PSI. The law
calls upon U.S. agencies to take specific actions, namely to establish
clear PSI policies and procedures, structures, funding, and performance
indicators to measure the results of PSI activities; increase
cooperation and coordination with PSI countries; and develop a strategy
to resolve interdiction issues. The law required the President to
submit a PSI implementation report by February 2008 to relevant
congressional committees. State and DOD are required to submit a
comprehensive joint budget report to Congress for each fiscal year
describing U.S. funding and other resources for PSI-related activities.
Finally, Congress required GAO to assess and report on the
effectiveness of PSI, including the progress made in implementing the
provisions of the law.
Based on these provisions, we examined the actions that the
administration and relevant U.S. agencies have taken to expand and
strengthen PSI. Specifically, this report assesses the (1) extent to
which the administration issued a PSI directive and submitted to
Congress the required PSI-related reports; (2) steps U.S. agencies have
taken to establish clear PSI policies and procedures, structures,
budgets, and performance indicators; and (3) efforts U.S. agencies have
made to increase cooperation and coordination with PSI countries and
develop a strategy to resolve interdiction issues.
To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed U.S. agency
management reports, cables, and other documents. We interviewed
officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security,
Justice, and other agencies with PSI responsibilities, including
officials and military personnel at five Combatant Commands: (1)
Central Command, (2) European Command, (3) Africa Command, (4) Southern
Command, and (5) Strategic Command's Center for Combating WMD. We also
conducted structured interviews with U.S. agency officials and military
personnel who have attended multilateral PSI planning meetings of WMD
proliferation experts. At these multilateral meetings--referred to as
Operational Expert Group meetings--experts from the United States and
19 other leading PSI countries consider ways to enhance the WMD
interdiction capabilities of PSI participants, plan PSI exercises, and
build support for the initiative.[Footnote 4] Appendix I provides more
details on our objectives, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2007 to November
2008, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
The administration has not issued a directive for PSI called for in the
law or submitted the PSI budget report required by the law; however, it
has submitted to Congress the required PSI implementation report.
First, the administration has not issued a directive directing U.S.
agencies to take actions, such as establishing clear PSI structures. In
its implementation report to Congress in July 2008,[Footnote 5] the
administration stated it is unnecessary to issue a directive for PSI
because it believes that an existing WMD interdiction process,
documented in an 8-page 2002 National Security Presidential Directive,
already addresses the relevant issues that would be covered under a PSI
directive. However, this process predates the creation of PSI and does
not cover U.S. agencies' involvement in three broad PSI activities:
multilateral planning meetings, exercises, and other outreach efforts.
Second, the administration has not submitted the joint budget report to
Congress that was to be prepared by the Secretaries of State and
Defense and was due in February 2008. The budget report must describe
the administration's funding and other resources for PSI-related
activities over a specified period of time. Third, the administration
has issued an implementation report, required by the law, to describe
the steps agencies have taken to implement the provisions of the law.
However, this report was issued in July 2008, rather than February
2008, and does not fully specify the steps taken to implement GAO's
previous recommendations or other provisions of the law.Our assessment
of U.S. agencies' performance in implementing the provisions of the law
shows that the agencies have taken some steps, but more effort is
needed to strengthen and expand U.S. PSI activities.
DOD has taken more steps to address some of the law's provisions, such
as establishing clear PSI policies and procedures, than State or law
enforcement agencies; however, none of the agencies has established
performance indicators to measure the results of PSI activities.
Consistent with internal controls, establishing clear PSI policies and
procedures and indicators to measure results will help the agencies
better organize their PSI activities. DOD has taken some steps to
establish PSI policies and procedures, but uncertainties remain about
incorporating law enforcement agencies into PSI exercises. DOD has
established some structures to implement its PSI policies, such as a
PSI support office designed to improve DOD's participation in PSI
exercises and an informal interagency working group that sets
priorities for U.S. agencies' involvement in multilateral PSI planning
meetings. DOD established an $800,000 annual budget (starting fiscal
year 2008) to offset the costs of adding a PSI component into existing
DOD exercises, but DOD staff responsible for arranging PSI exercises
stated that this budget is inadequate to support stand-alone PSI
exercises or large exercise planning conferences. State and U.S. law
enforcement agencies do not all have the policies, procedures, or
budgets in place to facilitate their participation in PSI activities,
even though PSI activities are increasingly focused on law enforcement
issues. Although State has an existing structure, it has not
established written policies and procedures or a budget to facilitate
its participation in PSI activities. While relevant law enforcement
agencies such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Coast Guard have some basic
structures in place, only CBP has written PSI guidance establishing
agency roles and responsibilities; other law enforcement agencies have
not taken similar steps. None has established PSI funding lines in its
annual budgets. Although CBP and FBI officials stated that they have
small travel budgets for fiscal year 2008 to facilitate participation
in PSI activities, these officials stated that additional funding may
be needed to support important PSI activities, such as hosting PSI
exercises, training, or workshops.[Footnote 6] Furthermore, U.S.
agencies have not established performance indicators to measure the
results of PSI activities.
U.S. agencies have made efforts to increase cooperation and
coordination through multilateral PSI planning meetings, exercises, and
other outreach with the 19 other leading PSI countries that attend the
multilateral meetings. However, U.S. agencies have not built
relationships in the same way with their counterparts from the more
than 70 PSI countries not invited to attend the meetings and have not
developed a written strategy to resolve interdiction issues, as we
recommended in 2006.[Footnote 7] First, U.S. agencies have primarily
focused on the 19 other leading PSI countries that attend multilateral
PSI planning meetings to consider ways to improve WMD interdiction
capabilities and plan PSI exercises. Agency officials stated that the
United States has used these multilateral meetings, and related
bilateral meetings, to build relationships with their foreign
counterparts. However, U.S. agencies have not built relationships in
the same way with their counterparts from the more than 70 PSI
countries that are not invited to the meetings. Second, U.S. agencies
have made efforts to increase cooperation and coordination with PSI
countries through exercises, but these exercises do not always involve
countries from among the more than 70 PSI countries that are not
invited to attend the multilateral meetings. The 20 PSI leading
countries have established a schedule of PSI exercises to practice and
enhance collective capabilities to interdict suspected WMD cargoes
shipped by sea, air, and land. From September 2003 through September
2008, 21 countries have led 36 PSI exercises. However, only 6 of the 36
exercises were hosted or cohosted by countries from among the more than
70 PSI countries who are not invited to attend the multilateral
meetings. Third, U.S. agencies have undertaken other outreach
activities to increase cooperation and coordination with PSI countries.
For example, State sponsored a fifth anniversary conference for PSI
countries in May 2008 and is continuing to seek PSI shipboarding
arrangements with other countries. Also, the FBI sponsored a workshop
in 2006 to train law enforcement officials from PSI countries to
identify WMD items. However, only representatives from the 19 other
leading PSI countries were invited to attend the workshop. Agency
officials acknowledged that more needs to be done to directly engage
the more than 70 countries that are not invited to attend the
multilateral meetings. Finally, State and DOD have not developed a
written strategy to resolve interdiction issues, as GAO previously
recommended. Agency officials stated that the involvement of the U.S.
delegation at the multilateral meetings is part of an attempt to
resolve these issues.
This report makes two recommendations. First, we recommend that
relevant law enforcement agencies, such as CBP and Coast Guard (both
within the Department of Homeland Security [DHS]) and FBI establish
clear PSI policies, procedures, and performance indicators to support
PSI activities. Second, we recommend that DOD in cooperation with State
increase cooperation, coordination, and information exchange between
the United States and the more than 70 PSI countries who are not
invited to attend multilateral PSI planning meetings.
We received written comments on a draft of this report from State, DOD,
and FBI within the Department of Justice (Justice) that are reprinted
in appendixes VI, VII, and VIII; we also received e-mail comments from
DHS. DHS and FBI concurred with our first recommendation and State and
DOD concurred with our second recommendation.
DHS concurred with our first recommendation and provided a Planned
Corrective Action for CBP that CBP will update its PSI directive and
implementation plan, including adding appropriate performance
indicators and milestones. FBI also concurred with our first
recommendation and described some steps being taken to mitigate the
issues.
DOD concurred with our second recommendation and stated that it has
already taken several steps to implement it. State also concurred with
our second recommendation, recognizing the need to deepen the
involvement and knowledge of all PSI endorsing countries and stating
that it is undertaking new efforts to address this need. State said
that foremost among future plans of the leading PSI countries that
attend the multilateral meetings is to focus on regional PSI activities
and outreach workshops to increase the participation of those PSI
countries who are not invited to attend the multilateral meetings.
We also received technical comments from State and DHS, which we have
incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.
Background:
PSI is a multinational effort to prevent the trafficking of WMD, their
delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and nonstate
actors of proliferation concern. The PSI has no formal organization or
bureaucracy. U.S. agencies are involved in the PSI as a set of
activities, rather than a program. PSI encourages partnership among
states to work together to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic,
economic, military, law enforcement, and other capabilities to prevent
WMD-related transfers to states and nonstate actors of proliferation
concern. International participation is voluntary, and there are no
binding treaties on those who choose to participate. Countries
supporting PSI are expected to endorse PSI principles, embodied in six
broad goals in the Statement of Interdiction Principles of September
2003 (see app. II) by a voluntary, nonbinding "political" commitment to
those principles and to voluntarily participate in PSI activities
according to their own capabilities. According to the principles, PSI
participants use existing national and international authorities to put
an end to WMD-related trafficking and take steps to strengthen those
authorities, as necessary.
The U.S. government's PSI efforts involve three broad activities:
multilateral PSI planning meetings (referred to as Operational Expert
Group meetings), participation in PSI exercises, and other outreach
efforts such as workshops and conferences.[Footnote 8] According to
State, at multilateral PSI planning meetings, military, law
enforcement, intelligence, legal, and diplomatic experts from the
United States and 19 other PSI countries meet to explore and consider
operational ways to enhance the WMD interdiction capabilities of PSI
participants, build support for the initiative, develop operational
concepts, organize PSI exercises, and share information about national
legal authorities. The policy office in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense heads the U.S. delegation to these multilateral meetings.
PSI exercises vary in size and complexity, and some involve military
personnel and assets from participating PSI countries. Some exercises
do not involve any military assets but instead examine the use of law
enforcement or customs authorities to stop WMD proliferation. Other
exercises are "tabletop" exercises or simulations, which explore
scenarios and determine solutions for hypothetical land, air, or sea
interdictions. Among the most visible PSI exercises are those that
combine a tabletop and a live interdiction exercise using military
assets from multiple PSI countries, such as practicing the tracking and
boarding of a target ship. Outreach efforts include workshops,
conferences, and other meetings that relevant U.S. officials said they
engage in to support PSI goals and bilateral PSI shipboarding
agreements that the United States concludes with other states.
The Administration Has Not Issued Two of Three PSI Documents Called for
or Required in Law:
The administration has not issued the directive, as called for by a
sense of Congress provision in the law, that directs U.S. agencies to
take actions to improve PSI activities, such as establishing clear
structures. In addition, the administration has not submitted a PSI
budget report for fiscal year 2009 detailing PSI-related expenditures
in the past 3 fiscal years and a plan for the next 3 years. In July
2008, the administration submitted to Congress a PSI implementation
report that was required by law to be issued in February 2008.
The Administration Has Not Issued a Directive Directing U.S. Agencies
to Take Actions Specified in Law to Expand and Strengthen PSI:
The administration has not issued a directive to U.S. agencies that
perform PSI functions to take actions to expand and strengthen PSI, as
called for by a sense of Congress provision in the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.[Footnote 9]
Multiple U.S. agencies, including State, DOD, and law enforcement
agencies such as CBP and FBI, perform PSI-related activities for the
United States. Section 1821(a) of Pub. L. No. 110-53 contains a sense
of Congress that a presidential directive should be issued to direct
these agencies to take actions such as establishing clear PSI
structures, incorporating a PSI budget request in each agency's fiscal
year budget request, and providing other resources necessary to achieve
better performance of U.S. PSI-related activities.
The administration, in its implementation report to Congress in July
2008, asserted that it is unnecessary to issue a directive for PSI. The
administration believes that an existing WMD interdiction process, as
documented in an 8-page 2002 National Security Presidential Directive,
addresses the relevant issues that would be covered under a PSI
directive. The existing WMD interdiction process covers how U.S.
agencies should coordinate U.S. government efforts to conduct WMD
interdictions. However, this process predates the creation of PSI and
does not cover U.S. agencies' involvement in three broad PSI
activities: multilateral planning meetings, exercises, and other
outreach efforts. According to the administration, the President
launched PSI in 2003 because of the recognition that stopping WMD
proliferation is a task the United States cannot accomplish by itself.
U.S. involvement in PSI activities, while complementing U.S. agencies'
participation in WMD interdictions, is focused on the diplomatic and
educational outreach efforts of the U.S. government to other countries
to strengthen their interdiction capabilities and efforts.
The Administration Has Not Submitted a PSI Joint Budget Report to
Congress for 2008:
The administration has not submitted a PSI joint budget report for
fiscal year 2009, as required by the law.[Footnote 10] Specifically,
the law required the Secretaries of State and Defense to submit an
unclassified comprehensive joint budget report to Congress in each year
for which the President submits a PSI budget request, with the first
report due in February 2008. The joint budget report should contain the
following:
* A 3-year plan, beginning with the fiscal year for which the budget is
requested, specifying the amount of funding and other resources the
United States would provide for PSI-related activities and the purposes
for such funding and resources over the term of the plan.
* For the 2008 report, a description of the PSI-related activities
carried out during the 3 fiscal years preceding the year of the report,
and for 2009 and each year thereafter, a description of PSI-related
activities carried out during the fiscal year preceding the year of the
report.
* Other information that the Secretaries of State and Defense determine
should be included to keep Congress fully informed of PSI operations
and activities.
Agency officials stated that they were in the process of preparing the
budget report, but they did not provide an estimated completion date.
The Administration Issued a PSI Implementation Report to Congress, but
It Was Late and Does Not Fully Specify Steps Taken to Implement
Provisions of the Law:
The administration issued a required PSI implementation report to
Congress in July 2008, 5 months after the mandated issuance date of
February 2008.[Footnote 11] In addition, the report does not fully
specify the steps taken to implement GAO's previous recommendations or
other provisions of the law.[Footnote 12] The law required the
administration to issue an implementation report to Congress describing
the steps it had taken to implement the recommendations contained in
our classified September 2006 report and the progress it has made
toward implementing the other actions contained in the sense of
Congress provisions of the law.[Footnote 13]
In our September 2006 report, we made two recommendations. First, we
recommended that the administration better organize its efforts for
performing PSI activities, including establishing clear PSI policies
and procedures and indicators to measure the results of PSI activities.
Second, we recommended that the administration develop a strategy to
work with PSI-participating countries to resolve interdiction issues.
The agencies did not concur with our recommendations. Their reasons are
discussed in our classified report. The administration's 2008
implementation report reiterates the agencies' nonconcurrence with our
prior recommendations. While the implementation report primarily
described the administration's activities with the 19 other leading
countries that attend the multilateral PSI planning meetings, it did
not specify the steps taken to develop a comprehensive strategy for
resolving interdiction issues with PSI-participating countries.
[Footnote 14]
Also, under a sense of Congress provision in the law, the
administration is called upon to issue a PSI directive, increase
cooperation with all countries, and increase coordination and
cooperation with PSI-participating countries. The implementation report
did not fully specify the steps taken to implement these other
provisions of the law. The report stated that the administration did
not consider it necessary to issue a PSI directive because it believes
that an existing WMD interdiction process already addresses the
relevant issues. However, this existing WMD interdiction process is not
responsive to the provisions of the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007. As previously noted, it predates the
creation of PSI and does not cover U.S. agencies' involvement in three
broad PSI activities: multilateral planning meetings, exercises, and
other outreach efforts.
DOD Has Taken More Steps than Other U.S. Agencies to Address the Law's
Provisions, but None Has Established Indicators to Measure PSI Results:
DOD has taken more steps to address some of the law's provisions, such
as establishing clearer PSI policies and procedures, structures, and
budgets, compared with other agencies such as State and law enforcement
agencies. State and U.S. law enforcement agencies do not all have the
policies, procedures, or budgets in place to facilitate their
participation in PSI activities, despite the need for greater
involvement of U.S. law enforcement agencies to address PSI law
enforcement issues. Furthermore, U.S. agencies have not established
performance indicators to measure the results of PSI activities.
DOD Has Taken Some Steps to Clarify PSI Policies and Procedures for PSI
Activities, but Uncertainties Remain:
DOD has taken some steps to establish PSI policies and procedures for
U.S. military support to PSI, specifically by encouraging Combatant
Commands (COCOM) to incorporate PSI components into existing DOD
exercises when resources or mission requirements permit. However,
uncertainties remain about how to incorporate law enforcement agencies
into PSI exercises and track PSI expenditures. Consistent with internal
controls, establishing clear PSI policies and procedures will help the
agencies better organize their PSI activities. COCOMs generally plan,
implement, and pay for military exercises in their area of
responsibility. According to agency officials, in the past, DOD Joint
Staff encouraged the COCOMs to implement PSI exercises in addition to
their scheduled standard DOD exercise program. As a result, financial
and logistical pressures of planning and implementing PSI exercises
outside their standard exercise program discouraged COCOM participation
in PSI exercises. In March 2007, DOD Joint Staff revised its guidance
to direct COCOMs to leverage the staff, assets, and resources of the
existing DOD exercise program in support of PSI exercises. Joint Staff
guidance is the primary document setting forth PSI policy and provides
procedures, including roles and responsibilities, for the planning and
execution of U.S. military support to PSI. The guidance encourages
COCOMs to put a PSI component into existing DOD exercises and
establishes a small office that will assist COCOMs in planning and
executing a PSI component.[Footnote 15]
According to agency officials, COCOMs generally plan to include PSI
components, such as PSI-focused interdictions and boardings, into their
existing multinational exercises that regularly practice these
activities and intend to increase the complexity of PSI components in
the future. For example, since 2006, Southern Command has included a
PSI component in its multinational military exercise designed to defend
the Panama Canal against a terrorist-based threat. Agency officials
stated that there is no significant cost for including an additional
PSI interdiction scenario. This strategy helps to relieve COCOMs from
developing and paying for a stand-alone PSI exercise with their
operational funds and, therefore, allows COCOMs to exercise PSI
objectives more frequently.[Footnote 16]
However, placing a PSI component in a strictly military exercise does
not allow COCOMs to exercise law enforcement issues and interagency
coordination. To address these issues, COCOMs can plan stand-alone PSI
exercises and computer-based or gaming exercises. In one case, a COCOM
is planning a stand-alone PSI exercise that will address law
enforcement issues, such as seizure and disposal of cargo, and
interagency participation. DOD officials stated that it also plans to
examine these and other law enforcement concerns in greater detail
through gaming and simulation exercises. In February 2008, DOD
conducted such a simulation using a U.S. shipboarding agreement with
Malta. In June 2007, DOD sponsored a PSI game at the Naval War College
to test national interagency processes to interdict WMD-related
materials and to address post-interdiction issues, such as disposition
of seized cargo and prosecution of proliferators.[Footnote 17]
Although COCOM officials generally report having clear roles and
responsibilities in incorporating PSI components, they lack guidance on
how to incorporate law enforcement issues into military exercises and
track PSI expenditures. The revised Joint Staff guidance does not
clearly address some areas of COCOM responsibility. For example, to
facilitate interagency involvement, the revised Joint Staff guidance
encourages COCOMs to include law enforcement agencies in exercise
planning, but the guidance does not provide specifics on how to liaise
with law enforcement agencies. Some COCOM officials stated that they
need clear guidance on how to exercise the disposition of cargo and
other law enforcement issues. Direct coordination with either domestic
or foreign law enforcement agencies is outside of normal COCOM military
function. In one case, a PSI exercise was hosted by foreign law
enforcement agencies, but a DOD official stated that they did not have
clear guidance on how to coordinate U.S. military participation with
U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies. Also, Joint Staff guidance
calls upon COCOMs to track PSI expenditures, personnel, and military
assets used in support of PSI activities. However, some COCOM officials
stated that they typically do not track these types of expenditures,
except for PSI-related travel costs for COCOM staff. For example, while
COCOMs may submit to Joint Staff the costs for travel to exercise
planning conferences or a PSI exercise site, as well as travel cost
estimates for future activities, they typically do not submit other
costs expended on PSI stand-alone exercises or PSI components of
existing DOD exercises.
DOD Has Established Some PSI Structures and Budget:
DOD has structures in place at the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), the Joint Staff, and the COCOMs to coordinate its involvement in
PSI activities. Within OSD, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats leads
the U.S. interagency delegation to multilateral PSI planning meetings
and coordinates with Joint Staff on U.S. participation in PSI-related
live and tabletop exercises. Joint Staff assists with exercise planning
and provides COCOMs with policies and procedures to direct their
participation in PSI activities. Joint Staff also can provide COCOMs
with information gathered at multilateral PSI planning meetings to keep
them informed on PSI-related developments. COCOMs plan, implement, and
participate in PSI stand-alone exercises or existing DOD exercises with
PSI components based on their mission priorities and available
resources.
DOD also has established an office to further support COCOM involvement
in PSI exercises and produce guidance on how to achieve this goal. The
March 2007 Joint Staff guidance directed Strategic Command to develop a
"PSI Support Cell" that educates COCOMs regarding the process of
putting a PSI component into an existing DOD exercise and helps develop
exercise scenarios that meet objectives developed at multilateral PSI
planning meetings. COCOM officials reported that they have collaborated
with the cell to incorporate PSI components into two existing DOD
exercises and, in one case, it improved the exercise's sophistication.
COCOM officials also reported that they use the cell's secure Web
portal, which integrates information for planning and implementing PSI
exercises, such as scenarios and lessons learned from previous PSI
exercises. The PSI support cell is drafting an exercise planning
handbook that will detail guidelines and best practices for use by
COCOMS in designing and conducting multilateral PSI exercises. DOD also
has created public affairs guidance to publicize exercises and other
PSI activities in U.S. and international media.
OSD established an interagency working group that sets priorities for
U.S. agencies involved in multilateral PSI planning meetings. This
interagency working group leverages capabilities and resources of U.S.
agencies participating in PSI activities. Through this working group,
OSD provides input to the host of the multilateral meeting on the
agenda and determines which agencies will participate in the U.S.
delegation. Before the multilateral PSI planning meeting, OSD ensures
that the U.S. delegation coordinates and cooperates to reach a
consensus on PSI-related issues and resolves any disagreements. OSD
requests relevant U.S. agencies to submit briefings on agenda topics
and circulates them to staff involved in PSI to receive feedback before
clearing them for presentation at the multilateral meeting. After the
multilateral meeting, OSD also oversees the process of delegating tasks
to relevant U.S. agencies and keeps track of their progress. Agency
officials reported that this informal interagency working group is
valuable because it is a regular channel for exchanging information
about PSI and setting priorities identified at multinational PSI
planning meetings among all U.S. agencies that support PSI activities.
DOD has established an annual budget to offset COCOM costs of adding a
PSI component into existing DOD exercises and other PSI-related
expenses. However, COCOM staff responsible for arranging PSI exercises
stated that this funding level is inadequate to support stand-alone PSI
exercises. DOD has created an $800,000 annual budget (starting fiscal
year 2008) that can be used by COCOMs for variety of PSI-related
activities, including upgrades to equipment used in interdictions and
to engage subject matter experts. Some COCOMs stated that this funding
helped them to attend multilateral PSI planning meetings, exercise
planning conferences, and other PSI events. These funds are not
available, however, to other U.S. agencies to host PSI events, such as
PSI workshops or other outreach events, or to cover any foreign
country's costs to participate in PSI activities. Some COCOM officials
responsible for arranging PSI exercises stated that the $800,000, which
DOD has established out of operations and maintenance funds, is
sufficient to fund less-expensive PSI activities, such as adding PSI
components into existing DOD exercises, hosting computer-simulated
games or tabletop exercises. However, this funding is inadequate to
cover the costs of stand-alone PSI exercises or large exercise planning
conferences, according to these officials. For example, one COCOM
reported that it will need to request additional funds from DOD or find
additional operational funds to host a stand-alone PSI exercise in the
next 2 years. Otherwise, the COCOM will have to reduce the scope of the
exercise.
State Has an Existing Structure but Does Not Have Policies, Procedures,
or a Budget in Place for PSI Activities:
Although State has an existing structure, it has not established
written policies and procedures or developed a budget to facilitate its
participation in PSI activities. State placed responsibility for PSI in
the Office of Counter Proliferation Initiatives (CPI) within the bureau
of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN).[Footnote 18] CPI
handles a number of WMD and related issues, in addition to PSI, and is
primarily involved in PSI's diplomatic outreach. Besides a mission
statement that describes roles of CPI's PSI activities, State has not
created policies or procedures, consistent with internal controls,
regarding PSI-related activities. Also, State has not established a
separate funding line for PSI in its annual budget but uses operational
funds to travel to PSI activities. State stated that its operating
funds are sufficient for its officials' involvement in PSI activities,
and it will continue to evaluate any funding requests for PSI in
accordance with established department budget procedures.
Law Enforcement Agencies Have Existing Structures, but Not All Agencies
Have Policies, Procedures, or Budgets in Place for PSI Activities:
Although relevant law enforcement agencies such as CBP, FBI, and Coast
Guard have some basic structures in place, only CBP has written
policies and procedures, and none has established PSI funding lines in
their annual budgets to facilitate participation in PSI activities.
CBP's Office of International Affairs (INA) has the programmatic lead
for the agency's contributions to PSI. Several personnel from other CBP
offices coordinate on legal, intelligence, and operational issues to
facilitate support of PSI activities. CBP has issued a PSI directive
specifying roles and responsibilities of INA and related program
offices. CBP also created an implementation plan that establishes the
agency's leadership role among law enforcement agencies in PSI and
specifies strategies to achieve this and other PSI-related goals,
including participating in PSI exercises and hosting trainings and
workshops. CBP has a limited budget, used mostly for travel to PSI
multilateral meetings from existing agency operational funds, but
budget constraints could limit the extent of CBP's participation in PSI
activities. According to agency officials, CBP's internal budget for
travel to multilateral PSI planning meetings and exercises was cut from
about $100,000 in fiscal year 2007 to about $50,000 in fiscal year
2008. CBP officials stated that additional funds may be needed to host
exercises or workshops, or aid CBP's outreach to industry, as stated in
the goals of its implementation plan.
FBI has delegated its PSI responsibility to the Counter Proliferation
Operations Unit within the WMD directorate and has one staff member
dedicated part-time to PSI activities. However, this unit has not
created policies and procedures for PSI-related activities. Coast Guard
participates in multilateral PSI meetings and exercises through its
Office of Law Enforcement, Operations Law Division, and Office of
Counterterrorism and Defense Operations. The Office of Law Enforcement
and the Operations Law Division also work with State to arrange
bilateral PSI shipboarding agreements to conduct interdictions at sea.
However, the Coast Guard also has not established policies and
procedures to guide its involvement in PSI activities.
The FBI has budgeted $40,000 to support staff travel costs to PSI
meetings and exercises for fiscal year 2008 but has generally been
funding PSI workshops and training exercises on an ad hoc basis. Agency
officials stated that additional funding would be needed to host
exercises or workshops. Also, the FBI made a special request for a
fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror (GWOT) grant of about $700,000 to
fund training for some PSI countries on how to enhance their national
interagency decision-making processes and WMD interdiction
capabilities. However, FBI officials noted that this type of grant will
probably not be available for PSI activities next fiscal year. The
Coast Guard has not established a PSI funding line and uses operational
funds to travel to PSI activities.
PSI exercises, multilateral PSI planning meetings, and workshops are
increasingly focused on law enforcement issues, including customs
enforcement, and legal authorities to detain and dispose of cargo.
Agency officials said that law enforcement agencies are key
participants in PSI activities since shipboardings and cargo
inspections are conducted by those agencies. For example, CBP and Coast
Guard assisted New Zealand with developing a PSI exercise hosted by New
Zealand in September 2008. According to agency officials, this was the
first live PSI exercise mostly focused on law enforcement issues.
Agency officials stated that law enforcement agencies of other
countries, instead of their militaries, are increasingly participating
in PSI exercises. According to agency officials, it can be challenging
to find countries willing to exercise PSI law enforcement issues with
the U.S. military in an existing DOD exercise. Constitutions or
political considerations of some countries preclude their military's
involvement in exercises with a law enforcement component. For example,
one COCOM planned to add a PSI component into an existing DOD military
exercise, but the foreign country participants refused to allow such a
component to be added. According to COCOM officials, the foreign
country participants said a PSI component should be part of a law
enforcement exercise with law enforcement agencies; these countries'
military and law enforcement agencies can not exercise together.
U.S. Agencies Have Not Established Performance Indicators to Measure
the Results of PSI Activities:
While the COCOMs assess the extent to which they meet the goals of
their mission to combat WMD, they do not make the same kind of
assessments for PSI activities. None of the agencies participating in
PSI activities has established performance indicators to measure the
results of their activities. GAO previously recommended in its 2006
report that DOD and State develop performance indicators to measure PSI
results. A good internal control environment calls for agencies to
create the means to monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them
to identify areas needing improvement. Further, a good internal control
environment requires assessing both ongoing activities and separate
evaluations of completed activities and should assess quality of
performance over time.[Footnote 19] Without establishing and monitoring
performance indicators, it will be difficult for policymakers to
objectively assess the relevant U.S. agencies' contributions to PSI
activities over time. State officials stated that they measure PSI
progress by the number of endorsing PSI countries, the number and
complexity of PSI exercises around the world, and the number of PSI
shipboarding agreements. However, it is difficult to attribute these
high-level outcomes to the PSI activities of U.S. agencies because
these outcomes are dependent on the actions of other governments as
well. CBP officials stated that the agency has designed a PSI
Implementation Plan to use when participating in PSI. The plan
established expected goals and targets related to each goal. Although
the plan indicates which goals have been completed and which are
ongoing, the document has not been updated since June 2006. In
addition, CBP has not established performance indicators for its
involvement in PSI activities.
U.S. Agencies Have Made Efforts to Increase Cooperation and
Coordination with Leading PSI Countries but Less So with Other PSI
Countries and Have Not Developed a Written Strategy to Resolve
Interdiction Issues:
U.S. agencies have made efforts to increase cooperation and
coordination with PSI countries by working with the 19 other leading
PSI countries at multilateral PSI planning meetings; however, U.S.
agencies have not built relationships in the same way with their
counterparts from the more than 70 PSI countries who are not invited to
these meetings. U.S. agencies also have made efforts to increase
cooperation and coordination with PSI countries through exercises and
other outreach activities, but the more than 70 PSI countries who are
not invited to attend multilateral meetings are not often involved.
State and DOD have not developed a written strategy to resolve
interdiction issues, as we previously recommended. Agency officials
stated that the involvement of the U.S. delegation at the multilateral
meetings is part of an attempt to resolve these issues.
U.S. Agencies Have Made Efforts to Increase Cooperation and
Coordination with 19 Leading PSI Countries through Multilateral
Meetings but Less So with More than 70 Other PSI Countries:
U.S. agencies have made efforts to increase cooperation and
coordination with PSI countries by working with the 19 other leading
PSI countries at multilateral PSI planning meetings; however, U.S.
agencies have not built and expanded relationships in the same way with
their counterparts from the more than 70 PSI countries who are not
invited to attend these meetings.[Footnote 20] According to DOD,
multilateral PSI planning meetings are to be held three to four times
annually as delegations from 20 leading PSI countries (including the
United States) meet to consider ways to enhance the WMD interdiction
capabilities of PSI participants.[Footnote 21] At the meetings, the
delegations also consider ways to build support for PSI, share ideas to
strengthen legal authorities to interdict, and discuss hosting and
participating in PSI exercises. Each of the 20 leading PSI countries
sends a delegation to the multilateral PSI planning meetings; the
Office of the Secretary of Defense heads the U.S. delegation to these
multilateral meetings.
According to agency officials, the multilateral PSI planning meetings
themselves have no compliance mechanisms. However, according to agency
officials, by actively engaging in bilateral meetings, the U.S.
delegation is able to reach bilateral agreement with leading PSI
countries to take certain actions to support PSI, such as hosting a PSI
exercise. Before or during the multilateral meetings, the U.S.
delegation often meets with delegations from other leading PSI
countries bilaterally. Agency officials use bilateral meetings to reach
agreements with other leading PSI countries to host future multilateral
PSI planning meetings, participate in PSI exercises, or engage in
outreach to countries that do not yet endorse or support PSI. Agency
officials said that the bilateral meetings have been useful in
increasing U.S. cooperation and coordination with the 19 other leading
PSI countries. Meeting bilaterally before the multilateral PSI planning
meetings allows the U.S. delegation to make arrangements with other
leading PSI countries before the large plenary session of the
multilateral PSI planning meeting begins.
Agency officials stated that the plenary session and related breakout
sessions at multilateral meetings have been useful in increasing
cooperation and coordination with their counterparts from other leading
PSI countries. The plenary session is where the heads of the
delegations from the 20 leading PSI countries meet to discuss current
PSI issues and explain their countries' perspectives and opinions on
such issues. Following or concurrent with the plenary session, breakout
sessions are held for working-level officials to get together and
discuss exercise, law enforcement, intelligence, or legal issues in
more detail.
However, because the multilateral PSI planning meetings only include
the 20 leading PSI countries (including the United States), U.S.
agencies have not built and expanded relationships in the same way with
their counterparts from the more than 70 additional PSI countries who
are not invited to attend these meetings. Agency officials acknowledged
that more needs to be done to directly engage these more than 70
additional PSI countries.[Footnote 22]
U.S. Agencies Have Made Efforts to Increase Cooperation and
Coordination with PSI Countries through Exercises, but More Than 70 PSI
Countries Are Not Always Involved:
U.S. agencies also have made efforts to increase cooperation and
coordination with PSI countries through hosting and/or participating in
PSI exercises, but countries from among the more than 70 PSI countries
who are not invited to attend multilateral meetings are not always
involved. While the United States encourages PSI supporting countries
to participate in PSI exercises, agency officials acknowledged that
more needs to be done to directly engage the PSI countries who are not
invited to attend multilateral PSI planning meetings. According to DOD,
PSI exercises are intended to test national capabilities to conduct
air, ground, and maritime interdictions; increase understanding of PSI
among participating countries; and establish interoperability among PSI
participants. The 20 leading PSI countries have established a schedule
of PSI exercises to practice and enhance collective capabilities to
interdict suspected WMD cargoes shipped by sea, air, and land. These
exercises have also included simulations and scenarios to practice
country-to-country and interagency communication processes to conduct
WMD interdictions.
Twenty-one countries have led 36 PSI exercises from September 2003
through September 2008. As figure 1 shows, these exercises have
included sea, land, and air exercises, spanning the different regions
of the globe, although more of them have been held in Europe and the
Mediterranean. Also, while the United States has led a number of the
exercises, the large majority of them have been led by other PSI
countries, with European countries leading most of these. However, only
6 of the 36 exercises held from September 2003 to September 2008 were
hosted or cohosted by countries from among the more than 70 PSI
countries who are not invited to attend the multilateral PSI planning
meetings.[Footnote 23]
Figure 1: PSI Exercises from September 2003 through September 2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the world depicting the site and date of PSI
Exercises from September 2003 through September 2008. The following
information is illustrated (host nations in parenthesis):
Pacific:
Sea:
Sept. 03 -- Pacific Protector (Australia);
Oct. 04 -- Team Samurai 04 (Japan);
Aug. 05 -- Deep Sabre (Singapore);
Oct. 07 -- Pacific Shield 07 (Japan);
Air:
Apr. 06 -- Pacific Protector (Australia);
Combined (sea and land):
Sept. 08 -- Maru (New Zealand) (proposed).
Europe:
Sea:
Apr. 06 -- Top Port (Netherlands);
Air:
June 05 -- Blue Action (Spain);
June 06 -- Hades (France);
Apr. 07 -- Smart Raven (Lithuania);
Land:
Apr. 04 -- Safe Borders (Poland);
Mar. 04 -- Hawkeye (Germany);
June 05 -- Bohemian Guard (Poland, Czech Republic);
Combined:
Sept. 06 -- Amber Sunrise sea/land (Poland);
Oct. 07 -- Eastern Shield 07 sea/air/land (Ukraine).
Mediterranean:
Sea:
Oct. 03 -- Sanso 03 (Spain);
Nov. 03 -- Basilac (France);
Apr. 04 -- Clever Sentinel (Italy);
May 05 -- Ninfa 05 (Portugal);
Apr. 08 -- Phoenix Express 08 (United States);
May 08 -- Adriatic Shield 08 (Croatia);
Air:
Oct. 03 -- Air CPX Tabletop Exercise (United Kingdom);
Feb. 04 -- Air Brake 04 (Italy);
June 04 -- ASPE 2004 (France);
Land:
May 07 -- Adriatic Gate (Slovenia);
Combined (sea, air, and land):
May 06 -- Anatolian Sun (Turkey).
PSI Gaming Exercises:
Sept. 04 -- Sea (United States);
Oct. 05 -- Sea/air (Norway);
June 07 -- Sea/air/land (United States).
Western Hemisphere:
Sea:
Nov. 04 -- Chokepoint 04 (United States);
Aug. 07 -- Panamax 07 (United States);
Aug. 08 -- Panamax 08 (United States).
Indian Ocean:
Sea:
Jan. 04 -- Sea Saber (United States);
Nov. 05 -- Exploring Themis (United Kingdom);
Mar. 08 -- Guistir 08 (Djibouti, France);
Combined (sea and land):
Oct. 06 -- Leading Edge (United States).
Sources: Departments of State, Defense; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
According to agency officials, U.S. agencies have used PSI exercises to
increase cooperation and coordination with PSI countries and educate
countries that have not yet endorsed PSI about the initiative. For
example, DOD officials stated that they used a U.S.-hosted September
2007 exercise to protect the Panama Canal as a means of increasing
cooperation and coordination among the 8 PSI countries (including the
United States) that participated in it. However, of the 8 PSI countries
who participated, only 3 were from among the more than 70 PSI countries
who are not invited to attend multilateral meetings.[Footnote 24]
According to DOD officials, the inclusion of PSI in existing DOD
exercises also creates opportunities to educate other countries about
PSI. The September 2007 exercise was an existing DOD exercise, which
included a PSI component, and involved 9 other countries that have not
yet endorsed PSI. However, agency officials cautioned against potential
backlash from "overloading" existing DOD exercises with PSI components.
For example, foreign countries may choose not to participate in an
existing DOD exercise if a PSI component appears to overshadow the
original objectives of the exercise.
U.S. Agencies Have Undertaken Other Outreach Activities to Increase
Cooperation and Coordination with PSI Countries:
U.S. agencies stated that they have engaged in other outreach
activities to increase cooperation and coordination with PSI countries.
For example, since we issued our 2006 report, State sponsored a PSI
fifth anniversary conference in May 2008 attended by 86 PSI countries.
At this conference, these countries restated their support for PSI and
the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles.[Footnote 25] State
officials also stated that their outreach efforts have included
promoting the PSI when senior State officials meet foreign
representatives or make high-level country visits. In addition, agency
officials said the United States and other leading PSI countries
sometimes engage in ad hoc outreach activities to other PSI countries
before or after multilateral PSI planning meetings, such as a 1-day
outreach session with Middle Eastern PSI countries after the February
2008 multilateral meeting in London, England.
Also, State is continuing to seek international agreements, such as PSI
shipboarding agreements, with input from the U.S. Coast Guard. These
legally binding bilateral agreements, between the United States and
other countries, facilitate bilateral, reciprocal cooperation by
establishing the authorities and procedures the parties use to confirm
and authorize flag state consent to board and search each other's
vessels suspected of carrying WMD and related materials. Since PSI was
announced in 2003, the United States has signed a total of nine PSI
shipboarding agreements, including agreements with Malta, Mongolia, and
the Bahamas since we issued our report in 2006.[Footnote 26] In
addition, as we reported in September 2006, the United States helped
negotiate an amendment to the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation that criminalizes WMD
proliferation activities. The amendment also created an international
framework for nations that are party to the amended convention to board
ships believed to be engaged in WMD proliferation activities. Agency
officials said that the amended convention was sent to the Senate for
review in October 2007, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
voted favorably on it on July 29, 2008. According to agency officials,
the Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the
amended convention on September 25, 2008. The administration awaits
congressional enactment of the necessary implementing legislation. With
the success of amending the maritime convention, U.S. agencies, with
other members of the International Civil Aviation Organization, are
currently examining ways to amend the Montreal Convention of 1971, to
criminalize the airborne transportation of WMD and related materials.
Other U.S. agencies have also made some efforts to increase cooperation
and coordination with PSI countries through outreach activities.
According to DOD officials, DOD has produced talking points on PSI for
high-level, military-to-military discussions with PSI countries and,
where appropriate, for high-level DOD officials' discussions with high-
level foreign political officials. Also, through the recently
established Africa command, DOD officials, in consultation with State,
have contacted some North African political officials on enhancing
their involvement in PSI activities, including exercises. The FBI
sponsored a workshop in 2006 to train law enforcement officials from
the 19 other leading PSI countries to identify WMD items. According to
agency officials, attendance of representatives from the 19 other
leading PSI countries at the conference led to improved relationships
between the United States and these countries, and these relationships
are still yielding benefits. However, only representatives from the 19
other leading PSI countries who go to multilateral meetings were
invited to attend the FBI-sponsored workshop in 2006; no other PSI
countries were invited.
State and DOD Have Not Developed a Written Strategy to Resolve
Interdiction Issues:
According to State and DOD officials, the departments have not
developed a formal, written strategy to resolve interdiction issues, as
GAO previously recommended. Agency officials stated that the
involvement of the U.S. delegation at the multilateral meetings is part
of an attempt to resolve these issues. The administration's PSI
implementation report states that diplomatic, military, law
enforcement, and legal experts from the United States and the 19 other
leading PSI countries convene at multilateral PSI planning meetings to
develop cooperative strategies to address issues that extend beyond the
control of any one country, such as compensation for seized cargo.
These issues are discussed through a plenary session and in greater
detail through law enforcement, legal, intelligence, and exercise
breakout sessions. The PSI implementation report also states that the
United States, a leading member of the meetings, continues to develop
and implement multinational strategies to resolve issues beyond the
exclusive control of the United States.
Conclusions:
The administration has only partially addressed the provisions of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
Although relevant agencies perform various activities under PSI, the
administration's approach to PSI activities overall has been ad hoc.
While DOD has taken more steps than State and law enforcement agencies
to address some of the law's provisions, such as clarifying policies
and procedures, none of the agencies has fully addressed the law's
provisions. Consistent with internal controls, establishing clear PSI
policies and procedures and performance indicators to measure results
will help the agencies better organize their PSI activities. While U.S.
agencies have made efforts to increase cooperation and coordination
with the 19 other leading PSI countries that attend multilateral PSI
planning meetings, they have not yet built relationships in the same
way with over 70 PSI countries that are not part of these meetings.
Agency officials acknowledged that more efforts are needed to directly
engage these countries; doing so could create opportunities for
increased PSI cooperation and coordination, including information
exchanges between them and the United States. We also reaffirm the
recommendations from our 2006 report on PSI that DOD and State should
better organize their efforts for performing PSI activities, including
establishing clear PSI policies and procedures and indicators to
measure the results of PSI activities, and that they develop a strategy
to work with PSI-participating countries to resolve interdiction
issues.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
* Since PSI activities are increasingly focused on law enforcement
issues, we recommend that relevant law enforcement agencies, such as
CBP, FBI, and Coast Guard, establish clear PSI policies and procedures
and work toward developing performance indicators to support PSI
activities, including PSI workshops, training courses, and exercises.
* Since U.S. agencies have not built relationships with their
counterparts from the more than 70 PSI countries who are not invited to
attend multilateral PSI planning meetings to the same extent as with
the 19 other leading PSI countries, we recommend that DOD, in
cooperation with State, take additional steps to increase cooperation,
coordination, and information exchange between the United States and
these countries. In building such relationships, DOD and State will
obviously have to work cooperatively with the 19 other leading PSI
countries that attend the PSI multilateral planning meetings.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of State,
Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice for their review and comment.
We received written comments from State, DOD, and FBI within Justice
that are reprinted in appendixes VI, VII, and VIII; we also received e-
mail comments from DHS. DHS and FBI concurred with our first
recommendation and State and DOD concurred with our second
recommendation. State and DHS also provided us with technical comments,
which we incorporated as appropriate.
DHS concurred with our first recommendation and provided a Planned
Corrective Action for CBP that CBP will update its PSI directive and
implementation plan, including adding appropriate performance
indicators and milestones. FBI also concurred with our first
recommendation and described some steps being taken to mitigate the
issues.
DOD concurred with our second recommendation and stated that it has
already taken several steps to implement it. State also concurred with
our second recommendation, recognizing the need to deepen the
involvement and knowledge of all PSI endorsing countries and stating
that it is undertaking new efforts to address this need. State said
that foremost among future plans of the leading PSI countries that
attend the multilateral meetings is to focus on regional PSI activities
and outreach workshops to increase the participation of those PSI
countries who are not invited to attend the multilateral meetings.
State maintained that a PSI directive is not necessary to strengthen
and expand PSI because an existing WMD interdiction process created by
a classified National Security Presidential Directive is sufficient.
However, as we noted in our report, the existing WMD interdiction
process predates the creation of PSI and does not cover U.S. agencies'
involvement in three broad PSI activities: multilateral planning
meetings, exercises, and other outreach efforts. State also said the
agency uses the number of countries endorsing PSI, the number and
complexity of PSI exercises, and the conclusion of PSI shipboarding
agreements as indicators to measure PSI performance. However, a good
internal control environment calls for agencies to create their own
means to monitor and evaluate their own efforts to identify areas
needing improvement and requires assessing the quality of performance
of ongoing and completed activities over time. We reaffirm the
recommendation from our 2006 report that DOD and State should better
organize their efforts for performing PSI activities, including
establishing indicators to measure the results of PSI activities.
State also said that it is not feasible or effective to develop a
single comprehensive written strategy to deal with issues arising after
interdictions because every interdiction must be dealt with on a case-
by-case basis. While acknowledging the unique characteristics of each
interdiction, we reaffirm our prior recommendation; the recurring
interdiction issues that are beyond the control of the United States,
as noted in our 2006 classified report, demonstrate the need for a
written strategy to resolve these issues. State also stated that it has
policies and procedures in place for PSI activities, although they are
not recorded in a single document, but did not provide us any evidence
of these written PSI policies and procedures.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees. We also will make copies available to others on request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IX.
Signed by:
Joseph A. Christoff, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To examine U.S. agencies' efforts to take a variety of actions to
expand and strengthen the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), we
assessed the (1) extent to which the administration issued a PSI
directive, a sense of Congress provision in the law, and submitted to
Congress required PSI-related reports; (2) steps U.S. agencies have
taken to establish clear PSI policies and procedures, structures,
budgets, and performance indicators; and (3) efforts U.S. agencies have
made to increase cooperation and coordination with PSI countries and
develop a strategy to resolve interdiction issues. We employed various
methodologies to address these three objectives. We reviewed the
Department of Defense's (DOD) Public Affairs Guidance on the
Proliferation Security Initiative, the Report to Congress on
Implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative Pub. L. No. 110-
53, Section 1821, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
on the Proliferation Security Initiative (2005 and revised in 2007) and
documentation on the PSI fifth anniversary conference held May 2008 in
Washington, D.C.
In addition, we reviewed various documents produced by the Departments
of State (State), DOD, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and other
agencies involved in PSI, such as presentations, management reports,
documents, and cables on U.S. agencies' participation in and management
of their involvement in PSI activities. We reviewed various documents
produced by the U.S. delegation to multilateral PSI planning meetings,
including presentations, exercise summaries, meeting summaries, and DOD
documents that discussed best practices for PSI exercises. We met with
officials from State, DOD, CBP, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), Coast Guard, and other agencies in Washington, D.C., involved in
PSI activities.
We interviewed officials and military personnel at five DOD Combatant
Commands (COCOM): (1) Central Command in Tampa, Florida; (2) European
Command in Stuttgart, Germany; (3) Africa Command in Stuttgart,
Germany; (4) Southern Command in Miami, Florida; and (5) the Strategic
Command's Center for Combating WMD in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. We
discussed how DOD manages and coordinates its involvement in PSI
activities, including preparation and execution of PSI components
within existing DOD exercises, as well as stand-alone PSI exercises;
cooperation between the COCOMs, particularly with the Center for
Combating WMD; and management of PSI activities between the Joint Staff
and the COCOMs.
To collect detailed qualitative information from participants on how
and why the multilateral PSI planning meetings (including breakout
sessions and related bilateral meetings) are or are not useful for the
U.S. delegation, we conducted structured interviews with 12 U.S.
participants. In addition, we gathered the participants' perspectives
on the structure, evolution, and possible improvements for such
meetings through the structured interviews. While we did not select a
generalizeable sample, we did select one that included officials with a
wide range of views and relatively more experience of the meetings.
Specifically, we selected U.S. agency officials and military personnel
that had a range of military, law enforcement, legal, diplomatic, and
intelligence expertise and that had attended two or more of the last
six multilateral PSI planning meetings. To ensure that the structured
instrument we used was clear and comprehensive, we pretested the
instrument with two agency officials who had attended at least four of
the last six multilateral meetings. We made changes to the content and
format of the structured interview based on comments from the expert
reviews, as well as the pretests.
The scope of our review was set by the Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.[Footnote 27] The law specified that
the President and relevant agencies and departments take a variety of
actions to expand and strengthen PSI, including implementing
recommendations from our September 2006 classified report, which
identified weaknesses with the U.S. government's planning and
management of PSI. Under a sense of Congress provision of the law, the
President is called upon to issue a PSI directive to U.S. agencies, and
U.S. agencies are called upon to take actions listed in the law, namely
to establish clear PSI policies and procedures, structures, funding,
and performance indicators to measure the results of PSI activities; to
take steps to increase cooperation and coordination with PSI countries;
and to develop a strategy to resolve interdiction issues. The law
required the President to submit a PSI implementation report by
February 2008 to congressional committees; State and DOD are required
to submit a comprehensive joint budget report to Congress describing
U.S. funding and other resources for PSI-related activities. Congress
required GAO to issue three consecutive reports assessing the
effectiveness of PSI, including progress made in implementing the
provisions of the act. This report is the first of the three reports.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2007 to November
2008, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Statement of Interdiction Principles:
PSI: Statement of Interdiction Principles:
The PSI is a response to the growing challenges posed by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery
systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by
the international community to prevent proliferation of such items,
including existing treaties and regimes. It is consistent with, and a
step in the implementation of the UN Security Council Presidential
Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all
WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and
underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent
proliferation. The PSI is also consistent with recent statements of the
G8 and the European Union, establishing that more coherent and
concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their
delivery systems, and related materials. PSI participants are deeply
concerned about this threat and of the danger that these items could
fall into the hands of terrorists and are committed to working together
to stop the flow of these items to and from states and nonstate actors
of proliferation concern.
The PSI seeks to involve, in some capacity, all states that have a
stake in nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps
to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. The PSI
also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports,
territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation
purposes by states and nonstate actors of proliferation concern. The
increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to
circumvent existing nonproliferation norms, and to profit from such
trade, requires new and stronger actions by the international
community. We look forward to working with all concerned states on
measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as
outlined in the following set of "Interdiction Principles."
Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative:
PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles
to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to
impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related
materials flowing to and from states and nonstate actors of
proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and
relevant international law and frameworks, including the UN Security
Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to
international peace and security to join in similarly committing to:
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other
states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their
delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and nonstate
actors of proliferation concern. "States or nonstate actors of
proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or entities
that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to
interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation
through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or
nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems or (2) transfers
(either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery
systems, or related materials.
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant
information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the
confidential character of classified information provided by other
states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and
efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize
coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.
3. Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal
authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to
strengthen when necessary relevant international law and frameworks in
appropriate ways to support these commitments.
4. Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding
cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the
extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with
their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include:
a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to
or from states or nonstate actors of proliferation concern and not to
allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.
b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by
another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying
their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas
beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably
suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or nonstate
actors of proliferation concern, and to seize such cargoes that are
identified.
c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate
circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by
other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such
vessels that may be identified by such states.
d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their
internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared)
vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or
from states or nonstate actors of proliferation concern and to seize
such cargoes that are identified and (2) to enforce conditions on
vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters, or
territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such
cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding,
search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.
e. At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by
another state, to (1) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of
carrying such cargoes to or from states or nonstate actors of
proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land
for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified and/or
(2) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit
rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.
f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as
transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or
nonstate actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft,
or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such
cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Chronology and Location of Multilateral PSI Planning
Meetings, 2003 to 2008:
The following multilateral PSI planning meetings are also known as
Operational Expert Group (OEG) meetings:
2003:
1.Brisbane, Australia (July):
2. London, United Kingdom (July):
3. Paris, France (September):
4. London, United Kingdom (October):
5. Washington, D.C., United States (December):
2004:
1. Ottawa, Canada (April):
2. Oslo, Norway (August):
3. Sydney, Australia (November):
2005:
1. Omaha, Nebraska, United States (March):
2. Copenhagen, Denmark (July):
3. Hamburg, Germany (November) - Regional OEG meeting:
2006:
1. Miami, Florida, United States (April):
2. Singapore (July):
3. Montreal, Canada (December):
2007:
1. Auckland, New Zealand (March):
2. Rhodes, Greece (October):
2008:
1. London, United Kingdom (February):
2. Paris, France (September):
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Bilateral Shipboarding Agreements, 2004 to 2008:
1. Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed with
Liberia:
Signed February 11, 2004, entered into force December 9, 2004.
According to State, Liberia has the second largest ship registry in the
world.
2. Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed with
Panama:
Signed May 12, 2004; entered into force December 1, 2004.
According to State, Panama has the largest ship registry in the world.
3. Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed with
Marshall Islands:
Signed August 13, 2004; provisionally applied from August 13, 2004;
entered into force November 24, 2004.
According to State, Marshall Islands has the eleventh largest flag
registry in the world.
4. Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed with
Republic of Croatia:
Signed June 1, 2005; entered into force March 5, 2007.
5. Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed with
Cyprus:
Signed July 25, 2005; entered into force January 12, 2006.
According to State, Cyprus has the sixth largest ship registry in the
world and was the first European Union member to sign such an agreement
with the United States.
6. Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed with
Belize:
Signed August 4, 2005; entered into force October 19, 2005.
According to State, Belize is the first Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
member state to sign such an agreement with the United States in
support of PSI.
7. Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed with
the Republic of Malta:
Signed March 15, 2007; entered into force December 19, 2007:
According to State, Malta has the eighth largest ship registry in the
world.
8. Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed with
Mongolia:
Signed October 23, 2007; entered into force February 20, 2008.
9. Proliferation Security Initiative Shipboarding Agreement Signed with
the Bahamas:
Signed August 11, 2008; not yet in force.
According to State, the Bahamas has the third largest flag registry of
merchant ships in the world and serves as an open registry for
shipowners from dozens of countries.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Countries Supporting PSI:
Countries supporting PSI are as follows; PSI countries with an asterisk
are the 20 leading PSI countries who attend multilateral PSI planning
meetings:
1. Afghanistan:
2. Albania:
3. Andorra:
4. Angola:
5. Argentina*:
6. Armenia:
7. Australia*:
8. Austria:
9. Azerbaijan:
10. Bahamas:
11. Bahrain:
12. Belarus:
13. Belgium:
14. Belize:
15. Bosnia:
16. Brunei Darussalam:
17. Bulgaria:
18. Cambodia:
19. Canada*:
20. Chile:
21. Croatia:
22. Cyprus:
23. Czech Republic:
24. Denmark*:
25. Djibouti:
26. El Salvador:
27. Estonia:
28. Fiji:
29. Finland:
30. France*:
31. Georgia:
32. Germany*:
33. Greece*:
34. Holy See:
35. Honduras:
36. Hungary:
37. Iceland:
38. Iraq:
39. Ireland:
40. Israel:
41. Italy*:
42. Japan*:
43. Jordan:
44. Kazakhstan:
45. Kyrgyzstan:
46. Kuwait:
47. Latvia:
48. Liberia:
49. Libya:
50. Liechtenstein:
51. Lithuania:
52. Luxembourg:
53. Macedonia:
54. Malta:
55. Marshall Islands:
56. Moldova:
57. Mongolia:
58. Montenegro:
59. Morocco:
60. The Netherlands*:
61. New Zealand*:
62. Norway*:
63. Oman:
64. Panama:
65. Papua New Guinea:
66. Paraguay:
67. Philippines:
68. Poland*:
69. Portugal*:
70. Qatar:
71. Romania:
72. Russia*:
73. Samoa:
74. San Marino:
75. Saudi Arabia:
76. Serbia:
77. Singapore*:
78. Slovakia:
79. Slovenia:
80. Spain*:
81. Sri Lanka:
82. Sweden:
83. Switzerland:
84. Tajikistan:
85. Tunisia:
86. Turkey*:
87. Turkmenistan:
88. Ukraine:
89. United Arab Emirates:
90. United Kingdom*:
91. United States*:
92. Uzbekistan:
93. Yemen:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
October 17, 2008:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"Nonproliferation: U.S. Agencies Have Taken Some Steps, but More Effort
Is Needed to Strengthen and Expand the Proliferation Security
Initiative," GAO Job Code 320563.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Jan
Purcell, Foreign Affairs Officer, International Security and
Nonproliferation at (202) 647-6186.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO - Joseph Christoff:
ISN -- Patricia Mcnerney:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Nonproliferation: U.S. Agencies Have Taken Some Steps, but More Effort
Is Needed to Strengthen and Expand the Proliferation Security
Initiative:
(GAO-09-43, GAO Code 320563)
Thank you for giving the Department of State the opportunity to comment
on the draft report 'Nonproliferation: U.S. Agencies Have Taken Some
Steps, but More Effort Is Needed to Strengthen and Expand the
Proliferation Security Initiative.' The comments below respond to
statements made in various places in the GAO‘s draft report.
GAO Recommendation: DOD and State should take steps to increase
cooperation and coordination between the United States and the more
than 70 PSI countries who are not invited to attend multilateral PSI
planning meetings.
Response: The U.S. and the 19 other countries participating in the PSI
Operational Experts Group (OEG) have recognized the need to deepen the
involvement and knowledge of all PSI endorsing states. This year, we
are undertaking several new efforts to implement this objective,
including creation of a PSI web portal to share documents among all PSI
countries, and creation of a regular PSI newsletter for all PSI
countries.
The Department of State sponsored a PSI 5th Anniversary Senior-Level
Meeting on May 28, 2008 in Washington for all PSI countries.
Representatives from 86 PSI countries attended. At this meeting, the
attendees discussed current PSI issues and restated their support for
the PSI and the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, in particular
through adoption of the Washington Declaration (available online at
[hyperlink, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/105268.htm]).
[See comment 1] The GAO‘s draft report failed to note that, on the
following day, the U.S. hosted a PSI outreach workshop, attended by
representatives of 21 countries that had not yet endorsed the PSI, as
well as most of the PSI participating states. The workshop provided
detailed information on the broad range of PSI activities and tools
that have been developed for training, organizing for, and conducting
interdictions of shipments of proliferation concern. It was designed
both to promote PSI endorsement by additional states and to deepen the
knowledge of and participation in PSI activities by states that have
endorsed the PSI.
Foremost among future plans of the countries participating in the OEG
is to focus on regional PSI activities and outreach workshops intended
to increase active PSI participation by the countries that do not
participate in the OEG meetings. [See comment 2] For example, the USG
will host an OEG meeting in May 2009 in Miami, Florida, and will invite
all PSI partners from the Western Hemisphere to actively participate.
This will be the first time an OEG meeting will integrate non-OEG
regional partners from the Western Hemisphere. The meeting‘s content
will focus on interdiction issues and challenges most relevant to the
region. Other PSI partners also plan to host regional OEG meetings for
other regions in 2009 and beyond. These meetings will help to increase
the capabilities of all PSI partners to interdict WMD shipments.
The Department of State has always disseminated summaries of each PSI
OEG meeting to all PSI countries. State also has supported - with
funding and/or expert advice - several PSI exercises in Central and
Eastern Europe, Africa, and Central/South America hosted by and
intended for non-OEG countries. These exercises have enhanced the
skills and interoperability of the non-OEG countries in that region in
combating WMD-related trafficking. In addition, exercises hosted by OEG
countries in the last two years have been attended by a number of non-
OEG countries, as well as by countries that have not yet endorsed the
PSI, as noted in DOD‘s comments on this report.
In addition, the Department of State leads USG efforts to conclude
bilateral, reciprocal PSI shipboarding agreements with key ship
registry states, with support from the U.S. Coast Guard, DOD and the
Department of Justice. [See comment 3] All nine agreements we have
concluded so far are with non-OEG PSI partner nations. Since 2006,
three more shipboarding agreements have been signed -- with Malta,
Mongolia and The Bahamas. These agreements provide expedited procedures
for obtaining authorization to board and search ships suspected of
transporting proliferation-related cargo.
GAO Statement: The Administration has not issued a PSI directive that
directs U.S. agencies to establish clear PSI authorities, structures,
roles, responsibilities, policies and procedures, including budget
requests for PSI activities. In its implementation report to Congress
in July 2008, the Administration stated it is unnecessary to issue a
directive for PSI because it believes that an existing WMD interdiction
process, documented in an 8-page 2002 National Security Presidential
Directive, already addresses the relevant issues that would be covered
under a PSI directive.
Response: As was the case in 2006, all U.S. PSI activities are
conducted via an extensive interagency coordination process through a
policy coordination committee chaired by National Security Council
(NSC) staff, implementing clearly defined strategy documents that
established agency roles, responsibilities, and common goals. In its
PSI implementation report to Congress of July 2008, the Administration
stated it does not consider issuing an additional Presidential
directive to be necessary in order to continue expanding and
strengthening the PSI. The Administration continues to hold this view.
A classified National Security Presidential Directive governs the
interdiction process. [See comment 4]
The report correctly notes that there is no single Administration
budget request for the PSI. In fact, the PSI was designed to be not a
single, distinct program, but rather a set of activities interwoven
into the USG‘s established diplomatic, military, and law enforcement
relations with other countries. In addition, many existing programs,
missions, international agreements and frameworks promote the same
objectives as the PSI without being narrowly defined as part of the
PSI. It should remain the responsibility of each agency to determine
whether it can accomplish its PSI objective best by establishing a
budget line item for PSI activities.
GAO Statement: The existing WMD interdiction process covers how U.S.
agencies should coordinate U.S. government efforts to conduct WMD
interdictions. However, this process predates the creation of PSI and
does not cover U.S. agencies‘ involvement in three broad PSI
activities: multilateral planning meetings, exercises, and other
outreach efforts.
Response: Presidential directives set out broad U.S. Government policy
and goals. Such a document is neither appropriate nor necessary to
administer the details of USG agencies‘ work on PSI Operational Experts
Group meetings, PSI exercises, PSI outreach, and WMD-related
interdictions. USG agencies are working together closely and
continuously on these PSI activities, via an extensive interagency
coordination process through a policy coordination committee chaired by
National Security Council (NSC) staff. [See comment 5]
GAO Statement: U.S. agencies have not established performance
indicators to measure the results of PSI activities.
Response: Standard Department of State procedures are followed
regarding indicators to measure program results for State‘s work on the
PSI. There are certain unclassified PSI activities that can be
quantified, which State uses as indicators to measure the Initiative‘s
progress as required in the annual Strategic Plan of the Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN). [See comment 6]
These are: increases in the number of countries endorsing the PSI; the
number and complexity of PSI exercises conducted around the world; and
the conclusion of PSI shipboarding agreements.
The Department of State requires evidence of countries‘ endorsement of
the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles in order to consider them
to be PSI participants. Such evidence can take the form of a diplomatic
note to the U.S. or to another PSI partner state, a public statement of
endorsement, or representation at a meeting of PSI participating
states. Use of this clear criterion allowed the Department to begin
publishing in 2006 a list of PSI participants on the State website.
GAO Statement: State officials stated that they measure PSI progress by
the number of endorsing PSI countries; the number and complexity of PSI
exercises around the world; and the number of PSI shipboarding
agreements. However, it is difficult to attribute these high-level
outcomes to the PSI activities of U.S. agencies because these outcomes
are dependent on the actions of other governments as well.
Response: The mission of the Department of State is to conduct
international diplomacy in support of U.S. foreign policy goals, where
all outcomes depend on the actions of other governments. State‘s PSI
activities are no exception, as the GAO‘s previous report highlighted.
State uses these performance indicators because we are confident that
the results would not have occurred without our efforts. [See comment
7]
GAO Statement: State and DOD have not developed a written strategy to
resolve interdiction issues. Agency officials stated that the
involvement of the U.S. delegation at the multilateral meetings is part
of an attempt to resolve these issues.
Response: U.S. agencies have developed tools and use standard
procedures to plan and execute interdictions. [See comment 8] To deal
with issues arising as a result of interdictions that have taken place,
we have not found it feasible or effective to develop a single,
comprehensive written strategy, because every interdiction case is
unique and each must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis depending on
the specific circumstances. U.S. agencies are familiar with the tools
and resources available to deal with the issues that come up. Subject
matter experts from across the USG consult and coordinate courses of
action to address each WMD-related interdiction case, guided by
Presidential Directives and agency procedures.
Because interdictions involve other countries, resolving interdiction
issues is a task the U.S. cannot accomplish by itself. The PSI is based
on the concept of cooperation and coordination among PSI partners in
countering WMD-related trafficking, each utilizing the national
authorities available to it. All PSI activities are aimed at
strengthening such cooperation and coordination.
GAO Statement: State has an existing structure but does not have
policies, procedures, or a budget in place for PSI activities.
Response: The Department of State does have policies and procedures in
place for its PSI activities, although they are not all recorded in a
single document. State updates its PSI plans and strategies frequently
to take developments into account. [See comment 9]
The Department of State has provided funding to support four complex
interdiction-related PSI exercises hosted by PSI partners Poland and
Ukraine, as authorized under section 504(a) of the Freedom Support Act
and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund‘s (NDF) expanded
authority under the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and
Related Programs (NADR). Apart from these line items, the ISN Bureau‘s
operating budget has been sufficient to fund the expenses for State‘s
PSI activities. [See comment 10]
In order to ensure that Department of State activities related to the
PSI and interdiction are properly coordinated, in late 2005 the
Department created the Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives. This
Office is responsible for all State Department PSI activities, as part
of its counterproliferation diplomacy mission. As noted in its Mission
Statement, the Office of Counterproliferation Initiatives develops and
conducts diplomatic outreach to prospective PSI participants, informs
current participants of PSI events, and works on broadening their
participation; participates in negotiation of ship-boarding and other
relevant international agreements and understandings; and facilitates
State support to the PSI Operational Experts Group. Most important,
this Office routinely interfaces with foreign governments on WMD-
related interdictions and the disposition of seized cargo.
GAO Statement: International [PSI] participation is voluntary and there
are no binding treaties on those who choose to participate.
Response: It is correct that PSI participation is voluntary. Of course,
the actions of PSI participants must be consistent with their national
legal authorities and relevant international law. The PSI is part of
the overall international nonproliferation framework that includes the
international nonproliferation treaties – such as the NPT, CWC, and
BWC, to which most countries are parties. The Law of the Sea and the
Chicago Conventions govern the actions of PSI countries in the maritime
and air domains, respectively. In addition, the UN Security Council
resolutions addressing North Korea‘s and Iran‘s WMD-related activities,
as well as UNSC Resolution 1540, are legally binding on all UN Member
states. Finally, our bilateral PSI shipboarding agreements with other
countries are binding on the Parties.
GAO Statement: The multilateral PSI planning meetings themselves have
no compliance mechanisms. [See comment 11]
Response: The term ’compliance“ indicates legal obligations. The
meetings of the 20-nation OEG are not based on or involved with
establishing legal obligations, so it is meaningless to refer to
compliance mechanisms in this context. The operational experts meet to
discuss and resolve issues related to interdictions, and to plan
exercises and outreach events. This forum for experts to meet regularly
with their counterparts from other countries has proven very valuable
for strengthening the PSI network and the collective body of knowledge
about how to effectively interdict proliferation-related trafficking.
We are working on ways to expand the benefits of the OEG to all PSI
countries by holding more regionally-focused meetings.
GAO Statement: The United States helped negotiate an amendment to the
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation that criminalizes WMD proliferation activities...
Agency officials said that the amended convention was sent to the
Senate for review in October 2007, and the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee voted favorably on it on July 29, 2008. It is now awaiting
full Senate action.
Update: The Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of
the 2005 Protocols to the Convention of the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation on September 25, 2008
(source: Congressional Record). The Administration welcomes the
Senate‘s action, and awaits Congressional enactment of the necessary
implementing legislation before the U.S. can deposit its instruments of
ratification. [See comment 12]
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
dated October 17, 2008.
GAO Comments:
1. We have added information in the report that State hosted a PSI
outreach workshop at the PSI fifth anniversary conference.
2. We have added information in the report on the future multilateral
PSI planning meeting in 2009 to be hosted by the United States.
3. Appendix IV provides information on the shipboarding agreements the
United States has signed with other countries.
4. As we stated in our report, the existing WMD interdiction process
covers how U.S. agencies should coordinate U.S. government efforts to
conduct WMD interdictions. This process, as we noted, predates the
creation of PSI and does not cover U.S. agencies' involvement in three
broad PSI activities: multilateral planning meetings, exercises, and
other outreach efforts.
5. As noted in our report, the WMD interdiction process predates the
creation of PSI and does not cover U.S. agencies' involvement in three
broad PSI activities: multilateral planning meetings, exercises, and
other outreach efforts.
6. We reaffirm the recommendation from our 2006 report that DOD and
State should better organize their efforts for performing PSI
activities, including establishing indicators to measure the results of
PSI activities. As we stated in our report, a good internal control
environment calls for agencies to create their own means to monitor and
evaluate their own efforts to enable them to identify areas needing
improvement. Further, a good internal control environment requires
assessing both ongoing activities and separate evaluations of completed
activities and should assess quality of performance over time.
7. See response (6) above.
8. State has not worked with DOD to implement the second recommendation
from our 2006 report, as called for in the law. While acknowledging the
unique characteristics of each interdiction, we reaffirm our prior
recommendation. The recurring interdiction issues that are beyond the
control of the United States, as noted in our 2006 classified report,
demonstrate the need for a written strategy to resolve these issues.
9. While State said that it has PSI policies and procedures that are
not recorded in a single document, it did not provide GAO any evidence
of its written PSI policies and procedures.
10. Although State reports providing funding to support certain PSI
exercises, State has not requested funds necessary for PSI-related
activities, as called for in the law.
11. This statement was based on information from U.S. agency officials.
We have modified the text in our report to attribute it to agency
officials.
12. We have updated our report to reflect the Senate's actions.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Global Security Affairs:
2900 Defense Pentagon:
Washington D.C. 20201-2900:
Mr. Joseph A Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Christoff:
This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-09-43, `Nonproliferation: U.S. Agencies Have Taken Some
Steps, but More Effort Is Needed to Strengthen and Expand the
Proliferation Security Initiative,' dated September 3, 2008 (GAO Code
320563). The GAO Report contained one recommendation for the Department
of Defense. The Department concurs with the recommendation and has
already taken steps to implement it.
My point of contact for the report is Ms. Beth Flores, 703-692-0147.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Richard J. Douglas:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation and Global Threats:
GAO Draft Report Dated September 30, 2008:
GAO-09-43 (GAO Code 320563):
"Nonproliferation: U.S. Agencies Have Taken Some Steps, But More Effort
Is Needed To Strengthen And Expand The Proliferation Security
Initiative"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation:
Recommendation: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in
cooperation with the Department of State. take additional steps to
increase cooperation, coordination, and information exchange between
the United States and the more than 70 PSI countries that do not attend
the multilateral PSI planning meetings. (p. 26/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: DoD concurs with this recommendation and has already
taken several steps to implement it, working in close cooperation with
the Department of State and other relevant U.S. government Departments
and Agencies. In February 2008 at the PSI Operational Experts Group
(OEG) meeting in London, a Department of Defense official proposed that
the OEG increase its efforts to build the knowledge and capacity of all
PSI partners. That objective was formally captured in the Washington
Declaration, which was adopted by the PSI-endorsing countries at the
Department of State-hosted PSI 5th Anniversary Senior-Level Meeting
held in Washington, DC on May 28, 2008. Over the past several years,
there have been multiple engagements with non-OEG PSI partners to
explore operational concepts through live and table top exercises. In
2008 alone, the U.S. sponsored two bilateral table top exercises with
Malta and Croatia, respectively, focusing on the implementation
procedures of PSI shipboarding agreements. Additionally, the U.S.
(USEUCOM and USSOUTHCOM), Croatia. Djibouti, France. Poland, and New
Zealand hosted PSI exercises that involved more than thirty non-OEG PSI-
endorsing countries from the Western Hemisphere, North Africa. Europe
and Asia-Pacific regions. OSD and Joint Staff worked together to
establish a task-organized delegation of experts from the Department of
Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security,
the Department of Justice, the Department of Energy, the Department of
Commerce, the Department of Treasury and organizations across the
intelligence community. In 2009, DoD will sponsor two major PSI events
that will emphasize capacity-building involve non-OEG PSI partners.
[See comment 1] OSD and SOUTHCOM will host an Operational Experts Group
meeting in Miami, FL and will invite regional PSI partners from the
Western Hemisphere to participate. This will be the first time an OEG
meeting will integrate regional partners and gear content toward
regional aspects of the proliferation challenge. In October 2009,
USCENTCOM will host a PSI exercise, inviting PSI partners from the
region and integrating non-military elements of interdiction into the
design. In sum, the above activities reflect a concerted effort among
the Department of Defense, the Department of State and other U.S.
government Departments and Agencies to extend the reach of PSI capacity-
building efforts to all PSI endorsing countries.
Attachment:
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's letter
dated October 10, 2008.
GAO Comments:
1. We have added information to the report noting the 2009 PSI events
DOD will be sponsoring.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Washington, DC:
October 22, 2008:
In Reply, Please Refer to file No.:
Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. General Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Thank you for providing the Federal Bureau of Investigation the
opportunity to comment on the draft report 'Nonproliferation:
U.S. Agencies Have Taken Some Steps, Put More Effort is Needed to
Strengthen and Expand the Proliferation Security Initiative.' The FBI
concurs with the recommendation presented in the GAO report. However,
the FBI would like to describe how we are mitigating the issues
regarding the recommendation.
GAO Recommendation: Since PSI activities are increasingly focused on
law enforcement issues we recommend that relevant law enforcement
agencies such as Customs and Border Protection (CEP), FBI, and Coast
Guard establish clear PST policies and procedures, and work toward
developing performance indicators to support PSI activities, including
PSI workshops, training courses, and exercises.
As an agency with both intelligence collection and law enforcement
investigative responsibilities, the FBI is bound by a number of
operating documents, primary of which are the Attorney General
Guidelines AGG) in addition to numerous other departmental and agency
policy documents which are clearly defined.
FBI PSI related activities are captured as part of the FBI's Strategic
Management System (SMS). Under SMS the FBI is required to meet
performance metrics on a quarterly and/or yearly basis.
The GAO finding that there is no specific departmental budget line item
supporting PSI is correct. PSI activities are covered by the
Counterproliferation Operations Unit (CPOU), which is part of the
Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate (WMDD), which is in turn a
component of the FBI's National Security Branch (NSB). As a sub-
program, there is no specific line item in the congressional budget
request. However, funding for PSI is a priority matter within
CPOU/WMDD. In FY 2009, the FBI increased the number of personnel
assigned to PST.
While it is true that most activities to date have focused on the 20
leading PSI countries, it is important to note that the FBI maintains a
network of overseas Legal Attaches (Legats), based at U.S. embassies,
covering all of the remaining PSI partner nations. Many of these Legats
have received PSI specific training. As the overall mission of the FBI
Legats is to foster liaison and cooperation with our global partners in
the realm of law enforcement and criminal intelligence, the FBI
maintains an established capability and a growing commitment to PSI.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Gary Douglas Perdue:
Chief, Investigations and Operations Section:
Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate:
Federal Bureau of Investigation:
[End of section]
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-8979, or Christoffj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Godwin Agbara, Assistant
Director; Ian Ferguson; Yana Golburt; Helen Hwang; and Lynn Cothern
made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See GAO, Better Controls Needed to Plan and Manage Proliferation
Security Initiative Activities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-937C] (Washington, D.C.: September 2006).
[2] The Department of Defense (DOD) did not concur with both
recommendations, and State did not concur with the first
recommendation.
[3] Pub. L. No. 110-53, Sec. 1821. Section 1821 includes a nonbinding
sense of Congress provision, as well as binding provisions.
[4] The 20 leading PSI countries who attend multilateral PSI planning
meetings are Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. In this report, these countries are referred to as the
"leading PSI countries" because only they attend the multilateral PSI
planning meetings held three to four times annually. At these meetings,
delegations of experts from these 20 countries meet to decide how to
build support for the initiative, consider ways to enhance the WMD
interdiction capabilities of all PSI countries, share ideas to
strengthen legal authorities to interdict, and discuss hosting and
participating in PSI exercises.
[5] See Report to Congress on Implementation of the Proliferation
Security Initiative, Pub. L. No. 110-53, Sec. 1821, July 2008.
[6] CBP officials stated that, since they hosted a workshop in 2005,
they have not been asked to host any exercises or workshops so they
have not had to request funding to host such events.
[7] According to State, more than 90 countries currently support PSI.
More than 70 of these PSI countries do not attend multilateral PSI
planning meetings, and some of these countries might be located along
routes of WMD proliferation concern, or have other strategic importance
to international WMD interdiction efforts. For a full list of countries
supporting PSI, according to State, see appendix V.
[8] According to State officials, the U.S. government's PSI efforts
also involve working with partner states on interdictions. We discussed
interdiction cases in our 2006 classified report.
[9] Pub. L. No. 110-53, Sec. 1821 (a) (1).
[10] Pub. L. No. 110-53, Sec. 1821 (b).
[11] Pub. L. No. 110-53, Sec. 1821 (c).
[12] See Report to Congress on Implementation of the Proliferation
Security Initiative, Pub. L. No. 110-53, Sec. 1821, July 2008.
[13] The other provisions are detailed in Pub. L. No. 110-53, Sec.
1821, paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of subsection (a).
[14] While the agencies did not concur with these two recommendations,
the law called on the agencies to implement GAO's recommendations.
[15] DOD is also in the process of revising its Weapons of Mass
Destruction Maritime Interdiction Execution Order, designed to
strengthen national WMD interdiction capabilities by including COCOMs
in the decision-making process. Based on these revisions, COCOMs will
change the design and implementation of existing WMD exercises as most
of these exercises involve interdiction scenarios.
[16] Stand-alone exercises typically include both a live exercise and a
simulated computer or tabletop component. The live portion requires
assets, such as a ship or a helicopter to interdict and board a
suspected vessel. During the simulated portion, participants discuss
issues that cannot be incorporated into the live portion, such as the
disposition of seized cargo.
[17] In DOD's letter commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated
that in October 2009 Central Command will host a PSI exercise inviting
PSI countries from the region. Among the countries that Central Command
plans to invite are those countries from the region that are not
normally invited to attend the multilateral PSI planning meetings. This
exercise will integrate nonmilitary elements of interdiction into the
design of the exercise.
[18] ISN was formed as a result of a 2005 State reorganization that
combined nonproliferation and arms control issues under one bureau.
[19] See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[20] The 20 leading PSI countries (including the United States) who
attend multilateral PSI planning meetings are: Argentina, Australia,
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore,
Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Many of these
countries have been active in international WMD and related materials
nonproliferation efforts, such as the Australia Group, the Missile
Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the
Wassenaar Arrangement.
[21] For a chronology and location of multilateral PSI planning
meetings held from 2003 to 2008, see appendix III.
[22] DOD and State's letters commenting on a draft of this report
stated that the U.S. government will host a multilateral PSI planning
meeting in Miami, Florida in 2009 and will invite regional PSI
countries from the Western Hemisphere to participate. This will be the
first time a multilateral meeting will include those PSI countries from
the Western Hemisphere who are not normally invited to attend the
multilateral meetings.
[23] Croatia, Slovenia, Lithuania, and Ukraine each hosted an exercise.
Czech Republic cohosted an exercise with Poland and Djibouti cohosted
an exercise with France.
[24] Three other PSI countries also attended the exercise as observers.
[25] At this conference, State also hosted a PSI outreach workshop
attended by representatives from 21 countries who had not yet endorsed
PSI, as well as representatives from PSI countries. According to State,
this workshop provided information on a broad range of PSI activities.
[26] The United States has signed PSI shipboarding agreements with nine
countries: Liberia, Panama, Marshall Islands, Croatia, Cyprus, Belize,
Malta, Mongolia, and the Bahamas. See appendix IV for more details.
[27] Pub. L. No. 110-53, Sec. 1821.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
