International Food Security
Insufficient Efforts by Host Governments and Donors Threaten Progress to Halve Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 Gao ID: GAO-08-680 May 29, 2008In 1996, the United States and more than 180 world leaders pledged to halve the number of undernourished people globally by 2015 from the 1990 level. The global number has not decreased significantly--remaining at about 850 million in 2001-2003--and the number in sub-Saharan Africa has increased from about 170 million in 1990-1992 to over 200 million in 2001-2003. On the basis of analyses of U.S. and international agency documents, structured panel discussions with experts and practitioners, and fieldwork in four African countries, GAO was asked to examine (1) factors that contribute to persistent food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa and (2) the extent to which host governments and donors, including the United States, are working toward halving hunger in the region by 2015.
Chronic undernourishment (food insecurity) in sub-Saharan Africa persists primarily due to low agricultural productivity, limited rural development, government policy disincentives, and the impact of poor health on the agricultural workforce. Additional factors, including rising global commodity prices and climate change, will likely further exacerbate food insecurity in the region. Agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa, as measured by grain yield, is only about 40 percent of that of the rest of the world's developing countries, and the gap has widened over the years. Low agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa is due, in part, to the limited use of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer and improved seed varieties, and the lack of modern farming practices. The efforts of host governments and donors, including the United States, to achieve the goal of halving hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 have thus far been insufficient. First, some host governments have not prioritized food security as a development goal, and, according to a 2008 report of the International Food Policy Research Institute, as of 2005, only a few countries had fulfilled a 2003 pledge to direct 10 percent of government spending to agriculture. Second, donors have reduced the priority given to agriculture, and their efforts have been further hampered by difficulties in coordination and deficiencies in measuring and monitoring progress. Third, limited agricultural development resources and a fragmented approach have impaired U.S. efforts to reduce hunger in Africa. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funding to address food insecurity in Africa has been primarily for emergency food aid, which has been crucial in helping to alleviate food crises but has not addressed the underlying factors that contributed to the recurrence and severity of these crises. Also, the United States' principal strategy for meeting its commitment to halve hunger in Africa is limited to some of USAID's agricultural development activities and does not integrate other U.S. agencies' agricultural development assistance to the region.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-680, International Food Security: Insufficient Efforts by Host Governments and Donors Threaten Progress to Halve Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2015
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2008:
International Food Security:
Insufficient Efforts by Host Governments and Donors Threaten Progress
to Halve Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2015:
GAO-08-680:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-680, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 1996, the United States and more than 180 world leaders pledged to
halve the number of undernourished people globally by 2015 from the
1990 level. The global number has not decreased significantly”remaining
at about 850 million in 2001-2003”and the number in sub-Saharan Africa
has increased from about 170 million in 1990-1992 to over 200 million
in 2001-2003. On the basis of analyses of U.S. and international agency
documents, structured panel discussions with experts and practitioners,
and fieldwork in four African countries, GAO was asked to examine (1)
factors that contribute to persistent food insecurity in sub-Saharan
Africa and (2) the extent to which host governments and donors,
including the United States, are working toward halving hunger in the
region by 2015.
What GAO Found:
Chronic undernourishment (food insecurity) in sub-Saharan Africa
persists primarily due to low agricultural productivity, limited rural
development, government policy disincentives, and the impact of poor
health on the agricultural workforce. Additional factors, including
rising global commodity prices and climate change, will likely further
exacerbate food insecurity in the region. Agricultural productivity in
sub-Saharan Africa, as measured by grain yield, is only about 40
percent of that of the rest of the world‘s developing countries, and
the gap has widened over the years (see left figure). Low agricultural
productivity in sub-Saharan Africa is due, in part, to the limited use
of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer and improved seed varieties,
and the lack of modern farming practices.
Figure: Sub-Saharan Africa Has Lagged Behind the Rest of the World's
Developing Countries in Agricultural Productivity:
[See PDF for image]
The figure is a multiple line graph and a photograph of a farmer
plowing a field. The graph depicts the following data:
Agricultural productivity, by grain yield (kilograms per acre):
Year: 1970;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 338.139;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 624.954.
Year: 1975;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 418.187;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 637.968.
Year: 1980;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 446.47;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 741.97.
Year: 1985;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 454.974.
Rest of the World's developing countries: 870.869.
Year: 1990;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 438.263;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1013.99.
Year: 1995;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 424.958;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1119.09.
Year: 2000;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 468.151;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1211.72.
Year: 2005;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 529.176;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1312.22.
[End of figure]
Figure: Share of Official Development Assistance (ODA) of Agriculture
for Sub-Saharan Africa Has Declined:
[See PDF for image]
The figure is a multiple line graph and a photograph of a child holding
a bowl of grain. The graph depicts the following data:
Year: 1974;
Mutilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-Saharan
Africa: 17%; Bilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa: 6%.
Year: 1978;
Mutilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-Saharan
Africa: 32%; Bilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa: 5%.
Year: 1982;
Mutilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-Saharan
Africa: 26%; Bilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa: 11%.
Year: 1986;
Mutilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-Saharan
Africa: 19%; Bilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa: 12%.
Year: 1990;
Mutilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-Saharan
Africa: 21%; Bilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa: 1%.
Year: 1994;
Mutilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-Saharan
Africa: 9%; Bilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa: 8%.
Year: 1998;
Mutilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-Saharan
Africa: 6%; Bilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa: 5%.
Year: 2002;
Mutilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-Saharan
Africa: 3%; Bilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa: 4%.
Year: 2006;
Mutilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-Saharan
Africa: 7%; Bilateral Assistance, Share of ODA for agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa: 3%.
Source: GAO analysis of Food and Agriculture Organization and
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development data.
[End of figure]
The efforts of host governments and donors, including the United
States, to achieve the goal of halving hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by
2015 have thus far been insufficient. First, some host governments have
not prioritized food security as a development goal, and, according to
a 2008 report of the International Food Policy Research Institute, as
of 2005, only a few countries had fulfilled a 2003 pledge to direct 10
percent of government spending to agriculture. Second, donors have
reduced the priority given to agriculture (see right figure), and their
efforts have been further hampered by difficulties in coordination and
deficiencies in measuring and monitoring progress. Third, limited
agricultural development resources and a fragmented approach have
impaired U.S. efforts to reduce hunger in Africa. The U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) funding to address food insecurity in
Africa has been primarily for emergency food aid, which has been
crucial in helping to alleviate food crises but has not addressed the
underlying factors that contributed to the recurrence and severity of
these crises. Also, the United States‘ principal strategy for meeting
its commitment to halve hunger in Africa is limited to some of USAID‘s
agricultural development activities and does not integrate other U.S.
agencies‘ agricultural development assistance to the region.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Administrator of USAID, in collaboration with
the Secretaries of Agriculture, State, and the Treasury, (1) develop an
integrated governmentwide U.S. strategy that defines actions and
resources, enhances collaboration with host governments and donors, and
improves measures to monitor progress and (2) report annually to
Congress on the implementation of the first recommendation. USAID
concurred with the first recommendation but expressed concerns about
the vehicle of the annual reporting. The Departments of Agriculture and
the Treasury generally concurred with the findings, while State
identified additional issues for consideration.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-680]. For more
information, contact Thomas Melito at (202) 512-9601 or
melitot@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Food Insecurity Persists in Sub-Saharan Africa Due to Several Factors,
Including Low Agricultural Productivity:
Efforts of Host Governments and Donors, Including the United States,
Toward Halving Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 Have Been
Insufficient:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: U.S. Participation in the 1996 World Food Summit:
Appendix III: Factors and Interventions Affecting Food Security:
Appendix IV: Summary Results of GAO's Structured Panel Discussions with
Donors and NGOs, with Examples of Interventions:
Appendix V: Additional Development Partners That Implement Food
Security Interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Appendix VI: New Food Security Challenges: Rising Demand for Biofuels
and Climate Change:
Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Sub-Saharan African Farmers' Use of Agricultural Inputs
Compared with Other Farmers Worldwide, 1998 to 2000:
Table 2: Framework for Addressing Food Security Issues:
Table 3: Key Recommendations for Improving Food Security:
Table 4: Selected Studies with Negative Projected Impacts of Climate
Change on African Agriculture:
Figures:
Figure 1: Selected Events Related to Achieving Food Security and to the
WFS and MDG Targets, 1996 to 2015:
Figure 2: Prevalence of Undernourishment in the World (as of 2001-
2003), and Progress Needed to Halve Hunger in Four Selected Sub-Saharan
African Countries by 2015:
Figure 3: Selected Factors Contributing to Persistent Food Insecurity
in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Figure 4: Grain Yield Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa Compared With the
Rest of the World's Developing Countries, 1961 to 2006:
Figure 5: Changes in Commodity Prices, 2000 to 2008:
Figure 6: Actual Annual Agricultural Sector Spending of Kenya,
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia Compared With CAADP Goal (2002 to
2005), and Annual Agricultural Sector Spending Required to Halve Hunger
by 2015:
Figure 7: Trends in Multilateral and Bilateral Official Development
Assistance to Agriculture for Africa, 1974 to 2006:
Figure 8: Worldwide ODA to Africa for Emergencies Compared with ODA to
Africa for Agriculture, 1974 to 2006:
Figure 9: Comparison of USAID Funding for Emergencies and Food Aid
Funding for Development Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa under Title II
of Public Law 480, Fiscal Years 1992 to 2007:
Figure 10: Trends in U.S. Official Development Assistance to
Agriculture for Africa, 1974 to 2006:
Abbreviations:
AGRA: Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa:
AU: African Union:
CAADP: Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program:
C3P: Crop Crisis Control Project:
CGIAR: Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research:
DAC: Development Assistance Committee:
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization:
G8: Group of Eight:
HIPC: Heavily Indebted Poor Countries:
HIV/AIDS: human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency
syndrome:
IEHA: Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (A U.S. Presidential
Initiative):
IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development:
IFAR: International Food Assistance Report:
IFPRI: International Food Policy Research Institute:
IITA: International Institute for Tropical Agriculture:
IMF: International Monetary Fund:
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change:
MDG: Millennium Development Goal:
MCC: Millennium Challenge Corporation:
NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa's Development:
NGO: nongovernmental organization:
ODA: official development assistance:
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:
PRSP: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper:
PSNP: Productive Safety Net Program (Ethiopia):
SOFI: The State of Food Insecurity in the World:
UN: United Nations:
UNDP: United Nations Development Program:
UNFCC: United Nations Framework on Climate Change:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:
WFP: World Food Program:
WFS: World Food Summit:
WHO: World Health Organization:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 29, 2008:
The Honorable Russell D. Feingold:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on African Affairs:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Donald M. Payne:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
At the 1996 World Food Summit (WFS) in Rome,[Footnote 1] the United
States and more than 180 world leaders pledged to halve the total
number of undernourished[Footnote 2] people worldwide from the 1990
level--a commitment that they reaffirmed in 2000 when they established
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which included a target to
halve the proportion or the percentage of the world's population that
is undernourished by 2015. More than a decade later, however, the
number of undernourished people has not decreased significantly, and
about 850 million people, including 170 million children, remain
undernourished, according to the United Nations (UN) Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO). Furthermore, the number of
undernourished people in sub-Saharan Africa has increased from about
170 million in the period of 1990 to 1992 to over 200 million in the
period of 2001 to 2003.[Footnote 3]
Since early 2007, food-related riots have occurred in 15 countries,
including 7 in sub-Saharan Africa,[Footnote 4] leading both the UN
Secretary-General and the head of the World Food Program (WFP) to
express concern about the impact of chronic undernourishment, or food
insecurity, on world peace and security. In January 2008, world leaders
meeting in Davos, Switzerland, for the World Economic Forum predicted
that food insecurity would be among the top potential threats to the
world economy this year and for decades to come. In April 2008, the
president of the World Bank called for a New Deal for a Global Food
Policy that would involve a combination of long-term efforts to boost
agricultural productivity in developing countries and short-term
emergency aid to address immediate food crises.
You asked us to examine (1) factors that contribute to persistent food
insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa and (2) the extent to which host
governments and donors, including the United States, are working toward
halving hunger in the region by 2015.
To address these objectives, we reviewed economic literature on the
factors that influence food security and recent reports, studies, and
papers issued by U.S. agencies, multilateral organizations, and
bilateral donors. In the four African countries that we selected for
fieldwork--Kenya and Tanzania in East Africa, and Mozambique and Zambia
in southern Africa[Footnote 5]--we conducted structured discussions
with groups of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and donors. We
conducted 9 panels with about 80 participants representing more than 60
entities, to obtain the panels' views on recommendations and lessons
learned for accelerating progress toward achieving food security in
these countries. In Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials from
several U.S. agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID); the U.S. Departments of Agriculture (USDA), State,
and the Treasury; and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). In
addition, we met with the Rome-based UN food and agriculture agencies-
-namely, FAO, WFP, and the International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD)--as well as the U.S. Mission to the UN and several
other bilateral donors' permanent representatives.[Footnote 6] We also
met with representatives of private foundations that actively fund
agriculture[Footnote 7] and food security projects in sub-Saharan
Africa. Lastly, we convened a roundtable of 12 experts and
practitioners--including representatives from academia, research
organizations, multilateral organizations, and NGOs--to further
delineate, on the basis of our initial work, some of the factors that
have contributed to continued food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa and
efforts to address these factors.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2007 to May 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. (App. I provides a more
detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and methodology.)
Results in Brief:
Persistent food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa is primarily due to
several factors, including low agricultural productivity, limited rural
development, government policy disincentives, and the impact of poor
health on the agricultural workforce. Additional factors, including
rising global commodity prices and climate change, will likely further
exacerbate food insecurity in the region. The gap between the average
grain yield in sub-Saharan Africa compared with the rest of the world's
developing countries has widened over the years, and, by 2006, the
yield in sub-Saharan Africa was only about 40 percent of that of the
rest of the world's developing countries. Low agricultural productivity
is due, in part, to the limited use of agricultural inputs, such as
fertilizer and improved seed varieties, and the lack of modern farming
practices. Poor roads and lack of access to credit make it difficult
for farmers to effectively participate in local and regional markets to
increase their income. Moreover, some government policies, such as high
taxation on agriculture, have a negative impact on agricultural
production and food security. For example, Tanzanian farmers must pay
about 55 taxes, levies, and fees to sell their agricultural products,
equivalent to 50 percent of the price the farmers receive. Poor health
also exacerbates food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa through its
adverse impact on the agricultural workforce, according to panels in
the four countries we visited. For example, the human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) has taken a heavy toll on the population and agricultural
production of sub-Saharan Africa, because two thirds of those in the
world who have HIV live in that region. In addition, rising global
commodity prices and climate change will likely further exacerbate food
insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. Higher fuel and food prices are
reducing the capacity of low-income consumers and import-dependent
countries to purchase food, as well as raising delivery costs for
emergency food aid programs providing assistance to the most food-
insecure. Experts predict that climate change, such as global warming,
will also reduce grain yields and increase hunger in sub-Saharan
Africa.
The efforts of host governments and donors, including the United
States, toward achieving the goal of halving hunger in sub-Saharan
Africa by 2015 have thus far been insufficient, as discussed below:
* Host governments: Despite their commitment in the 1996 Rome
Declaration on World Food Security to achieve food security for all,
some host governments have not prioritized food security as a
development goal, and agricultural spending levels fall below their
stated commitment. Of 10 African Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSP) reviewed in an FAO-commissioned study, only half included
policies to address food insecurity and fewer than half included
interventions to address food insecurity. Furthermore, by the end of
2008, only 13 of 40 countries are expected to have completed the
roundtable process for the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development
Program, which defines programs that are to be financed by host
governments and donors. Although host governments pledged in 2003 to
direct 10 percent of government spending to agriculture, only a few
countries had achieved this commitment as of 2005. In addition, weak
institutional capacity makes it difficult for host governments to
sustain interventions after donor assistance has ended and to report on
progress toward meeting the 2015 hunger goals.
* Multilateral and bilateral donors: Donors have reduced the priority
given to agriculture, and their efforts have been hampered by
difficulties in coordination and deficiencies in estimates of
undernourishment used to measure progress toward attaining the goals to
halve hunger. The share of official development assistance (ODA) from
both multilateral and bilateral donors to agriculture for Africa has
significantly declined, from about 15 percent in the 1980s to about 4
percent in 2006. Difficulties in coordination have also posed
challenges in aligning donor efforts. Consequently, the UN has
established new initiatives to facilitate donor coordination, such as
the UN MDG Africa Steering Group and country-level Food Security Theme
Groups. Furthermore, FAO's estimates of undernourishment have been
criticized for weaknesses in methodology and poor country data quality
and reliability. Its estimates are also outdated, with FAO's most
recent published estimates covering the 3-year period of 2001 to 2003.
[Footnote 8]
* The United States: Limited agricultural development resources and a
fragmented approach impair U.S. efforts to end hunger in sub-Saharan
Africa. In recent years, USAID's food aid funding for emergencies has
increased substantially, while its funding for development has not
changed significantly. While emergency food aid has been crucial in
helping to alleviate the growing number of emergency food crises, it
does not address the underlying factors that contributed to the
recurrence and severity of these crises. USAID's efforts since 2003 to
shift its focus from emergency food aid to long-term agricultural
development have not been successful. The United States' Presidential
Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA)--the principal U.S. strategy
to meet its commitment toward halving hunger in sub-Saharan Africa--is
limited to only some of the agricultural development activities of
USAID. Other U.S. agencies, such as MCC and USDA, provide substantial
assistance that includes efforts intended to address agriculture and
food security in sub-Saharan Africa, but these efforts are not
integrated into IEHA. Given this fragmented approach to food security,
the U.S. government is likely missing opportunities to leverage each
agency's expertise and to minimize duplication.
In this report, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID (1) work
in collaboration with the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, and the
Treasury to develop an integrated governmentwide U.S. strategy that
defines each agency's actions and resource commitments toward achieving
food security in sub-Saharan Africa, including improving collaboration
with host governments and other donors and developing improved measures
to monitor and evaluate progress toward the implementation of this
strategy, and (2) report on progress toward the implementation of this
recommendation as part of the annual U.S. International Food Assistance
Report[Footnote 9] submitted to Congress.
USAID, USDA, and State provided written comments on a draft of our
report. We have reprinted these agencies' comments in appendixes VII,
VIII, and IX, respectively, along with our responses to specific
points. In addition to these agencies, several other entities--
including MCC, Treasury, FAO, IFAD, the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI), the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), and WFP--provided technical comments on a draft of our report,
which we have incorporated as appropriate.
USAID concurred with our first recommendation--noting that the
responsibility for halving hunger by 2015 lies with the respective
countries, while mentioning activities that the United States, through
efforts such as IEHA, and the international community are undertaking
to address the issue of food insecurity. However, USAID expressed
concern with our conclusion that the shift in its focus from emergency
food aid to long-term agricultural development has not been successful.
We recognize the challenges of addressing an increasing number of
emergencies within tight resource constraints. However, addressing
emergencies does not break the cycle of low agricultural productivity,
high poverty, and food insecurity that has persisted in many sub-
Saharan African countries. Regarding our second recommendation, USAID
asserted that the International Food Assistance Report (IFAR) is not
the appropriate vehicle for reporting on the progress of the
implementation of our first recommendation. USAID suggested that a
report such as the annual progress report on IEHA (which is not
congressionally required) would be more appropriate. We disagree. We
believe that the congressionally required annual IFAR, in fact, would
be an appropriate vehicle for reporting on USAID's and other U.S.
agencies' implementation of our first recommendation. Public Law 480,
section 407(f) (codified at 7 U.S.C. 1736a(f)) requires that the
President prepare an annual report that "shall include. . .an
assessment of the progress toward achieving food security in each
country receiving food assistance from the United States Government."
This report is intended to contain a discussion of food security
efforts by U.S. agencies.
In addition, USDA stated that our report was timely and provided useful
information and recommendations. Noting its participation in an
interagency food aid policy coordinating process, USDA reaffirmed its
commitment to using its full range of authorities and programs to
address the need for and improve the effectiveness of global food
assistance and development. State identified additional issues for
consideration, which we have addressed as appropriate. Specifically,
State disagreed with our statement that U.S. agencies had made no
significant effort to coordinate their food security programs, citing
its ongoing coordination with USAID and USDA on food security issues.
For example, State indicated that several of its bureaus work closely
with USAID and USDA to coordinate food security issues. However, as we
noted in this report, to date, these efforts have been focused
primarily on food aid, as opposed to food security, and there is no
comprehensive U.S. governmentwide strategy for addressing food
insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. Treasury generally concurred with our
findings and provided additional comments for consideration, which we
have addressed in this report as appropriate.
Background:
[Definition and Elements of Food Security:
Definition: When all people at all times have both physical and
economic access to sufficient food to meet their dietary needs for a
productive and healthy life.
Elements: Food availability: achieved when sufficient quantities of
food (supplied through household production, other domestic output,
commercial imports, or food assistance) are consistently available to
all individuals within a country.
Food access: ensured when households and all individuals within them
have adequate resources to obtain appropriate foods for a nutritious
diet.
Food utilization: attained with the proper biological use of food,
requiring a diet providing sufficient energy and essential nutrients,
potable water, and adequate sanitation.
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization.]
Food insecurity--the lack of access of all people at all times to
sufficient, nutritionally adequate, and safe food, without undue risk
of losing such access--results in hunger and malnutrition, according to
FAO. FAO estimates that 90 percent of the hungry suffer from chronic
malnutrition. About 80 percent of the hungry worldwide live in rural
areas--about half of them are smallholder peasants; 22 percent are
landless laborers; and 8 percent live by using natural resources, such
as pastoralists.[Footnote 10] Inadequate food and nutrition have
profound impacts. Undernourished children have a smaller chance of
survival and suffer lasting damage to their mental and physical
development. In addition, work productivity is often impaired among
undernourished adults. Food aid has helped to address the immediate
nutritional requirements of some vulnerable people in the short term,
but food aid has not addressed the underlying causes of persistent food
insecurity.
World Leaders Have Established Goals to Halve World Hunger by 2015:
World leaders have agreed upon two different goals to halve world
hunger by 2015: the first, established at the 1996 WFS in Rome, is to
halve the total number of undernourished people worldwide; while the
second, the first of eight UN MDGs set in 2000, also referred to as MDG-
1, aims to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger by halving the
proportion of undernourished people from the 1990 level by
2015.[Footnote 11] Both of these goals apply not only globally but also
at the country and regional levels. Although both the WFS and MDG
targets to cut hunger are based on FAO's estimates of the number of
undernourished people, because the MDG target is defined as the ratio
of the number of undernourished people to the total population, it may
appear that progress is being made when population increases even
though there may have been no reduction in the number of undernourished
people, according to FAO. Figure 1 is a timeline of some of the key
events related to food security and the WFS and MDG targets.
Figure 1: Selected Events Related to Achieving Food Security and to the
WFS and MDG Targets, 1996 to 2015:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains a list of selected events related to achieving
food security and to the WFS and MDG targets, 1996 to 2015, as well as
a photograph of a child. The list of events is as follows:
1996:
* At the World Food Summit (WFS), the United States and 185 other
countries set a target to halve the number of undernourished people in
the world by 2015.
1997:
* The President of the United States announced the Partnership for
Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa to expand U.S.-African trade
and investment and to assist African leaders in making needed economic
reforms.
1998:
* The U.S. Congress passed the Africa Seeds of Hope Act authorizing the
Africa Food Security Initiative to provide agricultural assistance to 5
target countries.
1999:
* The Food and Agriculture Organization published the first State of
Food Insecurity in the World report.
2000:
* The U.S. Congress passed the African Growth and Opportunity Act to
promote stable and sustainable economic growth and development in sub-
Saharan Africa.
* The United Nations (UN) established the Millennium Development Goals
(MDG). MDG-1 set a target to halve the proportion of undernourished
people in the world by 2015.
2001:
* The African Union established the New Partnership for Africa's
Development (NEPAD), a strategic policy framework for the revival and
development of Africa.
2002:
* Approximately 15.3 million people in 6 countries in southern Africa
experienced severe food shortages and the threat of famine.
* The United States launched the Presidential Initiative to End Hunger
in Africa (IEHA).
2003:
* The African Union endorsed the implementation of NEPAD‘s
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP), a
framework to guide countries‘ agricultural development efforts, and
agreed to allocate 10 percent of national budgetary resources to
agriculture by 2008.
* The UN established the first of 12 Millennium Villages in Sauri,
Kenya, as part of the UN Millennium Project.
2004:
* The United States established the Millennium Challenge Corporation to
reduce poverty by supporting sustainable economic growth in partnership
with developing countries.
* The UN established the first of 12 Millennium Villages in Sauri,
Kenya, as part of the UN Millennium Project.
2005:
* The U.S. Agency for International Development committed to provide an
estimated $200 million per year for 5 years through IEHA to support
CAADP.
* Leaders of government ministries responsible for development and
heads of multilateral and bilateral donors agreed upon the Paris
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to reform the delivery and management
of donor assistance in preparation for the 5-year review of MDGs.
2006:
* The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa was launched, chaired
by the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, as
an African-led partnership to help millions of small-scale farmers and
their families lift themselves out of poverty and hunger.
* The African Union called for an increase in fertilizer use from 8 to
50 kilograms per hectare by 2015 and an increase in intra-African trade
and other appropriate strategies to address food security in the Abuja
Declaration.
2007:
* The UN Secretary-General established the UN MDG Africa Steering
Group.
2008:
* The World Bank 2008 World Development Report featured agriculture.
* The World Economic Forum predicted food security to be among the top
threats to global economy in 2008 and for decades to come.
* The World Bank announced its New Deal for Global Food Policy to focus
on hunger, malnutrition, access to food, and interconnections with
climate change, investment, and other issues.
2015:
* Target year to achieve both the WFS and MDG targets to halve hunger.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
To reach the goal set at the 1996 WFS, world leaders approved a Plan of
Action,[Footnote 12] the focus of which is to assist developing
countries in becoming more self-reliant in meeting their food needs by
promoting broad-based economic, political, and social reforms at the
local, national, regional, and international levels. The WFS
participants endorsed various actions but did not enter into any
binding commitments. They agreed to review and revise their national
plans, programs, and strategies, where appropriate, to achieve food
security that is consistent with the WFS Plan of Action. Participants
also agreed to submit periodic reports to FAO's Committee on World Food
Security (CFS) on the implementation of the Plan of Action to track
progress on food security.
To monitor progress toward the target of halving the number of
undernourished people worldwide, FAO periodically updates its estimates
of the undernourished population at the global level as well as at the
country level. FAO publishes these estimates in its annual report on
The State of Food Insecurity in the World (SOFI), which was first
issued in 1999. The same estimates are used by the UN to track progress
toward the MDG hunger goal.
Sub-Saharan Africa Has Made Little or No Progress in Achieving WFS and
MDG Goals:
As shown in figure 2, food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa is severe
and widespread. According to FAO's estimates, one out of every four
undernourished people in the developing countries lives in sub-Saharan
Africa. This region also has the highest prevalence of food insecurity,
with one out of every three people considered undernourished. In April
2008, FAO reported that 21 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, out of 37
countries worldwide, were critically food-insecure and required
external assistance.
Sub-Saharan Africa has not made much progress toward the WFS and MDG
hunger goals to halve, respectively, the total number of and the
proportion (or the percentage) of undernourished people by 2015.
Between the periods of 1990 to 1992 and 2001 to 2003, the number of
undernourished people in the region increased from 169 million to 206
million,[Footnote 13] and decreased in only 15 of the 39 countries for
which data were reported. The prevalence of hunger, or the proportion
of undernourished people in the population, has declined slightly, from
35 percent in 1990 to 1992 to 32 percent in 2001 to 2003--but this
change is due to population growth. According to FAO's projections, the
prevalence of hunger in sub-Saharan Africa will decline by 2015, but
the number of hungry people will not fall below the 1990 to 1992
levels. By 2015, FAO estimates that sub-Saharan Africa will have 30
percent of the undernourished population in developing countries,
compared with 20 percent in 1990 to 1992. These data suggest that sub-
Saharan Africa needs to substantially accelerate progress if it is to
meet the WFS and MDG targets by 2015. Figure 2 shows the prevalence of
undernourishment around the world and also shows, for each of the four
selected countries in East Africa and southern Africa that we focused
on in our review, the progress needed to reduce the number of
undernourished people to meet the WFS and MDG targets by 2015.
Figure 2: Prevalence of Undernourishment in the World (as of 2001-
2003), and Progress Needed to Halve Hunger in Four Selected Sub-Saharan
African Countries by 2015:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains a map of the World and an inset map of Sub-Saharan
Africa, with shading indicating the percentage of the population that
is undernourished. A series of pie-charts depicts the following data:
Number and proportion of undernourished people in selected countries,
2001-2003:
Kenya: 9.7 million (31%0;
Tanzania: 16.1 million (44%);
Mozambique: 8.3 million (45%);
Zambia: 5.1 million (47%).
Four line graphs depict the following data:
Number of undernourished people in selected countries compared with the
MDG and WFS targets for 2015 (in millions):
Kenya:
1990-92: 9.5;
1995-97: 10;
2001-03: 9.7;
2015 targets: 4.7 (WFS), 7.6 (MDG).
Tanzania:
1990-92: 9.9;
1995-97: 15.7;
2001-03: 16.1;
2015 targets: 4.9 (WFS), 8.5 (MDG).
Mozambique:
1990-92: 9.2;
1995-97: 9.5;
2001-03: 8.3;
2015 targets: 4.6 (WFS), 7.4 (MDG).
Zambia:
1990-92: 4;
1995-97: 4.6;
2001-03: 5.1;
2015 targets: 2 (WFS), 3 (MDG).
Sources: GAO analysis of Food and Agriculture Organization data; Map
Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Multiple Development Partners Implement Programs to Advance Agriculture
and Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa:
The principal development partners that implement programs to advance
agriculture and food security in sub-Saharan Africa are as follows:
* Regional organizations and host governments: At the regional level,
the primary vehicle for addressing agricultural development in sub-
Saharan Africa is the New Partnership for Africa's Development
(NEPAD)[Footnote 14] and its Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Program (CAADP).[Footnote 15] The African Union (AU)
established NEPAD in July 2001 as a strategic policy framework for the
revitalization and development of Africa. In 2003, AU members endorsed
the implementation of CAADP, a framework that is aimed to guide
agricultural development efforts in African countries, and agreed to
allocate 10 percent of government spending to agriculture by 2008.
Subsequently, member states established a regionally supported, country-
driven CAADP roundtable process, which defines the programs and
policies that require increased investment and support by host
governments; multilateral organizations, including international
financial institutions; bilateral donors; and private foundations.
According to USAID officials, the CAADP roundtable process is designed
to increase productivity and market access for large numbers of
smallholders and promote broad-based economic growth. At the country
level, host governments are expected to lead the development of a
strategy for the agricultural sector, the coordination of donor
assistance, and the implementation of projects and programs, as
appropriate.
* Multilateral organizations: Several multilateral organizations and
international financial institutions implement programs that contribute
to agricultural development and food security--providing about half of
the donor assistance to African agriculture in 2006. These entities
include the following Rome-based UN food and agriculture agencies: FAO,
whose stated mandate is to achieve food security for all and lead
international efforts to defeat hunger;[Footnote 16] WFP, which is the
food aid arm of the UN;[Footnote 17] and IFAD, which finances (through
loans and grants) efforts in developing countries to reduce rural
poverty, primarily through increased agricultural productivity, with an
emphasis on food production. IFAD and other international financial
institutions, such as the World Bank and the African Development Bank,
play a large role in providing funding support for agriculture. For
example, the World Bank also provides Secretariat support for the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), a
partnership of countries, international and regional organizations, and
private foundations supporting the work of 15 international
agricultural research centers, whose work has played an important role
in improving agricultural productivity and reducing hunger in the
developing countries. Together, the World Bank, IFAD, and the African
Development Bank account for about 73 percent of multilateral ODA to
agriculture for Africa from 1974 to 2006. In addition, the New York-
based UNDP is responsible for supporting the implementation of the MDG
targets and houses the UN MDG Support Team.
* Bilateral donors, including the United States: The major bilateral
donors have focused on issues of importance to Africa at every Group of
Eight (G8) summit since the late 1990s.[Footnote 18] In 2005, these
donors reiterated their commitment to focus on Africa as the only
continent not on track to meet the MDG targets by 2015 and further
committed themselves to supporting a comprehensive set of actions to
raise agricultural productivity, strengthen urban-rural linkages, and
empower the poor, based on national initiatives and in cooperation with
NEPAD, CAADP, and other African initiatives. At that time, the
commitments of the G8 and other donors were expected to lead to an
increase in ODA to Africa of $25 billion a year by 2010, more than
twice the amount provided in 2004.[Footnote 19] (See app. V for a
summary discussion of the role of other development partners, such as
NGOs and private foundations.)
In the wake of the 1996 WFS, the United States adopted a number of
development initiatives for Africa. These initiatives--including the
Africa Food Security Initiative in 1998, the Africa Seeds of Hope Act
in 1998, and the African Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000--reflect
U.S. efforts to improve the deteriorating food security situation in
sub-Saharan Africa. The consistent U.S. positions at the summit were
that the primary responsibility for reducing food insecurity rests with
the host governments, and that it is critical that all countries
promote self-reliance and facilitate food security at all levels. (See
app. II for a summary of U.S. participation in the 1996 summit.)
In 2002, the United States launched IEHA, which represents the U.S.
strategy to help fulfill the MDG of halving hunger in Africa by 2015.
In 2005, USAID, the primary agency that implements IEHA, committed to
providing an estimated $200 million per year for 5 years through the
initiative, using existing funds from Title II of Public Law
480[Footnote 20] food for development and assorted USAID Development
Assistance and other accounts. IEHA is intended to build an African-led
partnership to cut hunger and poverty by investing in efforts to
promote agricultural growth that is market-oriented and focused on
small-scale farmers. IEHA is currently implemented in three regional
missions in Africa as well as in eight bilateral missions: Kenya,
Tanzania, and Uganda in East Africa; Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia in
southern Africa; and Ghana and Mali in West Africa.[Footnote 21]
Food Insecurity Persists in Sub-Saharan Africa Due to Several Factors,
Including Low Agricultural Productivity:
Low agricultural productivity, limited rural development, government
policy disincentives, and poor health are among the main factors
contributing to persistent food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa.
[Footnote 22] Additional factors, including rising global commodity
prices and climate change, will likely further exacerbate food
insecurity in the region (see fig. 3).
Figure 3: Selected Factors Contributing to Persistent Food Insecurity
in Sub-Saharan Africa:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of selected factors contributing to
persistent food insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to the
following information, the figure contains four photographs related to
the selected factors.
Selected factors contributing to persistent food insecurity:
Agricultural productivity:
Examples of some interventions to address food insecurity:
* Develop and improve markets;
* Conduct and disseminate research;
* Increase access to inputs;
* Improve farm management and capacity;
* Improve risk management.
Rural development:
Examples of some interventions to address food insecurity:
* Strengthen rural communities and economies;
* Invest in and improve infrastructure;
* Increase access to credit.
Governance:
Examples of some interventions to address food insecurity:
* Strengthen sector policies;
* Improve emergency preparedness and risk management practices;
* Improve tax policies
Health:
Examples of some interventions to address food insecurity:
* Ensure access to health care and nutrition
Source: GAO analysis of literature review and structured discussions.
[End of figure]
(For further discussions of factors and interventions affecting food
security, including a framework for addressing food security issues,
see table 2 in app. III. Additional examples of the interventions, as
well as the summary results of our structured panel discussions with
donors and NGOs during fieldwork, are discussed in app. IV.)
Low Agricultural Productivity:
Figure:
[Agricultural Productivity:
* Photograph showing use of a treadle pump improves a Zambian farmer‘s
access to water.
* Photograph depicting markets are not developed in many countries in
East Africa and southern Africa.
Source: GAO.]
[End of figure]
One of the most important factors that contribute to food insecurity in
sub-Saharan Africa is its low agricultural productivity. Raising
agricultural productivity is vital to all elements of food security:
food availability, food access, and food utilization. Although imports
can be used to supplement domestic agricultural production in some
countries, importing staple foods may not be practical because some
main staples, such as cassava,[Footnote 23] are generally not traded in
the international market. In addition, poor infrastructure in many
African countries makes it extremely costly to transport imported foods
to remote areas. Furthermore, because the income of the majority of
people in developing countries depends directly or indirectly on
agriculture, growth in this sector would have widespread poverty-
reducing benefits and improve food access for the poor. The World Bank
pointed out in its 2008 World Development Report[Footnote 24] that
agriculture's ability to generate income for the poor, particularly for
women, is more important for food security than its ability to increase
local food supplies. According to FAO, poverty is a main immediate
cause of food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. Agriculture can also
help enhance diet quality and diversity through new and improved crop
varieties, thereby improving food utilization and nutritional status.
Sub-Saharan Africa has lagged behind other developing countries in
improving agricultural productivity. Since the early 1960s, grain yield
[Footnote 25] in the rest of the world has increased almost 2.5 percent
annually (see fig. 4). In contrast, grain yield in sub-Saharan Africa
has stagnated, with an annual increase of only approximately 1 percent.
As a result, yield of basic food staples in sub-Saharan Africa, such as
maize, is much lower than that of other countries. For example, Zambia
produces about 1,800 kilograms of maize on a hectare of land, while
China produces almost 3 times as much on the same amount of land.
Overall, the gap between the average grain yield in sub-Saharan Africa
compared with the rest of the world's developing countries has widened
over the years. By 2006, the average grain yield in sub-Saharan Africa
was only about 40 percent of the rest of the world's developing
countries. Research has also shown that the expansion of food
production has taken a very different course in Asia than in sub-
Saharan Africa, where increases in food staples were achieved largely
by expanding the area cultivated, not by increasing the yield on
existing acreage.
Figure 4: Grain Yield Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa Compared With the
Rest of the World's Developing Countries, 1961 to 2006:
[See PDF for image]
The figure is a multiple line graph and two photographs of bowls full
of grain. The graph depicts the following data:
Agricultural productivity, by grain yield (kilograms per acre):
Year: 1961;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 324.413;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 452.216.
Year: 1962;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 332.922;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 471.596.
Year: 1963;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 331.614;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 467.072.
Year: 1964;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 320.23;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 512.214.
Year: 1965;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 311.83;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 487.868.
Year: 1966;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 315.6;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 543.169.
Year: 1967;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 372.777;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 547.915.
Year: 1968;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 323.745;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 571.476.
Year: 1969;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 325.019;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 571.104.
Year: 1970;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 338.139;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 624.954.
Year: 1971;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 367.831;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 632.577.
Year: 1972;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 378.861;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 608.47.
Year: 1973;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 329.628;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 662.097.
Year: 1974;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 423.397;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 651.136.
Year: 1975;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 418.187;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 637.968.
Year: 1976;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 391.765;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 704.438.
Year: 1977;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 684.676;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 425.217.
Year: 1978;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 429.489;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 755.004.
Year: 1979;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 422.415;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 725.825.
Year: 1980;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 446.47;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 741.97.
Year: 1981;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 524.64;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 747.384.
Year: 1982;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 460.161;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 803.112.
Year: 1983;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 408.863;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 849.535.
Year: 1984;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 399.408;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 864.266.
Year: 1985;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 454.974;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 870.869.
Year: 1986;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 447.594;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 900.825.
Year: 1987;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 440.473;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 909.354.
Year: 1988;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 469.845;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 917.777.
Year: 1989;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 484.835;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 956.619.
Year: 1990;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 438.263;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1013.99.
Year: 1991;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 445.046;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 977.494.
Year: 1992;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 377.755;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1074.92.
Year: 1993;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 456.185;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1099.08.
Year: 1994;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 451.85;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1087.76.
Year: 1995;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 424.958;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1119.09.
Year: 1996;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 484.543;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1166.15.
Year: 1997;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 458.771;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1173.42.
Year: 1998;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 447.679;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1206.05.
Year: 1999;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 462.371;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1233.28.
Year: 2000;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 468.151;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1211.72.
Year: 2001;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 473.582;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1236.21.
Year: 2002;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 479.901;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1232.5.
Year: 2003;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 487.183;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1256.01.
Year: 2004;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 491.313;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1301.34.
Year: 2005;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 529.176;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1312.22.
Year: 2006;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 537.399;
Rest of the World's developing countries: 1341.16.
Sources: GAO analysis of Food and Agriculture Organization data; GAO
(photos).
[End of figure]
Low agricultural productivity growth in sub-Saharan Africa is partially
due to inadequate investment and the limited use of modern inputs and
farming practice. Panelists in all four countries we visited reported
difficulty in accessing critical inputs, such as land, seed,
fertilizer, and water, due to their high costs and limited
availability. The panelists also noted that farm management practices
were weak in all four countries. FAO data show that the investment per
hectare of land in sub-Saharan Africa is about one third of the world's
average. Less than 1 percent of the agricultural land in sub-Saharan
Africa is irrigated, thereby making agricultural production prone to
natural disasters, such as droughts. Sub-Saharan Africa uses far less
inputs, such as fertilizer and pesticide, than other parts of the
world. For example, its pesticide use is only about 5 percent of the
world's average, which was 0.39 kilograms per hectare in 1998 to 2000
(see table 1). The World Bank reports that while scientific plant
breeding has improved agricultural production throughout much of the
world, sub-Saharan Africa lags behind in adoption of these new
varieties. For example, while at least 80 percent of the crop area in
Asia was planted with improved varieties of rice, maize, sorghum, and
potatoes, only about 20 percent to 40 percent of the crop area in sub-
Saharan Africa used new varieties in these categories. According to
several USAID officials, agricultural productivity has also lagged in
sub-Saharan Africa because innovations in science and technologies,
such as improved seed and soil fertility systems, have not been
transferred and adapted to each country's unique agro-ecosystem.
Table 1: Sub-Saharan African Farmers' Use of Agricultural Inputs
Compared with Other Farmers Worldwide, 1998 to 2000:
Category: Number of live animals per hectare of agricultural land;
Unit: Livestock units per hectare;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 0.18;
Worldwide: 0.33.
Category: Fertilizer consumption per hectare of agricultural land;
Unit: Kilograms per hectare;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 1.4;
Worldwide: 27.6.
Category: Pesticide consumption per hectare of agricultural land;
Unit: Kilograms per hectare;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 0.02;
Worldwide: 0.39.
Category: Share of irrigated land in total agricultural land;
Unit: Percentage;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 0.6%;
Worldwide: 5.4%.
Category: Number of tractors used per hectare of arable land;
Unit: Number per 1,000 hectare;
Sub-Saharan Africa: 1.1;
Worldwide: 19.1.
Category: Investment per hectare of agricultural land;
Unit: U.S. dollars per hectare;
Sub-Saharan Africa: $247;
Worldwide: $788.
Source: GAO analysis of Food and Agriculture Organization data.
[End of table]
Limited Rural Development:
Figure:
Photograph: Opportunities to increase nonfarm income include beekeeping
training in Kenya.
Photograph: Weak infrastructure, such as poor roads, impedes economic
growth in East Africa and southern Africa.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Limited rural development has also been a primary factor aggravating
food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa. The majority of the population,
as well as the majority of the poor, lives in the rural areas of the
region. Weak rural infrastructure and lack of rural investment, among
other factors, limit the potential for agricultural development and
opportunities for nonfarm income. Panels in all four countries we
visited cited poor infrastructure and farmers' lack of access to
microcredit[Footnote 26] as challenges.
Rural development in sub-Saharan Africa has suffered from weak
infrastructure, such as lack of rural telecommunications, electricity,
and roads. Although the development community has recognized the
importance of improving rural infrastructure for poverty reduction and
agricultural growth, infrastructure in the region is generally in a
frail condition. For example, IFPRI reported that progress in paved
roads is almost nonexistent in sub-Saharan Africa, and the World Bank
reported that less than half of the rural population in this region
lives next to an all-season road. The lack of adequate rural roads
increases distribution costs, adds to postharvest food spoilage, and
inhibits the development of local and regional markets as well as
access to those markets. Many rural households also do not have access
to safe drinking water, electricity, modern communication services, or
good transportation. For example, in Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Zambia,
walking is the principal means of transportation for 87 percent of
rural residents. IFPRI concluded that it is the poor households within
the rural areas that have the least access to infrastructure.
Farmers' lack of access to credit also hinders rural development. The
World Bank noted that almost all countries in Africa have a large unmet
demand for agricultural credit and rural finance. With inadequate
financing in the short term, farmers find it difficult to buy inputs
and seeds. In the long term, they are unable to invest in land
improvement, better technology, or irrigation development. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted that rural credit in sub-
Saharan Africa is hampered by land tenure systems that prevent the use
of land as collateral, the absence of physical collateral, the high
risk associated with rain-fed agriculture and sharp commodity price
fluctuations, and poor transport and communication facilities. Banks
that specialize in agricultural lending have become insolvent in many
sub-Saharan African countries, or have had to be rescued at large
public cost, with many of these banks collapsing through the 1980s.
Government Policy Disincentives:
Figure: Governance:
Illustration of Report of Baseline Survey of Food Security and
Nutrition in Mozambique: Mozambique took action to improve emergency
preparedness and disaster management capacity to help deal with cycles
of droughts and floods in the region.
Source: Government of Mozambique.
[End of figure]
Each of the panels we conducted in the four countries we visited cited
weak governance or deficient agricultural policies as challenges, with
one panelist noting that government policies can be a disincentive to
agricultural growth. These policies can have a detrimental impact on
the rural poor. While Asia has fostered growth in agriculture by
providing credit to support prices and input subsidies to farmers, sub-
Saharan African governments have taxed agriculture more than the
governments of other regions. For example, according to the government
of Tanzania's 2007/2008 Agricultural Sector Review,[Footnote 27]
Tanzanian farmers must pay about 55 taxes, levies, and fees to sell
their agricultural products, which is equivalent to 50 percent of the
products' price. The World Bank noted that efforts by local governments
to raise local revenue in Tanzania have occasionally added a
significant tax burden to agriculture, with little benefit. A World
Bank study found that of the 18 countries studied, the 3 with the
highest tax rates on the agricultural sector were all in sub-Saharan
Africa--Côte d'Ivoire (49 percent), Ghana (60 percent), and Zambia (46
percent).
While progress has been made over the past two decades by numerous
developing countries in reducing these policy biases, many welfare-and
trade-reducing price distortions remain. These policies continue to
provide disincentives for agricultural development and investment.
Other government policies, such as subsidies to agriculture, if used
improperly, can also negatively affect agriculture and food security.
For example, a World Bank report notes that the government of Zambia's
policy of subsidizing smallholders' maize production has had a number
of long-term effects, including a loss of farmers' skills and knowledge
and increased dietary concentration on subsidized maize meal among
Zambian people. We met with officials in Zambia who also expressed
concern that Zambian maize subsidies led to overreliance on maize meal
for nutrition and underreliance on other sources of food, such as
vegetables.
Poor Health:
Figure: Photograph with caption: Poor Health: HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
other diseases affect population and agricultural productivity.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Poor health also exacerbates food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa,
according to panels in the four countries we visited, through its
adverse impact on the agricultural workforce. For example, HIV has
taken a heavy toll on the population and agricultural production of sub-
Saharan Africa, because two thirds of those in the world who have HIV
live in that region. HIV is concentrated in the most economically
productive groups, those aged 15 to 45 years, with slightly more women
infected than men. UNDP noted that more than one quarter of Africans
are directly affected by the HIV epidemic. HIV/acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) has a profound impact on poverty by
reducing adults' capability to work and raising mortality among young
adults. In addition, malaria kills over 1 million people each year,
according to the World Health Organization (WHO), mostly in Africa. The
World Bank notes that there is a two-way relationship between malaria
and agriculture. Specifically, on one hand, when farmers become ill or
die from malaria, agricultural production decreases because of lost
labor, knowledge, and assets. On the other hand, some methods that
farmers use to increase agricultural production, such as increased
irrigation, can increase the risk of malaria by increasing the
population of mosquitoes. Furthermore, WHO estimates that there were
14.4 million cases of tuberculosis worldwide in 2006, and that Africa
has the highest incidence of the disease--363 cases per 100,000 people.
Tuberculosis spreads particularly rapidly in areas with high
concentrations of livestock.
Rising Global Commodity Prices:
Global prices for fuel and agricultural commodities have been rising
significantly due to various factors, further exacerbating food
insecurity. From 2000 to early 2008, oil prices have increased by 238
percent, grain prices have increased by 175 percent, and vegetable oil
prices have increased by 184 percent (see fig. 5). The growing use of
agricultural products, such as soybeans and corn, for biofuels has
raised the price of these commodities and reduced the amount of land
available for production of other food commodities.[Footnote 28] (See
app. VI for further discussion of biofuels and their impacts on food
security.) Economic growth in large countries, such as China and India,
has also raised demand for food--through both increased incomes and
shifting dietary patterns.[Footnote 29] Droughts in major grain-
producing countries, such as Australia, and record-low grain reserves
have further constrained world supplies and increased the prices of
agricultural goods.
Figure 5: Changes in Commodity Prices, 2000 to 2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple line graph depicting the following data:
Index 2000=100:
Year: 2000;
Grain: 100;
Vegetable oil: 100;
Crude Oil: 100.
Year: 2001;
Grain: 104.58;
Vegetable oil: 98.63;
Crude Oil: 86.17.
Year: 2002;
Grain: 119.48;
Vegetable oil: 116.49;
Crude Oil: 88.36.
Year: 2003;
Grain: 120.95;
Vegetable oil: 142.2;
Crude Oil: 102.33.
Year: 2004;
Grain: 130.62;
Vegetable oil: 167.83;
Crude Oil: 133.73.
Year: 2005;
Grain: 126.83;
Vegetable oil: 140.91;
Crude Oil: 188.96.
Year: 2006;
Grain: 153.84;
Vegetable oil: 156.75;
Crude Oil: 227.64.
Year: 2007;
Grain: 201.33;
Vegetable oil: 227.31;
Crude Oil: 251.91.
Year: 2008 (projected);
Grain: 274.76;
Vegetable oil: 284.24;
Crude Oil: 338.23.
Source: GAO analysis of International Monetary Fund World Economic
Outlook Database (April 2008) data.
Note: Index numbers are used to compare changes in prices over time. An
index-based comparison involves measuring the relative value of a price
in a given time period (e.g., in 2004) compared with a price in another
time period, which has been designated as the base (e.g., in 2000). The
value of the base period is set at 100 and prices for other periods are
expressed as percentages of the value of the base period. Therefore, if
the index of 2004 is 140, prices in 2004 were 40 percent higher than
prices in 2000.
[End of figure]
Experts suggest that rising fuel and commodity prices are negatively
impacting African food security efforts through several channels, as
follows:
* Higher fuel prices increase the prices of fertilizer and other inputs
for farmers and make harvesting, storage, and transportation of
agricultural production more expensive. Higher fuel import costs also
limit available foreign exchange for imports of food. USDA reports that
official development assistance has fallen well short of rising energy
import bills. Twenty-two countries--15 of which are in sub-Saharan
Africa--depend on imported fuel, import grain, and report a prevalence
of undernourishment exceeding 30 percent, according to FAO.
* Higher agricultural prices hurt many of Africa's food-insecure,
including low-income consumers who spend a large share of their income
on grains and farmers who buy more food than they produce. Food-
insecure populations are likely to be net buyers of food, and many sub-
Saharan African countries are, in fact, net importers of food.[Footnote
30] In February 2008, FAO announced that 21 African countries are in
crisis as a result, in part, of higher food prices, while nutritional
studies estimate that 16 million additional people would be affected by
food insecurity for every 1 percent increase in staple food prices,
with many of these people being in Africa. In the long term, while
higher grain prices provide incentives to expand agricultural
production, complementary policies and investments in technology and
market development may be required.
* Higher fuel and commodity prices increase delivery costs for
emergency food aid programs to Africa's most food-insecure. For the
largest U.S. emergency food aid program, USAID has reported that
commodity costs increased by 41 percent and transportation costs
increased by 26 percent in the first half of fiscal year 2008. As a
result, USAID projects a $265 million shortfall in this year's food aid
budget. According to our estimates, that $265 million could provide
enough food aid to reach about 4.5 million vulnerable people in sub-
Saharan Africa during a typical peak hungry season lasting 3 months.
Similarly, in March 2008, WFP appealed to the international community,
including the United States, to compensate for the growing shortfall in
its food aid budget.[Footnote 31]
Climate Change:
Climate change is also an important emerging challenge that is expected
to worsen African food insecurity.[Footnote 32] Key climate change
models conclude that global warming has occurred and, since the mid-
twentieth century, has been largely attributable to human activities,
such as the burning of fossil fuels and deforestation.[Footnote 33]
Several models predict further global warming, changed precipitation
patterns, and increased frequency and severity of damaging weather-
related events for this century. IFPRI reports that sub-Saharan Africa
may be hardest hit by climate change, with one estimate predicting that
temperature increases for certain areas may double those of the global
average. Since sub-Saharan African countries have a lower capacity to
adapt to variable weather, models also predict that climate change will
further reduce African agricultural yields and will increase the number
of people at risk of hunger. Climate change affects agriculture in
several ways: higher temperatures shorten the growing season and
adversely affect grain formation; reduced precipitation levels limit
the availability of water to grow rain-fed crops; variable climates
shift production to marginal lands and intensify soil erosion; rising
sea levels threaten coastal agricultural land; and climate extremes,
such as floods and droughts, result in crop failure and livestock
deaths. Accounting for these effects, numerous studies seek to estimate
the impact of climate change on African agricultural yields. By 2060,
for example, the United Nations Environment Program projects a 33
percent reduction in grain yield in sub-Saharan Africa, while FAO
predicts that the number of Africans at risk of hunger will increase to
415 million.[Footnote 34] (For further discussion of climate change,
see app. VI, which also includes a compendium of the results of several
studies that project adverse impacts from climate change on African
agriculture.)
Efforts of Host Governments and Donors, Including the United States,
Toward Halving Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 Have Been
Insufficient:
Despite their commitment to halve hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015,
efforts of host governments and donors, including the United States, to
accelerate progress toward that goal have been insufficient. First,
host governments have not prioritized food security as a development
goal, and few have met their 2003 pledge to direct 10 percent of
government spending to agriculture. Second, donors reduced the priority
given to agriculture, and their efforts have been hampered by
difficulties in coordination and deficiencies in estimates of
undernourishment used to measure progress toward attaining the goals to
halve hunger by 2015. Third, limited agricultural development
resources, increased demand for emergency food aid, and a fragmented
approach impair U.S. efforts to end hunger in sub-Saharan Africa.
Limited Prioritization, Low Agricultural Spending, and Weak Capacity of
Government Institutions Hamper Host Government Efforts:
Host government efforts in sub-Saharan Africa have been hampered by
limited prioritization of food security in poverty reduction strategies
and slow follow-through on CAADP goals, low agricultural spending
levels, and weak capacity of government institutions to sustain food
security interventions and to report on progress toward goals to halve
hunger by 2015.
Achieving Food Security Has Not Been Prioritized by Some Host
Governments:
Despite their commitment in the November 1996 Rome Declaration on World
Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action to achieve food
security for all, some host governments have not prioritized food
security in their strategies and use of resources. An FAO-commissioned
review of the PRSP process found a lack of consistency among policies,
strategies, and interventions for alleviating food insecurity and
poverty. Developing countries prepare a PRSP every 3 to 5 years through
a participatory process with civil society and donors. As country-owned
documents that establish development priorities and serve as the basis
for assistance from the World Bank and other donors, PRSPs are to
include a country poverty assessment and clearly present the priorities
for macroeconomic, structural, and social policies. Of 10 African PRSPs
reviewed in the FAO-commissioned review, only half included policies to
address food insecurity and less than half included interventions to
address food insecurity. Furthermore, several delegates who attended
the 2004 Committee on World Food Security meeting expressed concern
that food security and rural development issues were not adequately
reflected in PRSPs of many countries. Similarly, our analysis of World
Bank and IMF joint assessments of current PRSPs for eight countries in
East Africa and southern Africa found that food security and
agricultural development require greater prioritization in more than
half of the strategies examined.[Footnote 35]
Although African leaders pledged their commitment to prioritize
agricultural development in the CAADP framework,[Footnote 36] both the
initial planning process and the actual implementation of the CAADP
framework at the country level have been slow. According to a World
Bank official, CAADP's initial planning process[Footnote 37] did not
begin until 2005, 2 years after the framework was developed, because it
involved (1) forming stakeholder groups at the regional and continental
levels and (2) establishing credibility within the development
community. Thus, country-level implementation did not start until 2007.
Regional entities representing 40 countries in East Africa, West
Africa, and southern Africa have continued to encourage the
implementation and acceleration of CAADP. However, by the end of 2008,
only 13 of the 40 countries[Footnote 38] are expected to have completed
the initial planning process and organized a roundtable to formally
adopt a CAADP compact. The remaining 27 countries are scheduled to
complete the entire process by the summer of 2009. However, for those
countries that will formally adopt a CAADP compact, it is unclear
whether concrete results will follow. According to an IFPRI official,
because CAADP is still in the early stages of implementation, it is
difficult to demonstrate the impact of CAADP efforts to date.
Low Agriculture Spending Levels Remain a Significant Challenge:
Although African leaders in 2003 pledged to devote 10 percent of
government spending on agriculture, according to an IFPRI study issued
in 2008, most countries in Africa--with the exception of four
countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, and Burkina Faso--had not reached
this goal as of 2005. Of the four countries we reviewed--Kenya,
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia--none had met the goal as of 2005.
Mozambique was close to reaching the goal, and government spending for
agriculture in Zambia has shown an upward trend since 2002. However, as
shown in figure 6, government spending for agriculture in Kenya and
Tanzania from 2002 to 2005 was well below the CAADP goal.
According to estimates by several research organizations, the total
financial investment required for agricultural development and to halve
hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015 is significant, and experts
conclude that the majority of African countries will need to
substantially scale up spending for their agricultural sectors.
[Footnote 39] IFPRI estimated that annual investments of $32 billion to
$39 billion per year would be required for agriculture in sub-Saharan
Africa, more than 3 to 4 times the level in 2004. Specifically, Kenya's
spending would need to increase by up to 12 times its 2004 levels;
Mozambique spending would need to double; Tanzania would need to triple
its 2004 spending levels; and Zambia would need to spend up to 9 times
its 2004 total. (See fig. 6 for a comparison of actual 2004
agricultural sector spending and the annual agricultural sector
spending required under different scenarios to halve hunger by 2015 in
Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.)
Figure 15: Actual Annual Agricultural Sector Spending of Kenya,
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia Compared With CAADP Goal (2002 to
2005), and Annual Agricultural Sector Spending Required to Halve Hunger
by 2015:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains four line graphs and four vertical bar graphs
depicting the following data:
Actual annual agricultural spending (2002-2005) as a percentage of
total government spending compared with CAADP goal:
Country: Kenya:
Year: 2002;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 4.99%.
Country: Kenya:
Year: 2003;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 4.58%.
Country: Kenya:
Year: 2004;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 4.22%.
Country: Kenya:
Year: 2005;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 3.83%.
Country: Mozambique:
Year: 2002;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 17.1.
Country: Mozambique:
Year: 2003;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 1.2%.
Country: Mozambique:
Year: 2004;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 9.1%.
Country: Mozambique:
Year: 2005;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 9.1%.
Country: Tanzania:
Year: 2002;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 4.5%;
Country: Tanzania:
Year: 2003;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 6.8%;
Country: Tanzania:
Year: 2004;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 4.22%.
Country: Tanzania:
Year: 2005;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 3.83%.
Country: Zambia:
Year: 2002;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 1.8%.
Country: Zambia:
Year: 2003;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 2.3%.
Country: Zambia:
Year: 2004;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 4%.
Country: Zambia:
Year: 2005;
CAADP Goal: 10%;
Actual spending: 8%.
2004 agricultural spending compared with annual spending required to
halve hunger by 2015 (Constant 2000 dollars in billions):
Country: Kenya;
Actual agricultural spending in 2004: $0.339;
Optimistic estimated annual agricultural spending required to meet
MDG-1 by 2015: $3.313;
Conservative estimated annual agricultural spending required to meet
MDG-1 by 2015: $4.318.
Country: Mozambique;
Actual agricultural spending in 2004: $0.216;
Optimistic estimated annual agricultural spending required to meet
MDG-1 by 2015: $0.413;
Conservative estimated annual agricultural spending required to meet
MDG-1 by 2015: %0.463.
Country: Tanzania;
Actual agricultural spending in 2004: $0.042;
Optimistic estimated annual agricultural spending required to meet
MDG-1 by 2015: $0.118;
Conservative estimated annual agricultural spending required to meet
MDG-1 by 2015: $0.156.
Country: Zambia;
Actual agricultural spending in 2004: $0.072;
Optimistic estimated annual agricultural spending required to meet
MDG-1 by 2015: $0.324;
Conservative estimated annual agricultural spending required to meet
MDG-1 by 2015: $0.665.
Sources: GAO analysis of International Food Policy Research Institute
data; Nova Development (Art Explosion).
[End of figure]
Weak Capacity of Host Government Institutions Hinders Long- term
Sustainability of Interventions and Reporting on Progress:
Some Food Security Interventions Are Unsustainable Due to a Lack of
Host Government Capacity:
Host governments' institutional capacity affects whether they can
eventually take over development activities at the conclusion of donor
assistance, and some lack the capacity to sustain donor- assisted food
security interventions over time. In a 2007 review of World Bank
assistance to the agricultural sector in Africa, the World Bank
Independent Evaluation Group reported that only 40 percent of the
bank's agriculture-related projects in sub-Saharan Africa had been
sustainable, compared with 53 percent for its projects in other
sectors. For example, the World Bank found the expected sustainability
of two agriculture projects in Tanzania to be unrealistic, given the
government's limited capacity to generate the projected public sector
resources. Similarly, IFAD maintains that sustainability remains one of
the most challenging areas that require priority attention. An annual
report, issued by IFAD's independent Office of Evaluation, on the
results and impact of IFAD operations between 2002 and 2006 rated 45
percent of its agricultural development projects satisfactory for
sustainability.[Footnote 40]
Donors' exit strategies vary depending on host governments' capacity to
continue their assistance activities. For some sub-Saharan African
countries, the handover may be progressive--that is, a relevant
government ministry gradually takes over the responsibilities of
certain food security interventions in specific geographic regions as
the government's capacity improves. For example, because the government
of Lesotho currently lacks the capacity to run the WFP-funded school-
feeding program throughout the country, WFP has targeted schools in
remote, inaccessible mountainous areas and expects to hand over full
responsibility to the government by 2010. Political instability can
also impact the sustainability of food security, even when the handover
is expected to be successful. For example, although the director of the
UN Millennium Village in Sauri, Kenya, has been relying on effective
coordination with several Kenyan government ministries to enable the
village to continue its operations after the UN's departure, recent
postelection turmoil in the country has raised uncertainties about the
project's long-term sustainability.[Footnote 41]
Weak Reporting on Progress Toward Hunger Goals:
All participating governments and international organizations agreed to
submit a biannual national progress report to FAO's Committee on World
Food Security on the implementation of the WFS Plan of Action. However,
many governments have not submitted reports, and the quality of the
reports that have been submitted has varied. Successful reporting
requires a lengthy consultation process with government officials and
other stakeholders to answer several questions about indicators of
progress that cover 7 commitments and 27 objectives. To make the
process easier, FAO revised its reporting requirements in 2004, but the
reporting rate has remained low. In 2006, the last time that the
reports were due, only 79 member states and organizations, such as the
World Bank and WFP, had submitted progress reports on the WFS Plan of
Action to FAO's Committee on World Food Security, according to FAO. Of
these 79 member states and organizations, only 17 were from sub-Saharan
Africa.[Footnote 42]
FAO cited the limited capacity of government institutions as one of the
main reasons for low reporting rates on progress toward hunger targets.
According to FAO, government officials working within ministries of
agriculture are responsible for reporting on their country's national
food security action plan. However, some government ministries that are
responsible for reporting lack the capacity to prepare a comprehensive
report on all seven commitments because they do not have the support
they require from other domestic institutions and agencies.
According to FAO, the poor quality and inconsistency of the national
progress reports have not allowed FAO to draw general substantive
conclusions. While most national progress reports provide information
on policies, programs, and actions being taken to reduce
undernourishment, few of the reports provide information on the actual
results of actions taken to reduce the number of undernourished people.
In addition, the content of the reports varies. Specifically, some
countries either (1) provide only selective information on certain
aspects of food security that they consider most relevant, such as food
stocks or reserve policies; (2) provide variable emphasis on past,
ongoing, and future food security plans and programs; (3) focus on
irrelevant issues; or (4) provide more description than analysis.
Despite these concerns, providing feedback or critical assessments on
the submitted reports is beyond the mandate and the staff capacity of
the Committee on World Food Security Secretariat, according to FAO
officials. As a result, the usefulness of the information submitted and
the potential to improve the quality of reporting are limited. FAO
officials acknowledged these limitations and the usefulness of the
information submitted for monitoring and is investigating ways to
improve the WFS monitoring process.
Declining Resources, Difficulties in Coordination, and Deficiencies in
Undernourishment Estimates Limit Donor Efforts:
Multilateral and Bilateral Aid to African Agriculture Has Declined:
For some sub-Saharan Africa countries, a large portion of food security
assistance comes from multilateral and bilateral donors through ODA
provided to the country's agriculture sector. However, the share of
multilateral and bilateral ODA provided to agriculture for Africa has
declined steadily since peaking in the 1980s. Specifically, ODA data
show that the worldwide share of ODA to the agricultural sector for
Africa has significantly declined, from about 15 percent in the early
1980s to about 4 percent in 2006.[Footnote 43] According to a World
Bank official, in the 1980s, the bank directed considerable funding
toward agricultural development programs in sub-Saharan Africa that
ultimately proved unsustainable. In the 1990s, the World Bank
prioritized health and sanitation programs in the region over
agricultural development programs. By 2005, the bank had started
shifting its priorities back to African agricultural development,
investing approximately $500 million per year in the sector. Bank
officials expect that total to increase by 30 percent by the end of
2008. According to the UN, the international community needs to
increase external financing for African agriculture from the current $1
to $2 billion per year to about $8 billion by 2010. Figure 7 shows the
overall declining trend of multilateral and bilateral ODA to
agriculture for Africa and the percentages of bilateral and
multilateral donor contributions from 1974 to 2006.
Figure 7: Trends in Multilateral and Bilateral Official Development
Assistance to Agriculture for Africa, 1974 to 2006:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains a line graph a pie-chart, and two pie-chart
insets, depicting the following information:
Actual ODA to agriculture for sub-Saharan Africa (constant 2006 dollars
in millions):
Year: 1974;
Bilateral assistance: $396;
Multilateral assistance: $526;
Overall assistance: $922.
Year: 1975;
Bilateral assistance: $496;
Multilateral assistance: $721;
Overall assistance: $1218.
Year: 1976;
Bilateral assistance: $486;
Multilateral assistance: $1170;
Overall assistance: $1656.
Year: 1977;
Bilateral assistance: $719;
Multilateral assistance: $931;
Overall assistance: $1651.
Year: 1978;
Bilateral assistance: $542;
Multilateral assistance: $1008;
Overall assistance: $1550.
Year: 1979;
Bilateral assistance: $947;
Multilateral assistance: $757;
Overall assistance: $1704.
Year: 1980;
Bilateral assistance: $961;
Multilateral assistance: $1287;
Overall assistance: $2248.
Year: 1981;
Bilateral assistance: $1261;
Multilateral assistance: $1266;
Overall assistance: $2527.
Year: 1982;
Bilateral assistance: $1215;
Multilateral assistance: $1624;
Overall assistance: $2839.
Year: 1983;
Bilateral assistance: $1233;
Multilateral assistance: $1051;
Overall assistance: $2283.
Year: 1984;
Bilateral assistance: $1378;
Multilateral assistance: $1332;
Overall assistance: $2709.
Year: 1985;
Bilateral assistance: $1391;
Multilateral assistance: $1181;
Overall assistance: $2572.
Year: 1986;
Bilateral assistance: $1669;
Multilateral assistance: $700;
Overall assistance: $1369.
Year: 1987;
Bilateral assistance: $1775;
Multilateral assistance: $1406;
Overall assistance: $3180.
Year: 1988;
Bilateral assistance: $2389;
Multilateral assistance: $1649;
Overall assistance: $4039.
Year: 1989;
Bilateral assistance: $1559;
Multilateral assistance: $1639;
Overall assistance: $3197.
Year: 1990;
Bilateral assistance: $1765;
Multilateral assistance: $1140;
Overall assistance: $2905.
Year: 1991;
Bilateral assistance: $1147;
Multilateral assistance: $666;
Overall assistance: $1813.
Year: 1992;
Bilateral assistance: $1209;
Multilateral assistance: $668;
Overall assistance: $1877.
Year: 1993;
Bilateral assistance: $1077;
Multilateral assistance: $631;
Overall assistance: $1708.
Year: 1994;
Bilateral assistance: $907;
Multilateral assistance: $569;
Overall assistance: $1476.
Year: 1995;
Bilateral assistance: $844;
Multilateral assistance: $932;
Overall assistance: $1776.
Year: 1996;
Bilateral assistance: $1134;
Multilateral assistance: $390;
Overall assistance: $1524.
Year: 1997;
Bilateral assistance: $773;
Multilateral assistance: $331;
Overall assistance: $1104.
Year: 1998;
Bilateral assistance: $772;
Multilateral assistance: $516;
Overall assistance: $1287.
Year: 1999;
Bilateral assistance: $790;
Multilateral assistance: $585;
Overall assistance: $1375.
Year: 2000;
Bilateral assistance: $824;
Multilateral assistance: $609;
Overall assistance: $1433.
Year: 2001;
Bilateral assistance: $656;
Multilateral assistance: $571;
Overall assistance: $1227.
Year: 2002;
Bilateral assistance: $674;
Multilateral assistance: $347;
Overall assistance: $1021.
Year: 2003;
Bilateral assistance: $584;
Multilateral assistance: $750;
Overall assistance: $1334.
Year: 2004;
Bilateral assistance: $739;
Multilateral assistance: $518;
Overall assistance: $1257.
Year: 2005;
Bilateral assistance: $716;
Multilateral assistance: $438;
Overall assistance: $1154.
Year: 2006;
Bilateral assistance: $873;
Multilateral assistance: $932;
Overall assistance: $1805.
Over the last 3 decades, bilateral contributions of ODA to agriculture
for Africa have exceeded multilateral contributions.The United States
has provided the largest share of bilateral ODA to agriculture for
Africa, while the World Bank has provided the largest share of
multilateral ODA to agriculture for Africa.
Multilateral: 46%; Of that:
- World Bank (International Development Assistance): 44%;
- International Fund for Agricultural Development: 11%;
- African Development Bank: 18%;
- Other: 27%.
Bilateral: 54%; Of that:
- United States: 22%;
- France: 15%;
- Japan: 12%;
- Germany: 9%;
- Netherlands: 8%;
- Other: 34%.
Source: GAO analysis of Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (Development Assistance Committee) data.
Note: As discussed in appendix I, OECD's classification of ODA to
agriculture may underreport funding to agriculture. For example, OECD's
ODA to agriculture excludes developmental food aid.
[End of figure]
The decline of donor support to agriculture in Africa is due to
competing priorities for funding and a lack of results from past
unsuccessful interventions. According to the 2008 World Development
Report, many of the large-scale integrated rural development
interventions promoted heavily by the World Bank suffered from
mismanagement and weak governance and did not produce the claimed
benefits. In the 1990s, donors started prioritizing social sectors,
such as health and education, over agriculture. For example, one of the
United States' top priorities for development assistance is the
treatment, prevention, and care of HIV/AIDS through the President's
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, which is receiving billions of dollars
every year. The increasing number of emergencies and response required
from international donors has also diverted ODA that could have been
spent on agricultural development. (See fig. 8 for the increasing trend
of ODA to Africa for emergencies compared with ODA to agriculture for
Africa.)
Figure 8: Worldwide ODA to Africa for Emergencies Compared with ODA to
Africa for Agriculture, 1974 to 2006 (constant 2006 dollars in
billions):
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple line graph with two accompanying photographs
of agricultural settings, depicting the following information:
Year: 1974;
ODA for emergencies: $3.9;
ODA for agriculture: $0.52.
Year: 1975;
ODA for emergencies: $3.1;
ODA for agriculture: $0.21.
Year: 1976;
ODA for emergencies: $3.9;
ODA for agriculture: $0.34.
Year: 1977;
ODA for emergencies: $5.5;
ODA for agriculture: $0.12.
Year: 1978;
ODA for emergencies: $6.5;
ODA for agriculture: $0.26.
Year: 1979;
ODA for emergencies: $6.6;
ODA for agriculture: $0.3.
Year: 1980;
ODA for emergencies: $7.6;
ODA for agriculture: $0.3.
Year: 1981;
ODA for emergencies: $6.3;
ODA for agriculture: $0.4.
Year: 1982;
ODA for emergencies: $8.1;
ODA for agriculture: $0.7.
Year: 1983;
ODA for emergencies: $7.3;
ODA for agriculture: $0.7.
Year: 1984;
ODA for emergencies: $8.5;
ODA for agriculture: $1.5.
Year: 1985;
ODA for emergencies: $8.1;
ODA for agriculture: $0.8.
Year: 1986;
ODA for emergencies: $5.0;
ODA for agriculture: $1.0.
Year: 1987;
ODA for emergencies: $7.4;
ODA for agriculture: $0.7.
Year: 1988;
ODA for emergencies: $8.3;
ODA for agriculture: $0.6.
Year: 1989;
ODA for emergencies: $7.1;
ODA for agriculture: $0.6.
Year: 1990;
ODA for emergencies: $6.7;
ODA for agriculture: $0.9.
Year: 1991;
ODA for emergencies: $4.7;
ODA for agriculture: $1.1.
Year: 1992;
ODA for emergencies: $5.1;
ODA for agriculture: $1.6.
Year: 1993;
ODA for emergencies: $3.2;
ODA for agriculture: $1.5.
Year: 1994;
ODA for emergencies: $4.3;
ODA for agriculture: $1.8.
Year: 1995;
ODA for emergencies: $3.9;
ODA for agriculture: $2.2;
Year: 1996;
ODA for emergencies: $4.2;
ODA for agriculture: $2.9.
Year: 1997;
ODA for emergencies: $3.5;
ODA for agriculture: $2.8.
Year: 1998;
ODA for emergencies: $3.9;
ODA for agriculture: $4.3.
Year: 1999;
ODA for emergencies: $3.7;
ODA for agriculture: $6.9.
Year: 2000;
ODA for emergencies: $3.7;
ODA for agriculture: $3.8.
Year: 2001;
ODA for emergencies: $4.0;
ODA for agriculture: $3.7.
Year: 2002;
ODA for emergencies: $2.9;
ODA for agriculture: $5.3.
Year: 2003;
ODA for emergencies: $3.8;
ODA for agriculture: $6.4.
Year: 2004;
ODA for emergencies: $3.5;
ODA for agriculture: $6.2.
Year: 2005;
ODA for emergencies: $3.7;
ODA for agriculture: $8.2.
Year: 2006;
ODA for emergencies: $3.9;
ODA for agriculture: $6.5.
Sources: GAO analysis of Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (Development Assistance Committee) data; GAO (photos).
Note: As discussed in appendix I, OECD's classification of ODA to
agriculture may underreport funding to agriculture. For example, OECD's
ODA to agriculture excludes developmental food aid.
[End of figure]
Donors and Other Development Partners Have Experienced Difficulties in
Coordination:
Donor and NGO panels that we convened in the four countries we visited-
-Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia--reported a general lack of
donor coordination as a challenge, despite efforts to better align
donor support with national development priorities, such as those that
the international community agreed upon in the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness in March 2005.[Footnote 44] Improved donor coordination
was recommended seven times in four panels that we convened during our
fieldwork.
Coordination of agricultural development programs has been difficult at
the country level due, in part, to the large number of simultaneous
agricultural development projects that have not been adequately
aligned. According to the 2008 World Development Report, in Ethiopia,
almost 20 donors were supporting more than 100 agriculture projects in
2005. Similarly, government efforts in Tanzania have been fragmented
among some 17 multilateral and bilateral donors in
agriculture.[Footnote 45] A study of the United Kingdom National Audit
Office reported that British country teams are not sure about specific
activities, geographical focus, and donors' comparative advantage due,
in part, to the large number of donors and projects ongoing at the
country level. In addition, bilateral donor assistance is often not
adequately aligned with the strategies and programs of international
financial institutions and private foundations. Specifically, according
to the UN Millennium Project, UN agencies are frequently not well-
linked to the local activities of the large financial institutions and
regional development banks that tend to have the most access in
advising a government, since they provide the greatest resources. The
World Bank in its 2008 World Development Report was critical of the
lack of complementary investments made by other donors at different
stages of the food production and supply process.
In an attempt to address inadequate division of labor among donors, the
UN agencies have established new coordination mechanisms. In September
2007, the UN Secretary-General first convened the UN MDG Africa
Steering Group to identify strategic ways in which the international
community could better coordinate and support national governments'
implementation of MDG programs, including the implementation of
agriculture and food security. The steering group met again in March
2008, where it identified the unpredictability of aid, poor alignment
with country systems, and inadequate division of labor among donors as
major challenges to African food security. The group expects to publish
its recommendations for achieving MDGs in Africa by the end of May
2008. In addition, the UN has recently established the One UN
initiative at the country level to facilitate coordination. The purpose
of this initiative is to shift from several individual agency programs
to a single UN program in each country with specific focus areas, one
of which could be food security. Two countries we visited--Tanzania and
Mozambique--were among the eight countries[Footnote 46] worldwide to
pilot the One UN initiative in 2007 and 2008. In addition, to
accelerate progress toward MDGs--particularly MDG-1--WFP, FAO, and IFAD
recently agreed to establish joint Food Security Theme Groups at the
country level. The main purpose of these groups is to enhance
interagency collaboration and coordination to support countries'
development efforts in the areas of food security, agriculture, and
rural development. Between June 2007 and August 2007, a review of the
status of the Food Security Theme Groups showed that they are present
in 55 countries (29 in sub-Saharan Africa). However, according to the
UN Millennium Project, efforts through UN country teams are more of a
forum for dialogue, rather than a vehicle for real coordination.
FAO Estimates of Undernourishment Have Deficiencies:
It is difficult to accurately assess progress toward the hunger goals
because of deficiencies in FAO's estimates of undernourishment, which
are considered the authoritative statistics on food security. These
deficiencies stem from methodological weaknesses and poor data quality
and reliability, as follows:
* Weaknesses in methodology: FAO's methodology has been criticized on
several grounds. First, FAO relies on total calories available from
food supplies and ignores dietary deficiencies that can occur due to
the lack of adequate amounts of protein and essential micronutrients.
Second, FAO underestimates per capita food availability in Africa, and,
according to several FAO officials in Rome, coverage of noncereal
crops, such as cassava--a main staple food for sub-Saharan Africa--has
been inadequate. Third, FAO estimates are more subject to changes in
the availability of food and less so to changes in the distribution of
food, which leads to the underestimation of undernourishment in regions
with relatively better food availability but relatively worse
distribution of food, such as South Asia. Even when food is available,
poor people may not have access to it, which leads to undernourishment.
Lastly, FAO relies on food consumption data from outdated household
surveys to measure inequality in food distribution. According to FAO,
some of these surveys are over 10 years old.
* Poor data quality and reliability: According to FAO officials, the
quality and reliability of food production, trade, and population data,
which FAO relies on for its estimates of undernourishment, vary from
country to country. For many developing countries, the data are either
inaccurate or incomplete, which directly impacts FAO's final estimate
of undernourishment. For example, FAO officials told us that the
estimated prevalence of undernourishment in Myanmar was 5 percent, but
the officials questioned the reliability and accuracy of the data
reported by the government of Myanmar. In addition, FAO lacks estimates
of undernourishment for some countries to which a substantial amount of
food aid has been delivered, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia.
Since data on production, trade, and consumption of food in some
countries are not available, FAO makes one undernourishment estimate
for these countries as a group and takes this estimate into account to
determine total undernourishment worldwide.
Furthermore, FAO's undernourishment estimates are outdated, with its
most recent published estimates covering the 3-year period of 2001 to
2003. In 2007, FAO suspended publication of The State of Food
Insecurity in the World (SOFI) report, which it had been issuing
annually since 1999. FAO also did not submit hunger data for the UN
Millennium Development Report in 2006, and, according to an official
from the UN Statistics Division, FAO is unlikely to do so for 2007 as
well. FAO did not publish the 2007 SOFI report or contribute data for
the Millennium Development Report because it is presently revising the
minimum caloric requirements, a key component in FAO's methodology for
estimating undernourishment to measure progress toward the 2015 hunger
goals.
FAO has acknowledged that it needs to improve its methodology and
consider other indicators to accurately portray progress toward hunger
targets. As part of this effort, FAO sponsored an "International
Scientific Symposium" in 2002 for scientists and practitioners to
discuss various measures and assessment methods on food deprivation and
undernourishment. According to FAO, efforts to improve food security
and nutrition measures are a continuous activity of the agency, which
has also been involved in strengthening data collection and reporting
capacity at the regional and country levels. FAO is also developing a
new set of indicators for measuring food security and nutrition status.
Limited Agricultural Development Resources and a Fragmented Approach
Impair U.S. Efforts to End Hunger in Sub-Saharan Africa:
USAID's Food Aid Funding for Emergencies Has Increased Substantially,
While Its Food Aid Funding for Development Has Not Changed
Significantly:
In recent years, the levels of USAID funding for development in sub-
Saharan Africa have not changed significantly compared with the
substantial increase in funding for emergencies (see fig. 9). Funding
for the emergency portion of Title II of Public Law 480--the largest
U.S. food aid program--has increased from about 70 percent a decade ago
to over 85 percent in recent years. After rising slightly from 2003 to
2005, the development portion of USAID'S food aid funding fell below
the 2003 level in 2006 and 2007.
Figure 9: Comparison of USAID Funding for Emergencies and Food Aid
Funding for Development Activities in Sub-Saharan Africa under Title II
of Public Law 480, Fiscal Years 1992 to 2007 (Constant 2007 dollars in
millions):
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple line graph with two accompanying photographs
of agricultural emergency and development, depicting the following
information:
Year: 1992;
Emergency funding: $395.3;
Development funding: $115.8.
Year: 1993;
Emergency funding: $362.3;
Development funding: $131.9.
Year: 1994;
Emergency funding: $509.4;
Development funding: $102.7.
Year: 1995;
Emergency funding: $514.3;
Development funding: $94.7.
Year: 1996;
Emergency funding: $400.6;
Development funding: $106.0.
Year: 1997;
Emergency funding: $288.0;
Development funding: $138.0.
Year: 1998;
Emergency funding: $383.1;
Development funding: $165.1.
Year: 1999;
Emergency funding: $308.1;
Development funding: $177.2.
Year: 2000;
Emergency funding: $353.8;
Development funding: $195.6.
Year: 2001;
Emergency funding: $359.6;
Development funding: $196.8.
Year: 2002;
Emergency funding: $430.9;
Development funding: $181.0.
Year: 2003;
Emergency funding: $1105.3;
Development funding: $221.
Year: 2004;
Emergency funding: $1112.3;
Development funding: $224.9.
Year: 2005;
Emergency funding: $1171.4;
Development funding: $179.9.
Year: 2006;
Emergency funding: $1071.6;
Development funding: $161.2.
Year: 2007;
Emergency funding: $1065.5;
Development funding: $167.4.
Sources: GAO analysis of U.S. Agency for International Development
data; GAO (photos).
[End of figure]
While emergency food aid has been crucial in helping to alleviate the
growing number of food crises, it does not address the underlying
factors that contributed to the recurrence and severity of these
crises. Despite repeated attempts from 2003 to 2005, the former
Administrator of USAID was unsuccessful in significantly increasing
long-term agricultural development funding in the face of increased
emergency needs and other priorities. Specifically, USAID and several
other officials noted that budget restrictions and other priorities,
such as health and education, have limited the U.S. government's
ability to fund long-term agricultural development programs in sub-
Saharan Africa. The United States, consistent with other multilateral
and bilateral donors, has steadily reduced its ODA to agriculture for
Africa since the late 1980s, from about $500 million in 1988 to less
than $100 million in 2006 (see fig. 10).[Footnote 47]
Figure 10: Trends in U.S. Official Development Assistance to
Agriculture for Africa, 1974 to 2006 (Constant 2006 dollars in
millions):
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a line graph depicting the following information:
Year: 1974;
Assistance to Agriculture: $82.3.
Year: 1975;
Assistance to Agriculture: $242.6.
Year: 1976;
Assistance to Agriculture: $109.4.
Year: 1977;
Assistance to Agriculture: $37.6.
Year: 1978;
Assistance to Agriculture: $82.8.
Year: 1979;
Assistance to Agriculture: $23.4.
Year: 1980;
Assistance to Agriculture: $376.8.
Year: 1981;
Assistance to Agriculture: $403.9.
Year: 1982;
Assistance to Agriculture: $502.1.
Year: 1983;
Assistance to Agriculture: $302.8.
Year: 1984;
Assistance to Agriculture: $391.8.
Year: 1985;
Assistance to Agriculture: $445.2.
Year: 1986;
Assistance to Agriculture: $422.7.
Year: 1987;
Assistance to Agriculture: $510.7.
Year: 1988;
Assistance to Agriculture: $522.7.
Year: 1989;
Assistance to Agriculture: $282.8.
Year: 1990;
Assistance to Agriculture: $257.6.
Year: 1991;
Assistance to Agriculture: $297.7.
Year: 1992;
Assistance to Agriculture: $272.0.
Year: 1993;
Assistance to Agriculture: $176.2.
Year: 1994;
Assistance to Agriculture: $207.9.
Year: 1995;
Assistance to Agriculture: $151.3.
Year: 1996;
Assistance to Agriculture: $96.6.
Year: 1997;
Assistance to Agriculture: $143.6.
Year: 1998;
Assistance to Agriculture: $180.4.
Year: 1999;
Assistance to Agriculture: $202.3.
Year: 2000;
Assistance to Agriculture: $191.7.
Year: 2001;
Assistance to Agriculture: $174.4.
Year: 2002;
Assistance to Agriculture: $99.5.
Year: 2003;
Assistance to Agriculture: $47.5.
Year: 2004;
Assistance to Agriculture: $79.6.
Year: 2005;
Assistance to Agriculture: $107.7.
Year: 2006;
Assistance to Agriculture: $82.4.
Source: GAO analysis of Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (Development Assistance Committee) data.
Note: The figure shows U.S. bilateral ODA and does not include U.S.
contributions to multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank,
African Development Bank, and International Fund for Agricultural
Development, which also provide ODA to agriculture. As discussed in
appendix I, OECD's classification of ODA to agriculture may underreport
funding to agriculture. For example, OECD's ODA to agriculture excludes
developmental food aid.
[End of figure]
Despite Other Agency Efforts, U.S. Presidential Initiative to End
Hunger in Africa Is Limited to USAID:
The U.S. Presidential Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA)--the
principal U.S. strategy to meet its commitment toward halving hunger in
sub-Saharan Africa--has undertaken a variety of efforts that, according
to USAID officials, aim to increase rural income by improving
agricultural productivity, increasing agricultural trade, and advancing
a favorable policy environment, including building partnerships with
donors and African leaders. However, USAID officials acknowledged that
IEHA lacks a political mandate to align the U.S. government food aid,
emergency, and development agendas to address the root causes of food
insecurity. Despite purporting to be a governmentwide presidential
strategy, IEHA is limited to only some of USAID's agricultural
development activities and does not integrate with other agencies in
terms of plans, programs, resources, and activities to address food
insecurity in Africa. For example, because only eight USAID missions
have fully committed to IEHA and the rest of the missions have not
attributed funding to the initiative, USAID has been unable to leverage
all of the agricultural development funding it provides to end hunger
in Africa. This lack of a comprehensive strategy has likely led to
missed opportunities to leverage expertise and minimize overlap and
duplication. Our meetings with officials of other agencies demonstrated
that there was no significant effort to coordinate their food security
programs. A U.S. interagency working group that had attempted to
address food security issues since the mid- 1990s disbanded in 2003. In
April 2008, USAID established a new Food Security and Food Price
Increase Task Force, but it is not a governmentwide interagency working
group.
Although both MCC and USDA are making efforts to address agriculture
and food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa, IEHA's decision-making
process does not take these efforts into consideration. In addition,
IEHA does not leverage the full extent of the United States' assistance
to African agriculture through its contributions to multilateral
organizations and international financial institutions, which are
managed by State and Treasury. Some of the U.S. agencies' plans and
programs for addressing food insecurity in Africa involve significant
amounts of assistance. For example, as of June 2007, MCC had committed
$1.5 billion for multiyear compacts in sub-Saharan Africa, of which
$605 million (39 percent) was for agriculture and rural development
programs and another $575 million (37 percent) was for transportation
and other infrastructure. Only recently, USAID has provided MCC with
assistance in the development and implementation of country compacts.
USDA, which administers several food aid programs,[Footnote 48] also
administers a wide range of agricultural technical assistance,
training, and research programs in sub-Saharan Africa to support the
African Growth and Opportunity Act, NEPAD/CAADP, and the regional
economic organizations. However, according to USAID Mission officials
in Zambia, coordination difficulties arise when U.S.-based officials
from other government agencies, such as USDA, plan and implement food
security projects at the country level with little or no consultation
with the U.S. Mission staff.
Conclusions:
Most donors, including the United States, have committed to halving
global hunger by 2015, but meeting this goal in sub-Saharan Africa is
increasingly unlikely. Although host governments and donors share
responsibility for this failure, especially with regard to devoting
resources to support sub-Saharan Africa's agricultural sector, host
governments play a primary role in reducing hunger in their own
countries. Without adequate efforts by the host governments coupled
with sufficient donor support, it is difficult to break the cycle of
low agricultural productivity, high poverty, and food insecurity that
has contributed to an increase in emergency needs. The United States'
approach to addressing food insecurity has traditionally relied on the
U.S. food aid programs. However, in recent years, the resources of
these programs have focused on the rising number of acute food and
humanitarian emergencies, to the detriment of actions designed to
address the fundamental causes of these emergencies, such as low
agricultural productivity. Moreover, IEHA does not comprehensively
address the underlying causes of food insecurity, nor does it leverage
the full extent of U.S. assistance to sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently,
the U.S. approach does not constitute an integrated governmentwide food
security strategy. In implementing its food security efforts, the
United States has not adequately collaborated with host governments and
other donors, which has contributed to further fragmentation of these
efforts. Finally, without reliable data on the nature and extent of
hunger, it is difficult to target appropriate interventions to the most
vulnerable populations and to monitor and evaluate their effectiveness.
Sustained progress in reducing sub-Saharan Africa's persistent food
insecurity will require concerted efforts by host governments and
donors, including the United States, in all of these areas.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To enhance efforts to address global food insecurity and accelerate
progress toward halving world hunger by 2015, particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID take the
following two actions:
* work in collaboration with the Secretaries of State, Agriculture, and
the Treasury to develop an integrated governmentwide U.S. strategy that
defines each agency's actions and resource commitments toward achieving
food security in sub-Saharan Africa, including improving collaboration
with host governments and other donors and developing improved measures
to monitor and evaluate progress toward the implementation of this
strategy, and:
* prepare and submit, as part of the annual U.S. International Food
Assistance Report, an annual report to Congress on progress toward the
implementation of the first recommendation.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
USAID and the Departments of Agriculture and State provided written
comments on a draft of our report. We have reprinted these agencies'
comments in appendixes VII, VIII, and IX, respectively, along with our
responses to specific points. In addition to these agencies, several
other entities--including MCC, Treasury, FAO, IFAD, IFPRI, UNDP, and
WFP--provided technical comments on a draft of our report, which we
have incorporated as appropriate.
USAID concurred with our first recommendation--noting that the
responsibility for halving hunger by 2015 lies with the respective
countries while mentioning activities that the United States, through
efforts such as IEHA, and the international community are undertaking
to address the issue of food security. However, USAID expressed concern
with our conclusion that the shift in its focus from emergency food aid
to long-term agricultural development has not been successful. We
recognize the challenges of addressing an increasing number of
emergencies within tight resource constraints. However, it is equally
important to recognize that addressing emergencies--to the detriment of
long-term agricultural development--does not break the cycle of low
agricultural productivity, high poverty, and food insecurity that has
persisted in many sub-Saharan African countries. Regarding our second
recommendation, USAID asserted that the International Food Assistance
Report (IFAR) is not the appropriate vehicle for reporting on progress
on the implementation of our first recommendation. USAID suggested that
a report such as the annual progress report on IEHA (which is not
congressionally required) would be more appropriate. We disagree. We
believe that the congressionally required annual IFAR, in fact, would
be an appropriate vehicle for reporting on USAID's and other U.S.
agencies' implementation of our first recommendation. Public Law 480,
section 407(f) (codified at 7 U.S.C. 1736a(f)) requires that the
President prepare an annual report that "shall include. . .an
assessment of the progress toward achieving food security in each
country receiving food assistance from the United States Government."
This report is intended to contain a discussion of food security
efforts by U.S. agencies.
In addition, USDA stated that our report was timely and provided useful
information and recommendations. Noting its participation in an
interagency food aid policy coordinating process, USDA reaffirmed its
commitment to using its full range of authorities and programs to
address the need for and improve the effectiveness of global food
assistance and development. Although we recognize that an interagency
Food Assistance Policy Council provides a forum for the discussion and
coordination of U.S. food aid programs, a similar forum to address food
security issues had not been established until May 2008 following the
release of a draft of this report. Finally, although USDA administers
food assistance programs, including food aid programs for development,
we note that these are not included in IEHA.
State identified additional issues for consideration, which we have
addressed as appropriate. Specifically, State disagreed with our
statement that U.S. agencies had made no significant effort to
coordinate their food security programs, citing its ongoing
coordination with USAID and USDA on food security issues. For example,
State indicated that several of its offices and bureaus--such as as the
Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance; the Bureaus of
Population, Refugees, and Migration; Economic, Energy, and Business
Affairs; African Affairs; International Organization Affairs, and
others--work closely with USAID and USDA to coordinate food security
issues. However, as we noted in this report, these efforts, to date,
have been focused primarily on food aid, as opposed to food security,
and there is no comprehensive U.S. governmentwide strategy for
addressing food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa.
Treasury generally concurred with our findings and provided additional
comments for consideration, which we have addressed as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested Members of Congress;
the Administrator of USAID; and the Secretaries of Agriculture, State,
and the Treasury. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix X.
Signed by:
Thomas Melito:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to examine (1) factors that contributed to
persistent food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa and (2) the extent to
which host governments and donors, including the United States, are
working toward halving hunger in the region by 2015.
To examine factors that have contributed to continued food insecurity
in sub-Saharan Africa, we relied on the United Nations (UN) Food and
Agriculture Organization's (FAO) estimates on the number of
undernourished people, and the prevalence of undernourishment, which is
one of two progress indicators in the Millennium Development Goals
(MDG) target of halving hunger, to illustrate the lack of progress in
reducing hunger in sub-Saharan Africa as compared with other parts of
the developing world. Although we recognize the limitations of FAO's
estimates (such as the lack of up-to-date information), they are the
official basis of the World Food Summit (WFS) and MDG targets and are
largely consistent with the trends reported by other sources, such as
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) estimates on global hunger.
We discussed the reliability of FAO's undernourishment data with
several cognizant FAO officials and various U.S. government officials
in Washington and in sub-Saharan Africa. We determined that these
estimates are sufficiently reliable for our purpose, which is to show
overall trends over time at the aggregate level. We also analyzed FAO's
data on input use, grain production, and grain planting areas to
compare agricultural input use and productivity in sub-Saharan Africa
with that of other parts of the world. We determined that these data
are sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To assess the reliability
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) data on commodity prices, we
reviewed (1) existing documentation related to the data sources and (2)
documents from other agencies reporting on commodity prices and found
collaborating support. Accordingly, we determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
We selected four countries for fieldwork--Kenya and Tanzania in East
Africa, and Mozambique and Zambia in southern Africa--on the basis of
geographic region, data on undernourished people, and U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) programs in-country. We selected
countries in east and southern Africa because those regions have high
prevalence rates of undernourishment and excluded countries with
current conflict. While this selection is not representative in any
statistical sense, it ensured that we had variation in the key factors
we considered. We do not generalize the results of our fieldwork beyond
that selection, using fieldwork primarily to provide illustrative
examples.
In addition, we reviewed economic literature on the factors that
influence food security and recent reports, studies, and papers issued
by U.S. agencies, multilateral organizations, and bilateral donors. We
reviewed the Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food
Summit Plan of Action, which included 7 commitments, 27 objectives, and
181 specific actions. We recognize the multifaceted nature of factors
affecting food security, but some of them, such as conflict and trade
reforms, were beyond the scope of our study. We reviewed economic
studies and recent reports on the factors that influence food security.
These included articles from leading authors published in established
journals, such as World Development. We also included studies by such
organizations as the International Food Policy and Research Institute
(IFPRI), FAO, IMF, USDA's Economic Research Service, World Food Program
(WFP), and the World Bank. These sources were chosen because they
represent a wide cross section of the discussion on food security and
are written by the leading authorities and institutions working in the
field. To summarize and organize meaningfully the many factors and
interventions that impact and can address global food security, we
created a framework. To ensure that the framework was comprehensive and
rigorous, we based it on relevant literature and the input of
practitioners and experts. Specifically, our first step was to review
relevant research on global food security from multilateral
institutions and academia and consider key policy documents, such as
the Rome Declaration. We presented the first draft of the framework to
a panel of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and government
representatives in Washington, D.C., and subsequently used the
framework during our panels in the four African countries to help
stimulate discussion. We refined the framework on the basis of
preliminary analysis of the panel results and finalized it on the basis
of the input of a roundtable of food security experts in Washington,
D.C.
In the four African countries that we selected for fieldwork, we
conducted structured discussions with groups of NGOs and donors,
organizing them into 9 panels with about 80 participants representing
more than 60 entities. To identify the panelists' views on key
recommendations for improvement and lessons learned, we posed the same
questions to each of the 9 panels and recorded their answers.
Subsequently, we coded their recommendations and lessons according to
the factors that were further refined and are shown in figure 3. We
also coded some recommendations and lessons according to a few
additional topics that occurred with some frequency in the panels but
that fell outside the scope of our framework, such as donor
coordination and the targeting of U.S. food aid. Two staff members
performed the initial coding independently and then met to reconcile
any differences in their coding. These lessons and recommendations that
we coded represent the most frequently expressed views and perspectives
of in-country NGOs, donors, and regional representatives that we met
with, and cannot be generalized beyond that population.
To examine the extent to which host governments and donors, including
the United States, are working toward halving hunger by 2015, we
analyzed data on official development assistance (ODA) to developing
countries published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
Specifically, we analyzed the trends in the share of ODA going to
agriculture and to emergencies from multilateral and bilateral donors,
from 1974 to 2006. The DAC Secretariat assesses the quality of aid
activity data each year by verifying both the coverage (completeness)
of each donor's reporting and the conformity of reporting with DAC's
definitions to ensure the comparability of data among donors. These
data are widely used by researchers and institutions in studying
development assistance resource flows. OECD's classification of
agriculture may underreport funding to agriculture. OECD's ODA to
agriculture excludes rural development and development food aid. For
example, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
believes that some of its multisectoral lending may not have counted as
ODA to agriculture. However, since OECD has consistently used the same
classification, we determined that the data are sufficiently reliable
for our purpose, which is to track trends over time. To determine
whether African governments have fulfilled their pledge to devote 10
percent of their budgets to agriculture, we relied on the government
expenditure data provided by IFPRI, which is the same data source on
which USAID relies. We determined that these data are sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of a broad comparison of countries'
agricultural spending to the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture
Development Program (CAADP) targets in the aggregate. IFPRI recognizes
that data on government sectoral spending are weak in many developing
countries and is working with some of these countries to improve data
quality. We also analyzed USAID budget for the Presidential Initiative
to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA). We determined that these data are
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. The information on foreign law
in this report does not reflect our independent legal analysis but is
based on interviews and secondary sources.
In Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials from U.S. agencies,
including USAID, USDA, the Departments of State and the Treasury, and
the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). We also met with IFPRI and
the World Bank. In New York, we met with UNDP, the Rockefeller
Foundation, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), and
Columbia University; and in Seattle, Washington, we met with the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation. In Rome, we met with FAO, WFP, IFAD, and
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).
We also met with the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in Rome and
several bilateral donors' permanent representatives to the Rome-based
UN food and agriculture agencies. In addition, in Washington, D.C., we
convened a roundtable of 12 experts and practitioners--including
representatives from academia, research organizations, multilateral
organizations, NGOs, and others--to further delineate, on the basis of
our initial work, some of the factors that have contributed to food
insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa and challenges that hamper
accelerating progress toward food security.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2007 to May 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: U.S. Participation in the 1996 World Food Summit:
As a major participant in the 1996 WFS, the United States supported the
summit's goal of halving the number of undernourished people in the
world by 2015. During the summit and over the last decade, the U.S.
position on global food security has been predicated on a strong belief
that the primary responsibility for reducing food insecurity rests with
each country, and that it is critical that all countries adopt policies
that promote self-reliance and facilitate food security at all levels,
including food availability, access, and utilization. U.S. policy as
represented at the summit advocated the following national policies and
actions to improve food security:
* Governments should act as facilitators rather than intervenors.
National policies that facilitate the development of markets and expand
the individual's freedom of action are the best guarantor of food
security. Emphasis is placed on democratic institutions, transparency
in government, opposition to graft and corruption, and full
participation by the private sector.
* All countries should work to promote liberalized trade to maximize
the potential for economic growth (within the context of sustainable
development) and realize the benefits of comparative advantage.
* Governments should invest in a public goods infrastructure that
includes transportation, communication, education, and social safety
nets; and governments should provide basic health and sanitary
services, maintain basic levels of nutrition, and facilitate the
stabilization of vulnerable populations.
* Governments should ensure a political system that does not
discriminate against women. All countries must recognize the essential
role of women, who work to produce more than half of the food in
developing countries.
* Governments should establish a general development policy that (1)
neither discriminates against agricultural or fisheries sectors nor
against rural or coastal areas and (2) recognizes that poverty
alleviation requires an integrated approach to rural development.
* All countries should promote the critical role of sustainable
development in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sectors, and these
policies must be environmentally sound.
* Greater emphasis needs to be placed on agricultural research and
extension services. Governments should emphasize investment in
agricultural research and technical education.
During negotiations on the summit policy statement and Plan of Action,
the United States opposed any agreement that supported additional
resource pledges by the developed countries or the creation of new
financial mechanisms, institutions, or bureaucracies. Although the
United States was not prepared to commit increased resources for food
security, U.S. government representatives at the summit indicated that
the United States intended to play a major role in promoting food
security around the world. According to a U.S. position paper, the
United States planned to accomplish this objective by:
* enhancing U.S. government support for research and technology
development in agriculture and related sectors;
* employing an integrated approach to sustainable development, with a
strong emphasis on those countries that show a good-faith willingness
to address policy reforms;
* continuing support for food security through the use of agriculture
programs, development assistance, and food aid;
* continuing support for international efforts to respond to and
prevent humanitarian crises that create a need for emergency food;
* continuing efforts to encourage and facilitate implementations of
food security-related actions adopted at international conferences or
agreed-to conventions;
* working within the multilateral system to enhance global approaches
to food security; and:
* working with all countries to achieve freer trade and ensure that the
benefits are equitably realized, and urging all countries to open their
markets in the interest of achieving greater stability and
participation in the world market.
An interagency governmentwide Working Group on Food Security that was
established to prepare for the 1996 summit continued to operate until
2003, issuing two annual reports on a U.S. Food Security Plan of Action
in 1999 and 2000. This group was assisted by a Food Security Advisory
Committee composed of representatives from the private agribusiness
sector, NGOs, and educational institutions. (These groups were
disbanded in 2003.) These reports indicated some limited progress in
addressing food security, primarily through the use of existing U.S.
food aid and limited agricultural development and trade initiatives.
The establishment of the African Food Security Initiative in 1998, the
Greater Horn of Africa Initiative, the Africa Seeds of Hope Act in
1998, and the African Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000 all reflected
some limited U.S. government initiative to improve a deteriorating food
security situation in sub-Saharan Africa.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Factors and Interventions Affecting Food Security:
This appendix provides greater detail and explains the importance of
the factors we used to develop a framework to evaluate findings
obtained during the in-country interviews in Kenya, Tanzania,
Mozambique, and Zambia and the literature on food security, including
the 2008 World Bank Development report and the Rome Declaration. The
factors listed in the framework shown in table 2 are areas on which
development efforts can be focused. They include such areas as
agricultural productivity and development; rural development;
governance; and health, education, and social welfare. All of these
factors contribute to food security. For example, actions to improve
agricultural productivity are most effective in conjunction with rural
development, good governance, and good health and welfare. The
framework also identifies actions or interventions that can be taken to
address these development factors. They include such actions or
interventions as increasing access to inputs, improving infrastructure,
and strengthening rural communities. Successful agricultural
development requires coordination of these interventions across a range
of activities. For example, farmers cannot buy inputs unless there are
functioning credit institutions. Also, farmers cannot access markets if
there are no roads. Given that achieving food security is an extremely
difficult and complex process and that there are many different ways in
which to categorize these factors, this list should not be construed as
exhaustive. Nonetheless, this categorization provides a framework with
which to identify the issues on which to base discussion on food
security and summarize the range of programs implemented in various
African countries.
Table 2: Framework for Addressing Food Security Issues:
Factor: Agricultural productivity and development;
Intervention: Develop and improve markets: Encourage private sector
investment and support the value chain approach, build private sector
capacity, assist and develop markets, establish public/private
partnerships, use vouchers, and develop agroprocessing.
Factor: Agricultural productivity and development;
Intervention: Conduct and disseminate research:
Develop disease-resistant, pest-resistant varieties; develop
organizations to disseminate information, such as extension programs
and farmer groups. Maintain and increase yields through research.
Strengthen research capacity at all levels.
Factor: Agricultural productivity and development;
Intervention: Increase access to inputs: Provide access to fertilizer
seed, water, chemicals, machinery, land (via tenure/title), and
technologies.
Factor: Agricultural productivity and development;
Intervention: Improve farm management and capacity: Encourage farmer
education, modern farm practices, cash crops, transaction costs,
sustainable businesses, and crop diversification.
Factor: Agricultural productivity and development;
Intervention: Improve risk management for farm and food systems:
Promote systems to mitigate risks such as crop insurance,
diversification of risks, stock policy, and postharvest conservation,
conservation agriculture, and storage of food stocks.
Factor: Agricultural productivity and development;
Intervention: Institute natural resource management: Strengthen water
management, biodiversity, and drought management.
Factor: Rural development;
Intervention: Strengthen rural communities and economies: Provide
opportunities for nonfarm income, farmer's cooperative associations,
empowered rural communities, local processing, decentralized resources
to regions, and cash transfers to rural communities.
Factor: Rural development;
Intervention: Invest in and improve infrastructure: Invest in roads,
ports, telecommunications, and power.
Factor: Rural development;
Intervention: Increase access to credit: Provide access to microcredit
and financial training.
Factor: Governance;
Intervention: Strengthen sectoral policies: Lobby to improve
agriculture policies and balance agriculture and nonagriculture
subsidies.
Factor: Governance;
Intervention: Improve emergency preparedness and disaster management
capacities: Improve systems for vulnerability mapping, climate
forecasting, and early warning systems.
Factor: Governance;
Intervention: Improve tax policies: Rationalize tax policies-- such as
minimizing agricultural input, output, and land taxes--as a way to
enhance agricultural sector development.
Factor: Governance;
Intervention: Modernize trade policy: Encourage trade policies that
foster agricultural trade.
Factor: Governance;
Intervention: Strengthen fiscal and monetary policy: Promote sound
fiscal and monetary policies that could allow more funding for the
agricultural sector.
Factor: Governance;
Intervention: Improve governance: Engage government in rule of law
reform, anticorruption efforts, institutional capacity building, and
conflict resolution.
Factor: Health, education, and social welfare;
Intervention: Improve health and nutrition: Provide access to health
care and basic sanitation to prevent or minimize the negative effects
of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. Supply the agricultural
workforce with adequate vitamins, minerals, and nutrients.
Factor: Health, education, and social welfare;
Intervention: Develop and retain qualified staff: Build capacity
through training government and NGO personnel and establish pay and
conditions to retain needed staff.
Factor: Health, education, and social welfare;
Intervention: Develop safety nets: Encourage and implement social
safety nets for vulnerable populations.
Factor: Health, education, and social welfare;
Intervention: Address gender inequalities: Promote women's rights and
access to basic education.
Source: GAO analysis of literature reviews and structured discussions.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Summary Results of GAO's Structured Panel Discussions with
Donors and NGOs, with Examples of Interventions:
On the basis of a content analysis of the results from our nine
structured panel discussions in Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and
Zambia, we identified key recommendations for improving food security
(see table 3).[Footnote 49] For example, the first row of this table
indicates that all 9 panels mentioned the recommendation to improve
marketing, and that the recommendation was mentioned 35 times across
all 9 panels.
Table 3: Key Recommendations for Improving Food Security:
Recommendation: Develop and improve markets;
Total number of panels in which the recommendation was mentioned
(maximum = 9): 9;
Total number of times the recommendation was mentioned across all 9
panels: 35.
Recommendation: Strengthen rural communities and economies;
Total number of panels in which the recommendation was mentioned
(maximum = 9): 9;
Total number of times the recommendation was mentioned across all 9
panels: 21.
Recommendation: Better target or manage nonemergency food aid;
Total number of panels in which the recommendation was mentioned
(maximum = 9): 8;
Total number of times the recommendation was mentioned across all 9
panels: 14.
Recommendation: Invest in and improve infrastructure;
Total number of panels in which the recommendation was mentioned
(maximum = 9): 7;
Total number of times the recommendation was mentioned across all 9
panels: 16.
Recommendation: Improve natural resource management systems;
Total number of panels in which the recommendation was mentioned
(maximum = 9): 7;
Total number of times the recommendation was mentioned across all 9
panels: 12.
Recommendation: Increase access to inputs;
Total number of panels in which the recommendation was mentioned
(maximum = 9): 6;
Total number of times the recommendation was mentioned across all 9
panels: 10.
Source: GAO analysis of structured panel discussions with donors and
NGOs in Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.
[End of table]
The next several sections of this appendix provides some examples of
interventions that governments, research organizations, NGOs, private
foundations, and other donors have undertaken to address the factors
underlying food insecurity.
Interventions to Improve Access to Markets:
Our panelists noted that improving markets and farmers' access to them
is key to improving their food security. Well-functioning markets at
all levels of the marketing chain, among other things, provide accurate
price information, buyer contacts, distribution channels, and buyer and
producer trends. They can be facilitated by encouraging private
investment and establishing private/public partnerships and developing
the capacity of agrobusiness and processing focused on value-added
production. As an early action under CAADP, an Alliance for Commodity
Trade in East and Southern Africa is being developed to open up
national and regional market opportunities for staple foods produced by
millions of smallholder farmers. Agribusiness, in particular, has an
economic interest in a vibrant agricultural sector. For this reason,
USAID supports private agribusiness development in Africa, working
directly with about 900 public/private partnerships to build capacity
and leverage additional resources in 2006. These include producers,
exporters, and their associations, such as the East African Fine
Coffees Association, which is linking buyers from companies like
Starbucks in the United States with producers and exports of high-value
coffee, and the African Cotton and Textile Industry Federation, which
is improving the links of African farmers to the U.S. market through
the African Growth and Opportunity Act. To facilitate market access in
arid and semi-arid areas, USAID's Famine Fund[Footnote 50] has been
supporting a pastoral livelihood program.
Interventions to Strengthen Rural Communities and Economies:
Weak rural development contributes to food insecurity throughout sub-
Saharan Africa. Agricultural productivity growth requires fostering
linkages between the agricultural and nonagricultural sections. Growth
in agriculture is more effective if the proper infrastructure is in
place, rural communities are strong and effective and financial systems
are able to provide credit to producers to buy, among other things,
inputs for production. The experts we interviewed noted that efforts to
strengthen rural communities and economies are essential to increasing
food security. Interventions that help to increase rural farmers'
incomes help to strengthen rural economies. We observed the UN
Millennium Villages helping farmers increase their incomes by using the
value chain approach to link farmers to markets. For example, in Kenya,
a local business called HoneyCare Africa trained farmers in beekeeping.
The farmers were financed to start beekeeping, provide honey, and
ensure quality control and collection. Beekeepers bring their honey to
the company's collection center where the honey is weighed and is
prepared for shipment from Nairobi. After being processed and packaged
in a Nairobi facility, HoneyCare Africa products are sold in Kenyan and
overseas retail outlets. The program trained 44 farmers, who produced
an average of 800 kilograms of honey, generating $1,500 per farmer per
year.
Interventions to Better Target or Manage Nonemergency Food Aid:
The focus of U.S. assistance on commodities creates some problems for
NGOs and donors that would like to see U.S. Title II assistance better
managed. The panelists noted that this food aid can be better managed
by targeting those communities that can absorb the commodities that are
provided by the United States, so that the commodities do not distort
markets. Despite the inherent inefficiency of monetization,[Footnote
51] there are some examples of the successful use of monetized Title II
funding for food security. An external evaluation of IEHA's use of food
aid noted that Title II monetization proceeds have a large realm of
possible uses, including financing small business start-ups; paying the
costs of training programs; locally purchasing commodities, rather than
using imported food in particular situations, where there is a
particularly high potential for disincentives for local producers; and
providing start-up capital for initiating farmer association-based
thrift and savings societies.
Interventions to Invest in and Improve Infrastructure:
As we have previously noted, improving infrastructure, such as roads
and power, is key to helping rural farmers. Investment in
infrastructure links the local economy to broader markets.
Infrastructure, particularly roads, is important in making technology
available to farmers and is key to getting commodities to markets. Good
roads and port facilities reduce the costs of moving products to
markets. Telecommunications bring consumers and farmers into contact
and transmit market signals on prices helping markets operate
efficiently. MCC provides funding to African countries to improve their
infrastructure. As of February 2008, MCC had signed 16 compacts
totaling $5.5 billion. Nine of the 16 compacts were with African
countries, and about 70 percent of MCC compacts ($3.8 billion) funded
projects in Africa. This includes two of the four countries that we
reviewed--Tanzania and Mozambique. MCC signed a compact with Tanzania
in 2008 that will provide $698 million in funding for infrastructure
investments in energy, water, and transportation, with the largest
portion (about half) dedicated to transportation. In Mozambique, the
MCC compact signed in July 2007 will include funds to improve water
systems, sanitation, agribusiness, roads, land tenure, and agriculture.
In addition, according to State, while the short-term goal of a WFP
road-building operation was to facilitate food aid delivery in southern
Sudan, it also helped contribute to the long-term food security by
reducing the cost of access to food and markets.
Interventions to Improve Natural Resource Management Systems:
Sustainable production increases require resource management. Soil
fertility, water management, and water use efficiency are important for
raising agriculture productivity in a sustainable manner. Natural
resource management, particularly water resources, is key to helping
farmers maintain productivity, even during times of drought and flood.
The Ethiopian government's Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP)
provided food and cash assistance to 7.2 million people in 2006, and
includes water resources development projects. In Tigray, Ethiopia, we
visited a program focusing on the construction of deep hand-dug wells
that provide accessible and safe water for rural communities. An
irrigation program also focuses on harvesting methods and irrigation
development activities. An IFPRI evaluation of PSNP found that while
there were some delays in payments made to beneficiaries, the well
construction and soil and water conservation projects were valuable.
Interventions to Increase Access to Inputs:
Increasing access to inputs, such as improved seed and fertilizer,
helps farmers boost their productivity, which is essential for food
security. A number of research organizations support African
agricultural development, including CGIAR, which was established in
1971 to help achieve sustainable worldwide food security by promoting
agricultural science and research-related activities. CGIAR has 15
research centers under its umbrella, including IFPRI, the International
Livestock Research Institute, and the International Institute for
Tropical Agriculture (IITA). IITA and 40 NGO partners, including
Catholic Relief Service, worked on a U.S. government-funded $4.5
million, 19-month project in 6 countries[Footnote 52] called the Crop
Crisis Control Project (C3P). Officials from this program said that
they have introduced 1,400 varieties of cassava and provided 5,000
farmers with seeds for growing banana trees. In Kenya, beneficiaries of
the C3P project, especially women, said that the project has directly
led to more profitable cassava growth and increased banana production.
In addition, USAID, USDA, and other donors have also been providing
direct support to African Research Institutions at both the national
and regional levels, promoting collective action on problems that cut
across borders, like pests and diseases.
Participants in GAO's Structured Panel Discussions and Roundtable:
The following organizations were among those that participated in
structured panel discussions during our fieldwork and our roundtable in
Washington, D.C.:
* Bilateral and multilateral donors:
African Development Bank;
Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation;
Canadian International Development Agency;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark;
European Community Food and Agriculture Organization;
Japan International Cooperation Agency;
International Food Policy Research Institute;
Ireland Embassy;
The Netherlands;
United Nations Development Program;
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF);
U.S. Agency for International Development;
The World Bank World Food Program.
* NGOs and other organizations:
Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in
Overseas Cooperative Assistance;
Academy for Education Development;
ActionAid;
Adventist Development and Relief Agency;
Africare;
Agricultural Consultative Forum;
The Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and
Central Africa;
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE);
CARITAS;
Catholic Relief Services;
Christian Council Tanzania;
CIUSA Mozambique;
Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET)--Chemonics, Inc.
Fintrac, Inc.
International Livestock Research Institute;
Jesuit Center for Theological Reflection;
Kenya Agricultural Research Institute;
Land O'Lakes International Development;
Michigan State University;
Oxfam Great Britain;
Partnership to End Hunger and Poverty in Africa;
Program Against Malnutrition;
Project Concern International;
TechnoServe;
Tegemeo Institute;
University of Maryland;
Western Seed Company;
World Vision.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Additional Development Partners That Implement Food
Security Interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa:
In addition to the efforts of host governments, multilateral
organizations, and bilateral donors, NGOs and private foundations play
an active role in advancing food security in sub-Saharan Africa.
* Nongovernmental organizations. NGOs or not-for-profit organizations
may design and implement development-related projects. They are
particularly engaged in community mobilization activities and extension
support services. NGOs include community-based self-help groups,
research institutes, churches, and professional associations. Examples
include implementing partners for USAID and USDA, such as Cooperative
for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc.; Catholic Relief Services;
and Land O'Lakes International Development. Additional examples also
include advocacy groups such as the International Alliance Against
Hunger, founded by the Rome-based food and agriculture agencies and
international NGOs in 2003 to advocate for the elimination of hunger,
malnutrition, and poverty; the National Alliances Against Hunger,
including a U.S. alliance, which brings together civil society and
governments in developed and developing countries to raise the level of
political commitment to end hunger and malnutrition; and the
Partnership to Cut Hunger and Poverty in Africa, which is a coalition
of U.S. and African organizations formed in 2000 to advocate support
for efforts to end hunger and poverty in Africa.
* Private foundations. A number of philanthropic private organizations,
such as the Rockefeller Foundation and the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, provide support for African agricultural development. The
Gates Foundation recently became one of the largest funding sources for
agriculture in Africa, announcing in January 2008 a $306 million
package of agricultural development grants to boost the productivity
and incomes of farmers in Africa and developing countries in other
parts of the world. Among the most prominent efforts funded by
philanthropic private organizations is AGRA, headquartered in Nairobi
(Kenya) and established in 2007 with an initial grant of $150 million
from the Gates Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation to help small-
scale farmers lift themselves out of hunger and poverty through
increased farm productivity and incomes.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: New Food Security Challenges: Rising Demand for Biofuels
and Climate Change:
Rising global commodity prices and climate change are emerging
challenges that will likely exacerbate food insecurity in sub-Saharan
Africa.[Footnote 53] Rising commodity prices are in part due to the
growing global demand for biofuels, and this appendix provides further
information on how biofuels impact food security.[Footnote 54] This
appendix also provides further information on how climate change is
predicted to affect food security in sub-Saharan Africa, primarily
through its impact on agricultural yields.
Growing Biofuel Demand Projected to Increase African Food Insecurity:
Driven by environmental concerns and the high price of oil, global
demand for biofuels is rapidly rising. Total biofuel production has
been recently growing at a rate of about 15 percent per year, such
that, between 2000 and 2005, production more than doubled to nearly
equal 650,000 barrels per day or about 1 percent of global
transportation fuel use. In the United States, ethanol production will
consume more than one third of the country's corn crop in 2009,
according to USDA. The United States and other key producers of
biofuels have pledged to pursue further growth in production. In the
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, the United States pledged
to increase ethanol production nearly five-fold over current levels by
2022. Similarly, the European Commission has announced its intentions
to expand biofuel production to 10 percent of its transportation fuel
use by 2020. Although potential growth in biofuel production is
uncertain, various estimates suggest that global biofuel production
could grow to supply over 5 percent of the world's transportation
energy needs.[Footnote 55]
Growth in biofuel demand potentially creates both positive and negative
impacts for African agriculture and food security. For example:
* Rural development opportunities could exist for African communities
that are able to produce biofuels. Countries with biofuel production
could also qualify for emission-reduction credits through the
international market for greenhouse gas emission reductions under the
Kyoto Protocol. Such credits would allow these countries to attract
additional investment through the Clean Development Mechanism that
could assist them in further developing their biofuel industries.
However, while several African countries are pursuing biofuel
production, commercial production is not yet widely developed and
experts suggest that such production risks excluding smallholder
farmers.
* African biofuel production may compete with food production through
competition for land, water, and other agricultural inputs. The UN
reports concern that commercial biofuel production in sub-Saharan
Africa will target high-quality lands and push food production to less
productive lands. The World Bank reports that 75 percent of the
farmland in sub-Saharan Africa is already characterized by soils that
are degraded and lack nutrients.
[Volume of Biofuels Commercially Produced in Sub-Saharan Africa: The
current volume of biofuels being commercially produced in sub-Saharan
Africa (with the exception of South Africa) is small. However, Kenya,
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe are among the
countries that have enacted pro-biofuel policies. By 2010, these six
countries will be producing over 700 million liters of biofuels if they
meet government targets. Implementing successful biofuel programs in
sub-Saharan Africa will depend on a host of factors, including access
to markets and technology, agricultural and trade policy, and the price
difference between biofuels and fossil fuels. [Source: GAO based on
literature review.)]
* Rapid growth in demand for grains to produce biofuels has contributed
to rising agricultural prices. Between 2005 and 2007 alone, world
prices of grains rose 43 percent. Biofuel growth has also triggered
increases in the prices of other agricultural commodities as the use of
land to grow biofuels has decreased land available for other crops.
Higher grain prices reduce resources for low-income consumers who spend
a large share of their income on food, farmers who buy more food than
they produce, and food aid programs. In the long term, while higher
grain prices provide incentives to expand agricultural production,
complementary policies and investments in technology and market
development may be required.
On a net basis, IFPRI has concluded that current growth in biofuels
will result in an increase in African food insecurity. Using their
IMPACT model, IFPRI projects that world prices for maize will rise 26
percent and world prices for oilseeds will rise 18 percent by 2020
under the assumption that current biofuel investment plans are
realized. In this case, total net calorie availability in sub-Saharan
Africa will decline by about 4 percent. Worldwide, FAO projects a 15
percent net increase in the 2007 grain import bills of developing
countries, partly as a result of growing biofuel demand. Concern over
the negative impacts of biofuels has also been widely noted by
organizations such as FAO; the World Bank; and the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, who has called for a 5-year moratorium
on the production of biofuels.
Climate Change Predicted to Increase African Food Insecurity:
Although global temperatures have varied throughout history, key
scientific studies have found that higher temperatures during the past
century are largely attributable to human activities, and that, as
such, temperatures are likely to rise further during this century. The
National Academy of Sciences has found that global temperatures have
been warmer during the last few decades of the twentieth century than
during any comparable period of the preceding 400 years.[Footnote 56]
These assessments also predict rising global temperatures for this
century, resulting in changed precipitation patterns and increased
frequency and severity of damaging weather-related events. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for example, has
predicted a rise in global mean temperatures of between 1.8 and 4.0
degrees Celsius, depending upon human and economic behavior. Assuming
no fundamental change in that behavior, a comprehensive review of
climate change models finds a 77 to 99 percent likelihood that global
average temperatures will rise in excess of 2 degrees Celsius.[Footnote
57]
Regarding climates in Africa, key studies also conclude that warming
has taken place. For example, according to the IPCC, southern Africa
has had higher minimum temperatures and more frequent warm spells since
the 1960s, as well as increased interannual precipitation variability
since the 1970s. The IPCC also reports that both East Africa and
southern Africa have had more intense and widespread droughts. In the
future, IFPRI reports that Africa may be the continent hardest hit by
climate change, with one estimate predicting temperature increases for
certain areas in Africa that are double those of the global average.
One climate study predicts future annual warming across the continent
ranging from 0.2 to 0.5 degrees Celsius, per decade.[Footnote 58]
Climate is an important factor affecting agricultural productivity and
experts report that Africa's agricultural sector is particularly
sensitive to climate change due, in part, to low adaptive
capacity.[Footnote 59] Experts find that climate change will likely
significantly limit agricultural production in sub-Saharan Africa in
various ways:
* Higher temperatures shorten the growing season and adversely affect
grain formation at night. As a result of climate change, FAO states
that the quantity of African land with a growing season of less than
120 days could increase by 5 to 8 percent and the World Resources
Institute describes projected future declines in the length of the
growing season by 50 to 113 days in certain areas in Africa.
* Reduced precipitation limits the availability of water to grow crops.
The World Wildlife Fund reports that water constraints have already
reduced agricultural productivity, as 95 percent of cropland in sub-
Saharan Africa is used for low-input, rain-fed agriculture rather than
for irrigated production. Models referenced by the United Nations
Framework on Climate Change (UNFCC) estimate that more than an
additional 600,000 square kilometers of agricultural land in sub-
Saharan Africa will become severely water-constrained with global
climate change.
* Variable climates lead farmers to shift agricultural production
sites, often onto marginal lands, exacerbating soil erosion. According
to the World Bank's 2008 World Development Report, soil erosion can
result in agricultural productivity losses for the east African
highlands of 2 to 3 percent a year.
* Rising sea levels threaten coastal agricultural land. In its national
communication to the UNFCC, for example, Kenya predicted losses of more
than $470 million for damage to crops from a 1-meter rise in sea
levels.
* Climate extremes aggravate crop diseases and result in crop failures
and livestock deaths. FAO reports that both floods and droughts have
increased the incidence of food emergencies in sub-Saharan Africa.
To quantify expected climate change impacts on African agricultural
production and food security, a number of studies employ climate models
that estimate changes in temperature, precipitation, and agricultural
yields. Results vary widely due to the large degree of uncertainty
entailed in climate modeling, as well as differences in assumptions
about adaptive capacity.[Footnote 60] Despite the wide variation in
results, these studies generally conclude that climate change will
increase African food insecurity in both the short and long term. For
example, one study predicts that agricultural revenues in Kenya could
decline between 27 and 34 percent by 2030. FAO reports a projected
increase in the number of Africans at risk of hunger from 116 million
in 1980 to 415 million in 2060. To illustrate potential food security
impacts from climate change, results from several studies are shown in
table 4. (The full citation of the sources in table 4 follow the
table.)
Table 4: Selected Studies with Negative Projected Impacts of Climate
Change on African Agriculture:
Source: Agoumi (2003);
Year of estimated impact: 2020;
Description of estimated impact: Describes a reduction in rain-fed
agricultural yields of up to 50 percent in some African countries, with
smallholder farms being impacted relatively more.
Source: Lobell, et al. (2008);
Year of estimated impact: 2030;
Description of estimated impact: Describes declines in southern African
cereal production--maize yields in Zimbabwe, for example, projected to
decline between 4 and 7 percent for a 1 degree Celsius increase.
Source: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4334;
Year of estimated impact: 2030;
Description of estimated impact: Describes a reduction in Kenyan
agricultural revenues of 27 to 34 percent depending upon climate
scenario.
Source: CEEPA (2006)[A] Discussion Paper No. 14;
Year of estimated impact: 2039;
Description of estimated impact: Describes a loss of 15 percent of
cropland in East Africa, averaged across scenarios.
Source: CEEPA (2006) Discussion Paper No. 15;
Year of estimated impact: 2050;
Description of estimated impact: Describes a decline in farm
productivity:
* Ethiopia: -1.3 percent;
* Kenya: -9.8 percent;
* South Africa: -3.0 percent;
* Zambia: -6.0 percent;
* Zimbabwe: -4.9 percent.
Source: UNDP Human Development Report (2007/2008);
Year of estimated impact: 2050;
Description of estimated impact: Describes a reduction in potential
maize yields of over 10 percent in Malawi.
Source: United Nations Environment Program (2006);
Year of estimated impact: 2060;
Description of estimated impact: Describes a reduction in grain yields
of 33 percent in sub-Saharan Africa.
Source: CEEPA (2006) - Discussion Paper No. 8;
Year of estimated impact: 2060;
Description of estimated impact: Describes a decrease in African
agricultural revenues from rain-fed production of over $25 billion
under two scenarios.
Source: FAO (1996);
Year of estimated impact: 2060;
Description of estimated impact: Describes an increase in the number of
Africans at risk of hunger from 116 million in 1980 to 291 million in
2020 to 415 million in 2060. For several scenarios, predicts a 20 to 25
percent decline in cereal production by 2060.
Source: FAO (2005);
Year of estimated impact: 2080;
Description of estimated impact: Describes a decrease in cultivated
rain-fed land in Africa with 29 African countries projected to lose a
total of 35 million tons in potential cereal production.
Source: Fischer, et al. (2005);
Year of estimated impact: 2080;
Description of estimated impact: Describes sub-Saharan African cereal
yields to decline on average by 12 percent in net terms; expansion of
land with severe climate or soil constraints by 30-60 million hectares,
and possible disappearance of land suitable for wheat production.
Source: Warren, et al. (2006);
Year of estimated impact: 2080;
Description of estimated impact: Describes an increase in the number of
people at risk of hunger in Africa by over 150 million under two
scenarios.
Source: Tubiello and Fischer (2007);
Year of estimated impact: 2080;
Description of estimated impact: Describes an increase of over 220
million Africans at risk of hunger.
Source: Arnell (2002);
Year of estimated impact: 2080;
Description of estimated impact: Describes cereal yields to decrease
between 2.5 and 5.0 percent, even with CO2 stabilization, in certain
African countries.
Source: GAO.
Note: Full citations of the sources are listed following this table.
[A] The University of Pretoria's Centre for Environmental Economics and
Policy in Africa is coordinating a Global Environment Facility-funded
project to assess climate change impacts on agroecological systems in
11 African countries. Assisting with the project are the World Bank,
FAO, Yale University, University of Colorado, and the International
Water Management Institute.
[End of table]
Additional Source Information:
Agoumi, Ali. Vulnerability of North African Countries to Climatic
Changes: Adaptation and Implementation Strategies for Climate Change.
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2003.
Arnell, N.W, M.G.R. Cannell, M. Hulme, R.S. Kovats, J.F.B. Mitchell,
R.J. Nicholls, M.L. Parry, M.T.J. Livermore, and A. White. "The
Consequences of CO2 Stabilisation for the Impacts of Climate Change."
Climatic Change, vol. 53, 2002.
FAO. Global Climate Change and Agricultural Production. Rome, Italy,
1996.
FAO. Special Event on Impact of Climate Change, Pests and Diseases on
Food Security and Poverty Reduction: Background Document. 31st Session
of the Committee on World Food Security. Rome, Italy, 2005.
Fischer, Gunther, Mahendra Shah, Francesco N. Tubiello, and Harrij van
Velhuizen. "Socio-economic and Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture:
an Integrated Assessment, 1990-2080," Philosophical Transactions of The
Royal Society B, vol. 360, 2005.
Kabubo-Mariara, Jane and Fredrick K. Karanja. The Economic Impact of
Climate Change on Kenyan Crop Agriculture: A Ricardian Approach, World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4334. Washington, D.C., August 2007.
Kurukulasuriya, Pradeep and Robert Mendelsohn. A Ricardian Analysis of
the Impact of Climate Change on African Cropland. CEEPA Discussion
Paper No. 8, Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa,
University of Pretoria, July 2006.
Lobell, David B., Marshall B. Burke, Claudia Tebaldi, Michael D.
Mastrandrea, Walter P. Falcon, and Rosamond L. Naylor. "Prioritizing
Climate Change Adaptation Needs for Food Security in 2030." Science,
Vol. 319, February 2008.
Lotsch, Alexander. Sensitivity of Cropping Patterns in Africa to
Transient Climate Change. CEEPA Discussion Paper No. 14, Centre for
Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa, University of Pretoria,
July 2006.
Maddison, David, Marita Manley, and Pradeep Kurukulasuriya. The Impact
of Climate Change on African Agriculture: A Ricardian Approach. CEEPA
Discussion Paper No. 15, Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy
in Africa, University of Pretoria, July 2006.
Tubiello, Francesco N. and Günther Fischer. "Reducing Climate Change
Impacts on Agriculture: Global and Regional Effects of Mitigation, 2000-
2080." Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 74, 2007.
United Nations Environment Programme. African Regional Implementation
Review for the 14th Session of the Commission on Sustainable
Development: Report on Climate Change. Nairobi, Kenya, 2006.
Warren, Rachel, Nigel Arnell, Robert Nicholls, Peter Levy, and Jeff
Price. Understanding the Regional Impacts of Climate Change: Research
Report Prepared for the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change. Tyndall Center for Climate Change Research Working Paper 90,
September 2006.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
[End of section]
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
USAID: From The American People:
U.S. Agency for International Development:
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW:
Washington, DC 20523:
[hyperlink, http://www.usaid.gov]:
May 16, 2008:
Mr. Thomas Melito:
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Melito:
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's
(USAID) formal response on the draft GAO report "International Food
Assistance: Insufficient Efforts by Host Governments and Donors
Threaten Progress to Halve Hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015" (GAO-
08-680).
We appreciate the GAO's examination of USAID's agriculture investments
in sub-Saharan Africa and its recognition of the significant reductions
in funding that have occurred over the past decade. Enclosed you will
find our detailed comments on the draft report.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this
review.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sean Mulvaney:
Assistant Administrator Management Bureau:
Enclosed: Detailed Comments:
USAID Detailed Comments on Draft GAO Report:
International Food Assistance: Insufficient Efforts by Host Governments
and Donors Threaten Progress to Halve Hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by
2015 (GAO-08-680):
USAID concurs with the first recommendation. The 1996 World Food Summit
clearly identified responsibilities for halving hunger by 2015. Primary
responsibility resides with the respective nations themselves. In this
regard, in sub-Saharan Africa (as the report rightly points out), a key
element is getting African countries to direct 10 percent of their
national budgets to agriculture and rural development. There has been
good progress on this, but clearly more progress is needed.
In 2006, the economy of all sub-Saharan Africa grew by 5.5 percent. As
noted by the African Development Bank, overall economic growth in
Africa reached a robust 6 percent in 2007, the highest in the last 20
years. In many of the non-oil producing countries that have experienced
growth, agriculture has been a major contributor. [See GAO comment 1]
The emergence of the African Union (AU), which along with regional and
sub-regional organizations in Africa, is demonstrating effective
leadership in the promotion of good governance, peace, and security,
critical components for ensuring sustained economic development and
food security. To consolidate our partnership. the United States has
appointed an ambassador to the AU and is working closely with the AU to
implement its food security strategy which is part of the New
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Comprehensive Africa
Agriculture Development Program (CAADP). [See GAO comment 2]
There are additional activities that the USG and the global community
are undertaking that address the question of food security, namely:
* In 2006, the USG undertook a major effort in interagency
coordination, the U.S. Foreign Assistance Reform.
* In May 2008, a sub-Principals Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Food
Price Increases and Global Food Security was established to enhance USG
interagency coordination.
* A parallel effort at donor coordination, the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was implemented
by USAID in 2005.
* In Africa, donors have formed the AU NEPAD CAADP Donor Partner
Platform to coordinate and align investments in African countries under
CAADP.
* USAID has made extensive investments to address long-term agriculture
production constraints through support of agricultural research by the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) (a
large portion of which is spent on Africa), U.S. land grant university
programs such as the Collaborative Research Support Programs (CRSPs),
and research in the area of agricultural biotechnology. These programs
undertake research in partnership with African research institutions
and work to build African science and technology capacity.
The President's Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA) is directly
addressing food insecurity in Africa. IEHA has played an important
leadership role in improving the capacity of African governments to
identify and make the strategic investments necessary to meet the food
security needs of their people. Through IEHA, USAID is actively working
with the AU, NEPAD, African countries and other donors. For example,
the U.S. is collaborating with donors and African partners to design
the Alliance for Commodity Trade in East and Southern Africa, a multi-
donor effort led by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), to build regional cross-border alliances that will strengthen
innovative market institutions and link chronically food insecure
smallholder farmers with growing national and regional markets for
staple foods. [See GAO comment 3]
The report links the non-food factors of health, rising commodity
prices, and climate change to food security. Because the report uses
malnutrition as the basis for measuring hunger, it is important to
understand the role of additional non-food factors such as water and
sanitation investments on the level of hunger in sub-Saharan Africa and
the rest of the world. [See GAO comment 4]
We are concerned with the report's conclusion (pp. 5-6) that "USAID's
efforts to shift its focus from emergency food aid to long-term
agricultural development have not been successful." USAID recognizes
that food aid is not the solution to chronic hunger and poverty and,
that, in the longer term, the USG needs to help countries and their
people achieve food security and reduce the need for emergency food
aid. However, given the high levels of acute food insecurity in sub-
Saharan Africa, it is important that a shift in focus from relief to
development not translate into reduced emergency food aid in the short
term. Rather a shift in focus should signal recognition that investment
in rural agriculture is the best means of reversing hunger and food
security and that these investments will likewise reduce the need for
emergency food aid over time. [See GAO comment 5]
Finally, the second recommendation that progress on developing and
implementing an integrated government-wide U.S. strategy on achieving
food security in sub-Saharan Africa be reported as part of the annual U
S. International Food Assistance Report, which is required to be
submitted to Congress by P.L. 480, infers (1) that the key means for
addressing food insecurity and agricultural and/or economic development
is - or should be - food aid, and (2) that USAID is not appropriately
managing this resource by using it primarily as an emergency resource.
A more appropriate report would capture the various accounts the USG
uses to invest in African agricultural and economic development such as
the annual report on progress under the IEHA. [See GAO comment 6]
Following are GAO's comments on the U.S. Agency for International
Development letter dated May 16, 2008.
GAO Comments:
1. Although some African countries have had robust economic growth in
recent years, to achieve the WFS and MDG-1 goals, the growth,
especially in agriculture, needs to be sustained. As we note in our
report, concerted efforts and sustained growth are needed for many
years to overcome the numerous challenges facing host governments and
donors to halve hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by 2015.
2. While GAO recognizes the various ongoing coordination efforts at the
international and U.S. government level, our work revealed that
coordination on improving food security in sub-Saharan Africa has thus
far been insufficient. In May 2008, following the release of a draft of
this report, USAID initiated the creation of a sub-Principals
Coordinating Committee on Food Price Increases and Global Food Security
to help facilitate interagency coordination. In addition to USAID,
USDA, State, and Treasury, participating agencies include the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Department of Commerce, MCC, the National
Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget, the Peace Corps,
the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, and the U.S. Trade
Representative.
3. As we note in our report, while IEHA has undertaken a variety of
efforts to address food insecurity in Africa, these efforts have thus
far been limited in scale and scope. IEHA does not integrate with other
agencies in terms of plans, programs, resources, and activities. In
addition, many IEHA projects are limited in their impact because they
may not necessarily address the root causes of food insecurity. For
example, projects distributing treadle pumps benefit only the farmers
who receive them, but do not address the larger issue of the
underdevelopment of agricultural input markets.
4. While we recognize that clean water and sanitation are important to
nutrition and food utilization, these issues were outside the scope of
our study.
5. We recognize the importance of emergency assistance. However, to
break the cycle of poverty, food insecurity, and emergencies,
agricultural development needs to increase in priority. We agree with
USAID that a shift in focus from relief to development should not
translate into reduced emergency food aid in the short term.
6. We disagree with USAID's comment that a report such as the annual
progress report on IEHA (which is not congressionally required),
instead of the congressionally required International Food Assistance
Report (IFAR), be used to report on USAID's and other agencies'
implementation of our first recommendation. Public Law 480, section 407
(f)(codified at 7.U.S.C. 1736a(f) requires that the President prepare
an annual report that "shall include—an assessment of the progress
toward achieving food security in each country receiving food
assistance from the United States Government." Expanding the scope of
current reporting to include progress on achieving food security would
enhance the usefulness of IFAR, while making it unnecessary to
recommend the promulgation of a separate report.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:
Note: GAO comment supplementing those in the report text appears at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of Agricultural:
Foreign Agriculture Service:
Washington, D.C. 20250:
May 14, 2008:
Mr. Thomas Melito:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Melito:
Thank you for providing the Department of Agriculture (USDA) with this
opportunity to comment on the Government Accountability Office's draft
report "International Food Assistance: Insufficient Efforts by Host
Governments and Donors Threaten Progress to Halve Hunger in sub-Saharan
Africa by 2015" (GAO-08-680). This timely report is of great interest
within and beyond USDA, especially as reduced food stocks and high
commodity prices raise the anxiety of millions of people worldwide who
are concerned about their health and livelihoods.
The draft report contains useful information and recommendations. The
Department is also pleased with the role it plays in meeting the short-
and long-term food needs in sub-Saharan Africa. Currently, USDA
participates in a food aid policy coordinating process with the
U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of State, the
Office of Management and Budget, and other government agencies, to help
ensure the effective coordination and distribution of food aid
resources. [See GAO comment 1]
USDA remains committed to utilize its full range of authorities and
programs to address the need for improving the effectiveness of global
food assistance and development.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael W. Yost:
Administrator:
Following is GAO's comment on the U.S. Department of Agriculture letter
dated May 14, 2008.
GAO Comment:
1. We acknowledge the role that USDA plays in meeting short-and long-
term food needs in sub-Saharan Africa. Although an interagency Food
Assistance Policy Council provides a forum for the discussion and
coordination of U.S. food aid programs, a similar forum to address food
security issues had not been established until May 2008 after the
issuance of a draft of this report. Finally, although USDA administers
food assistance programs, including food aid programs for development,
we note in this report that these are not included in IEHA.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
May 16, 2008:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"International Food Assistance: Insufficient Efforts by Host
Governments and Donors Threaten Progress to Halve Hunger in sub-Saharan
Africa by 2015," GAO Job Code 320503.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact John
Menard, Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of Economic, Energy and
Business Affairs at (202) 663-2505.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sid Kaplan (Acting):
cc: GAO - Phil Thomas;
EEB - Dan Sullivan:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
International Food Assistance: Insufficient Efforts by Host Governments
and Donors Threaten Progress to Halve Hunger In sub-Saharan Africa by
2015 (GAO-08-680, GAO Code 320503):
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled
International Food Assistance: Insufficient Efforts by Host Governments
and Donors Threaten Progress to Halve Hunger in sub-Saharan Africa by
2015. The Department of State, and its interagency partners, have been
and continue to be engaged on the important issues of food aid and food
security. The report provides timely information on this issue, which
has become more critical in recent months with the sharp increase in
food prices.
The Department of State acknowledges the main findings of the GAO
report. Although there are no recommendations to the Department of
State in the report, we would like to provide some formal comments.
On page 43, the report states that, "...Our meetings with officials of
other agencies demonstrated that there was no significant effort to
coordinate their food security programs." State believes this statement
is inaccurate, as we engage in ongoing coordination with USAID and USDA
on food security issues. Specifically, various bureaus within State
such as the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (F), Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), the Bureau of Economic,
Energy, and Business Affairs (EEB), Bureau of African Affairs (AF),
Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO), and others work
closely with our colleagues at USAID and USDA to coordinate food
security issues. [See GAO comment 1]
We would also note the following issues should be addressed:
* The issue of post-harvest food spoilage and market delivery,
particularly in developing countries, needs to be examined and
incorporated. [See GAO comment 2]
* Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues/access requires attention and
further study. The African countries regularly complain about the
negative effects EU SPS rules have on their agricultural production. We
understand that, technically, such rules would affect production for
export, but the effects of the rules usually spill over into the
domestic market as well. [See GAO comment 3]
* Despite GAO's acknowledgement that FAO's surveys and studies are
methodologically faulty and out of date (pages 39-41), GAO appears to
rely on them to come up with its own analyses, noting in Appendix 1
that FAO survey/data is reliable enough to use. (This would seem to
produce data that is even less reliable than FAO's original data.) [See
GAO comment 4]
* The report relies solely on FAO reports/data regarding
undernourishment. Other UN organizations, including UNHCR and WFP, do a
good job of tracking malnutrition, etc., however, their data is not
referenced in the report, neither is it clear what standard FAO employs
for its assessments. Is it using SPHERE standards or standards that it
has developed? No mention is made of WFP food assessments/surveys
and/or the results of UN Joint Assessment Missions (JAMs). [See GAO
comment 5]
* The report fails to fully describe (take into account) WFP's work in
the agriculture and infrastructure development sectors (see footnote
14, page 14) and host governments' support of such projects. (For
example, the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) contributed $55M to a WFP
infrastructure-road building/improvement operation in 2007; since the
operation began in 2004, the GOSS has contributed over $85M. The
operation's short-term goal was to make it easier to deliver food
assistance in southern Sudan; the long-term benefits to the region's
economy will be its lasting contribution to food security including
reducing the cost of access to food and markets in which to sell
food/agriculture products. The operation has been so successful that at
the GOSS' request WFP has extended it through mid-2009. The USG has
contributed over $72.55M to this operation. (Note: Neither the GOSS or
any other government entity in Sudan has ever contributed to a WFP
feeding operation.) [See GAO comment 6]
* Although the report's authors acknowledge role of trade policies in a
footnote on page 16 of the report, in order for the report to be
comprehensive it should take into account the important role trade
(access to markets; subsidies, etc.) has on food security and the goal
of halving hunger. It is clear that under-investment in agriculture is
a global phenomenon that is one of the biggest factors in preventing
food security. [See GAO comment 3]
* When discussing the causes of hunger in Africa, the report does not
mention such key issues as a prolonged period of warfare and civil
strife, and inadequately addresses such important host government
issues as good governance, and a commitment to agricultural and rural
development. [See GAO comment 7]
* To further address the causes of hunger in Africa, especially in
light of rising food prices, the USG is pursuing an integrated policy
response. [See GAO comment 8]
* On May 1, the President announced his request to the Congress for an
additional $770 million in funding for food aid and agricultural
development programs to help address global food insecurity issues. The
additional $770 million will support a three-pillared response to the
food crisis: (1) increasing food assistance to meet the immediate needs
of the most vulnerable ($620 million); (2) augmenting agriculture
productivity programs, especially in Africa and other key agricultural
regions, to boost food staple supplies ($150 million); and (3)
promoting an international policy environment that addresses the
systemic causes of the food crisis.
* Emergency assistance funds will target those regions most severely
affected by the food shortage crisis, including Ethiopia, Kenya,
Mauritania, Niger, Somalia and Zimbabwe. Non-emergency assistance funds
to help boost agriculture productivity will also target countries in
Africa, including Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, Mali, Uganda, Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Rwanda.
* The President's announcement is in addition to his previous request
for an additional $350 million for emergency food aid in FY 2008, and
the $200 million drawdown of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Bill
Emerson Humanitarian Trust announced two weeks ago. The President
stated that, with these additional resources, the U.S. will contribute
a total of almost $5 billion to the fight against global hunger in FY
2008 and FY 2009.
* Critically, the U.S. strategy goes beyond the immediate impacts of
the food price crisis to address the underlying causes of commodity
market fluctuations. We have outlined steps the U.S., the international
community, and the affected governments can take to increase
agricultural productivity, as well as the systemic international policy
issues that distort the international food market.
* The second pillar of the U.S. approach is to jump-start a substantial
supply response in key developing countries where we can rapidly double
production of key food staples. At the same time, we will work to break
the transportation chokepoints and bottlenecks that inhibit the
efficient flow of food across key points in Africa. Together this will
target some of the most fundamental challenges facing agricultural
development that are contributing to high food prices.
* Finally, the U.S. will strongly promote an international policy
environment that facilitates a truly global market for food. This
includes a strong push for the conclusion of the Doha Round this year
that contains a strong agreement on agricultural market access. In
addition, the U.S. will work with countries to remove harmful export
restrictions that result in higher global food prices and deny poor
farmers access to global markets. We will also press for countries to
abide by global trading rules and accept science based evaluations of
food production methods. Advanced crops developed through biotechnology
have an important role to play in increasing productivity, and lifting
agriculture export restrictions that contribute to higher food prices
is essential.
Following are GAO's comments on the Department of State letter dated
May 16, 2008.
GAO Comments:
1. We maintain that U.S. agencies' efforts to coordinate food security
programs have thus far been insufficient. Efforts to date are focused
primarily on food aid, as opposed to food security, and there is no
comprehensive U.S. governmentwide strategy for addressing food
insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa.
2. A major reason for food spoilage and poor market delivery is poor
infrastructure, as we note in our discussion of rural development.
3. As we note in our discussion of our objectives, scope, and
methodology (see app. I), although we recognize the multifaceted nature
of factors affecting food security, we excluded some factors, such as
international trade, from the scope of our study. While international
trade is important to global food security, its relative importance to
sub-Saharan Africa is considerably lower. Many smallholder farmers in
sub-Saharan Africa are not in a position to benefit from international
trade due to high transaction costs, and they generally produce
products, such as cassava, that are not traded internationally.
4. We did not generate data from FAO's original estimates of
undernourishment. We relied on FAO's estimates to assess progress
toward the WFS and MDG goals. As we note in our previously mentioned
objectives, scope, and methodology, we discussed the reliability of
FAO's undernourishment estimates with cognizant FAO and U.S. government
officials in Washington and in sub-Saharan Africa, and we determined
that these estimates are sufficiently reliable for our purpose, which
is to show overall trends over time at the aggregate level.
5. FAO's estimates are the official indicators used to track progress
toward the WFS and MDG-1 goals. In addition, they are the only
estimates available to assess undernourishment at the global level.
Other UN agencies, such as WFP, conduct assessments and collect other
data on food supply and nutrition for their respective missions.
However, they do not do so at the global level, and their data cannot
replace FAO's estimates on undernourishment to track long-term progress
toward the WFS and MDG-1 goals.
6. We added language in appendix IV to reflect the recent experiences
in southern Sudan.
7. As we previously mentioned in our objectives, scope, and
methodology, although we recognize the multifaceted nature of factors
affecting food security, some factors, such as conflicts, were excluded
from the scope of our study. We disagree with State's assertion that we
did not adequately address host government issues. Our report points
out that host government policy disincentives are a main factor in food
insecurity. We also note that the lack of the sufficient investment in
agriculture by the host government is one of the challenges hindering
progress to halving hunger by 2015.
8. In May 2008, the President announced a $770 million initiative that
aims to (1) increase food assistance to meet the immediate needs of the
most vulnerable ($620 million); (2) augment agricultural productivity
programs, especially in Africa and other key agricultural regions, to
boost food staple supplies ($150 million); and (3) promote an
international policy environment that addresses the systemic causes of
the food crisis. However, as of the time of this report, Congress had
not passed legislation implementing this proposal.
[End of section]
Appendix X: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Thomas Melito, (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Phillip J. Thomas (Assistant
Director), Carol Bray, Ming Chen, Debbie Chung, Martin De Alteriis,
Leah DeWolf, Mark Dowling, Etana Finkler, Melinda Hudson, Joy Labez,
Julia A. Roberts, Kendall Schaefer, and Elizabeth Singer made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
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[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Food Security: Factors That Could Affect Progress Toward
Meeting World Food Summit Goals, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-99-15] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 1999).
[2] FAO defines "undernourishment" as the condition of people whose
food consumption is continuously below a minimum dietary energy
requirement for maintaining an acceptable minimum body size, living a
healthy life, and carrying out light physical activity. While we
recognize that there are different technical definitions for "chronic
undernourishment," "food insecurity," and "hunger," we use these terms
interchangeably in this report.
[3] In its report on The State of Food and Agriculture (2006), FAO
reported undernourishment estimates for 39 countries in sub-Saharan
Africa: 6 countries in Central Africa, 8 in East Africa, 11 in southern
Africa, and 14 in West Africa. FAO makes a composite estimate for
countries for which it lacks country-level data and uses that estimate
in developing its overall undernourishment estimates for sub-Saharan
Africa. FAO uses the average of the period of 1990 to 1992 as the
baseline in measuring progress toward the WFS goal, and its most recent
official statistics available for undernourishment are for the period
of 2001 to 2003.
[4] Between January 2007 and April 2008, 15 countries reported food
riots and protests, according to WFP. These countries are Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Guinea, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Italy,
Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal, and Yemen.
[5] We selected East Africa and southern Africa for fieldwork because
these are the regions where food insecurity is most severe and
widespread. All four countries that we selected had undernourishment
rates of more than 30 percent. We also selected countries that could
serve as illustrative examples of regional USAID activities (e.g.,
Kenya), U.S. Presidential Initiative to End Hunger in Africa priority
countries (e.g., Mozambique and Zambia), Millennium Challenge
Corporation compact countries (e.g., Tanzania), and UN Millennium
Villages (e.g., Kenya).
[6] These included representatives from the missions of Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
[7] In this report, we use the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development's Development Assistance Committee statistical
definition of aid to agriculture. This definition includes agricultural
sector policy, planning, and programs; agricultural land and water
resources; agricultural development and supply of inputs, crops, and
livestock production; agricultural services; agricultural education,
training, and research; and institution capacity building and advice.
[8] FAO's estimates on undernourishment are the only global-level
estimates currently available.
[9] Pub. L. No. 480, section 407(f), states that "the President shall
prepare an annual report concerning the programs and activities
implemented under this law for the preceding fiscal year." The U.S.
International Food Assistance Report, which USAID prepares and submits
to Congress annually, provides a report on USAID and USDA international
food assistance programs that are aimed at reducing food insecurity.
[10] The term "pastoralists" refers to nomadic communities--including
an estimated 15 to 20 million people in East Africa--who depend on
raising and herding livestock for a living and who move with rainy and
dry seasons in search of water and grazing land. In some instances,
nomadic families become agropastoralists, with some family members
raising agricultural crops to meet a portion of their household food
needs and others moving with their herds of livestock in search of
water and grazing land.
[11] MDG-1 has two targets: first, between 1990 and 2015, to halve the
proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day; and second,
between 1990 and 2015, to halve the proportion of people who suffer
from hunger. The second target is measured by two progress indicators:
(1) the prevalence of underweight children under 5 years of age on the
basis of United Nations Children's Fund and World Health Organization
data and (2) the proportion of the population below the minimum level
of dietary energy consumption. In this report, we focus on the latter
indicator, which is based on FAO's WFS goal estimates.
[12] FAO, Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit
Plan of Action, World Food Summit (Rome: Nov. 13-17, 1996).
[13] Instability caused by conflict is one of the major contributors to
the increase in the undernourished population in sub-Saharan Africa.
According to FAO, the increase in undernourished people since 1990 was
mainly driven by five war-torn countries (Burundi, Democratic Republic
of Congo, Eritrea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone).
[14] The New Partnership for Africa's Development, formerly known as
the New African Initiative, was established by the AU in July 2001.
[15] According to officials from USAID's East Africa Mission, support
to CAADP is coordinated by a partnership platform, a group of senior
representatives of multilateral and bilateral donors.
[16] FAO was one of the first international organizations established
at the end of World War II in recognition of the importance of ensuring
food for all as a precondition to security and peace. Among its varied
functions, FAO also sets international standards and provides technical
assistance to developing countries.
[17] Although the majority of WFP's funding goes toward relief food aid
to address emergencies, a small proportion of its funding is geared
toward development projects, such as community-based food-for-work and
food-for-assets programs, to help communities build or rebuild food
security and enhance their resilience to shocks. Funding for WFP's
nonemergency development projects worldwide has gradually declined over
the last 15 years, from about 30 percent of WFP's operational budget in
the early 1990s to about 10 percent in recent years. Some of WFP's work
in the agriculture and infrastructure development sectors contribute to
long-term food security.
[18] Members of the G8 are Canada, the European Commission, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.
[19] To meet its commitment to double aid to sub-Saharan Africa between
2004 and 2010, the United States launched MCC, with the aim of
providing up to $5 billion a year; the $15 billion President's
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; an initiative to address humanitarian
emergencies in Africa that cost more than $2 billion in 2005; and a new
$1.2 billion malaria initiative.
[20] Title II of Pub. L. No. 480 (the Agricultural Trade Development
and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq) is the
largest U.S. food aid program, representing approximately 74 percent of
total in-kind food aid allocations from fiscal years 2002 through 2006.
This program is managed by USAID.
[21] In addition, Nigeria and South Africa receive biotechnology
funding through IEHA but do not have a comprehensive IEHA agenda.
[22] Although trade reform was beyond the scope of our review, we
recognize that it is an important factor to both food security and the
goal of halving hunger. However, its relative importance to sub-Saharan
Africa is considerably lower.
[23] Cassava plants provide an essential part of the diet of more than
half a billion people. Cassava roots are high in calories, and their
leaves are a source of protein and vitamins A and B. Cassava plants
grow in poor soils with minimum amounts of fertilizer, pesticides, and
water. Because cassava roots can be harvested from 8 months to 24
months after planting, they are an important safeguard against
unexpected food shortages.
[24] World Bank, World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for
Development (Washington, D.C.: 2007).
[25] Grain yield, which is measured by kilograms of cereal production
per acre, is a commonly used measure for agricultural productivity.
[26] Microcredit involves giving small, low-interest start-up loans to
poor entrepreneurs to assist them in developing small business
enterprises.
[27] United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Agriculture, Food
Security and Cooperatives, Agriculture Sector Review and Public
Expenditure Review for 2007/2008.
[28] Biofuels are combustible fuels produced from biomass. Current
biofuel technology uses agricultural feed stocks, such as maize and
sugar, to produce ethanol and rapeseed, and uses soybean and palm oil
to produce biodiesel.
[29] Economic development has diversified diets away from starchy foods
to meat and dairy products, with increased demand for feed grains. FAO
reports that it takes about 7 to 8 kilos of grain to produce 1 kilo of
beef.
[30] USDA, for example, ranked 70 low-income countries by grain import
dependence and daily calorie consumption. Several agriculture-
producing countries, including Eritrea and Zimbabwe, depend on grain
imports for more than 40 percent of calories consumed.
[31] WFP's food aid budget shortfall increased from $500 million in
February 2008 to $755 million as of April 2008. However, on May 23,
2008, WFP announced a $500 million donation from Saudi Arabia, which
effectively closed the shortfall when combined with $460 million in
donations from 31 other countries. WFP now estimates having an
additional $214 million for other urgent hunger needs. According to our
earlier estimates, if WFP's shortfall had not been met, the agency
would have been required to cut rations or reduce the number of
beneficiaries, and may have had to reduce the amount of food aid it
planned to deliver by as much as 35 percent.
[32] For the purposes of this report, climate change refers to any
change in the climate over time, whether due to natural variability or
as a result of human activity.
[33] For a discussion of models from the National Academy of Sciences
and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, see GAO, Climate
Change: Financial Risks to Federal and Private Insurers in Coming
Decades Are Potentially Significant, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-285] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2007).
[34] FAO is planning a high-level conference in June 2008 entitled
"World Food Security: Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy on
Food Security." For information on the conference, see the following
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.fao.org/foodclimate].
[35] We reviewed eight joint assessments of PRSPs for eight countries
in East Africa and southern Africa, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
[36] In recognition of the lack of political and financial leadership
for agricultural development by African governments, and the importance
of agriculture to poverty reduction and food security, CAADP was
designed to (1) guide country strategies and investment, (2) allow
regional peer learning and review, and (3) facilitate greater alignment
and harmonization of development efforts.
[37] The CAADP process requires (1) a country assessment of progress
and performance toward CAADP targets and principles; (2) establishment
of a country CAADP compact that includes needed actions and commitments
by national governments, the private sector, the farming community, and
development partners; and (3) a policy dialogue and arrangement to
monitor commitments and progress.
[38] The 13 countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi,
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia.
[39] For example, the World Bank estimated that $54 to $62 billion per
year is needed worldwide to meet MDG-1. UNDP estimated that $46 billion
per year is required among Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)--
which is an initiative that was established in 1996 as a bilateral and
multilateral effort to provide debt relief to poor countries to help
them achieve economic growth and debt sustainability. HIPC currently
identifies 41 countries, of which 32 countries are in sub-Saharan
Africa, as potentially eligible to receive debt relief.
[40] In 2006, 53 percent of the projects were rated satisfactory in
sustainability.
[41] Despite adverse conditions during the postelection turmoil,
according to a UN official, as of May 2008, the Millennium Villages in
Kenya have been able to continue activities as planned due to community
ownership and holistic development strategies that ensure the villages'
long-term sustainability.
[42] In 2006, 132 countries were members of the Committee on World Food
Security. The 17 sub-Saharan African countries that submitted progress
reports in 2006 were Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
[43] Although ODA may be limited relative to the size of a recipient
country's economy, foreign assistance is important to agricultural
development for some African countries. According to the 2008 World
Development Report, for 24 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, ODA
averages 28 percent of total agricultural spending, and for Mozambique,
Niger, and Rwanda, ODA averages more than 80 percent.
[44] This high-level forum of aid effectiveness was composed of leaders
of government ministries responsible for development and heads of
multilateral and bilateral development institutions. The forum met to
reform the delivery and management of aid in preparation for the 5-year
review of the Millennium Declaration and MDGs in late 2005.
[45] According to the 2008 World Development Report, the government of
Tanzania has been overcoming this challenge by pooling donor resources.
[46] The other pilot countries were Albania, Cape Verde, Pakistan,
Rwanda, Uruguay, and Vietnam.
[47] This ODA funding includes the U.S. Presidential Initiative to End
Hunger in Africa.
[48] These programs include, for example, Food for Progress, which
involves donations or credit sales of commodities to developing
countries and emerging democracies, and the McGovern-Dole Food for
Education and Child Nutrition, which involves the donation of
commodities and provision of financial and technical assistance in
foreign countries. In fiscal year 2007, USDA assistance totaled $130
million and $99 million to these two programs, respectively.
[49] Our analysis applied the following criteria: (1) these
recommendations and lessons, both positive and negative, were mentioned
in at least 6 of the 9 panels, and were mentioned at least 10 times or
more overall, and (2) these criteria were consistent with the natural
breaks in the data.
[50] This Famine Fund is also known as the International Disaster and
Famine Assistance Fund, which provides funding for famine prevention
and relief, as well as mitigation of the effects of famine by
addressing its root causes. One of the projects USAID has funded is the
Regional Enhanced Livelihoods in Pastoral Areas (RELPA), a $19.8
million program to increase the resiliency of pastoralists in drought-
prone areas by stabilizing and improving their livelihoods.
[51] Monetization is the use of food aid as a means to raise cash to
fund development projects. It requires food to be procured, shipped,
and eventually sold--incurring costs at each step in the process. For a
discussion of this practice, see GAO, Foreign Assistance: Various
Challenges Impede the Efficiency and Effectiveness of U.S. Food Aid,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-560] (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 13, 2007).
[52] The 6 countries are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and
Uganda.
[53] For the purposes of this report, climate change refers to any
change in the climate over time, whether due to natural variability or
as a result of human activity.
[54] Biofuels are combustible fuels produced from biomass. Current
biofuel technology uses agricultural feed stocks, such as maize and
sugar, to produce ethanol and rapeseed, soybean, and palm oil to
produce biodiesel. Biofuels reduce world dependence on oil in the
transportation sector and are a renewable energy. They generate less
smog-producing carbon monoxide and less greenhouse gas emissions than
oil.
[55] Most biofuel producers require government subsidies to be
commercially viable, and the potential positive environmental impacts
from biofuel production have also been questioned. World Resources
Institute estimates that it took 13 percent of the U.S. corn harvest in
2005 to displace less than 3 percent of fuel needs. It further reports
that, since planting, fertilizing, and harvesting; fermentation;
distillation; and transportation of 1 gallon of corn-based ethanol
requires between 60 and 75 percent of the energy that is produced by
that gallon, global greenhouse gas emissions are only reduced by about
25 to 40 percent relative to oil.
[56] Furthermore, most observed increases in global average
temperatures since the mid-twentieth century are likely caused by human
activity, principally the burning of fossil fuels and deforestation,
which have increased the amount of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
For a discussion of models from the National Academy of Sciences and
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, see GAO, Climate Change:
Financial Risks to Federal and Private Insurers in Coming Decades Are
Potentially Significant, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-285] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2007).
[57] Stern, Sir Nicholas, Stern Review: Economics of Climate Change,
Report to the Prime Minister, United Kingdom Government Economic
Service (October 2006).
[58] Hulme, Mike, Ruth Doherty, Todd Ngara, Mark New, and David Lister,
African Climate Change: 1900-2100. Revised manuscript for Climate
Research (April 2000).
[59] Development of adaptive capacity is costly. African agriculture's
ability to adapt to climate change could improve through agronomic
research (including biotechnology, which may result in drought and pest
resistant crops), improved irrigation and water management, expanded
access to credit and information, and development of appropriate risk
management. However, such efforts are costly. The United Nations
Framework for Climate Change, for example, has established several
funds to help poor countries adapt to climate change, though the World
Bank reports that current adaptation funding, with contributions at
$150 million to $300 million a year, are insufficient to finance
adaptation costs estimated at tens of billions of dollars in developing
countries.
[60] Climate change impact modeling entails significant uncertainty due
to the complexity of weather systems, limited statistical precision of
projections of future precipitation changes, and the potential for
changes in adaptive capacity. While regional climate change models are
now being developed, global climate models have also been criticized
for not adequately accounting for the El Niño effects that are
important drivers of African climate variability.
[End of section]
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