Drug Control
Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are Needed Gao ID: GAO-08-784 July 15, 2008Each year, criminal organizations transport hundreds of tons of illegal drugs from South America to the United States through a 6 million square mile "transit zone" including Central America, the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. Since fiscal year 2003, the United States has provided over $950 million to support counternarcotics efforts in transit zone countries, which historically lacked the capacity to interdict drugs. GAO was asked to examine (1) how the United States has assisted transit zone countries in disrupting drug trafficking and (2) what factors have impeded these efforts. GAO analyzed relevant data, met with U.S. and foreign officials, and visited selected countries.
U.S. government assistance has improved international counternarcotics cooperation with the eight major drug transit countries GAO reviewed, except Venezuela. First, assistance programs have helped partner nations gather, process, and share information and intelligence leading to arrests and drug seizures. Second, they have enabled these nations to participate in counternarcotics operations--both at sea and on land--by providing assets (such as interceptor boats and vehicles), logistical support, and training for police units. Third, U.S. assistance has helped strengthen the capacity of prosecutors to work more effectively on drug-related cases. Assessing the impact of such a wide variety of programs is difficult because some are indirectly related to drug interdiction, and because results reporting has been limited and inconsistent. Despite gains in international cooperation, several factors, including resource limitations and lack of political will, have impeded U.S. progress in helping governments become full and self-sustaining partners in the counternarcotics effort--a goal of U.S. assistance. These countries have limited resources to devote to this effort, and many initiatives are dependent on U.S. support. Programs to build maritime interdiction capacity have been particularly affected, as partner nations lack fuel and other resources needed to operate and maintain U.S.-provided boats. Limited political support, particularly in Venezuela, and corruption have also hindered U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented a Container Security Initiative (CSI) that targets and scans containers for weapons of mass destruction and terrorist contraband. But CSI has not routinely been used for illicit drug detection, despite its applicability for this purpose.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-784, Drug Control: Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are Needed
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2008:
Drug Control:
Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has Improved, but
Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are Needed:
GAO-08-784:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-784, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Each year, criminal organizations transport hundreds of tons of illegal
drugs from South America to the United States through a 6 million
square mile ’transit zone“ including Central America, the Caribbean,
the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean. Since fiscal year
2003, the United States has provided over $950 million to support
counternarcotics efforts in transit zone countries, which historically
lacked the capacity to interdict drugs. GAO was asked to examine (1)
how the United States has assisted transit zone countries in disrupting
drug trafficking and (2) what factors have impeded these efforts. GAO
analyzed relevant data, met with U.S. and foreign officials, and
visited selected countries.
What GAO Found:
U.S. government assistance has improved international counternarcotics
cooperation with the eight major drug transit countries GAO reviewed,
except Venezuela. First, assistance programs have helped partner
nations gather, process, and share information and intelligence leading
to arrests and drug seizures. Second, they have enabled these nations
to participate in counternarcotics operations”both at sea and on
land”by providing assets (such as interceptor boats and vehicles),
logistical support, and training for police units. Third, U.S.
assistance has helped strengthen the capacity of prosecutors to work
more effectively on drug-related cases. Assessing the impact of such a
wide variety of programs is difficult because some are indirectly
related to drug interdiction, and because results reporting has been
limited and inconsistent.
Despite gains in international cooperation, several factors, including
resource limitations and lack of political will, have impeded U.S.
progress in helping governments become full and self-sustaining
partners in the counternarcotics effort”a goal of U.S. assistance.
These countries have limited resources to devote to this effort, and
many initiatives are dependent on U.S. support. Programs to build
maritime interdiction capacity have been particularly affected, as
partner nations lack fuel and other resources needed to operate and
maintain U.S.-provided boats. Limited political support, particularly
in Venezuela, and corruption have also hindered U.S. counternarcotics
efforts. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
implemented a Container Security Initiative (CSI) that targets and
scans containers for weapons of mass destruction and terrorist
contraband. But CSI has not routinely been used for illicit drug
detection, despite its applicability for this purpose.
Figure: Major Drug Transit Countries in the Transit Zone and Principal
Cocaine Vectors to the United States:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains a map depicting major drug transit countries in
the transit zone and principal cocaine vectors to the United States, as
follows:
Major drug transit countries (except Mexico):
Bahamas;
Dominican Republic;
Ecuador;
Guatemala;
Haiti;
Jamaica;
Panama;
Venezuela.
Central American Corridor: 90% of traffic.
Caribbean Corridor: 10% of traffic.
Source: GAO based on a similar map in ONDCP's 2007 Interagency
Assessment of Cocaine Movement; Nova Development (map).
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that State (1) report more comprehensively and
consistently on the results of U.S. initiatives and (2) develop plans
for sustaining U.S.-provided assets. State partially disagreed. GAO
modified the first recommendation to emphasize reporting results rather
than developing performance measures; however, GAO believes that plans
are needed for sustaining U.S.-provided assets. GAO also recommends
that DHS determine the feasibility of expanding its Container Security
Initiative (CSI) to target and scan containers for illicit drugs. DHS
disagreed, indicating that drug interdiction is not in CSI‘s mandate.
GAO notes that CSI‘s 2006-2011 Strategic Plan envisions potential
expansion to detect drugs and examining the feasibility of doing so
would be a logical first step.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-784]. For more
information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Overall, U.S. Assistance Has Enhanced International Cooperation in
Disrupting Illegal Drug Markets:
Several Factors Impede the Effectiveness of the Counternarcotics
Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement
Administration:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of National Drug Control Policy:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: U.S. Agencies' Support for Counternarcotics-Related Activities
in Transit Zone Countries (Excluding Mexico), Fiscal Years 2003-2007:
Table 2: U.S.-Supported Counternarcotics Initiatives in Eight Major
Drug Transit Countries, Fiscal Years 2003-2007:
Table 3: Estimated Cocaine Flow and Removal within the Transit Zone,
Fiscal Years 2002-2006:
Table 4: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index Scores
for Eight Major Drug Transit Countries (2007):
Table 5: Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements with
Countries in the Transit Zone:
Figures:
Figure 1: Major Drug Transit Countries and Main Drug-Trafficking
Vectors through the Transit Zone to the United States:
Figure 2: U.S.-Provided Maritime Training and Equipment in Panama:
Figure 3: Training Canines in Ecuador to Detect Drugs in Luggage and on
Passengers:
Figure 4: Interceptor Boat Provided to Panama under Defense's Enduring
Friendship Program:
Abbreviations:
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
CPI: Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International):
CSI: Container Security Initiative:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia:
IACM: Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement:
JIATF-South: Joint Interagency Task Force-South:
ONDCP: Office of National Drug Control Policy:
State/INL: State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 15, 2008:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley:
Co-Chairman:
Caucus on International Narcotics Control:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The importation of illegal drugs, primarily cocaine, from countries in
South America, continues to threaten the health and well-being of
American citizens.[Footnote 1] Criminal drug trafficking organizations
transport these drugs into the United States through a 6 million square
mile "transit zone," encompassing Mexico, Central America, the
Caribbean island nations, the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and
the eastern Pacific Ocean. The U.S. Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP) reports that these organizations have smuggled between
about 460 and 1,030 metric tons of cocaine through the transit zone to
the United States annually since 2003. In recent years, ONDCP has
reported that about 90 percent of that cocaine has come to the United
States through Central America and Mexico, while approximately 10
percent was trafficked through the Caribbean.
One of the three priorities in the United States' National Drug Control
Strategy is to disrupt the illicit drug market by eradicating drug
crops, interdicting illicit drugs in the transit zone, and attacking
drug trafficking organizations.[Footnote 2] As we have previously
reported, countries in the transit zone have historically lacked the
resources and institutional capacity to conduct counternarcotics
operations.[Footnote 3] As a result, the United States has assisted
nations in the region to strengthen their law enforcement, judicial,
military, and other sectors. According to the Department of State's
(State) International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,[Footnote 4]
U.S. assistance is intended to help nations become "full and self-
sustaining partners" in the international counternarcotics effort.
[Footnote 5] From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2007, the United
States provided over $950 million to directly or indirectly support
counternarcotics activities in transit zone countries, excluding
Mexico.
As requested, we examined U.S. counternarcotics assistance to selected
countries in the transit zone since 2003. Specifically, we examined:
(1) how U.S. agencies have assisted these countries in their efforts to
disrupt drug trafficking and what results this assistance has yielded,
and (2) the factors that have impeded counternarcotics efforts in these
countries.
To address these objectives, we analyzed program data and documentation
relating to counternarcotics efforts in eight countries within the
transit zone designated by the President as major drug transit
countries--the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Jamaica, Panama, and Venezuela--from 2003 through 2007. We did
not include Mexico because we reported on U.S. counternarcotics
assistance to that country in 2007.[Footnote 6] We met with U.S.
government officials from ONDCP; the Departments of Defense (Defense),
Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (Justice), and State; and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID). We also met with
officials at the Joint Interagency Task Force-South and U.S. Southern
Command in Florida and traveled to four major drug transit countries
(the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama) to meet with
U.S. embassy officials, host government officials, and local program
beneficiaries. While in country, we visited a number of project sites
relating to maritime operations, port security, intelligence gathering,
drug crop eradication, alternative development, and other activities.
We also reviewed estimates of illicit drug flow and data on seizures
and disruptions of drug trafficking operations. We determined that
these data were sufficiently reliable to provide an overall indication
of the magnitude and nature of the illicit drug trade and interdiction
efforts since 2003.
We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to July 2008 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for a more
complete discussion of our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
Since 2003, U.S. agencies, primarily State, Defense, Justice's Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), DHS, and USAID, have undertaken a
wide variety of efforts, which, overall, have improved international
cooperation with the eight major drug transit countries we examined,
except Venezuela. Assistance programs focused on three key areas: (1)
intelligence-gathering and investigations, (2) maritime and land-based
operations, and (3) criminal prosecutions. Through these programs, the
United States has gained access to intelligence, evidence, and drug
trafficking suspects that it might not otherwise have had to advance
its counternarcotics activities.
* Intelligence-gathering and investigations. State's Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), DEA, and
Defense have helped all the countries we reviewed develop organizations
and methods for gathering, analyzing, and sharing intelligence and
information that have led to major arrests and drug seizures. DEA and
State/INL have established vetted investigative units, staffed by local
law enforcement officers, in all of the major drug transit countries in
the region. These units have worked closely with U.S. officials to
develop successful drug investigations. Justice has also helped
governments draft legislation to broaden the scope of investigative
tools available to law enforcement organizations. In addition, Defense
has funded the installation of a computer network in six major transit
countries through which participating countries have shared information
in real time on aircraft and vessels suspected of transporting drugs.
* Maritime and land-based counternarcotics operations. State/INL,
Defense, and a variety of U.S. law enforcement agencies, including DEA
and the Coast Guard, have enabled several partner nations to undertake
or participate in law enforcement, military, and other counterdrug-
related operations--both at sea and on land--including seizing drugs,
weapons, and assets; arresting suspects; disrupting drug shipments; and
eradicating drug crops. In addition to providing assets, such as boats,
and logistical support for participation in short-and long-term joint
maritime operations, the United States and several major drug transit
countries have implemented maritime law enforcement cooperation
agreements and procedures providing U.S. forces improved access to
suspect vessels in international and territorial waters. The United
States has supported the development of national counternarcotics
police units in all the countries we reviewed, including special units
to target drug traffickers at airports, seaports, and transit
checkpoints. State/INL and Defense have also provided logistical
support for manual eradication of opium poppy and coca plants in
Guatemala and Ecuador, respectively.
* Criminal prosecutions. State/INL and USAID, in cooperation with
Justice, have supported justice sector reforms intended to make the
judicial systems in some partner nations more fair, impartial, and
efficient and have strengthened the capacity of prosecutors to work
effectively on drug-related cases within those systems. In cases where
prosecution in the United States is warranted and legal, most partner
nations have also supported the deportation or extradition of drug-
related defendants to the United States.
Measuring the results of such a wide variety of counternarcotics
initiatives is difficult, especially as some efforts are indirectly
related to drug interdiction. And while State/INL, DEA, and others have
reported on some of the results of their programs, they have not done
so in a comprehensive and consistent manner among partner nations and
over time. Thus, the effect of particular initiatives is often unclear,
making it difficult for agency managers to assess progress in achieving
agency goals, compare the relative effectiveness of their initiatives,
and make results-based decisions concerning resource allocations.
We noted several factors relating to U.S. assistance programs that have
impeded international counternarcotics efforts. In particular, nations'
limited ability to sustain assistance programs, limited political
support of U.S.-funded initiatives, as well as corruption have kept
these nations from becoming full partners in the international
counternarcotics effort, which, according to State, is a key goal of
U.S. assistance.
* Limited ability to sustain programs. Most partner nations in the
transit zone have limited resources to devote to counternarcotics, and
many initiatives depend on U.S. support. Programs aimed at building
maritime interdiction capacity have been particularly affected, as
partner nations have been unable to use U.S.-provided boats for patrol
or interdiction operations due to a lack of funding for fuel and
maintenance. Assistance programs have not always included plans for the
long-term sustainment of U.S.-provided assets. In 2007, Defense began
providing new interceptor boats and related equipment to transit zone
countries under its program Enduring Friendship without such a plan,
expecting that the countries would continue funding the operations and
maintenance of the assets after initial U.S.-support ends.
* Limited political support. Unwillingness to implement
counternarcotics initiatives for political reasons has also impeded
cooperative counternarcotics efforts in some countries. This is
particularly true in Venezuela, which, due to strained relations with
the United States, has ceased cooperating in U.S. counternarcotics
initiatives since 2005.
* Corruption. State and DEA have reported that key law enforcement
officials in some countries have undermined international
counternarcotics operations or have been subject to corruption charges.
This has limited the opportunities to involve those organizations in
all aspects of planning and executing interdiction operations.
In addition, U.S. initiatives relating to cargo container security have
been limited and generally ineffective for the international
counternarcotics effort. State/INL has funded assistance programs at
container ports in four of the eight countries we reviewed and, in
three of those countries, results have been unsatisfactory, according
to State. DHS has implemented a program overseas as part of its
Container Security Initiative (CSI) that could have potential for
greater use in counternarcotics operations. CSI has provided foreign
ports, including seven in the transit zone, with equipment and
personnel to target and scan cargo containers for weapons of mass
destruction and terrorist contraband. However, the program is not used
routinely to screen for illicit narcotics. DHS officials raised several
concerns about using CSI for this purpose, including the need for
additional resources and potential difficulty gaining host country
agreement, but they have not studied the feasibility of expanding the
program.
We are recommending that the Secretary of State, in consultation with
ONDCP, Defense, DHS, Justice, and USAID, report the results of U.S.-
funded counternarcotics initiatives for each country more
comprehensively and consistently in State's annual International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report. We are also recommending that State
work with these agencies to develop a plan to ensure that U.S.-provided
counternarcotics assets in partner nations are operated and maintained
for the remainder of their useful life, report this plan to the
Congress, and ensure that agencies providing an asset to partner
nations determine the operations and maintenance costs over the asset's
useful life and develop a plan for how these costs would be funded. We
also recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation
with State and Justice, determine the feasibility--by assessing the
costs, benefits, risks, and other factors--of expanding CSI to include
routine targeting and scanning of containers for illegal drugs in major
drug transit countries in the transit zone and report their findings to
the Congress.
State, DHS, ONDCP, and Justice/DEA provided written comments on a draft
of this report. State generally agreed with the report's conclusions,
but disagreed with our recommendation on results reporting. State noted
that it has already developed broad performance measures to reflect
progress in achieving counternarcotics goals and development goals in
general, though they do not necessarily capture program-specific
results. We revised our recommendation to emphasize the need for more
systematic reporting of program-specific results that would link U.S.
counternarcotics efforts to State's broader performance goals and
measures. State partially agreed with our recommendation on
sustainability plans, indicating that its project designs, agreements
with recipient countries, and monitoring mechanisms are appropriate for
addressing sustainability concerns. Given past experience, we question
whether donating assets is justifiable without more discreet
sustainability planning that gives better assurances that the recipient
country and participating agencies are committed to funding specified
operations and maintenance costs. DHS disagreed with our recommendation
to study the expansion of CSI, noting that the program is mandated to
address the potential risk of terrorism and acts of terrorism. CSI's
mandate does not prohibit narcotics interdiction, and we note that the
program's 2006-2011 Strategic Plan envisions potential expansion to
address narcotics trafficking, as a factor "known to support
terrorism." ONDCP strongly concurred with this recommendation and State
fully supported any consultation needed to implement it.
Background:
Virtually all the cocaine destined for the United States originates in
the Andean countries of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia and travels through
the transit zone. The United States provides significant
counternarcotics assistance toward reducing coca cultivation,
disrupting cocaine production, and preventing cocaine from reaching the
United States. Drug traffickers move cocaine and other drugs to the
United States through two main vectors or "corridors." In recent years,
approximately 90 percent of cocaine moving toward the United States has
gone through the Central American/Mexican corridor and then over the
border to the United States. The remainder, roughly 10 percent,
transits the Caribbean and enters the United States through Florida,
Puerto Rico, and other eastern locations. (See fig. 1.) More than 25
countries lie within the transit zone. The President has designated
eight of these as "major drug transit countries" based on the estimated
volume of illicit drugs that pass through their territory each year.
[Footnote 7] These countries are the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Panama, and Venezuela.[Footnote 8]
Figure 1: Major Drug Transit Countries and Main Drug-Trafficking
Vectors through the Transit Zone to the United States:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains a map depicting major drug transit countries in
the transit zone and principal cocaine vectors to the United States, as
follows:
Major drug transit countries (except Mexico):
Bahamas;
Dominican Republic;
Ecuador;
Guatemala;
Haiti;
Jamaica;
Panama;
Venezuela.
Central American Corridor: 90% of traffic.
Caribbean Corridor: 10% of traffic.
Source: GAO based on a similar map in ONDCP's 2007 Interagency
Assessment of Cocaine Movement; Nova Development (map).
[End of figure]
Transit Zone Drug Trafficking Tactics:
Drug trafficking organizations and associated criminal networks are
extremely adaptive. They shift routes and operating methods quickly in
response to pressure from law enforcement organizations or rival
traffickers. They ship drugs through the transit zone primarily by sea,
though their methods have become more evasive in recent years. They
typically use go-fast boats and fishing vessels to smuggle cocaine from
Colombia to Central America and Mexico en route to the United States.
Go-fast boats are capable of traveling at speeds over 40 knots, are
difficult to detect in open water, and are often used at night. When
drug traffickers travel in daylight, they often use boats painted blue,
or that can be quickly covered with a blue tarpaulin, thereby becoming
virtually impossible to see. Even when detected, go-fast boats can
often outrun conventional ships deployed in the transit zone.
Traffickers also use "mother ships" in concert with fishing vessels to
transport illicit drugs into open waters and then distribute the load
among smaller boats at sea. In addition, traffickers use evasive
maritime routes and change them frequently. Some boats travel as far
southwest as the Galapagos Islands in the Pacific Ocean before heading
north toward Mexico, while others travel through Central America's
littoral waters, close to shore, where they can hide among legitimate
maritime traffic. In addition, the Joint Interagency Task Force-South
(JIATF-South), under Defense's U.S. Southern Command,[Footnote 9] has
reported an increase in suspicious flights--particularly departing from
Venezuela. In addition, traffickers fly loads of cocaine to remote,
ungoverned spaces--such as northern Guatemala, near the Mexican border-
-and abandon the planes. Planes, however, generally carry much smaller
loads than most maritime vessels used for drug trafficking. Traffickers
also are using increasingly sophisticated concealment methods. For
example, they have built fiberglass semisubmersible craft that can
avoid both visual-and sonar-detection, hidden cocaine within the hulls
of boats, and transported liquefied cocaine in fuel tanks.
According to Defense's Office of Counternarcotics,
Counterproliferation, and Global Threats, these shifts in drug
trafficking patterns and methods have likely taken place largely in
response to U.S. and international counternarcotics efforts in the
Pacific Ocean and Caribbean, although measuring causes and effects is
imprecise. In addition, according to Defense, drug trafficking
organizations and associated criminal networks commonly enjoy greater
financial and material resources (including weapons as well as
communication, navigation, and other technologies) than do governments
in the transit zone.
U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy:
The U.S. National Drug Control Strategy's goal is to reduce illegal
drug usage in the United States. One priority is to disrupt the illegal
drug trade abroad--including in the transit zone--by attacking the
power structures and finances of international criminal organizations.
This involves seizing large quantities of cocaine from transporters,
disrupting major drug trafficking organizations, arresting their
leaders, and seizing their assets. The strategy also calls for the
United States to support democratic institutions and the rule of law in
allied nations, strengthen these nations' prosecutorial efforts, and
prosecute foreign traffickers. According to State's International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the goal of U.S. counternarcotics
assistance to other countries is to help their governments become full
and self-sustaining partners in the fight against drugs.
ONDCP produces the National Drug Control Strategy, establishes
policies, priorities, and objectives for the nation's drug control
program, and evaluates, coordinates, and oversees the counternarcotics
efforts of executive branch agencies, including assistance to countries
in the transit zone. State/INL manages and funds law enforcement
assistance, including programs implemented by a variety of other U.S.
agencies, such as DHS's Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. State also administers
security assistance programs generally implemented by Defense,
including Foreign Military Financing and International Military
Education and Training programs, which are intended to strengthen the
overall capacity of foreign forces to address security threats,
including violence and instability associated with drug trafficking.
Defense, primarily through its Office of Counternarcotics,
Counterproliferation, and Global Threats, provides guidance and
oversight, as well as funds for counternarcotics and related security
activities in the transit zone. DEA works to disrupt drug trafficking
operations and dismantle criminal organizations, bringing leaders to
prosecution either in the United States or in other countries; it
maintains offices in countries throughout the transit zone. USAID also
supports the U.S. counternarcotics effort indirectly through its rule
of law and alternative development programs.
Table 1 shows assistance provided by State, DEA, Defense, and USAID to
support counternarcotics-related programs and activities in transit
zone countries for fiscal years 2003 through 2007.
Table 1: U.S. Agencies' Support for Counternarcotics-Related Activities
in Transit Zone Countries (Excluding Mexico), Fiscal Years 2003-2007:
Bahamas[E]:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $4.1;
DEA subtotal[B]: $20.4;
Special investigative units: 0.0;
Other DEA: $20.4;
Defense subtotal[C]: $11.3;
Counternarcotics: $9.5;
International Military Education and Training: $1.3;
Foreign military financing: $0.5;
USAID subtotal[D]: 0.0;
Rule of law and human rights: 0.0;
Good governance: 0.0;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $35.7.
Barbados[E]:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $4.8;
DEA subtotal[B]: $5.3;
Special investigative units: 0.0;
Other DEA: $5.3;
Defense subtotal[C]: $1.3;
Counternarcotics: $1.3;
International Military Education and Training: 0.0;
Foreign military financing: 0.0;
USAID subtotal[D]: 0.0;
Rule of law and human rights: 0.0;
Good governance: 0.0;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $11.4.
Belize[E]:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $3.6;
DEA subtotal[B]: $4.0;
Special investigative units: 0.0;
Other DEA: $4.0;
Defense subtotal[C]: $6.2;
Counternarcotics: $3.3;
International Military Education and Training: $1.5;
Foreign military financing: $1.4;
USAID subtotal[D]: 0.0;
Rule of law and human rights: 0.0;
Good governance: 0.0;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $13.7.
Costa Rica[E]:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $2.1;
DEA subtotal[B]: $4.9;
Special investigative units: 0.0;
Other DEA: $4.9;
Defense subtotal[C]: $5.0.
Counternarcotics: $4.6;
International Military Education and Training: $0.4;
Foreign military financing: 0.0;
USAID subtotal[D]: 0.0;
Rule of law and human rights: 0.0;
Good governance: 0.0;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $12.0.
Dominican Republic:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $3.9;
DEA subtotal[B]: $12.3;
Special investigative units: $2.7;
Other DEA: $9.6;
Defense subtotal[C]: $14.3;
Counternarcotics: $4.2;
International Military Education and Training: $5.1;
Foreign military financing: $5.0;
USAID subtotal[D]: $14.3;
Rule of law and human rights: $6.0;
Good governance: $8.3;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $44.8.
Ecuador[F]:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $128.8;
DEA subtotal[B]: $16.2;
Special investigative units: $3.7;
Other DEA: $12.5;
Defense subtotal[C]: $9.4;
Counternarcotics: $7.7;
International Military Education and Training: $0.7;
Foreign military financing: $1.0;
USAID subtotal[D]: $91.7;
Rule of law and human rights: $22.5;
Good governance: $3.9;
Alternative development: $65.3;
Grand total by country: $246.1.
El Salvador[F]:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $2.1;
DEA subtotal[B]: $2.7;
Special investigative units: 0.0;
Other DEA: $2.7;
Defense subtotal[C]: $39.2;
Counternarcotics: $5.0;
International Military Education and Training: $8.0;
Foreign military financing: $26.1;
USAID subtotal[D]: $13.1;
Rule of law and human rights: $1.8;
Good governance: $11.3;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $57.0.
Guatemala:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $14.0;
DEA subtotal[B]: $5.1;
Special investigative units: $0.3;
Other DEA: $4.8;
Defense subtotal[C]: $6.8;
Counternarcotics: $4.6;
International Military Education and Training: $2.3;
Foreign military financing: 0.0;
USAID subtotal[D]: $66.6;
Rule of law and human rights: $23.9;
Good governance: $42.7;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $92.5.
Haiti:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $29.7;
DEA subtotal[B]: $5.2;
Special investigative units: 0.0;
Other DEA: $5.2;
Defense subtotal[C]: $4.4;
Counternarcotics: $0.6;
International Military Education and Training: $0.9;
Foreign military financing: $3.0;
USAID subtotal[D]: $21.4;
Rule of law and human rights: $6.4;
Good governance: $15.1;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $60.8.
Honduras:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $2.4;
DEA subtotal[B]: $1.8;
Special investigative units: 0.0;
Other DEA: $1.8;
Defense subtotal[C]: $15.2;
Counternarcotics: $3.6;
International Military Education and Training: $6.0;
Foreign military financing: $5.6;
USAID subtotal[D]: $5.1;
Rule of law and human rights: $4.9;
Good governance: $0.2;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $24.6.
Jamaica:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $6.1;
DEA subtotal[B]: $9.3;
Special investigative units: 0.0;
Other DEA: $9.3;
Defense subtotal[C]: $10.1;
Counternarcotics: $3.4;
International Military Education and Training: $3.8;
Foreign military financing: $3.0;
USAID subtotal[D]: $23.4;
Rule of law and human rights: $14.0;
Good governance: $9.4;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $48.9.
Netherlands Antilles[F]:
State/INL subtotal[A]: 0.0;
DEA subtotal[B]: $4.8;
Special investigative units: 0.0;
Other DEA: $4.8;
Defense subtotal[C]: 0.0;
Counternarcotics: 0.0;
International Military Education and Training: 0.0;
Foreign military financing: 0.0;
USAID subtotal[D]: 0.0;
Rule of law and human rights: 0.0;
Good governance: 0.0;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $4.8.
Nicaragua:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $2.9;
DEA subtotal[B]: $3.5;
Special investigative units: 0.0;
Other DEA: $3.5;
Defense subtotal[C]: $10.1;
Counternarcotics: $3.6;
International Military Education and Training: $3.0;
Foreign military financing: $3.5;
USAID subtotal[D]: $5.2;
Rule of law and human rights: $1.0;
Good governance: $4.2;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $21.7.
Panama:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $25.4;
DEA subtotal[B]: $7.0;
Special investigative units: 0.0;
Other DEA: $7.0;
Defense subtotal[C]: $17.3;
Counternarcotics: $8.3;
International Military Education and Training: $3.3;
Foreign military financing: $5.7;
USAID subtotal[D]: $190.3;
Rule of law and human rights: $92.1;
Good governance: $98.2;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $240.0.
Trinidad and Tobago[E]:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $0.9;
DEA subtotal[B]: $3.2;
Special investigative units: 0.0;
Other DEA: $3.2;
Defense subtotal[C]: $1.6;
Counternarcotics: $1.0;
International Military Education and Training: $0.2;
Foreign military financing: $0.4;
USAID subtotal[D]: 0.0;
Rule of law and human rights: 0.0;
Good governance: 0.0;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $5.8.
Venezuela[E]:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $13.3;
DEA subtotal[B]: $11.1;
Special investigative units: 0.0;
Other DEA: $11.1;
Defense subtotal[C]: $9.0;
Counternarcotics: $8.4;
International Military Education and Training: $0.7;
Foreign military financing: 0.0;
USAID subtotal[D]: 0.0;
Rule of law and human rights: 0.0;
Good governance: 0.0;
Alternative development: 0.0;
Grand total by country: $33.5.
Grand total by program:
State/INL subtotal[A]: $243.9;
DEA subtotal[B]: $116.7;
Special investigative units: $6.8;
Other DEA: $110.0;
Defense subtotal[C]: $161.3;
Counternarcotics: $69.0;
International Military Education and Training: $37.2;
Foreign military financing: $55.1;
USAID subtotal[D]: $431.2;
Rule of law and human rights: $172.6;
Good governance: $193.3;
Alternative development: $65.3;
Grand total by country: $953.1.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[A] State/INL data reflect expenditures.
[B] DEA data reflect expenditures for country and resident offices,
less payroll expenses.
[C] Defense data reflect estimates of counternarcotics-related support
in these countries because Defense budgets by program, not by country.
[D] USAID data reflect expenditures.
[E] USAID does not have programs in these countries.
[F] Defense supports forward operating locations for conducting
counternarcotics operations from these three countries. To operate
these facilities, Defense expended $95.9 million in Ecuador; $25.2
million in El Salvador; and $83.5 million in Aruba and Curacao, which
are part of the Netherlands Antilles.
[End of table]
As part of the "Merida Initiative," the President has asked the
Congress to provide $1.1 billion in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 to train
and equip Mexican and Central American security forces to combat
criminal organizations. Of this amount, $950 million would be dedicated
to Mexico, and $150 million would be dedicated to Central American
countries.[Footnote 10] This proposal is under consideration by the
Congress. The Administration's proposal is for all programs to be
administered by the State Department, although other U.S. agencies may
be involved in implementation.
Overall, U.S. Assistance Has Enhanced International Cooperation in
Disrupting Illegal Drug Markets:
Since 2003, through U.S.-supported international counternarcotics
programs, the United States and the eight major drug transit countries
we reviewed, except Venezuela, have enhanced their cooperation in
combating drug trafficking, primarily through improvements in
investigations and intelligence gathering, maritime and land-based
operations, and prosecutions of drug traffickers. Measuring the results
of a wide variety of assistance programs across many countries over
time is difficult as U.S. agencies have compiled limited and
inconsistent performance data. Nevertheless, the improvements attained
through these programs have contributed to the U.S. strategy of
disrupting the illicit drug market through drug seizures, arrests,
prosecutions, and drug crop eradication, according to information
provided by State and DEA.
Intelligence-Gathering and Investigations:
Actionable intelligence is a critical component of interdiction, and
the United States often requires access to raw information and sources
from partner nations to develop this intelligence. State/INL, DEA, and
Defense have helped all eight partner nations we reviewed develop
organizations and methods for gathering, analyzing, and sharing
intelligence and information that have led to arrests and seizures of
drugs and assets. These efforts have included establishing vetted and
specialized investigative units; strengthening investigative authority
of local law enforcement; and installing data networks within and among
countries to compile, analyze, and share information.
DEA and State/INL have established vetted investigative units, staffed
by local law enforcement officers, in all of the major drug transit
countries we reviewed.[Footnote 11] These units have worked closely
with U.S. officials to develop successful investigations. The United
States provides these units with operational support, from money to pay
agents and confidential sources to vehicles and surveillance equipment.
For example, in the Dominican Republic, a vetted unit within the
counternarcotics police used a U.S.-supported wire intercept program to
conduct more than 730 wiretap operations in fiscal year 2007. The
program provided daily support to numerous major investigations in the
United States and abroad, including the investigation of eight priority
target organizations. In Ecuador, DEA estimates that one vetted
investigative unit has been responsible for 70 percent of all drug
seizures in that country. In Jamaica, according to State, intelligence-
driven operations coordinated with DEA and the vetted unit targeted
major drug traffickers, and collaboration between Jamaican and
international law enforcement agencies have resulted in significant
seizures of cocaine and arrests of midlevel and major traffickers--
including kingpins--and the dismantling of their organizations, in
Jamaica, the United States, the Bahamas, and Colombia. Since late 2004,
almost all significant bilateral investigations with Jamaica have
included a wire intercept component using DEA-funded facilities. In the
Bahamas, according to State, intelligence gathering and surveillance
equipment provided by State/INL enabled local law enforcement to
dismantle two Bahamas-based drug trafficking organizations in 2006.
DEA has also helped governments draft legislation to broaden the scope
of investigative tools available to law enforcement organizations. For
example, Guatemala's Organized Crime Bill, put into effect in 2007,
authorizes wire intercepts and undercover operations, and allows drugs
to be delivered under controlled circumstances in order to identify the
traffickers involved--referred to as controlled delivery. DEA also
encouraged legislation in Jamaica to authorize wire intercepts and
fingerprinting of suspects. Similarly, legislation in Venezuela
enhanced police investigative powers in 2005 by allowing controlled
deliveries.
In addition, with U.S. technical and financial assistance, several
countries are operating information centers to collect, analyze, and
disseminate statistical and case-related data to aid local and foreign
law enforcement officials in criminal investigations. In the Dominican
Republic, for example, the DEA-sponsored Caribbean Center for Drug
Information serves as a clearinghouse for narcotics-related
intelligence for countries throughout the Caribbean and Latin America.
According to DEA, Caribbean countries are both frequent contributors to
and beneficiaries of the center's intelligence analysis services. In
addition, Defense funded the installation of a computer network in
countries throughout the transit zone, including in six of the eight
countries we reviewed,[Footnote 12] called the Cooperating Nation
Information Exchange System, through which participating countries
share information in real time regarding aircraft and vessels suspected
of transporting drugs. Defense also posts liaisons throughout the
region who facilitate the exchange of actionable intelligence between
the United States and host nation counterparts to assist in planning
counternarcotics operations.
Maritime and Land-Based Operations:
The United States generally cannot intercept shipments of drugs and
their precursors and apprehend traffickers in the sovereign territory
of another nation without the consent, and often the active
participation, of that country's government. The United States has
reached cooperative agreements with several partner nations that expand
U.S. authority and U.S. ability to conduct interdiction operations in
the transit zone. In addition, assistance provided by State/INL,
Defense, and U.S. law enforcement agencies has enabled the countries we
reviewed to undertake or participate in land-based police, military,
and other counternarcotics operations involving seizures, arrests, and
eradication.
Maritime Operations:
State/INL, Defense, and the Coast Guard have provided partner countries
with equipment, such as new and refurbished boats; infrastructure, such
as docks and piers; and training for maritime, littoral, and riverine
patrol and interdiction operations. With this support, several
countries have participated in short-and long-term maritime
interdiction operations with the United States and other countries
since 2003. For example, in the Bahamas, State/INL donated several
"fast response" boats, which the Bahamian police force has deployed
throughout the country for use with U.S. helicopters and personnel
under Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos. According to State, these
boats have been used in interdiction missions, participating in the
seizure of go-fast drug smuggling boats.
Figure 2: Photograph of U.S.-Provided Maritime Training and Equipment
in Panama:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Panamanian National Police.
[End of figure]
Since 2003, the United States has also entered into maritime law
enforcement cooperation agreements or procedures with four of the eight
major drug transit countries we reviewed, affording U.S. forces
improved access to suspect vessels in international and territorial
waters.[Footnote 13] (See app. II for a listing of maritime law
enforcement agreements with transit zone countries.) For example, in
2003, the Dominican Republic entered into a bilateral agreement
granting the United States permanent over-flight rights for
counternarcotics operations. In 2006, the United States and Ecuador
negotiated operating procedures to facilitate interdiction of suspect
Ecuadorian-flagged vessels. According to State, in fiscal year 2007,
these new procedures enabled the United States to board seven
Ecuadorian flagged vessels and remove about 26 metric tons of cocaine.
In addition, according to State, under the terms of maritime
agreements, Guatemala and Panama have provided valuable support for
international interdictions by permitting the Coast Guard to fly
suspected drug traffickers to the United States. This has allowed U.S.
assets to remain on station and continue pursuing drug interdiction and
homeland security missions. In Panama, according to State, the Coast
Guard's 2007 seizure of over 32 metric tons of cocaine--including the
single largest maritime drug seizure in U.S. history--was directly
related to cooperative efforts executed under provisions of the
bilateral agreement between Panama and the United States. Bilateral
maritime agreements have proven valuable in the other major drug
transit countries, as well. Even Venezuela, which has ceased to
cooperate with the United States on many counternarcotics initiatives,
continues to honor the provisions of its ship-boarding agreement,
authorizing the United States to board Venezuelan flagged vessels on
the high seas suspected of being engaged in narcotics trafficking.
In addition, in Ecuador, the United States operates a counternarcotics
forward operating location to support host nation and interagency drug
detection and monitoring efforts in the transit zone. Facilities such
as this permit the United States and allied nations to deploy
interdiction assets closer to cocaine departure points in the source
zone.[Footnote 14] According to U.S. officials at the forward operating
location in Manta, Ecuador, this facility supported over 1,150
counternarcotics missions in 2007 by providing logistical support for
U.S. aircraft that detect and monitor narcotics trafficking.
Land-Based Operations:
In several countries, State/INL, in collaboration with DEA and DHS
agencies, has helped finance the operations of special law enforcement
units to target drug traffickers at airports, seaports, and other
transit checkpoints using X-ray equipment, canines, and other methods
and technologies. For example, since 2003, Jamaican authorities have
arrested thousands of departing passengers at the country's two
international airports on drug charges, aided by the use of drug
detection equipment provided by the United States and Great Britain.
With funding from State and USAID, DHS has deployed advisors and
specialized teams for both short-and long-term details to provide
training and technical assistance in such areas as customs
documentation, airport/border/seaport interdiction operations, mail
processing, container examination, security, firearms, and officer
safety.
In addition, due to Ecuador's close proximity to drug-producing regions
of Colombia, Defense, State/INL, and DEA have provided extensive
support for police and military counternarcotics operations there.
According to State/INL, it and DEA have provided nearly all the
logistical support for Ecuador's counternarcotics police, including
construction or refurbishment of facilities and the provision of
vehicles and equipment. State reported in 2007 that U.S.-supported
canine units, which were deployed at airports and checkpoints, were
involved in nearly all of Ecuador's drug interdictions. During 2007,
the counternarcotics police conducted a series of interdiction
operations throughout the country, which resulted in the largest amount
of land-based seizures in the country's history. With logistical
support from Defense and State/INL, the Ecuadorian armed forces
conducted nine operations in 2006 and 17 in 2007, which led to the
discovery and destruction of 47 camps used by the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia,[Footnote 15] 36 hectares of coca plants, as well as
a number of cocaine producing laboratories.
Figure 3: Two photographs: Training Canines in Ecuador to Detect Drugs
in Luggage and on Passengers:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In Guatemala, which has recently experienced a growth in illicit opium
poppy cultivation, State/INL and Defense have provided aerial
reconnaissance, transportation, and other logistical support for
several large-scale, manual eradication missions. In 2007, Guatemalan
authorities destroyed nearly 450 hectares of poppy--over half of the
estimated area of cultivation.
Prosecution:
Dismantling drug trafficking organizations requires the criminal
prosecution of key traffickers. State/INL and USAID have supported
judicial reforms within some partner nations intended to make judicial
systems more fair, impartial, and efficient, and have strengthened the
capacity of prosecutors to work effectively within those systems on
drug-related cases. For example, in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic,
State/INL and USAID sponsored training of police, prosecutors, and
judges on the application of new criminal procedure codes.
State/INL has also supported national task forces in several countries
to prosecute drug-related crimes. In Guatemala, State/INL has worked
with the country's Attorney General to support three task forces
dealing with narcotics, corruption, and money-laundering cases. In
2004, the anticorruption prosecutor in Guatemala brought cases against
over 380 individuals, including many high-ranking former public
officials, army officers, and police. In Venezuela, until 2005, State/
INL provided extensive logistical support, and DEA provided advice and
supervision, to help develop the professional investigative and
operational capability of the Prosecutors' Drug Task Force, which was
composed of three dozen vetted prosecutors and investigators from three
agencies.[Footnote 16] According to State and DEA, the work of this
task force resulted in multi-ton seizures of drugs, the arrest of
numerous traffickers (including at least one kingpin), and asset
seizures.
In many cases where prosecution in the United States is warranted and
legal, partner nations have also transferred or extradited drug-related
defendants. For example, in 2007, Haiti's President authorized the
narcotics police to cooperate with DEA and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) personnel in locating, arresting, and removing nine
high-level drug trafficking defendants. Also, according to State, the
Dominican Republic and Jamaica have been particularly cooperative with
the U.S. Marshals Service in locating, extraditing, and deporting
defendants.
Measuring Results Is Difficult, but Cocaine Interdiction in the Transit
Zone Reflects International Cooperation:
While State/INL, DEA, and others have reported the results of their
assistance programs, they have not done so in a comprehensive and
consistent manner among partner nations and over time. Reports we
reviewed showed that some programs have helped disrupt drug markets
through seizures and arrests. Other programs, such as alternative
development, justice reform, and security service capacity building,
are less directly related to drug interdiction operations but are
designed to have longer-term and more systemic results, which are more
difficult to measure.
Assistance Programs Are Diffuse, and Results Are Not Reported
Comprehensively and Consistently:
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal
agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in
achieving their goals and to communicate their results to the Congress.
[Footnote 17] The act requires agencies to set multiyear strategic
goals in their strategic plans and corresponding annual goals in their
performance plans, measure performance toward the achievement of those
goals, and report on their progress in their annual performance
reports. These reports are intended to provide important information to
agency managers, policymakers, and the public on what each agency
accomplished with the resources it was given. Moreover, the act calls
for agencies to develop performance goals that are objective,
quantifiable, and measurable, and to establish performance measures
that adequately indicate progress toward achieving those goals. Our
previous work has noted that the lack of clear, measurable goals makes
it difficult for program managers and staff to link their day-to-day
efforts to achieving the agency's intended mission.[Footnote 18]
U.S.-funded transit zone counternarcotics assistance encompasses a wide
variety of initiatives across many countries, but State/INL and other
agencies have collected limited information on results. Records we
obtained from State/INL and DEA, including State's annual International
Narcotics Control Strategy Reports and End Use Monitoring Reports,
provide information on the outcomes of these initiatives but do not do
so comprehensively. For example, in our review of State's International
Narcotics Control Strategy Reports for 2003 to 2007, we identified over
120 counternarcotics initiatives in the countries we reviewed, but for
over half of these initiatives, the outcomes were unclear or not
addressed at all in the reports. Table 2 depicts the range of U.S.-
supported counternarcotics efforts in the countries we reviewed,
including those described in State or DEA records as having negligible
or unsatisfactory outcomes.
Table 2: U.S.-Supported Counternarcotics Initiatives in Eight Major
Drug Transit Countries, Fiscal Years 2003-2007:
Initiative: Intelligence gathering and investigation; Special
investigative unit;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: [Empty];
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-
2007;
Panama: [Empty].
Initiative: Intelligence gathering and investigation; Other vetted
police investigative unit;
Bahamas: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: [Empty];
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Venezuela: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Dominican Republic: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-
2007;
Panama: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007.
Initiative: Intelligence gathering and investigation; Financial
intelligence unit;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Venezuela: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Dominican Republic: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having
negligible or unsatisfactory outcomes;
Panama: [Empty].
Initiative: Intelligence gathering and investigation; Wire intercept;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: [Empty];
Haiti: [Empty];
Ecuador: [Empty];
Jamaica: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Venezuela: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Dominican Republic: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-
2007;
Panama: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007.
Initiative: Intelligence gathering and investigation; Hotline;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: [Empty];
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic: [Empty];
Panama: [Empty].
Initiative: Intelligence gathering and investigation; Information
center;
Bahamas: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Ecuador: [Empty];
Jamaica: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-
2007;
Panama: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007.
Initiative: Intelligence gathering and investigation; Cooperating
Nation Information Exchange System;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: [Empty];
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Venezuela: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Dominican Republic: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-
2007;
Panama: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007.
Initiative: Intelligence gathering and investigation; JIATF-South
intelligence liaison;
Bahamas: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: [Empty];
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Venezuela: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Dominican Republic: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-
2007;
Panama: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007.
Initiative: Intelligence gathering and investigation; Expanded legal
authority for investigation;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: [Empty];
Ecuador: [Empty];
Jamaica: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Venezuela: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Dominican Republic: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-
2007;
Panama: [Empty].
Initiative: Maritime operations; Initiative: Interceptor boats;
Bahamas: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Guatemala: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Haiti: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having
negligible or unsatisfactory outcomes;
Panama: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes.
Initiative: Maritime operations; Maritime facilities;
Bahamas: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic:
Panama: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007.
Initiative: Maritime operations; New maritime agreement or procedures;
Bahamas: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: [Empty];
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-
2007;
Panama: [Empty].
Initiative: Land-based operations; Canine detection program;
Bahamas: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: [Empty];
Venezuela: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Dominican Republic: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-
2007;
Panama: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007.
Initiative: Land-based operations; Airport interdiction;
Bahamas: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Venezuela: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Dominican Republic: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-
2007;
Panama: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007.
Initiative: Land-based operations; Cargo container inspection[A];
Bahamas: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Guatemala: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Haiti: [Empty];
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: [Empty];
Venezuela: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Dominican Republic: [Empty];
Panama: [Empty].
Initiative: Land-based operations; Interdiction checkpoints;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: [Empty];
Haiti: [Empty];
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: [Empty];
Venezuela: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Dominican Republic:
Panama: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes.
Initiative: Land-based operations; Mobile units;
Bahamas: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Guatemala: [Empty];
Haiti: [Empty];
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: [Empty];
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic: [Empty];
Panama: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007.
Initiative: Land-based operations; Police bases;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: [Empty];
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic: [Empty];
Panama: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007.
Initiative: Land-based operations; Police vetting;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: [Empty];
Ecuador: [Empty];
Jamaica: [Empty];
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic: [Empty];
Panama: [Empty].
Initiative: Land-based operations; Crop eradication;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: [Empty];
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: [Empty];
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic: [Empty];
Panama: [Empty].
Initiative: Prosecution; Criminal procedures code training;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: [Empty];
Haiti: [Empty];
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: [Empty];
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic: [Empty];
Panama: [Empty].
Initiative: Prosecution; Prosecution task forces;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Ecuador: [Empty];
Jamaica: [Empty];
Venezuela: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Dominican Republic: [Empty];
Panama: [Empty].
Initiative: Prosecution; Anticorruption prosecutor;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: [Empty];
Ecuador: [Empty];
Jamaica: [Empty];
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic: [Empty];
Panama: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007.
Initiative: Prosecution; Fugitive apprehension;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: [Empty];
Haiti: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Ecuador: [Empty];
Jamaica: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-
2007;
Panama: [Empty].
Initiative: Other; Alternative development;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: [Empty];
Haiti: [Empty];
Ecuador: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Jamaica: [Empty];
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic: [Empty];
Panama: [Empty].
Initiative: Other; Police reform;
Bahamas: [Empty];
Guatemala: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Haiti: funded by United States during fiscal years 2003-2007;
Ecuador: [Empty];
Jamaica: reported by State, DEA, or Defense as having negligible or
unsatisfactory outcomes;
Venezuela: [Empty];
Dominican Republic: [Empty];
Panama: [Empty].
Sources: GAO analysis of information provided by State, DEA, Defense,
DHS, and USAID.
[A] The Bahamas, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Panama have ports
participating in DHS's Container Security Initiative, which is not
explicitly counternarcotics-related. Sources: GAO analysis of
information provided by State, DEA, Defense, DHS, and USAID.
[End of table]
State has attempted to measure the outcomes of counternarcotics
programs in its annual mission performance reports, which report on a
set of performance indicators for each country. However, these
indicators have not been consistent over time or among countries. In
our review of mission performance reports for four major drug transit
countries covering fiscal years 2002 through 2006, we identified 86
performance indicators directly and indirectly related to
counternarcotics efforts; however, over 60 percent of these indicators
were used in only one or two annual reporting cycles, making it
difficult to discern performance trends over time. Moreover, nearly 80
percent of these performance indicators were used for only one country,
making it difficult to compare program results among countries.
Cocaine Seizures and Disruptions Reflect Cooperation with Partner
Nations:
Program specific information we reviewed indicates that these U.S.
counternarcotics assistance programs, along with other efforts, have
contributed to an active international interdiction effort in the
transit zone. Data reported by the U.S. interagency counternarcotics
community indicate that, since 2002, the United States and its partner
nations have removed, through seizures and disruptions,[Footnote 19]
between 22 and 38 percent of the estimated amount of cocaine flowing
through the transit zone, excluding Mexico (see table 3).
Table 3: Estimated Cocaine Flow and Removal within the Transit Zone,
Fiscal Years 2002-2006 (Amounts in metric tons):
Total estimated cocaine flow[B]: Total removals (seizures and
disruptions);
2002: 460 to 760; Removals, 162;
2003: 660 to 960; Removals, 164;
2004: 540 to 900; Removals, 208;
2005: 520 to 1,030; Removals, 254;
2006: 460 to 1,010; Removals, 218;
Total[A]: 2,650 to 4,650: Removals, 1006.
Total estimated cocaine flow[B]: Central America;
2002: 460 to 760; Removals, 17;
2003: 660 to 960; Removals, 27;
2004: 540 to 900; Removals, 30;
2005: 520 to 1,030; Removals, 39;
2006: 460 to 1,010; Removals, 27;
Total[A]: 2,650 to 4,650: Removals, 140.
Total estimated cocaine flow[B]: Ecuador and Venezuela;
2002: 460 to 760; Removals, 27;
2003: 660 to 960; Removals, 20;
2004: 540 to 900; Removals, 30;
2005: 520 to 1,030; Removals, 36;
2006: 460 to 1,010; Removals, 27;
Total[A]: 2,650 to 4,650: Removals, 140.
Total estimated cocaine flow[B]: Caribbean Sea;
2002: 460 to 760; Removals, 32;
2003: 660 to 960; Removals, 51;
2004: 540 to 900; Removals, 47;
2005: 520 to 1,030; Removals, 67;
2006: 460 to 1,010; Removals, 30;
Total[A]: 2,650 to 4,650: Removals, 227.
Total estimated cocaine flow[B]: Eastern Pacific;
2002: 460 to 760; Removals, 86;
2003: 660 to 960; Removals, 66;
2004: 540 to 900; Removals, 101;
2005: 520 to 1,030; Removals, 112;
2006: 460 to 1,010; Removals, 134;
Total[A]: 2,650 to 4,650: Removals, 499.
Total estimated cocaine flow[B]: Estimated percentage of cocaine flow
removed (seized and disrupted);
2002: 21% to 35%;
2003: 17% to 25%;
2004: 23% to 39%;
2005: 25% to 49%;
2006: 22% to 47%;
Total[A]: 22% to 38%.
Source: 2007 Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement (IACM).
Note: Data for 2007 were not available at the date of issuance of our
report.
[A] Totals may not add due to rounding.
[B] The IACM reports low and high estimates of the metric tons of
cocaine flowing through the transit zone. Because of the uncertain
nature of the estimates involved, we rounded the figures to the nearest
"10."
[End of table]
Results of Indirectly-Related Assistance Are More Difficult to Assess:
U.S. agencies have supported a wide variety of programs that relate to
the counternarcotics effort indirectly, and results are therefore
difficult to assess. These programs generally focus on root causes of
drug-related crime, as well as strengthening the overall rule of law
and security of partner nations. Since these programs are not directly
associated with interdiction efforts and outcomes, and some are long-
term efforts, their results and effect on the overall success of
counternarcotics efforts are even more difficult to assess.
State/INL has funded programs, including training and public awareness
campaigns, which address some of the underlying causes of drug
trafficking, such as local drug consumption and corruption. Some
programs are also aimed at strengthening institutions, such as public
health, educational, and financial accountability organizations, which
can help prevent drug-related crime by fostering a culture that does
not tolerate drug consumption and corruption. Very limited data were
available in State reports to discern trends in either corruption or
drug consumption that could be attributable to these programs. However,
in several countries, State/INL has reported an increased willingness
among local law enforcement entities to prosecute public officials.
Several USAID programs combat narcotics trafficking indirectly in
vulnerable populations by addressing underlying social problems, such
as crime, inadequate public services, and lack of economic
opportunities. In Jamaica, according to State/INL, anticrime and
community policing programs contributed to a 16 percent reduction in
crime in 2006, but the crime rate rose again in 2007. Development
programs in Ecuador have helped stabilize communities along the border
with Colombia most likely to become involved in drug trafficking by
providing social services and productive infrastructure, including
water and sanitation systems, bridges, roads, and irrigation canals.
These programs have also helped strengthen local governments and
promote citizen participation in a number of municipalities and
parishes. While these programs have focused national and international
development assistance on these vulnerable communities, their effect on
the drug trade in the Colombian border region of Ecuador has not been
evaluated.
Defense and DHS have implemented many programs aimed at building the
overall capacity and professionalism of military and security
organizations through international cooperation. Defense officials in
both Ecuador and Panama told us they considered all U.S. cooperative
programs with the security forces of those countries to be
counternarcotics-related because they help counter the threats posed by
trafficking organizations, including incursions by the irregular armed
forces of neighboring Colombia. However, because many defense
assistance programs in partner nations do not have specific goals
related to interdiction, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of
the programs for counternarcotics. Similarly, State/INL has funded
training programs through DHS agencies to help improve overall
immigration, customs, and coast guard operations.
Several Factors Impede the Effectiveness of the Counternarcotics
Efforts:
Several factors relating to U.S. assistance programs have impeded
international counternarcotics efforts in the transit zone. Partner
nations have limited resources to devote to counternarcotics efforts,
and many U.S.-supported counternarcotics initiatives are not self-
sustaining but, rather, are dependent on continued U.S. funding.
Limited political support of U.S.-funded initiatives, as well as
corruption, have also kept these nations from becoming full partners in
the international counternarcotics effort--a goal of U.S. assistance,
according to State. In addition, the effect of U.S. cargo container
security assistance for the counternarcotics effort has been limited.
Many Partner Nations Cannot Sustain U.S. Supported Initiatives:
The inability of transit zone countries to patrol their shores
effectively and conduct other maritime operations presents a major gap
in drug interdiction. In many of the countries we reviewed, State has
reported that partner nations cannot operate U.S.-provided maritime
assets for counternarcotics missions due to a lack of operations and of
maintenance resources. Some examples are as follows:
* In the Dominican Republic, the United States has provided a wide
range of new and refurbished boats, including interceptor and patrol
craft, that the Dominican Navy has been unable to employ due to a lack
of fuel, fuel filters, and other routine maintenance supplies. Also,
several U.S. vessels that were transferred to the Dominican Navy as
excess defense articles are in poor condition due to a lack of
preventive maintenance and funds for repairs. State reported in 2006
that the Navy's maintenance command lacked necessary equipment, parts,
and training.
* In Haiti, State/INL and the U.S. Coast Guard provided substantial
support to the Haitian coast guard, including interceptor boats, vessel
overhauls and retrofitting, infrastructure improvements, and training
and equipment. However, according to State, a lack of necessary
equipment, maintenance, fuel, and logistical support has continued to
impair the Haitian coast guard's ability to conduct maritime operations
and combat drug trafficking effectively.
* In Guatemala, State/INL provided the counternarcotics police force
with two fiberglass boats--one located on the Caribbean Coast and the
other on the Pacific Coast--for limited counternarcotics operations. In
2007, State reported that both boats were inoperable because the police
had not maintained the engines.
* In Jamaica, the United States donated several patrol vessels capable
of intercepting go-fast boats. State reported in 2006 that the vessels
had only limited operational capability because they were not in good
working order.
* In Panama, the U.S. Coast Guard donated a 180-foot cutter. However,
Panama's National Maritime Service, which is highly dependent on U.S.
support for operations and maintenance resources, has been unable to
keep the vessel seaworthy.
U.S. agencies have not always planned for the sustainability of the
counternarcotics-related assets they provided to partner nations.
According to State officials we spoke to, when receiving these assets,
country officials have typically signed agreements accepting the long-
term responsibility of operating and maintaining them, including
providing the necessary staff, as well as fuel, parts, and other
maintenance resources, unless these are provided for by the United
States. However, the long-term cost of operating and maintaining the
assets and the source of funding are not typically included in such
agreements, according to these officials.
In 2007, Defense began providing additional boats to partner nations,
including Panama, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and the Bahamas,
under its Enduring Friendship program, for use in maritime security
operations.[Footnote 20] However, Defense has not developed plans to
address long-term sustainability of these assets over their expected 10-
year operating life. These interceptor boats were accompanied by
support equipment such as trucks and trailers for on-land mobility;
radios; infrared cameras; as well as training and a limited maintenance
program, at a cost of between $6 million and $11 million for each
country. However, Defense did not make provisions to ensure that the
partner countries can fuel the donated boats and maintain them beyond
an initial short-term maintenance contract period. For the boats
provided to the Dominican Republic, for example, the agreement between
Defense and the Dominican Republic did not specify the estimated costs
or funding source of operating the boats and related equipment. The
agreement indicated the United States may provide some additional
support for repair parts, contingent upon the availability of funds.
The ability to provide the necessary resources to operate these assets
over the long-term is a concern, according to the U.S. and partner
nation officials we spoke to in the Dominican Republic and Panama.
According to the Coast Guard attaché in the Dominican Republic,
although the Dominican Navy has added these and other boats to its
fleet in recent years, it has not increased its budget for fuel since
2002, and the cost of fuel has since doubled. Similarly, according to a
senior official of the Panamanian National Maritime Service, it has
been operating under a static budget and fuel allotment, even as the
number of assets and staff under its control has increased. State/INL
officials in both Panama and the Dominican Republic told us that these
countries have not effectively used the interceptor boats for
counternarcotics purposes.
In addition, the personnel operating the interceptor boats have limited
maritime interdiction skills. Training included in the assistance
package focused on operation and maintenance of boats and included some
training in first aid, navigation, and communications but only limited
training on interdiction tactics. The memorandum of understanding
between Defense and the Dominican Republic for this program indicated
that Defense may provide some additional training, contingent upon the
availability of funds, but did not specify the training likely to be
needed for conducting counternarcotics operations or its cost.
Figure 4: Photograph of Interceptor Boat Provided to Panama under
Defense's Enduring Friendship Program:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In some cases, however, State/INL has recognized the long-term
sustainability challenges associated with providing capital assets and
has planned and budgeted for operations and maintenance costs, thus
helping to ensure the assets will be used effectively for
counternarcotics operations. For example, State reported that it has
funded maintenance contracts in the Bahamas that provide a means for
keeping U.S.-provided boats operational for drug interdiction missions.
Also, State/INL helps sustain U.S.-funded initiatives along the Ecuador-
Colombian border by funding a large spare parts program, as well as
maintenance training for the heavy trucks and other vehicles it has
provided, and by budgeting for gas and maintenance costs over the long
term. State/INL has also funded contractors to maintain the electrical
and plumbing systems in the police buildings constructed for the police
in Ecuador.
According to State, the counternarcotics police of several partner
nations are dependent on logistical and operational support of State/
INL and DEA, as the following examples show:
* In the Dominican Republic, the police force's effectiveness in
counternarcotics affairs is almost completely attributable to
equipment, training, and close support provided by DEA and State/INL
over several years. State also reported that the financial intelligence
unit, begun with U.S. support in 2003, lacks the resources and
institutional support to perform effectively and has reported no real
successes in implementing its money-laundering legislation since the
unit was established.
* In Ecuador, State/INL and DEA provide almost all logistical and
operational support to the Ecuadorian National Police Anti-Drug
Division.
* In Haiti, the lack of government resources makes the national police
largely dependent upon DEA and State/INL for logistical and advisory
support.
Some Countries' Limited Political Support Impairs U.S. Counternarcotics
Initiatives:
According to State, a few governments in the region have demonstrated
limited political support for U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In
particular, Venezuelan cooperation has declined dramatically in recent
years, and in 2006 and 2007 State reported that Venezuela had failed
"demonstrably" to make substantial efforts in the war on drugs.
[Footnote 21] In 2005, the Venezuelan President accused DEA of
espionage and planning a coup, and the government eventually withdrew
from both U.S.-supported vetted units and has refused counternarcotics
cooperation with the United States.
State has also reported that Jamaica has shown limited political
support for some U.S. counternarcotics-related initiatives. For
example, the United States helped develop a corporate reform strategy
for the Jamaican constabulary forces, but it was never implemented due
to a combination of internal resistance to change and a lack of power
to ensure implementation of the strategy's recommendations. In
addition, the government of Jamaica has not enacted an initiative to
permit extended data-sharing between U.S. and Jamaican law enforcement
agencies concerning money-laundering cases.
In Ecuador, even though the government has generally supported U.S.-
funded counternarcotics initiatives, political developments may
threaten future international cooperation in maritime operations.
Ecuador's President has stated that he no longer supports a U.S.
military presence in Ecuador and that his government will not renew the
agreement allowing the United States to operate its forward operating
location there when the agreement expires in November 2009.[Footnote
22]
Corruption Undermines Interdiction Efforts:
The United States relies on the cooperation of partner nations' law
enforcement and security agencies in the transit zone to conduct
successful counternarcotics operations. But, corruption in these
agencies limits the extent to which U.S. law enforcement agencies can
involve their counterparts in investigations. According to data
compiled by Transparency International, a civil society organization
that monitors corruption issues worldwide, corruption is a major
problem in transit zone countries. Its Corruption Perception Index
(CPI) ranks countries from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean)
based on a series of indicators. Seven of the eight countries in our
review received a score of 3.3 or lower (compared with a score of 7.2
for the United States and 8.7 for Canada).[Footnote 23] The eighth
country, the Bahamas, was not reviewed. (See table 4.)
Table 4: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index Scores
for Eight Major Drug Transit Countries (2007):
Country: Bahamas;
World-wide country rating (of 180 countries): Data not available;
Regional rating (of 32 countries): Data not available;
CPI score[A]: Data not available.
Country: Mexico;
World-wide country rating (of 180 countries): 72;
Regional rating (of 32 countries): 13;
CPI score[A]: 3.5.
Country: Jamaica;
World-wide country rating (of 180 countries): 84;
Regional rating (of 32 countries): 19;
CPI score[A]: 3.3.
Country: Panama;
World-wide country rating (of 180 countries): 94;
Regional rating (of 32 countries): 20;
CPI score[A]: 3.2.
Country: Dominican Republic;
World-wide country rating (of 180 countries): 99;
Regional rating (of 32 countries): 21;
CPI score[A]: 3.0.
Country: Guatemala;
World-wide country rating (of 180 countries): 111;
Regional rating (of 32 countries): 25;
CPI score[A]: 2.8.
Country: Ecuador;
World-wide country rating (of 180 countries): 150;
Regional rating (of 32 countries): 30;
CPI score[A]: 2.1.
Country: Venezuela;
World-wide country rating (of 180 countries): 162;
Regional rating (of 32 countries): 31;
CPI score[A]: 2.0.
Country: Haiti;
World-wide country rating (of 180 countries): 177;
Regional rating (of 32 countries): 32;
CPI score[A]: 1.6.
Source: Transparency International.
[A] The CPI score should be interpreted as a ranking of countries
ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean).
[End of table]
In addition, U.S. officials have noted instances of official
corruption--particularly among military and police units--that have
limited the opportunities for and scope of cooperation with the United
States and, in some cases, undermined specific interdiction operations.
Some examples of this official corruption are as follows:
* Guatemala disbanded its antinarcotics police unit in 2002 in response
to reports of widespread corruption within the agency and its general
lack of effectiveness in combating the country's drug problem. The
government reassigned most of the unit's law enforcement agents to the
national civilian police, and the U.S. government suspended major joint
operations in light of these circumstances. With U.S. assistance,
Guatemala established a successor antinarcotics police force but, in
2005, in a joint operation with DEA, the Chief and Deputy of this
agency were arrested in the United States for corruption. Later that
year, DEA suspected that members of the antinarcotics force stole 475
kilograms of cocaine from an evidence storage facility. Further,
according to DEA, Guatemalan antinarcotics agents misused intelligence
leads provided by DEA to extort investigative targets.
* In Haiti, in 2003, State reported strong evidence of Haitian law
enforcement officials leaking information on planned operations and
trafficking drugs. DEA reported that planes under surveillance for drug
shipments were met and off-loaded by heavily armed uniformed police
officials with vehicles that transported the drugs. In 2007, the
Haitian government removed both the National Police Director of
Administration and Director of Logistics for suspected corruption.
* In the Dominican Republic, the government removed 24 judges from
office for improperly handing out favorable sentences to known
traffickers in 2006. Corruption has also hampered Dominican-based,
money-laundering investigations, according to DEA.
* In Panama, in 2005, the head of a police counternarcotics unit was
arrested and charged with corruption. In 2007, after years of
lackluster counternarcotics cooperation from the National Maritime
Service, the former head of this organization was also arrested on
corruption charges.
* In the Bahamas, State reported in 2003 that it was reluctant to
include Bahamian defense personnel in Operation Bahamas, Turks and
Caicos and to share sensitive law enforcement information with them due
to corruption concerns.
* In Ecuador, in 2002, the Deputy Chief of Operations of the Ecuadorian
Army was arrested for facilitating the transshipment of drugs through
cargo containers by providing trafficking organizations with false
security seals.
Cargo Container Security Programs Have Had Limited Effect on the
Counternarcotics Effort:
According to DEA, drug smuggling on containerized cargo ships poses a
significant threat to U.S. counternarcotics efforts. Both State/INL and
DHS have provided cargo security assistance to countries in the transit
zone. However, most of State/INL's initiatives have not been effective,
and DHS has not routinely used its program of targeting and scanning
cargo containers overseas to detect illicit drugs.
State/INL has supported counternarcotics initiatives at cargo container
ports in four of the eight countries we reviewed, and in three of those
countries State's International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports
indicate that these initiatives were largely ineffective. For example,
in Guatemala, although State/INL has provided technical assistance,
logistical support, and training for the country's port security
program for several years, State reported in 2006 that the program had
little interdiction success, and seizures were very low. In the
Bahamas, State/INL supported a canine unit of the Bahamian Customs
Department to help detect drugs shipments at the Freeport container
port but discontinued the assistance in 2004 due to high maintenance
costs and its failure to produce expected results. In Venezuela, the
United States funded a sophisticated container inspection facility at a
large port known to be an embarkation point for multiton shipments of
cocaine, but the Venezuelan government has not put it into operation.
DHS, through CBP, has implemented the Container Security Initiative
(CSI) overseas, which may have potential for greater use in
counternarcotics operations. CBP initiated CSI under its existing
authority in January 2002 to assist selected overseas ports in
targeting suspicious containers and scanning their contents.[Footnote
24] The program subsequently received specific congressional
authorization in 2006.[Footnote 25] By 2007, CSI operated in 58 ports,
including seven in the transit zone.[Footnote 26] CBP officers
stationed at foreign ports collaborating with host-country partners use
intelligence and automated risk assessment information to target
shipments and identify those that may contain weapons of mass
destruction or other terrorist contraband. DHS has generally not used
the technology to detect and interdict illicit drug shipments, though
CSI technology can help detect illicit drugs. In fact, the automated
targeting system that CSI uses to help target containers for inspection
was originally designed for this purpose. The first time the CSI
scanning equipment was used in the port of Caucedo in the Dominican
Republic, operators detected a shipment of cocaine that was packed
amidst canned fruit. Ultimately, several metric tons of cocaine were
seized, and suspected traffickers were arrested.
CBP officials we spoke with noted that including routine container
screening for drugs in CSI's scope of operations would be difficult and
could conflict with achievement of CBP's counterterrorism objectives.
They indicated that CSI's budget and staffing are based on its
counterterrorism-related workload, and targeting drugs would require
additional research and analysis resources. They said that, without
more funding, DHS would have to shift its priorities away from
counterterrorism activities. Furthermore, they said that expanding
existing agreements with CSI participating countries would entail
difficult and sensitive negotiations. According to these officials,
proposing that CSI should search for illicit drugs could undermine the
international political support for CSI and other CBP counterterrorism
initiatives because additional container screening could cause
transshipment delays and related economic costs and involve other
concessions that participating countries may not be willing to accept.
However, CBP officials acknowledged that they have not formally
assessed the feasibility of conducting additional container targeting
and inspection in selected major drug transit countries. In particular,
CBP has neither calculated the related costs, including human resource
requirements, nor has it consulted with State and Justice on the
related diplomatic and security risks or the potential law enforcement
benefits. Senior officials we spoke to at State/INL, DEA, and ONDCP
indicated that it would be useful to examine the feasibility of a
limited expansion of CSI on an interagency basis.
Conclusions:
U.S. agencies, primarily State, DEA, Defense, DHS, and USAID, have
supported initiatives that have fostered cooperation with partner
nations in the transit zone, enabling these nations to engage in the
counternarcotics effort in ways that the United States alone could not.
Through these initiatives, U.S. law enforcement has been able to extend
the scope and effectiveness of its drug interdiction activities by (1)
gaining access to critical information and intelligence, (2)
participating in seizure and eradication operations within the
territory or jurisdiction of partner nations, and (3) bringing
suspected drug traffickers to justice.
The absence of comprehensive and consistent reporting on the results of
these initiatives makes it difficult to monitor their outcomes over
time, assess their relative effectiveness, and make resource allocation
decisions based on results. However, available information concerning
results indicates that the United States has not made significant
progress toward its goal of assisting governments to become full and
self-sustaining partners in the international counternarcotics effort.
Partner nations are dependent on U.S. logistical, financial, and
advisory support, and without this support many U.S. initiatives are
not sustainable. U.S. agencies have funded initiatives and invested in
assets, particularly for maritime operations, without planning for the
long-term operations and maintenance of these assets, and partner
nations have not utilized many of them to their maximum capacity.
U.S. assistance in cargo container security has been largely
ineffective for the international counternarcotics effort. However, DHS
has invested in cargo container security programs overseas that in at
least one instance helped detect illicit drugs being shipped in the
transit zone. DHS has raised a number of concerns about using CSI
routinely for this purpose, but has not assessed the feasibility of
this program as another tool in the U.S. counternarcotics strategy.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To link U.S.-funded initiatives in transit zone countries to the
priority of disrupting illicit drug markets and the goal of assisting
nations to become full and self-sustaining partners in the
international counternarcotics effort, we recommend that the Secretary
of State, in consultation with the Director of ONDCP, the Secretaries
of Defense and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the
Administrator of USAID, report the results of U.S.-funded
counternarcotics initiatives more comprehensively and consistently for
each country in the annual International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report.
We recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Director of ONDCP, the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security,
and the Attorney General, (1) develop a plan to ensure that partner
nations in the transit zone can effectively operate and maintain all
counternarcotics assets that the United States has provided, including
boats and other vehicles and equipment, for their remaining useful life
and report this plan to the Congress for the fiscal year 2010
appropriations cycle and (2) ensure that, before providing a
counternarcotics asset to a partner nation, agencies determine the
total operations and maintenance cost over its useful life and, with
the recipient nation, develop a plan for funding this cost.
To help maximize cargo container security assistance, we recommend that
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary
of State and the Attorney General, determine the feasibility of
expanding the Container Security Initiative to include routine
targeting and scanning of containers for illicit drugs in major drug
transit countries in the transit zone, and report the results to the
Congress. Factors to be assessed should include the cost, workload and
staffing ramifications, the potential benefits to international
counternarcotics law enforcement efforts, the political support of CSI
participating countries, statutory authority, and any risks associated
with such an expansion.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to Defense, DHS, Justice/DEA, ONDCP,
State, and USAID for their comment. DHS, Justice/DEA, ONDCP, and State
provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes III
through VI. All agencies provided technical corrections, which we
incorporated into the report, as appropriate.
State generally agreed with the report's conclusions, but disagreed
with our recommendation on results reporting. State noted that it has
already developed performance measures to reflect progress in achieving
broad counternarcotics goals and development goals in general, though
they do not necessarily capture program-specific results. We modified
our recommendation to emphasize the need for more systematic reporting
of program-specific results that would link U.S. counternarcotics
efforts to State's broader performance goals and measures. State also
noted that there is substantial variation in assistance programs in
particular countries in terms of program types and funding levels.
However, we observed that many programs in several countries are
similar in nature and lend themselves to the comparison of results
among countries. Developing a method of reporting these results more
comprehensively and consistently across years and among country
programs in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report would
address our concern.
State partially agreed with our recommendation on sustainability
planning and indicated that its project designs, agreements with
recipient countries, and monitoring mechanisms are appropriate for
addressing sustainability concerns, given the unpredictability of
recipient countries' long-term priorities and budgetary resources.
Furthermore, State commented that it has limited ability to influence
the coordinated sustainability planning of other agencies and has no
influence over Defense's Enduring Friendship program. Given past
experience, we question whether providing assets is justifiable without
more specific and detailed plans that give better assurances that the
recipient country and participating agencies are committed to funding
specified operations and maintenance costs. State is in a unique
position as the lead foreign affairs agency to ensure that all
participating U.S. agencies involved in providing counternarcotics
assets agree on a discrete sustainability plan. State, in particular,
can influence Defense's sustainability planning when it approves
security assistance programs, such as Enduring Friendship. Section 1206
of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, under which Enduring
Friendship was authorized, requires State and Defense to jointly
approve all projects and coordinate their implementation.[Footnote 27]
State fully supports any consultation needed to determine the
feasibility of expanding DHS's container security assistance program.
DHS did not concur with our recommendation to study the feasibility of
expanding the CSI program. According to DHS, expanding CSI to include
narcotics interdiction would unnecessarily broaden the program's
strategic goals and is inconsistent with its mandate to secure the
international supply chain from high-risk shipments with a potential
risk of terrorism and acts of terrorism. CSI's mandate does not
prohibit leveraging the program's resources for other agency missions.
In addition, the CSI Strategic Plan for 2006-2011 states that, "at some
point in the future, consideration should be given to potential
expansion of the program from focusing on terrorism alone to
encompassing other activities known to support terrorism, such as
smuggling narcotics, violations of intellectual property rights and
currency violations." A logical first step would be for relevant
stakeholders to study the feasibility of enlisting CSI as a
counternarcotics tool, formally assessing the program's statutory
authority, among other factors. DHS also noted that 90 percent of
cocaine moves through Mexico, but that no CSI ports are located in
Mexico. However, as we reported, approximately 90 percent of the
cocaine flowing toward the United States has gone through the Central
American/Mexican corridor, in which four CSI ports are located.
ONDCP accepted our recommendation that it assist other agencies in
developing performance measures and sustainability plans for U.S.-
provided counternarcotics assets. In addition, ONDCP strongly concurred
with the recommendation to determine the feasibility of expanding CSI.
DEA said that, while it is difficult to measure the outcome of all U.S.
counternarcotics efforts, it has tracked statistical data to ensure
that it is achieving its strategic goals and assists State and ONDCP in
developing overall performance measures for U.S. counternarcotics
programs.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and State; the
Attorney General; the Administrator of USAID; the Director of ONDCP;
and interested congressional committees. We also will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff members who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Our review encompassed U.S.-funded counternarcotics initiatives during
2003 through 2007, in countries in the Caribbean Sea and Central
America, as well as Ecuador and Venezuela. We specifically focused our
efforts on eight countries designated by the President as "major drug
transit countries." Those countries include the Bahamas, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Panama, and Venezuela.
Although Mexico is also a major transit country, we excluded it from
our review because we reviewed U.S. counternarcotics assistance to that
country in 2007.[Footnote 28]
To identify U.S.-funded assistance programs and initiatives, we
reviewed the Department of State's (State) International Narcotics
Control Strategy Reports (INCSR), Mission Performance Plans for fiscal
years 2003 through 2007, and end use monitoring reports, as well as
work plans, activity reports, and country summaries provided by the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). We also met with Washington,
D.C.-based representatives of the White House's Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP); the Department of State's (State) Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (State/INL); the Department
of Justice's Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Criminal
Division; the Departments of Defense's (Defense) Office of Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics,
Counterproliferation and Global Threats; the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP); and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID).[Footnote 29] We also met with cognizant officials at the U.S.
Southern Command in Miami, Florida, and the Joint Interagency Task
Force (JIATF)-South in Key West, Florida. We included among the
initiatives we reviewed those cooperative endeavors that may not have
had any identifiable costs associated with them, including support for
legislative reform in partner nations and efforts to reach agreements
that enhance international cooperation in interdiction, including
bilateral maritime law enforcement agreements and agreements to
establish forward operating locations.
To document the cost of U.S. counternarcotics support, we focused on
fiscal years 2003 through 2007 by reviewing and analyzing program
funding data from the various departments and agencies in Washington,
D.C., including State and Defense,[Footnote 30] USAID, and DEA for
background purposes. While we performed some checks on the data, we did
not perform a full reliability assessment of them. We believe the data
provide a reasonable indication of spending on counternarcotics-related
activities, but we recognize that the data the agencies gave us
included funding for some activities that go beyond counternarcotics
assistance and may include some U.S. interdiction-related activities.
To assess program results and factors that have impeded
counternarcotics efforts, we reviewed State's International Narcotics
Control Strategy Reports and Mission Strategic Plans for fiscal years
2002 through 2007, End Use Monitoring reports, and other relevant State
documents. At DEA, we reviewed Significant Action Reports and "blue
notes"--reports to the agency's Administrator on selected significant
drug interdiction and other activities--as well as all available
"rightsizing reports" and all country and work plans for the eight
major drug transit countries in our review. We also reviewed
evaluations, midterm and final reports, and other program documents for
those activities which USAID officials and State/INL documents had
identified as related to the international counternarcotics effort. In
addition, we reviewed Transparency International's Corruption
Perception Index to evaluate the level of corruption in these
countries. The index is based on the results of surveys of business
people and citizens and analysis by country experts. It ranks countries
by the degree of corruption perceived to exist in each country rather
than by actual corruption, which is difficult to measure directly. In a
previous GAO report, we determined that Transparency International's
data were sufficiently reliable to provide a broad gauge of corruption
and demonstrate that levels of corruption vary among countries.
[Footnote 31]
To obtain more detailed information on program results and impediments,
we traveled to four of the eight major drug trafficking countries in
our review: the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama. We
chose these four countries based on: (1) the size of the U.S.
assistance program; (2) the location within the various geographic
regions of the transit zone, including Central America, South America,
and the Caribbean Islands; (3) designation as a major money-laundering
country; (4) posting of senior embassy officials representing State/
INL, DEA, DHS, ICE, and CBP, and Defense; and (5) implementation of
major USAID rule of law and alternative development initiatives. During
our visits we obtained information from U.S. embassy officials, host
government officials, and local program beneficiaries. While in
country, we visited a number of project sites relating to maritime
operations, port security, intelligence gathering, drug crop
eradication, alternative development, and other activities.
To identify trends in cocaine flow, seizures, and disruptions, we
reviewed data from the Interagency Assessment on Cocaine Movement from
2002 through 2007, with limited updated data provided by ONDCP. In the
course of previous work, we discussed how cocaine flow data were
developed with officials from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the
Central Intelligence Agency, Crime and Narcotics Center. In addition,
we discussed how seizure and disruption data were developed with
officials from ONDCP. Overall, the data have limitations, due in part
to the illegal nature of the drug trade and the time lag inherent in
collecting meaningful data. Notwithstanding the limitations of the drug
production and seizure data, we determined that these data were
sufficiently reliable to provide an overall indication of the magnitude
and nature of the illicit drug trade since 2003. We supplemented this
data with information about trends in drug trafficking, interdiction,
and cooperation with transit zone countries obtained from officials at
JIATF-South.
Finally, the information and observations on foreign law in this report
do not reflect our independent legal analysis but are based on
interviews with cognizant officials and secondary sources.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements:
The United States has signed Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement
agreements with 25 countries in the transit and source zones. According
to Coast Guard officials, these agreements have improved cooperation
with nations in the region and increased the United States' and, in
particular, the Coast Guard's capability to board suspect vessels and
detain suspected drug traffickers. These bilateral agreements typically
have six provisions to them. The United States and the other countries
negotiate each provision separately, which means that some countries
may agree to some provisions and not others. The six parts provide for
the following:
* Ship-boarding provisions establish an expedited process for U.S. law
enforcement agencies to obtain authorization from the competent
authority of a designated country to board and search a vessel flying
its flag and suspected of being engaged in illicit traffic outside the
territorial waters of any nation. In certain limited circumstances,
U.S. vessels may stop, board, and search suspicious vessels flying the
flag of a designated country without having specific permission.
* Ship-rider provisions permit countries to place law enforcement
officials on each other's vessels.
* Pursuit provisions allow U.S. law enforcement agencies, under very
limited circumstances, to pursue aircraft and vessels in a country's
airspace and territorial waters. In particular, the provisions permit
U.S. law enforcement agencies to stop, board, and search a suspect
vessel if the country does not have a vessel or aircraft available to
respond immediately.
* Entry-to-investigate provisions allow the U.S. law enforcement
agencies, under very limited circumstances, to enter a country's
airspace or territorial waters to investigate aircraft or vessels
suspected of illicit drug trafficking. Specifically, the provisions
permit U.S. law enforcement agencies to board and search a suspect
vessel if the country does not have a vessel or aircraft available to
respond immediately.
* Over-flight provisions permit the U.S. law enforcement aircraft to
fly over the country's territorial waters, with appropriate notice to
the country's coastal authorities.
* Relay order-to-land provisions allow U.S. law enforcement agencies to
relay an order to land from the host country to the suspect aircraft.
Moreover, an additional International Maritime Interdiction Support
clause permits U.S. law enforcement agencies, principally the Coast
Guard, to transport suspected drug traffickers through that country to
the United States for prosecution and provides for expedited access to
that country's dockside facility to search suspect vessels. Since 2003
the United States has entered into support clauses with five countries.
Table 5 lists the law enforcement agreements, including the
international maritime interdiction support clause, that the United
States has negotiated with countries in the transit and source zones.
Table 5: Counternarcotics Maritime Law Enforcement Agreements with
Countries in the Transit Zone:
Country: Antigua and Barbuda;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause:
[Check][A].
Country: Bahamas;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check][A];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check][A];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check][A];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause:
[Check][A].
Country: Barbados;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country: Belize;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country: Colombia;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Empty];
Provision: Pursuit: [Empty];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Empty];
Provision: Over-flight: [Empty];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Empty];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country:
Costa Rica;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Check].
Country: Dominica;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Empty];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Empty];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country: Dominican Republic;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check][A];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check][A];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause:
[Check][A].
Country: Ecuador[B];
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check][A];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Empty];
Provision: Pursuit: [Empty];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Empty];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check][C];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Empty];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country: El Salvador;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Empty];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Empty];
Provision: Pursuit: [Empty];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Empty];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check][C];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Empty];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country: Grenada;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country: Guatemala;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check][A];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check][A];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check][A];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check][A];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check][A];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check][A];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause:
[Check][A].
Country: Haiti;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country: Honduras;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Check].
Country: Jamaica;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: v;
Provision: Over-flight: [Check];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country: Netherlands Antilles and Aruba;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Empty];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check][C];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Empty];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country: Nicaragua;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check][A];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check][A];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check][A];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check][A];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check][A];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check][A];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause:
[Check][A].
Country: Panama;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Check].
Country: St. Kitts and St. Nevis;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Empty];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country: St. Lucia;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country: St. Vincent and Grenadines;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Empty];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Empty];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country: Trinidad and Tobago;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Check];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Check];
Provision: Over-flight: [Check];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Check];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country: Turks and Caicos;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Empty];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Check];
Provision: Pursuit: [Empty];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Empty];
Provision: Over-flight: [Empty];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Empty];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Country: Venezuela;
Provision: Ship-boarding: [Check];
Provision: Ship-rider: [Empty];
Provision: Pursuit: [Empty];
Provision: Entry-to-Investigate: [Empty];
Provision: Over-flight: [Empty];
Provision: Relay order-to-land: [Empty];
Provision: International Maritime Interdiction Support clause: [Empty].
Source: JIATF-South.
[A] Indicates that the provision or clause was agreed to since 2003.
[B] The United States and Ecuador do not have a counternarcotics
maritime law enforcement agreement for ship-boarding but have agreed to
ship-boarding procedures.
[C] Over-flight rights have been negotiated in the context of a forward
operating location agreement through which the United States is allowed
the use of aviation and other facilities.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
June 27, 2008:
Mr. Jess T. Ford:
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G, St. NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
The Department of Homeland Security (OHS) appreciates the opportunity
to review and comment on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO's)
draft report GAO 08-784 entitled Drug Control: Cooperation with Most
Major Drug Transit (Countries Has Improved, but Better Performance
Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are Needed (GAO job code 320530).
In the aforementioned draft report. GAO recommends that: "To help
maximize cargo container security assistance, we recommend that the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of
Stare and the Attorney General. determine the feasibility of expanding
the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to include routine targeting
and scanning of containers for illicit drugs in major drug transit
countries in the transit zone, and report the results to the Congress.
Factors to be assessed should include the cost, workload and staffing
ramifications, the potential benefits to international counternarcotics
law enforcement efforts, the political support of CST participating
countries, statutory authority, and risks associated with such an
expansion."
DHS does not concur with the recommendation and expressed its concerns
to GAO during a meeting held prior to the issuance of the draft report.
We requested that GAO reconsider issuing a recommendation for the
potential expansion of the CSI program to include narcotics
interdiction as it would unnecessarily broaden CSI's current strategic
goals that support the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP's)
priority mission, among other things. Despite DHS efforts, GAO moved
forward with making the recommendation. As a result, we reiterate the
mission of the CST program in this response with the goal of providing
information that will support DHS's position of non-concurrence with
the recommendation. [See comment 1]
Congress has provided clear direction as to the mission of the CSI
program, which is securing the international supply chain from high-
risk shipments with a potential threat of terrorism and acts of
terrorism. The Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006
(SAFE Port Act). Title II (Security of the International Supply Chain),
Section 205, established and codified the implementation of the CSI to
identify and examine or search maritime containers that pose a security
risk before loading such containers in a foreign port for shipment to
the United States, either directly or through a foreign port. [See
comment 2]
CSI was created to ensure the twin goals of CBP are met - presenting
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States, while
facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. CSI's
effectiveness and success can be measured by several factors. At CSI's
core is the unique and unparalleled cooperation and information sharing
between the CBP officers at the foreign seaports and the host
government customs personnel when pre-screening maritime containerized
cargo destined to the United States for weapons of mass destruction or
other terrorist related activities.
In the draft report, GAO states that 90 percent of cocaine moves
through Mexico; however, no CSI ports are located in Mexico. The report
also states that the U.S. government efforts to interdict narcotics in
the Central American and Caribbean corridors have not made significant
progress due to these countries' limited resources. limited political
support (within their own govenment). inability to maintain equipment
and vessels provided by the United States and corruption of government
officials. The CSI program is no the mechanism to address these vast
discrepancies. [See comment 3]
As stated above, CSI was implemented to address the threat to border
security and global trade posed by the potential for terrorist use of a
maritime container to deliver a weapon of mass destruction.
Importantly, CSI focuses efforts And resources on maritime
containerized cargo destined to the United States with a nexus to
terrorism. The CST program is a voluntary program and there are no
binding agreements which can be enforced if a country refuses to
continue with the CST program. CSI's focus, as stipulated in the SA FE
Port Act. is the security of the international supply chain. [See
comment 4]
In March 2008, CRP met with the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) and representatives of the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF
South) to discuss the CSI program and its mission. At this meeting,
ONDCP and JIATF South inquired whether CSI tracked maritime containers
not destined to the United States, such as maritime containers from the
Central American end Caribbean corridors destined to Europe and/or
Mexico. CBP reiterated that the CSI program. as mandated by Congress,
only pre-screens and targets maritime containers destined to the United
States. In essence. what GAO and ONDCP are requesting, is not only
expanding the CSI program to target for narcotics, but to also target
maritime containers that are destined to other countries. Such an
expansion is outside the mandate of the CSI program. [See comment 5]
In addition, although the draft report does not recognize CBP's counter-
narcotics program, CRP will continue to use its assets within its
domestic operations to target for narcotics and will continue to work
with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and our
foreign counterparts in that we believe is an effective counter-
narcotics program. [See comment 6]
With regard to GAO's comment and observations made on intelligence-
gathering and investigations, we would like to emphasize that a
constant flow of information pertaining to drug trafficking networks
and organizations is the key to our targeting and interdiction efforts.
[See comment 7]
The draft report also tends to focus principally on Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) or military assistance given to host governments.
The report does not mention that DHS has deployed advisors (funded by
Department of State or U.S. Agency for International Development) for
both shot and long term details in provide training and technical
assistance.
DHS advisory presence has existed in Ecuador since 2001. In addition,
DHS has provided support to other transit zone countries by deploying
specialized teams to those locations. The advisors have provided
guidance or training in the following areas: customs documentation, 24
hour rule, targeting/risk management, integrity awareness,
airport/border/seaport interdiction operations. management, mail
processing. container examination, security, firearms, and officer
safety. [See comment 6]
Lastly, the draft report does not include the significant efforts
contributed by CBP Air and Marine (A&M). All of these efforts are
resource intensive for an office of its size whose personnel, assets,
and budget are self contained and do not receive the benefit of State
Department funding. Some specific examples of CBP A&M efforts include
but are not limited to:
* P-3 Transit. Zone Operations - Currently CBP's entire fleet of P-3
aircraft supports counterdrug operations in the Transit Zone, to
include missions flown from Central and South America;
* Operation Halcon - Up until November 30, 2006, legacy Customs and CRP
aircraft supported a continuous joint interdiction operation with
Mexico that began in 1990;
* Air to Air Interdiction, Dominican Republic - Art interdiction effort
that was reinstituted after a resurgence of airborne smuggling activity
near the island nations of Hispaniola;
* Longstanding Support to The Bahamas - CBP A&M has placed an Aviation
Advisor the U.S. Embassy in Nassau to provide enhanced support to
Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), which targets smuggling
operations destined to the Bahamas from other source countries as well
as smuggling operations from the Bahamas to the United States,
specifically southern Florida.
In addition to sustained efforts by P-3 aircraft in the Eastern Pacific
conducting maritime operations and the Citation (C-530) interceptors
conducting airborne interdiction operations in Mexico. CBP A&M re-
initiated the airborne interdiction and Blackhawk helicopter endgame
operations in the Dominican Republic to combat smuggling operations.
These interagency joint nation operations, are assisting in the
disruption of smuggling operations operating in the transit vector to
the Dominican Republic. CBP A&M was also instrumental in providing
maritime enforcement interdiction training to the Government of
Colombia Coast Guard. including high speed boat-to-boat tactical
enforcement techniques and disabling procedures.
We thank you again for the opportunity to offer comments on this draft
report and look forward to working with you on future homeland security
issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Penelope G. McCormack:
Acting Director:
Departmental Audit Liaison Office:
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland
Security's letter dated June 27, 2008.
GAO Comments:
1. A decision on whether to enlist CSI as a counternarcotics tool
should be based on a reasoned study of its feasibility by relevant
stakeholders, formally assessing the program's statutory authority
among other factors. ONDCP and State support this recommendation.
2. CSI's mandate does not prohibit leveraging the program's resources
for other agency missions. In addition, DHS/CBP notes in the CSI
Strategic Plan for 2006-2011 that, "at some point in the future,
consideration should be given to potential expansion of the program
from focusing on terrorism alone to encompassing other activities known
to support terrorism, such as smuggling narcotics, violations of
intellectual property rights and currency violations."
3. As noted in our report, seven CSI ports are located the Caribbean
and Central America. Four of those ports (Balboa, Colon, and Manzanillo
in Panama and Puerto Cortes in Honduras), are located on the central
American isthmus and, as such, are included in the "Central American/
Mexican Corridor," through which nearly 90 percent of cocaine destined
for the United States moves. (See figure 1.)
4. As DHS notes in its letter, the United States has "unique and
unparalleled cooperation and information sharing between the CBP
officers at the foreign seaports and the host government customs
personnel." CSI's way of working with host country partners may serve
as a model for combating corruption and gaining the political support
necessary to make U.S. efforts successful.
5. We are not recommending that CSI target maritime containers destined
for other countries. Rather, we are recommending that, in addition to
the factors CSI currently uses to target containers for inspection, DHS
study the feasibility of using potential narcotics trafficking as one
of the targeting factors.
6. We added information on CBP's advisory program.
7. The focus of our review was on U.S. initiatives to assist selected
major drug transit zone countries and we intentionally did not address
many U.S. interdiction operations DHS described. We have reported
previously on CBP's activities. See GAO, Drug Control: Agencies Need to
Plan for Likely Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop
Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-200] (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
15, 2005); and GAO, Drug Control: Difficulties in Measuring Costs and
Results of Transit Zone Interdiction Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-13] (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
25, 2002).
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement
Administration:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Drug Enforcement Administration:
[hyperlink, http://www.dea.gov]:
June 19, 2008:
Mr. Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) appreciates the opportunity
to review and comment on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
draft report, entitled: Drug Control: Cooperation with Major Drug
Transit Countries Has Improved, But Better Performance Reporting and
Sustainability Plans Are Needed, GAO-07-784. This letter constitutes
DEA's formal response.
GAO's draft report addressed how U.S. agencies have assisted with
disrupting drug trafficking through the eight major transit zone
countries in Central and South America and the Caribbean. GAO's report
also focused on U.S. efforts to assist these countries with becoming
self-sustaining partners in the international counternarcotics effort.
The report recognized the significant accomplishments of DEA's vetted
investigative units. These vetted units are located in the principal
drug transit countries in the region and are staffed by local law
enforcement officers working in cooperation with DEA. These units have
conducted numerous successful investigations targeting priority drug
trafficking organizations (DTO). The report also noted DEA' s efforts
to assist these countries with developing methods for gathering,
analyzing, and sharing intelligence.
In the report, GAO acknowledged the difficulty in measuring the
collective outcomes of all U.S. counternarcotics efforts for each
transit zone country. While it is difficult to measure the outcome of
all efforts, DEA has tracked statistical data to include financial and
drug seizures, arrests, intelligence sharing, and the disruption/
dismantling of DTOs in the transit zone countries to ensure DEA is
achieving its strategic goals. DEA utilizes its performance goals
regarding disrupting and dismantling DTOs to assist the Department of
State and the Office of National Drug Control Policy in developing
overall performance measures for US counternarcotics programs.
DEA has also reviewed the draft report for sensitivity and technical
issues and has no recommendations for redactions or revisions.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Gary W. Oetjen:
Deputy Chief Inspector:
Cc: Richard Theis, ALG:
AD, OC, NC, CC, CP, OG:
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, DC 20520:
June 25, 2008:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"Drug Control: Cooperation with Most Major Drug Transit Countries Has
Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are
Needed," GAO Job Code 320530.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Pat
Yorkman, Procurement Specialist, Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs at (202) 776-8806.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO - Al Huntington:
INL - David Johnson:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
U.S. Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Drug Control: Cooperation with Major Drug Transit Countries Has
Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are
Needed, (GAO-08-784/Code 320530):
The Department has reviewed the draft report, "Drug Control:
Cooperation with Major Drug Transit Countries Has Improved, but Better
Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are Needed," and
generally agrees with its main conclusions. However, we partially
disagree with the recommendations concerning the establishment of
performance measures and the operation and maintenance of donated
counternarcotics assets.
Specifically, we disagree with the recommendation that the Secretary of
State, in consultation with the Director of ONDCP, the Secretaries of
Defense and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the
Administrator USAID, establish performance measures for U.S. assistance
efforts and report the results annually for each country in the
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). [See comment
1]
The recommendation is duplicative of uniform performance measures
already established by the State Department and USAID as part of the
Transformational Diplomacy Initiative, which is designed not only to
assess the impact of counternarcotics efforts but to evaluate
development assistance in general. [See comment 2]
While these measures do not necessarily capture the impact of specific
projects such as boats for maritime interdiction, they do indicate
movement toward the larger, long-term objective of assisting countries
to become full and self-sustaining partners in the international
counternarcotics effort, especially when incorporated into a holistic
program performance plan.
While true that the standard measures of cooperation appearing in the
INCSR are not directly aligned by country and program, there is
substantial variation in assistance programs to particular countries in
terms of program types and funding levels. Additional variation occurs
due to the fact that many countries in the INCSR receive no program
assistance at all. [See comment 3]
The Department agrees in part with the recommendation that "the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of ONDCP, the
Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, and the Attorney General,
(1) develop a plan to ensure that partner nations in the transit zone
can effectively operate and maintain all counternarcotics assets the
U.S. has provided... and report this plan to the Congress for the
fiscal year 2010 appropriations cycle; and (2) ensure that before
providing a counternarcotics asset to a partner nation, agencies
determine the total operations and maintenance cost over its useful
life, and, with the recipient nation, develop a plan for funding this
cost."
The Department recognizes the need to consider the sustainability of
donated assets; we address this concern in designing projects and in
drafting letters of agreement (LOAs) with partner countries. However,
we caution that foreign assistance cannot always be preconditioned on
the recipient government's ability or willingness to sustain donated
equipment for its projected useful life.
While we strive to forge agreements with the recipient governments for
sustainability, it is difficult to project another government's
budgetary resources; moreover, governments and priorities change. A
case in point involved the donation of two C-26 surveillance aircraft
for maritime interdiction operations to the Regional Security System of
the Eastern Caribbean in 1999. According to the "plan", the U.S. would
support the operation and maintenance of the aircraft for a period of
five years, after which the RSS would gradually assume responsibility
for the program over a four-year period. Despite our best efforts, in
2004 the RSS refused to begin cost-sharing, the U.S. cut funding
completely in 2006, and the planes are no longer being used for
surveillance and interdiction operations. Sustainability is an
important goal, but given the unpredictability of foreign partners'
long-term priorities, we believe our existing oversight mechanisms are
appropriate to monitor partner nations' commitment towards
counternarcotics efforts. [See comment 4]
Developing an interagency plan beyond the Department's present
monitoring capability is impractical. Agencies presently work together
collegially at an interagency level. Sustainability of assets is one of
the aspects considered in State's decisions to provide development
support to other countries. However, options are limited beyond the
ability to influence other agencies for a coordinated plan when, for
example, competing program objectives arise. For example, the
Department has no influence over a Department of Defense program like
"Enduring Friendship" which has donated boats to foreign countries who
then request fuel and maintenance assistance from State to keep the
boats operational. [See comment 5]
The Department fully supports any consultations needed to implement the
recommendation that "the Secretary of Homeland Security (should)
determine the feasibility of expanding its container security
assistance program to include routine targeting and scanning of
containers for illegal drugs in major drug transit countries."
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
dated June 25, 2008.
GAO Comments:
1. We modified our recommendation to emphasize the need for State to
report the results of U.S.-funded counternarcotics initiatives more
comprehensively and consistently for each country in its annual
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Such information would
complement and aid interpretation of the broad performance measures
State includes in its performance plan.
2. While the broad performance measures State has developed are
important, they do not capture results of specific assistance programs,
and, without other information, their usefulness in managing
counternarcotics programs is limited. Reviewing program-specific
results in a particular country over time or comparing results among
countries with similar programs can help identify patterns and lessons
learned that may be useful in evaluating and managing these programs
more effectively. Furthermore, without consistently reported program-
specific results information, State cannot assess the extent to which
the results of specific programs have contributed to overall progress
reflected in State overall performance measures.
3. While we agree that assistance programs vary, we observed that many
programs in several countries are similar and comparable.
4. Past experience with U.S.-provided assets has shown that State's
monitoring of nation's commitment alone has not been sufficient to
ensure that such assets are utilized effectively. We question whether
such U.S. investments are justifiable without stronger up-front
assurances, beyond an agreement, that recipient countries or sponsoring
U.S. agencies can afford the long-term operations and maintenance costs
and are committed to providing those resources. We continue to believe
that explicit sustainability plans are needed that include a projection
of total asset ownership costs that have been considered and agreed
upon by all relevant parties with adequate contingency plans in case
assumptions change about sustainability and commitment.
5. State is in a unique position as the lead foreign affairs agency to
ensure that all participating U.S. agencies involved in providing
counternarcotics assets agree on a discreet sustainability plan. State,
in particular, can influence Defense's sustainability planning when it
approves security assistance programs, such as Enduring Friendship.
Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, under
which Enduring Friendship was authorized, requires State and Defense to
jointly approve all projects and coordinate their implementation.
[Footnote 32]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of National Drug Control Policy:
Executive Office Of The President:
Office Of National Drug Control Policy:
Washington, D.C. 20503:
June 23, 2008:
Mr. Jess Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade Issues:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548-0001:
Dear Mr. Ford:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft GAO 08-784 Report
to Congressional Requesters, entitled Cooperation with Most Major Drug
Transit Countries Has Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and
Sustainability Plans Are Needed. Your report comes during a unique
period in our bi-lateral relations with many of these major transit
countries. We are diligently working to improve the effectiveness of
counternarcotics cooperation throughout the Western Hemisphere.
We accept your recommendation that ONDCP provide technical assistance
to the National Drug Control Program agencies in the development of
appropriate performance measures, and also in the development of plans
to ensure that partner nations are able to effectively operate and
maintain all counternarcotics assets provided by the United States. In
addition, we strongly concur with your recommendation that DHS
determine the feasibility of expanding the Container Security
Initiative to include routine targeting and scanning of containers for
illicit drugs.
Once again, we appreciate the opportunity to review this report and
believe we are already on the right course concerning your
recommendations.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
John P. Walters:
Director:
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4268, or fordj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, A. H. Huntington, III,
Assistant Director; Joseph Carney; Miriam A. Carroll; and James Michels
made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO has published several related reports, including: GAO, Drug
Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts,
but Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow into the United States,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1018] (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 17, 2007); GAO, Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for
Likely Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better
Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-200] (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
15, 2006); GAO, Drug Control: Difficulties in Measuring Costs and
Results of Transit Zone Interdiction Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-13] (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
25, 2002); and GAO, Drug Control: Update on U.S. Interdiction Efforts
in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-30] (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 15, 1997).
[2] The strategy's other priorities include stopping drug use before it
starts and healing America's drug users.
[3] See GAO, Drug Control: U.S. Efforts in Latin America and the
Caribbean, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-
90R] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 18, 2000) and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-98-30].
[4] International Narcotics Control Strategy Report is a
congressionally mandated report (22 U.S.C. sec. 2291h(a)). It requires
that State report annually on the efforts of source and transit
countries to attack all aspects of the international drug trade.
[5] The 1988 UN Drug Convention sets forth a number of obligations that
the parties agree to undertake. Generally, it requires the parties to
take legal measures to outlaw and punish all forms of illicit drug
production, trafficking, and drug money-laundering, to control
chemicals that can be used to process illicit drugs, and to cooperate
in international efforts to these ends.
[6] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1018].
[7] As defined in State's International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, a major drug-producing, or transit country, is one: (a) that is
a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs
or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United
States or (b) through which such drugs or substances are transported. A
country's presence on this list is not necessarily an adverse
reflection of its government's counternarcotics efforts or level of
cooperation with the United States.
[8] The President has also designated Mexico as a "major drug transit
country;" however, because we reported on the U.S. drug assistance to
Mexico in 2007, we are not reviewing it in this report.
[9] JIATF-South includes representatives from Defense, Justice, DHS,
and other U.S. agencies; nations such as France, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom; and several nations in the transit and source
zones.
[10] Including Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Panama.
[11] The vetted unit in Venezuela is no longer cooperating with U.S.
law enforcement officials, due to political tensions between the U.S.
and Venezuelan governments.
[12] Venezuela discontinued its participation in this system in 2005.
[13] These countries' consent is required to interdict vessels
operating in their territorial waters or vessels operating under their
flag in international waters.
[14] The United States operates three other forward operating locations
in Aruba, Curacao, and El Salvador.
[15] According to ONDCP, all fronts of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) are involved in the drug trade at some level, which
includes controlling cocaine production, securing labs and airstrips,
and, at times, cooperating with other organizations to transport
multiton quantities of cocaine from Colombia through transit zone
countries to the United States and Europe.
[16] The task force ceased operation in 2005, when the government of
Venezuela began refusing nearly all counternarcotics cooperation with
the United States.
[17] Pub. L. No. 103-62, as amended.
[18] See GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid
Foundation for Achieving Greater Results, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-38] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
10, 2004).
[19] Seizures are defined as taking physical possession of the cocaine.
Disruptions are defined as forcing individuals suspected of
transporting cocaine to jettison or abandon their cargo.
[20] Enduring Friendship is a regional multiyear initiative that
provides maritime security assistance to select countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean. Enduring Friendship is intended to
strengthen partner nations' maritime domain awareness and operational
capabilities to anticipate and respond to threats, maritime
emergencies, and natural disasters, and to enhance control over illicit
trafficking lanes. This program is intended to improve partner nation
maritime command, control, and communications capability; increase
interoperability; and integrate maritime operational pictures, thus
laying the foundation for maritime theater-wide information sharing and
coalition operations. The first of three Enduring Friendship phases
focused on the Dominican Republic, Panama, Jamaica, and the Bahamas.
Phase two will include Belize, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. The
eastern Caribbean and the Regional Security Systems countries will be
included in phase three.
[21] Section 706 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires that the
President identify any country that has "failed demonstrably... to make
substantial efforts" to adhere to international counternarcotics
agreements and to take certain counternarcotics measures set forth in
U.S. law. Any country so identified may not receive U.S. assistance
except under certain conditions. This prohibition does not affect
counternarcotics, humanitarian, and certain other types of assistance.
[22] According to the agreement, signed in November 1999, following the
initial 10-year period, it may be renewed by both countries for
additional 5-year periods or terminated by either country, effective 1
year later.
[23] We present the Transparency International Corruption Perception
Index as a useful, broad gauge of corruption; however, the index is an
imprecise measure. It gauges survey respondents' perceptions of
corruption rather than directly measuring the incidence of corruption.
The index is not intended to guide specific program or policy
decisions.
[24] In 2007, CBP and the Department of Energy also began the Secure
Freight Initiative, a pilot program implemented at selected CSI
seaports to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers for nuclear
and radiological materials overseas. Honduras is the only transit zone
country with a Secure Freight Initiative program.
[25] Pub. L. No. 109-347, sec. 205 (codified at 6 U.S.C. 945).
[26] The seven CSI ports in the transit zone are: Puerto Cortes,
Honduras; Caucedo, Dominican Republic; Kingston, Jamaica; Freeport, the
Bahamas; and Balboa, Colon, and Manzanillo, Panama.
[27] National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, §
1206. 119 Stat. 3136, 3456-58 (2006). See GAO, Section 1206 Security
Assistance Program--Findings on Criteria, Coordination, and
Implementation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
416R] (Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007).
[28] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1018].
[29] The Department of the Treasury (Treasury) implements a relatively
small amount of counternarcotics related assistance in the transit
zone, primarily relating to training on money-laundering
investigations; however, since State funded and reported on this
assistance, we relied on State-provided information and did not meet
with Treasury officials, other than officials from the Office of
Foreign Assets Control, who indicated they had undertaken very little
activity in the countries we reviewed.
[30] Defense counternarcotics data reflect estimates of
counternarcotics-related support in these countries, because Defense
budgets are by program, not by country.
[31] GAO, Foreign Assistance: U.S. Anticorruption Programs in Sub-
Saharan Africa Will Require Time and Commitment, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-506] (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
26, 2004).
[32] National Defense Authorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, §
1206. 119 Stat. 3136, 3456-58 (2006). See GAO, Section 1206 Security
Assistance Program--Findings on Criteria, Coordination, and
Implementation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
416R] (Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007).
[End of section]
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