Combating Terrorism
Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Gao ID: GAO-08-860 July 31, 2008In fiscal year 2005, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) was established to eliminate terrorist safe havens in northwest Africa by strengthening countries' counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology. Funds obligated for TSCTP in fiscal years 2005 through 2007 and committed for fiscal year 2008 by the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD) have amounted to about $353 million for activities in nine partner countries. In this report, GAO examines (1) the distribution of funds for TSCTP and the types of activities supported and (2) the program's implementation, including the extent to which it is guided by a comprehensive, integrated strategy. GAO has reported previously on the need for a strategy that includes priorities and milestones that can help agencies collaborate in combating terrorism. GAO analyzed TSCTP-related documents and conducted work in Mali, Morocco, and Mauritania.
In fiscal years 2005 through 2007, State, USAID, and DOD distributed about 74 percent of their obligations for TSCTP to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; about 3 percent to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia; and about 8 percent to Nigeria and Senegal. The remaining 15 percent was distributed through regional assistance, such as military exercises in multiple partner countries. The agencies expected to distribute about half of total funds committed for TSCTP for fiscal year 2008 to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger and the remainder among the other countries. State, USAID, and DOD have supported a wide range of diplomacy, development assistance, and military activities aimed at strengthening partner countries' counterterrorism capacity and inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology. For example, State--the lead agency for TSCTP--has hosted educational programs intended to marginalize violent extremists; USAID supported efforts to improve education and health; and DOD has provided counterterrorism training in marksmanship and border patrol to the militaries of partner countries. Several factors have hampered the key agencies' implementation of TSCTP activities, in some cases limiting their ability to collaborate in working to combat terrorism. First, the agencies lack a comprehensive, integrated strategy for their TSCTP activities, and the documents used in planning the activities do not prioritize proposed activities or identify milestones needed to measure progress or make improvements. Second, disagreements about whether State should have authority over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in partner countries have led to DOD's suspending some activities, for example, in Niger. Third, fluctuation in State's and USAID's distribution of funds for TSCTP resulted in suspension of a peace-building program in Mali. Fourth, although the agencies measure activities' outputs, such as the number of foreign military personnel trained, they do not measure their activities' outcomes in combating terrorism--for instance, any decrease in extremism in the targeted countries.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-860, Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
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Report to the Ranking Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2008:
Combating Terrorism:
Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership:
GAO-08-860:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-860, a report to the Ranking Member, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In fiscal year 2005, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP) was established to eliminate terrorist safe havens in northwest
Africa by strengthening countries‘ counterterrorism capabilities and
inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology. Funds obligated for TSCTP
in fiscal years 2005 through 2007 and committed for fiscal year 2008 by
the Department of State (State), the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD) have amounted
to about $353 million for activities in nine partner countries. In this
report, GAO examines (1) the distribution of funds for TSCTP and the
types of activities supported and (2) the program‘s implementation,
including the extent to which it is guided by a comprehensive,
integrated strategy. GAO has reported previously on the need for a
strategy that includes priorities and milestones that can help agencies
collaborate in combating terrorism. GAO analyzed TSCTP-related
documents and conducted work in Mali, Morocco, and Mauritania.
What GAO Found:
In fiscal years 2005 through 2007, State, USAID, and DOD distributed
about 74 percent of their obligations for TSCTP to Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, and Niger; about 3 percent to Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia; and about 8 percent to Nigeria and Senegal. The remaining 15
percent was distributed through regional assistance, such as military
exercises in multiple partner countries. The agencies expected to
distribute about half of total funds committed for TSCTP for fiscal
year 2008 to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger and the remainder among
the other countries. State, USAID, and DOD have supported a wide range
of diplomacy, development assistance, and military activities aimed at
strengthening partner countries‘ counterterrorism capacity and
inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology. For example, State”the
lead agency for TSCTP”has hosted educational programs intended to
marginalize violent extremists; USAID supported efforts to improve
education and health; and DOD has provided counterterrorism training in
marksmanship and border patrol to the militaries of partner countries.
Figure: Distribution of TSCTP Funds by Country and Region, Fiscal Years
2005-2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Distribution of TSCTP Funds by Country and Region, Fiscal Years 2005-
2008:
Country/Region: Chad/Sahel;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $23 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $9 million;
Total: $32 million.
Country/Region: Mali/Sahel;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $31 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $6 million;
Total: $37 million.
Country/Region: Mauritania/Sahel;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $18 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $6 million;
Total: $24 million.
Country/Region: Niger/Sahel;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $37 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $7 million;
Total: $44 million.
Country/Region: Algeria/Maghreb;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $1 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $6
Total: $7 million.
Country/Region: Morocco/Maghreb;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $3 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $6 million;
Total: $9 million.
Country/Region: Tunisia/Maghreb;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: 0;
Fiscal year 2008: $1 million;
Total: $1 million.
Country/Region: Senegal/Sub-Shara;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $9 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $3 million;
Total: $12 million.
Country/Region: Nigeria/Sub-Shara;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $3 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $5 million;
Total: $8 million.
Country/Region: Regional;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $22 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $10 million;
Total: $30 million.
Source: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and DOD data.
Note: Commitments shown for 2008 are based on State, USAID, and DOD
estimates as of June 2008.
[End of figure]
Several factors have hampered the key agencies‘ implementation of TSCTP
activities, in some cases limiting their ability to collaborate in
working to combat terrorism. First, the agencies lack a comprehensive,
integrated strategy for their TSCTP activities, and the documents used
in planning the activities do not prioritize proposed activities or
identify milestones needed to measure progress or make improvements.
Second, disagreements about whether State should have authority over
DOD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in
partner countries have led to DOD‘s suspending some activities, for
example, in Niger. Third, fluctuation in State‘s and USAID‘s
distribution of funds for TSCTP resulted in suspension of a peace-
building program in Mali. Fourth, although the agencies measure
activities‘ outputs, such as the number of foreign military personnel
trained, they do not measure their activities‘ outcomes in combating
terrorism”for instance, any decrease in extremism in the targeted
countries.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State work with the heads of other
partner agencies to develop a comprehensive strategy for TSCTP. GAO
also recommends that the Secretaries of State and Defense issue joint
guidance regarding DOD personnel operating in TSCTP partner countries.
State and USAID concurred, and DOD partially concurred, with GAO‘s
findings and recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-860]. For more
information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or
johnsoncm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Funds for TSCTP Were Distributed Primarily in the Sahel Region and
Support a Range of Diplomacy, Development Assistance, and Military
Activities:
Several Challenges Have Hampered Implementation of TSCTP Activities:
Conclusion:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Selected Accounts Used to Fund TSCTP Activities:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Figures:
Figure 1: Northwestern African Countries Participating in Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership:
Figure 2: Overview of Key Agencies Participating in TSCTP:
Figure 3: TSCTP Obligations and Commitments by Year and Key Agency,
2005-2008:
Figure 4: TSCTP Obligations and Commitments by Country and Region, 2005-
2008:
Figure 5: Overview of Key Agencies' TSCTP Activities:
Figure 6: Students Receiving Instruction in a School in Mali:
Figure 7: DOD Representative Trains African Military Units:
Figure 8: DOD Representative Provides Humanitarian Assistance:
Figure 9: Distribution of Funds for State and USAID TSCTP Activities by
Country and Year, 2005-2007:
Abbreviations:
AFRICOM: U.S. Africa Command:
CAP: country action plan:
COM: Chief of Mission:
COCOM: Combatant Command:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOS: Department of State:
ESF: Economic Support Funds:
EUCOM: U.S. European Command:
MSP: Mission Strategic Plan:
OEF-TS: Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara:
OSD: Office of Secretary Defense:
PKO: Peacekeeping Operations:
S/CT: State Coordinator for Counterterrorism:
TSCTP: Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 31, 2008:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The growing presence of terrorist safe havens in northwestern Africa,
as well as the region's vast ungoverned spaces, smuggling routes,
porous borders, and fragile states, contributes to an environment
vulnerable to the spread of violent extremist ideology. The affiliation
of some terrorist groups in the region with Al Qaeda, as well as such
groups' increased efforts to attract young recruits, has also prompted
concern that the region could be used as a base for launching attacks
against U.S. interests.[Footnote 1] Eliminating terrorist safe havens
in ungoverned regions to prevent such attacks is a critical U.S.
national security goal.
The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is the primary
vehicle of U.S. counterterrorism policy in northwestern Africa.
Established in 2005,[Footnote 2] TSCTP is a multiyear, multiagency
effort to support diplomacy, development assistance, and military
activities aimed at strengthening country and regional counterterrorism
capabilities and inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology.[Footnote
3] TSCTP presently operates in nine partner countries--Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, and Niger in the Sahel region; Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia in the Maghreb region; and Nigeria and Senegal in the sub-
Saharan region--and may include other countries in the future. Key
agencies participating in TSCTP are the Department of State (State),
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the
Department of Defense (DOD), with State's Bureau of African Affairs as
the program lead. Since the program's inception, the key agencies'
obligations and commitments[Footnote 4] for TSCTP have amounted to
about $353 million, primarily for diplomacy, development assistance,
and military activities, respectively.[Footnote 5] The Departments of
the Treasury and Justice and several intelligence agencies also conduct
limited counterterrorism activities in TSCTP partner countries.
[Footnote 6]
Given the U.S. government's interest in enhancing foreign governments'
ability to combat terrorism, this report examines (1) the distribution
of funds for TSCTP in 2005 through 2008 and the types of activities
supported and (2) the program's implementation, including the extent to
which it has been guided by a comprehensive, integrated strategy. We
have reported previously on the need for such a strategy, as well as
other key elements, to enhance and sustain collaboration in large
interagency efforts to combat terrorism.[Footnote 7]
In conducting our work, we analyzed TSCTP policy, planning, budget, and
programming documents provided by State, DOD, and USAID. We met with
agency representatives, including officials in Washington, D.C. and at
the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, Germany. In addition, we met
with U.S. embassy, host nation government, and nongovernmental
organization officials in Morocco, Mali, and Mauritania. In selecting
the countries to visit, we considered the agencies' resource
allocations in each country, the countries' geographic distribution,
the number and duration of TSCTP activities in each country, and TSCTP
representatives' recommendations. We requested that State, USAID, and
DOD provide funding data by country and account; although there are
some limitations in the ways these data were collected and maintained,
we concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable to meet the
objectives of our report.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to July 2008, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides a more
detailed description of our scope and methodology. We plan to issue a
classified annex to this report.
Results in Brief:
In 2005 through 2008, the key agencies distributed the majority of the
obligated and committed resources to countries in the Sahel region,
supporting a range of diplomacy, development assistance, and military
activities. In 2005 through 2007, the agencies distributed about 74
percent of approximately $230 million obligated to the four countries
in the Sahel region, about 3 percent to the countries in the Maghreb
region, and about 8 percent to the countries in the sub-Saharan region;
the remaining 15 percent of the obligations was distributed through
regional assistance, such as military exercises in multiple countries.
As of June 2008, the agencies expected to distribute about half of
approximately $123 million committed for TSCTP for 2008 to the Sahel
countries and to distribute the remaining commitments among the Maghreb
and Sub-Saharan countries and through regional assistance. The agencies
have supported a wide range of activities related to diplomacy,
development, and military assistance. For example, State has hosted
educational and cultural exchange programs intended to isolate and
marginalize violent extremists; USAID supported efforts to improve
education and health; and DOD has provided counterterrorism training in
marksmanship and border patrol as well as distributed equipment such as
vehicles to the militaries of TSCTP partner countries.
Several challenges have hampered the key agencies' implementation of
TSCTP activities, in some cases limiting their ability to collaborate
in working to strengthen countries' counterterrorism capacity and
inhibit the spread of extremist ideology.
* No comprehensive, integrated strategy has been developed to guide the
program's implementation. The documents used in planning TSCTP
activities lack key elements that we have found to be needed in
strategies for large interagency programs, such as a clear definition
of the program's goals and objectives and milestones linked to these
objectives. State, USAID, and DOD have developed separate plans related
to their respective TSCTP activities. However, while these plans
reflect some interagency collaboration--for example, in assessing
country needs for development assistance--the agencies' plans are
focused on their respective missions and do not comprise an integrated
strategy addressing TSCTP activities in all nine countries.
* Disagreements about whether State should have authority over DOD
personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the
partner countries has hampered implementation of some activities. The
agencies agree that State is responsible for the security and
coordination of all U.S. government executive branch personnel assigned
to all diplomatic and consular posts abroad, except for personnel under
the command of a U.S. military commander, and that DOD is responsible
for all activities carried out by military personnel deployed by a
combatant commander. However, in some partner countries, agency
officials have disagreed about whether some DOD personnel carrying out
TSCTP activities should be subject to State's authority. For example,
in one country, State and DOD officials disagreed about the number of
DOD personnel to be permitted in the country; this disagreement
contributed to DOD's suspension of some of its activities. According to
agency officials, such disagreements cannot be resolved at the country
level and require higher-level guidance or intervention.
* Fluctuation in the distribution of funds for TSCTP activities has
limited USAID's implementation of its activities in Mali. USAID
received funds for its TSCTP activities in Mali in 2005 and 2007, but
not in 2006. Because it received no funds for 2006, the mission
suspended a peace-building program in northern Mali.
* The agencies have few common mechanisms for measuring their TSCTP
activities' outcomes--that is, the results of the products and services
delivered. The agencies have some indicators to measure their
activities' outputs--that is, direct products and services--such as the
number of foreign military personnel trained. However, they generally
do not measure their activities' outcomes, such as any decrease in
extremism in the targeted regions. According to State, USAID, and DOD
officials, they are working to develop indicators to assess their
activities' outcomes.
To enhance U.S. agencies' ability to collaborate in strengthening
country and regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the
spread of extremist ideology in northwest Africa, we recommend that the
Secretary of State work through the Director of Foreign Assistance, who
serves concurrently as USAID Administrator, to develop a comprehensive
strategy for TSCTP in conjunction with the Secretaries of Defense and
the Treasury, the U.S. Attorney General, and the heads of any other
participating agencies. In addition, we recommend that the Secretaries
of State and Defense issue joint guidance regarding DOD personnel
temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the partner
countries.
Commenting on a draft of this report, State and USAID concurred, and
DOD partially concurred, with our findings and recommendations (see
app. III, IV, and V, respectively). Regarding our recommendation that
State and DOD develop and issue joint guidance with regard to DOD
personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the
partner countries, DOD commented that it believes sufficient guidance
exists in U.S. government documents defining the agencies' respective
authorities. We made some clarifications in response to DOD's comments
but maintain that joint guidance is needed to resolve the agencies'
existing disagreements over implementation of their authorities in some
TSCTP countries. State, USAID, DOD, and the Department of Justice
provided technical corrections, which we incorporated where
appropriate.
Background:
Through TSCTP, the U.S. government aims to strengthen country and
regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibit the spread of
extremist ideology in northwest Africa. Since its launch in 2005, TSCTP
has operated in nine countries (see fig. 1), and it may expand to
include others.
Figure 1: Northwestern African Countries Participating in Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of Northwestern Africa indicating the following
countries that are participating in Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership:
Algeria;
Chad;
Mali;
Mauritania;
Morocco;
Niger;
Nigeria;
Senegal;
Tunisia.
Sources: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and DOD data; Art Explosion
(images).
[End of figure]
TSCTP was conceived as an interagency program, with State, USAID, and
DOD primarily responsible for diplomacy, development assistance, and
military activities, respectively, and with State as the program lead.
In each country participating in the program, a country team led by,
and under the authority of, the Ambassador coordinates the
implementation of U.S. foreign assistance in the country, including
TSCTP activities.[Footnote 8] The country teams include representatives
from State, USAID, and DOD, among other agencies. Within State, the
Bureau of African Affairs is the lead coordinator for TSCTP activities
conducted by several bureaus,[Footnote 9] as shown in figure 2. USAID's
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, in
Washington, D.C., manages the agency's TSCTP activities with support
from its regional office in Accra, Ghana, as well as USAID overseas
mission offices in some TSCTP countries. DOD's Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) is responsible for coordinating the agency's TSCTP
activities.[Footnote 10] In addition, DOD representatives under the
authority of the department's U.S. European Command (EUCOM) participate
with the country team in coordinating and implementing the agency's
TSCTP military activities.[Footnote 11]
Figure 2: Overview of Key Agencies Participating in TSCTP:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the key agencies participating in
TSCTP, as follows:
State Department (lead):
Program planning:
* Secretary of State;
- Bureau of African Affairs;
- Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs;
- Political-Military Affairs;
- Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism.
Program implementation at country level:
* Ambassador - Chief of Mission (under Bureau of African Affairs);
- Deputy Chief of mission;
- Defense attaché;
- Political Military officer;
- Public affairs officer;
- USAID Officer; NGO's implementing partners;
- Other country team members.
Department of Defense:
Program planning:
* Secretary of Defense;
- Office of the Secretary of Defense;
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint staff;
- European Command (Germany); SOCEUR.
Program implementation at country level:
* Other DOD TSCTP personnel (under European command);
* Military Trainers (under SOCEUR);
* Contractors supporting military activities (under SOCEUR).
USAID:
Program planning:
* Director of Foreign Assistance/USAID Administrator;
- Bureau for Africa;
- Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance.
Sources: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and DOD data; Art Explosion
(images).
[End of figure]
In 2005 through 2007, the key agencies participating in TSCTP obligated
about $230 million for TSCTP activities.[Footnote 12] For 2008, the
agencies' commitments for TSCTP amounted to approximately $123 million.
(See fig. 3.) TSCTP is not directly funded by Congress, but is funded
at the agencies' discretion from various appropriation accounts, such
as the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) fund; Economic Support Funds
(ESF); the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
Programs; and Section 1206 and 1207 funds.[Footnote 13] (See app. II
for more information about the agencies' funding for TSCTP.)
Figure 3: TSCTP Obligations and Commitments by Year and Key Agency,
2005-2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Fiscal year: 2005;
DOD Obligations and commitments: $7 million;
State and USAID Obligations and commitments: $18 million.
Fiscal year: 2006;
DOD Obligations and commitments: $39 million;
State and USAID Obligations and commitments: $10 million.
Fiscal year: 2007;
DOD Obligations and commitments: $118 million;
State and USAID Obligations and commitments: $37 million.
Fiscal year: 2008;
DOD Obligations and commitments: $92 million;
State and USAID Obligations and commitments: $31 million.
Sources: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and DOD data.
Notes:
The amounts shown include obligations for 2005-2007 and commitments for
2008. Commitments shown for 2008 are based on agencies' projections as
of June 2008.
Because the Director of Foreign Assistance determines funding for both
State and USAID, we have combined State's and USAID's TSCTP funding in
this figure. In addition, funding that DOD provided to State and USAID
from the Sections 1206 and 1207 accounts are included in the
obligations and commitments shown for DOD.
[End of figure]
Funds for TSCTP Were Distributed Primarily in the Sahel Region and
Support a Range of Diplomacy, Development Assistance, and Military
Activities:
The distribution of funds for TSCTP has varied among regions, with the
majority of obligations in 2005 through 2007 distributed to the Sahel
region. State, USAID, and DOD have supported a range of diplomacy,
development assistance, and military activities aimed at strengthening
country and regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the
spread of extremist ideology.
Distribution of TSCTP Obligations Has Focused on the Sahel Region:
About 74 percent of the $230 million obligated for 2005 through 2007
was distributed to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, in the Sahel
region; about 3 percent to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, in the
Maghreb region; and about 8 percent to Nigeria and Senegal, in sub-
Sahara. The remaining 15 percent of the obligations for 2005 through
2007 was distributed through regional assistance, such as military
exercises, to support TSCTP objectives in multiple countries. For 2008,
as of June 2008, the agencies expected to distribute about 49 percent
of total commitments for TSCTP to the countries of the Sahel region; 21
percent to the countries of the Maghreb region; 13 percent to the Sub-
Saharan countries; and 17 percent for regional assistance. (See fig.
4.)
Figure 4: TSCTP Obligations and Commitments by Country and Region, 2005-
2008:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Country/Region: Chad/Sahel;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $23 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $9 million;
Total: $32 million.
Country/Region: Mali/Sahel;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $31 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $6 million;
Total: $37 million.
Country/Region: Mauritania/Sahel;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $18 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $6 million;
Total: $24 million.
Country/Region: Niger/Sahel;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $37 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $7 million;
Total: $44 million.
Country/Region: Algeria/Maghreb;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $1 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $6
Total: $7 million.
Country/Region: Morocco/Maghreb;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $3 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $6 million;
Total: $9 million.
Country/Region: Tunisia/Maghreb;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: 0;
Fiscal year 2008: $1 million;
Total: $1 million.
Country/Region: Senegal/Sub-Shara;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $9 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $3 million;
Total: $12 million.
Country/Region: Nigeria/Sub-Shara;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $3 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $5 million;
Total: $8 million.
Country/Region: Regional;
Fiscal years 2005 to 2007: $22 million;
Fiscal year 2008: $10 million;
Total: $30 million.
Source: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and DOD data.
Notes:
The amounts shown represent the agencies' obligations for 2005-2007 and
commitments for 2008. The commitments shown for 2008 are based on
projections by State, USAID, and DOD as of June 2008.
The obligated amount shown in the column labeled "Regional" was
distributed through assistance efforts that support TSCTP objectives in
multiple countries.
In addition to the obligations shown, $147 million was obligated for
program support costs for all TSCTP partner countries, including
administrative and related personnel costs and air lift support.
[End of figure]
Agency officials indicated that the differences in the distribution of
obligations and commitments for TSCTP partner countries of the Sahel
and the Maghreb regions related, respectively, to countries' capacity
to absorb the assistance and their willingness to receive it. In the
Sahel, for example, the Nigerien military is fighting a rebellion in
the northern part of the country and therefore has limited capacity to
receive TSCTP military training, according to U.S. embassy officials in
Niger. According to DOD officials, a lack of needed resources, such as
jet fuel, also has limited the capacity of some countries in the Sahel
to receive military training. In the Maghreb, the Algerian government
has expressed unwillingness to receive TSCTP military training,
according to embassy and State officials.
U.S. Agencies Have Supported Diplomacy, Development Assistance, and
Military Activities:
The key agencies have supported various types of activities in support
of TSCTP goals,[Footnote 14] with State primarily focused on diplomacy,
USAID on development assistance, and DOD on military activities. Figure
5 illustrates the types of TSCTP activities that each agency supports.
Figure 5: Overview of Key Agencies' TSCTP Activities:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of three interlocking circles
representing Key Agencies' TSCTP Activities and areas of overlap, as
follows:
State:
* Diplomacy;
- Embassy security and support;
- Law enforcement counterterrorism training;
- Public diplomacy (shared with DOD);
- Support for vulnerable populations (shared with USAID).
DOD:
* Military;
- Military counterterrorism training and equipping;
- Intelligence training;
- Military infrastructure;
- Public diplomacy (shared with State);
- Humanitarian assistance (shared with USAID).
USAID:
* Development;
- Democracy and governance;
- Economic growth;
- Support for vulnerable populations (shared with State);
- Humanitarian assistance (shared with DOD).
Source: GAO analysis of State, USAID, and DOD data.
[End of figure]
State's TSCTP Activities:
State leads public diplomacy efforts, provides embassy security and
support for TSCTP activities, and supports some counterterrorism
training for law enforcement officers. Examples of State's TSCTP
activities include the following:
* Public diplomacy. State works to communicate messages among
vulnerable populations to isolate and marginalize violent extremists.
In addition, State works to foster a sense of common interests and
values between Americans and people of different countries and
cultures. For example, Morocco, Algeria, and Nigeria are all hosting
educational and cultural exchange programs.
* Embassy security and support. In some cases, State provides security,
logistical, and personnel support services, as well as office space at
U.S. embassies, to support DOD and USAID personnel implementing TSCTP
activities. In addition, State serves as the lead in diplomatic
discussions with host-country governments to facilitate TSCTP
activities.
* Law enforcement counterterrorism training. State's regional security
officers oversee the training of friendly governments' civilian
security and law enforcement personnel in police procedures that
address terrorism. For example, in Niger, the police forces received
training courses to help combat terrorism. In addition, State provides
funding in support of mobile training and military intelligence
conducted by DOD.
USAID's TSCTP Activities:
USAID supports development assistance intended to promote good
governance, provides economic opportunities, and engages populations
vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Examples of USAID's TSCTP
activities include the following:
* Democracy and governance. USAID supports efforts to improve
communication, and improve education and health, to help promote
legitimate authority in the region's vast, lightly-populated areas
where government presence is minimal. For example, USAID provided
training and support in democracy and governance for elected local
officials in Chad and Niger in remote areas. In addition, in Mali,
USAID supports basic education programs in schools to engage youths and
promote messages of tolerance. (See fig. 6.)
Figure 6: Students Receiving Instruction in a USAID-supported School in
Mali:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of students receiving instruction in a USAID-supported
school in Mali.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
* Economic growth. USAID supports alternatives to illicit activities,
such as drug trafficking, trafficking in humans, and banditry that can
provide financing for terrorist or extremist activities. For example,
in Niger, USAID is working with the United Nations Development Program
to reintegrate more than 3,000 ex-rebel fighters into civil society.
* Support for vulnerable populations. USAID supports programs that
encourage market-driven job training and job creation for youth through
market-driven vocational education, microfinance apprenticeships, and
coaching and mentoring. For example, USAID has provided rural radios to
target vulnerable regions in Niger and Mali by broadcasting moderate
views and providing information on government services.
DOD's TSCTP Activities:
DOD provides basic training and equipment to foreign militaries to
combat terrorism, provides military infrastructure, conducts
intelligence training, engages in some humanitarian assistance, and
supports State's public diplomacy efforts. Examples of DOD's TSCTP
activities include the following:
* Military counterterrorism training and equipment. DOD provides basic
training--for example, in marksmanship and border patrol--and
distributes equipment such as vehicles to the militaries of partner
countries.[Footnote 15] For instance, EUCOM conducts an annual military
exercise to provide specialized counterterrorism training and to foster
communication and cultural exchange between military counterparts. (See
fig. 7.)
Figure 7: DOD Representative Trains African Military Units:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of DOD representative training African Military Units.
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
* Military infrastructure. DOD provides military infrastructure, such
as storage and training facilities, and systems designed to foster
communication and cultural exchanges between militaries. For example,
DOD constructed a military training facility in northern Niger to
enhance the capabilities of the military.
* Intelligence training. DOD provides military intelligence training in
partner countries to support military counterterrorism and border
security operations. The training is intended to help build the
countries' intelligence capacity and establish regional intelligence
working groups.
* Humanitarian assistance. DOD assists partner countries'
infrastructure development and addresses humanitarian needs. For
example, DOD helps to construct wells and schools and provides medical
services to indigenous populations. In addition, DOD started a program
in Mauritania to educate the local population in landmine awareness and
risks. (See fig. 8.)
Figure 8: DOD Representative Provides Humanitarian Assistance:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of DOD representative providing humanitarian assistance.
Source: DOD.
[End of figure]
* Public diplomacy. DOD works with State to support public diplomacy
and information programs in partner countries. For example, DOD
promoted governance activities such as a voter registration drive in
Mauritania. DOD is also funding internet initiatives to foster
communication between TSCTP country governments and among key agencies
implementing TSCTP activities and to promote moderate political
messages to the public in partner countries. Furthermore, DOD has
worked in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Mali, and Mauritania to help these
countries minimize terrorist recruiting and influence.
Several Challenges Have Hampered Implementation of TSCTP Activities:
Several factors have hampered the key agencies' ability to
collaboratively implement TSCTP activities, in some cases limiting
their ability to achieve or assess progress in combating terrorism and
inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology.[Footnote 16] First, no
comprehensive, integrated strategy has been developed to guide the
agencies' activities, and documents used in planning program activities
have not included some elements that we have identified as needed in an
interagency counterterrorism program's strategic plan. Second, despite
some collaboration at the headquarters level, disagreement between
State and DOD about whether State should have authority over DOD
personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the
partner countries has contributed to the suspension of some of these
activities. Third, fluctuation in the distribution of obligations for
TSCTP in Mali resulted in the suspension of some program activities.
Fourth, although the agencies have indicators to measure activities'
direct results, the agencies have not yet developed the capability to
measure and report on overall progress toward program goals.
No Comprehensive Strategy Guides Implementation of TSCTP:
The agencies lack a comprehensive, integrated strategy to guide their
implementation of TSCTP. Our previous work has shown the importance, in
particular, of developing a strategy that identifies goals, objectives,
priorities, and milestones as well as resource needed for interagency
efforts to combat terrorism. According to DOD and State officials,
developing an interagency strategic plan has been identified as a
priority at annual TSCTP conferences, including the most recent
conference in March 2008;[Footnote 17] however, as of June 2008, the
agencies had not developed such a strategy.
State and DOD officials reported using two documents to plan their
TSCTP activities: a 2004 document outlining a regional effort to
counter terrorism in the Sahel and Maghreb and a 2005 document defining
the program's purpose and projecting resource needs. The documents
identify some agency activities related to the program's general
purpose and acknowledge the agencies' primary responsibilities for
these activities. However, the documents lack some key elements that we
have previously found to be needed in a large, interagency effort's
strategic plan. For example, the documents do not clearly articulate or
list the program's goals; our review of these and other agency
documents suggested goals that agency officials confirmed as those of
TSCTP.[Footnote 18] In addition, the 2004 and 2005 TSCTP planning
documents do not prioritize proposed activities or identify milestones
that could be used to measure progress or make improvements. Moreover,
the documents do not identify or provide guidance for selecting
countries for the program; reassessing and adjusting program goals in
response to any alterations in the level of threat; or determining when
countries in the program no longer require assistance. In addition, the
documents do not define the agency's specific roles with respect to
achieving the program's goals. Further, the projections of resource
needs have not been updated to account for variations in available
funds given State's and USAID's 2-year budget cycle.[Footnote 19]
State, USAID, and DOD have developed separate plans related to their
respective TSCTP activities. Although these plans reflect some
interagency collaboration, they do not provide an integrated,
comprehensive approach to guide TSCTP overall.
* At U.S. embassies, the country teams--led by the ambassador and
including State, USAID, and DOD representatives--have developed
bilateral country-level plans identifying embassy priorities and goals,
known as mission strategic plans (MSP), for each of the partner
countries. The nine MSPs for 2009 that we reviewed include
counterterrorism objectives as priority goals, but none of the nine
reflect detailed planning for TSCTP activities. State reported that it
plans to develop country assistance strategies to coordinate all U.S.
assistance in the partner countries, but no such strategies had been
developed for the TSCTP partner countries as of June 2008.
* USAID reported using a series of strategic assessments for the Sahel
countries to identify development assistance activities that could
support TSCTP. A USAID official stated that these assessments were
developed in cooperation with DOD and U.S. embassies; however, the
assessments address only USAID activities. Further, the USAID
assessments focus only on the four countries in the Sahel--Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, and Niger--where USAID has provided substantial development
assistance.
* DOD has developed operational plans, known as country action plans
(CAP), for TSCTP activities[Footnote 20] in each of the nine countries.
The CAPs identify the objectives of proposed military activities for
each country but also point to objectives outlined in State's MSPs.
According to DOD officials, in 2007, EUCOM officials began traveling to
TSCTP country teams to coordinate CAPs with the embassy mission teams
in an effort to secure embassy support for planned TSCTP activities.
However, the CAPs remain specific to DOD's military operations in each
country. Moreover, as of June 2008, none of the nine partner countries'
CAPs had been approved by the ambassadors in those countries, and only
two country teams, Niger and Mauritania, had held country-level CAP
discussions. According to a DOD official, in 2007, the Niger country
team failed to reach agreement regarding the CAP. A State official
noted that an April 2008 discussion of the Mauritania CAP helped to
improve coordination among DOD and State officials.
Disagreement on Authority over DOD Personnel Has Hampered Some TSCTP
Activities:
Although State, USAID, and DOD have undertaken efforts to collaborate
in implementing TSCTP, disagreements about whether State should have
authority over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP
activities in the partner countries have hampered some TSCTP
activities. Previously, we have found that for large-scale interagency
efforts in which collaboration is essential, agencies should work
together to define and agree on roles and responsibilities, including
how the collaborative effort will be led. We have also found that--to
enable a cohesive working relationship and create the mutual trust
required to enhance and sustain the collaborative effort--agencies
should establish compatible policies to operate across agency
boundaries.
The three agencies meet regularly to discuss TSCTP in Washington, D.C.,
and with DOD officials stationed at EUCOM in Germany, according to
State and DOD officials. For example, agency representatives hold
monthly video conferences to discuss TSCTP priorities and activities.
In addition, an annual conference brings U.S. embassy officials from
the partner countries, as well as from agency headquarters in
Washington and from EUCOM, to discuss past, present, and future TSCTP
operations. However, according to agency representatives, agreements
reached at these meetings have not always been implemented in some
partner countries.
Written statements from State and DOD show disagreement about whether
State should have authority over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to
conduct TSCTP activities in the partner countries. The agencies agree
that State is responsible for the security and coordination of all U.S.
government executive branch personnel assigned to all diplomatic and
consular posts abroad, except for personnel under the command of a U.S.
military commander, and that DOD is responsible for all activities
carried out by military personnel deployed by a combatant commander.
However, although acknowledging that DOD personnel[Footnote 21] who
report to EUCOM are not directly subject to the embassy's authority,
State asserts that, because these personnel seek clearance from the
ambassador to enter the country to conduct TSCTP activities, they are
subject to the ambassador's supervision while in the country. DOD
asserts that because these personnel are under the EUCOM commander's
direct authority, they are not under the ambassador's authority
although they actively seek to coordinate with the ambassador.
Several DOD officials told us that the disagreements about whether
State should have authority over DOD personnel temporarily assigned to
conduct TSCTP activities have affected implementation of DOD's
activities in Niger and Chad. In Niger, according to DOD officials, the
agency suspended most of its TSCTP activities in 2007 after the
Ambassador limited the number of DOD personnel allowed to enter the
country. State officials said that these limits were set in part
because of embassy concerns about the country's fragile political
environment as well as limited space and staff available to support DOD
personnel deployed to TSCTP partner countries.[Footnote 22] In Chad,
according to DOD officials, the ambassador recently called for a
"strategic pause" in implementing TSCTP activities, stating the need to
reassess available embassy personnel to support DOD activities in
country.[Footnote 23]
Disagreements between the agencies regarding authority over DOD
personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the
partner countries cannot be officially resolved by the country teams,
according to State and DOD officials. Lacking guidance from agency
headquarters, country team officials have tried to establish agreements
between State and DOD; for instance, DOD personnel have signed
memorandums of understanding with some embassies to facilitate their
TSCTP activities. However, some of these agreements were concluded
without the consent of higher offices within DOD, such as the Office of
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and therefore are
not considered valid by DOD. An embassy official in Mauritania recently
requested higher-level guidance regarding authority over the DOD
personnel who report to EUCOM. State officials noted that although the
Bureau of African Affairs is the designated lead of TSCTP, the bureau
official charged with TSCTP operations is subordinate in rank to the
ambassadors of partner countries and therefore lacks sufficient
authority to mediate the disagreements with DOD. DOD officials
expressed concern that program activities may continue to be hampered
if the agencies' disagreements are not resolved.
Fluctuation in the Distribution of Funds Has Hampered Implementation:
Fluctuation in the distribution of funds for TSCTP activities has
hampered USAID's implementation of activities in Mali. Our previous
work has shown that for large interagency counterterrorism efforts,
agencies should identify resource needs and deploy available resources
to address these needs.
As figure 9 shows, the distribution of funds for State and USAID TSCTP
activities has fluctuated over time in some countries, most
significantly in Mali.
Figure 9: Distribution of Funds for State and USAID TSCTP Activities by
Country and Year, 2005-2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Country/Region: Chad/Sahel;
Fiscal year 2005: $2,780,000;
Fiscal year 2006: $2,990,000;
Fiscal year 2007: $2,895,000.
Country/Region: Mali/Sahel;
Fiscal year 2005: $2,330,000;
Fiscal year 2006: $550,000;
Fiscal year 2007: $13,570,000.
Country/Region: Mauritania/Sahel;
Fiscal year 2005: $2,620,000;
Fiscal year 2006: $58,000;
Fiscal year 2007: $6,200,000.
Country/Region: Niger/Sahel;
Fiscal year 2005: $3,220,000;
Fiscal year 2006: $4,340,000;
Fiscal year 2007: $5,372,000.
Country/Region: Algeria/Maghreb;
Fiscal year 2005: $417,876;
Fiscal year 2006: 0;
Fiscal year 2007: 0.
Country/Region: Morocco/Maghreb;
Fiscal year 2005: $1,550,000;
Fiscal year 2006: $463,381;
Fiscal year 2007: $382,423.
Country/Region: Tunisia/Maghreb;
Fiscal year 2005: 0;
Fiscal year 2006: $32,836;
Fiscal year 2007: 0.
Country/Region: Nigeria/Sub-Sahara;
Fiscal year 2005: 0;
Fiscal year 2006: 0;
Fiscal year 2007: $1,260,000.
Country/Region: Senegal/Sub-Sahara;
Fiscal year 2005: $397,000;
Fiscal year 2006: $1,160,000;
Fiscal year 2007: $3,970,000.
Country/Region: Regional;
Fiscal year 2005: $5,000,000;
Fiscal year 2006: 0;
Fiscal year 2007: $3,650,000.
Source: GAO analysis of State and USAID data.
Note: Embassy officials in Mauritania stated that the reduced
distribution of funds for 2006 primarily resulted from a U.S. decision
to curtail its activities following a political coup in Mauritania in
2005.
[End of figure]
According to a USAID official, the fluctuation in funds for Mali has
made it difficult to plan over the medium to long term. Although USAID
received the funds it had requested to support TSCTP activities in Mali
for 2005 and 2007,[Footnote 24] it received no funds to obligate for
TSCTP activities in Mali in 2006. Because it received no funds for
2006, the mission suspended a peace-building program in northern Mali.
USAID officials noted that the inability to continue these activities
caused the Mali government to question somewhat the agency's commitment
to conducting TSCTP activities in the country.
Measurement of Progress toward TSCTP Goals Has Been Limited:
Although the agencies have developed indicators to measure their TSCTP
activities' outputs--their direct products and services--they have not
developed common indicators to measure the activities' outcomes--the
results of the products and services provided. Our previous work has
shown that developing common mechanisms to evaluate outcomes is
important to improving the effectiveness of large interagency efforts
to combat terrorism.
The agencies have developed performance indicators to measure their
TSCTP activities' outputs. However, because of the lack of common
indicators to measure their activities' outcomes, agency officials are
limited in their ability to determine progress toward program goals and
identify needed improvements.[Footnote 25]
* U.S. embassies use performance indicators to measure the outputs of
their counterterrorism activities and report on them annually to State
headquarters in Washington, D.C. However, the embassies do not measure
the outcomes of their TSCTP activities.
* USAID works with organizations implementing its TSCTP activities to
identify and establish performance indicators to measure the
activities' outputs.
* DOD uses indicators such as the amount of equipment provided and the
number of foreign military personnel trained through TSCTP activities
to measure the outputs of its TSCTP activities. In addition, DOD has
conducted surveys to determine the effect of its activities on local
populations' attitudes and perceptions.
State, USAID, and DOD officials acknowledged the need for, and are
working to develop, common indicators that demonstrate progress toward
TSCTP goals. For example, to facilitate the development of indicators
linked to the goal of inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology,
USAID recently hired a contractor to identify the root causes of
terrorism and extremism in Africa. State, USAID, and DOD officials
stated that the results of the study could be useful in their efforts
to develop common indicators of TSCTP activities' outcomes. However,
agency officials noted the difficulty of measuring how certain
activities, such as building wells or providing radios, may contribute
to the achievement of TSCTP goals.
A 2007 report by the Congressional Research Service acknowledges the
difficulty of measuring progress in combating terrorism.[Footnote 26]
The report notes that a common difficulty in demonstrating success in
combating terrorism is an overreliance on quantitative data--
particularly those that may correlate with progress but not accurately
measure it, such as the amount of money spent on counterterrorism
efforts--without considering its qualitative significance. According to
the report, an alternative for measuring progress in combating
terrorism might involve analyzing data on the numbers, magnitude,
impact and significance of terrorist incidents; public attitudes in
targeted countries or regions; and trends in incidents, attitudes, and
other factors over time. The report also notes that agencies' lack of
common criteria, as well as uncertainty with respect to strategies and
measurements, makes it difficult to describe and demonstrate progress.
Conclusion:
In supporting diplomacy, development assistance, and military
activities aimed at strengthening country and regional counterterrorism
capabilities and inhibiting the spread of extremist ideology in
northwest Africa, the key agencies implementing TSCTP have undertaken
an important effort to meet U.S. national security goals. However, the
lack of a comprehensive, integrated strategy that identifies program
goals and objectives, defines agreed-on agency roles and
responsibilities, and identifies resources needed to achieve the
program goals may limit the agencies' ability to enhance and sustain
this large-scale, interagency effort to combat terrorism. Moreover,
without guidance from agency headquarters, continued disagreements
about whether State should have authority over DOD personnel
temporarily assigned to conduct TSTCP activities in the partner
countries could further hamper TSCTP's implementation. In addition,
fluctuation in the distribution of State's and USAID's obligations may
continue to affect the implementation of TSCTP activities. Finally,
without common indicators of their activities' outcomes, the agencies
will continue to have limited ability to measure overall progress in
combating terrorism. Given the growing threat of terrorism in northwest
Africa, as well as the possibility of TSCTP's expansion to other
countries and agencies, addressing these factors is essential to
strengthening U.S. agencies' collaborative efforts to combat terrorism
in the region.
Recommendations:
To enhance U.S. agencies' ability to collaborate in strengthening
country and regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the
spread of extremist ideology in northwest Africa, we recommend that the
Secretary of State work through the Director of Foreign Assistance, who
serves concurrently as USAID Administrator, to develop a comprehensive
strategy for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership in
conjunction with the Secretaries of Defense and the Treasury, the U.S.
Attorney General, and the heads of any other partner agencies. The
strategy should include clear goals, objectives, and milestones,
including output and outcome indicators, and identify resources needed
to achieve the program's goals.
We also recommend that the Secretaries of State and Defense develop and
issue joint guidance with regard to DOD personnel temporarily assigned
to conduct TSCTP activities in the partner countries.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
State, USAID, and DOD provided written comments about a draft of this
report, which we have reproduced in appendixes III, IV, and V,
respectively. In addition, State, USAID, DOD, and the Department of
Justice provided technical corrections, which we incorporated as
appropriate.
State agreed with our report's findings and recommendations. State
noted that our recommendation regarding the importance of a
comprehensive TSCTP strategy is consistent with its view that the core
strategy developed in 2005 would benefit from updates on issues such as
the analysis of the counterterrorism challenge presented by the region,
the funding levels and prioritization of available U.S. and non-U.S.
resources, and the methodology used to evaluate program performance.
State also commented that our report's recommendation concerning the
importance of guidance on the appropriate integration of Department of
Defense (DOD) personnel into the U.S. missions in TSCTP countries
identifies an important issue. State observed that if a Chief of
Mission and the area military commander are unable to reach agreement,
they may refer the issue to the Secretaries of State and Defense for
resolution.
USAID likewise agreed with our findings and recommendations. USAID
noted that our recommendations reinforce its efforts to encourage
interagency collaboration and create efficiencies in implementation.
DOD agreed with most of our findings and recommendations. However, DOD
stated that it partially concurred with the recommendation regarding
developing and issuing joint guidance with regard to DOD personnel
temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the partner
countries. Specifically, DOD believes that sufficient guidance exists
in the government documents that define the authorities of DOD's
Combatant Commander (COCOM) and State's Chief of Mission (COM).
However, DOD noted that issuing joint guidance reflecting the
implications of the shift to a greater DOD emphasis and support in
shaping and deter operations would be helpful to both COCOMs and COMs
in the TSCTP region. We added information about State's and DOD's
authority in the report, but we maintain that joint guidance is needed
to resolve existing disagreements over implementation of the agencies'
respective authorities in some TSCTP countries.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees. We will also make copies of available to others on request.
In addition, this report is available at no charge on GAO's Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This report examines (1) the distribution of funds for TSCTP in 2005
through 2008 and the types of activities supported and (2) the
program's implementation, including the extent to which it has been
guided by a comprehensive, integrated strategy. We performed our work
from June 2007 through July 2008 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
In conducting our work, we interviewed representatives of the
Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), Justice, and the Treasury
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in
Washington, D.C., and of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in
Stuttgart, Germany. During site visits to three TSCTP partner
countries, we visited a U.S.-funded military facility in Mali and we
met with numerous Malian, Mauritanian, and Moroccan government and
military officials. We also met with some nongovernmental organization
representatives implementing TSCTP activities on behalf of the U.S.
government. In selecting the countries we would visit, we considered
the following criteria: funding allocations, geographic distribution,
the number and duration of TSCTP activities in the country, and TSCTP
representatives' recommendations. We also met with participants of the
2008 Annual TSCTP conference hosted by EUCOM in Garmisch, Germany, in
March 2008.
To identify the agencies' obligations and commitments of funds for
TSCTP for 2005 through 2008, we reviewed relevant laws that have
appropriated funds for accounts supporting TSCTP. We asked State, DOD,
and USAID officials to provide obligations for TSCTP activities by
country and account for 2005 through 2007. We also received information
on the agencies' commitments for TSCTP activities for 2008. We
collected and reviewed the information and noted that there is no
central repository for TSCTP funds, because the program is supported by
funds from multiple accounts. Owing to the limitations of the data, we
rounded the figures up to the nearest millions of dollars. We also
reviewed and compared State, USAID, and DOD documents to verify the
accuracy of the data provided by the agencies. Based on the checks
performed and the assessment of the data, we believe that the data are
sufficiently reliable to support general conclusions about State's and
USAID's total obligations and commitments by year and also by country
and are therefore sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report. To identify the TSCTP activities implemented by U.S. government
agencies, we collected and reviewed relevant documents from State,
USAID, and DOD as well as the Department of the Treasury. We also
interviewed relevant officials from the State, DOD, and USAID and the
intelligence community. At State, we interviewed officials from the
Bureau of African Affairs, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and the
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; we also met with officials from
the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the Office of
the Foreign Assistance. At USAID, we met with officials from the Bureau
for Africa. At DOD, we interviewed officials from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, U.S. European Command, U.S. Special Operations
Command--Europe, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
To examine the agencies' implementation of TSCTP, including the extent
to which it has been guided by a comprehensive, integrated strategy, we
collected and reviewed U.S. government strategy documents and evaluated
them against GAO-identified criteria for an interagency strategy. At
the U.S. government level, we reviewed the National Security Strategy,
the National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism, and two key
documents establishing the TSCTP. We also reviewed agencies' respective
strategy documents. For State, we reviewed 2008 and 2009 Mission
Strategic Plans (MSP) for all nine partner countries and the Country
Reports on Terrorism. For DOD, we reviewed the Contingency Plan
(CONPLAN) 7500, the OEF-TS Phase-2 Executive Order, and Country Action
Plans (CAP) for some partner countries. For USAID, we reviewed USAID
strategy documents, including the State-USAID Fiscal Year 2007-2012
Strategic Plan and three USAID assessments for the Sahel countries. We
also reviewed a draft USAID report on critical drivers underlying
terrorism. To further identify aspects of TSCTP's implementation, we
met with U.S. embassy staff, foreign government officials and NGO
representatives in Mali, Mauritania, and Morocco. We also interviewed
relevant U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C., and EUCOM in
Stuttgart, Germany. Further, we met with participants attending the
annual TSCTP conference in Garmisch, Germany, including EUCOM officials
and U.S. Embassy officials from Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,
Nigeria, and Tunisia. To assess the disagreement between State and DOD
related to the DOD personnel implementing TSCTP activities, we
submitted questions requesting each agency's view regarding the chief
of mission versus combatant command authorities at the embassy level.
We received written responses from each agency and summarized these
responses accordingly in our report. In addition, we plan to issue a
classified annex to this report.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 through July 2008,
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Selected Accounts Used to Fund TSCTP Activities:
State and USAID provide funding for TSCTP through the following key
accounts:
* Peacekeeping Operations - Provides assistance to friendly countries
and international organizations for peacekeeping operations and other
programs carried out in furtherance of the national security interests
of the United States.
* Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs -
Supports activities designed to enhance the antiterrorism skills of
friendly countries by providing training and equipment to deter and
counter terrorism.
* Economic Support Funds - Supports assistance to countries in order to
promote economic or political stability.
* Development Assistance - Used to transfer financial resources to
developing countries as well as to help countries solve development
problems in accordance with a strategy that aims to insure wide
participation of the poor in the benefits of development on a sustained
basis.
* Foreign Military Financing - Intended to promote U.S. national
security by contributing to regional and global stability,
strengthening military support for democratically-elected governments
and containing transnational threats, including terrorism and
trafficking in narcotics, weapons, and persons:
DOD provides funding for TSCTP through the following key accounts:
* Various Title X programs - Primary source of funding to support
activities conducted by the armed forces, including training with
foreign friendly forces. Federal law contains legal restrictions that
require DOD to conduct activities solely with foreign military
personnel and prohibit DOD from providing training to foreign law
enforcement personnel or paramilitary units.
* Section 1206 funds[Footnote 27] - DOD is authorized to conduct or
support security assistance programs in foreign countries, using fiscal
years 2006, 2007, and 2008 funds. These funds may be used by DOD with
State's concurrence, to build the capacity of a foreign country's
national military forces to (1) conduct counterterrorist operations or
(2) participate in or support military and stability operations with
the U.S. armed forces. These activities are jointly reviewed and
approved by the Secretaries of Defense and State.
* Section 1207/1210 funds[Footnote 28] - DOD is authorized to provide
services to and transfer defense articles and funds to State for
security, stability, and/or reconstruction to maintain peace and
security in a foreign country. These activities are jointly reviewed
and approved by the Secretaries of Defense and State.
* Section 1208 funds - DOD is authorized to reimburse foreign forces,
groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing
military operations by U.S. special operations forces to combat
terrorism.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
July 23, 2008:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Combating
Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership," GAO Job Code 320506.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Daniel Epstein, Desk Officer, Bureau of African Affairs at (202) 736-
4435.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO - Charles Johnson:
AF - Jendayi Frazer:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Reports:
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (GAO-08-860, GAO Code 320506):
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report
"Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership."
We appreciate the GAO's recommendations for maximizing the potential of
the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the courtesy
and professionalism of the GAO staff during the review. We agree with
the report's conclusion that "in supporting diplomacy, development
assistance, and military activities aimed at strengthening country and
regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of
extremist ideology of northwest Africa, the key agencies implementing
TSCTP have undertaken an important effort to meet U.S. national
security goals." Supporting the efforts of countries in North and West
Africa to prevent the spread of terrorism and the imposition of
extremist ideology in the region is an important USG priority.
Most TSCTP partner countries are counted among the poorest countries in
the world and currently lack the capacity to effectively combat this
threat over the long-term. However, they have demonstrated critical
political will to fight terrorism and will continue to benefit from
U.S. assistance. The operation of TSCTP recognizes that a sustained
interagency approach to counter-terrorism/counter-extremism is vital.
The approach is designed to address immediate security challenges and
assist countries in their long-term efforts to prevent terrorists from
using the areas as sources of recruits, sanctuary, sustainment, and
finance. The program's long-term objective is to make the area
inhospitable to terrorists and those who want to promote extremism.
The report's recommendation regarding the importance of a comprehensive
TSCTP strategy is consistent with our view that the initiative would
benefit from an update of the core strategy developed in 2005. The
strategy provides a strong foundation for program implementation and
would benefit from updates on such issues as the analysis of the
counter-terrorism challenge presented by the region, the funding levels
and prioritization of the USG and non-USG resources available and
appropriate to respond to the challenges, and the methodology to
evaluate program performance. Program implementation is guided by
recognition that threats, requirements, and absorptive capacities vary
widely among the TSCTP countries and our individual country engagement
strategies are therefore tailored to respond to individual needs and
opportunities.
The report's recommendation concerning the importance of guidance on
the appropriate integration of Department of Defense (DOD) personnel
into the U.S. Missions in TSCTP countries identifies another important
issue. Pursuant to the President's Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of
Mission (COMs), the COM has full responsibility for the direction,
coordination, and supervision of all United States Government executive
branch employees in his or her country of assignment, regardless of
their employment categories or location, except those under command of
a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an international
organization.
Most DOD personnel implementing TSCTP activities on a nonpermanent
basis are under the command of the area military commander and thus,
pursuant to the terms of the President's letter to COMs, do not
directly fall under COM authority. In practice, however, these DOD
personnel come under COM control at post: they seek clearance from the
Ambassador to enter the country to conduct their activities, and while
posted there they abide by COM rules and policies and are subject to
the COM's supervision. DOD's common practice in TSCTP countries of
deploying personnel for seriatim "enduring presence" extended tdy
periods, however, creates positions considered "permanent" under
Department policy. Like other permanent Mission positions, employees
encumbering those positions should come under COM authority. If a COM
and the area military commander are unable to reach agreement, they may
refer the issue to the Secretaries of State and Defense for resolution.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID:
From The American People:
U.S. Agency for International Development:
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW:
Washington, DC 20523:
[hyperlink, http://www.usaid.gov]:
Mr. Charles M. Johnson, Jr.,
Director International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
July 24, 2008:
Dear Mr. Johnson:
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to provide comments on
the draft GAO report entitled Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to
Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(GAO-08-860).
USAID has been a committed partner in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership (TSCTP) from its inception. While this area of programming
is not part of the traditional focus of reducing poverty, advancing
democracy, building market economies, promoting security, responding to
crises, and improving quality of life, USAID recognizes the strategic
contribution that such assistance provides in addressing broader
challenges.
USAID appreciates the recommendations in the report that reinforce our
efforts to encourage interagency collaboration and create efficiencies
in implementation. For example, in the most recent TSCTP Interagency
Conference, one of the key recommendations was to update the original
planning documents from 2005. USAID is also moving forward with field
testing of indicators to better determine if development activities
affect the root causes of extremism in an Africa context. In terms of
detailed technical comments, our staff provided technical comments to
your staff earlier in the week by email.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this
review. We look forward to receiving the final report once completed.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Franklin Moore:
Deputy Assistant Administrator:
Bureau for Africa:
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
International Security Affairs:
2400 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2400:
July 28, 2008:
Mr. Charles M. Johnson, Jr.
Director, International Affairs & Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Johnson:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO-08-860, "Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance
Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership," dated
July 9, 2008 (GAO Code 320506).
The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of State and Defense develop
and issue joint guidance with regard to DoD personnel conducting
operations in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
partner countries (Page 26/GAO Draft Report).
DoD partially concurs with the GAO recommendation. Sufficient guidance
exists in governing statutes and directives that prescribe the
authorities of the Combatant Commander (COCOM) and the Chief of Mission
(COM) regarding deployed DoD personnel, including those participating
in TSCTP efforts under Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-
TS). Examples include: 10 U.S.C. Section 164, 22 U.S.C. Section
3902(a), 22 U.S.C. 3927, 22 U.S.C. 4802(c), the Foreign Affairs
Handbook Volume 2, the Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 1, each COM Letter
of Instruction from the President, and Joint Publication 1, "Doctrine
for the Armed Forces of the United States," dated May 14, 2007
(specifically in Chapters II and IV). However, issuing further guidance
reflecting the implications of DoD's growing role in shaping and
deterrence operations would be helpful to both COCOMs and COMs in the
TSCTP region. [See comment 1]
We understand that further analytic details regarding TSCTP,
specifically addressing Department and Agency obligations in the
context of the original strategic guidance and resource commitments,
will be addressed in a follow-on classified annex.
Specific DoD comments regarding GAO recommendations are contained in
the attachment.
My point of contact on this issue is Mr. Jeff McManus at commercial
(703) 571-9398 or electronic mail address: jeffrey.mcmanus@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Theresa Whelan:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs:
GAO Draft Report Dated July 9, 2008:
GAO-08-860 (GAO CODE 320506):
"Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed To Enhance Implementation Of Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership"
Department Of Defense Comments On The GAO Recommendations:
General Comments: The report assesses the strategic objectives,
resource obligations, and challenges faced by the U.S. departments and
agencies in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The
GAO states there is no comprehensive, integrated strategy to guide
TSCTP implementation. The report outlines disagreements between State
and DoD regarding what State's authority should be for some DoD
personnel conducting TSCTP activities in some countries. The report
states that fluctuations in the distribution of obligations for TSCTP
activities have limited USAID's implementation of TSCTP. The report
points out that the U.S. Government has few common mechanisms for
measuring TSCTP activities' outcomes.
Recommendation: The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of State and
Defense develop and issue joint guidance with regard to DoD personnel
conducting operations in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP) partner countries (Page 26/GAO Draft Report).
DOD Response: Partially Concur. Sufficient guidance exists in governing
statutes and directives that prescribe the authorities of the Combatant
Commander (COCOM) and the Chief of Mission (COM) regarding deployed DoD
personnel, including those participating in TSCTP efforts under
Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS). Examples include: 10
U.S.C. Section 164, 22 U.S.C. Section 3902(a), 22 U.S.C. 3927, 22
U.S.C. 4802(c), the Foreign Affairs Handbook Volume 2, the Foreign
Affairs Manual Volume 1, each COM Letter of Instruction from the
President, and Joint Publication 1, "Doctrine for the Armed Forces of
the United States, dated May 14, 2007 (specifically in Chapters II and
IV).
However, issuing further guidance reflecting the implications of DoD's
growing role in shaping and deterrence operations would be helpful to
both COCOMs and COMs in the TSCTP region.
We understand that further analytic details regarding TSCTP,
specifically addressing Department and Agency obligations in the
context of the original strategic guidance and resource commitments,
will be addressed in a follow-on classified annex.
The following is GAO's comment from the Department of Defense's letter
dated July 28, 2008.
GAO Comment:
1. DOD states that it partially concurs with our recommendation that
State and DOD develop and issue joint guidance with regard to DOD
personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities in the
partner countries. DOD believes that sufficient guidance exists in the
government documents that define the authorities of DOD's Combatant
Commander (COCOM) and State's Chief of Mission (COM). DOD also comments
that issuing joint guidance reflecting the implications of the shift to
a greater DOD emphasis and support in shaping and deter operations
would be helpful to both COCOMs and COMs in the TSCTP region. In
response to DOD's comments, we have cited both COCOM and COM
authorities in the report. However, we maintain that joint guidance
from State and DOD is needed to resolve existing disagreements over
implementation of these authorities in some TSCTP countries.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Zina D. Merritt (Assistant Director), Ashley Alley, Nanette J. Barton,
David Dornisch, Reid Lelong Lowe, and John F. Miller made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
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Afghan National Security Forces. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-661]. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to
Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-622]. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs
Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-336]. Washington,
D.C.: February 29, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist
Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-697]. Washington,
D.C.: May 25, 2007.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15]. Washington, D.C.: October
21, 2005.
International Affairs: Information on U.S. Agencies' Efforts to Address
Islamic Extremism. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-
852.Washington], D.C.: September 16, 2005.
Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National
Strategies Related to Terrorism. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-04-408T]. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2004.
Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to
Address the Overseas Threat. GAO-03-165. Washington, D.C.: May 23,
2003.
Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to
Terrorism. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-519T].
Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2003.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For example, an Algerian terrorist group, formerly known as the
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), merged with Al Qaeda in
September 2006 and subsequently, in early 2007, changed its name to Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
[2] In this report, all years cited are fiscal years (Oct. 1-Sept. 30).
[3] TSCTP, originally known as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Initiative, was developed as a follow-on to the Pan-Sahel Initiative,
which provided basic military training and equipment to the militaries
of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger from 2002 through 2004.
[4] Obligations reflect a liability or binding agreement. Commitments
are estimates or projections that may be used to project future
obligations but are not based on a legal obligation.
[5] From 2005 through 2007, the key agencies participating in TSCTP
obligated about $230 million for TSCTP activities. For 2008, the
agencies' commitments totaled approximately $123 million.
[6] These agencies are considering increasing their TSCTP involvement
in the future.
[7] Our previous work has shown that the following practices can help
agencies overcome barriers to interagency collaboration in large-scale
efforts where such collaboration is essential: (1) develop a strategy
with clearly defined goals and objectives, among other elements; (2)
agree on roles and responsibilities and establish policies for
operating across agency boundaries; (3) identify resource needs and
deploy available resources; and (4) develop mechanisms to monitor,
evaluate, and report on results. See page 46 of this report for a
listing of our previous work.
[8] Country teams in embassies are made up of key figures from the
State Department and other agencies that work under the direction of
the ambassador and meet regularly to share information and coordinate
their actions.
[9] Although State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is charged
with developing coordinated strategies to defeat terrorists abroad, S/
CT has not been charged with developing a strategy for TSCTP.
[10] OSD's Office of African Affairs oversees DOD's TSCTP activities,
provides policy and guidance to EUCOM, and interfaces with other U.S.
agencies in TSCTP implementation.
[11] EUCOM's Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) is DOD's
component of TSCTP. In October 2008, execution authority for OEF-TS
will transition from EUCOM to the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).
[12] See appendix I for a description of our methodology for obtaining
these data and assessing their reliability.
[13] Because no specific congressional authorization or appropriation
exists for TSCTP, State, USAID, and DOD fund their TSCTP activities
through multiple accounts. State requested funds for TSCTP as a line
item in the 2009 Congressional Budget Justification; the request
included funds for USAID, which is included in State's budgetary
process. DOD has designated funds for TSCTP for 2008 through 2012,
including funds from the Sections 1206 and 1207 accounts, which it
provides to State and USAID. See appendix II for more information.
[14] In addition to conducting TSCTP activities, each agency conducts
other activities that support U.S. counterterrorism goals in northwest
Africa.
[15] Equipment is provided to militaries of TSCTP partner countries
through State-funded programs and is distributed by DOD personnel in
the partner countries.
[16] Our previous work identified the following practices, among
others, that can help agencies enhance and sustain large-scale efforts,
such as counterterrorism programs, where interagency collaboration is
essential: (1) establish a strategy that clearly defines goals,
objectives, priorities, and milestones, among other elements; (2)
define and agree on roles and responsibilities, including how the
collaborative effort will be led, and establish compatible policies,
procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries; (3)
identify resource needs and deploy available resources; and (4) develop
mechanisms to monitor and evaluate results. See GAO, Results-Oriented
Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration
among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); Evaluation of
Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-408T] (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). See page 46 of this report for a listing of these
products and other related GAO work.
[17] State, USAID, and DOD rotate responsibility for hosting an annual
TSCTP conference; DOD hosted the March 2008 conference in Germany.
[18] After reviewing these and other agency documents and conferring
with agency officials, we derived the following as TSCTP goals: (1)
strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities; (2) enhancing and
institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces; (3)
denying support and sanctuary through strategically targeted
development assistance; (4) promoting good governance; (5) discrediting
terrorist ideology; and (6) reinforcing bilateral military ties.
[19] State and USAID follow a 2-year budget process, in which bureaus'
funding requests are submitted 2 years prior to appropriation and
obligation of funds.
[20] DOD also produces multiple plans to address the military goals and
objectives for the Global and Regional War on Terror.
[21] These DOD personnel do not include individuals already considered
to be under embassy Chief of Missions' authority, such as Defense
Attaches and Security Assistance Officers.
[22] According to a DOD official, DOD personnel are not required to
operate within a U.S. embassy compound, and in some countries, DOD has
operations and facilities outside the embassies.
[23] When a rebellion in Chad began, the embassy was evacuated and all
U.S. government personnel were withdrawn. Since the evacuation of U.S.
personnel from Chad, the embassy has reopened and plans for TSCTP
activities are being reevaluated.
[24] Some of the 2007 obligations for USAID's TSCTP activities in Mali
were provided through the Section 1207 account, which allows DOD to
transfer funds to State for reconstruction, security, or stabilization
assistance in a foreign country.
[25] Previously, we have found that federal agencies engaged in
collaborative efforts need to create the means to monitor and evaluate
their efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement. We also
found that reporting on activities can help key decision makers within
the agencies, as well as clients and stakeholders, to obtain feedback
for improving both policy and operational effectiveness. See GAO-06-15.
[26] Congressional Research Service, Combating Terrorism: The Challenge
of Measuring Effectiveness (Washington, D.C.: 2007).
[27] The National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 (Pub. L. No. 109-
163, § 1206, Jan. 6, 2006) authorized Section 1206 programs to be
funded with funds from 2006 and 2007. The John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act of 2007 (Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 1210, Oct. 17, 2006)
extended this authorization to include funds from 2008.
[28] The National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 (Pub. L. No. 109-
163, § 1207, Jan. 6, 2006) authorized Section 1207 funds and services
to be provided through the end of 2007. Section 1210 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-181 § 1210, Jan.
20, 2008) reauthorized and extended the program through 2008.
[End of section]
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