Combating Terrorism
The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Gao ID: GAO-08-622 April 17, 2008Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing the terrorist safe haven have been key national security goals. The United States has provided Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror, more than $10.5 billion for military, economic, and development activities. Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which border Afghanistan, are vast unpoliced regions attractive to extremists and terrorists seeking a safe haven. GAO was asked to assess (1) the progress in meeting these national security goals for Pakistan's FATA, and (2) the status of U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive plan for the FATA. To address these objectives, GAO compared national security goals against assessments conducted by U.S. agencies and reviewed available plans.
The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. Since 2002, the United States relied principally on the Pakistan military to address U.S. national security goals. Of the approximately $5.8 billion the United States provided for efforts in the FATA and border region from 2002 through 2007, about 96 percent reimbursed Pakistan for military operations there. According to the Department of State, Pakistan deployed 120,000 military and paramilitary forces in the FATA and helped kill and capture hundreds of suspected al Qaeda operatives; these efforts cost the lives of approximately 1,400 members of Pakistan's security forces. However, GAO found broad agreement, as documented in the National Intelligence Estimate, State, and embassy documents, as well as Defense officials in Pakistan, that al Qaeda had regenerated its ability to attack the United States and had succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan's FATA. No comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in the FATA has been developed, as stipulated by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), called for by an independent commission (2004), and mandated by congressional legislation (2007). Furthermore, Congress created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2004 specifically to develop comprehensive plans to combat terrorism. However, neither the National Security Council (NSC), NCTC, nor other executive branch departments have developed a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support--called for by the various national security strategies and Congress. As a result, since 2002, the U.S. embassy in Pakistan has had no Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorism and close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. In 2006, the embassy, in conjunction with Defense, State, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and in cooperation with the government of Pakistan, began an effort to focus more attention on other key elements of national power, such as development assistance and public diplomacy, to address U.S. goals in the FATA. However, this does not yet constitute a comprehensive plan.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-622, Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-622
entitled 'Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive
Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas' which was released on
April 17, 2008.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2008:
Combating Terrorism:
The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist
Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered
Tribal Areas:
Combating Terrorism in Pakistan:
GAO-08-622:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-622, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing the terrorist
safe haven have been key national security goals. The United States has
provided Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror, more than $10.5
billion for military, economic, and development activities. Pakistan‘s
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which border Afghanistan,
are vast unpoliced regions attractive to extremists and terrorists
seeking a safe haven.
GAO was asked to assess (1) the progress in meeting these national
security goals for Pakistan‘s FATA, and (2) the status of U.S. efforts
to develop a comprehensive plan for the FATA. To address these
objectives, GAO compared national security goals against assessments
conducted by U.S. agencies and reviewed available plans.
What GAO Found:
The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy
terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA. Since
2002, the United States relied principally on the Pakistan military to
address U.S. national security goals. Of the approximately $5.8 billion
the United States provided for efforts in the FATA and border region
from 2002 through 2007, about 96 percent reimbursed Pakistan for
military operations there. According to the Department of State,
Pakistan deployed 120,000 military and paramilitary forces in the FATA
and helped kill and capture hundreds of suspected al Qaeda operatives;
these efforts cost the lives of approximately 1,400 members of
Pakistan‘s security forces. However, GAO found broad agreement, as
documented in the National Intelligence Estimate, State, and embassy
documents, as well as Defense officials in Pakistan, that al Qaeda had
regenerated its ability to attack the United States and had succeeded
in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA.
No comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in the
FATA has been developed, as stipulated by the National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism (2003), called for by an independent commission
(2004), and mandated by congressional legislation (2007). Furthermore,
Congress created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2004
specifically to develop comprehensive plans to combat terrorism.
However, neither the National Security Council (NSC), NCTC, nor other
executive branch departments have developed a comprehensive plan that
includes all elements of national power”diplomatic, military,
intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement
support”called for by the various national security strategies and
Congress. As a result, since 2002, the U.S. embassy in Pakistan has had
no Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorism and
close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. In 2006, the embassy, in
conjunction with Defense, State, and U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and in cooperation with the government of
Pakistan, began an effort to focus more attention on other key elements
of national power, such as development assistance and public diplomacy,
to address U.S. goals in the FATA. However, this does not yet
constitute a comprehensive plan.
Figure: Map of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA):
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the FATA and surrounding areas of Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
Source: GAO; USAID and Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the National Security Advisor and the Director of
the NCTC, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State and
others, implement the congressional mandate to develop a comprehensive
plan to combat the terrorist threat and close the safe haven in the
FATA. Defense and USAID concurred with the recommendation; State
asserted that a comprehensive strategy exists, while the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence stated that plans to combat terrorism
exist. In GAO‘s view, these plans have not been formally integrated
into a comprehensive plan as called for by Congress. The NSC provided
no comments.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-622]. For more
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or
johnsoncm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The U.S. Government Has Not Met National Security Goals in Pakistan's
FATA:
No Comprehensive Plan for Guiding U.S. Efforts in the FATA Has Been
Developed, as Called for by the Administration and Congress:
Conclusion:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence:
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Key Recommendations by Executive, Independent, and
Congressional Sources to Combat Terrorism and Close Terrorist Safe
Havens:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan:
Figure 2: Percentage of U.S. Funding Directed toward Military, Border
Security, and Development Activities in Pakistan's FATA and Border
Region from Fiscal Years 2002 to 2007:
Abbreviations:
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command:
CIA: Central Intelligence Agency:
CSF: Coalition Support Funds:
Defense: Department of Defense:
DNI: Director of National Intelligence:
FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas:
FCR: Frontier Crimes Regulations:
NIE: National Intelligence Estimate:
NCTC: National Counterterrorism Center:
NSC: National Security Council:
ODNI: Office of the Director of National Intelligence:
State: Department of State:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 17, 2008:
Congressional Requesters:
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were planned from an Afghan safe haven,
and many of the terrorists who attacked the United States used Pakistan
as the main route to travel from Afghanistan to the United States.
Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the administration and Congress have
repeatedly stated that destroying terrorist threats and closing
terrorist safe havens are the nation's critical national security
goals.[Footnote 1] As such, the United States has provided Pakistan,
which has become a key U.S. ally in the global war on terror, with more
than $10.5 billion for military, economic, and development activities
in support of these goals. The 9/11 Commission, an independent,
bipartisan commission created by congressional legislation in late
2002, concluded in 2004 that it is hard to overstate the importance of
Pakistan in the struggle against Islamist terrorism. The commission
found that the country's vast unpoliced regions have made it attractive
to extremists seeking a safe haven and have reportedly provided a base
for terrorist operations against U.S. and coalition forces in
Afghanistan. Following the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, al
Qaeda and Taliban fighters are believed to have retreated across the
Afghan border and into Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) in an effort to re-establish a terrorist safe haven.
Because of the challenges the United States faces in Pakistan in
meeting its goals to destroy the terrorist threats and close the
terrorist safe haven, we were asked to assess (1) U.S. progress in
meeting its national security goals in Pakistan's FATA region, and (2)
the status of U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive plan for the
FATA.
This report is the first in a series of reports we plan to issue in
response to your interest in U.S. support of the Pakistani government's
efforts in the FATA region bordering Afghanistan. We plan to issue an
interim product on the use and oversight of Coalition Support Funds
(CSF) in May 2008 and a report on CSF in the summer of 2008, followed
by a broader report covering security, political, and development
assistance activities undertaken by the United States to meet U.S.
national security goals in the FATA.
To address our objectives, we reviewed relevant national security
strategies, the 9/11 Commission Report, key congressional legislation,
and related documentation from the Departments of Defense (Defense) and
State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), and discussed these issues with relevant department officials
in Washington, D.C. We also interviewed Defense officials operating out
of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters in Tampa, Florida.
We requested meetings with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the National Security
Council (NSC); however, only the CIA agreed to meet with us. To
determine progress in meeting national security objectives, we compared
the national security goals stated in strategic documents with
unclassified assessments conducted by the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), State, and U.S. officials operating in Pakistan. To
determine if comprehensive plans were developed and contained the
elements recommended by national security documents, legislation, and
GAO, we requested all plans addressing U.S. efforts in the FATA from
the CIA, Defense, NCTC, NSC, State, USAID, and the U.S. Embassy in
Pakistan. CIA, NCTC, and NSC did not provide any plans. We reviewed all
plans provided by Defense, State, and USAID, as of April 17, 2008. We
also met with members of the International Crisis Group in Washington,
including the director of their office in Pakistan.[Footnote 2] In
addition, we conducted field work in Pakistan, where we met with
officials from the U.S. embassy and Pakistan's Ministries of Defense
and Interior, as well as international donors from Canada, Japan, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. We visited Peshawar, near the
FATA, to conduct discussions with the U.S. consulate, Pakistan's 11th
Army Corps, the Frontier Corps, the FATA Secretariat and Development
Authority, and a Pakistani nongovernmental organization with experience
working in the FATA. We determined the amount of U.S. funding to
Pakistan by analyzing Defense, State, and USAID budget documents
covering the period from fiscal years 2002 through 2007 and by
verifying the amounts used for the FATA and the border regions through
discussions with agency officials. This analysis does not include
funding for covert activities in Pakistan.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 through April 2008
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy
the terrorist threat and close the safe haven in Pakistan's FATA
region. Since 2002, the United States has relied principally on the
Pakistani military to address its national security goals. There have
been limited efforts, however, to address other underlying causes of
terrorism in the FATA by providing development assistance or by
addressing the FATA's political needs. Of the over $10.5 billion that
the United States has provided to Pakistan from 2002 through 2007, we
identified about $5.8 billion specifically for Pakistan's FATA and
border region; about 96 percent of this funding reimbursed Pakistan for
military operations in the FATA and the border region. According to
Defense and State Department officials, Pakistan deployed up to 120,000
military and paramilitary forces in the FATA and killed and captured
hundreds of suspected al Qaeda operatives. In October 2007, State
reported that it had determined that Pakistan was making "significant"
progress toward eliminating the safe haven in the FATA. However, we
found broad agreement, as documented in the unclassified 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE), State and embassy documents, as well as
among Defense, State, and other officials, including those operating in
Pakistan, that al Qaeda had regenerated its ability to attack the
United States and had succeeded in establishing a safe haven in
Pakistan's FATA.
No comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in the
FATA has been developed, as stipulated by the National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism, recommended by the independent 9/11 Commission,
and mandated by congressional legislation.[Footnote 3] Since 2003, the
administration's national security strategies and Congress have
recognized that a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of
national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development
assistance, economic, and law enforcement support--was needed to
address the terrorist threat emanating from the FATA. Furthermore, in
2004, a provision of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act) established the NCTC to develop
comprehensive plans to combat terrorism that included clear objectives,
the assignment of tasks among executive branch departments, and
interagency coordination. We have previously reported on the need for
these and other elements to enhance interagency cooperation and improve
effectiveness.[Footnote 4] The NCTC also was tasked with monitoring
each department's efforts. However, neither the NCTC, the NSC, nor the
other executive branch departments have developed a comprehensive plan
that integrates the capabilities of the executive agencies and the
intelligence community. As a result, since 2002, the embassy has had no
Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorists and close
the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. In 2006, the U.S. government, in
conjunction with the government of Pakistan, began an effort to focus
more attention on other key elements of national power, such as
development and public diplomacy, to address U.S. goals in the FATA. In
support of this effort, Defense, State, and USAID began to develop
department-specific plans and hold interagency meetings to address
security and development issues in the FATA. However, this effort has
not yet resulted in a comprehensive plan. As of April 2008, not all of
these efforts have been approved in Washington, funding shortfalls
exist, and support from the recently elected government of Pakistan is
unknown.[Footnote 5]
We are recommending that the National Security Advisor and the Director
of the NCTC, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State,
the Administrator of USAID, the intelligence community, and other
executive departments as deemed appropriate, work to develop a
comprehensive plan using all elements of national power to combat the
terrorist threat and close the associated safe haven in Pakistan's FATA
region. The comprehensive plan should also include key components
called for in the Intelligence Reform Act and components that we have
previously reported as being needed to improve the effectiveness of
plans involving multidepartmental efforts to combat terrorism.
State, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),
Defense, and USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report,
which are reproduced in appendixes I, II, III, and IV.
State and ODNI did not comment on our recommendation, while Defense and
USAID concurred. In general, they all commented on their individual
planning efforts and interagency meetings to coordinate these efforts
that began in 2006. This, however, was not the focus of our review; our
report assessed whether a comprehensive plan had been developed that
incorporated all elements of national power.
State's comments asserted that embassy and U.S. government efforts to
date have resulted in a comprehensive strategy. We disagree, and note
in our report that while the initiatives begun by Defense, State, and
USAID are being coordinated by the embassy, they have not been fully
approved or integrated into a formal, comprehensive plan.
ODNI's comments stated that they agreed with our finding that the
United States had not met its national security goals in Pakistan's
FATA; however, they disagreed that the United States lacks plans to
combat terrorism. Our report does not state that the U.S. lacks agency-
specific plans; rather, we found that there was no comprehensive plan
that integrated the combined capabilities of Defense, State, USAID, the
intelligence community, and others, as called for by the 2003 national
security strategy, the 9/11 Commission report, and Congress.
We also received technical comments from Defense and USAID, which we
have incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.
Background:
The FATA is mountainous and shares a 373-mile border with Afghanistan
known as the Durand Line (see fig. 1). The FATA, which has a population
of 3.1 million people, is one of Pakistan's poorest regions, with high
poverty, high unemployment, and an underdeveloped infrastructure. Most
of the population depends on subsistence agriculture. The FATA's per
capita income is $250 per year, which is half of the national per
capita income; about 60 percent of the population lives below the
national poverty line. Per capita public development expenditure is
reportedly one-third of the national average. Social development
indicators are also poor. The overall literacy rate is 17 percent,
compared with 56 percent nationally, with male literacy at 29 percent
and female literacy at 3 percent. The FATA has just 41 hospitals for
its population of 3.1 million, and a doctor to population ratio of 1 to
6,762.
Figure 1: Map of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),
Pakistan:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of the FATA and surrounding areas of Pakistan and
Afghanistan. The boundaries and names used on this map do not imply
official endorsement or acceptance by the U.S. government.
The following areas are included in the FATA:
Bajuar Agency;
Mohmand Agency;
Khyber Agency;
Orakzai Agency;
Kurrum Agency;
North Waziristan Agency;
South Waziristan Agency.
Source: GAO; USAID and Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
The FATA is governed by an administrative system and a judicial system
different from the rest of Pakistan--the Frontier Crimes Regulations
(FCR) of 1901, codified under British rule.[Footnote 6] Because
Pakistan retained the colonial administrative and legal structures of
the British, as codified in the FCR, the FATA populations are legally
separate from and unequal to other Pakistani citizens. Examples of
these differences under the FCR follow:
* FATA residents do not have access to national political parties, and
political parties are forbidden from extending their activities into
the agencies of FATA.
* The FATA is under the direct executive authority of the President of
Pakistan. Laws framed by the National Assembly of Pakistan do not apply
in the FATA unless so ordered by the President, who is empowered to
issue regulations for the tribal areas.
* FATA residents do not have the right to legal representation, to
present material evidence, or to cross-examine witnesses in Pakistan's
judicial system. Those convicted are denied the right of appeal in
Pakistan's courts.
* The President's representatives to the FATA, who are called political
agents, can punish an entire tribe for crimes committed on the tribe's
territory by issuing fines, making arrests, implementing property
seizures, and establishing blockades.
In response to the draft, Defense noted that the FCR is a culturally
acceptable recognition of the tribal structure of the FATA, where the
population is ethnically different from the majority of Pakistan's
citizens, and precludes forced assimilation. Further, Defense noted
that removing the FCR without a replacement mechanism that is accepted
by the indigenous population has the potential to create a vacuum that
could result in negative consequences. A recent announcement by
Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani regarding the repeal of
the FCR drew mixed reactions from tribesmen and political leaders, some
of whom called for amendments to the FCR, rather than its repeal.
The U.S. Government Has Not Met National Security Goals in Pakistan's
FATA:
The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy
the terrorist threat and close the safe haven in the FATA, despite more
than $10.5 billion in U.S. support to Pakistan since 2002. Various
national security strategies have called for the use of all elements of
national power, such as diplomatic, military, intelligence, development
assistance, economic, and law enforcement support, to meet these goals;
however, the United States has relied principally on supporting the
Pakistani military to meet these goals. According to Defense and State,
the Pakistani government deployed up to 120,000 military and
paramilitary forces to combat terrorism in the FATA. Despite this
effort, the 2007 NIE, State and embassy documents, and Defense and
State officials, including those operating in Pakistan, have concluded
that al Qaeda has regenerated its ability to attack the United States
and succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan's FATA.
Although State Has Reported Some Progress in Pakistan's FATA, Other
Sources Indicate Resurgence of an al Qaeda Threat and the Establishment
of a Terrorist Safe Haven in the FATA:
On October 1, 2007, State provided Congress with a report in response
to a requirement in the Implementation of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007 (9/11 Commission Act).[Footnote 7] The report stated that it had
determined that Pakistan was (1) committed to eliminating from
Pakistani territory any organization, such as the Taliban, al Qaeda, or
any successor engaged in military, insurgent, or terrorist activities
in Afghanistan; (2) undertaking a comprehensive military, legal,
economic, and political campaign to achieve the goal described; and (3)
making demonstrated, significant, and sustained progress toward
eliminating support or safe havens for terrorists. Notwithstanding
State's report to Congress, we found broad agreement that al Qaeda had
established a safe haven in the FATA and reconstituted its attack
capability. In particular, the unclassified versions of the 2007 NIE
and 2008 Annual Threat Assessment state that al Qaeda has regenerated
its attack capability and secured a safe haven in Pakistan's FATA.
[Footnote 8] These conclusions are supported by a broad array of
sources, including Defense, State, and senior U.S. embassy officials in
Pakistan.
The NIE and other sources have found that al Qaeda has established a
safe haven in Pakistan. The DNI's 2008 assessment stated that the safe
haven in Pakistan provides al Qaeda with many of the same advantages it
had when it was based across the border in Afghanistan. According to
the assessment, the safe haven in the FATA serves as a staging area for
al Qaeda's attacks in support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Further,
it serves as a location for training new terrorist operatives for
attacks in Pakistan, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the United
States. U.S. government officials in Washington and Pakistan also
acknowledge that al Qaeda has established a safe haven near Pakistan's
border with Afghanistan. For example, State's April 2007 Country
Reports on Terrorism states that Pakistan remains a major source of
Islamic extremism and a safe haven for some top terrorist leaders,
including those of al Qaeda.
The NIE, The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland, also found that al
Qaeda had effectively found replacements for many of its senior
operational planners over the years. The NIE stated that, in the past 2
years, al Qaeda's central leadership regenerated the core operational
capabilities needed to conduct attacks against the United States. It
also found that al Qaeda's central leadership, based in the border area
of Pakistan, is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to
the United States.
The 2008 DNI Annual Threat Assessment and other sources have concluded
that the resurgence of al Qaeda terrorists on the border between
Pakistan and Afghanistan now pose a preeminent threat to U.S. national
security. The assessment also examines the impact of not meeting the
national security goals. It states that al Qaeda is now using the
Pakistani safe haven to put the last element necessary to launch
another attack against America into place, including the
identification, training, and positioning of Western operatives for an
attack. It stated that al Qaeda is most likely using the FATA to plot
terrorist attacks against political, economic, and infrastructure
targets in America "designed to produce mass casualties, visually
dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear
among the population."
DNI's 2008 assessment found that al Qaeda and other Pakistan-based
militants now also pose a threat to Pakistan. The assessment found an
unparalleled increase in suicide attacks against Pakistan's military
and civilians over the past year, with total casualties in 2007
exceeding all such attacks in the preceding 5 years. These attacks were
ordered by Pakistan-based militants, many of whom are allied with al
Qaeda. It found that the terrorist assassination of former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto could encourage terrorists to strike the
Pakistani establishment anywhere in the country. The assessment
concluded that radical elements now have the potential to undermine
Pakistan itself.
The United States Has Relied Primarily on the Pakistani Military to
Accomplish Its Goals in Pakistan's FATA, with Little Focus on Economic
Development and Improving Governance:
Since 2002, the United States has relied principally on the Pakistani
military to address U.S. national security goals in the FATA. There
have been limited efforts, however, to address other underlying causes
of terrorism in the FATA, such as providing development assistance or
addressing the FATA's political needs. For example, although the FATA
has some of the worst development indicators in Pakistan and is ruled
under colonial administrative and legal structures dating from 1901,
the United States has devoted little funding to address these issues in
the FATA.
From fiscal years 2002 to 2007, the United States has provided Pakistan
with more than $10.5 billion in funds and assistance.[Footnote 9]
Approximately $5.8 billion of this amount has been directed at efforts
to combat terrorism in Pakistan's FATA and the border region. As figure
2 shows, about 96 percent of this amount was used to reimburse the
Pakistani government through CSF[Footnote 10] for military operations
in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, most
significantly against terrorists in Pakistan's FATA and border region.
We identified only two nonmilitary activities that occurred in the FATA
and border region: State's Border Security Program, which received
about $187 million, and USAID development activities, which amounted to
about $40 million.
Figure 2: Percentage of U.S. Funding Directed toward Military, Border
Security, and Development Activities in Pakistan's FATA and Border
Region from Fiscal Years 2002 to 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a pie-chart depicting the following data:
Percentage of U.S. Funding Directed toward Military, Border Security,
and Development Activities in Pakistan's FATA and Border Region from
Fiscal Years 2002 to 2007:
Military Efforts: 96%;
Border Security Program: 3%;
Development Assistance: 1%.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense, State, and USAID data.
[End of figure]
According to a State Department report, Pakistan's military forces have
had some tactical successes in the FATA. The Pakistani government
stationed military and paramilitary forces along the border with
Afghanistan, and security operations in the FATA disrupted terrorist
activity by targeting and raiding al Qaeda and other militant safe
havens.[Footnote 11] According to State, Pakistan has helped kill or
capture hundreds of suspected terrorists, including al Qaeda operatives
and Taliban leaders. In addition, Pakistani military operations have
resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,400 members of its security
forces.
Key Government Stakeholders Recognize That a More Comprehensive
Approach Is Needed:
Defense, State, U.S. embassy, and Pakistani government officials
recognize that relying primarily on the Pakistani military has not
succeeded in neutralizing al Qaeda and preventing the establishment of
a safe haven in the FATA. State's April 2007 Country Reports on
Terrorism states that, despite having Pakistani troops in the FATA and
sustaining hundreds of casualties, the government of Pakistan has been
unable to exert control over the area. The report concluded that
Pakistan has now recognized that military operations alone will not
restore security and stability to the FATA. Similarly, U.S. embassy
officials in Pakistan stated that Taliban and al Qaeda elements have
created a safe haven in the FATA and have used it to plan and launch
attacks on Afghan, Pakistani, U.S., and coalition forces in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. The embassy further noted that al Qaeda and the Taliban
continue to recruit, train, and operate in the FATA.
According to senior embassy officials, U.S. reliance on Pakistan's
military stemmed from the lack of a comprehensive plan to guide embassy
efforts and the sense that the Pakistani military was the most capable
institution in Pakistan to quickly undertake operations against al
Qaeda immediately after the attacks of 9/11. Senior embassy officials
stated that this may have led to an "over-reliance" on the Pakistani
military to achieve U.S. national security objectives in Pakistan.
No Comprehensive Plan for Guiding U.S. Efforts in the FATA Has Been
Developed, as Called for by the Administration and Congress:
Despite the recognition of U.S. government officials, including the
U.S. President and Congress, that a comprehensive plan employing all
elements of national power--diplomatic, military, intelligence,
development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support--was
needed to combat terrorism and close the terrorist safe haven in
Pakistan's FATA region, a comprehensive plan to meet U.S. national
security goals in the region was never developed. Recognizing in 2006
that military efforts alone would not succeed in the FATA, the embassy,
with Defense, State, and USAID support, and in conjunction with the
Pakistani government in power at that time, began an effort to focus
more attention on the other key elements of national power, such as
development and public diplomacy, to address U.S. national security
goals in the FATA. However, this effort has not been formally approved
by U.S. government stakeholders who would play a key role in the
funding and implementation of such an effort, and support from the
recently elected Pakistani government is uncertain.
Presidential Powers for Implementing National Security Strategies and
Developing a Comprehensive Plan:
The President of the United States has primary responsibility to ensure
that his national security strategy is carried out effectively. The
President has the authority to task executive branch departments to
develop comprehensive plans that use all elements of U.S. power--
diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic,
and law enforcement support--toward meeting U.S. national security
goals. As a result, the President can task key national security
agencies, such as Defense, State, USAID, the Departments of Homeland
Security, Justice, the Treasury, and intelligence agencies, to develop
a comprehensive, integrated strategy and to use their combined
capabilities to combat terrorism, as called for in the national
security strategies. The President can also use the NSC[Footnote 12]
and the NCTC[Footnote 13] to assist in developing, coordinating, and
monitoring these plans.
Despite Executive, Congressional, and Independent Calls for
Comprehensive Plans to Combat Terrorism and Close Terrorist Safe
Havens, Such Plans Were Never Developed:
As table 1 shows, the need for the development of comprehensive plans
employing all elements of national power--diplomatic, military,
intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement
support--to combat terrorism and close terrorist safe havens has been
recognized by the President's national security strategies (2003), the
independent 9/11 Commission (2004), and by Congress in repeated
legislation (2004 and 2007). As it became clearer that al Qaeda had
retreated from Afghanistan into Pakistan and was creating a safe haven
in the FATA, Congress increased its demands on the U.S. administration
to develop comprehensive plans to help Pakistan combat terrorism and
close the FATA safe haven.
Table 1: Key Recommendations by Executive, Independent, and
Congressional Sources to Combat Terrorism and Close Terrorist Safe
Havens:
Key document: National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003;
Source: President Bush and the NSC;
Recommendation:
* Called for comprehensive plans employing all elements of national
power--diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance,
economic, and law enforcement support--to combat terrorism;
* Gave State lead to develop coordinated plans; all appropriate
departments were to develop supporting strategies;
* Directed Defense, State, and intelligence agencies to annually assess
and develop plans to close safe havens.
Key document: 9/11 Commission Report, 2004;
Source: 9/11 Commission, an independent, bipartisan study group
mandated by Congress in 2002;
Recommendation:
* Stated that long-term success demands coordinated, comprehensive,
multidepartment efforts employing all elements of national power;
* Recommended that a single entity be responsible for comprehensive,
multidepartment planning for U.S. efforts to combat terrorism;
* Recommended U.S. (1) make a long-term, comprehensive commitment to
assist Pakistan to combat terrorism and (2) develop a strategy to close
safe havens.
Key document: Intelligence Reform Act, 2004;
Source: Congress;
Recommendation:
* Authorized creation of the NCTC to develop comprehensive,
multidepartment plans to combat terrorism employing all elements of
national power;
* Stipulated that such plans should include (1) the mission, (2)
objectives, (3) tasks to be performed, (4) interagency coordination,
and (5) roles and responsibilities. It also tasked the NCTC with
monitoring each agency involved;
* Required a report within 180 days of passage of the act on the
administration's strategies for (1) closing terrorist safe havens and
(2) assisting Pakistan to combat terrorism.
Key document: 9/11 Commission Act, 2007;
Source: Congress;
Recommendation:
* Required the President to submit a report by November 2007 on the
strategy, employing all elements of national power, to combat terrorism
in the FATA.
Source: GAO analysis of key documents.
[End of table]
Despite recommendations by the President's own national security
strategy, by the independent 9/11 Commission, as well as legislative
mandates from Congress, a comprehensive plan to destroy the terrorist
threat or close the safe haven in the FATA was never developed. Even
after the creation of the NCTC, an organization specifically intended
to develop, implement, and monitor multidepartment plans to combat
terrorism, the embassy has yet to receive any such plan to combat
terrorism in Pakistan's FATA. In addition, the administration did not
report to Congress on its plans for assisting Pakistan in (1) combating
terrorism and (2) closing terrorist safe havens, as required by both
the 2004 and 2007 legislation.
As a result, the embassy has lacked a Washington-approved,
comprehensive plan that combines the capabilities of Defense, State,
USAID, intelligence agencies, and other U.S. departments to combat
terrorism in the FATA. According to senior embassy officials in
Islamabad, the embassy had not received a comprehensive plan from the
CIA, Defense, State, the NCTC, the NSC, the White House, or any other
executive department. Further, these officials stated that they had not
received any strategic guidance on designing, implementing, funding,
and monitoring a comprehensive effort that would use all elements of
national power to combat terrorism in Pakistan. According to senior
embassy officials, given the strategic threat to America, the United
States should have a comprehensive strategy to defeat terrorists that
uses all elements of national power.
Defense, State, the DNI, USAID, and the government of Pakistan
recognize that a comprehensive approach is needed to meet U.S. national
security goals in Pakistan. For example, in its 2007 Country Reports on
Terrorism, State indicated that Pakistan recognized that military
operations alone would not restore stability to the FATA; instead, a
comprehensive strategy was needed that also included economic, social
development, political, and administrative efforts to enhance security
in the region. The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan also concluded that, while
force is a necessary component of an overall strategy to combat
terrorism in the FATA, it is not sufficient as the sole component.
Similarly, the DNI stated that Pakistan now recognizes it must take a
more comprehensive approach to defeating terrorism and that an
intensified and sustained effort that combines administrative,
economic, educational, legal, and social reforms to defeat the
terrorist threat is required.[Footnote 14]
We have previously reported on the need for plans to combat terrorism
to include elements that would enhance interagency cooperation and
improve effectiveness. Specifically, in large-scale interagency efforts
where collaboration is essential, we have found that agencies should
(1) define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually
reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address funding needs
by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and responsibilities; (5)
establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate
across agency boundaries; (6) develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate,
and report on results; (7) reinforce agency accountability for
collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports; and (8)
reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts through
performance management systems.[Footnote 15]
Pakistan and the U.S. Embassy are Encouraging More Focus on Other Key
Elements of National Power to Achieve U.S. Goals in the FATA:
In March 2006, the President of Pakistan requested that President Bush
support Pakistan's effort to support a more comprehensive approach to
combating terrorism in the FATA. As a result, the U.S. Embassy in
Pakistan began coordinating efforts by Defense, State, and USAID to
develop department-specific efforts to support Pakistan's Sustainable
Development Plan for the FATA. Pakistan's Sustainable Development Plan
is a 9 year, $2 billion effort to provide economic development, extend
the influence of the Pakistani government, and establish security in
the FATA. To assist this effort, Defense undertook a counterinsurgency
assessment in the FATA and began developing its Security Development
Plan. At the same time, USAID provided technical assistance to the
Pakistani government to help formalize its Sustainable Development
Plan, as well as to plan USAID-development activities in the FATA.
This approach, if approved by the administration and key U.S.
government agency stakeholders, would constitute the U.S. government's
first attempt to focus more attention on other key elements of national
power to address U.S. counterterrorism goals in the FATA. These
elements include development assistance and public diplomacy, as well
as counterinsurgency training, which have not been part of the previous
military approach. This new approach also calls for greater levels of
direct U.S. planning, implementation, coordination, and oversight.
However, this new approach does not yet constitute a comprehensive
plan, and all of the agencies' individual efforts have not been fully
approved in Washington. Furthermore, funding shortfalls exist, and
support by the recently elected government of Pakistan is uncertain.
If fully approved, the United States would provide an estimated $956
million between fiscal years 2008 through 2011 for development,
security, capacity building, and infrastructure in support of the
Pakistani government. This approach represents the first effort by the
U.S. embassy to directly plan, implement, coordinate, and monitor a
multidepartment effort to combat terrorism in the FATA. According to
officials with the U.S. embassy, the Pakistani government, and
international donors, this comprehensive approach is critical to
addressing the terrorist threat in the FATA and represents a
significant departure from the past.
As of September 2007, the embassy planned to spend $187.6 million on
this initial effort using fiscal year 2007 funds. The funding has been
directed to four areas:
* Development: The $99 million development effort would be led by USAID
and would include capacity building for the FATA institutions needed to
plan, manage, and monitor development projects; efforts to build
community and government relations; funding for health and education
services; and efforts to increase employment and economic
growth.[Footnote 16]
* Security: The $54.1 million Defense and State security effort would
include training for military and paramilitary units in the FATA--
including the Frontier Corps, special operations forces, and air crews-
-and for providing night vision goggles, radios, and other equipment.
* Infrastructure: The $32.5 million the U.S. embassy has designated for
infrastructure improvements related to both its security and
development efforts would be used for road construction, the Frontier
Corps training center, and border surveillance outposts.
* Public diplomacy: $2 million in funding was allotted for public
diplomacy programs.
According to the embassy, the success of this new effort in the FATA
will depend on close coordination among an array of institutions within
the U.S. and Pakistani governments. The new effort also will involve
partner agencies and allies, including the United Kingdom, Japan, and
Europe; the Asian Development Bank; nongovernmental organizations; and
the Pakistani private sector, civil society, and the tribes of the
FATA.
We plan to monitor the status and progress of the U.S. government in
developing this effort and provide an assessment in a subsequent report
covering security, political, and development activities undertaken by
the United States to meet U.S. national security goals in the FATA.
Conclusion:
Combating terrorism is the United States' top national security
priority at home and abroad. Since 9/11, U.S. national security
strategies have consistently called for using all elements of national
power to combat terrorism, including diplomatic, military,
intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement
support. Because the use of the various elements of national power
falls under the authority of numerous U.S. government agencies, the
development of a comprehensive plan is needed to ensure that the full
capacity of the U.S. government is focused on meeting U.S. national
security goals.
We believe that such a plan would help to ensure coordination,
integration, and implementation of U.S. efforts to close the terrorist
safe haven in the FATA. A comprehensive plan to combat terrorism in the
FATA that establishes goals, objectives, priorities, outcomes, and
milestones, including specific performance measures, would allow an
assessment of progress and help ensure accountability of U.S. efforts.
As such, we believe that the administration should develop a
comprehensive plan using the full capabilities provided by Defense,
State, USAID, and other U.S. agencies and stakeholders to further
assist Pakistan in combating terrorism.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the National Security Advisor and the Director of the
NCTC, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State, and
the Administrator of USAID, the intelligence community, and other
executive departments as deemed appropriate, implement the
congressional mandate to develop a comprehensive plan using all
elements of national power to combat the terrorist threat and close
their safe haven in Pakistan's FATA region.
The comprehensive plan should also include key components called for in
the Intelligence Reform Act, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission Act of 2007, and components that we have previously
reported as being needed to improve the effectiveness of plans
involving multidepartmental efforts to combat terrorism.[Footnote 17]
The plan should (1) place someone directly in charge of this
multidepartment effort to improve accountability; (2) articulate a
clear strategy to implement the national security goal to destroy
terrorists and close the safe haven in the FATA; (3) clarify roles and
responsibilities of each department for implementing the goal; (4)
provide guidance on setting funding priorities and providing resources
to meet these national security goals; and (5) require a monitoring
system and provide periodic reports to Congress on the progress and
impediments to meeting national security goals in Pakistan.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
State, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI),
Defense, and USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report,
which are reproduced in appendixes I, II, III, and IV.
State and ODNI did not comment on our recommendation, while Defense and
USAID concurred with our recommendation. In general, they all commented
on their individual planning efforts and interagency meetings to
coordinate these efforts that began in 2006. This, however, was not the
focus of our review; our report assessed whether a comprehensive plan
had been developed that incorporated all elements of national power. We
plan to conduct a detailed assessment of the individual agency efforts
from 2002 to the present as part of our broader engagement efforts and
look forward to working closely with ODNI, Defense, State, USAID, and
other agencies in assessing their plans and efforts to meet national
security goals in Pakistan.
State's comments assert that embassy and U.S. government efforts to
date have resulted in a comprehensive strategy. We disagree and note in
our report that, while the initiatives begun by Defense, State, and
USAID are being coordinated by the embassy, they have not been fully
approved or integrated into a formal, comprehensive plan. While we
acknowledge that this effort is a step in the right direction toward
implementing the 2003 national security strategy, the recommendations
by the 9/11 Commission, and Congress, it is unclear whether the new
approach will include all of the key elements of national power, such
as intelligence, economic, and law enforcement support.
ODNI's comments stated that they agreed with our finding that the
United States had not met its national security goals in Pakistan's
FATA and that countering the growth of terrorist safe havens requires
all elements of national power. They disagreed, however, that the
United States lacks plans to combat terrorism in the area. Our report
does not state that the U.S. lacks individual plans; rather, we found
that there was no comprehensive plan that integrated the combined
capabilities of Defense, State, USAID, the intelligence community, and
others to meet U.S. national security goals in Pakistan.
We also received technical comments from Defense and USAID, which we
have incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested congressional committees, to the National Security
Advisor of the NSC, the Director of the NCTC, the Secretaries of State
and Defense, and the Administrator of USAID. We will also make copies
of this report available to others upon request. We will also make
copies available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Charles Michael Johnson Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Congressional Requesters:
The Honorable Howard Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Gary Ackerman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Mike Pence:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Harkin:
The Honorable Robert Menendez:
United States Senate:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
April 7, 2008:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"Combating Terrorism: U.S. Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy
Terrorist Threat and Close Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Areas," GAO Job Code 320573.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Tom
West, Desk Officer, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, at (202)
647-6710.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO - Charles Michael Johnson:
SCA - Richard Boucher:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy
Terrorist Threat and Close Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (GAO-08-622; GAO Code 320573):
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) draft report titled: Combating
Terrorism: U.S. Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy Terrorist Threat
and Close Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
The study does not acknowledge that the United States had an overall
plan for Pakistan, put together in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
That initial plan called for working closely with and supporting the
Pakistani military to confront the extremists militarily and working to
deny them their safe havens along the Pakistan-Afghan border. To a
large extent, the plan worked. From 2001-2006, we - or the Pakistanis -
arrested or killed hundreds of al-Qaeda and Taliban extremists,
shattered terrorist networks, disrupted their training camps and short-
circuited terrorist operations. U.S.-Pakistani cooperation made it more
difficult for terrorists to operate in Pakistan. By the end of 2006,
120,000 Pakistani troops were involved in on-going operations against
violent extremists along the Pakistan-Afghan border. The GAO draft
report acknowledges this but fails to attribute it to a deliberate
planning effort.
The immediate post-9/11 plan was, however, largely military and was
therefore limited in its effect. Additionally, the plan was undercut by
events following the 2006 North Waziristan agreement between the
militants and the Government of Pakistan (also unaddressed in the
report), during which time terrorists were able to rebuild and regroup.
We and the Pakistanis recognized that a new plan was needed to address
the broader conditions that support terrorism; specifically, the
abysmal social conditions in the Tribal Areas and the absence of
central authority there. A series of interagency meetings in summer of
2006 (Deputies Committees meetings on July 16 and August 22,
specifically) laid further groundwork for what became our current FATA
strategy and our support for the Pakistani Sustainable Development Plan
for the Tribal Areas. This strategy brought together security
assistance for the local Frontier Corps, economic and development
assistance for the Tribal Region, private sector development programs,
and our proposal for Reconstruction Opportunity Zones for job creation
in border areas of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Taken together with
complementary military and intelligence participation, this became our
comprehensive, integrated strategy and has been implemented since that
time.
The GAO draft does acknowledge the difficult conditions in Pakistan,
the vast un-policed territories, the abysmal social conditions in the
tribal belt and our need to rely completely upon a Pakistani military
under-equipped and under-trained to conduct counter-insurgency
operations. It also acknowledges the decades when the Tribal Areas were
used as a jihadist training area and jumping off point for the anti-
Soviet war in Afghanistan. But the Report fails to acknowledge the
continuing efforts that have gone into devising, funding and
implementing a broad-based plan to address these conditions.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
2700 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2700:
April 7, 2008:
Mr. Charles Johnson Jr.
Director, International Counterterrorism Issues, International Affairs
and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Mr. Johnson:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-08-622, "Combating Terrorism: U.S. Lacks Comprehensive Plan
to Destroy Terrorist Threat and Close Safe Haven in Pakistan's
Federally Administered Tribal Areas," dated March 28, 2008 (GAO Code
320573).
We have enclosed comments addressing the report and its
recommendations.
My point of contact is Mr. Eric Lebson, 703-697-3754, or e-mail:
eric.lebson@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James J. Shinn:
GAO Draft Report Dated March 28, 2008:
GAO-08-622 (GAO Code 320573):
"Combating Terrorism: U.S. Lacks Comprehensive Plan To Destroy
Terrorist Threat And Close Safe Haven In Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Areas"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendation:
Recommendation: The GAO recommends that the National Security Advisor
and the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, in
consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the
Administrator of United States Agency for International Development,
the intelligence community, and other executive departments as deemed
appropriate, implement the congressional mandate to develop a
comprehensive plan using all elements of national power, to combat the
terrorist threat and close their safe haven in Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Areas region. The comprehensive plan should also
include key components called for in the Intelligence Reform Act and by
GAO to improve the effectiveness of plans involving multi-departmental
effort to combat terrorism. (p. 25/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: Concur. DoD supports the development of a comprehensive
plan to close safe havens in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal
Areas. In November 2007 and February 2008, DoD provided to the State
Department inputs for a comprehensive strategy. DoD has participated in
a wide variety of inter-agency meetings that have addressed the on-
going development of this strategy. This includes Deputies Committee
meetings on 14 and 20 March 2008 and long-standing weekly informal
South/Central Asia inter-agency meetings hosted by the Assistant
Secretary of State for South and Central Asia. DoD is continuing to
play an active role in the inter-agency effort to develop and
coordinate a comprehensive plan to close terrorist safe havens in
Pakistan.
Note: DoD has forwarded technical comments (context, inaccuracies and
additional background) about the report directly to GAO and recommended
their consideration for the final version of the report.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID:
From The American People:
U.S. Agency for International Development:
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW:
Washington, DC 20523:
[hyperlink, http://www.usaid.gov]:
April 9, 2008:
Mr. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Johnson:
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) appreciates the
opportunity to review and respond to your draft audit report entitled
"Combating Terrorism: U.S. Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy
Terrorist Threat and Close Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Areas," GAO-08-622.
In general, we concur with your overall recommendation that the U.S.
Government (USG) needs a comprehensive plan for work in the FATA.
However, work in the FATA should be guided by the Government of
Pakistan's own FATA Sustainable Development Plan, which was developed
in consultation with the USG and was completed in 2006. The USAID plan
for programs in the FATA was presented to the USG's interagency in
December 2006. Prior to the formal presentation, this plan was vetted
thoroughly with, and approved by, the country team in Islamabad, and
also in the interagency in Washington.
Additionally, please note that:
* USAID is an instrument of "soft power" as opposed to the "hard power"
programs with the Pakistani military described extensively in the draft
report. Our programs focus on addressing the underlying causes of
insurgencies and the development issues which allow for terrorist safe
havens. Successful strategies in settings such as the FATA depend on
mutually reinforcing hard and soft approaches conducted in tandem.
* The embassy's engagement on strategic development in FATA began in
summer 2006 and included reopening a USAID office in Peshawar,
launching a development strategy in tandem with the GOP and organizing
a FATA donor's discussion at the fall 2006 World Bank/IMF meetings in
Singapore.
* USAID initially started with small scale programs in education,
health and microfinance as pilots which then determined the strategy
for our larger programs currently being implemented.
In conclusion, we feel that the GAO should recognize the Government of
Pakistan, USAID and the wider country team for advancing strategic
thinking on the FATA development program.
Thanks very much for the opportunity to comment on this report and for
the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this review.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Lisa Chiles:
Deputy Assistant Administrator:
Bureau for Asia:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence:
Office Of The Director Of National Intelligence:
Washington, DC 20511:
April 8, 2008:
Ms. Janet St. Laurent:
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the National
Counterterrorism Center appreciate the opportunity to review the GAO
report number 08-622 Combating Terrorism: U.S. Lacks Comprehensive Plan
to Destroy Terrorist Threat and Close Safe Haven in Pakistan's
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Although we agree that the United
States has not yet met its national security goals in Pakistan's
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), we disagree that the United
States lacks plans to combat terrorism in the area.
Effectively countering the growth of extremism and the emergence of
terrorist safehavens requires all elements of national power, to
include diplomatic, military, development assistance, financial, law
enforcement, and intelligence. The National Security Council, the
Department of State, and the Department of Defense, have, therefore,
been actively involved in the United States Government efforts to deny
our terrorist enemies safehavens such as the FATA. The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, the National Counterterrorism
Center, and the Intelligence Community have also been actively involved
in such efforts.
The National Counterterrorism Center, for example, produced the
landmark National Implementation Plan for the War on Terror, which was
signed by the President in June 2006, and was the first-ever United
States Government-wide strategic plan for countering terrorism. This
war plan does not stand alone. Rather, it complements two types of
planning efforts that have long existed and continue to exist: (1) high-
level national strategies directed by the President and the National
Security and Homeland Security Councils, and (2) very granular and
tactical department and agency-specific implementation plans.
The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has also been expanding its
ongoing efforts to coordinate near-term department and agency
activities at the strategic operational level in certain key regions of
the world. NCTC combines regional and functional priorities to ensure
its strategic operational planning initiatives, which by definition are
interagency in nature, properly balance high-level and mission centric
perspectives, and are comprehensive in drawing on all instruments of
national power. NCTC has participated in a recently-completed
interagency initiative to determine counterterrorism priorities, which,
along with other efforts, provide a regional perspective to functional
efforts and plans, such as the National Implementation Plan.
I thank you again for the opportunity to review this report and look
forward to working with your office in the future.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Kathleen Turner:
Director of Legislative Affairs:
[End of section]
Appendix V GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Charles Michael Johnson Jr., Director, International Affairs and Trade,
(202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Hynek Kalkus, Assistant
Director; Edward J. George; Claude Adrien; David Hancock; Lynn Cothern;
Karen Deans; Mark Dowling; and Jena Sinkfield made key contributions to
this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] These goals have been set forth in the 2002 National Security
Strategy, the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the 2004
9/11 Commission Report, and endorsed by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458, sec 7102 (b)(3)) and
the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
(P.L. 110-53, sec. 2042(b)(2)).
[2] The International Crisis Group is an independent, nonpartisan
source of analysis on the prevention and resolution of global
conflicts.
[3] The administration's 2003 National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism, the independent 9/11 Commission Report, and Congress's (1)
Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-
458, sec. 7120) and (2) the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53, sec. 2042 (c)) all support the
development of a comprehensive plan that uses all elements of national
power.
[4] We reported that strategic plans should clearly define objectives
to be accomplished, identify the roles and responsibilities for meeting
each objective, ensure that funding necessary to achieve the objectives
is available, and employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress
and identify needed improvements. See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law
Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to
Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697] (Washington, D.C.: May
25, 2007); GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help
Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
21, 2005); and GAO, Combating Terrorism: Observations on National
Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2003).
[5] We will continue to monitor the status and progress of the U.S.
government's effort in the FATA and report on the matter in a
subsequent report.
[6] The information on foreign law in this report does not reflect our
independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary
sources.
[7] P.L. 110-53, sec. 2042(d), Aug. 3, 2007.
[8] The DNI's 2007 NIE and its 2008 Annual Threat Assessment are
designed to help U.S. civilian and military leaders develop policies to
protect U.S. national security interests and represent the combined
judgments of 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, according to the NIE.
[9] GAO arrived at this figure by analyzing Defense, State, and USAID
documents. We identified major sources of U.S. funding to Pakistan,
including $5.56 billion in CSF reimbursed through June 2007, $1.98
billion in development assistance (through December 2007), $1.6 billion
in economic support fund cash transfers to support basic government
operations, $1.22 billion for the purchase of military equipment, $9
million in international military training, and $202 million in border
security assistance.
[10] CSF reimburses Pakistan for a variety of activities in support of
the global war on terror, the majority of which consists of Army and
Air Force operations against terrorists in Pakistan's FATA and the
border region. However, some of the CSF also supports Pakistani Navy
and Air Force activities outside of this area. Defense was unable to
quantify what was reimbursed for activities outside the FATA and the
border region at the time of our report, and therefore, we included all
CSF funds in figure 2 as funds going toward the FATA and the border
region.
[11] Department of State report to Congress, pursuant to Section 2042
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commissions Act of 2007
(P.L. 110-53).
[12] The NSC is charged with more effectively coordinating the policies
and functions of the departments and agencies related to national
security. The NSC advises the President with respect to the integration
of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national
security to enable the departments and agencies to cooperate more
effectively in matters involving national security.
[13] The NCTC is charged with conducting strategic operational planning
for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of
national power--including diplomatic, military, intelligence,
development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support--within
and among agencies, with the ultimate goal of preventing future attacks
against the United States and its interests worldwide. Both report
directly to the President.
[14] Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence
for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 5, 2008.
[15] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697],
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15], and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T].
[16] In commenting on this report, USAID stated they received $88
million for these efforts in the Fiscal Year 2007 Supplemental
Appropriation.
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697],
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15], and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T].
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Mail or Phone:
The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent.
Orders should be sent to:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room LM:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
To order by Phone:
Voice: (202) 512-6000:
TDD: (202) 512-2537:
Fax: (202) 512-6061:
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
