Combating Terrorism
Guidance for State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program Is Limited and State Does Not Systematically Assess Outcomes Gao ID: GAO-08-875T June 4, 2008The Department of State's (State) Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program's objectives are to provide partner nations with counterterrorism training and equipment, improve bilateral ties, and increase respect for human rights. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) provides policy guidance and its Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism, Assistance (DS/T/ATA), manages program operations. GAO assessed (1) State's guidance for determining ATA priorities, (2) how State coordinates ATA with other counterterrorism programs, (3) the extent State established ATA program goals and measures, and (4) State's reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance. This statement is based on a February 2008, GAO report titled Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes, GAO-08-336 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 2008).
S/CT provides minimal guidance to help prioritize ATA program recipients, and S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically align ATA assistance with U.S. assessments of foreign partner counterterrorism needs. S/CT provided policy guidance to DS/T/ATA through quarterly meetings and a tiered list of priority countries, but the list did not provide guidance on country counterterrorism-related program goals, objectives, or training priorities. S/CT and DS/T/ATA also did not consistently use country-specific needs assessments and program reviews to plan assistance. S/CT had established mechanisms to coordinate the ATA program with other U.S. international efforts to combat terrorism. S/CT held interagency meetings with officials from the Department of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury and other agencies as well as ambassador-level regional strategic coordinating meetings. GAO did not find any significant duplication or overlap among the various U.S. international counterterrorism efforts. State had made progress in establishing goals and intended outcomes for the ATA program, but S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically assess the outcomes and, as a result, could not determine the effectiveness of program assistance. For example, although sustainability is a principal focus, S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not set clear measures of sustainability or integrated sustainability into program planning. State reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad was incomplete and inaccurate. S/CT had not provided a congressionally mandated annual report to Congress on U.S. government-wide assistance related to combating international terrorism since 1996. After 1996, S/CT has only submitted to Congress annual reports on the ATA program, such as the number of students trained and courses offered. Moreover, these reports contained inaccurate program information. Additionally, the reports lacked comprehensive information of the results on program assistance that would be useful to Congress.
GAO-08-875T, Combating Terrorism: Guidance for State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program Is Limited and State Does Not Systematically Assess Outcomes
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, June 4, 2008:
Combating Terrorism:
Guidance for State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program Is
Limited and State Does Not Systematically Assess Outcomes:
Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director: International
Affairs and Trade:
GAO-08-875T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-875T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of State‘s (State) Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA)
program‘s objectives are to provide partner nations with
counterterrorism training and equipment, improve bilateral ties, and
increase respect for human rights. State‘s Office of the Coordinator
for Counterterrorism (S/CT) provides policy guidance and its Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism, Assistance (DS/T/ATA),
manages program operations. GAO assessed (1) State‘s guidance for
determining ATA priorities, (2) how State coordinates ATA with other
counterterrorism programs, (3) the extent State established ATA program
goals and measures, and (4) State‘s reporting on U.S. counterterrorism
assistance. This statement is based on a February 2008, GAO report
titled Combating Terrorism: State Department‘s Antiterrorism Program
Needs Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes,
GAO-08-336 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29, 2008).
What GAO Found:
S/CT provides minimal guidance to help prioritize ATA program
recipients, and S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically align ATA
assistance with U.S. assessments of foreign partner counterterrorism
needs. S/CT provided policy guidance to DS/T/ATA through quarterly
meetings and a tiered list of priority countries, but the list did not
provide guidance on country counterterrorism-related program goals,
objectives, or training priorities. S/CT and DS/T/ATA also did not
consistently use country-specific needs assessments and program reviews
to plan assistance.
S/CT had established mechanisms to coordinate the ATA program with
other U.S. international efforts to combat terrorism. S/CT held
interagency meetings with officials from the Department of State,
Defense, Justice, and Treasury and other agencies as well as ambassador-
level regional strategic coordinating meetings. GAO did not find any
significant duplication or overlap among the various U.S. international
counterterrorism efforts.
State had made progress in establishing goals and intended outcomes for
the ATA program, but S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically assess
the outcomes and, as a result, could not determine the effectiveness of
program assistance. For example, although sustainability is a principal
focus, S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not set clear measures of sustainability
or integrated sustainability into program planning.
State reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad was
incomplete and inaccurate. S/CT had not provided a congressionally
mandated annual report to Congress on U.S. government-wide assistance
related to combating international terrorism since 1996. After 1996,
S/CT has only submitted to Congress annual reports on the ATA program,
such as the number of students trained and courses offered. Moreover,
these reports contained inaccurate program information. Additionally,
the reports lacked comprehensive information of the results on program
assistance that would be useful to Congress.
What GAO Recommends:
In its report, GAO suggested that Congress reconsider the requirement
that State prepare an annual report on U.S. counterterrorism
assistance. GAO also recommended that State review its use of needs
assessments, and measures for assessing the ATA program. State
generally agreed with the recommendations regarding the ATA program,
and supported the matter GAO suggested for congressional consideration.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-875T]. For more
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or
johnsoncm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
June 4, 2008:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here to discuss the results of GAO's examination of
the Department of State's (State) antiterrorism assistance (ATA)
program.[Footnote 1] Our work focused primarily on the time period from
fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2007, although we included more recent
data where available.
State's ATA program has assumed an increasingly important role in U.S.
counterterrorism efforts, and is a key mechanism in State's efforts to
help foreign nations improve their ability to combat terrorism. ATA's
legislatively mandated[Footnote 2] objectives are to (1) enhance the
antiterrorism skills of friendly countries by providing
counterterrorism training and equipment; (2) improve bilateral ties
with partner nations by offering assistance; and (3) increase respect
for human rights by sharing modern, humane and effective antiterrorism
techniques with foreign civil authorities. Funding for ATA has
increased over fourfold in recent years--from $38 million in fiscal
year 2001 to almost $171 million in fiscal year 2007. Over the period,
State provided counterterrorism assistance to nearly 100 countries.
Much of this assistance is equipment and counterterrorism training
provided in the country by trainers on temporary duty, as well as six
programs, which use permanent, in-country training facilities.
Within State, the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is charged
with the overall supervision (including policy oversight of resources)
and coordination of the U.S. government's counterterrorism
activities.[Footnote 3] The broadly mandated[Footnote 4] role of the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/
T/ATA),[Footnote 5] includes implementing security programs to protect
diplomatic personnel and advise chiefs of mission on security matters.
Today, I will discuss (1) State's guidance for determining country
recipients and types of counterterrorism assistance to provide; (2) how
State coordinates ATA with other U.S. government counterterrorism
programs; (3) the extent to which State establishes clear ATA goals,
and measures sustainability of program outcomes; and (4) State's
reporting on U.S. international counterterrorism assistance. Over the
course of our work, we reviewed and analyzed State planning, funding,
and reporting documents concerning ATA. We interviewed officials from
State's offices in Washington, D.C., including ATA program managers
responsible for each of the six in-country programs--Afghanistan,
Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, and the Philippines--and visited
four of the six in-country programs.[Footnote 6] In these countries, we
reviewed country-specific program documents, and interviewed ATA in-
country program managers, course instructors, and other contractors;
U.S. embassy officials responsible for managing counterterrorism
assistance and activities; and partner nation government officials. We
also observed various types of ATA training and equipment that were
provided to partner nation security units.
We conducted our work for the ATA report from November 2006 through
January 2008 and, for purposes of this statement, we updated certain
data in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
At the time of our review, S/CT provided minimal guidance to help
determine ATA priorities and ensure that assistance provided supports
broader U.S. policy goals. In addition, S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not
systematically use country-specific needs assessments and program
reviews to plan what types of assistance to provide partner nations in
accordance with State policy guidance.
* S/CT provided a tiered list of priority countries for policy guidance
to DS/T/ATA through quarterly meetings. However, this list did not
provide guidance on country counterterrorism-related program goals,
objectives, or training priorities that DS/T/ATA could use to implement
a country-specific counterterrorism program and ensure that assistance
provided is consistent with U.S. policy objectives. As a result,
neither S/CT nor DS/T/ATA could ensure that program assistance provided
to specific countries supports broader U.S. antiterrorism policy goals.
In addition, some countries not on the tiered list received assistance
because of unanticipated circumstances, such as an increase in the U.S.
government's diplomatic or political interest in a country.
* S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not consistently use country-specific needs
assessments and program reviews to plan what types of assistance to
provide to partner nations. In the five countries receiving the largest
amounts of program assistance since fiscal year 2002, we found that
program managers did not use the assessments as the basis for
developing ATA country-specific plans. According to State policy
documents, the assessments are to guide ATA resource decisions and form
the basis of country-specific assistance plans. However, the
assessments included broad-ranging recommendations for counterterrorism
assistance, but they generally did not prioritize assistance to be
provided. Consequently, the assessments did not consistently provide a
basis for targeting program assistance to the areas of a partner
nation's greatest counterterrorism need.
S/CT had established mechanisms to coordinate ATA with other U.S.
international efforts to combat terrorism. S/CT held biweekly
interagency meetings with officials from the Departments of State,
Defense, Justice, Treasury, and other agencies as well as ambassador-
level regional strategic coordinating meetings in order to help
coordinate all U.S. government international counterterrorism training
assistance and avoid duplication of efforts. Based on our review of
program documents and interviews and meetings with counterterrorism
officials in the four countries we visited, we did not find any
significant duplication or overlap among the various U.S. international
counterterrorism efforts.
State had made progress in establishing goals and intended outcomes for
ATA, but S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically assess the outcomes
of program assistance. Since fiscal year 2006, State planning documents
listed sustainability--that is, enabling partner nations to achieve
advanced counterterrorism capabilities and maintain them--as a key
intended program outcome. However, S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not set clear
measures of sustainability, and had not integrated sustainability into
program planning. As a result, State could not determine the
effectiveness of program assistance or assess the extent to which ATA
was meeting its longer-term, congressionally mandated objectives.
S/CT had not provided a congressionally mandated report to Congress on
U.S. government-wide assistance related to combating international
terrorism since 1996.[Footnote 7] After 1996, S/CT has only submitted
to Congress annual reports prepared by DS/T/ATA on just the ATA
program. Moreover, we found that the ATA annual reports contained
inaccuracies, such as the number of students trained and courses
offered. Additionally, the ATA annual reports lacked comprehensive
information on the results of program assistance that would be useful
to Congress in evaluating the effectiveness of the program.
Given changes in the overall scope and nature of U.S. international
counterterrorism assistance and the fact that State had not submitted
the mandated report on such matters since 1996, we included a matter
for congressional consideration regarding the legislative requirement
for State's reporting on U.S. counterterrorism assistance.
Additionally, to ensure that ATA, as a key element of State's broader
international counterterrorism efforts, is focused on improving partner
nations' counterterrorism capabilities and aligned with overall U.S.
counterterrorism policy goals, we recommended that the Secretary of
State improve internal program guidance. We made other recommendations
to help S/CT and DS/T/ATA more effectively link assistance needs to
resource allocations and better assess program outcomes.
Background:
Congress authorized State's ATA program in 1983 through the Foreign
Assistance Act.[Footnote 8] According to the legislation the purpose of
ATA is "(1) to enhance the antiterrorism skills of friendly countries
by providing training and equipment to deter and counter terrorism; (2)
to strengthen the bilateral ties of the United States with friendly
governments by offering concrete assistance in this area of great
mutual concern; and (3) to increase respect for human rights by sharing
with foreign civil authorities modern, humane, and effective
antiterrorism techniques."
ATA Program Assistance:
ATA offers a wide range of counterterrorism assistance to partner
nations, but most assistance consists of (1) training courses on
tactical and strategic counterterrorism issues and (2) grants of
counterterrorism equipment, such as small arms, bomb detection
equipment, vehicles, and computers. ATA curricula and training focus on
enhancing critical counterterrorism capabilities, which cover issues
such as crisis management and response, cyberterrorism, dignitary
protection, and related areas. According to DS/T/ATA, all its courses
emphasize law enforcement under the rule of law and sound human rights
practices.
ATA Program Funding:
ATA is State's largest counterterrorism program, and receives
appropriations under the Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining,
and Related Programs account. Fiscal year 2002 appropriations for ATA
increased to about $158 million--over six times the level of funding
appropriated in fiscal year 2000. Appropriations have fluctuated since
fiscal year 2002, but increased to almost $171 million in fiscal year
2007. From fiscal years 2002 to 2007, program assistance for the top 10
recipients of ATA allocations ranged from about $11 million to about
$78 million. The top 10 recipients represented about 57 percent of ATA
funding allocated for training and training-related activities over the
6-year period. ATA funding for the other 89 partner nations that
received assistance during this period ranged from $9,000 to about
$10.7 million.
ATA Program Management:
The Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the head of S/CT, is
statutorily[Footnote 9] charged with the overall supervision (including
policy oversight of resources) and coordination of the U.S.
government's counterterrorism activities. The broadly mandated[Footnote
10] role of the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, the head
of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, includes implementing security
programs to protect diplomatic personnel and advise chiefs of mission
on security matters. Specific roles and responsibilities for S/CT and
DS/T/ATA regarding ATA are described in a 1991 internal policy guidance
memorandum, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act of 1986,[Footnote 11]
and incorporated into State's Foreign Affairs Manual.[Footnote 12]
S/CT is responsible for leading the initial assessment of a partner
nation's counterterrorism needs, and DS/T/ATA is responsible for
developing annual, country-specific plans. Under current program
operations, DS/T/ATA conducts an initial assessment of a new
participant nation's counterterrorism capabilities, and conducts
subsequent assessments--referred to as program reviews--every 2 to 3
years thereafter. In general, the needs assessments include input from
the embassy teams, but the assessments themselves are conducted by
technical experts contracted by DS/T/ATA. According to DS/T/ATA, the
purpose of the needs assessment and program review process is to
determine the forms of assistance for a partner nation to detect,
deter, deny, and defeat terrorism; and to evaluate program
effectiveness.
State's Implementation of ATA Lacks Guidance and Use of Country Needs
Assessments:
S/CT provides minimal policy guidance to DS/T/ATA to help determine
assistance priorities and ensure that it supports broader U.S. policy
goals. In addition, S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically use
country-specific needs assessments and program reviews to plan what
types of assistance to provide partner nations in accordance with State
policy guidance. The assessments we reviewed had weaknesses and
inconsistencies.
S/CT Provides a Tiered Country List, but Little Additional Policy
Guidance:
According to State officials, S/CT places countries on a tiered list in
one of four priority categories based on criteria that address several
factors, including country-specific threats and the level and depth of
diplomatic and political engagement in a country. State officials
indicated that other factors also may be considered in determining
whether and where a country is placed on the list, such as the presence
of a U.S. military base or a planned international sporting or cultural
event with U.S. participation. Since 2006, S/CT has reviewed and
discussed the tiered list--including changes, additions, or deletions-
-with DS/T/ATA during quarterly meetings. In addition to the quarterly
meetings, an S/CT official told us that they had established a series
of regional roundtable discussions in 2006 between S/CT regional
subject experts and DS/T/ATA counterparts. According to the S/CT
official, the roundtables were intended as a means of identifying
priority countries and their counterterrorism needs for purposes of
developing budget requests.
S/CT provides little guidance to DS/T/ATA beyond the tiered list,
although the 1991 State policy guidance memorandum states that S/CT's
written policy guidance for the program should include suggested
country training priorities. While S/CT provides some additional
guidance to DS/T/ATA during quarterly meetings and on other occasions,
DS/T/ATA officials in headquarters and the field stated they received
little or no guidance from S/CT beyond the tiered list. As a result,
neither S/CT nor DS/T/ATA could ensure that program assistance provided
to specific countries supports broader U.S. antiterrorism policy goals.
Other factors beyond S/CT's tiered list of countries, such as
unforeseen events or new governmental initiatives, also influence which
countries receive program assistance. We found that 10 countries on the
tiered list did not receive ATA assistance in fiscal year 2007, while
13 countries not on the tiered list received approximately $3.2
million. S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials stated that assistance does not
always align with the tiered list because U.S. foreign policy
objectives sometimes cause State, in consultation with the President's
National Security Council, to provide assistance to a non-tiered-list
country.
S/CT and DS/T/ATA Did Not Systematically Align Program Assistance with
Counterterrorism Needs:
According to the 1991 State policy guidance memorandum and DS/T/ATA
standard operations procedures, ATA country-specific needs assessments
and program reviews are intended to guide program management and
planning. However, S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically use the
assessments to determine what types of assistance to provide to partner
nations or develop ATA country-specific plans. Although the 1991 State
policy memorandum states that S/CT should lead the assessment efforts,
a senior S/CT official stated that S/CT lacks the capacity to do so. As
a result, DS/T/ATA has led interagency assessment teams in recent
years, but the assessments and recommendations for types of assistance
to be provided may not fully reflect S/CT policy guidance concerning
overall U.S. counterterrorism priorities.
DS/T/ATA Did Not Consistently Use Country Needs Assessments:
DS/T/ATA officials responsible for five of the top six recipients of
ATA support--Colombia, Kenya, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines
[Footnote 13]--did not consistently use ATA country needs assessments
and program reviews in making program decisions or to create annual
country assistance plans. In some instances, DS/T/ATA officials
responsible for in-country programs had not seen the latest assessments
for their respective countries, and some said that the assessments they
had reviewed were either not useful or that they were used for
informational purposes only.
* The Regional Security Officer, Deputy Regional Security Officer, and
DS/T/ATA Program Manager for Kenya had not seen any of the assessments
that had been conducted for the country since 2000. Although the in-
country program manager for Kenya was familiar with the assessments
from her work in a previous position with DS/T/ATA, she stated that in
general, the assessments were not very useful for determining what type
of assistance to provide. She said that the initial needs assessment
for Kenya failed to adequately consider local needs and capacity.
* The Regional Security Officer and Assistant Regional Security Officer
for Indonesia stated they had not seen the latest assessment for the
country. The DS/T/ATA program manager for Indonesia said that he
recalled using one of the assessments as a "frame of reference" in
making program and resource decisions. The in-country program manager
also recalled seeing one of the assessments, but stated that he did not
find the assessment useful given the changing terrorist landscape;
therefore, he did not share it with his staff.
* The DS/T/ATA Program Manager for Pakistan stated that decisions on
the types of assistance to provide in Pakistan were based primarily on
the knowledge and experience of in-country staff regarding partner
nation needs, rather than the needs assessments or program reviews. He
added that he did not find the assessments useful, as the issues
identified in the latest (2004) assessment for the country were
outdated.
Needs Assessments Generally Lacked Prioritized Recommendations and Were
Inconsistent:
We reviewed 12 of the 21 ATA country-specific needs assessments and
program reviews[Footnote 14] that, according to ATA annual reports, DS/
T/ATA conducted between 2000 and 2007 for five of the six in-country
programs.[Footnote 15] The assessments and reviews generally included a
range of recommendations for counterterrorism assistance, but did not
prioritize assistance to be provided or include specific timeframes for
implementation. Consequently, the assessments did not consistently
provide a basis for targeting program assistance to the areas of a
partner nation's greatest counterterrorism assistance need. Only two of
the assessments--a 2000 needs assessment for Indonesia and a 2003
assessment for Kenya--prioritized the recommendations, although a 2004
assessment for Pakistan and a 2005 assessment for the Philippines
listed one or two recommendations as priority ATA efforts. In addition,
the information included in the assessments was not consistent and
varied in linking recommendations to capabilities. Of the 12
assessments we reviewed:
* Nine included narrative on a range of counterterrorism capabilities,
such as border security and explosives detection, but the number of
capabilities assessed ranged from 5 to 25.
* Only four of the assessments that assessed more than one capability
linked recommendations provided to the relevant capabilities.
* Six included capability ratings, but the types of ratings used
varied. For example, a 2003 assessment for Colombia rated eight
capabilities from 1 through 5, but the 2004 assessment rated 24
capabilities, using poor, low, fair, or good.
* Two used a format that DS/T/ATA began implementing in 2001. The
assessments following the new format generally included consistent
types of information and clearly linked recommendations provided to an
assessment of 25 counterterrorism capabilities. However, they did not
prioritize recommendations or include specific timeframes for
implementing the recommendations.
Country Assistance Plans Were Not Used or Were Not Linked to Needs
Assessments:
Although the 1991 State policy memorandum states that DS/T/ATA should
create annual country assistance plans that specify training objectives
and assistance to be provided based upon the needs assessments and
program reviews, we found that S/CT and DS/T/ATA did not systematically
use the assessments to create annual plans for the five in-country
programs. DS/T/ATA officials we interviewed regarding the five in-
country programs stated that in lieu of relying on the assessments or
country assistance plans, program and resource decisions were primarily
made by DS/T/ATA officials in the field based on their knowledge and
experience regarding partner nation needs. Some DS/T/ATA officials said
they did not find the country assistance plans useful. The program
manager for Pakistan stated that he used the country assistance plan as
a guide, but found that it did not respond to changing needs in the
country. The ATA program manager for Kenya said that he had not seen a
country assistance plan for that country.
We requested ATA country assistance plans conducted during fiscal years
2000-2006 for the five in-country programs included in our review, but
S/CT and DS/T/ATA only provided three plans completed for three of the
five countries. Of these, we found that the plans did not link planned
activities to recommendations provided in the needs assessments and
program reviews. For example, the plan for the Philippines included a
brief reference to a 2005 needs assessment, but the plan did not
identify which recommendations from the 2005 assessment were intended
to be addressed by current or planned efforts.
S/CT Has Established Various Mechanisms to Coordinate Program
Assistance:
S/CT has mechanisms to coordinate the ATA program with other U.S.
government international counterterrorism training assistance and to
help avoid duplication of efforts. S/CT chairs biweekly interagency
working group meetings of the Counterterrorism Security Group's
Training Assistance Subgroup[Footnote 16] to provide a forum for high-
level information sharing and discussion among U.S. agencies
implementing international counterterrorism efforts.[Footnote 17] S/CT
also established the Regional Strategic Initiative in 2006 to
coordinate regional counterterrorism efforts and strategy. S/CT
described the Regional Strategic Initiative as a series of regionally
based, interagency meetings hosted by U.S. embassies to identify key
regional counterterrorism issues and develop a strategic approach to
addressing them, among other goals.
In the four countries we visited, we did not find any significant
duplication or overlap among U.S. agencies' country-specific training
programs aimed at combating terrorism. Officials we met with in each of
these countries noted that they participated in various embassy working
group meetings, such as Counterterrorism Working Group and Law
Enforcement Working Group meetings, during which relevant agencies
shared information regarding operations and activities at post. DS/T/
ATA officials also coordinated ATA with other counterterrorism efforts
through daily informal communication among cognizant officials in the
countries we visited.
State Had Made Progress in Establishing ATA Goals, but S/CT and DS/T/
ATA Did Not Assess Sustainability:
In response to concerns that ATA lacked elements of adequate strategic
planning and performance measurement, State took action to define goals
and measures related to the program's mandated objectives. S/CT and DS/
T/ATA, however, did not systematically assess sustainability--that is,
the extent to which assistance has enabled partner nations to achieve
and maintain advanced counterterrorism capabilities. S/CT and DS/T/ATA
lacked clear measures and processes for assessing sustainability, and
program managers did not consistently include sustainability in ATA
planning.
State Recently Established ATA Goals and Measures, and Emphasizes
Sustaining Partner Nations' Counterterrorism Capabilities:
State did not have measurable performance goals and outcomes related to
the mandated objectives for ATA prior to fiscal year 2003, but has
recently made some progress to address the deficiency, which had been
noted in reports by State's Office of Inspector General. Similarly,
State developed specific goals and measures for each of the program's
mandated objectives in response to a 2003 Office of Management and
Budget assessment.
Since fiscal year 2006, State planning documents, including department
and bureau-level performance plans, have stated that enabling partner
nations to achieve advanced and sustainable counterterrorism
capabilities is a key outcome. S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials further
confirmed that sustainability is the principal intended outcome and
focus of program assistance. In support of these efforts, DS/T/ATA
appointed a Sustainment Manager in November 2006 to, among other
things, coordinate with other DS/T/ATA divisions to develop
recommendations and plans to assist partner nations in developing
sustainable counterterrorism capabilities.
S/CT and DS/T/ATA Did Not Assess Sustainability of Capabilities:
Despite progress towards establishing goals and intended outcomes,
State had not developed clear measures and a process for assessing
sustainability and had not integrated the concept into program
planning. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993[Footnote
18] requires agencies in charge of U.S. government programs and
activities to identify goals and report on the degree to which goals
are met. S/CT and DS/T/ATA officials noted the difficulty in developing
direct quantitative measures of ATA outcomes related to partner
nations' counterterrorism capabilities. Our past work also has stressed
the importance of establishing program goals, objectives, priorities,
milestones, and measures to use in monitoring performance and assessing
outcomes as critical elements of program management and effective
resource allocation.[Footnote 19]
We found that the measure for ATA's principal intended program outcome
of sustainability is not clear. In its fiscal year 2007 Joint
Performance Summary, State reported results and future year targets for
the number of countries that had achieved an advanced, sustainable
level of counterterrorism capability. According to the document,
partner nations that achieve a sustainable level of counterterrorism
would graduate from the program and no longer receive program
assistance. However, program officials in S/CT and DS/T/ATA directly
responsible for overseeing ATA were not aware that the Joint
Performance Summary listed numerical targets and past results for the
number of partner nations that had achieved sustainability, and could
not provide an explanation of how State assessed the results. DS/T/
ATA's Sustainment Manager also could not explain how State established
and assessed the numerical targets in the reports. The Sustainment
Manager further noted that, to his knowledge, S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not
yet developed systematic measures of sustainability.
DS/T/ATA's mechanism for evaluating partner nation capabilities did not
include guidance or specific measures to assess sustainability.
According to program guidance and DS/T/ATA officials, needs assessments
and program reviews are intended to establish a baseline of a partner
nation's counterterrorism capabilities and quantify progress through
subsequent reviews. DS/T/ATA officials also asserted that the process
is intended to measure the results of program assistance. However, the
process did not explicitly address sustainability, and provided no
specific information or instruction regarding how reviewers are to
assess sustainability. Moreover, the process focused on assessing a
partner nation's overall counterterrorism capabilities, but did not
specifically measure the results of program assistance.
DS/T/ATA had not systematically integrated sustainability into country-
specific assistance plans, and we found a lack of consensus among
program officials about how to address the issue. In-country program
managers, embassy officials, instructors, and partner nation officials
we interviewed held disparate views on how to define sustainability
across all ATA participant countries, and many were not aware that
sustainability was the intended outcome. Several program officials
stated that graduating a country and withdrawing or significantly
reducing program assistance could result in a rapid decline in the
partner nation's counterterrorism capabilities, and could undermine
other program objectives, such as improving bilateral relations.
Further, although State has listed sustainability in State-level
planning documents since 2006, S/CT and DS/T/ATA had not issued
guidance on incorporating sustainability into country-specific
planning, and none of the country assistance plans we reviewed
consistently addressed the outcome. As a result, the plans did not
include measurable annual objectives targeted at enabling the partner
nation to achieve sustainability. For example, Colombia's assistance
plan listed transferring responsibility for the antikidnapping training
to the Colombian government and described planned activities to achieve
that goal. However, the plan did not include measurable objectives to
determine whether activities achieved intended results.
State Reporting on U.S. Counterterrorism Assistance Abroad Has Been
Incomplete and Inaccurate:
Since 1996, State has not complied with a congressional
mandate[Footnote 20] to report to Congress on U.S. international
counterterrorism assistance. Additionally, State's annual reports on
ATA contained inaccurate data regarding basic program information, did
not provide systematic assessments of program results, and lacked other
information necessary to evaluate program effectiveness.
S/CT Has Not Prepared a Mandated Report:
In 1985, Congress amended the Foreign Assistance Act requiring the
Secretary of State to report on all assistance related to international
terrorism provided by the U.S. government during the preceding fiscal
year.[Footnote 21] Since 1996, State has submitted ATA annual reports
rather than the broader report required by the statute.
A S/CT official noted confusion within State over what the statute
required and he asserted that the ATA annual report, which is prepared
by DS/T/ATA, and State's annual "Patterns of Global Terrorism"
report[Footnote 22] were sufficiently responsive to congressional
needs. He further noted that, in his view, it would be extremely
difficult for State to compile and report on all U.S. government
terrorism assistance activities, especially given the significant
growth of agencies' programs since 2001. Officials in State's Bureau of
Legislative Affairs indicated that, to their knowledge, they had never
received an inquiry from congressional staff about the missing reports.
ATA Annual Reports Contain Inaccuracies:
Recent ATA annual reports have contained inaccurate data relating to
basic program information on numbers of students trained and courses
offered. For example,
* Afghanistan. According to annual reports for fiscal years 2002 to
2005, 15 Afghan students were trained as part of a single training
event over the 4-year period. DS/T/ATA subsequently provided us data
for fiscal year 2005, which corrected the participation total in that
year from 15 participants in 1 training event to 1,516 participants in
12 training events.
* Pakistan. According to the fiscal year 2005 ATA annual report, ATA
delivered 17 courses to 335 participants in Pakistan. Supporting tables
in the same report listed 13 courses provided to 283 participants, and
a summary report provided to us by DS/T/ATA reported 13 courses
provided to 250 course participants.
DS/T/ATA officials acknowledged the discrepancies and noted that
similar inaccuracies could be presumed for prior years and for other
partner nations. The officials indicated that inaccuracies and
omissions in reports of the training participants and events were due
to a lack of internal policies and procedures for recording and
reporting program data. In the absence of documented policies and
procedures, staff developed various individual processes for collecting
the information that resulted in flawed data reporting. Additionally,
DS/T/ATA officials told us that its inadequate information management
system and a lack of consistent data collection procedures also
contributed to inaccurate reporting.
ATA Annual Reports Lack Performance and Other Useful Program
Information:
We reviewed ATA annual reports for fiscal years 1997 through 2005, and
found that the reports varied widely in terms of content, scope, and
format. Moreover, the annual reports did not contain systematic
assessments of program performance or consistent information on program
activity, such as number and type of courses delivered, types of
equipment provided, and budget activity associated with program
operations. In general, the reports contained varying levels of detail
on program activity, and provided only anecdotal examples of program
successes, from a variety of sources, including U.S. embassy officials,
ATA instructors, and partner nation officials. DS/T/ATA program
officials charged with compiling the annual reports for the past 3
fiscal years noted that DS/T/ATA did not have guidance on the scope,
content, or format for the reports.
Conclusions:
Although ATA plays a central role in State's broader effort to fight
international terrorism, deficiencies in how the program is guided,
managed, implemented, and assessed could limit the program's
effectiveness. Specifically, minimal guidance from S/CT makes it
difficult to determine the extent to which program assistance directly
supports broader U.S. counterterrorism policy goals. Additionally,
deficiencies with DS/T/ATA's needs assessments and program reviews may
limit their utility as a tool for planning assistance and prioritizing
among several partner nations' counterterrorism needs. As a result, the
assessments and reviews are not systematically linked to resource
allocation decisions, which may limit the program's ability to improve
partner nation's counterterrorism capabilities.
Although State has made some progress in attempting to evaluate and
quantitatively measure program performance, ATA still lacks a clearly
defined, systematic assessment and reporting of outcomes, which makes
it difficult to determine the overall effectiveness of the program.
This deficiency, along with State's noncompliance with mandated
reporting requirements, has resulted in Congress having limited and
incomplete information on U.S. international counterterrorism
assistance and ATA efforts. Such information is necessary to determine
the most effective types of assistance the U.S. government can provide
to partner nations in support of the U.S. national security goal of
countering terrorism abroad.
In our February 2008 report, we suggested that Congress should
reconsider the requirement that the Secretary of State provide an
annual report on the nature and amount of U.S. government
counterterrorism assistance provided abroad, given the broad changes in
the scope and nature of U.S. counterterrorism assistance abroad in
conjunction with the fact that the report has not been submitted since
1996.
We also recommended that the Secretary of State take the following four
actions:
1. Revisit and revise internal guidance (the 1991 State policy
memorandum and Foreign Affairs Manual, in particular) to ensure that
the roles and responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA are still relevant
and better enable State to determine which countries should receive
assistance and what type, and allocate limited ATA resources.
2. Ensure that needs assessments and program reviews are both useful
and linked to ATA resource decisions and development of country-
specific assistance plans.
3. Establish clearer measures of sustainability, and refocus the
process for assessing the sustainability of partner nations'
counterterrorism capabilities. The revised evaluation process should
include not only an overall assessment of partner nation
counterterrorism capabilities, but also provide guidance for assessing
the specific outcomes of ATA.
4. Comply with the congressional mandate to report to Congress on U.S.
international counterterrorism assistance.
In commenting on our report, State agreed overall with our principal
findings and recommendations to improve its ATA program guidance, the
needs assessment and program review process, and its assessments of ATA
program outcomes. State noted that the report highlighted the
difficulties in assessing the benefits of developing and improving long-
term antiterrorism and law enforcement relationships with foreign
governments. State also outlined a number of ongoing and planned
initiatives to address our recommendations. As noted in our report, we
will follow up with State to ensure that these initiatives have been
completed, as planned.
Although State supported the matter we suggested for congressional
consideration, it did not specifically address our recommendation that
it comply with the congressional mandate to report on U.S.
counterterrorism assistance.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:
For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Charles Michael
Johnson, Jr. (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Albert H. Huntington,
III, Assistant Director; Matthew E. Helm; Elisabeth R. Helmer; and
Emily Rachman made key contributions in preparing this statement.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program
Needs Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-336] (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 29, 2008).
[2] 22 U.S.C. §§ 2349aa, 2349aa-1.
[3] 22 U.S.C. § 2651a.
[4] State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security in its current form is an
outgrowth of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986 (Pub. L. No. 99-399, §§ 104-105).
[5] ATA is part of a training directorate within Diplomatic Security
comprised of the Office of Antiterrorism Assistance, the Office of
Training and Performance Support, and the Office of Mobile Security
Training.
[6] We visited Colombia, Indonesia, Kenya, and the Philippines. These
four countries comprised about 55 percent of total ATA funding for
training and training-related activities in fiscal year 2006, and about
43 percent of funding in fiscal year 2007.
[7] 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-7 (requiring the Secretary of State to report
annually on the amount and nature of all assistance provided by the
U.S. government related to international terrorism).
[8] Pub. L. No. 87-195, Pt. II, §571, as added by Pub. L. No. 98-151,
§101(b)(2), 97 Stat. 972 (1983) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2349a).
[9] 22 U.S.C. § 2651a.
[10] State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security in its current form is an
outgrowth of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of
1986 (Pub. L. No. 99-399, §§ 104-105).
[11] Pub. L. No. 99-399, §§ 104-105.
[12] The general responsibilities for S/CT and DS/T/ATA regarding the
ATA program are described in the 2007 U.S. Department of State Foreign
Affairs Manual, Volume 1-Organization and Functions, 1 FAM 022.5 and 1
FAM 262.3-1.
[13] Each of these countries received a range of ATA training and other
assistance through an in-country presence. The sixth in-country
program, Afghanistan, also received significant program assistance
during this period. But, according to DS/T/ATA officials, the
Afghanistan in-country program focuses principally on training and
monitoring a Presidential Protective Service.
[14] DS/T/ATA was unable to provide nine assessments that were
reportedly conducted for four of these countries between 2002 and 2007.
According to DS/T/ATA officials, they were either unable to locate
these assessments, written reports on the assessment visits were not
completed, or the annual reports stating that they had been completed
were inaccurate.
[15] We did not include the ATA in-country program in Afghanistan in
this analysis because the scope of the program is narrowly focused on
presidential protection training.
[16] The Training Assistance Subgroup includes representatives from the
Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, Treasury,
and other agencies.
[17] The Counterterrorism Security Group is chaired by the National
Security Council and is intended to serve as a means for U.S. agencies
to share information and coordinate the response to terrorist threats
against U.S. interests domestically and abroad.
[18] Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285, 287-88 (1993).
[19] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives
to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute
Terrorists, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697]
(Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2007).
[20] 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-7.
[21] Pub. L. No. 99-83, Title V, § 502, 99 Stat. 220 (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 2349aa-7).
[22] S/CT prepares this annual report, which is required by a separate
statute (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(a)). The report primarily describes
international terrorist activity.
[End of section]
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