United Nations Peacekeeping
Challenges Obtaining Needed Resources Could Limit Further Large Deployments and Should Be Addressed in U.S. Reports to Congress Gao ID: GAO-09-142 December 18, 2008The United Nations (UN) supports U.S. interests in maintaining international security by deploying and operating 16 peacekeeping operations in locations in conflict, including Darfur, Lebanon, and Haiti. Over the past 10 years, the number of deployed UN personnel increased from about 41,000 peacekeepers and civilian staff to about 109,000 in 2008. In this report on the UN's capacity to deploy further operations, GAO was asked to examine (1) the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations in the past 10 years; (2) the likely characteristics of a potential new peacekeeping operation, given this evolution; (3) the challenges, if any, the UN would face deploying this operation; and (4) U.S. efforts to support and report on UN peacekeeping. GAO reviewed UN documents, developed a methodology to assess the requirements for a potential new operation with UN assistance, interviewed UN headquarters and mission officials, and assessed U.S. government documents on UN peacekeeping.
UN peacekeeping operations since 1998 have taken on increasinglyambitious mandates, been located in more challenging environments, and grown in size and scope. UN operations in 1998 averaged three mandated tasks, such as observing cease-fires; in 2008, they averaged nine more ambitious tasks, such as restoring government institutions. Operations in 2008 were located in some of the world's most unstable countries, were larger and more complex than in 1998, and deployed thousands of civilians. Based on trends in peacekeeping and recent UN planning options, GAO analysis indicates that a potential new operation would likely be large and complex, take place in sub-Saharan Africa, and have nine mandated tasks. This potential new operation would likely require member states to contribute 21,000 troops and military observers, including those in engineering and aviation units, and 1,500 police to carry out the mandate. The UN would likely need to deploy 4,000 to 5,000 civilians. The operation's logistics needs also would be large and complex. The ability to fully deploy any potential new operation would likely face challenges, in view of current UN resource constraints. As of September 2008, ongoing UN operations had about a 20 percent gap between troops and military observers authorized to carry out operations and actual deployments. For police, the gap was about 34 percent; it was similar for civilians. Some gaps reflect UN difficulties in obtaining and deploying resources to carry out operations. Lack of these resources, such as special military units, prevented some operations from executing mandates. Lack of infrastructure in the potential new operation's environment would challenge the UN to provide logistical needs.
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Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
December 2008:
United Nations Peacekeeping:
Challenges Obtaining Needed Resources Could Limit Further Large
Deployments and Should Be Addressed in U.S. Reports to Congress:
GAO-09-142:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-142, a report to the Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The United Nations (UN) supports U.S. interests in maintaining
international security by deploying and operating 16 peacekeeping
operations in locations in conflict, including Darfur, Lebanon, and
Haiti. Over the past 10 years, the number of deployed UN personnel
increased from about 41,000 peacekeepers and civilian staff to about
109,000 in 2008. In this report on the UN‘s capacity to deploy further
operations, GAO was asked to examine (1) the evolution of UN
peacekeeping operations in the past 10 years; (2) the likely
characteristics of a potential new peacekeeping operation, given this
evolution; (3) the challenges, if any, the UN would face deploying this
operation; and (4) U.S. efforts to support and report on UN
peacekeeping. GAO reviewed UN documents, developed a methodology to
assess the requirements for a potential new operation with UN
assistance, interviewed UN headquarters and mission officials, and
assessed U.S. government documents on UN peacekeeping.
What GAO Found:
UN peacekeeping operations since 1998 have taken on increasingly
ambitious mandates, been located in more challenging environments, and
grown in size and scope. UN operations in 1998 averaged three mandated
tasks, such as observing cease-fires; in 2008, they averaged nine more
ambitious tasks, such as restoring government institutions. Operations
in 2008 were located in some of the world‘s most unstable countries,
were larger and more complex than in 1998, and deployed thousands of
civilians.
Based on trends in peacekeeping and recent UN planning options, GAO
analysis indicates that a potential new operation would likely be large
and complex, take place in sub-Saharan Africa, and have nine mandated
tasks. This potential new operation would likely require member states
to contribute 21,000 troops and military observers, including those in
engineering and aviation units, and 1,500 police to carry out the
mandate. The UN would likely need to deploy 4,000 to 5,000 civilians.
The operation‘s logistics needs also would be large and complex.
The ability to fully deploy any potential new operation would likely
face challenges, in view of current UN resource constraints. As of
September 2008, ongoing UN operations had about a 20 percent gap
between troops and military observers authorized to carry out
operations and actual deployments. For police, the gap was about 34
percent; it was similar for civilians. (See figure.) Some gaps reflect
UN difficulties in obtaining and deploying resources to carry out
operations. Lack of these resources, such as special military units,
prevented some operations from executing mandates. Lack of
infrastructure in the potential new operation‘s environment would
challenge the UN to provide logistical needs.
Figure: UN Peacekeeping Force Levels for Troops, Civilians, and Police
in 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure contains three pie-charts depicting the following
information:
UN Peacekeeping Force Levels for Troops, Civilians, and Police in 2008:
Troops and military observers:
Deployed: 77,000;
Gap between authorized and deployed: 18,000.
Police:
Deployed: 11,500;
Gap between authorized and deployed: 6,000.
Civilians:
Deployed: 19,600;
Gap between authorized and deployed: 8,000.
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
[End of figure]
The U.S. government has helped train and make available over 40,000
troops and police through the Global Peace Operations Initiative. The
President is required to report to Congress on UN peacekeeping
operations‘ status and effectiveness. State provides some of this
information through its monthly briefings to Congress. However, in its
notifications and annual peacekeeping reports to Congress, State has
not provided information about UN troop and other resource
gaps”important elements of status and effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends:
To ensure Congress has the information needed to consider U.S. budget
and other requests for peacekeeping, GAO recommends that the Department
of State (State) include in its reporting to Congress information about
UN challenges and gaps in obtaining resources needed to carry out
peacekeeping. In response to State‘s comment that GAO should not
specify the reports in which this information should be provided, GAO
modified the recommendation. The UN concurred with the conclusions of
the report.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-142]. For more
information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or
christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
UN Peacekeeping Operations Have Evolved into Large, Complex Operations
Concentrated in Less Developed Countries:
A Potential New UN Operation Would Likely Require Significant
Resources:
The UN Would Likely Face Difficulty in Obtaining Troops, Police,
Civilians, and Logistics Needed for the Potential New Operation:
The United States Has Provided Assistance to UN Peacekeeping, but
Reporting to Congress Provides Limited Information about Gaps between
Authorized and Deployed Force Levels:
Conclusion:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Methodology for Identifying Potential New Peacekeeping
Operation Requirements:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix IV: Comments from the United Nations:
Appendix V: Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Operations, as of September 2008:
Appendix VI: Military Capabilities Required by UN Peacekeeping
Operations, as of November 2008:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Key Characteristics of UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1998 and
2008:
Table 2: Force Requirements for a Potential New UN Peacekeeping
Operation:
Table 3: UN Operations Launched since 1998 and the UN Planning
Scenario/Potential New Operation:
Table 4: UN Planning Scenario and GAO Estimate of Potential New
Operation:
Table 5: Current UN Peacekeeping Operations as of September 30, 2008:
Table 6: Deployed Operational and Support Units by Peacekeeping
Operation in November 2008:
Figures:
Figure 1: Location of UN Peacekeeping Operations, as of September 2008:
Figure 2: U.S. Payments for UN Peacekeeping, 1998-2008:
Figure 3: UN Peacekeeping Personnel Authorized and Deployed in 2008:
Abbreviations:
AU: African Union:
DFS: Department of Field Support:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DPKO: Department of Peacekeeping Operations:
FPU: formed police unit:
G8: Group of Eight:
GPOI: Global Peace Operations Initiative:
HDI: Human Development Index:
IDP: internally displaced person:
MONUC: UN Operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo:
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization:
UK: United Kingdom:
UN: United Nations:
UNDP: United Nations Development Program:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 18, 2008:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
As of September 2008, the United Nations (UN) supported U.S. interests
in maintaining international security by deploying and operating 16
peacekeeping operations in locations experiencing conflict, including
Darfur (in western Sudan), Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
and Haiti. The United States pays about 26 percent of the total UN
peacekeeping budget--about $1.8 billion for the 2009 peacekeeping
fiscal year (July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2009). Over the past 10 years,
the demand for UN operations has grown, with the UN initiating or
strengthening 17 peacekeeping operations and increasing the number of
deployed UN personnel from about 41,000 uniformed peacekeepers and
civilian staff in 2000 to about 109,000 in 2008.[Footnote 1] The UN
currently deploys more than 88,000 uniformed peacekeepers, with only
the U.S. military deploying a larger number of troops to provide
international security. The demand for greater UN peacekeeping efforts
is likely to grow in 2009 as the UN Security Council considers
additional or expanded operations in Somalia and Chad and the Central
African Republic that will require thousands more troops and police.
Given the growing demand for UN peacekeeping, you requested that we
examine how peacekeeping operations have changed over the past 10 years
and the UN's capacity to deploy new operations. Specifically, in this
report, we examine (1) the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations in
the past 10 years; (2) the characteristics of a potential new
peacekeeping operation, given this evolution and UN planning scenarios;
(3) the challenges, if any, the UN would face in deploying this
potential new operation; and (4) U.S. efforts to support and report on
UN peacekeeping.
To examine the evolution of UN peacekeeping over the past 10 years, we
reviewed UN performance reports on and evaluations of peacekeeping
operations and detailed planning and resource specifications for
operations. To address the issue of capacity, we developed detailed
requirements for a potential new operation based on our analysis of the
trends in peacekeeping combined with force planning details derived
from comparable UN planning scenarios for possible real world
operations. Our analysis is not intended to predict the size, scope, or
location of a new UN peacekeeping operation. The UN Security Council
decides whether to deploy an operation. A new operation's mandate and
resource needs would be determined by the Security Council and the
circumstances particular to the country to which it is deployed. We
analyzed possible challenges to the UN's ability to fulfill these
potential requirements based on UN reports and analysis, as well as
discussions, including a roundtable, with UN officials from the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Department of Field
Support (DFS), Department of Political Affairs, and Department of
Management. We evaluated the differences between deployed versus
authorized levels of personnel and other resources. The authorized
levels are approved by the UN Security Council and reflect the
resources it agrees are necessary to carry out the operations'
mandates. We then examined Secretary General reports for indications
that any gaps between deployed and authorized levels affected
operations and thus represented unmet needs. Finally, we conducted
interviews with UN officials in New York and in the field for four
peacekeeping operations of significant interest to the United States.
We discussed the performance of their operations and their challenges.
In Washington, D.C., we met with officials from the Departments of
State (State) and Defense (DOD) on their efforts to address UN
challenges to conducting operations. We also reviewed State Department
notifications to Congress about peacekeeping operations and the 2006
and 2007 annual reports on peacekeeping. Appendix I provides a more
detailed description of our objectives, scope, and methodology.
Appendix II provides our methodology for the potential new peacekeeping
operation's requirements.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 to December
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
Since 1998, UN peacekeeping operations have taken on increasingly
ambitious mandates, taken place in more challenging environments, and
grown in size and scope. In 1998, UN operations had an average of three
mandated tasks largely associated with traditional peacekeeping
activities, such as monitoring cease-fire agreements. Operations begun
since 1998 have had an average of nine mandated tasks focusing on more
ambitious efforts, such as reforming judicial systems and restoring
government institutions. UN operations are also taking place in
volatile, less developed countries. The UN deployed more than two-
thirds of its peacekeeping personnel to sub-Saharan Africa as of
September 2008. Most of the UN operations are located in some of the
most politically unstable countries, as measured by the World Bank. The
operations have become larger, more complex, and more resource
intensive. In June 1998, the UN's 16 peacekeeping operations fielded
about 14,600 uniformed peacekeepers. The UN had the same number of
operations in September 2008, but it fielded more than 88,000 troops,
military observers and police. These operations also deploy thousands
of civilians in a wide range of specialties and large logistics
operations.
As a way to assess UN capacity, we developed the parameters of a
potential new peacekeeping operation to illustrate the resources the UN
would need to deploy a possible new operation. GAO analysis of the
evolution of peacekeeping operations and UN planning scenarios for a
new operation indicates that this operation likely would be large and
complex and take place in sub-Saharan Africa. Reflecting the trend
toward more ambitious mandates, this potential new mission would likely
have nine mandated tasks, including restoration of the rule of law and
government, election support, and protection of internally displaced
persons. To carry out the mandate, the potential operation would
require an estimated 21,000 troops and military observers, including 15
infantry battalions in five sectors with engineering, logistics, and
combat and utility helicopter units. Key factors determining the force
size for the potential new operation include the expected security
threat, the size and condition of the population requiring UN
assistance and protection, and the nature and extent of the terrain
patrolled by the force. The force would also require 1,500 police,
about half of whom would be fielded in five formed police units.
[Footnote 2] UN planning scenarios did not assess civilian staffing
needs or contain the details necessary to assess or estimate the costs
of logistics requirements. However, we estimated that on the basis of
interviews with UN officials and analysis of UN planning templates, an
operation of this size and scope would require 4,000 to 5,000 civilian
staff, about 20 to 30 percent of whom would be international staff. UN
officials stated that total logistical needs would likely be comparable
to those of other large, complex operations in similar environments,
such as the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
The UN would likely face difficulty in obtaining the troops,
specialized military units, police, and civilians it would need to
deploy the potential new operation. Some contributing countries are
unwilling to provide forces for operations facing particular political,
security, and environmental conditions. Moreover, only a limited number
of countries provide full battalions of troops or specialized units
with critical capabilities such as engineering or logistics support.
These challenges confront some existing operations. As of September
2008, forces for existing UN operations were about 18,000 troops and
military observers, or about 20 percent, below the authorized level of
approximately 95,000. State and UN officials and reports indicated that
member states had committed to fill some of the requirements,
particularly for the operation in Darfur, but as of November 2008, the
troops were not in place nor was it known when they all would be. UN
officials and reports also note that the lack of needed troops, police,
and civilians has hindered some operations from executing their
mandates. Some peacekeeping operations did not have all needed
specialized military units, such as logistics, helicopters, and ground
transport. The gap in deployed police from authorized levels was about
34 percent. In particular, capable formed police units are difficult to
obtain because they require special training and skills. The vacancy
rate for international civilians at peacekeeping operations between
2005 and 2008 averaged about 22 percent. Even if the UN were to obtain
the needed personnel for the potential new mission, it would face the
logistics challenges confronted by other large operations in sub-
Saharan Africa.
The U.S. government, along with the governments of other countries, has
taken some steps to help address UN challenges in obtaining troops and
police for peacekeeping operations, primarily through the Global Peace
Operations Initiative (GPOI).[Footnote 3] This initiative intends to
expand worldwide capacity to support peacekeeping by training and
equipping member states' troops and police for peacekeeping. In June
2008, we reported that GPOI had provided training and material
assistance to about 40,000 peacekeeping troops, of which about 22,000
have been deployed to peacekeeping operations. The United States
generally supports UN proposals to address the chronic civilian vacancy
rates, such as developing a standing UN corps of civilians from several
countries (international civilians) to deploy to peacekeeping
operations. As of September 2008, these proposals were being reviewed
by the UN. The United States has also provided logistics support to
specific UN operations. The President is required to report to Congress
on the status and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, and State
provides some of this information through its monthly briefings to
Congress. However, in its notifications and annual peacekeeping reports
to Congress, State has not provided information about troop and other
resource gaps--important elements of status and effectiveness.
To ensure that Congress has the information needed to conduct oversight
and fully consider Administration budget and other requests for UN
peacekeeping, we are recommending that the Department of State include
in its annual report or in another appropriate written submission to
Congress information about UN resource challenges and gaps in obtaining
and deploying troops, police, and civilians authorized to carry out
peacekeeping operations. The information should include commitments to
provide these resources, difficulties in obtaining them, and whether
the gaps have impeded operations from carrying out their mandates. If
the information is not available when an appropriate written submission
is sent to Congress, we recommend that State ensure the information is
provided, as available, during its consultations with Congress.
The Department of State and the UN provided written comments on a draft
of this report, which are reprinted in appendices III and IV. State
commented that the report reflects a very thorough inquiry into the
increase in and developing nature of international expectations of
United Nations peacekeeping. In commenting on our draft recommendation,
State said the recommendation should not specify in which reports to
Congress the information on peacekeeping gaps should be included. We
had originally recommended that State provide the information in annual
reports to Congress and Congressional notifications. We agree that this
is too prescriptive but believe the information should be provided in
writing; therefore, we modified our recommendation so as to allow the
information to be provided in appropriate written submissions to
Congress. The UN commented that it fully concurred with the conclusions
of our report and appreciated recognition that UN peacekeeping
operations should be properly resourced and that mandates should be
aligned with said resources. State and the UN also provided technical
and general comments which we address in the report as appropriate.
Background:
The 1945 Charter of the United Nations gives the UN Security Council
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security. UN peacekeeping operations have traditionally been associated
with Chapter VI of the charter, which outlines provisions for the
peaceful settlement of disputes. However, in recent years, the Security
Council has increasingly used Chapter VII to authorize the deployment
of peacekeeping operations into volatile environments where the
government of the host country is unable to maintain security and
public order.[Footnote 4] Chapter VII allows the peacekeepers to take
military and nonmilitary action to maintain or restore international
peace and security. Chapter VIII authorizes regional organizations,
such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the African
Union (AU), to resolve disputes prior to intervention by the UN
Security Council, so long as the activities of the regional
organizations are consistent with UN principles.
In this report, we differentiate between traditional and
multidimensional mandates for peacekeeping operations. Traditional
operations generally monitor or supervise cease-fire and other peace
agreements between formerly warring parties. Their tasks can include
monitoring of border demarcation, exchange of prisoners, and
demobilization efforts. Multidimensional operations tend to go beyond
traditional peace monitoring tasks by attempting to restore or create
conditions more conducive to a lasting peace. On two occasions since
1998, the UN Security Council granted multidimensional operations the
executive authority to direct and carry out the construction or
reconstruction of political, legal, and economic institutions in Timor
L'este and Kosovo. Multidimensional mandates generally include one or
more of the following tasks in their mandates:
* Monitoring, supervising, training, or reconstructing police forces
and otherwise supporting efforts to restore rule of law;
* monitoring, assisting, or instituting efforts to improve human
rights;
* supporting, facilitating, coordinating, or safeguarding humanitarian
relief operations or deliveries;
* restoring government institutions;
* monitoring, supporting, coordinating, or safeguarding assistance
provided to help refugees or internally displaced persons return home
and reintegrate into the society of the affected country or region;
and:
* conducting, supporting, or coordinating elections and other democracy-
building efforts.
In general, the United States has supported the expansion of UN
peacekeeping operations as a useful, cost-effective way to influence
situations affecting U.S. national interests without direct U.S.
intervention. For example, in 2006, the United States voted for UN
operations to ensure that Southern Lebanon was not used for hostile
activities; to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule
of law and public safety in Haiti; and to contribute to the protection
of civilian populations and facilitate humanitarian activities in
Darfur. These operations support U.S. national interests by carrying
out mandates to help stabilize regions and promote international peace.
The UN manages 16 peacekeeping operations worldwide as of September
2008, 6 of them in sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 1 shows the location of
UN peacekeeping operations as of September 2008.
Figure 1: Location of UN Peacekeeping Operations, as of September 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the world, depicting the following locations of
UN Peacekeeping Operations, as of September 2008:
Central African Republic and Chad;
Côte d'Ivoire;
Cyprus;
Democratic Republic of Congo;
Georgia;
Golan Heights (Syria, Israel);
Haiti;
Kosovo;
Liberia;
Palestine (Middle East);
Southern Lebanon;
State of Jammu and Kashmir (Pakistan);
Sudan (Darfur);
Sudan (Southern);
Timor L'este;
Western Sahara.
Source: GAO analysis of UN data; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
The United States contributes the greatest share of funding for
peacekeeping operations. All permanent members of the Security Council-
-China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States--are
charged a premium above their assessment rate for the regular budget
(22 percent for the United States). For the 2008-2009 UN peacekeeping
budget year, the UN assessed the United States about $2 billion
according to a State official, or about 26 percent of the total UN
peacekeeping budget. This represents an increase of over 700 percent in
the budget since 1998 (see figure 2).
Figure 2: U.S. Payments for UN Peacekeeping, 1998-2008:
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
U.S. Payments for UN Peacekeeping, 1998-2008:
Calendar year: 1998;
Payment: $246,000,000.
Calendar year: 1999;
Payment: $237,400,000.
Calendar year: 2000;
Payment: $518,600,000.
Calendar year: 2001;
Payment: $1,328,500,000.
Calendar year: 2002;
Payment: $794,200,000.
Calendar year: 2003;
Payment: $651,600,000.
Calendar year: 2004;
Payment: $1,160,400,000
Calendar year: 2005;
Payment: $1,161,300,000
Calendar year: 2006;
Payment: $1,118,400,000.
Calendar year: 2007[A];
Payment: $1,500,000,000
Calendar year: 2008[A];
Payment: $1,350,000,000.
[A] Estimated: 2008 data as of September 2008.
[End of figure]
The U.S. government also makes significant voluntary contributions in
support of countries providing UN peacekeeping forces. For example,
State obligated about $110 million in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 funds
for countries providing forces for the UN operation in Darfur. In
addition, the United States had provided 308 troops, police, and
military observers to six UN peacekeeping operations as of September
30, 2008. The extent and nature of U.S. support for UN peacekeeping is
largely contained in Section 10 of the UN Participation Act of 1945.
For example, it limits total U.S. contributions to 1,000 troops at any
one time.[Footnote 5] It also limits the U.S. government to providing
free of charge to the UN no more than $3 million worth of items or
services--such as supplies, transportation assistance, or equipment--
to each operation per year.[Footnote 6]
UN guidelines call for DPKO to undertake planning and predeployment
tasks before the approval of a UN Security Council mandate authorizing
an operation. These include drawing up operations plans to address the
expected mandate, estimated sector responsibilities, and force
requirements. DPKO also assesses the availability of forces from
potential contributors and then validates the estimates through visits
of UN military and police officials to the host country and to troop
and police contributing countries to assess unit readiness and
availability. The Secretary General then issues a report on
establishing the mission, including its size and resources. On the
basis of the report, the Security Council may then pass a resolution
authorizing the operation's mandate and number of troops and police.
According to U.S. officials, this is the maximum level allowed.
Although the Security Council may authorize the mission's mandate, its
full budget must still be prepared and approved. In this process, the
UN Department of Field Support prepares a draft budget and the UN
Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions reviews
it. According to the UN, considerable scrutiny of the proposed budget
occurs during this process and there is debate among member states that
pay the bulk of costs of the operation and the top troop contributors.
The General Assembly then approves the budget for the amount agreed
upon.
UN guidelines note that the lead time required to deploy a mission
depends on a number of factors, particularly the will of member states
to contribute troops and police to a particular operation and the
availability of financial and other resources due to long procurement
lead times. For missions with highly complex mandates or difficult
logistics, or where peacekeepers face significant security risk, it may
take several weeks or even months to assemble and deploy the necessary
elements. The UN has set a 90-day target for deploying the first
elements of a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation endorsed by
the UN Security Council.[Footnote 7]
Over the past decade, the UN has undertaken a number of assessments and
initiatives to improve its peacekeeping organization, doctrine,
planning, logistics and conditions of service for peacekeeping staff,
as well as its efforts to establish a capacity to rapidly deploy
peacekeepers. For example, the 2000 report of the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations, or Brahimi report, made recommendations to
the Secretary General to improve the strategic direction, planning,
organization, and conduct of peace operations. In response, the UN
consolidated all peacekeeping responsibilities into DPKO, substantially
increased its staff, and took steps to improve and integrate mission
planning. Moreover, the Secretary General's 2001 No Exit Without a
Strategy noted that missions' mandates should include elements such as
institution building and the promotion of good governance and the rule
of law to facilitate sustainable peace. The Peace Operations 2010
initiative announced by the Secretary General in 2006 focused on
further reforms in the area of personnel, doctrine, partnerships,
resources and organization. As a result, the UN took steps to
strengthen its capacity to direct and support peacekeeping operations
that included splitting DPKO into two departments in 2007 by creating
the separate Department of Field Support; establishing integrated
operations teams to integrate the daily direction and support of
peacekeeping operations; and, in 2008, issuing a consolidated statement
of peacekeeping operations, principles, and guidelines and a field
guide to assist senior staff address critical mission startup tasks and
challenges. GAO has reviewed the status of a number of UN reform
initiatives, most recently the UN's efforts to clarify lines of
authority for field procurement between DPKO and DFS.[Footnote 8]
UN Peacekeeping Operations Have Evolved into Large, Complex Operations
Concentrated in Less Developed Countries:
Since 1998, UN peacekeeping operations have taken on more complex and
ambitious mandates, taken place in increasingly challenging
environments, and grown in size and scope.[Footnote 9] As shown in
table 1, the operations have more mandated tasks and are increasingly
authorized under Chapter VII of the UN charter to use all means
necessary to carry out the mandate. The locations of the operations
also are in less developed areas, as measured by the UN's index of
health, economic, and education levels, and the operations are deployed
in some of the most politically unstable countries in the world.
Finally, current operations with multidimensional mandates have an
average of nearly 9 times as many troops, observers, and police as
those in 1998, and more than 13 times as many civilian staff. Appendix
V provides details on current UN peacekeeping operations. Appendix VI
provides details on the military capabilities of UN peacekeeping
operations as of November 2008.
Table 1: Key Characteristics of UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1998 and
2008:
Key characteristics: Total ongoing operations;
1998: 16;
2008: 16.
Key characteristics: Operations with multidimensional mandates;
1998: 6;
2008: 11.
Key characteristics: Average number of mandated tasks;
1998: 3;
2008: 9.
Key characteristics: Chapter VII operations;
1998: 4;
2008: 9.
Key characteristics: Average Human Development Index rating of host
countries in preceding decade[A];
1998: Medium development level;
2008: Low development level.
Key characteristics: Missions in sub-Saharan Africa (as percentage of
total operations);
1998: 2 (13%);
2008: 6 (38%).
Key characteristics: Total troops, observers and police;
1998: 14,570 (June);
2008: 88,415 (September).
Key characteristics: Troops and military observers only;
1998: 11,586;
2008: 76,900.
Key characteristics: Deployed police;
1998: 2,984;
2008: 11,515.
Key characteristics: Average number of troops, observers and police per
multidimensional mission;
1998: 875;
2008: 7829.
Key characteristics: Operations with formed police units (number of
personnel deployed);
1998: 0;
2008: 7 (4,365).
Key characteristics: Civilians (per multidimensional mission);
1998: 125[B];
2008: 445[C].
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
[A] The Human Development Index is a measure of human development
dating back to 1990. It is an average of three measures on an index
from 0 to 1: standard of living, as measured through a country's gross
domestic product; knowledge, as measured through education levels and
adult literacy; and health and longevity, as measured through life
expectancy. Peacekeeping operations initiated between 1990 and 1998
were located in countries with a Human Development Index score in the
medium development category as of 1995. The operations initiated since
then in sub-Saharan countries have an average score in the low
development category as of 2005.
[B] This number is based on 2000 data, as complete UN civilian data by
operation was not made available for earlier periods.
[C] This number is based on data as of June 2008. This average rises to
1,708 if national staff and UN volunteer staff are included.
[End of table]
UN Peacekeeping Mandates Are Becoming More Complex:
Since 1998, the United Nations has undertaken operations with broader
and more complex mandates than before. The 16 operations in 1998 had
mandates averaging three tasks or objectives each. The mandates of 10
of these operations were limited to such traditional peacekeeping tasks
as monitoring cease-fire agreements and boundaries between formerly
warring parties. The other 6 operations had a small number of tasks,
which went beyond traditional peace monitoring by calling for the
restoration or creation of conditions more conducive to a lasting
peace.[Footnote 10]
In September 2008, the UN also had 16 ongoing peacekeeping operations,
but 11 had multidimensional mandates with political, security, social,
and humanitarian objectives. Also, 15 of the 17 UN Peacekeeping
Operations begun or augmented since 1998 were multidimensional
missions. According to the November 2000 report by the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations, the mandated tasks of these operations
reflected the more comprehensive approach to restoring security the UN
had adopted as part of its ongoing efforts to improve the strategic
direction and conduct of peace operations. This report noted that the
effective protection of civilians and assistance in postconflict
environments requires a coordinated strategy that goes beyond the
political or military aspects of a conflict if the operation is to
achieve a sustainable peace. [Footnote 11] We reported that since 1999
the UN has increasingly focused on a more comprehensive approach to
making a transition from peacekeeping to a sustainable peace.[Footnote
12] Reflecting this trend, our analysis of the 17 UN operations since
1998 shows that operations averaged nine mandated tasks, with the most
frequent tasks calling for the UN to:
* monitor a peace or cease-fire agreement,
* use all means necessary to carry out the mandate (Chapter VII),
* help restore civil order with police support,
* train and develop the police force,
* support development of the rule of law,
* restore government institutions,
* support elections,
* ensure human rights/women's rights and protection, and:
* support humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons.
Moreover, since 2006, the UN Security Council has mandated that
peacekeeping operations include a responsibility to protect civilians
from "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity," with force if necessary, when national authorities fail in
this task.
More Recent Operations Have Been Deployed in Less Developed
Environments with Volatile Security Situations:
According to UN documents and officials, peacekeeping operations
initiated after 1998 were deployed in less secure and more volatile
postconflict situations. Since then, the Security Council has
frequently deployed new operations into areas where the government of
the host country was unable to maintain security and public order. For
example, most of the UN operations ongoing as of September 2008 were
deployed in locations that had among the highest levels of instability
as measured by the World Bank's index of political instability.
[Footnote 13] Moreover, the Security Council has increasingly
authorized peacekeepers to take all steps necessary to carry out their
mandate, including the use of force, under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. In 1998, four UN missions operated under Chapter VII
authority; in 2008, nine operated under explicit Chapter VII authority.
UN operations currently are also being conducted in countries that are
relatively less developed on average than the countries in which they
were deployed a decade ago. This has increased the level of effort and
resources needed to sustain peacekeeping operations, according to UN
officials. In 1998, the average UN peacekeeping operation was deployed
to a country with aggregate levels of knowledge, standard of living,
and life expectancy that placed them in the medium category of
development, as measured by the United Nations Development Program's
(UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI). Ten of the 17 operations
initiated since 1998 were deployed to sub-Saharan Africa, of which 7
were in countries falling within the HDI's lowest category of human
development. As of September 2008, about 78,000, or 72 percent of the
UN's uniformed and civilian peacekeepers were in sub-Saharan Africa.
UN Operations Require Larger Commitments of Specialized Forces,
Civilians, and Logistics:
As peacekeeping operations have taken on more ambitious mandates in
challenging environments, the operations have become larger and more
complex, with expanded troop deployments and sophisticated
capabilities. Seven of the 11 ongoing multidimensional UN operations in
2008 had deployed from 7,000 to over 17,000 troops. [Footnote 14] In
1998, multidimensional operations averaged fewer than 1,000 troops and
military observers. UN troops also are being deployed in larger and
more capable units, according to UN officials. As of November 2008, the
UN had approximately 76 battalion-sized infantry units deployed,
including 21 mechanized infantry battalions.[Footnote 15] Most recent
operations require major troop-contributing countries to deploy at
least one 800-person infantry battalion with armored vehicles and
supported by its own engineer and logistics units. A March 2008 UN
report noted that the UN's peacekeeping deployments included over 5,000
engineers, 24,000 vehicles, and 200 aircraft. Appendix VI provides more
information on the military capabilities required by ongoing
multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations as of November 2008.
The UN also has deployed more police to peacekeeping operations over
the past 10 years. In June 1998, the UN deployed 2,984 police, compared
with 11,515 police deployed as of September 2008. The UN also has come
to rely more heavily on formed police units (FPU), armed units of
approximately 125 to 140 officers trained in crowd control and other
specialized tasks and equipped with armored personnel carriers. These
units, which are deployed to UN operations as cohesive units by
contributing countries, were first utilized in small numbers in 2003
but now compose about 40 percent of all UN police deployed. FPUs are
intended to perform three main functions--protection of UN facilities
and personnel, provision of security support to national law
enforcement agencies, and national police capacity building--and the
increase in their use reflects the trend toward operations with more
complex mandates taking place in less secure situations. In contrast,
UN police are individually selected and deployed by the UN to monitor
host nation police activities or supervise local police training.
The increasingly large and complex operations also require larger
civilian staffs with a diverse range of skill sets to execute the
mandate and coordinate with other UN and international organizations.
In 2000, the average multidimensional operation deployed about 125
international civilian staff; in 2008, the average rose to 445
international civilian staff. A global survey of international
peacekeeping reported that as of October 2007, international UN
civilian staff deployed on UN peacekeeping operations worked in 22
occupational groups, including administration, aviation, engineering,
rule of law, security, and transportation.[Footnote 16]
The task of sustaining and supplying operations launched since 1998 has
grown increasingly complicated due to their larger size and deployment
in less developed and more unstable environments. Under these
circumstances, units need more equipment, use it more intensively,
consume more fuel, and require more maintenance due to increased wear
and tear. According to a senior UN official, such operations must bring
in more international staff because skilled local personnel are scarce.
They also must bring in more of their own food and water, and build
their own roads, buildings, and accommodations from the ground up and
then maintain them. The United Nations Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) is an example of an operation
that is heavily dependent upon aircraft to move and supply forces over
a large area because the country lacks adequate roads. According to a
July 2006 UN report, MONUC required 105 aircraft, distributed among 60
airports; maintenance of 150 landing sites; and aviation support staff
of 1,600. This effort consumed 21 percent of MONUC's total 2007-2008
budget, compared with an average of 11 percent for all UN peacekeeping
operations.[Footnote 17]
A Potential New UN Operation Would Likely Require Significant
Resources:
As a way to assess UN capacity, we developed a potential new
peacekeeping operation to illustrate the detailed and likely resources
the UN would need to deploy a new operation. Based on our analysis of
the evolution of peacekeeping operations and UN planning scenarios,
this operation would likely be large and complex and take place in sub-
Saharan Africa. The potential new operation would be consistent with
the mandates of the 17 operations launched since June 1998 and have
nine security, political, and humanitarian tasks. Based on the most
appropriate UN planning scenario, the potential new operation would
likely require 21,000 troops and military observers and 1,500 police.
We estimate that this operation would require 4,000 to 5,000 civilian
staff, and UN officials noted that it would have logistical needs
comparable to those of other large, complex operations in similar
environments. Like other peacekeeping operations located in sub-Saharan
Africa, the potential new mission likely would confront limited roads,
other infrastructure, and water, thereby requiring greater logistical
planning and support. Furthermore, according to the UN, in the majority
of post-conflict scenarios, mine clearance is necessary to begin
rehabilitating roads and other infrastructure. Our analysis is not
intended to predict the size, scope, or location of a new UN
peacekeeping operation. A new operation's mandate and resource needs
would be determined by the UN Security Council and the circumstances
particular to the country to which the operation is deployed.
Therefore, the requirements of a new operation could differ from those
of the potential new operation presented here.
A Potential New UN Operation Would Likely Have a Multidimensional
Mandate and Be Located in Sub-Saharan Africa:
The potential new operation would likely have a multidimensional
mandate, with nine tasks related to security, political, and
humanitarian efforts. The operation could be mandated to provide a
secure environment, protect civilians and UN staff, monitor a cease-
fire or peace agreement, and promote reconciliation. Political tasks
could include supporting elections; helping establish rule of law and
assisting in the reform of military, police, and corrections systems;
and assisting in disarmament and demobilization of combatants.
Humanitarian tasks could include monitoring human rights and developing
the capability of the government. To derive these tasks for a potential
new operation, we reviewed UN planning scenarios for a new operation in
sub-Saharan Africa and selected the scenario that best matched our
trend analysis of the 17 UN operations initiated or augmented since
June 1998.
The potential new operation likely would be located in sub-Saharan
Africa because 10 of the 17 operations started or expanded since 1998
were deployed to the region. Like the areas of other peacekeeping
operations in sub-Saharan Africa, the potential new mission's area of
operations would have limited infrastructure and utilities, lacking
roads, buildings, and water, and would thus require increased
logistical planning. Using the assumptions contained in the selected UN
planning scenario, the potential new operation would be in a high-
threat environment, political factions would recently have been
fighting for control of the country, and there would be large numbers
of internally displaced persons. As a precondition for deployment of
the potential new operation, the UN would likely secure political and
security agreements among the parties to the conflict and a clear
statement of support from the host country for the deployment of a UN
peacekeeping operation.
The Potential New UN Operation Would Likely Require Significant
Military Forces to Execute Its Mandate:
To accomplish the political, security, and humanitarian tasks in the
mandate, the potential new operation would require 21,000 troops and
observers distributed among five sectors. Both combat capable and
supporting units would be required, including troops with armored
personnel carriers, engineers, truck transport companies, and medical,
aviation, and logistics units. The force size would be derived from a
threat assessment that would determine how the UN troops could ensure a
safe and secure operating environment while protecting civilians and UN
staff. According to UN planners, a potential new force would likely
require units with the capability to deter threats from armed factions
supported by international terrorist groups, which previous operations
did not have to take into account to the same degree. The force would
need special troops to detect and defeat the threat of improvised
explosive devices and would need significant intelligence resources.
The operation would be mandated to provide area security for an
estimated 1.5 million internally displaced persons (IDP). Table 2
presents the composition of a potential new peacekeeping operation.
Table 2: Force Requirements for a Potential New UN Peacekeeping
Operation:
Operational units:
* Sector One: 2 battalions;
* Sector Two: 2 battalions;
* Sector Three: 2 battalions;
* Sector Four: 2 battalions;
* Sector Five: 6 battalions;
* Force Reserve: 1 mechanized battalion.
Aviation element:
* 24 utility/transport helicopters;
* 12 attack helicopters.
Enabling units:
* Multipurpose logistics units: 1 unit per sector with 200 personnel
each;
* Military engineers: 5 to 6 companies;
* Military transport: 5 medium companies and 1 heavy truck company;
* Airport and port units;
* Hospital (possibly ship-based).
[End of table]
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
The force's operational units (14 infantry battalions and 1 mechanized
battalion) would be distributed among five sectors. [Footnote 18] Each
sector would contain all the civilian and uniformed components
necessary to carry out the mandated tasks. Four of the sectors would
require two battalions each. The infantry battalions in these sectors
would be deployed in mobile company-sized groups to provide wide
coverage by patrolling, establishing checkpoints, and enforcing buffer
zones and demilitarized areas. The plan envisions a larger force of
5infantry battalions for the fifth sector, encompassing the capital
city; these units would not require as many vehicles because much of
their patrolling would be done on foot in urban areas. This sector
would also maintain a mechanized battalion in reserve to serve as a
rapid reaction force.
The size of the helicopter force would be based on the need to provide
aerial observation and firepower support 24 hours per day, 7 days per
week, for all sectors, as well as the capability to transport infantry
battalions and conduct search and rescue operations as needed. Many of
the operational units would need to come from countries capable of
providing supplies for the first 60 days after deployment, given the
limitations of local infrastructure expected in this environment. The
force would require five specialized logistics units to provide a
number of base camp service and supply functions, five to six
engineering companies, and four airfield support units to assist
aviation operations.
Initially, Police Units Would Likely Be Limited to Confidence-Building
Tasks:
According to a UN planning scenario and UN officials, the potential new
operation would likely require 1,500 police, including 700 officers in
five FPUs. The police units will eventually assist with the
reactivation of the potential new country's police force; provide
mentoring, skills training, and professional development assistance;
advise on police reform and restructuring; and support capacity
building and police oversight. However, as with the operation in
Darfur, a large police force with a high profile would likely be needed
to build confidence among the population. Furthermore, as in other UN
operations, police officers must speak the official language (English),
know how to operate four-wheel drive vehicles, and have about 5 years
of police service and a background in country development activities.
Civilian Staff with a Strong International Presence Would Be Needed:
We estimated that the potential new operation would require 4,000 to
5,000 civilian staff, based on discussions with UN officials and
analysis of UN planning documents. International staff of other complex
UN operations ongoing in sub-Saharan Africa constitute between 20 and
30 percent of total civilian staff. According to UN officials,
operations initially have a higher percentage of international staff. A
more precise estimate of the number of civilians needed for the
potential new operation would require detailed information, such as
information about the skills available in the local labor market. The
potential new operation's international civilian staff would likely
include the following:
* a special representative of the Secretary General;
* Assistant Secretary Generals, including the force commander;
* directors, including police commissioner, judicial affairs, political
affairs, and civil affairs;
* professional staff for legal affairs, rule of law, judicial affairs,
child protection, finance, and mission support functions (logistics and
administration, finance, budget, human resources and management,
procurement); and:
* a substantial allocation of field service officers to provide
technical/administrative support.
In addition to international staff, the potential new operation would
need national support staff and national professional officers.
Furthermore, according to UN estimates, between 20 and 25 percent of
the civilian force of the potential new operation could be needed to
provide security for its civilian staff and facilities in the expected
high-threat environment.
The Potential New Operation's Logistics Needs Would Likely Be
Comparable to Those of Other Recent Large Operations in Sub-Saharan
Africa:
UN officials could not provide an estimate of the logistical needs for
the potential new operation without detailed planning in the field that
precedes actual deployments. However, they stated that total logistical
needs would likely be comparable to those of other large, complex
operations, such as the operation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo or Darfur. For example, the potential new operation would likely
need to establish and sustain camps and other facilities; manage major
contracts for transport, food, fuel, water, and property and other
services; and plan and coordinate the use of engineering,
transportation, and other specialized assets provided by troop-
contributing countries. The potential new operation, as with other sub-
Saharan operations, would be dependent upon specialized military
support units to meet its logistics needs. The potential new force
would likely have to build roads, buildings, and other infrastructure
and would be heavily dependent on helicopters and other relatively
expensive aviation units for movement and supply. For example, as of
June 2008, the operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the
Congo) allocated 21 percent of its annual budget on air operations,
compared with a UN-wide average of 11 percent.
The UN Would Likely Face Difficulty in Obtaining Troops, Police,
Civilians, and Logistics Needed for the Potential New Operation:
The UN would likely face difficulty in obtaining troops, military
observers, police, and civilians for the potential new operation. As of
September 2008, the UN was about 18,000 troops and military observers
below the level of about 95,000 authorized for current operations. In
addition, several peacekeeping operations needed specialized military
units, such as units for logistics, helicopters, and transport. There
are a limited number of countries that provide troops and police with
needed capabilities to meet current needs, and some potential
contributors may be unwilling to provide forces for a new operation due
to such political factors as their own national interests and the
environmental and security situation in the host country. The UN also
has a large vacancy rate for international civilians, and the UN is
considering proposals to address the difficulty of obtaining and
retaining international civilian staff. Figure 3 illustrates the
authorized and deployed levels of troops, police, and civilians.
Moreover, the UN would likely face the logistics challenges that have
confronted other large UN operations in sub-Saharan Africa. UN
officials and performance reports note that the difficulty of obtaining
needed personnel and other resources has had an impact on the ability
of ongoing operations to fully execute their mandates.
Figure 3: UN Peacekeeping Personnel Authorized and Deployed in 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image]
UN Peacekeeping Force Levels for Troops, Civilians, and Police in 2008:
Troops and military observers:
Deployed: 77,000;
Gap between authorized and deployed: 18,000.
Police:
Deployed: 11,500;
Gap between authorized and deployed: 6,000.
Civilians:
Deployed: 19,600;
Gap between authorized and deployed: 8,000.
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
[End of figure]
The UN Faces Challenges in Obtaining Needed Military Units:
As of September 2008, about 77,000 troops and military observers were
deployed to existing UN peacekeeping operations, an overall gap of
18,000, or about 20 percent, below the authorized level of
approximately 95,000. Of the 18,000, approximately 11,000 are
attributable to the operation in Darfur. According to the State
Department, the UN has secured pledges of troops to fill most of the
authorized numbers for Darfur and the UN planned to deploy a majority
of them by the end of the year. However, a UN report in October stated
that the troop deployment would be delayed. The UN further reported
that it had received no commitments from member states for some of the
critical units required for the Darfur mission to become fully
operational, including an aerial reconnaissance unit, transport units,
a logistics support unit, and attack and transport helicopters with
crews. Other operations have significant gaps between their deployed
and authorized troop levels. For example, Lebanon has about 2,500
troops fewer than its authorized levels as of September 2008, and a UN
report stated that the UN was seeking these troops from member
countries. In addition to existing needs, a September 2008 UN report
estimates that 6,000 troops will be needed, along with specialized
units, for an augmented operation in Chad and the Central African
Republic in the first quarter of 2009. However, the Secretary General
requested the Security Council not to authorize the mission until the
UN obtained firm troop commitments.
The UN would confront three critical issues in obtaining needed
military resources for a potential new mission in sub-Saharan Africa.
First, a relatively small number of countries have demonstrated the
willingness and ability to provide the UN with units of sufficient size
and capability. As of November 2008, 120 nations provide troops or
police to UN operations; however, only 30 countries provide at least 1
of the 76 battalion-sized infantry units these operations require.
[Footnote 19] A standard UN infantry battalion has 800 troops; U.S.
government officials note that countries generally must commit 2
additional battalions for every battalion currently deployed to ensure
sufficient units are available for the rotation cycle, entailing a
total commitment of 2,400 troops. As of November 2008, UN operations
lacked 8 battalion-sized infantry units for Darfur.[Footnote 20] The
potential new operation discussed in this report would likely increase
the potential need by 15 battalions. A UN official indicated that the
UN would approach its major contributors, such Bangladesh, India, and
Pakistan, which have provided an increasingly large portion of total UN
peacekeeping forces since 1998, if confronted with the challenge of
staffing an operation similar to the potential new operation.[Footnote
21]
Second, the potential new operation would require military logistics
units, hospitals, military engineers, and military transport units. The
UN relies on 37 countries to provide these specialized units in company
strength or greater as of November 2008. The potential new operation
would require 24 utility helicopters, 12 armed helicopters, and crew to
fly them. However, according to US officials and UN documents, these
types of units and resources are difficult to obtain and are currently
being sought for existing operations. As of December 2008, the UN has
been unable to obtain any of the 28 helicopters needed for the
operation in Darfur, according to a State official. A UN official said
it would be reasonable to assume an inability to obtain helicopters for
the potential new operation.
Third, member state decisions to provide troops for UN operations
depend on factors such as the state's national interest, the
operation's mandate, and the host country's environment and security
situation. For example, concerns over the security situation in Rwanda
in 1994 resulted in member states not providing additional troops for
the UN operation. Member states were unwilling to provide needed troops
and reinforcements for operations in Bosnia and Somalia for similar
reasons.[Footnote 22] The government hosting the UN operation also can
impose political restrictions. For example, the government of Sudan
insists that the UN force in Darfur be composed primarily of troops
from African member states. This led to the withdrawal of an offer by
Norway and Sweden to provide a needed joint engineering unit to the
operation, a decision that the Secretary General noted undermined
operations.
The UN Faces Challenges Recruiting and Deploying Police:
The potential new operation would require deployment of 1,500 police--
800 individual UN police and 700 officers in five FPUs. However, as of
September 2008, UN peacekeeping operations had a 34 percent gap between
deployed and authorized levels of police. The total number of police
authorized for all operations was 17,490, but the number deployed was
11,515. Moreover, the UN required 46 FPUs as of June 2008, but the UN
had deployed only about 31 FPUs. The gap between deployed and
authorized FPUs stems mainly from the lack of units for operations in
Darfur.[Footnote 23]
The UN encounters difficulties in obtaining qualified UN police with
the special skills its operations may require. For example, according
to a November 2007 Stimson Center report, some UN operations require
experienced police officers capable of conducting criminal
investigations or officers with supervisory or administrative skills.
[Footnote 24] According to this report, unlike states contributing
troops or FPUs, potential police contributing countries lack incentives
because the UN does not reimburse them for their individual police
contributions. In addition, a UN official noted that it is difficult to
find police for the UN with the necessary skills because these officers
are in demand in their home countries.
Limited resources for recruiting individual UN police add to this
difficulty. In contrast with its reliance on member states to
contribute and deploy FPUs as a unit, the UN recruits and deploys UN
police individually. A senior UN police official stated that this task
is time-consuming; he noted that he reviews an estimated 700
applications to find 30 qualified police officers for an operation.
Recruitment is the responsibility of the 34-strong Police Division of
the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which also helps deploy
the police components for new UN operations, sends members of this
staff to the field to help with start-up of new operations, and
supports and assists police components of existing UN operations.
According to a senior UN official, current staff levels are not
adequate to support these functions and undertake all recruitment, and
the UN should have three to four times the support personnel that
currently reside in the division. UN police officials also noted that
supporting an additional operation would be beyond their current
capacity. However, a strategic review of the functions and structure of
the Police Division, which will include an analysis of the adequacy of
current resources levels, is ongoing.
Obtaining needed FPUs required by its operations presents the UN with
additional difficulties. These units, which are composed of law
enforcement officers with expertise in crowd management and other
policing tactical activities, require special training and equipment.
For example, FPUs must undergo training in several areas before being
eligible for deployment to a UN operation, including emergency medical
services, use of nonlethal weapons and firearms, and crowd control and
behavior. As of June 2008, only 11 countries provide full-sized FPUs to
the UN, compared to the much larger number of countries that contribute
UN police. According to a UN official, obtaining even one additional
FPU is difficult. For example, it took a year to obtain an additional
unit for the mission in Haiti. According to a conference report on
international police issues co-sponsored by the U.S. government, if the
UN plans to continue increasing its use of FPUs, this will require the
development of a greater international capacity to deploy units that
have been properly prepared for the demands of peacekeeping operations.
The UN Has Difficulty Obtaining and Retaining Civilian Staff for
Peacekeeping Operations:
The UN would likely need between 4,000 and 5,000 civilian staff for the
potential new operation but would have difficulty obtaining these staff
and retaining them once in place. Recruiting enough international
civilian staff to fill the number of authorized positions in
peacekeeping operations is difficult. From 2005 through early 2008, UN
peacekeeping operations have had an average vacancy rate for
international civilian staff of about 22 percent. As of April 2008, the
vacancy rate for all civilian staff for the sub-Saharan operations in
Chad/Central African Republic and Darfur was over 70 percent, and the
vacancy rate for international civilian personnel in the adjoining UN
operation in southern Sudan, was approximately 30 percent of its
authorized level. Operations outside sub-Saharan Africa also have
experienced high international civilian staff vacancy rates; the
average vacancy rate for these operations ranged from 14 to 25 percent
from 2005 through 2008. Some specialties are difficult to fill. In
2000, a UN report found critical shortfalls in key areas including
procurement, finance, budget, logistics support, and engineers. In
addition, a 2006 UN report found a 50 percent vacancy rate for
procurement officers in the field.
The UN also has difficulty retaining the existing civilian staff in
peacekeeping operations. About 80 percent of international staff have
appointments of 1 year or less, and the turnover rate in the field is
approximately 30 percent. In addition, about half of professional staff
serving in peacekeeping operations have 2 years or less experience. In
September 2008, we reported that limited career development
opportunities have contributed to the UN's difficulties in attracting
and retaining qualified field procurement staff.[Footnote 25] According
to UN officials, turnover among field procurement staff has continued
to hurt the continuity of their operations and peacekeeping missions
continue to face challenges in deploying qualified, experienced
procurement staff, especially during the critical start-up phase.
The UN has identified several problems in obtaining and retaining
civilian staff for peacekeeping. First, nearly all civilian staff
deployed to UN operations hold appointments limited to specific
missions or are on loan from other UN offices as temporary duty
assignments. Most of these civilians cannot be redeployed from one
mission to another in response to urgent needs at one of the
operations, which limits the UN's ability to launch new operations.
Second, the UN has reported that the terms and conditions of service
for civilians at field missions create inequities in the field. In
March 2008, the UN reported that it has nine different types of
employment contracts for field civilians, which set differing terms of
service. Some operations do not offer the incentive of hardship pay.
According to a UN official, it would be difficult to attract
international staff and contractors to the potential new operation
without better conditions of service.
The UN has developed proposals to address these challenges. For
example, in 2006, the UN Secretariat proposed establishing 2,500 career-
track positions for expert and experienced technical civilian staff to
serve in field missions. These staff would have the flexibility to move
to different operations as needed. The UN Secretariat also proposed
reducing the types of contracts offered to civilian staff and
harmonizing conditions of service so that civilians serving in UN
operations have similar benefits. As of September 2008, the UN was
considering these proposals, according to a State official.
Logistics Difficulties Would Likely Impede or Delay the Potential New
Operation:
The recent experiences of other UN operations in sub-Saharan Africa
illustrate the challenges the potential new operation may face in terms
of logistical requirements. First, it is likely that the UN will not be
able to draw upon preexisting buildings for office space and staff
accommodations. For example, UN planning standards assume that a host
country could provide 40 percent of a new operation's required
accommodation space; however, a panel of UN officials from the
Departments of Peacekeeping and Field Support stated that a host
country in sub-Saharan Africa would likely be unable to provide any of
the office space or accommodations needed. As a result, a new operation
such as the potential new operation could face the task of constructing
accommodations from the ground up for approximately 10,000 people in
and around the force headquarters.
Second, poor infrastructure conditions would likely hinder the
activities of the potential new operation; UN officials noted that road
conditions for the potential new operation could resemble those facing
Darfur, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the poor
or nonexistent road networks strained the UN's ability to move people,
goods, and equipment. According to UN reports, the roads in Darfur are
especially poor, supplies take an average of 7 weeks to travel the
1,400 miles from port to operation, and banditry along the roads
compounds the problem. As a result, according to a UN official, the
potential new operation would likely require engineering units with
substantial road-building capabilities for each sector, but as noted
earlier, engineering units are difficult for the UN to obtain.
According to the UN, the four month rainy season in the sub-Saharan
region also complicates the challenge of supplying missions.
Third, commercial opportunities for procuring goods and services will
likely be limited given the potential new operation's location in sub-
Saharan Africa. Lack of local commercial opportunities has caused
problems for other operations in the area. When items cannot be
procured locally, they must be imported from abroad and sent to the
operation, a fact that causes delays and compounds the burden on the
operation's transport assets. For example, the Darfur mission's slow
deployment is partially due to lack of capacity in the local market to
meet the cargo transport requirements of the operation.
These challenges also would likely delay the start-up of the potential
new mission. As of September 2008, UN mission planning factors call for
UN operations to begin with a rapid deployment phase in which the force
would achieve an initial operational capability within 90 days of
Security Council authorization.[Footnote 26] However, according to UN
planning staff and documents, this objective is unrealistic. Operations
in the Congo, Sudan, Darfur, and Chad required a substantial buildup of
logistical military units before achieving initial operating
capability. According to a UN report, arranging for the commitment and
deployment of these units requires an expeditionary approach--the
establishment and progressive buildup of the personnel, equipment,
supplies, and infrastructure. One UN military planner estimated that
arranging for and coordinating these complex logistical arrangements
with existing UN planning resources added 6 months to the deployment
process.
Gap between Deployed and Authorized Resource Levels Affected Some
Operations' Execution of Their Mandates:
The gaps between authorized and deployed levels of troops, police, and
civilians--compounded by the logistics challenges--have affected
ongoing operations. Some State and UN officials note that some gaps
simply may be due to the time lag between securing and deploying
forces. However, interviews with some officials from selected
operations and our review of operation performance reports have
demonstrated that the lack of troops, police, and civilians for
existing operations has delayed or prevented some operations from
undertaking mandated activities.
The operation in Darfur, for example, has been unable to fully
undertake many of its mandated activities, such as protection of
civilians, due to a lack of military personnel. According to UN
reports, lack of critical support units, such as helicopter, logistics
support, and transport units has limited the operation's ability to
provide for its own protection, carry out its mandated tasks
effectively, and transport equipment and supplies necessary to house
and maintain the troops it has deployed so far. Moreover, the inability
to secure these support units has delayed the deployment of some of the
troops already committed to the operation for several months. The
operation in Haiti lacked required levels of police, according to a UN
official, and this lack decreased the support that could be provided to
the Haitian National Police. Several operations have recently
experienced civilian vacancies in key areas, affecting operation
activities in the areas of public information, property management,
medical services, and procurement. For example, officials at some
missions stated that vacancies in procurement staff positions,
particularly in supervisory positions, have impeded procurement actions
and heightened the risk of errors. In general, according to a UN
Secretary General report, the UN has not made progress in solving the
problems with civilian staffing and the resulting high civilian vacancy
rates have put the organization at managerial and financial risk.
In addition, challenges in the areas of logistics have also had an
impact on existing operations. Lack of local procurement opportunities
required the operation in Haiti to procure most needed goods and
services from outside the country, creating delays for the operation
that are difficult to overcome. For example, it took the operation some
time to find a suitable headquarters building, and it required outside
resources to bring the building up to UN standards of safety and
security.
The United States Has Provided Assistance to UN Peacekeeping, but
Reporting to Congress Provides Limited Information about Gaps between
Authorized and Deployed Force Levels:
The U.S. government, along with those of other countries, has taken
some steps to help address UN challenges in obtaining troops and police
for peacekeeping operations, primarily through the Global Peace
Operations Initiative. The United States has also provided logistics
support to specific UN operations and is supports, in principle, UN
proposals to address gaps between the number of authorized and deployed
civilians. State is required to report to Congress on the status and
effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and provides some of this
information through its monthly briefings to Congress. However, State
has not provided information about troop and other gaps between
authorized and deployed force levels--important elements of status and
effectiveness--in its notifications or annual UN report to Congress.
The United States and Other Countries Provide Some Help to Address Gaps
between Deployed and Authorized Levels:
The U.S. government, along with those of other countries, has provided
some help to address UN challenges in obtaining peacekeeping troops,
police, civilians, and logistics requirements through both GPOI and in
response to specific UN mission needs.[Footnote 27] GPOI is a 5-year
program begun by the U.S. government in 2004 in support of the Group of
Eight (G8) countries' action plan to build peacekeeping capabilities
worldwide, with a focus on Africa. According to the State department,
efforts are underway to extend this program's activities beyond 2010.
The key goals of the program are to train and, when appropriate, equip
military peacekeepers and provide nonlethal equipment and
transportation to support countries' deployment of peacekeepers. In
June 2008, we reported that as of April 2008 GPOI had provided training
and material assistance to about 40,000 of the 75,000 peacekeeping
troops it intends to train by 2010.[Footnote 28] Approximately 22,000
of these troops, predominantly African soldiers, have been deployed to
9 UN peacekeeping operations, one UN political mission, and 2 AU
peacekeeping operations. We also reported that GPOI is unlikely to meet
all of its goals and that State was unable to assess how effectively
its instruction was improving the capacity of countries to provide and
sustain peacekeepers. In addition, the United States has initiated
actions to address mission-specific gaps. For example, State and DOD
formed the Missing Assets Task Force to conduct a global search for 28
attack and transport helicopters, logistics units, and other assets for
the operation in Darfur. As of December 2008, the task force was unable
to obtain commitments for the helicopters.
Through GPOI, the United States also supports efforts at the
international Center of Excellence for Stability Police in Italy to
increase the capabilities and interoperability of stability police to
participate in peace operations. As of June 2008, the center had
trained more than 1,300 of the 3,000 stability police instructors it
intends to train by 2009. Moreover, State has allocated about $10
million for training and equipping FPUs deploying to Sudan.
According to State and DOD officials, the United States has done little
to help the UN address gaps between deployed and authorized civilian
levels. According to State officials, the United States supports, in
principle, UN internal efforts to address chronic gaps between civilian
deployment and authorized staff levels by improving the terms of
service for civilian peacekeeping staff, improving contracting
arrangements and incentives for UN civilians, and developing a rapidly
deployable standing civilian corps. However, a U.S. official noted in
late September 2008 that these initiatives are still undergoing review
by the UN and member states and the U.S. position on the final
initiatives could be influenced by the projected costs and other
factors.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State wrote that it is
supporting reforms in personnel policy that will mitigate the
difficulty the UN is having in recruiting critical international staff.
However, the UN comments on the draft stated that the general
expression of U.S. support for the Secretary-General's human resources
management reform proposals is welcome, but is somewhat at dissonance
with the position presented by the U.S. delegation to the fifth
Committee of the General Assembly and on-going regular sixty-third
sessions of the General Assembly. The UN stated that the U.S.
delegation did not join the consensus reached by all other member
states to streamline contractual arrangements, offer greater job
security to staff in field missions, and improve their conditions of
service. The UN also commented that at the regular sixty-third session
of the General Assembly, the U.S. delegation proposed to significantly
reduce allowances and benefits to new recruits and to staff to serve on
temporary appointments in UN peacekeeping operations.
The United States has helped the UN address logistical challenges both
through GPOI and on a mission-specific basis. For example, GPOI
supports an equipment depot in Sierra Leone that has provided nonlethal
equipment to support the logistical training and deployment of African
troops. State and DOD officials stated that they also have responded to
specific logistics needs of UN operations. For example, State provided
$110 million in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 funds to help troop-
contributing nations deploy or sustain their forces in Darfur,
including about $20 million worth of support to equip and deploy
Rwandan troops as of September 2008. The U.S. government also responded
to requests to provide transport and logistics assistance in 2006,
resulting in the provision of additional support to help deploy troops
from two countries to the UN operation in Lebanon.
U.S. Government Reporting to Congress Provides Limited Discussion of
Resource Needs:
Federal law requires the President to report, to notify, and consult
with Congress on UN peacekeeping operations.[Footnote 29] When the
President submits his annual budget report to Congress, the law
requires the President to provide Congress an annual report that
assesses the effectiveness of ongoing international peacekeeping
operations, their relevance to U.S. national interests, the projected
termination dates for all such operations, and other matters. The law
also requires that the President provide Congress written information
about new operations that are anticipated to be authorized by the UN
Security Council or existing operations where the authorized force
strength is to be expanded or the mandate is to be changed
significantly. The information to be provided is to include the
anticipated duration, mandate, and command and control arrangements of
such an operation, the total cost to both the UN and the United States,
the planned exit strategy, and the vital national interest the new
operation is to serve. The law also requires the President to consult
monthly with Congress on peacekeeping.
To comply with these requirements, State consults with Congress about
peacekeeping through monthly briefings. At these briefings, State
officials update Congress on the status of peacekeeping operations,
such as progress being made in Darfur, the Congo, and Haiti, as well as
the problems encountered, such as kidnappings in Port au Prince or
incursions along the Chad-Sudan border discussed in the April 2008
monthly briefing. In some briefings, State provides updates on the
progress in obtaining needed troops, police, and other resources. State
also provides written notification to Congress about new peacekeeping
operations that the United States expects to vote for in the Security
Council and for operations where the mandate is significantly revised.
For example, on August 30, 2006, State provided written notification to
Congress that it had voted to approve the expansion of the UN operation
in Lebanon, including increasing the troop level from about 2,000 to
15,000.
Although they provide information about UN peacekeeping operations and
their mandates, the annual reports to Congress and the notifications do
not discuss potential successes or difficulties in obtaining the
resources necessary to carry out the mandates. For example, between
January 2006 and October 2008, the Congress received 17 notifications
about new or expanded peacekeeping operations, including missions in
Haiti, Timor L'este, Lebanon, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan, Darfur, and others.
All 17 provided information about the operations' mandates, the forces
authorized, the U.S. national interest served, and the exit strategy.
None of the 17 reported on whether the UN had commitments for the
troops, police, and the other resources required to carry out the
mandate; whether there might be problems in obtaining them; or whether
this information was known. Moreover, just 4 of 20 notifications
regarding reprogramming of State Peacekeeping Operations funds in
support of UN peacekeeping operations provided to Congress between
January 2006 and September 2008 cited possible UN gaps in troops or
equipment as part of the justification for this reprogramming.[Footnote
30] Furthermore, State's 2006 and 2007 annual reports on peacekeeping
included one sentence each on potential difficulties in attaining
needed resources. This sentence stated that an ongoing challenge will
be to ensure sufficient qualified troops for present and possible new
missions. Information about the resources available to carry out the
operations is not specified in the law. However, as this report has
discussed, important elements of assessing the effectiveness, exit
strategy, and mandate of operations would necessarily include a
discussion of commitments made to provide the troops, police, and other
resources needed to carry out the mandate; whether there would be
problems in obtaining them; or whether this information is known.
Conclusion:
Through its peacekeeping operations, the UN is trying to build
sustainable peace in some of the most unstable countries in the world.
However, the UN has at times been unable to obtain the authorized level
of resources, particularly specialized military units, police, and
civilians. This has hindered some operations from fully carrying out
their mandates. In some cases, these gaps reflect the inability of
member states to provide the needed resources. However, the gaps
between authorized and deployed levels of civilians, specialized
military units, full battalion strength contingents, and formed police
units pose challenges to current UN operations as well as to the UN in
deploying another large multidimensional operation. The United States
government, along with other member countries, is helping the UN
address the resource challenges. However, gaps in needed resource
levels for current operations still exist and State has not reported to
Congress about this issue. Congress may lack the critical information
it needs to assess the effectiveness of ongoing operations or the
challenges the UN may face when considering or fielding proposed new UN
peacekeeping operations. Congress needs this information when
considering Administration requests for funding and support for UN
peacekeeping operations.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To ensure that Congress has the information needed to conduct oversight
and fully consider Administration budget and other requests for UN
peacekeeping, we recommend that the Secretary of State include in the
department's annual report or in another appropriate written submission
to Congress information about UN resource challenges and gaps in
obtaining and deploying troops, police, and civilians authorized to
carry out peacekeeping operations. The information should include
commitments to provide these resources, difficulties in obtaining them,
and whether the gaps have impeded operations from carrying out their
mandates. If the information is not available when an appropriate
written submission is sent to Congress, we recommend that State ensure
the information is provided, as available, during its consultations
with Congress.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Department of State and the UN provided written comments on a draft
of this report, which are reprinted in appendices III and IV. State
commented that the report reflects a very thorough inquiry into the
increase in and developing nature of international expectations of
United Nations peacekeeping. State also commented that our
recommendation should not specify in which reports to Congress the
information on peacekeeping gaps should be included. Our draft
recommendation specified that State should provide the information in
annual reports to Congress and Congressional notifications. We agree
that this may be too prescriptive but believe the information should be
provided in writing; therefore, we modified our recommendation so as to
allow the information be provided in appropriate written submissions to
Congress. The UN commented that it fully concurred with the conclusions
of our report and appreciated recognition that UN peacekeeping
operations should be properly resourced and that mandates should be
aligned with said resources. State and the UN also provided technical
and general comments which we addressed in the report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the United
Nations. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff
have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-
8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix VII.
Signed by:
Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our review focused on four objectives related to the evolution of
peacekeeping operations and the United Nations' (UN) capacity to deploy
new operations: Specifically, in this report, we examine (1) the
evolution of UN peacekeeping operations in the past 10 years; (2) the
characteristics of a potential new peacekeeping operation, given this
evolution and UN planning scenarios; (3) the challenges, if any, the UN
would face in deploying this potential new operation; and (4) U.S.
efforts to support and report on UN peacekeeping.
We analyzed the evolution of peacekeeping operations from 1998 to 2008.
We chose this timeframe because it is the most recent 10-year time
period and the period during which the UN initiated major peacekeeping
reforms, such as the response to the Brahimi report. Also, during this
time period, the UN articulated its approach and rationale to multi-
dimensional peacekeeping. In the Secretary General's report, No Exit
without Strategy, the UN states that to facilitate sustainable peace a
peacekeeping mission's mandate should include elements such as
institution building and the promotion of good governance and the rule
of law. To analyze the evolution of UN peacekeeping operations from
1998-2008, we reviewed UN documents, including UN Security Council
resolutions containing operation mandates; budget documents with
information on resource requirements; and other UN reports. We also
obtained UN data on troop, police, and civilian deployments and World
Bank data on political instability. We analyzed the variation in
troops, police, and civilians from 1998 to 2008 to analyze trends in
mission size and scope. We analyzed the variation in civilian
deployments from 2000 to 2008 as complete UN civilian data by operation
was not made available for earlier periods. We categorized each mission
as traditional or multidimensional, based on the number of mandated
tasks and whether the mandated tasks were traditional, such as
observing cease-fires or whether they were ambitious, such as helping
restore government institutions. We met with UN officials in the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field
Support to discuss changes in the nature of operations. We also
reviewed previous GAO reports and used the distinction they had made
between traditional and multidimensional operations. To illustrate the
change in the types of countries where the UN launched peacekeeping
operations in 1998 and 2008, we collected and analyzed data from the
United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index from
within 5 years of the start date of each operation.[Footnote 31] To
show the specialized capabilities and increased number of civilians
required by recent operations, we used the 2008 Annual Review of Global
Peace Operations conducted by the Center on International Cooperation's
Global Peace Operations program at the request of and with the support
of the Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations,[Footnote 32] augmented by UN operation deployment maps. To
describe the stability of the countries in which peacekeeping
operations are deployed in 2008, we used the World Bank's Governance
Matters.[Footnote 33]
To determine the characteristics of a potential new peacekeeping
operation, we used a combination of trend analysis and UN contingency
planning documents. The trend analysis described in the preceding
paragraph provided us with an average of nine mandated tasks. We then
reviewed current UN contingency plans for a multidimensional operation
that included these tasks and selected this plan to provide detailed
requirements for the potential new operation. In developing
requirements for a potential new operation, we worked with UN
peacekeeping officials from several offices, including military
planning, budget, logistics, civilian personnel, and police, to review
the parameters of the operation. For further details on the potential
new operation, see appendix II.
To assess the challenges the UN would face in deploying the potential
new operation, we reviewed a variety of UN documents, met with UN
officials in New York, held teleconferences and interviews with UN
officials deployed to operations, and met with State Department
officials in Washington, D.C., and New York and DOD officials in
Washington, D.C. Our analysis discusses challenges to deploying a
potential large, multidimensional operation. It does not assess
challenges to deploying a smaller, less capable operation. To determine
the challenges the UN might face in obtaining troops, we analyzed UN
data on troop contributions; consulted academic research on troop
contribution patterns; spoke with various UN officials in the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including officials in Force
Generation Services; consulted a variety of UN reports, including
Secretary General reports on particular operations; and reviewed past
GAO reports. We assessed the gap between authorized forces and deployed
forces by comparing current authorized UN force levels with monthly
deployment data for troops, military observers and police up through
September 2008. We assessed the number of infantry battalions and
specialized units deployed by assessing the most current individual
operation deployment maps available--ranging from March to October
2008. We reported the number of leased and contributed aircraft based
on September 2007 data augmented with September 2008 data for the
Darfur operation. To address challenges in the realm of obtaining
police, we analyzed UN data on police contributions; met with officials
in the Police Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations;
consulted reports and studies completed by research institutions and
training centers; and spoke with a UN official at the mission in Haiti.
To assess challenges in recruiting and deploying civilians, we analyzed
UN data on civilian vacancy rates by mission and position; spoke with
UN officials in the Field Personnel Division of the Department of Field
Support; and reviewed the large number of UN reports addressing
civilian staffing issues that have been released between 2000 and 2008.
To describe potential challenges in the realm of logistical
requirements, we met with several UN officials in the Departments of
Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, including at a roundtable
discussion of our potential new mission; reviewed UN reports on
particular peacekeeping operations; and analyzed UN documents related
to Strategic Deployment Stocks and the UN Logistics Base. We determined
that data from the UN's peacekeeper troop-and deployment-reporting
systems are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report, which
is to support findings concerning the challenges the UN may encounter
when addressing the gaps between authorized and deployed levels of
uniformed and civilian UN peacekeepers.
To analyze U.S. efforts to help support UN peacekeeping, we reviewed
U.S. reports on peacekeeping, including GAO reports and State
Department budget submissions and reports on peacekeeping. We also
obtained all notifications to Congress on reprogramming funds for
peacekeeping from January 2006 through September 2008. There were a
total of 77 notifications, 17 of which were to announce new or expanded
peacekeeping operations. The others provided information on
reprogramming funds in the Peacekeeping Operations Account. We analyzed
these notifications for funding shifts and the information provided to
Congress about the peacekeeping operations, such as operations'
mandates, exit strategies, U.S. national interests served, and gaps
between the level of resources required and the level provided. We also
obtained the annual 2006 and 2007 peacekeeping reports to Congress and
reviewed them for the same issues. We compared our analysis of these
documents with the reporting standards for peacekeeping under 22 U.S.C.
§ 287b.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 to December
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Methodology for Identifying Potential New Peacekeeping
Operation Requirements:
To identify requirements for the potential new operation, we reviewed
UN planning scenarios for one that provided a reasonable basis for a
potential operation, as validated by (1) our analysis of trends in
peacekeeping since 1998 and (2) our examination of the scenarios'
components. Our analysis is not intended to predict the size, scope, or
location of a new UN peacekeeping operation. A new operation's mandate
and resource needs would be determined by the UN Security Council and
the circumstances particular to the country to which it is deployed.
Therefore, the requirements of a new operation would likely differ from
those of the potential new operation presented here.
We first examined the 17 operations deployed or enlarged since 1998 and
identified 18 categories of tasks included in the mandates of one or
more of these operations. We then determined these 17 operations had on
average nine mandated tasks. To construct a possible mandate for our
potential new peacekeeping operation reflecting these trends, we
selected nine tasks from the list of 18 categories of tasks that most
frequently appeared in the mandates of the previous 17 operations.
These include restoring the rule of law and supporting elections (each
included in the mandates of 11 of the 17 operations), and also
restoration of government institutions (present in 10 of 17 mandates).
We identified one UN planning scenario that was a close match to these
trends. As table 3 shows, this planning scenario has nine mandated
tasks that are consistent with the most common historical tasks since
1998. Seven of the tasks were similar or identical. Two tasks in the UN
planning scenario--facilitating political agreements and supporting
disarmament and demobilization--were not among the nine most common
historical tasks, but were frequent tasks of the 17 operations since
1998.
Table 3: UN Operations Launched since 1998 and the UN Planning
Scenario/Potential New Operation:
Mandated tasks and locations of 17 UN operations launched since 1998:
Tasks:
1. Monitor peace or cease-fire agreement;
2. Provide protection under Chapter VII authorization;
3. Provide civil police enforcement;
4. Train and develop police;
5. Support restoration of the rule of law;
6. Support restoration of government institutions;
7. Support elections;
8. Protect human rights, women's rights;
9. Support humanitarian assistance for internally displaced persons.
Location: Sub-Saharan Africa, the location of 10 of 17 operations
initiated or expanded since 1998. Others include Haiti, Timor L'este,
and Lebanon.
UN planning scenario/potential new operation tasks and location:
Tasks:
1. Monitor peace or ceasefire agreement;
2. Provide a safe and secure operating environment;
3. Protect civilians and UN staff;
4. Support rule of law and security sector development;
5. Develop capacity of government and institutions;
6. Support elections;
7. Monitor human rights;
8. Assist demobilization and arms collection;
9. Facilitate political agreements and reconciliation.
Location: Location in sub-Saharan Africa.
Source: GAO analysis of UN Security Council Resolutions for UN
Peacekeeping Operations, January 1998 to June 2008.
[End of table]
The UN planning scenario is located in sub-Saharan Africa. We validated
that sub-Saharan Africa is the modal location for a potential
operation. That is, 10 of the 17 operations deployed or expanded since
1998 were in this region. Also, 7 of the 11 operations deployed since
1998 and still ongoing are located in sub-Saharan Africa. We thus used
this UN planning scenario as the basis for the potential new operation.
This analysis acknowledges that the mandate, resource requirements, and
location of a new UN operation would be contingent on actual events,
and its characteristics may differ to an unknown extent from those
presented in the UN planning scenarios used for this assessment.
The UN planning scenario identified political and environmental
conditions in the area of operation and specified the troop and police
numbers for the operation. The assumptions in the UN planning scenario
are that the government is weak, the location would lack roads and
other infrastructure, UN troop contingents would operate in a high-
threat environment, and the operations would function at a high tempo
with active military patrols. We validated these as reasonable
assumptions by (1) reviewing U.S. and UN reports about locations in sub-
Saharan Africa, (2) reviewing UNDP reports on political instability and
level of development in sub-Saharan Africa, and (3) interviewing UN
officials who had surveyed the area.
The UN planning scenario calls for 27,000 troops and military observers
deployed in six locations in the country. The scenario also calls for
specialized military units, such as logistics, transport, and aviation
units. To validate whether this scenario was reasonable, we met with UN
officials in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Offices of
Military Affairs, Police Affairs, Planning Service, Strategic Military
Cell, Force Generation Services, and others. We discussed, in detail,
the planning scenarios and the planning process to generate the
scenarios, including the fact that some field survey work had been
conducted. We obtained and reviewed documents on force requirements for
similar operations, such as Darfur. We found that the requirements,
such as the need for special military units, were consistent for these
operations and the UN planning scenario. We reviewed the UN planning
guidelines, the UN survey mission handbook, and lessons learned reports
for procedures, requirements, and best practices for standards in
planning operations. On the basis of this work, we validated as
reasonable the deployment of 21,000 troops in five sectors for the
potential new operation. As table 4 shows, we eliminated one sector
from the potential new operation because it was primarily mandated to
observe and monitor a cease-fire and thus this sector constituted an
independent operation with a different mandate rather than part of the
potential new operation.
Table 4: UN Planning Scenario and GAO Estimate of Potential New
Operation:
Characteristics of UN planning scenario: Operation in location with
limited infrastructure, hostile conditions, and high operating tempo;
Characteristics of potential new operation: Same as UN planning
scenario;
Comments: Based on UN, U.S., and World Bank reports and interviews with
UN staff.
Characteristics of UN planning scenario: Military personnel: 27,000
troops in six sectors; 21 infantry battalions, One mechanized battalion
aviation units, engineers, logistics units, airport and port units,
transport units;
Characteristics of potential new operation: Military personnel: 21,000
troops in five sectors; 14 infantry battalions; Same as UN planning
scenario;
Comments: One sector eliminated as it was primarily a separate
observation mission that would not execute other; mandated tasks
identified in our trend analysis; Special military units based on
requirements for similar operation in Darfur and UN planning standards.
Characteristics of UN planning scenario: Police: 1,500 police,
including 700 deployed in five formed police units;
Characteristics of potential new operation: Same as UN planning
scenario;
Comments: Based on UN briefing documents and interviews with UN staff.
Characteristics of UN planning scenario: Civilian requirements: not
addressed in contingency planning;
Characteristics of potential new operation: Force composition: 4,000 to
5,000 civilians;
Comments: Based on interviews with UN civilian planners, analysis of
civilian component planning templates, and comparison with civilian
requirements for other large UN operations in sub-Saharan Africa.
Characteristics of UN planning scenario: Logistics needs: not addressed
in contingency planning;
Characteristics of potential new operation: Requires significant
military logistical capability and specialized support units
characteristic of other large peacekeeping operations in sub-Saharan
Africa;
Comments: Based on interviews with UN force planners, field support and
logistics officials, and review of initial resource requirements of
similar units deployed to Darfur.
Source: GAO analysis of UN peacekeeping planning scenarios and
mandates.
[End of table]
The UN planning scenario calls for 1,500 police, of which 700 would be
deployed in five formed police units. We validated this as reasonable
based on interviews and briefings with UN officials in the police
division and our review of reports and data on UN police in
peacekeeping operations. According to the UN officials, the estimate is
based on their experience, a technical assessment mission, the
population size, the tasks for the UN police, and the capacity of the
local police. These officials also said that more information about the
local police would be important in developing a more precise estimate
of required police and formed police units.
The UN scenario did not estimate the needed civilian staff. We
estimated that the potential new operation would require 4,000 to 5,000
civilian staff, based on interviews and data provided by UN officials.
UN officials noted that a lower bound estimate for a large operation
would be about 3,000 civilian staff. However, these officials also
stated that considering the potential new operation's mandated tasks,
force size, and security environment and comparisons with operations in
the Congo, Darfur, and Sudan, a more reasonable estimate is 4,000 to
5,000 civilians. In comparison, the 2008 to 2009 proposed budget for
the operation in the Congo had an authorized military component of
18,931 and an authorized civilian component of 4,934, 24 percent of
whom were international civilians[Footnote 34] The proposed budget for
the operation in Sudan had a military component of 10,715 and a
civilian component of 4,260, 23 percent of whom were international
civilians. The proposed budget for the Sudan operation had a military
component of 25,507 and a civilian component of 5,557, 27 percent of
whom were international civilians.
The UN planning scenario did not estimate logistics requirements. In
discussions with UN officials, they stated that due to the absence of
detailed planning in the field, resource requirements for the potential
new operation are difficult to calculate and infrastructure costs are
unknowable at this time. These officials stated that the best estimate
of logistics requirements and challenges would be from the experiences
of other operations in sub-Saharan Africa, such as Sudan and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the 2007-2008 peacekeeping fiscal
year, those operations had budgeted between about $420 million and $425
million for supplies, transport, and facilities. However, these
operations have been close to full deployment levels for 2 or more
years and the actual logistics requirements for a potential new force
could be significantly less in the first year, depending upon rate of
deployment for the troops, the resources required to achieve initial
operational capability for each mandated task in each sector, whether
sectors would be established simultaneously or in sequence, and many
other factors. In Darfur, for example, less than 50 percent of
authorized forces had been deployed as of October 2008, about 10 months
after the start of the operation. In contrast, the augmented force in
Lebanon deployed 70 percent of its authorized force level within the
first 4 months. On the other hand, some logistics requirements, such as
the transport in and establishment of facilities for the initial force,
may be greater for a new operation in its first year in comparison with
these mature operations, according to UN officials. Moreover, UN
officials indicated that the equipment needs and initial logistics
capabilities of individual infantry battalions would be comparable to
those deployed to Darfur; they provided mission resource requirements
for those units. For example, as in the case of Darfur, we found it
reasonable to assume that many of the operational units for this
potential new peacekeeping operation would need to come from countries
capable of providing supplies for the first 60 to 90 days after
deployment, given the limitations on local infrastructure expected in
this environment.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
December 15, 2008:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "UN
Peacekeeping: Challenges Obtaining Needed Resources Could Limit Further
Large Deployments and Should be Addressed in U.S. Reports to Congress,"
GAO Job Code 320531.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Tammy Pomerleau, Management Analyst, Bureau of International
Organization Affairs at (202) 736-7937.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO - Tetsuo Miyabara:
IO - James Warlick (Acting):
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Report:
United Nations Peacekeeping: Challenges Obtaining Needed Resources
Could Limit Further Deployments and Should be Addressed in U.S. Reports
Congress:
(GAO-09-142; GAO Code 320531)
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled
"United Nations Peacekeeping: Challenges Obtaining Needed Resources
Could Limit Further Deployments and Should be Addressed in U.S. Reports
Congress."
As the reports notes, the United Nation's Department of Peacekeeping
Operations (DPKO) consults in depth with both UN Security Council
(UNSC) members and potential troop and police contributors as crises
evolve in order to develop recommendations for UNSC consideration on
size and mandated tasks for both new and existing operations. This does
not imply that pledges of personnel or other assets will be immediately
available, and many constraints can impede delivery of pledges over the
longer term.
The report also discusses United States Government (USG) funding of
bilateral peacekeeping capacity building programs to help address the
shortage of peacekeepers. We will continue to regularly meet with the
United Nations (UN) and other regional collective security
organizations to discuss peacekeeping capacity shortfalls and through
programs such as, but not limited to, the Global Peace Operations
Initiative, we will continue to work with partner nations, within USG
legal and financial constraints, to increase the global capacity
available to respond to the rapid increase in number, size and
complexity of peace operations.
We will continue to work very closely with our Mission to the United
Nations, with the United Nations itself, and with our diplomatic allies
to ensure that UN operations and headquarters support are as lean and
efficient as possible. We are supporting reforms in personnel policy
that will mitigate the difficulty the UN is having in recruiting
critical international staff. We note that UN peacekeeping often takes
place in environments that pose security problems or are not family-
friendly, which exacerbate recruitment problems.
We are concerned with the GAO's formal recommendation "that the
Department of State include in its annual report and notifications to
Congress information about UN resource challenges and gaps in obtaining
and deploying troops, police and civilians authorized to carry out
peacekeeping operations. The information should include "commitments to
provide these resources, difficulties in obtaining them, and whether
the gaps have impeded operations from carrying out their mandates." The
Department believes that this recommendation should not specify which
submissions to Congress ought to include the requested information
because many such submissions would not be appropriate vehicles for the
information. The Department therefore suggests a modification to this
recommendation to state that such information could be included in "the
Department's annual report, in another appropriate submission to
Congress, or as part of the Department's regular consultations with
Congress."
In accordance with the United Nations Participation Act, P.L. 79-264
Section 4(e)(2), and annual appropriations acts, the Department
notifies Congress of its intention to vote in the UNSC to establish a
new UN peacekeeping mission or expand an existing one, and it notifies
certain reprogrammings within the Contributions for International
Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) appropriation. The Department provides
these notifications when required by applicable law, which often will
not coincide with the availability of information regarding UN resource
challenges. For example, we are required to submit vote notifications
before the UNSC votes on a new or expanded operation. At that point,
the Department would not yet have complete information about possible
shortfalls in UN resources, which may only become apparent after the UN
is authorized to recruit and deploy security forces. In addition,
preparation and transmittal of these letters typically must take place
within relatively short timeframes, which do not allow sufficient time
for appropriate analysis and presentation of additional information. In
many cases, information on UN resource challenges are best addressed in
the Department's monthly consultations with Congress on UN peacekeeping
activities, which provide an opportunity to discuss these challenges as
they occur.
The Department of State appreciates the main findings of the GAO report
that recognize the challenges and difficulties the UN has in planning
for and deploying large operations. The report reflects a very thorough
inquiry into the increase in and developing nature of international
expectations of United Nations peacekeeping.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the United Nations:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United Nations:
Nations Unies:
Headquarters: Siege: New York, NY 10017
Telephone: 1 (212) 963-1234:
Fax: 1 (212) 963-4879:
Reference:
11 December 2008:
Mr. Joseph A. Christoff:
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
US Government Accountability Office:
Dear Mr. Christoff,
Draft report of the United States Government Accountability Office on
UN Peacekeeping: Challenges obtaining needed resources could limit
further large deployments and should be addressed in U.S. report to
Congress:
On behalf of Alain Le Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping
Operations and myself, I would like to refer to your letter dated 26
November 2008 addressed to us on the above-mentioned draft report. We
would like to thank you for providing us with the opportunity to
comment on the report. We wholeheartedly concur with the conclusions in
the report and appreciate the recognition that United Nations
peacekeeping operations should be properly resourced and that mandates
be aligned with said resources. Our comments are provided in the
attached document.
We trust that these comments will be helpful in finalizing the report.
Should you wish to discuss them further, please do not hesitate to
contact me or my office. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) look forward to
receiving the finalized version of the report.
Yours sincerely,
Signed by:
Susana Malcorra:
Under Secretary-General:
Department of Field Support:
General comments:
1. DFS wishes to clarify that the 1998 benchmark used to measure
increases in peacekeeping budgets and personnel may not be entirely
valid. The United Nations had very large deployments in the early 1990s
(e.g. UNTAC, and UNPROFOR) which then declined around 1997/1998. The
Organization has been in the business of mounting large and complex
missions for some time. As a result, large-scale United Nations
peacekeeping operations are not a recent phenomenon, although their
complexity and collaboration with such partners as regional
organizations has evolved over the past decade. [See comment 1]
2. We note that there is no mention in the report of the various
strategic assessments/reform proposals that have shaped the development
of the UN's peacekeeping doctrine and capacity - such as the Brahimi
report of 2000, Peace Operations 2010 - and the restructuring proposals
of DPKO presented to the General Assembly last year in documents
A/61/868 and Add.l. We consider that these are relevant to the
discussion as they underscore that the need for adequate resources and
structures to deliver on mission mandates is one of the fundamental
principles and requirements for the successful delivery of peacekeeping
mandates. [See comment 2]
Page 10:
3. The first paragraph describes the process for establishing a
peacekeeping operation. However, there is little discussion of the
dynamics of the review of mission budgets and the support account, the
increasing scrutiny of legislative bodies including the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the
Fifth Committee of the General Assembly and the inherent tension
between the member states who bear the bulk of the costs of
peacekeeping (to include the US, Japan, and EU nations) and the top
troop and police contributors (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other
G-77 countries). We suggest that these points be included in the
general discussion in order to sensitize readers to the fact that the
approval of peacekeeping funding and mission deployment does not
automatically follow a Security Council resolution. The General
Assembly's own political dynamics can have a real impact on decisions
on approved resources. [See comment 3]
4. We further suggest line 3 of the second paragraph on page 10 he
reworded to read as follows: "...and the availability of financial and
other resources due to long procurement lead times." [See comment 4]
Page 15:
5. You may wish to add the following text at the end of the first
paragraph: "Since 2003, the UN has deployed corrections officers to 11
peacekeeping operations and, as of November 2008, over 150 corrections
officers have been deployed and co-located in national corrections
(prison) facilities, rendering advisory, mentoring, training and
capacity building services to national authorities." [See comment 5]
Page 16:
6. Several paragraphs starting on page 16 deal with the notion of a
potential new UN peacekeeping operation. While the use of a potential
peacekeeping "scenario" in Sub-Saharan Africa may be useful in that it
clearly maps out what would be needed in such a mission, it may imply a
"one-size-fits-all approach" which experience shows is simply not the
case. Each mission has its own particular dynamics in terms of the
politics, the affected parties, the logistical requirements and
challenges, and the resulting resource requirements. [See comment 6]
7. You may wish to add the following text at the end of the first
paragraph of page 16 "Further, in the majority of post-conflict
scenarios, mine clearance is required as the first step to
rehabilitating roads, opening airstrips and assessing sites prior to
occupation. In Sudan, for example, 15,600 miles of suspect road and 40
airstrips were cleared by the UN Mine Action Service and its
implementing partners". [See comment 7]
Page 20:
8. The Security Council has increasingly mandated peace operations to
assist in strengthening and reforming judicial and legal systems.
Within DPKO-led peace operations, such assistance is provided primarily
by justice components working together with corrections, police, human
rights and other mission components. The primary objective of justice
components as specified in many Security Council resolutions is to
assist national authorities in the early re-establishment,
strengthening and/or reform of the judicial and legal systems, so as to
uphold the rule of law and facilitate the maintenance of overall peace
and security. Support to court administration, legal frameworks and
capacity-building for judges and prosecutors arc key areas of
engagement. Justice components may also help to address justice and
legal sector issues that are highlighted in peace agreements and
related to the root causes of the conflict. Based on the above
explanation, we suggest rewording the third and forth bullets of
paragraph 2 to read as follow:
* "Directors, including police commissioner, judicial affairs,
political affairs, and civil affairs,".
* "Professional staff for legal affairs, rule of law, judicial affairs,
child protection, and mission support functions (to include logistics
and administration, finance, budget, human resources management and
procurement; and" [See comment 8]
Page 26:
9. The last sentence of paragraph 2 may be reworded to read "...air
operations, air safety, logisticians, engineers, budget, human
resources management, procurement and contract management personnel
were particularly difficult to recruit." [See comment 9]
Page 28:
11. The third paragraph may be followed by another challenge that could
read as follows: "Fourth, the weather conditions in the Sub-Saharan
region highly complicate the UN logistics support capacity to complex
peacekeeping operations. The rainy season usually lasts for four months
during which most of the supply chain reties upon air support which
highly impacts on mission budgets." [See comment 11]
Pages 30 and 32:
12. The general expression of U.S. support for the Secretary-General's
human resources management reform proposals referenced at the top of
page 32 is. most welcome, but is somewhat at dissonance with the
position presented by the U.S. delegation to the fifth Committee of the
General Assembly at the first resumed sixty-second in March 2008 and on-
going regular sixty-third sessions of the General Assembly. At the
March 2008 session, the U.S. delegation decline to join the consensus
reached by all other member states on a compromise package to
streamline contractual arrangements, offer greater job security to
staff in field missions and improve their conditions of service by
harmonizing them with all other staff of the United Nations
Secretariat. While the compromise proposal would not - as originally
recommended by the Secretary-General - have raised the compensation
package to the level enjoyed by the rest of the United Nations common
system, it would have represented a significant step forward to address
the significantly inferior contracts and conditions of service accorded
to staff in United Nations peacekeeping operations and special
political missions, which persistently confront vacancy rates that
hover at or above the 30% mark and turnover rates that fluctuate
between 22% and 30% for internationally-recruited staff. The compromise
package would have addressed to a large degree some of the fundament
difficulties confronted in attracting and retaining high quality
international staff in UN field missions. [See comment 12]
13. At the current, regular sixty-third session, the U.S. delegation
has tabled a proposal that would significantly reduce the allowances
and benefits to be offered to new recruits and to staff to serve on
temporary appointments in UN peacekeeping operations and special
political missions. If adopted, based on current indications, while
"grandfathering those already in service, the U.S. proposal would offer
less job security and even lower compensation packages than those
already paid to the vast majority of staff serving in UN field
missions. [See comment 13]
14. We would request that appropriate clarifying language be added to
the information presented in the final GAO report, in particular in the
context of the points made at the top of page 32. We would also
respectfully disagree with the phrasing at the end of the first
paragraph on page 30 that "the UN has noted its failure to address
problems with civilian staffing". We would note that the UN Secretariat
has analyzed the underlying causes of the Secretariat's difficulties in
attracting, recruiting and retaining high quality staff for UN
peacekeeping operations and special political missions, and presented
these on numerous occasions in formal reports, briefings and informal
consultations with member states. The International Civil Service
Commission, at its 2006 session, expressed overall support for the
Secretariat's analyses and recommendations and expressed general
support for the Secretary-General's original proposals to streamline
contracts and harmonize conditions of service for staff serving in
field locations across the UN common system. These proposals remain
before the General Assembly, and are under active consideration as
indicated above. [See comment 14]
The following are GAO's comments from the United Nations' letter dated
December 11, 2008:
GAO Comments:
1. We agree that the UN has conducted large peacekeeping operations
prior to 1998. However, we selected the time period 1998 to 2008 for
our review because it represents the most recent decade of growth in UN
peacekeeping activities as well as major UN initiatives to reform
peacekeeping operations. Most notably, this period reflects the
implementation of the Brahimi peacekeeping reform efforts and the UN's
No Exit Without Strategy approach that the UN articulated in 2001.
2. We added information that describes UN peacekeeping reform efforts.
3. We have expanded our discussion of the process for establishing a
peacekeeping operation.
4. We have reworded the sentence to reflect this comment.
5. We added this information to the report.
6. We agree and have noted the limitation in the report.
7. We added this information to the report.
8. We have reworded the section to reflect the UN's comment.
9. We have substituted alternative language.
11. We added this information to the report.
12. We added information to the report to reflect the UN and U.S.
positions on UN human resource reform policy.
13. We added information to the report to reflect the UN and U.S.
positions on UN human resource reform policy.
14. We modified the text to delete the word "failure." We already
discuss UN field staff proposals in another section.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Ongoing UN Peacekeeping Operations, as of September 2008:
The United Nations deployed approximately 109,000 personnel to 16 UN
peacekeeping operations as of September 2008. Table 5 indicates the
location, personnel distribution, and mandate type and size of each
operation.
Table 5: Current UN Peacekeeping Operations as of September 30, 2008
(Dollars in millions[A]):
Name of operation/location/start date:
UN Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) Middle East
1948-;
2008-2009 budget: $66.22[B];
Troops and military observers: 142;
Police: 0;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 235;
Total: 377;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Traditional; 2.
Name of operation/location/start date: UN Military Observer Group in
India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) Jammu, Kashmir and Pakistan 1949-;
2008-2009 budget: $16.96[B];
Troops and military observers: 44;
Police: 0;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 71;
Total: 115;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Traditional; 1.
Name of operation/location/start date: UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
(UNFICYP) 1964;
2008-2009 budget: $57.39;
Troops and military observers: 846;
Police: 69;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 146;
Total: 1,061;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Traditional; 3.
Name of operation/location/start date: U.N. Disengagement Observer
Force (UNDOF) Israel-Syria: Golan Heights 1974;
2008-2009 budget: $47.86;
Troops and military observers: 1,043;
Police: 0;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 144;
Total: 1,187;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Traditional; 2.
Name of operation/location/start date: UN Force for Southern Lebanon
(UNIFIL) 1978 augmented 2006;
2008-2009 budget: $680.93;
Troops and military observers: 12,543;
Police: 0;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 963;
Total: 13,506;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Multidimensional; 6.
Name of operation/location/start date: UN Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara; (MINURSO) Apr. 1991;
2008-2009 budget: $47.70;
Troops and military observers: 219;
Police: 6;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 270;
Total: 495;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Multidimensional; 2.
Name of operation/location/start date: UN Observer Mission in Georgia
(UNOMIG) Aug. 1993;
2008-2009 budget: $36.08;
Troops and military observers: 132;
Police: 17;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 273;
Total: 422;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Traditional; 3.
Name of operation/location/start date: UN Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) June 1999;
2008-2009 budget: $207.20;
Troops and military observers: 29;
Police: 1,910;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 2,481;
Total: 4,420;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Multidimensional; 10.
Name of operation/location/start date: UN Organization Mission in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) November 1999;
2008-2009 budget: $1,242.73;
Troops and military observers: 17,369;
Police: 1,065;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 3,657;
Total: 22,091;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Multidimensional; 12.
Name of operation/location/start date: UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
September 2003;
2008-2009 budget: $631.69;
Troops and military observers: 11,671;
Police: 1,037;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 1,688;
Total: 14,396;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Multidimensional; 10.
Name of operation/location/start date: UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire
(UNOCI) April 2004;
2008-2009 budget: $497.46;
Troops and military observers: 8,017;
Police: 1,136;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 1,305;
Total: 10,458;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Multidimensional; 9.
Name of operation/location/start date: UN Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH) June 2004;
2008-2009 budget: $601.58;
Troops and military observers: 7,012;
Police: 1,868;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 1,900;
Total: 10,780;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Multidimensional; 11.
Name of operation/location/start date: UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)
March 2005;
2008-2009 budget: 858.77;
Troops and military observers: 9,333;
Police: 600;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 3,457;
Total: 13,390;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Multidimensional; 14.
Name of operation/location/start date: UN Integrated Mission in Timor
L'este (UNMIT) August 2006;
2008-2009 budget: $180.84;
Troops and military observers: 33;
Police: 1,542;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 1,377;
Total: 2,952;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Multidimensional; 10.
Name of operation/location/start date: African Union/United Nations
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) Sudan Authorized July 31, 2007;
started December 31, 2007;
2008-2009 budget: $1,569.26;
Troops and military observers: 8,422;
Police: 2,039;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 2,244;
Total: 12,705;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Multidimensional; 13.
Name of operation/location/start date: UN Mission in the Central
African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) September 2007;
2008-2009 budget: $315.08;
Troops and military observers: 45;
Police: 226;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 481;
Total: 752;
Mandate type and number of mandated tasks: Multidimensional; 7.
Name of operation/location/start date: Total;
2008-2009 budget: $7,057.75[C];
Troops and military observers: 76,900;
Police: 11,515;
Civilians (international, local, and UN volunteers): 20,692;
Total: 109,107.
Source: GAO analysis of UN data.
[A] Figures are rounded to nearest $10,000.
[B] UNTSO and UNMOGIP are funded from the United Nations regular
biennial budget. Costs to the United Nations of the other current
operations are financed from their own separate accounts on the basis
of legally binding assessments on all member states. For these
missions, budget figures are for 1 year (July 2008--June 2009) unless
otherwise specified.
[C] A UN document notes that the total peacekeeping budget is about
$7,080 million, as it includes $105.01 million funded for the United
Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) operation that ended in
July 2008, and requirements for the support account for peacekeeping
operations and the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi (Italy).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Military Capabilities Required by UN Peacekeeping
Operations, as of November 2008:
UN peacekeeping operations have required increasingly large numbers of
combat capable battalions, aircraft for both transport and combat
support, and other support units. As of November 2008, 30 countries are
providing 76 battalions of infantry peacekeeping troops, including 21
battalions of mechanized infantry. Twenty-five of these same countries
also provide helicopters or support units in addition to infantry
battalions; another 12 countries provide only helicopters or support
units. Table 6 reflects the current number and type of operational
battalions and support units company-sized or larger required by 9 of
the 16 UN peacekeeping operations ongoing as of November 2008. The data
for the UN operation in Darfur (UNAMID) includes units authorized but
not yet deployed. Unit numbers and country of origin reflect deployment
data reported by the individual UN operations between March and
November 2008.
Table 6: Deployed Operational and Support Units by Peacekeeping
Operation in November 2008:
MONUC:
Operational/aviation units: Infantry battalions[A]:
8 battalions; 1 Senegal; 1 Benin; 1 India; 1 Uruguay; 3 Pakistan;
1 South Africa;
Operational/aviation units: Mechanized battalions or companies[B]:
10 battalions; 1 Ghana; 1 Tunisia; 1 Bangladesh; 3 Pakistan; 1 Nepal;
2 India; 1 Morocco;
Special forces company; Guatemala;
Operational/aviation units: Aviation units[C]:
47 helicopters; India; 8 attack; 15 transport; Bangladesh; 5 transport;
South Africa; 2 transport leased;
17 transport fixed wing aircraft; 22 leased;
Enabling/support units: Military police: (companies): [Empty];
Enabling/support units: Engineers: (companies):
3 S. Africa; 1 Uruguay; 1 Nepal; 1 Indonesia; 1 China;
Enabling/support units: Logistical units[D]:
2 CSS (combat service support) companies;
1 South Africa; 1 Malawi;
Enabling/support units: Ground transport/truck companies: [Empty];
Medical units[E]; Other units:
Level 3 (partial); India;
Level 2; Morocco; China; Jordan;
Riverine units; 3 Uruguay.
UNMIL:
Operational/aviation units: Infantry battalions[A]:
10 battalions; 2 Pakistan; 2 Nigeria; 2 Bangladesh; 2 Ethiopia;
1 Senegal; 1 Ghana;
Operational/aviation units: Mechanized battalions or companies[B]:
1 battalion; 1 Pakistan;
Operational/aviation units: Aviation units[C]:
22 Helicopters; 14 Ukraine; 6 attack; 8 transport; 8 leased transport;
fixed wing aircraft; 2 leased;
Enabling/support units: Military police: (companies):
1 Nepal; 1 Bangladesh; 1 China;
Enabling/support units: Engineers: (companies):
4 Pakistan; 2 Bangladesh;
Enabling/support units: Logistical units[D]:
1 unit; Bangladesh;
Enabling/support units: Ground transport/truck companies:
1 China;
Medical units[E]; Other units:
Level 3; Jordan;
Level 2; China; Senegal; Pakistan;
Signals platoons; 5 Nigeria; 1 Bangladesh.
UNOCI:
Operational/aviation units: Infantry battalions[A]:
8 battalions; 1 Bangladesh; 1 Benin; 1 Ghana; 1 Jordan; 1 Togo;
1 Niger; 1 Pakistan; 1 Senegal;
Operational/aviation units: Mechanized battalions or companies[B]:
3 battalions; 2 Bangladesh; 1 Morocco;
Special forces (SF) company; 1 Jordan;
Operational/aviation units: Aviation units[C]:
7 transport helicopters; 3 Ghana; 4 leased;
fixed wing aircraft; 3 leased;
Enabling/support units: Military police: (companies): [Empty];
Enabling/support units: Engineers: (companies):
1 France; 1 Pakistan;
Enabling/support units: Logistical units[D]: [Empty];
Enabling/support units: Ground transport/truck companies: 1 Pakistan;
Medical units[E]; Other units:
Level 3; Undesignated;
Level 2; Bangladesh; Ghana;
1 Signals company; Bangladesh.
MINUSTAH:
Operational/aviation units: Infantry battalions[A]:
8 battalions; 1 Brazil; 2 Nepal; 1 Argentina; 2 Uruguay; 1 Sri Lanka;
1 Jordan;
Operational/aviation units: Mechanized battalions or companies[B]:
1 battalion; 1 Chile;
Operational/aviation units: Aviation units[C]:
11 transport helicopters; 2 Argentina; 4 Chile; 5 leased;
fixed wing aircraft; 1 leased;
Enabling/support units: Military police: (companies):
1 Guatemala; Enabling/support units: Engineers: (companies):
1 Brazil; 1 Chile-Ecuador composite;
Enabling/support units: Logistical units[D]: [Empty];
Enabling/support units: Ground transport/truck companies: [Empty];
Medical units[E]; Other units:
Level 2; Argentina;
16 patrol boats deployed by Uruguay[F].
UNMIS:
Operational/aviation units: Infantry battalions[A]:
5 battalions; 1 Kenya; 1 India; 1 Bangladesh; 1 Pakistan; 1 Rwanda;
Operational/aviation units: Mechanized battalions or companies[B]:
[Empty];
Operational/aviation units: Aviation units[C]:
31 transport helicopters; 6 India; 6 Pakistan; 4 Russia; 15 leased;
fixed wing aircraft; 16 leased;
Enabling/support units: Military police: (companies):
1 Bangladesh;
Enabling/support units: Engineers: (companies):
6 companies; 3 China; 1 Egypt; 1 Pakistan; 1 India;
Enabling/support units: Logistical units[D]:
1 logistics base; 1 logistics battalion India;
Enabling/support units: Ground transport/truck companies:
1 Bangladesh; 1 China; 1 Pakistan;
Medical units[E]; Other units:
Level 3; Egypt;
Level 2; Bangladesh; China; India; Pakistan;
5 Demining companies; Bangladesh; Cambodia; Egypt; Kenya; Pakistan;
River patrol unit; Bangladesh.
UNIFIL: Operational/aviation units: Infantry battalions[A]:
4 battalions; 1 Korea; 1 India; 1 Ghana; 1 Belgium-Luxembourg;
Operational/aviation units: Mechanized battalions or companies[B]:
6 battalions; 1 Spain; 2 Italy; 1 France; 1 Nepal; 1 Indonesia;
Operational/aviation units: Aviation units[C]:
16 transport helicopters; 2 Spain/Turkey; 6 Italy/Netherlands; 4
Germany/Greece; 1 leased; [Empty];
Enabling/support units: Military police: (companies):
1 Tanzania;
Enabling/support units: Engineers: (companies):
1 battalion; 1 China; 4 companies; 1 Portugal; 1 Turkey; 1 France; 1
Belgium;
Enabling/support units: Logistical units[D]:
1 logistics unit; Poland;
Enabling/support units: Ground transport/truck companies: [Empty];
Medical units[E]; Other units:
Level 3; India;
Level 2; Belgium; China;
Dedicated Strategic Military Cell[G]; Maritime Task Force[H].
UNDOF:
Operational/aviation units: Infantry battalions[A]:
2 battalions; 1 Poland; 1 Austria/Slovakia;
Operational/aviation units: Mechanized battalions or companies[B]:
[Empty];
Operational/aviation units: Aviation units[C]: [Empty];
Enabling/support units: Military police: (companies): [Empty];
Enabling/support units: Engineers: (companies): [Empty];
Enabling/support units: Logistical units[D]:
Logistics battalion; 1 India/Japan;
Enabling/support units: Ground transport/truck companies: [Empty];
Medical units[E]; Other units: [Empty].
UNAMID[I]:
Operational/aviation units: Infantry battalions[A]:
10 of 18 authorized battalions deployed; 1 Senegal; 4 Rwanda; 1 S.
Africa; 4 Nigeria; 8 battalions pledged: 2 Ethiopia; 2 Egypt; 1
Thailand; 1 Senegal; 2 TBD;
Operational/aviation units: Mechanized battalions or companies[B]:
[Empty];
Operational/aviation units: Aviation units[C]:
26 helicopters[J]; 26 leased; fixed wing aircraft; 4 leased;
Enabling/support units: Military police: (companies):
1 Kenya;
Enabling/support units: Engineers: (companies):
3 companies; 1 Egypt; 1 China; 1 Pakistan;
Enabling/support units: Logistical units[D]:
3 pledged; multirole logistics units; 1 Bangladesh; 1 Ethiopia; 1 TBD;
Enabling/support units: Ground transport/truck companies:
Medium truck battalion deployed; 1 Egypt; 2 pledged medium truck
companies; 1 Ethiopia; 1 TBD; 1 heavy truck company TBD;
Medical units[E]; Other units:
3 Pledged medical units;
Level 3; Pakistan;
Level 2; Netherlands; Nigeria;
1 Signals company; Egypt.
UNFICYP:
Operational/aviation units: Infantry battalions[A]: [Empty];
Operational/aviation units: Mechanized battalions or companies[B]:
[Empty];
Operational/aviation units: Aviation units[C]:
3 transport helicopters; 3 Argentina;
Enabling/support units: Military police: (companies): [Empty];
Enabling/support units: Engineers: (companies): [Empty];
Enabling/support units: Logistical units[D]: [Empty];
Enabling/support units: Ground transport/truck companies: [Empty];
Medical units[E]; Other units: [Empty].
Other:
Operational/aviation units: Infantry battalions[A]: [Empty];
Operational/aviation units: Mechanized battalions or companies[B]:
[Empty];
Operational/aviation units: Aviation units[C]:
8 leased helicopters; MINURSO 3; UNMIT 4; UNOMIG 1; 5 leased fixed wing
aircraft; MINURSO 3 UNMIT 1; UNOMIG 1;
Enabling/support units: Military police: (companies): [Empty];
Enabling/support units: Engineers: (companies): [Empty];
Enabling/support units: Logistical units[D]: [Empty];
Enabling/support units: Ground transport/truck companies: [Empty];
Medical units[E]; Other units: [Empty].
Total[K]:
Operational/aviation units: Infantry battalions[A]:
55 infantry battalions;
Operational/aviation units: Mechanized battalions or companies[B]:
21 mechanized battalions;
Operational/aviation units: Aviation units[C]:
171 helicopters; 53 fixed wing aircraft; 224 total;
Enabling/support units: Military police: (companies): 7;
Enabling/support units: Engineers: (companies): 31;
Enabling/support units: Logistical units[D]: 8;
Enabling/support units: Ground transport/truck companies: 7;
Medical units[E]; Other units:
5 level 3; 17 level 2; 22 total.
Source: GAO analysis or data from the UN and the Center on
International Cooperation's Global Peace Operations Program.
[A] A standard UN infantry battalion numbers approximately 800 troops,
including 600 troops deployed in 4 companies, and 200 troops deployed
between a headquarters company and a logistics company.
[B] Includes force or sector rapid reaction and reserve units.
According to UN military planners, a standard UN mechanized infantry
battalion would contain 750 troops with three infantry companies
deployed in armored vehicles, a heavy weapons company, an
administrative and supply company, and a support company with
engineers.
[C] Aviation strength as of September 30, 2007, unless otherwise noted.
[D] Logistics units can vary in size and tasks depending upon the
mission they support. According to Department of Defense officials and
UN documents, the units in Darfur require approximately 300 to 350
personnel each and are required to perform 15 separate tasks.
[E] A level 2 medical unit comprises a basic field hospital with
limited specialist expertise (doctors) and limited surgical, intensive
care, dental, laboratory, X-ray, ward, sterilization and pharmaceutical
capabilities (e.g., life, limb and organ-saving surgery, definitive
treatment against a wide variety of common diseases/illnesses). UN
standards call for a facility capable of three to four surgical
operations per day; hospitalization of 10 to 20 sick or wounded for up
to 7 days; up to 40 outpatients per day; 5 to 10 dental consultations
per day; and medical supplies, fluids, and consumables for 60 days. A
level 3 medical unit comprises a fully equipped and staffed
multidisciplinary advanced field hospital, capable of providing
advanced services in surgical, intensive care, dental (emergency dental
surgery), laboratory, X-ray, ward and pharmaceutical capabilities or
all major medical and surgical specialties. While size and composition
vary by UN peacekeeping operation, UN standards call for a facility
capable of performing up to 10 surgical operations per day,
hospitalization for 50 patients up to 30 days, up to 60 outpatient
consultations per day, up to 10 dental consultations per day, up to 20
X-rays and 40 lab tests per day, and medical supplies and consumables
for 60 days; and provides a specialist team for collecting seriously
injured personnel from the site of injury and escorting patients in
serious condition to higher-level care.
[F] MINUSTAH is deploying a fleet of 16 small coastal patrol boats
initially manned with Uruguayan and Brazilian personnel and Haitian
trainees starting in November 2008, according to UN reports and State
officials.
[G] The UNIFIL Strategic Military Cell has provided UNIFIL augmented
headquarters planning capacity at DPKO headquarters and in the field
since 2006.
[H] UNIFIL's Maritime Task Force is commanded by the European Maritime
Force. It consists of 13 naval vessels from Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Spain, and Turkey.
[I] Deployed and pledged units as of September 2008. Deployed units
include a Nigerian level 2 Hospital deployed in September 2008.
Deployed units exclude those units that have sent in a number of
advance personnel only, such as the first Ethiopian battalion personnel
sent in August 2008, and the first Egyptian battalion personnel sent in
September 2008.
[J] Reflects interim aviation support as of May 2008. UNAMID was
authorized 24 helicopters from troop contributing countries (6 attack
and 18 transport) but no pledges have been made as of October 2008. The
UN has an interim proposal of leasing a total of 53 aircraft (14 fixed-
wing and 39 helicopters) for UNAMID. Moreover UNAMID has agreed to a
cost-sharing arrangement whereby UNAMID will share 2 of UNMIS's leased
fixed wing aircraft on a 70:30 basis and 1 of its heavy utility
helicopters on a 50:50 basis.
[K] Deployed units only.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff (202) 512-8979, or christoffj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Tet Miyabara, Assistant
Director; B. Patrick Hickey; Marisela Perez; Jennifer Young; Lynn
Cothern; and David Dornisch made key contributions to this report. In
addition, Ashley Alley, Jeremy Latimer, and Monica Brym provided
technical assistance.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Uniformed peacekeepers include soldiers, military observers, and
police.
[2] These police units are also referred to as stability police. We
define these as units of police whose duties bridge the gap between
military troops and UN police in peace operations. The standard UN
formed police unit contains between 125 and 140 stability police.
[3] GAO, Peacekeeping: Thousands Trained but United States Is Unlikely
to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-754] (Washington, D.C:
June 26, 2008).
[4] We use "peacekeeping operations" to mean both peacekeeping
operations authorized under Chapter VI and peace enforcement operations
authorized under Chapter VII.
[5] Past Presidents have justified exceeding this limit by invoking
their right under section 628 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to
provide "technical, scientific, or professional advice or service."
Currently, federal law prohibits U.S. troops from participating in a
peacekeeping operation absent presidential certification that U.S.
troops are immune from criminal prosecution in international courts. 22
U.S.C. section 7424.
[6] United Nations Participation Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-264, sec.
10 (Dec. 20, 1945).
[7] In 2001, a UN official used his experiences in planning UN
peacekeeping operations to create a model of the DPKO mission start-up
process, which estimates that it takes about 10 months from initial
planning to deployment of an operation.
[8] United Nations Peacekeeping: Lines of Authority for Field
Procurement Remain Unclear, but Reforms Have Addressed Some Issues,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1094] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 18, 2008).
[9] The United Nations deployed large missions prior to 1998, such as
the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, and the UN Protection Force
in the former Yugoslavia. This report covers the evolution of
peacekeeping from 1998 to 2008, the most recent 10 year period. See
Appendix I for a discussion of our scope and methodology.
[10] See the background section for a full description of the
distinction between traditional and multidimensional operations. See
also GAO, UN Peacekeeping: Estimated U.S. Contributions, Fiscal Years
1996-2001, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-294]
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2002).
[11] This panel of experts was convened by the Secretary General in
2000 to assess the shortcomings of the existing system for managing
peace operations. It made recommendations to the Secretary General in
November 2000 to improve the strategic direction, planning,
organization, and conduct of peace operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809).
[12] GAO, UN Peacekeeping: Transition Strategies for Post-Conflict
States Lack Results-Oriented Measures of Progress, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-1071] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26,
2003).
[13] World Bank, Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual
Governance Indicators, 1996-2007 (Washington, D.C: June 2008)
[14] This includes the operation in Darfur, which is still deploying
and is below its authorized level of 19,195 troops.
[15] UN standards call for infantry battalions to field 800 troops
each, including 600 troops deployed in four infantry companies and 200
troops deployed between a headquarters company and a logistics company.
According to UN military planners, a standard UN mechanized infantry
battalion would contain 750 troops with three infantry companies
deployed in armored vehicles, a heavy weapons company, an
administrative and supply company, and a support company with
engineers.
[16] Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace
Operations, 2008. (Boulder, Colorado: 2008).
[17] The UN peacekeeping budget year runs from July 1 to June 30 of the
following year.
[18] UN standards call for infantry battalions to field 800 soldiers,
including headquarters and support personnel. According to UN
officials, a standard UN mechanized infantry battalion would contain
750 troops with 3 infantry companies deployed in armored vehicles, an
administrative and supply company, and a support company with engineers
and heavy weapons.
[19] This total includes the joint Austrian-Slovakian infantry
battalion deployed in the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Middle
East as the contribution of one country. The number of contributing
countries and battalions can vary as units from one nation rotate in
and replace units from other nations.
[20] As of mid-2008, only 2 of the 11 deployed battalions in Darfur
were at full strength.
[21] At the end of 1998, these three countries had provided 2,098
troops, military observers, and police (about 15 percent of total
contributions); as of September 2008, they were providing 28,075
troops, observers, and police (about 32 percent of total
contributions). They also provided 22 of the UN's 77 battalion-sized
units.
[22] See GAO, United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions Requiring
Force to Restore Peace. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-97-34] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
27, 1997).
[23] A requirement for 2 additional FPUs authorized for the operation
in Liberia in September 2008 has not yet been met by member nations as
of the end of October 2008.
[24] Henry L. Stimson Center, Enhancing United Nations Capacity to
Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law (Washington, D.C.:
November 2007).
[25] GAO, United Nations Peacekeeping: Lines of Authority for Field
Procurement Remain Unclear, but Reforms Have Addressed Some Issues,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1094] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 18, 2008).
[26] The UN Mission Start-up Field Guide notes that initial operational
capability is different for each aspect of the operation. For the
military component, it assumes that the force and sector headquarters
are functional and enough forces are deployed to provide a suitable
level of force protection and sustainment to enable the force to
provide a secure environment for selected areas to enable the mission
to begin executing the mandate.
[27] G8 members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Countries directly assisting
GPOI include three G8 countries (Canada, France, and the United
Kingdom) plus Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Chile, Fiji, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the
Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and Uruguay. In addition, the
seven other G8 countries support the peace support operations in a
number of ways, including the training and equipping of military
peacekeepers, individual police, and stability police; supporting the
development of peacekeeping doctrine; providing funding to support
national and regional peacekeeping training centers; providing funding
and logistical support to regional organizations; and establishing a
stability police training school.
[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-754].
[29] 22 U.S.C. § 287b.
[30] State is required to notify Congress 15 days in advance of any
reprogramming of funds to be used to pay for the cost of ongoing or new
peacekeeping operations. 22 U.S.C. § 287b(d)(3)(B)(v), 22 U.S.C. 2706,
22 U.S.C. 2394-1.
[31] United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2007/
2008, New York, 2007; Human Development Report 1998, New York, 1997.
[32] Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace
Operations, 2008, Boulder, Colorado, 2008.
[33] World Bank, Governance Matters: Index of Political Stability,
Washington, D.C.: June 2008.
[34] Military component includes troops, observers, and police.
[End of section]
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