Visa Waiver Program
Actions Are Needed to Improve Management of the Expansion Process, and to Assess and Mitigate Program Risks Gao ID: GAO-08-967 September 15, 2008The Visa Waiver Program, which enables citizens of participating countries to travel to the United States without first obtaining a visa, has many benefits, but it also has risks. In 2006, GAO found that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) needed to improve efforts to assess and mitigate these risks. In August 2007, Congress passed the 9/11 Act, which provides DHS with the authority to consider expanding the program to countries whose short-term business and tourism visa refusal rates were between 3 and 10 percent in the prior fiscal year. Countries must also meet certain conditions, and DHS must complete actions to enhance the program's security. GAO has examined DHS's process for expanding the Visa Waiver Program and evaluated the extent to which DHS is assessing and mitigating program risks. GAO reviewed relevant laws and procedures and interviewed agency officials in Washington, D.C., and in U.S. embassies in eight aspiring and three Visa Waiver Program countries.
The executive branch is moving aggressively to expand the Visa Waiver Program by the end of 2008, but, in doing so, DHS has not followed a transparent process. DHS did not follow its own November 2007 standard operating procedures, which set forth key milestones to be met before countries are admitted into the program. As a result, Departments of State (State) and Justice and U.S. embassy officials stated that DHS created confusion among interagency partners and aspiring program countries. U.S. embassy officials in several aspiring countries told us it had been difficult to explain the expansion process to foreign counterparts and manage their expectations. State officials said it was also difficult to explain to countries with fiscal year 2007 refusal rates below 10 percent that have signaled interest in joining the program (Croatia, Israel, and Taiwan) why DHS is not negotiating with them, given that DHS is negotiating with several countries that had refusal rates above 10 percent (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia). Despite this confusion, DHS achieved some security enhancements during the expansion negotiations, including agreements with several aspiring countries on lost and stolen passport reporting. DHS, State, and Justice agreed that a more transparent process is needed to guide future program expansion. DHS has not fully developed tools to assess and mitigate risks in the Visa Waiver Program. To designate new program countries with refusal rates between 3 and 10 percent, DHS must first make two certifications. First, DHS must certify that it can verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign nationals who exit from U.S. airports. In February 2008, we testified that DHS's plan to meet this provision will not help mitigate program risks because it does not account for data on those who remain in the country beyond their authorized period of stay (overstays). DHS has not yet finalized its methodology for meeting this provision. Second, DHS must certify that the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) for screening visa waiver travelers in advance of their travel is "fully operational." While DHS has not announced when it plans to make this certification, it anticipates ESTA authorizations will be required for all visa waiver travelers after January 12, 2009. DHS determined that the law permits it to expand the program to countries with refusal rates between 3 and 10 percent after it makes these two certifications, and after the countries have met the required conditions, but before ESTA is mandatory for all Visa Waiver Program travelers. For DHS to maintain its authority to admit certain countries into the program, it must incorporate biometric indicators (such as fingerprints) into the air exit system by July 1, 2009. However, DHS is unlikely to meet this timeline due to several unresolved issues.In addition, DHS does not fully consider countries' overstay rates when assessing illegal immigration risks in the Visa Waiver Program. Finally, DHS has implemented many recommendations from GAO's 2006 report, including screening U.S.-bound travelers against Interpol's lost and stolen passport database, but has not fully implemented others. Implementing the remaining recommendations is important as DHS moves to expand both the program and the department's oversight responsibilities.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-967, Visa Waiver Program: Actions Are Needed to Improve Management of the Expansion Process, and to Assess and Mitigate Program Risks
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2008:
Visa Waiver Program:
Actions Are Needed to Improve Management of the Expansion Process, and
to Assess and Mitigate Program Risks:
GAO-08-967:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-967, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Visa Waiver Program, which enables citizens of participating
countries to travel to the United States without first obtaining a
visa, has many benefits, but it also has risks. In 2006, GAO found that
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) needed to improve efforts to
assess and mitigate these risks. In August 2007, Congress passed the
9/11 Act, which provides DHS with the authority to consider expanding
the program to countries whose short-term business and tourism visa
refusal rates were between 3 and 10 percent in the prior fiscal year.
Countries must also meet certain conditions, and DHS must complete
actions to enhance the program‘s security. GAO has examined DHS‘s
process for expanding the Visa Waiver Program and evaluated the extent
to which DHS is assessing and mitigating program risks. GAO reviewed
relevant laws and procedures and interviewed agency officials in
Washington, D.C., and in U.S. embassies in eight aspiring and three
Visa Waiver Program countries.
What GAO Found:
The executive branch is moving aggressively to expand the Visa Waiver
Program by the end of 2008, but, in doing so, DHS has not followed a
transparent process. DHS did not follow its own November 2007 standard
operating procedures, which set forth key milestones to be met before
countries are admitted into the program. As a result, Departments of
State (State) and Justice and U.S. embassy officials stated that DHS
created confusion among interagency partners and aspiring program
countries. U.S. embassy officials in several aspiring countries told us
it had been difficult to explain the expansion process to foreign
counterparts and manage their expectations. State officials said it was
also difficult to explain to countries with fiscal year 2007 refusal
rates below 10 percent that have signaled interest in joining the
program (Croatia, Israel, and Taiwan) why DHS is not negotiating with
them, given that DHS is negotiating with several countries that had
refusal rates above 10 percent (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Slovakia). Despite this confusion, DHS achieved some security
enhancements during the expansion negotiations, including agreements
with several aspiring countries on lost and stolen passport reporting.
DHS, State, and Justice agreed that a more transparent process is
needed to guide future program expansion.
DHS has not fully developed tools to assess and mitigate risks in the
Visa Waiver Program. To designate new program countries with refusal
rates between 3 and 10 percent, DHS must first make two certifications.
First, DHS must certify that it can verify the departure of not less
than 97 percent of foreign nationals who exit from U.S. airports. In
February 2008, we testified that DHS‘s plan to meet this provision will
not help mitigate program risks because it does not account for data on
those who remain in the country beyond their authorized period of stay
(overstays). DHS has not yet finalized its methodology for meeting this
provision. Second, DHS must certify that the Electronic System for
Travel Authorization (ESTA) for screening visa waiver travelers in
advance of their travel is ’fully operational.“ While DHS has not
announced when it plans to make this certification, it anticipates ESTA
authorizations will be required for all visa waiver travelers after
January 12, 2009. DHS determined that the law permits it to expand the
program to countries with refusal rates between 3 and 10 percent after
it makes these two certifications, and after the countries have met the
required conditions, but before ESTA is mandatory for all Visa Waiver
Program travelers. For DHS to maintain its authority to admit certain
countries into the program, it must incorporate biometric indicators
(such as fingerprints) into the air exit system by July 1, 2009.
However, DHS is unlikely to meet this timeline due to several
unresolved issues. In addition, DHS does not fully consider countries‘
overstay rates when assessing illegal immigration risks in the Visa
Waiver Program. Finally, DHS has implemented many recommendations from
GAO‘s 2006 report, including screening U.S.-bound travelers against
Interpol‘s lost and stolen passport database, but has not fully
implemented others. Implementing the remaining recommendations is
important as DHS moves to expand both the program and the department‘s
oversight responsibilities.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DHS establish a transparent process for Visa Waiver
Program expansion, and improve and monitor overstay rates for current
and aspiring program countries. DHS generally agreed with GAO‘s
recommendations. The Department of Justice (Justice) noted the
importance of lost and stolen passport reporting, but did not comment
on the recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
GAO-08-967. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Executive Branch Is Moving Quickly to Expand the Visa Waiver Program
without a Transparent Process:
DHS Has Not Fully Developed Tools Aimed at Assessing and Mitigating
Risks in the Visa Waiver Program:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Worldwide Refusal Rates for Short-term Business and
Tourism Visas, Fiscal Year 2007:
Appendix III: Key Legislative Requirements for Inclusion in the Visa
Waiver Program:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Justice:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Status of Prior GAO Recommendations:
Table 2: Worldwide Refusal Rates for Short-term Business and Tourism
Visas, Fiscal Year 2007:
Figures:
Figure 1: Comparison of DHS's Process to Expand the Visa Waiver Program
against the Standard Operating Procedures for Expansion:
Figure 2: Short-term Business and Tourism Visa Refusal Rates, by
Country, Fiscal Year 2007:
Figure 3: DHS's Current Plan to Meet Air Exit System Provision Omits
Those Who Remain in the United States:
Figure 4: DHS's Anticipated ESTA Implementation Timeline:
Abbreviations:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
ESTA: Electronic System for Travel Authorization:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
Interpol: International Criminal Police Organization:
MOU: memorandum of understanding:
US-VISIT: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status and Indicator Technology:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 15, 2008:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jon Kyl:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security:
Committee on the Judiciary:
United States Senate:
The Visa Waiver Program enables citizens of 27 participating countries
to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or
less without first obtaining a visa from a U.S. embassy or consulate.
[Footnote 1] The program has many benefits, including facilitating
travel for millions of foreign nationals seeking to visit the United
States each year. However, as we have reported,[Footnote 2] the program
also poses inherent security, law enforcement, and illegal immigration
risks to the United States. In particular, Visa Waiver Program
travelers are not subject to the same degree of screening as those with
visas because they are not interviewed by a Department of State (State)
consular officer before arriving at a U.S. port of entry. During the
visa issuance process, State consular officers can determine if an
individual has a criminal record or has prior immigration violations.
On the basis of their assessments, consular officers decide whether to
approve or deny a visa and, in doing so, help protect against
individuals who pose a risk to the United States. Without the added
safeguard of the visa issuance process, the Visa Waiver Program could
be exploited to gain illegal entry into the United States. Indeed, in
September 2007, the Director of National Intelligence testified that al
Qaeda is recruiting Europeans because most of them do not require a
visa to enter the United States. Effective oversight of the Visa Waiver
Program is essential to finding the right balance between facilitating
legitimate travel and screening for potential terrorists, criminals,
and others who may pose law enforcement and illegal immigration
concerns.
The executive branch aims to expand the Visa Waiver Program to
countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and South Korea. According to
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), some of these countries are
U.S. partners in the war in Iraq and have high expectations that they
will join the program due to their close economic, political, and
military ties to the United States. The executive branch has supported
more flexible criteria for admission to the program. In August 2007,
Congress passed legislation that allows DHS to consider admitting
countries that otherwise meet the program's requirements but that have
business and tourism visas refusal rates[Footnote 3] between 3 percent
and 10 percent, if the countries meet certain conditions, such as
cooperating with the United States on counterterrorism initiatives.
[Footnote 4] Previously, only countries with refusal rates below 3
percent in the prior fiscal year qualified to be considered for
admission. Before DHS can exercise this new authority, the legislation-
-referred to as the "9/11 Act"--requires that the department complete
certain actions aimed at enhancing the security of the Visa Waiver
Program.
At your request, this report (1) examines the process DHS is following
to admit countries into the Visa Waiver Program and (2) evaluates
actions taken to assess and mitigate potential risks in the program.
Throughout the course of our work, we reviewed laws governing the Visa
Waiver Program and its expansion, and relevant regulations and agency
operating procedures, as well as our prior reports and testimonies. We
met with several DHS component agencies and offices, including Customs
and Border Protection (CBP); Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE);
the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status and Indicator Technology (US-
VISIT); and the Visa Waiver Program Office,[Footnote 5] which is
responsible for oversight of Visa Waiver Program requirements. In
addition, we interviewed officials from State's Consular Affairs,
Europe and Eurasia, and East Asia and Pacific Bureaus, and met with
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) officials in
Lyon, France, as well as officials from the Department of Justice's
(Justice) Interpol-U.S. National Central Bureau.[Footnote 6]We also
spoke with officials at U.S. embassies in three current and eight
aspiring Visa Waiver Program countries. Appendix I contains a more
detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and methodology. We
conducted this performance audit from September 2007 to September 2008,
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
The executive branch is moving aggressively to expand the Visa Waiver
Program by the end of 2008, but, in doing so, DHS has not followed a
transparent process. The department did not follow its own November
2007 standard operating procedures, which set forth the key milestones
that DHS and aspiring countries must meet before additional countries
are admitted into the program. As a result, State, Justice, and U.S.
embassy officials stated that DHS created confusion among its
interagency partners and aspiring Visa Waiver Program countries.
Indeed, absent clear direction from DHS, U.S. embassy officials in
several aspiring countries told us that it had been difficult to
explain the expansion process to their foreign counterparts and manage
their expectations about when those countries might be admitted into
the Visa Waiver Program. Furthermore, State officials said that it was
difficult to explain to countries with fiscal year 2007 refusal rates
below 10 percent that have signaled interest in joining the program
(such as Croatia, Israel, and Taiwan) why DHS is not negotiating with
them. DHS, however, is negotiating with several countries that had
fiscal year 2007 visa refusal rates above the 10 percent ceiling
(Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia), with the expectation that
fiscal year 2008 rates will be below this ceiling. Nevertheless, DHS
achieved some security enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program during
expansion negotiations, including new agreements with several aspiring
countries on lost and stolen passport reporting. DHS, State, and
Justice agreed, however, that a more transparent process is needed to
guide any future consideration of program expansion. In acknowledging
weaknesses in the expansion process, DHS's Assistant Secretary for
Policy Development said that DHS did not have a clear process at the
outset of negotiations in late 2007, in part because the department
lacked prior experience in expanding the Visa Waiver Program and
because the program's legislative requirements had changed in August of
that year.
DHS has not fully developed tools to assess and mitigate risks in the
Visa Waiver Program. Specifically, DHS has not yet met two key
certification requirements in the 9/11 Act that would allow DHS to
consider admitting additional countries to the program with refusal
rates between 3 percent and 10 percent. First, DHS must certify that it
can verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign
nationals who exit from U.S. airports. In February 2008, we testified
that DHS's plan to meet this provision will not demonstrate
improvements in the air exit system and will not help the department
mitigate risks of the Visa Waiver Program, because the plan does not
account for data on those who remain in the country beyond their
authorized period of stay (referred to as "overstays"). Second, DHS
must certify that the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA)
for screening visa waiver travelers in advance of their travel is
"fully operational." DHS has not yet announced when it plans to make
this certification; however, ESTA became available on a voluntary basis
on August 1, 2008, and DHS anticipates that ESTA authorizations will be
required for all visa waiver travelers after January 12, 2009.[Footnote
7] DHS determined that the law permits it to expand the program to
countries with refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent after it
makes the two 9/11 Act certifications, and after the countries have met
certain conditions, but before ESTA is mandatory for all Visa Waiver
Program travelers. DHS may face challenges in implementing ESTA, such
as adequately informing the public and travel industry about the
system. In addition, for DHS to maintain its authority to admit certain
countries into the program, the 9/11 Act requires that the air exit
system also incorporate biometric indicators (such as fingerprints) by
July 1, 2009. However, DHS is unlikely to meet this timeline due to
several unresolved issues. In addition, DHS does not fully consider
countries' overstay rates when assessing illegal immigration risks in
the Visa Waiver Program because the department's overstay data have
weaknesses, according to the Visa Waiver Program Office. Finally, DHS
has fully implemented many recommendations from our 2006 report aimed
at improving DHS's ability to assess and mitigate program risks,
including screening U.S.-bound travelers against Interpol's database of
lost and stolen passports. However, DHS has not yet fully implemented
others, such as requiring that all Visa Waiver Program countries report
the theft or loss of blank and issued passports to the United States
and Interpol. Fully implementing the remaining recommendations is
important as DHS moves to expand both the Visa Waiver Program and the
department's oversight responsibilities.
To improve management of the Visa Waiver Program and better assess and
mitigate risks associated with the program, we recommend that DHS
establish a clear process, in coordination with State and Justice, for
program expansion that would include the criteria used to determine
which countries will be considered for expansion and timelines for
nominating countries, security assessments of aspiring countries, and
negotiation of any bilateral agreements to implement the program's
legislative requirements. In addition, we recommend that DHS designate
an office with responsibility for developing overstay rate information
for the Visa Waiver Program, explore cost-effective actions to further
improve these data's reliability, and use these validated data to help
evaluate whether current or aspiring Visa Waiver Program countries pose
a potential illegal immigration risk to the United States.
We received written comments on a draft of our report from DHS and
Justice, which we have reprinted in appendices IV and V, respectively.
State did not provide comments on the draft. DHS either agreed with, or
stated that it was taking steps to implement, all of our
recommendations. Justice did not comment on our recommendations, but
provided additional information about the importance of monitoring
countries' reporting of lost and stolen passports to Interpol, and its
efforts, in collaboration with DHS, to include screening against
Interpol's lost and stolen passport database in ESTA.
Background:
In 2007, almost 13 million citizens[Footnote 8] from 27 countries
entered the United States under the Visa Waiver Program.[Footnote 9]
The program was created to promote the effective use of government
resources and facilitate international travel without jeopardizing U.S.
national security. The United States last expanded the Visa Waiver
Program's membership in 1999; since then, other countries have
expressed a desire to become members. In February 2005, President Bush
announced that DHS and State would develop a strategy, or "Road Map
Initiative," to clarify the statutory requirements for designation as a
participating country. According to DHS, some of the countries seeking
admission to the program are U.S. partners in the war in Iraq and have
high expectations that they will join the program due to their close
economic, political, and military ties to the United States. As we
reported in July 2006, DHS and State are consulting with 13 "Road Map"
countries seeking admission into the Visa Waiver Program--Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and South Korea.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed
additional laws to strengthen border security policies and procedures,
and DHS and State instituted other policy changes that have affected a
country's qualifications for participating in the Visa Waiver Program.
In August 2007, Congress enacted the 9/11 Act, which provides DHS with
the authority to consider admitting into the Visa Waiver Program
countries that otherwise meet the program requirements, but have
refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent, provided the countries
meet certain conditions (see app. II for worldwide refusal rates for
fiscal year 2007). Before being admitted to the program, for example,
the countries must demonstrate a sustained reduction in refusal rates,
and must be cooperating with the United States on counterterrorism
initiatives, information sharing, and the prevention of terrorist
travel, among other things. In addition, DHS must complete two actions
aimed at enhancing the security of the program (see app. III for the
key legislative requirements for inclusion in the Visa Waiver Program).
[Footnote 10] In particular, to consider admitting countries into the
Visa Waiver Program with refusal rates between 3 percent and 10
percent, DHS must certify the following to Congress:
* A system is in place that can verify the departure of not less than
97 percent of foreign nationals who depart through U.S. airports.
Initially, this system will be biographic only. Congress required the
eventual implementation of a biometric exit system at U.S. airports. If
the biometric air exit system is not in place by July 1, 2009, the
flexibility that DHS may obtain to consider admitting countries with
refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent will be suspended until
the system is in place.
* An electronic travel authorization system is "fully operational."
This system will require nationals from Visa Waiver Program countries
to provide the United States with biographical information before
boarding a U.S.-bound flight to determine the eligibility of, and
whether there exists a law enforcement or security risk in permitting,
the foreign national to travel to the United States under the program.
DHS recommends that applicants obtain ESTA authorizations at the time
of reservation or ticket purchase, or at least 72 hours before their
planned date of departure for the United States. The ESTA application
will electronically collect information similar to the information
collected in paper form by CBP.[Footnote 11]To the extent possible,
according to DHS, applicants will find out almost immediately whether
their travel has been authorized, in which case they are free to travel
to the United States, or if their application has been rejected, in
which case they are ineligible to travel to the United States under the
Visa Waiver Program.[Footnote 12] Those found ineligible to travel
under the Visa Waiver Program must apply for a visa at a U.S. embassy
to travel to the United States.[Footnote 13]
In addition, the 9/11 Act requires that visa waiver countries:
* enter into an agreement with the United States to report, or make
available through Interpol or other means as designated by the
Secretary of Homeland Security, to the U.S. government information
about the theft or loss of passports within a strict time frame;
* enter into an agreement with the United States to share information
regarding whether citizens and nationals of that country traveling to
the United States represent a threat to U.S. security; and:
* accept for repatriation any citizen, former citizen, or national of
the country against whom the United States has issued a final order of
removal.
When DHS exercises its authority to waive the 3 percent refusal rate
requirement, it shall, in consultation with State, take into account
other discretionary factors, pursuant to the 9/11 Act, including a
country's airport security standards; whether the country assists in
the operation of an effective air marshal program; the standards of
passports and travel documents issued by the country; and other
security-related factors, including the country's cooperation with (1)
the United States' initiatives toward combating terrorism and (2) the
U.S. intelligence community in sharing information regarding terrorist
threats. DHS works in consultation with State and Justice, as well as
the intelligence community, as part of DHS's assessment of countries
seeking to join the Visa Waiver Program.
Executive Branch Is Moving Quickly to Expand the Visa Waiver Program
without a Transparent Process:
The executive branch is moving aggressively to expand the Visa Waiver
Program by the end of 2008, but, in doing so, DHS has not followed a
transparent process for admitting new countries to the program--an
approach that has created confusion among other U.S. agencies in
Washington, D.C.; U.S. embassy officials overseas; and those countries
that are seeking to join the Visa Waiver Program. During the expansion
negotiations, DHS has achieved some security enhancements, such as new
agreements that, among other things, require the reporting of lost and
stolen blank and issued passports.
DHS Has Not Followed a Transparent Process for Visa Waiver Program
Expansion:
We found that the Visa Waiver Program Office has not followed its own
standard operating procedures, completed in November 2007, which set
forth the key milestones that DHS and aspiring countries must meet
before additional countries are admitted into the program.[Footnote 14]
According to the standard procedures, State should submit to DHS a
formal, written nomination for a particular country, after which DHS is
to lead an interagency team to conduct an in-country, comprehensive
review of the impact of the country's admission into the Visa Waiver
Program on U.S. security, law enforcement, and immigration interests.
Figure 1 depicts the standard procedures that the program office
established to guide expansion of the Visa Waiver Program compared with
DHS's actions since August 2007. Although State has only nominated one
country--Greece--DHS has nonetheless conducted security reviews for
countries that State has not yet nominated--Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and South Korea. According to
State officials, until DHS has implemented the required provisions of
the 9/11 Act, and aspiring countries have met all of the Visa Waiver
Program's statutory requirements, State does not plan to nominate any
other countries. DHS's Assistant Secretary for Policy Development told
us that the department had determined that it would not follow the
standard operating procedures during these expansion negotiations and,
thus, had to "make up the process as it went along," in part because
DHS had never expanded the program before and because Congress
significantly changed the program's legislative requirements in August
2007.
Figure 1: Comparison of DHS's Process to Expand the Visa Waiver Program
against the Standard Operating Procedures for Expansion:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of a comparison of DHS's process to
expand the visa waiver program against the standard operating
procedures for expansion. The following information is depicted:
Standard Visa Waiver Program Expansion Process:
* State submits a formal nomination of an individual country to DHS;
* DHS conducts a comprehensive review of the nominated country, which
includes an in-country site visit;
* DHS completes comprehensive country review and submits it to
Congress.
DHS Expansion Process:
Country: Lithuania;
Visa refusal rate, fiscal year 2007: 12.9%;
Nomination date: [Empty];
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); DHS's standard operating procedures
do not include signing MOUs: March 2008;
In-country site visit: June 2008;
DHS goal to admit new countries: December 2008.
Country: Slovakia;
Visa refusal rate, fiscal year 2007: 12.0%;
Nomination date: [Empty];
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); DHS's standard operating procedures
do not include signing MOUs: March 2008;
In-country site visit: April/May 2008;
DHS goal to admit new countries: December 2008.
Country: Latvia;
Visa refusal rate, fiscal year 2007: 11.8%;
Nomination date: [Empty];
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); DHS's standard operating procedures
do not include signing MOUs: February/March 2008;
In-country site visit: June 2008;
DHS goal to admit new countries: December 2008.
Country: Hungary;
Visa refusal rate, fiscal year 2007: 10.3%;
Nomination date: [Empty];
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); DHS's standard operating procedures
do not include signing MOUs: March 2008;
In-country site visit: April/May 2008;
DHS goal to admit new countries: December 2008.
Country: Czech Republic;
Visa refusal rate, fiscal year 2007: 6.7%;
Nomination date: [Empty];
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); DHS's standard operating procedures
do not include signing MOUs: February 2008;
In-country site visit: March 2008;
DHS goal to admit new countries: December 2008.
Country: South Korea;
Visa refusal rate, fiscal year 2007: 4.4%;
Nomination date: [Empty];
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); DHS's standard operating procedures
do not include signing MOUs: April 2008;
In-country site visit: June 2008;
DHS goal to admit new countries: December 2008.
Country: Estonia;
Visa refusal rate, fiscal year 2007: 4.0%;
Nomination date: [Empty];
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); DHS's standard operating procedures
do not include signing MOUs: February/March 2008;
In-country site visit: March/April 2008;
DHS goal to admit new countries: December 2008.
Country: Malta;
Visa refusal rate, fiscal year 2007: 2.7%;
Nomination date: [Empty];
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); DHS's standard operating procedures
do not include signing MOUs: March/April 2008;
In-country site visit: [Empty];
DHS goal to admit new countries: December 2008.
Country: Greece;
Visa refusal rate, fiscal year 2007: 1.6%;
Nomination date: August 2007;
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); DHS's standard operating procedures
do not include signing MOUs: [Empty];
In-country site visit: November 2007;
DHS goal to admit new countries: December 2008.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data. Art Explosion (images).
[End of figure]
State and Justice officials told us that the lack of a transparent
timeline and requirements for Visa Waiver Program expansion has led to
confusion among U.S. agencies in headquarters' offices and at U.S.
embassies overseas, as well as foreign governments seeking to join the
program. For example, DHS's standard procedures were not updated to
account for the department's plans to sign with each of the aspiring
Visa Waiver Program countries separate memorandums of understanding
(MOU) that lay out the new legislative requirements from the 9/11 Act.
According to DHS, while not required by the act, the U.S. government is
seeking to negotiate MOUs with current and aspiring Visa Waiver Program
countries to help put the legislative provisions in place. Although DHS
has not yet signed MOUs with any current program countries, the
department intends to complete negotiations with existing program
countries by October 2009. As indicated in figure 1, DHS signed MOUs
with aspiring countries before conducting in-country security reviews.
The MOUs are to be accompanied by more specific "implementing
arrangements" for sharing biographic, biometric, and other data, as
required by the 9/11 Act, within general parameters of what the United
States is willing and able to reciprocate--this includes sharing
information on known or suspected terrorists. According to DHS, the
type and scope of these arrangements will vary by country and will take
into account existing bilateral information-sharing arrangements. As of
June 2008, DHS had signed MOUs with eight Road Map countries and had
begun negotiations on the implementing arrangements. However, State and
Justice officials told us that DHS had not been clear in communicating
these steps to aspiring and current program countries. DHS officials
acknowledged that the department was still exploring how to best
complete the implementing arrangements. U.S. embassy officials in
several Road Map countries told us that it had been difficult to
explain the expansion process to their foreign counterparts and manage
their expectations about when those countries might be admitted into
the Visa Waiver Program. Justice officials and U.S. officials in
several embassies told us that the implementing arrangements may be
more difficult to negotiate than the nonbinding MOUs because some
countries have expressed concerns about sharing private information on
their citizens due to strict national privacy laws--concerns that the
United States also has about its citizens' information. In response to
our request, in late April 2008, DHS provided us with an outline of the
department's completed and remaining actions for expanding the Visa
Waiver Program by the end of this year. DHS officials stated that this
outline could be a first step in providing guidance for all
stakeholders, should the program be expanded again in the future.
However, the outline does not include criteria for selecting countries
under consideration for admission into the program, other than the 13
Road Map countries.
The U.S. government is only considering the Road Map countries for
potential admission into the program in 2008 because the United States
began formal discussions with these 13 countries several years ago, not
due to the application of clearly defined requirements. DHS is
negotiating with 4 Road Map countries with fiscal year 2007 refusal
rates over 10 percent (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia), with
the expectation that fiscal year 2008 refusal rates for these countries
will fall below 10 percent. State officials told us that they lacked a
clear rationale to explain to other aspiring, non-Road Map countries
with refusal rates under 10 percent (Croatia, Israel, and Taiwan) that
they will not be considered in 2008 due to the executive branch's plans
to expand the program first to South Korea and countries in Central and
Eastern Europe. In addition, on May 1 of each year, State must report
to Congress those countries that are under consideration for inclusion
in the Visa Waiver Program; the department has never submitted this
report because, according to consular officials, no country has been
under consideration for admission into the program since the reporting
requirement was established in 2000.[Footnote 15] As of late June 2008,
State had not yet submitted its report for 2008. A State official told
us that, despite the actions that DHS, State, and other U.S. agencies
have taken to expand the Visa Waiver Program to as many as 9 countries
in 2008, State was initially unclear about which countries it should
include in this report. While only Greece has been nominated, DHS has
made clear its goal to admit many of the Road Map countries in 2008.
(Fig. 2 shows the fiscal year 2007 refusal rates for the 13 Road Map
countries.)
Figure 2: Short-term Business and Tourism Visa Refusal Rates, by
Country, Fiscal Year 2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a listing of short-term business and tourism visa
refusal rates, by country, fiscal year 2007, as follows:
Refusal rate: 30-40%;
Countries:
Romania (37.7%) ("Road Map" initiative country).
Refusal rate: 20-30%;
Countries:
Algeria;
Belarus;
Belize;
Bolivia;
Central African Republic;
Chad;
China;
Colombia;
Comoros;
Costa Rica;
Djibouti;
Ecuador;
Equatorial Guinea;
Gabon;
Grenada;
India;
Kyrgyzstan;
Lebanon;
Libya;
Maldives;
Morocco;
Panama;
Poland (25.2%; "Road Map" initiative country);
Samoa;
Serbia and Montenegro;
Sri Lanka;
St. Kitts and Nevis;
St. Lucia;
St. Vincent and the Grenadines;
Tanzania;
Tunisia;
Vanuatu.
Refusal rate: 10-20%;
Countries:
Angola;
Antigua/Barbuda;
Azerbaijan;
Bosnia-Herzegovina;
Botswana;
Bulgaria (14.32%; "Road Map" initiative country);
Hungary (10.3%; "Road Map" initiative country);
Kazakhstan;
Kiribati;
Latvia (11.8%; "Road Map" initiative country);
Lithuania (12.9%; "Road Map" initiative country);
Madagascar;
Mauritius;
Mozambique;
Papua New Guinea;
Paraguay;
North Korea;
Russia;
Seychelles;
Slovakia (12%; "Road Map" initiative country);
Suriname;
Swaziland;
Thailand;
Turkey;
Tuvalu;
Uruguay;
Venezuela.
Refusal rate: 3-10%;
Countries:
Argentina;
Barbados;
Brazil;
Chile;
Taiwan;
Croatia;
Czech Republic (6.7%; "Road Map" initiative country);
Estonia (4%; "Road Map" initiative country);
Kuwait;
Macau;
Malaysia;
Namibia;
Oman;
Marshall Islands;
Sao Tome and Principe;
Saudi Arabia;
Solomon Islands;
South Africa;
South Korea (4.4%; "Road Map" initiative country);
The Bahamas.
Refusal rate: 0-3%;
Countries:
Greece: (1.6%; "Road Map" initiative country);
Cyprus (1.8%; "Road Map" initiative country);
Malta (2.7%; "Road Map" initiative country);
Hong Kong;
Israel;
Qatar.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.
Note: DHS may consider adding to the Visa Waiver Program aspiring
countries with refusal rates below 3 percent in the prior fiscal year,
without meeting the two certification requirements in the 9/11 Act.
[End of figure]
According to DHS, it could not wait until all statutory requirements
were officially met before beginning bilateral negotiations with Road
Map countries, because doing so would not allow sufficient time to add
the countries by the end of 2008. DHS plans to complete the security
reviews and sign MOUs and implementing arrangements with Road Map
countries by the fall of 2008. If these and all other statutory
provisions are completed--including countries' achievement of refusal
rates below 10 percent--State indicated that it will then formally
nominate the countries. However, DHS has acknowledged that if it and
the aspiring countries cannot meet all of the program's statutory
requirements, the United States will not admit additional countries
into the program. In such an event, the U.S. government could face
political and diplomatic repercussions, given the expectations raised
that many of the Road Map countries will be admitted in 2008. DHS,
State, and Justice officials acknowledged that following a more
transparent process would be useful in the future as additional
countries seek to join the program.
DHS Has Achieved Some Results in Visa Waiver Program Expansion
Negotiations:
DHS's expansion negotiations with current and aspiring Visa Waiver
Program countries have led to commitments from countries to improve
information sharing processes with the United States. For example, by
signing MOUs, eight aspiring countries have signaled their intent to
comply with the program's statutory provision to report to the United
States or Interpol in a timely manner the loss or theft of passports--
a key vulnerability in the Visa Waiver Program, as we have previously
reported.[Footnote 16] In addition, as a result of ongoing visa waiver
negotiations with the South Korean government, in January 2008, DHS
initiated the Immigration Advisory Program at Incheon International
Airport in South Korea to help prevent terrorists and other high-risk
travelers from boarding commercial aircraft bound for the United States
[Footnote 17].Furthermore, a senior consular official testified that
the executive branch's dialogue on Visa Waiver Program expansion is
helping to stimulate U.S. negotiations on other terrorist watch-list-
sharing arrangements with Road Map countries.[Footnote 18]
DHS Has Not Fully Developed Tools Aimed at Assessing and Mitigating
Risks in the Visa Waiver Program:
As of early September 2008, DHS had not yet met two key certification
requirements in the 9/11 Act that are necessary to allow the department
to consider expanding the Visa Waiver Program to countries with refusal
rates between 3 percent and 10 percent. In addition, the Visa Waiver
Program Office does not fully consider data on overstay rates for
current and aspiring Visa Waiver Program countries, even though doing
so is integral to meeting a statutory requirement for continued
eligibility in the Visa Waiver Program. Finally, in reviewing
recommendations from our 2006 report aimed at improving efforts to
assess and mitigate program risks, we found that DHS has implemented
many of our prior recommendations, but some are only partially
implemented.
DHS Has Not yet Implemented Key Security Provisions of 9/11 Act That
Are Necessary to Admit Certain Countries into the Visa Waiver Program:
On February 28, 2008, we testified that DHS's plan for certifying that
it can verify the departure of 97 percent of foreign nationals from
U.S. airports will not help the department mitigate risks of the Visa
Waiver Program.[Footnote 19] Furthermore, DHS will face a number of
challenges in implementing ESTA by January 2009. Finally, it is
unlikely that DHS will implement a biometric air exit system before
July 2009, due to opposition from the airline industry.
Plan to Verify the Air Departure of Foreign Nationals Will Not Help DHS
Mitigate Program Risks:
As we have previously mentioned, the 9/11 Act requires that DHS certify
that a system is in place that can verify the departure of not less
than 97 percent of foreign nationals who depart through U.S. airports.
In December 2007, DHS reported to us that it will match records,
reported by airlines,[Footnote 20] of visitors departing the country to
the department's existing records of any prior arrivals, immigration
status changes,[Footnote 21]or prior departures from the United States.
At the time of our February 2008 testimony, DHS had confirmed that it
planned to employ a methodology that begins with departure records.
During the hearing, we also testified that this methodology will not
demonstrate improvements in the air exit system and will not help the
department mitigate risks of the Visa Waiver Program. We identified a
number of weaknesses with this approach, as follows:
* First, DHS's methodology will not inform overall or country-specific
overstay rates, which are key factors in determining illegal
immigration risks in the Visa Waiver Program. In particular, DHS's
methodology does not begin with arrival records to determine if those
foreign nationals departed or remained in the United States beyond
their authorized periods of admission--useful data for oversight of the
Visa Waiver Program and its expansion. As we previously testified, an
alternate approach would be to track air arrivals from a given point in
time and determine whether those foreign nationals have potentially
overstayed.[Footnote 22] Figure 3 compares DHS's plan to match visitor
records using departure data as a starting point with a methodology
that would use arrival data as a starting point.
Figure 3: DHS's Current Plan to Meet Air Exit System Provision Omits
Those Who Remain in the United States:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of DHS's Current Plan to Meet Air Exit
System Provision Omits Those Who Remain in the United States, as
follows:
DHS's plan uses departure date as starting point:
Foreign nationals depart by air;
Using air departure manifest records, DHS reports that it can match not
less than 97 percent of departure records to records of prior:
* Arrivals;
* Departures;
* Change of status.
Alternative approach uses arrival date as starting point:
Foreign nationals arrive;
Arrival data matched against subsequent records of those foreign
nationals, which will inform DHS of:
* Who has departed by air;
* Who has potentially overstayed.
Sources: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security data. Map
Resources (maps); Nova Development and Ingram Publishing (clip art).
[End of figure]
* Second, for purposes of this provision and Visa Waiver Program
expansion, we do not see the value in verifying that a foreign national
leaving the United States had also departed at a prior point in time
[Footnote 23]--in other words, matching a new departure record back to
a previous departure record from the country.[Footnote 24] DHS's
Assistant Secretary for Policy Development told us in January 2008 that
the department chose to include previous departures and changes of
immigration status records because this method allowed the department
to achieve a match rate of 97 percent or greater.
* Third, DHS's methodology does not address the accuracy of airlines'
transmissions of departure records, and DHS acknowledges that there are
weaknesses in the departure data. Foreign nationals who enter the
United States by air are inspected by DHS officers--a process that
provides information that can be used to verify arrival manifest data-
-and, since 2004, DHS has implemented the US-VISIT program to collect
biometric information on foreign nationals arriving in the United
States.[Footnote 25]However, the department has not completed the exit
portion of this tracking system; thus, there is no corresponding check
on the accuracy and completeness of the departure manifest information
supplied by the airlines.[Footnote 26] According to DHS, it works with
air carriers to try to improve both the timeliness and
comprehensiveness of manifest records, and fines carriers that provide
incomplete or inaccurate information. If DHS could evaluate these data,
and validate the extent to which they are accurate and complete, the
department would be able to identify problems and work with the
airlines to further improve the data.
An air exit system that facilitates the development of overstay rate
data is important to managing potential risks in expanding the Visa
Waiver Program. We found that DHS's planned methodology for meeting the
"97 percent provision" so it can move forward with program expansion
will not demonstrate improvements in the air exit system or help the
department identify overstays or develop overstay rates. As of early
September 2008, DHS had not yet certified this provision, nor had it
finalized a methodology to meet the provision.
DHS's Planned Implementation of ESTA by January 2009 Will Face
Challenges:
In June 2008, DHS announced in the Federal Register that it anticipates
that all visa waiver travelers will be required to obtain ESTA
authorization for visa waiver travel to the United States after January
12, 2009. However, we identified four potential challenges that DHS may
face in implementing ESTA, including a limited time frame to adequately
inform U.S. embassies and the public and the significant impact that
ESTA will have on the airline and travel industry.
We have previously reported that visa waiver travelers pose inherent
security and illegal immigration risks to the United States, since they
(1) are not subject to the same degree of screening as travelers with
visas and (2) are not interviewed by a consular officer before arriving
at a U.S. port of entry.[Footnote 27] In the 9/11 Act conference
report,[Footnote 28]Congress agreed on the need for significant
security enhancements to the Visa Waiver Program and to the
implementation of ESTA prior to permitting DHS to admit new countries
into the program with refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent.
According to DHS, ESTA will allow DHS to identify potential ineligible
visa waiver travelers before they embark on a U.S.-bound carrier. DHS
also stated that by recommending that travelers submit ESTA
applications 72 hours in advance of their departure, CBP will have
additional time to screen visa waiver travelers destined for the United
States.
DHS must follow several steps in implementing ESTA (see fig. 4). First,
the 9/11 Act requires that DHS must certify both the 97 percent air
exit system and ESTA as fully operational before the department can
consider expanding the Visa Waiver Program to countries with refusal
rates between 3 percent and 10 percent. DHS has not announced when it
plans to make this certification. DHS attorneys told us that the
department could admit additional countries to the program once it
provides this certification. In addition, according to DHS, the act
provides that 60 days after the Secretary of Homeland Security
publishes a final notice in the Federal Register of the ESTA
requirement, each alien traveling under the Visa Waiver Program must
use ESTA to electronically provide DHS with biographic and other such
information as DHS deems necessary to determine, in advance of travel,
the eligibility of, and whether there exists a law enforcement or
security risk in permitting, the alien to travel to the United States.
[Footnote 29] DHS stated that it expects to issue this final notice in
early November 2008, and, as of January 12, 2009, all visa waiver
travelers would be required to obtain authorization through ESTA prior
to boarding a U.S.-bound flight or cruise vessel. DHS stated that if,
after certifying ESTA as fully operational, it admits an additional
country prior to January 12, 2009, it will require that visa waiver
travelers from that country obtain ESTA authorizations immediately. For
example, if Estonia were admitted into the Visa Waiver Program on
October 10, 2008, citizens of that country traveling to the United
States under the program would be required to begin using ESTA on that
date; however, visa waiver travelers from existing program countries
would not be required to obtain approval through ESTA until January 12,
2009, more than 3 months later.
Figure 4: DHS's Anticipated ESTA Implementation Timeline:
[See PDF for image]
The timeline provides the following information:
DHS's Anticipated ESTA Implementation Timeline:
June 9, 2008:
DHS announced plans for the Electronic System for Travel Authorization
(ESTA) in the Federal Register;
August 1, 2008:
ESTA operational in English.
Early October 2008:
Fiscal year 2008 refusal rate data available.
October 15, 2008:
ESTA operational in additional languages.
Early November 2008:
DHS anticipates publishing final notice for ESTA in the Federal
Register.
End of 2008:
DHS anticipates expanding the Visa Waiver Program.
January 12, 2009:
DHS anticipates ESTA authorization to be mandatory for all visa waiver
travelers.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
We identified four potential challenges to DHS's planned implementation
of ESTA by January 12, 2009. It is difficult to predict the extent to
which DHS will address these challenges due to the short time frame in
which the department is implementing the system. These challenges
include the following:
* DHS has a limited time frame to adequately inform U.S. embassies in
Visa Waiver Program countries and the public about ESTA. U.S. embassy
officials in current and aspiring Visa Waiver Program countries told us
that the United States will need to ensure that there is sufficient
time to inform travelers, airlines, and the travel industry of ESTA
requirements and implementation timelines. U.S. commercial and consular
officials at a U.S. embassy in a current Visa Waiver Program country
told us that they would ideally like 1 year's advance notice before
ESTA is implemented to allow sufficient time to inform and train the
public and the travel industry of the new requirement. However, DHS's
announcement in June 2008 accelerated the timeline for ESTA
implementation in current visa waiver countries. During our site visits
in March 2008, U.S. embassy officials in a visa waiver country told us
that they had been informed by DHS officials that the department did
not plan to require ESTA authorization for travelers from that country
until the summer of 2009 or later. According to a senior U.S. official
at one embassy, DHS had confirmed this plan with host country
government officials in early May 2008. Following the June 2008
announcement, a senior U.S. embassy official in another country told us
that DHS did not give the embassy adequate advance notice--to prepare
translated materials, brief journalists from the major media, prepare
the embassy Web site, or set up a meeting with travel and tourism
professionals to discuss the implications of ESTA requirements--before
publishing the interim final rule. DHS officials told us that the
department is currently working on an outreach strategy to ensure that
travelers are aware of the ESTA requirement.
* Impact on air and sea carriers could be significant. DHS estimates
that 8 U.S.-based air carriers and 11 sea carriers, as well as 35
foreign-based air carriers and 5 sea carriers, will be affected by ESTA
requirements for visa waiver travelers. In addition, DHS stated that it
did not know how many passengers annually would request that their
carrier apply for ESTA authorization on their behalf to travel under
the Visa Waiver Program or how much it will cost carriers to modify
their existing systems to accommodate such requests. Thus, in the short
term, DHS expects that the carriers could face a notable burden if most
of their non-U.S. passengers request that their carriers submit ESTA
applications. On the basis of DHS's analysis, ESTA could cost the
carriers about $137 million to $1.1 billion over the next 10 years,
depending on how the carriers decide to assist the passengers. DHS has
noted that these costs to carriers are not compulsory because the
carriers are not required to apply for an ESTA authorization on behalf
of their visa waiver travelers. DHS is developing a separate system,
independent from ESTA, which will enable the travel industry to
voluntarily submit an ESTA application on behalf of a potential Visa
Waiver Program traveler. As of early August 2008, DHS had analyzed the
role that transportation carriers could play in applying for and
submitting ESTA applications on behalf of their customers when they
arrive at an air or sea port. However, CBP stated that there had been
no further development on this issue.
* ESTA could increase consular workload. In May 2008, we reported that
State officials and officials at U.S. embassies in current Visa Waiver
Program countries are concerned with how ESTA implementation will
affect consular workload.[Footnote 30]Consular officers are concerned
that more travelers will apply for visas at consular posts if their
ESTA applications are rejected or because they may choose to apply for
a visa that has a longer validity period (10 years) than an ESTA
authorization. We reported that if 1 percent to 3 percent of current
Visa Waiver Program travelers came to U.S. embassies for visas, it
could greatly increase visa demand at some locations, which could
significantly disrupt visa operations and possibly overwhelm current
staffing and facilities.[Footnote 31] DHS officials told us that the
department is aware of concerns regarding rejection rates and has been
working with State to create a system that mitigates these concerns.
* Developing a user-friendly ESTA could be difficult. According to DHS,
the ESTA Web site will initially be operational in English; additional
languages will be available by October 15, 2008. Even when the Web site
is operational in additional languages, ESTA will only allow travelers
to fill out the application in English, as with CBP's paper-based form.
In addition, during our site visits, embassy officials expressed
concerns that some Visa Waiver Program travelers do not have Internet
access and, thus, will face difficulties in submitting their
information to ESTA.[Footnote 32]Implementing a user-friendly ESTA is
essential, especially for those travelers who do not have Internet
access or are not familiar with submitting forms online.
Implementation of Biometric Air Exit System before July 2009 Will Be
Difficult:
A third provision of the 9/11 Act requires that DHS implement a
biometric air exit system before July 1, 2009, or else the department's
authority to waive the 3 percent refusal rate requirement--and thereby
consider admitting countries with refusal rates between 3 percent and
10 percent--will be suspended until this system is in place. In March
2008, DHS testified that US-VISIT will begin deploying biometric exit
procedures in fiscal year 2009. DHS released a proposed rule for the
biometric exit system in April 2008, and the department plans to issue
a final rule before the end of 2008. According to the proposed rule,
air and sea carriers are to collect, store, and transmit to DHS
travelers' biometrics. During the public comment period on the proposed
rule, airlines, Members of Congress, and other stakeholders have raised
concerns about DHS's proposal, and resolving these concerns could take
considerable time. For example, the airline industry strongly opposes
DHS's plans to require airline personnel to collect digital
fingerprints of travelers departing the United States because it
believes it is a public sector function. We have issued a series of
reports on the US-VISIT program indicating that there is no clear
schedule for implementation of the exit portion of the system, and that
DHS will encounter difficulties in implementing the system by July
2009.[Footnote 33] Although DHS program officials stated that DHS is on
track to implement the biometric exit system by July 2009, it is
unlikely that DHS will meet this timeline. We are currently reviewing
DHS's proposed rule and plan to report later this year on our findings.
DHS Does Not Fully Consider Overstay Rates to Assess the Illegal
Immigration Risks of the Visa Waiver Program:
Some DHS components have expanded efforts to identify citizens who
enter the United States under the Visa Waiver Program and then overstay
their authorized period of admission. In 2004, US-VISIT established the
Data Integrity Group, which develops data on potential overstays by
comparing foreign nationals' arrival records with departure records
from U.S. airports and sea ports. US-VISIT provides data on potential
overstays to ICE, CBP, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
as well as to State's consular officers to aid in visa adjudication.
For example, US-VISIT sends regular reports to ICE's Compliance
Enforcement Unit on potential overstays, and ICE officials told us they
use these data regularly during investigations. In fiscal year 2007,
ICE's Compliance Enforcement Unit received more than 12,300 overstay
leads from the Data Integrity Group.[Footnote 34]As an example of one
of these leads, on November 27, 2007, ICE agents in Ventura,
California, arrested and processed for removal from the United States
an Irish citizen whose term of admission expired in September 2006. On
the basis of concerns that Visa Waiver Program travelers could be
overstaying, ICE has requested that US-VISIT place additional emphasis
on identifying potential overstays from program countries. In turn, ICE
has received funding to establish a Visa Waiver Enforcement Program
within the Compliance Enforcement Unit to investigate the additional
leads from US-VISIT. As part of this funding, ICE plans to hire 46
additional employees to help the unit increase its focus on identifying
individuals who traveled to the United States under the Visa Waiver
Program and potentially overstayed.
However, DHS is not fully monitoring compliance with a legislative
provision that requires a disqualification rate (this calculation
includes overstays) of less than 3.5 percent for a country to
participate in the Visa Waiver Program.[Footnote 35]Monitoring these
data is a long-standing statutory requirement for the program. We have
testified that the inability of the U.S. government to track the status
of visitors in the country, identify those who overstay their
authorized period of visit, and use these data to compute overstay
rates has been a long-standing weakness in the oversight of the Visa
Waiver Program.[Footnote 36] DHS's Visa Waiver Program Office reported
that it does not monitor country overstay rates as part of its
mandated, biennial assessment process for current visa waiver countries
because of weaknesses in US-VISIT's data.[Footnote 37]
Since 2004, however, the Data Integrity Group has worked to improve the
accuracy of US-VISIT's overstay data and can undertake additional
analyses to further validate these data. For example, using available
resources, the group conducts analyses, by hand, of computer-generated
overstay records to determine whether individuals identified as
overstays by the computer matches are indeed overstays. In addition, US-
VISIT analysts can search up to 12 additional law enforcement and
immigration databases to verify whether a potential overstay may, in
fact, be in the country illegally. While it receives periodic reporting
on potential overstays from US-VISIT, the Visa Waiver Program Office
has not requested that the Data Integrity Group provide validated
overstay rate estimates from visa waiver or Road Map countries since
2005. Although DHS has not designated an office with the responsibility
of developing such data for the purposes of the Visa Waiver Program, US-
VISIT officials told us that, with the appropriate resources, they
could provide more reliable overstay data and estimated rates, by
country, to the Visa Waiver Program Office, with support from other DHS
components, such as the Office of Immigration Statistics. For example,
the Visa Waiver Program Office could request additional analysis for
countries where the preliminary, computer-generated overstay rates
raised concerns about illegal immigration risks in the program. These
resulting estimates would be substantially more accurate than the
computer-generated overstay rates. However, the resulting estimates
would not include data on departures at land ports of entry. In
addition, as we have previously mentioned, airline departure data have
weaknesses.[Footnote 38]DHS has asserted that overstay data will
continue to improve with the implementation of the biometric US-VISIT
exit program.
In addition to US-VISIT, State's overseas consular sections develop
data on overstay rates that might be useful for assessing potential
illegal immigration risks of the Visa Waiver Program. Specifically,
some consular sections have conducted validation studies to determine
what percentage of visa holders travel to the United States and
potentially overstay. For example, at the U.S. embassy in Estonia,
consular officials conducted a validation study in the summer of 2006
that concluded that 2.0 percent to 2.7 percent of Estonian visa holders
traveling to the United States in 2005 had potentially overstayed.
[Footnote 39] US-VISIT overstay data, after appropriate analysis and in
conjunction with other available data, such as validation studies,
would provide DHS with key information to help evaluate the illegal
immigration risks of maintaining a country's membership or admitting
additional countries into the Visa Waiver Program.
DHS Has Implemented Many of GAO's Prior Recommendations Aimed at
Improving Efforts to Assess and Mitigate Risks in the Visa Waiver
Program:
In July 2006, we reported that the process for assessing and mitigating
risks in the Visa Waiver Program had weaknesses, and that DHS was not
equipped with sufficient resources to effectively monitor the program's
risks.[Footnote 40]For example, at the time of our report, DHS had only
two full-time staff charged with monitoring countries' compliance with
the program's requirements and working with countries seeking to join
the program. We identified several problems with the process by which
DHS was monitoring countries' adherence to the program requirements,
including a lack of consultation with key interagency stakeholders. In
addition, we reported that DHS needed to improve its communication with
officials at U.S. embassies so it could communicate directly with
officials best positioned to monitor compliance with the program's
requirements, and report on current events and issues of potential
concern in each of the participating countries. Also, at the time of
our 2006 report, the law required the timely reporting of passport
thefts for continued participation in the Visa Waiver Program, but DHS
had not established or communicated these time frames and operating
procedures to participating countries. In addition, DHS had not yet
issued guidance on what information must be shared, with whom, and
within what time frame.
To address these weaknesses, we recommended that DHS take a number of
actions to better assess and mitigate risks in the Visa Waiver Program.
As we note in table 1, DHS has taken actions to implement some of our
recommendations, but still needs to fully implement others. In
particular, DHS has provided the Visa Waiver Program Office with
additional resources since our 2006 report. As of April 2008, the
office had five additional full-time employees, and two other staff
from the Office of Policy that devote at least 50 percent of their time
to Visa Waiver Program tasks. In addition, staff from several other DHS
components assists the office on a regular basis, as well as during the
in-country security assessments for Road Map and current program
countries. In response to our recommendation to finalize clear,
consistent, and transparent protocols for the biennial country
assessment, the Visa Waiver Program Office drafted standard operating
procedures in November 2007 for conducting reviews of nominated and
participating visa waiver countries. In addition, DHS now provides
relevant stakeholders with copies of the most current mandated,
biennial country assessments; during our visits in early 2008, U.S.
embassy officials confirmed that the assessments are now accessible.
Furthermore, regarding our recommendation to develop and communicate
clear, standard operating procedures for the reporting of lost and
stolen blank and issued passports, DHS established criteria for the
reporting of lost and stolen passport data--including a definition of
"timely reporting" and an explanation of to whom in the U.S. government
countries should report--as part of the MOUs it is negotiating with
participating and Road Map countries.
Table 1: Status of Prior GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation:
Provide additional resources to strengthen the Visa Waiver Program
Office;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation:
Finalize clear, consistent, and transparent protocols for the biennial
country assessments and provide these protocols to stakeholders at
relevant agencies at headquarters and overseas. These protocols should
provide timelines for the entire assessment process, including the role
of a site visit, an explanation of the clearance process, and deadlines
for completion;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation:
Create real-time monitoring arrangements, including the identification
of visa-waiver points of contact at U.S. embassies, for all 27
participating countries; and establish protocols, in coordination with
the appropriate headquarters offices, for direct communication between
points of contact at overseas posts and DHS's Visa Waiver Program
Office;
Status: Partially implemented.
Recommendation:
Require periodic updates from points of contact at posts in countries
where there are law enforcement or security concerns relevant to the
Visa Waiver Program;
Status: Partially implemented.
Recommendation:
Provide complete copies of the most recent country assessments to
relevant stakeholders in headquarters and overseas posts;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation:
Require that all Visa Waiver Program countries provide the United
States and Interpol with nonbiographical data from lost or stolen blank
and issued passports;
Status: Partially implemented.
Recommendation:
Develop and communicate clear standard operating procedures for the
reporting of lost and stolen blank and issued passports, including a
definition of "timely reporting" and to whom in the U.S. government
countries should report;
Status: Implemented.
Recommendation:
Develop and implement a plan to make Interpol's stolen travel document
database automatically available during primary inspection at U.S.
ports of entry;
Status: Implemented.
Sources: GAO analysis of DHS data and GAO, Border Security: Stronger
Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program,
GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006).
[End of table]
Furthermore, DHS, in coordination with the U.S. National Central
Bureau, has initiated a system that allows DHS to screen foreign
nationals arriving at all U.S. international airports against
Interpol's database of lost and stolen travel documents before the
foreign nationals arrive in the country. Results to date indicate that
the system identifies two to three instances of fraudulent passports
per month. According to the National Central Bureau, Interpol's
database has intercepted passports that were not identified by DHS's
other screening systems. For example, on February 18, 2008, the
Interpol database identified a Nigerian national traveling on a
counterfeited British passport who attempted to enter the United States
at Newark International Airport. Upon arrival, the individual was
referred to secondary inspection and determined to be inadmissible to
the United States.
While DHS has taken action on many of our recommendations, it has not
fully implemented others. We recommended that DHS require that all Visa
Waiver Program countries provide the United States and Interpol with
nonbiographical data from lost or stolen blank and issued passports.
According to DHS, all current and aspiring visa waiver countries report
lost and stolen passport information to Interpol, and many report such
information to the United States. The 9/11 Act requires agreements
between the United States and Visa Waiver Program countries on the
reporting of lost and stolen passports within strict time limits;
however, none of the current visa waiver countries have yet to formally
establish lost and stolen passport reporting agreements by signing MOUs
with DHS. DHS also still needs to fully implement our recommendations
to create real-time monitoring arrangements, establish protocols for
direct communication with contacts at overseas posts, and require
periodic updates from these contacts. For example, while the Visa
Waiver Program Office has recently begun communicating and
disseminating relevant program information regularly with U.S. embassy
points of contact at Visa Waiver Program posts, officials at some of
the posts we visited in early 2008 reported that they had little
contact with the office and were not regularly informed of security
concerns or developments surrounding the program.
Conclusions:
The executive branch is moving aggressively to expand the Visa Waiver
Program in 2008 to allies in Central and Eastern Europe and South
Korea, after the countries have met certain requirements and DHS has
completed and certified key security requirements in the 9/11 Act.
However, DHS has not followed a transparent process for expanding the
program, thereby causing confusion among other U.S. agencies and
embassies overseas. The lack of a clear process could bring about
political repercussions if countries are not admitted to the program in
2008, as expected. In addition, DHS is not fully assessing a critical
illegal immigration risk of the Visa Waiver Program and its expansion
since it does not consider overstay data in its security assessments of
current and aspiring countries. DHS should determine what additional
data and refinements of that data are necessary to ensure that it can
assess and mitigate this potential risk to the United States. Finally,
DHS still needs to take actions to fully implement our prior
recommendations in light of plans to expand the program.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve management of the Visa Waiver Program and better assess and
mitigate risks associated with it, we are recommending that the
Secretary of Homeland Security take the following four actions:
* establish a clear process, in coordination with the Departments of
State and Justice, for program expansion that would include the
criteria used to determine which countries will be considered for
expansion and timelines for nominating countries, security assessments
of aspiring countries, and negotiation of any bilateral agreements to
implement the program's legislative requirements;
* designate an office with responsibility for developing overstay rate
information for the purposes of monitoring countries' compliance with
the statutory requirements of the Visa Waiver Program;
* direct that established office and other appropriate DHS components
to explore cost-effective actions necessary to further improve,
validate, and test the reliability of overstay data; and:
* direct the Visa Waiver Program Office to request an updated,
validated study of estimated overstay rates for current and aspiring
Visa Waiver Program countries, and determine the extent to which
additional research and validation of these data are required to help
evaluate whether particular countries pose a potential illegal
immigration risk to the United States.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS, State, and Justice for
review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced
in appendix IV, and technical comments, which we incorporated into the
report, as appropriate. Justice also provided written comments, which
are reprinted in appendix V. State did not provide comments on the
draft report.
DHS either agreed with, or stated that it was taking steps to
implement, all of our recommendations. For example, DHS indicated that
it is working with State to create procedures so that future Visa
Waiver Program candidate countries are selected and designated in as
transparent and uniform a manner as possible. In addition, DHS noted
that it is taking steps to improve the accuracy and reliability of the
department's overstay data. DHS also provided additional details about
its continued outreach efforts to the department's interagency partners
and foreign counterparts on the expansion process for the Visa Waiver
Program. Justice did not comment on our recommendations, but provided
additional information about the importance of monitoring countries'
reporting of lost and stolen passport data to Interpol. In addition,
Justice discussed its efforts, in collaboration with DHS, to include
screening against Interpol's lost and stolen passport database as part
of ESTA. Justice noted that use of Interpol's database continues to
demonstrate significant results in preventing the misuse of passports
to fraudulently enter the United States.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State, and the
U.S. Attorney General. Copies of this report will be made available to
others upon request. In addition, this report is available at no charge
on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, at
(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix VI.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To describe the process that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
is following to admit countries into the Visa Waiver Program, we
reviewed laws governing the program and its expansion, and relevant
regulations and agency operating procedures, as well as our prior
reports and testimonies. In particular, we reviewed DHS's standard
operating procedures for oversight and expansion of the Visa Waiver
Program. We spoke with officials from the Visa Waiver Program Office,
which is responsible for oversight of Visa Waiver Program requirements,
as well as representatives from the Department of State's (State)
Consular Affairs, Europe and Eurasia, and East Asia and Pacific
Bureaus. In addition, we visited U.S. embassies in three current visa
waiver countries--France, Japan, and the United Kingdom--whose
nationals comprise a large percentage annually of visa waiver travelers
to the United States. We also visited U.S. embassies in four countries-
-Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, and South Korea--with which DHS is
negotiating visa waiver status. During these visits, we interviewed
political, economic, consular, commercial, and law enforcement
officials regarding oversight of the Visa Waiver Program and its
expansion. We also conducted telephone interviews with consular
officials in four additional countries--Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Slovakia--that DHS also aims to admit into the Visa Waiver Program in
2008. We did not interview officials in Bulgaria, Poland, or Romania
because DHS told us that it does not anticipate that these countries
will be admitted into the program in 2008. We did not interview
officials in Malta because of the country's relatively small number of
annual Visa Waiver Program travelers to the United States.
To assess actions taken to mitigate potential risks in the Visa Waiver
Program, we focused on DHS's efforts to implement the new security
enhancements required by the 9/11 Act, as well as the recommendations
from our July 2006 report.[Footnote 41] First, to review the
department's plans for air exit system implementation, we collected and
analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from DHS's Office of
Policy, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status and Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program Office. We
also reviewed prior GAO reports on immigrant and visitor entry and exit
tracking systems.
Second, to analyze plans for the implementation of the Electronic
System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), we collected and analyzed
documentation and interviewed officials from DHS's Offices of Policy,
Screening Coordination, and General Counsel, as well as CBP officials
who are implementing the Web-based program. In addition, to understand
DHS's legal position regarding the statutory requirements for ESTA
implementation, on May 5, 2008, we requested, in writing, DHS's legal
position on certain ESTA statutory requirements, which the department
provided to us on June 6, 2008.
Third, regarding DHS's efforts to monitor citizens who enter the United
States under the Visa Waiver Program and then overstay their authorized
period of admission (referred to as "overstays"), we assessed the
reliability of the US-VISIT data on potential overstays, which are
based on air and sea carriers' arrival and departure data. We reviewed
documentation and interviewed cognizant U.S. VISIT officials about how
data on potential overstays are generated and validated. As we have
previously mentioned, we determined that data on potential overstays
that are generated automatically by US-VISIT's systems have major
limitations; however, many of these limitations could be overcome by a
series of manual checks and validations that US-VISIT can perform, upon
request.
Fourth, to determine the status of our prior recommendations to DHS on
oversight of the Visa Waiver Program, we developed a scale to classify
them as (1) implemented, (2) partially implemented, or (3) not
implemented. We collected and analyzed documentation and interviewed
officials from DHS's Visa Waiver Program Office on the actions that
office has taken since July 2006 to respond to our recommendations. In
addition, we met with International Criminal Police Organization
(Interpol) officials in Lyon, France, as well as officials from the
Department of Justice's Interpol-U.S. National Central Bureau to
discuss the status of DHS's access to Interpol's database of lost and
stolen travel documents. We concluded that a recommendation was (1)
"implemented," if the evidence indicated that DHS had taken a series of
actions addressing the recommendation; (2) "partially implemented," if
the evidence indicated that DHS had taken some action toward
implementation; and (3) "not implemented," if the evidence indicated
that DHS had not taken any action.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 to September
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Worldwide Refusal Rates for Short-term Business and
Tourism Visas, Fiscal Year 2007:
The Visa Waiver Program nonimmigrant visa refusal rate is based on the
number of visitor visa applications submitted, worldwide, by nationals
of that country. Visitor visas are issued for short-term business or
pleasure travel to the United States. The adjusted refusal rate is
calculated by first subtracting from the number of visas that were
initially refused (referred to as "refusals"), the number of visas that
were subsequently issued after further administrative consideration
(referred to as "overcomes")--or, in short, refusals minus overcomes
(see table 2). This resulting number is then divided by the number of
visa issuances plus refusals minus overcomes--that is, refusals minus
overcomes divided by issuances plus refusals minus overcomes. Adjusted
visa refusal rates for nationals of Visa Waiver Program countries
reflect only visa applications submitted at U.S. embassies and
consulates abroad. These rates do not take into account persons who,
under the Visa Waiver Program, travel to the United States without
visas. Visa Waiver Program country refusal rates, therefore, tend to be
higher than they would be if the Visa Waiver Program travelers were
included in the calculation, since such travelers in all likelihood
would have been issued visas had they applied, according to State. We
are presenting these data to show that the countries under
consideration for Visa Waiver Program admission do not all have refusal
rates of less than 10 percent; we did not assess the reliability of
these data.
Table 2: Worldwide Refusal Rates for Short-term Business and Tourism
Visas, Fiscal Year 2007:
Country: Afghanistan;
Adjusted refusal rate: 38%.
Country: Albania;
Adjusted refusal rate: 50%.
Country: Algeria;
Adjusted refusal rate: 2%3.
Country: Andorra;
Adjusted refusal rate: 9%.
Country: Angola;
Adjusted refusal rate: 13%.
Country: Antigua and Barbuda;
Adjusted refusal rate: 15%.
Country: Argentina;
Adjusted refusal rate: 4%.
Country: Armenia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 61%.
Country: Australia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 17%.
Country: Austria;
Adjusted refusal rate: 16%.
Country: Azerbaijan;
Adjusted refusal rate: 15%.
Country: Bahrain;
Adjusted refusal rate: 2%.
Country: Bangladesh;
Adjusted refusal rate: 50%.
Country: Barbados;
Adjusted refusal rate: 6%.
Country: Belarus;
Adjusted refusal rate: 26%.
Country: Belgium;
Adjusted refusal rate: 13%.
Country: Belize;
Adjusted refusal rate: 27%.
Country: Benin;
Adjusted refusal rate: 37%.
Country: Bhutan;
Adjusted refusal rate: 44%.
Country: Bolivia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 29%.
Country: Bosnia-Herzegovina;
Adjusted refusal rate: 19%.
Country: Botswana;
Adjusted refusal rate: 16%.
Country: Brazil;
Adjusted refusal rate: 10%.
Country: Brunei;
Adjusted refusal rate: 2%.
Country: Bulgaria;
Adjusted refusal rate: 14%.
Country: Burkina Faso;
Adjusted refusal rate: 43%.
Country: Burma;
Adjusted refusal rate: 50%.
Country: Burundi;
Adjusted refusal rate: 56%.
Country: Cambodia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 53%.
Country: Cameroon;
Adjusted refusal rate: 43%.
Country: Canada;
Adjusted refusal rate: 37%.
Country: Cape Verde;
Adjusted refusal rate: 40%.
Country: Central African Republic;
Adjusted refusal rate: 29%.
Country: Chad;
Adjusted refusal rate: 29%.
Country: Chile;
Adjusted refusal rate: 7%.
Country: China - Mainland;
Adjusted refusal rate: 21%.
Country: China - Taiwan;
Adjusted refusal rate: 5%.
Country: Colombia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 29%.
Country: Comoros;
Adjusted refusal rate: 25%.
Country: Congo (Brazzaville);
Adjusted refusal rate: 32%.
Country: Congo (Kinshasa);
Adjusted refusal rate: 35%.
Country: Costa Rica;
Adjusted refusal rate: 22%.
Country: Cote D`Ivoire;
Adjusted refusal rate: 46%.
Country: Croatia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 5%.
Country: Cuba;
Adjusted refusal rate: 53%.
Country: Cyprus;
Adjusted refusal rate: 2%.
Country: Czech Republic;
Adjusted refusal rate: 7%.
Country: Denmark;
Adjusted refusal rate: 11%.
Country: Djibouti;
Adjusted refusal rate: 22%.
Country: Dominica;
Adjusted refusal rate: 29%.
Country: Dominican Republic;
Adjusted refusal rate: 41%.
Country: Ecuador;
Adjusted refusal rate: 28%.
Country: Egypt;
Adjusted refusal rate: 34%.
Country: El Salvador;
Adjusted refusal rate: 50%.
Country: Equatorial Guinea;
Adjusted refusal rate: 24%.
Country: Eritrea;
Adjusted refusal rate: 49%.
Country: Estonia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 4%.
Country: Ethiopia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 46%.
Country: Federated States of Micronesia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 0%.
Country: Fiji;
Adjusted refusal rate: 33%.
Country: Finland;
Adjusted refusal rate: 16%.
Country: France;
Adjusted refusal rate: 8%.
Country: Gabon;
Adjusted refusal rate: 23%.
Country: Georgia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 55%.
Country: Germany;
Adjusted refusal rate: 10%.
Country: Ghana;
Adjusted refusal rate: 55%.
Country: Great Britain and Northern Ireland;
Adjusted refusal rate: 21%.
Country: Greece;
Adjusted refusal rate: 2%.
Country: Grenada;
Adjusted refusal rate: 27%.
Country: Guatemala;
Adjusted refusal rate: 54%.
Country: Guinea;
Adjusted refusal rate: 58%.
Country: Guinea - Bissau;
Adjusted refusal rate: 55%.
Country: Guyana;
Adjusted refusal rate: 62%.
Country: Haiti;
Adjusted refusal rate: 44%.
Country: Honduras;
Adjusted refusal rate: 38%.
Country: Hong Kong (BNO HK passport);
Adjusted refusal rate: 2%.
Country: Hong Kong S. A. R.;
Adjusted refusal rate: 3%.
Country: Hungary;
Adjusted refusal rate: 10%.
Country: Iceland;
Adjusted refusal rate: 9%.
Country: India;
Adjusted refusal rate: 22%.
Country: Indonesia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 40%.
Country: Iran;
Adjusted refusal rate: 45%.
Country: Iraq;
Adjusted refusal rate: 45%.
Country: Ireland;
Adjusted refusal rate: 24%.
Country: Israel;
Adjusted refusal rate: 3%.
Country: Italy;
Adjusted refusal rate: 7%.
Country: Jamaica;
Adjusted refusal rate: 38%.
Country: Japan;
Adjusted refusal rate: 12%.
Country: Jordan;
Adjusted refusal rate: 39%.
Country: Kazakhstan;
Adjusted refusal rate: 12%.
Country: Kenya;
Adjusted refusal rate: 34%.
Country: Kiribati;
Adjusted refusal rate: 20%.
Country: Kuwait;
Adjusted refusal rate: 4%.
Country: Kyrgyzstan;
Adjusted refusal rate: 30%.
Country: Laos;
Adjusted refusal rate: 73%.
Country: Latvia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 12%.
Country: Lebanon;
Adjusted refusal rate: 25%.
Country: Lesotho;
Adjusted refusal rate: 40%.
Country: Liberia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 51%.
Country: Libya;
Adjusted refusal rate: 25%.
Country: Liechtenstein;
Adjusted refusal rate: 7%.
Country: Lithuania;
Adjusted refusal rate: 13%.
Country: Luxembourg;
Adjusted refusal rate: 6%.
Country: Macau S.A.R.;
Adjusted refusal rate: 10%.
Country: Macedonia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 36%.
Country: Madagascar;
Adjusted refusal rate: 14%.
Country: Malawi;
Adjusted refusal rate: 37%.
Country: Malaysia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 8%.
Country: Maldives;
Adjusted refusal rate: 22%.
Country: Mali;
Adjusted refusal rate: 56%.
Country: Malta;
Adjusted refusal rate: 3%.
Country: Mauritania;
Adjusted refusal rate: 59%.
Country: Mauritius;
Adjusted refusal rate: 13%.
Country: Mexico[A];
Adjusted refusal rate: 33%.
Country: Moldova;
Adjusted refusal rate: 36%.
Country: Monaco;
Adjusted refusal rate: 38%.
Country: Mongolia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 61%.
Country: Morocco;
Adjusted refusal rate: 24%.
Country: Mozambique;
Adjusted refusal rate: 18%.
Country: Namibia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 5%.
Country: Nauru;
Adjusted refusal rate: 0%.
Country: Nepal;
Adjusted refusal rate: 55%.
Country: Netherlands;
Adjusted refusal rate: 12%.
Country: New Zealand;
Adjusted refusal rate: 8%.
Country: Nicaragua;
Adjusted refusal rate: 46%.
Country: Niger;
Adjusted refusal rate: 53%.
Country: Nigeria;
Adjusted refusal rate: 32%.
Country: Norway;
Adjusted refusal rate: 9%.
Country: Oman;
Adjusted refusal rate: 4%.
Country: Pakistan;
Adjusted refusal rate: 40%.
Country: Palestinian Authority;
Adjusted refusal rate: 56%.
Country: Panama;
Adjusted refusal rate: 26v.
Country: Papua New Guinea;
Adjusted refusal rate: 12%.
Country: Paraguay;
Adjusted refusal rate: 18%.
Country: Peoples Republic of Korea - North Korea;
Adjusted refusal rate: 14%.
Country: Peru;
Adjusted refusal rate: 44%.
Country: Philippines;
Adjusted refusal rate: 32%.
Country: Poland;
Adjusted refusal rate: 25%.
Country: Portugal;
Adjusted refusal rate: 8%.
Country: Qatar;
Adjusted refusal rate: 2%.
Country: Republic of Palau;
Adjusted refusal rate: 0%.
Country: Republic of the Marshall Islands;
Adjusted refusal rate: 3%.
Country: Romania;
Adjusted refusal rate: 38%.
Country: Russia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 12%.
Country: Rwanda;
Adjusted refusal rate: 47%.
Country: Samoa;
Adjusted refusal rate: 29%.
Country: San Marino;
Adjusted refusal rate: 40%.
Country: Sao Tome and Principe;
Adjusted refusal rate: 10%.
Country: Saudi Arabia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 6%.
Country: Senegal;
Adjusted refusal rate: 61%.
Country: Serbia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 64%.
Country: Serbia and Montenegro;
Adjusted refusal rate: 23%.
Country: Seychelles;
Adjusted refusal rate: 19%.
Country: Sierra Leone;
Adjusted refusal rate: 43%.
Country: Singapore;
Adjusted refusal rate: 9%.
Country: Slovakia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 12%.
Country: Slovenia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 7%.
Country: Solomon Islands;
Adjusted refusal rate: 5%.
Country: Somalia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 52%.
Country: South Africa;
Adjusted refusal rate: 6%.
Country: South Korea;
Adjusted refusal rate: 4%.
Country: Spain;
Adjusted refusal rate: 7%.
Country: Sri Lanka;
Adjusted refusal rate: 28%.
Country: St. Kitts and Nevis;
Adjusted refusal rate: 21%.
Country: St. Lucia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 27%.
Country: St. Vincent and The Grenadines;
Adjusted refusal rate: 23%.
Country: Sudan;
Adjusted refusal rate: 34%.
Country: Suriname;
Adjusted refusal rate: 11%.
Country: Swaziland;
Adjusted refusal rate: 19%.
Country: Sweden;
Adjusted refusal rate: 8%.
Country: Switzerland;
Adjusted refusal rate: 7%.
Country: Syria;
Adjusted refusal rate: 36%.
Country: Tajikistan;
Adjusted refusal rate: 30%.
Country: Tanzania;
Adjusted refusal rate: 21%.
Country: Thailand;
Adjusted refusal rate: 17%.
Country: The Bahamas;
Adjusted refusal rate: 5%.
Country: The Gambia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 57%.
Country: Timor-Leste;
Adjusted refusal rate: 0%.
Country: Togo;
Adjusted refusal rate: 48%.
Country: Tonga;
Adjusted refusal rate: 45%.
Country: Trinidad and Tobago;
Adjusted refusal rate: 20%.
Country: Tunisia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 24%.
Country: Turkey;
Adjusted refusal rate: 15%.
Country: Turkmenistan;
Adjusted refusal rate: 49%.
Country: Tuvalu;
Adjusted refusal rate: 12%.
Country: Uganda;
Adjusted refusal rate: 43%.
Country: Ukraine;
Adjusted refusal rate: 38%.
Country: United Arab Emirates;
Adjusted refusal rate: 5%.
Country: Unknown place of birth or stateless;
Adjusted refusal rate: 42%.
Country: Uruguay;
Adjusted refusal rate: 12%.
Country: Uzbekistan;
Adjusted refusal rate: 71%.
Country: Vanuatu;
Adjusted refusal rate: 25%.
Country: Vatican City;
Adjusted refusal rate: 0%.
Country: Venezuela;
Adjusted refusal rate: 19%.
Country: Vietnam;
Adjusted refusal rate: 36%.
Country: Yemen;
Adjusted refusal rate: 64%.
Country: Zambia;
Adjusted refusal rate: 46%.
Country: Zimbabwe;
Adjusted refusal rate: 32%.
Source: Department of State.
[A] Includes applications for both B visas and combination B-1/B-2/
Mexican Border Crossing Cards.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Key Legislative Requirements for Inclusion in the Visa
Waiver Program:
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 created the Visa Waiver
Program as a pilot program.[Footnote 42]In 2000, the program became
permanent under the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act.[Footnote 43] In
2002, we reported on the legislative requirements to which countries
must adhere before they are eligible for inclusion in the Visa Waiver
Program.[Footnote 44] In general, the requirements are as follows:
* A low nonimmigrant visa refusal rate. To qualify for visa waiver
status, a country must maintain a refusal rate of less than 3 percent
for its citizens who apply for business and tourism visas. If DHS
certifies that it has met certain requirements under the 9/11 Act, it
will have the authority to waive the 3 percent refusal rate
requirement--currently up to a maximum of 10 percent--provided that the
country meets other security requirements.
* A machine-readable passport program. The country must certify that it
issues machine-readable passports to its citizens. As of June 26, 2005,
all travelers are required to have a machine-readable passport to enter
the United States under this program.
* Reciprocity. The country must offer visa-free travel for U.S.
citizens.
Persons entering the United States under the Visa Waiver Program must:
* have a valid passport issued by the participating country and be a
national of that country;[Footnote 45]
* be seeking entry for 90 days or less as a temporary visitor for
business or tourism;
* have been determined by CBP at the U.S. port of entry to represent no
threat to the welfare, health, safety, or security of the United
States;
* have complied with conditions of any previous admission under the
program (e.g., individuals must have stayed in the United States for 90
days or less during prior visa waiver visits);
* if entering by air or sea, possess a round-trip transportation ticket
issued by a carrier that has signed an agreement with the U.S.
government to participate in the program, and must have arrived in the
United States aboard such a carrier; and:
* if entering by land, have proof of financial solvency and a domicile
abroad to which they intend to return.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
[hyperlink, http://wws.dhs.gov]
August 27, 2008:
Mr. Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
RE: Draft Report GAO-08-967, Visa Waiver Program: Actions Needed to
Improve Management of Expansion Process and Assess and Mitigate Program
Risks (GAO Job Code 320540):
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS or the Department) appreciates
the opportunity to review and comment on the draft report referenced
above.
The report is broadly supportive of the Department's efforts to date.
It acknowledges that DHS has achieved several significant security
enhancements during the expansion process. It also concludes that DHS
has fully implemented the majority of the recommendations from the 2006
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report thereby improving
the Department's ability to assess and mitigate program risks.
Moreover, many of its recommendations are consistent with our current
approach, and we expect to be able to implement them. In fact, the
Department began, even before the report was drafted, to address
several of these issues. We also believe that the steps the Department
has taken to implement the security provisions mandated by the
"Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007" P.L. 109-
13 (9/11 Act) will ensure that the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) continues
to be appropriately structured to assess and mitigate program risks and
to adapt to evolving travel needs and security standards.
The following details the Department's response to issues raised in the
report particularly with respect to GAO's conclusions and
recommendations.
GAO states that the executive branch is moving quickly to expand the
Visa Waiver Program, but DHS has not followed a transparent process.
The report does not acknowledge sufficiently the dynamic and fluid
nature of the VWP expansion process. At various points over the past
year, DHS has had to adjust the schedule and manner of engagement to
expand and modernize the VWP in response to events. As evidenced by the
following information, DHS made these adjustments in as transparent a
manner as possible under the circumstances. In addition, DHS responded
promptly and favorably to all Congressional requests for information
and briefings.
DHS did not follow its own November 2007 standard operating procedures
(SOPs), which set forth the key milestones that DHS and aspiring
countries must meet before countries are admitted into the program.
DHS agrees that it did not precisely follow the November 2007 SOPs
(which have since been updated). Nevertheless, the Visa Waiver Program
Office (VWPO) staff followed a logical and transparent process for
expansion of the program. The VWPO initially created the SOP as an
internal document to assist program staff. It was not intended as
formal guidance; nor was it meant for a wider audience. Moreover, VWPO
staff understood that the procedures were subject to change should
circumstances warrant. In fact, the SOP is normally updated after the
completion of a country review cycle to account for relevant
developments and lessons learned. [See comment 1]
State, Justice, and U.S. Embassy officials stated that DHS created
confusion among interagency partners and aspiring Visa Waiver Program
countries.
DHS has successfully mitigated any confusion caused by a fluid and
dynamic expansion process in the following ways: technical briefings
for each of the aspirant countries to explain the new requirements and
the designation process; regular communication with US. embassy
personnel, DHS offices/personnel overseas, State and Justice offices
with equities in the VWP, and foreign government representatives; and
numerous staff and high-level meetings with State, Justice, and
aspirant country officials who are partners in the expansion process.
U.S. Embassy officials in several aspiring countries told us that it
had been difficult to explain the expansion process to foreign
counterparts and manage their expectations.
DHS headquarters officials have made and continue to make significant
and successful efforts to communicate next steps in VWP modernization
and expansion to various DHS and U S. embassy personnel as well as to
representatives from the embassies of current and aspirant VWP
countries in Washington, D.C. The VWPO is in near-daily contact with
the Department of State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, the designated
contact point for VWP issues, as well as with multiple consular
sections overseas. More formally, DHS sent regular email updates on VWP
reform efforts to U S. embassies in aspiring countries and held a
number of teleconferences with affected posts to discuss current
developments in the VWP. Finally, DHS held three high-level
informational meetings with the embassies of current VWP and "Road Map"
countries between March 2008 and July 2008, to explain the U S.
government's approach to VWP modernization and expansion and sent a
number of email announcements to the same audience.
State officials said that it was difficult to explain to countries with
fiscal year 2007 refusal rates below 10 percent that have signaled
interest in joining the program (Croatia, Israel, and Taiwan) why DHS
is not negotiating with them, given that DHS is negotiating with
several countries that had visa refusal rates above 10 percent
(Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia).
As GAO mentions in its report, State Department and DHS formulated a
list of 13 countries with whom the US. government planned to engage as
it sought to expand the Visa Waiver Program, called the "Road Map
Initiative." The State Department and DHS formulated the list on the
basis of a variety of factors, including the likely impact of a
country's entry on the law enforcement, national security, and
immigration interests of the United States; travel patterns; and
whether the country already offered U S. citizens visa-free travel
privileges. As State Department personnel are well aware, a low visa
refusal rate alone was not sufficient basis for inclusion in the "Road
Map." Furthermore, in White House-led policy discussions including all
agencies it was agreed that due to workload management issues the focus
this year would remain on identified Roadmap countries. [See comment 2]
GAO states that DHS has not fully developed tools aimed at assessing
and mitigating risks of the Visa Waiver Program noting that:
a. DHS must certify that it can verify the departure of not less than
97 percent of foreign nationals exiting U.S. airports;
b. DHS must certify that an Electronic System for Travel Authorization
for screening visa waiver travelers in advance of their travel is
"fully operational;"
c. For DHS to maintain its authority to admit certain countries into
the program, the 9/11 Act requires that the air exit system also
incorporate biometric indicators (such as fingerprints) by July 1,
2009. However, DHS will likely face difficulties implementing this
program due, in part, to opposition from the airline industry.
The GAO's claim that DHS has not fully developed the tools to assess
and mitigate risks in the VWP is premature as it rests on incomplete
information regarding the status of both the biographic and biometric
air exit systems and the Electronic System for Travel Authorization
(ESTA). As of the date of the draft report, these requirements have not
yet been completely met; the Department has not claimed otherwise. On
the contrary, DHS has consistently stated its intention to certify
later in 2008 both that an air exit system is in place that can verify
the departure of not less than 97% of foreign nationals who exit
through U S. airports and that ESTA is fully operational. Similarly,
the Department expects to implement a biometric exit system as required
by the 9/11 Act, despite significant resistance both on Capitol Hill
and in the private sector. Overall, GAO's finding at best reflects the
state of the VWP program in July 2008, prior to the implementation of
the new requirements. For example, ESTA was made available to VWP
travelers on a voluntary basis on August 1, 2008, the week after the
draft GAO report was released. The rollout has been smooth and
successful-with more than 50,000 applications processed to date-and the
Department continues to work with the Departments of State and
Commerce, as well as the travel and tourism industries, on outreach
efforts. Therefore, the draft report presents outdated information that
does not reflect the current state of the VWP or the publicly announced
implementation dates for the 9/11 Act security enhancements. [See
comment 3]
GAO states that DHS does not fully consider countries' overstay rates
when assessing illegal immigration risks in the Visa Waiver Program.
Neither the VWP statute nor regulations require that DHS consider a
country's overstay rates when determining the eligibility of a country
to join the VWP. A VWP member country's overstay rate would, however,
be considered as a factor to determine a country's continued
eligibility for participation in the Program. Countries' overstay rates
also may be considered as a factor to determine whether a country is
eligible for VWP membership based on a waiver of the low nonimmigrant
refusal rate requirement. However, waiver under that provision (8
U.S.C. § 1187(c)(8)) is not possible until the 97 percent air exit
system is certified and the Secretary, jointly with the Secretary of
State, establishes the maximum visa overstay rate. To date, DHS has not
formally relied on overstay data during country assessments because of
weaknesses in the quality of the relevant data. Nevertheless, DHS
agrees that overstay information should be developed to assess and
mitigate risks, and has been working to remedy these data problems and
develop overstay rates for foreign nationals arriving in the United
States. Based on its preliminary analysis, the Department believes that
the current data will soon be reliable enough to use to inform its
country assessments.
GAO states that DHS has implemented many recommendations from the 2006
report, but has not fully implemented others. GAO asserts that DHS has
"partially implemented" the following:
a. Create real-time monitoring arrangements, including the
identification of visa waiver points of contact at U.S. embassies, for
all 27 participating countries; and establish protocols, in
coordination with appropriate headquarters offices, for direct
communications between points of contact at overseas posts and DHS's
Visa Waiver Program Office.
DHS has fully implemented this recommendation. The VWPO monitors both
open source information and classified intelligence relating to VWP
countries on a daily basis. The VWPO has established points of contact
(POCs) at U S. Embassies and Consulates in the 27 participating
countries, as well as 13 roadmaps, to include Consular Section
officials, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Attaches, Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) Attaches, U S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) Attaches, and Legal Attaches. The VWPO communicates
directly with these officials (as well as with Consular Affairs in
Washington) and utilizes more formal tasking processes with the
appropriate headquarters offices when necessary. For example, the VWPO
distributes formal requests for information (RFIs) to ICE, CBP, USCIS,
State, and Justice headquarters offices before a VWP site-visit is
conducted. Many of the questions contained in these RFIs are for
embassy personnel to answer.
b. Require periodic updates from points of contacts at posts in
countries where there are law enforcement or security concerns relevant
to the Visa Waiver Program.
DHS has fully implemented this recommendation. The VWPO actively
engages POCs at U S. Embassies and Consulates to augment its continual
monitoring process. In addition, the VWPO receives-via appropriate
channels frequent updates on law enforcement and security concerns from
the Intelligence Community. [See comment 4]
c. Require that all Visa Waiver Program countries provide the United
States and Interpol with non-biographical data from lost and stolen
issued and blank passports.
Several VWP countries already report this data to the United States,
either directly or through Interpol or the Regional Movement Alert
System. Moreover, pursuant to an agreement between the U S. National
Central Bureau and the Department, the VWPO receives data on lost and
stolen passport reporting to Interpol and engages countries as
appropriate. As part of DHS's efforts to expand and modernize the VWP,
the Department is requiring current members to sign Memoranda of
Understanding (MOU). Among its other provisions, the MOU commits
signatories to report to Interpol or otherwise make available to the
United States Government information about lost and stolen issued and
blank passports. Eight aspirant countries have signed MOUs to date. DHS
has supplied templates of the MOU to all current VWP countries in
preparation for negotiations and is in active negotiations with several
of them. [See comment 5]
GAO quotes DHS Assistant Secretary for Policy Development Richard Barth
as follows: "The Department chose to include previous departures and
changes of immigration status records in its methodology because this
method allowed the department to achieve a match rate of 97 percent or
greater."
The quote attributed to Assistant Secretary Barth is inaccurate. As DHS
has made clear on several occasions, it has not decided on a final
methodology to verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of
foreign nationals exiting U S. airports. As noted above, the Department
intends to make this certification later this year consistent with the
statutory requirement. [See comment 6]
Recommendations and Action Taken or Planned:
The U.S. Government Accountability Office makes four recommendations in
this draft report to improve the management of the Visa Waiver Program
and better assess and mitigate risks:
1. Establish a clear process, in coordination with the Departments of
State and Justice, for program expansion that would include the
criteria used to determine which countries will be considered for
expansion and timelines for nominating countries, security assessments
of aspiring countries, and negotiation of any bilateral agreements to
implement the program's legislative requirements.
DHS and State are currently working to create procedures so that future
candidate countries are selected and designated in as transparent and
uniform manner as possible and that expectations are appropriately
managed during the process. That being said, program expansion criteria
can not be boiled down to a simple "check-list." Potential candidate
countries will be evaluated based on a variety of factors, including
the likely impact of their designation on the law enforcement, national
security, and immigration interests of the United States; travel
patterns; and the extent of security cooperation with the United
States.
2. Designate an office with responsibility for developing overstay rate
information for the purposes of monitoring countries' compliance with
the statutory requirements of the Visa Waiver Program.
To date, three DHS offices have collaboratively developed overstay rate
estimates based on their roles in the process: CBP Office of Field
Operations, US-VISIT, and the Office of Immigration Statistics. DHS is
currently assessing the feasibility and effectiveness of designating a
single office to assume this responsibility.
3. Direct that office and other appropriate DHS components to explore
cost effective actions necessary to further improve, validate, and test
the reliability of overstay data;
DHS is currently taking several steps to improve the accuracy and
reliability of the overstay data. For example, CBP will continue to
audit carrier performance and work with airlines to improve the
accuracy and completeness of data collection. The accuracy of the
overstay rate estimates also depends on the precision of the matching
algorithms. US-VISIT expects to receive a preliminary evaluation of the
current matching algorithms with possible recommended improvements from
the Lawrence-Livermore National Labs this fall.
4. Direct the Visa Waiver Program Office to request an updated,
validated study of estimated overstay rates for current and aspiring
Visa Waiver Program countries and determine the extent to which
additional research and validation of the data is required to help
evaluate whether particular countries pose a potential illegal
immigration risk to the United States.
The VWPO-working with the Office of Immigration Statistics-has
requested estimated overstay rates for current and aspiring VWP
countries. The VWPO has further requested additional validation of
these estimates. Based on its preliminary analysis of data provided by
US-VISIT, the Department believes that the current data will soon be
reliable enough to inform VWP country assessments.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
Following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland Security's
letter dated August 27, 2008.
GAO Comments:
1. We disagree that the department followed a transparent process for
expansion of the program. As we state in our report, State and Justice
officials told us that the lack of a transparent timeline and
requirements for Visa Waiver Program expansion has led to confusion
among U.S. agencies in headquarters' offices and at U.S. embassies
overseas, as well as foreign governments seeking to join the program.
Moreover, absent clear direction from DHS, U.S. embassy officials in
several aspiring countries told us that it had been difficult to
explain the expansion process to their foreign counterparts and manage
their expectations about when those countries might be admitted into
the Visa Waiver Program. Therefore, we recommend in this report that
DHS establish a clear process, in coordination with State and Justice,
for program expansion. DHS noted that it is currently working to create
procedures so that future candidate countries are selected and
designated in as transparent and uniform a manner as possible and
expectations are appropriately managed during the process.
2. Aside from the 13 Road Map countries identified in 2005, State
officials told us that they lacked a clear rationale to explain to
other aspiring, non-Road Map countries with refusal rates under 10
percent (Croatia, Israel, and Taiwan) that they will not be considered
in 2008 due to the executive branch's plans to expand the program first
to South Korea and countries in Central and Eastern Europe. DHS noted
that it is currently working to create procedures so that future
candidate countries are selected and designated in as transparent and
uniform a manner as possible and expectations are appropriately managed
during the process.
3. We have updated the report to indicate that ESTA began accepting
voluntary applications from visa waiver travelers on August 1, 2008.
However, DHS does not anticipate that ESTA authorizations will be
mandatory for visa waiver travelers until after January 12, 2009. As we
state in our report, and as DHS noted, the department has not yet
certified that it can verify the departure of not less than 97 percent
of foreign nationals exiting U.S. airports, or that an Electronic
System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) for screening visa waiver
travelers in advance of their travel is "fully operational." Moreover,
DHS has not yet implemented a biometric air exit system at U.S.
airports. Thus, DHS has not yet fully developed the tools to assess and
mitigate risks in the Visa Waiver Program.
4. In July 2006, we reported that DHS needed to improve its
communication with officials at U.S. embassies so it could communicate
directly with officials best positioned to monitor compliance with the
program's requirements, and report on current events and issues of
potential concern in each of the participating countries. Therefore, we
recommended that DHS establish points of contact at U.S. embassies and
develop protocols to ensure that the Visa Waiver Program Office
receives periodic updates in countries where there are security
concerns. As we note in this report, the Visa Waiver Program Office has
recently begun communicating and disseminating relevant program
information regularly with U.S. embassy officials at Visa Waiver
Program posts. However, despite our requests during the course of this
review--and again following our receipt of DHS's formal comments on the
draft of this report--the department has not provided us with
sufficient documentation to demonstrate that it has established points
of contact at U.S. embassies for all 27 participating countries or
established protocols for communications between these contacts and the
Visa Waiver Program Office. Furthermore, the department has not
provided us with documentation to demonstrate that established points
of contact are reporting periodically to the Visa Waiver Program
Office. Therefore, we cannot conclude that these 2006 recommendations
are fully implemented.
5. DHS noted that it has not yet signed memorandums of understanding
(MOU) with any of the 27 current Visa Waiver Program countries. Because
the MOUs will commit all signatories to report to Interpol or otherwise
make available to the United States information about lost and stolen
blank and issued passports, this recommendation will remain open until
all MOUs are finalized.
6. To verify the departure of not less than 97 percent of foreign
nationals exiting U.S. airports, DHS reported to us in December 2007
that it will match records, reported by airlines, of visitors departing
the country with the department's existing records of any prior
arrivals, immigration status changes, or prior departures from the
United States. In January 2008, the Assistant Secretary for Policy
Development made this statement, which corroborated data that we
received from US-VISIT in late October 2007. At the time of our
February 2008 testimony,[Footnote 46]DHS confirmed to us that it
planned to employ a methodology that begins with departure records;
however, as DHS indicated in its written comments on a draft of this
report, it has still not decided on a final methodology. DHS has not
provided us with information on any other options that it might be
considering to meet this provision. Furthermore, the department has not
explained how and when it intends to validate these data.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
National Central Bureau -Interpol:
Washington, DC 20530:
August 26, 2008:
Jess T. Ford:
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the final draft of the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled "Visa Waiver
Program: Actions Needed to Improve Management Expansion Process and
Assess and Mitigate Program Risks." The draft was reviewed by the US
National Central Bureau of Interpol (USNCB), and relevant components of
the Department of Justice (DOJ). This letter constitutes the USNCB's
formal comments. I request that the GAO include this letter in the
final report.
As noted in the report, DOJ and the Departments of Homeland Security
(DHS) and State (DoS) have collaborated extensively to bring
international lost and stolen passport data, provided by Interpol, to
United States (US) ports-of-entry and the US law enforcement community.
Use of the Interpol Lost and Stolen Travel Document Database (SLTD) in
the United States continues to demonstrate significant and sustained
results in thwarting the misuse of lost and stolen passports by
criminals seeking to fraudulently enter the US.
USNCB, in collaboration with DHS and DoS, played a key role in the
development of international standard operating procedures for the
reporting of lost and stolen passport data to Interpol. The United
States is presently in the top tier of Interpol member countries for
both reporting and consulting of this data. We believe that the
establishment, by Interpol, of a formal, transparent and accurate
monitoring system for country reporting to the SLTD would greatly
benefit the overall success of the system and bolster DHS' Visa Waiver
Program. Such a mechanism would allow the US and other participating
countries to track reporting compliance, identify discrepancies and
eliminate the need for duplicate reporting.
Based on the success of the Advance Passenger Manifest (MIS)-Interpol
interface, currently in place at all US ports-of-entry, the USNCB
engaged in a cooperative arrangement with DHS to incorporate SLTD
database checks for the Electronic System for Travel Authorization
(ESTA) program. The Interpol-ES TA interface was established in May
2008 and tested in a production environment in July 2008, prior to the
program launch earlier this month. At this time, I am happy to report
that the ESTA-Interpol system is functioning seamlessly and has already
resulted in automated denials of applications involving passports known
to the Interpol lost/stolen database.
We appreciate the efforts of you and your staff in highlighting the
work of the Department and Interpol in this important program.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Martin Renkiewicz:
Director:
cc:
Vicky Caponiti, Audit Liaison:
US Department of Justice:
Ronald K. Noble:
Interpol Secretary General:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128, or fordj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, John Brummet, Assistant
Director; Teresa Abruzzo; Kathryn Bernet; Joseph Carney; Martin de
Alteriis; Etana Finkler; Eric Larson; and Mary Moutsos made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The participating countries are Andorra, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brunei, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
[2] GAO, Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and
Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-854] (Washington, D.C.: July
28, 2006).
[3] The refusal rate refers only to the temporary business and tourism
visa applications that are denied as a percentage of the total
temporary business and tourism visa applications for nationals of that
country.
[4] See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53.
[5] DHS's Visa Waiver Program Office, known prior to September 2007 as
the Visa Waiver Oversight Unit within the Office of International
Enforcement, is led by a director, who reports to the DHS Assistant
Secretary for Policy Development.
[6] The U.S. National Central Bureau in Washington, D.C., facilitates
international law enforcement cooperation among the United States and
Interpol and its other member countries.
[7] According to DHS, ESTA will be implemented as a mandatory program
for all visa waiver travelers 60 days after publication of a notice in
the Federal Register. DHS anticipates issuing that notice in November
2008, for implementation of the mandatory ESTA requirements on January
12, 2009.
[8] This figure does not account for multiple admissions into the
United States under the Visa Waiver Program by the same individual.
[9] The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
created the Visa Waiver Program as a pilot program. In 2000, the
program became permanent under the Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act,
Pub. L. No. 106-396.
[10] Section 711 of the 9/11 Act specifically grants DHS the authority
to waive the 3 percent refusal rate requirement for countries--
currently up to a maximum of 10 percent--provided those countries meet
other security requirements.
[11] This form is CBP's I-94W Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Arrival/
Departure Form. According to DHS, the department is coordinating with
commercial aircraft and vessel carriers on the development and
implementation of messaging capabilities that will enable CBP to
provide the carriers with messages pertaining to a passenger's boarding
status. Once ESTA is mandatory and all carriers are capable of
receiving and validating messages from CBP pertaining to the traveler's
ESTA status as part of their boarding status, DHS plans to eliminate
the I-94W requirement.
[12] ESTA authorizations will be valid for up to 2 years and will allow
the individual to travel to the United States repeatedly within that
period. In some circumstances, such as when a passport has expired or a
traveler has changed his or her name, the traveler must apply for a new
ESTA authorization.
[13] In addition to receiving an authorization or rejection notice upon
submitting an ESTA application, the applicant may also receive a
response noting that the application is pending.
[14] In 2006, we reported on the executive branch's process for
admitting additional countries into the Visa Waiver Program. See GAO,
Process for Admitting Additional Countries into the Visa Waiver
Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-835R]
(Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006).
[15] State must report to the appropriate congressional committees on
the total number of nationals of that country who applied for U.S.
visas in that country during the previous calendar year; the total
number of such nationals who received U.S. visas during the previous
calendar year; the total number of such nationals who were refused U.S.
visas during the previous calendar year, and, specifically, under which
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act they were refused; and
the number of such nationals who were refused visas under section
214(b)of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a percentage of the
visas that were issued to such nationals. In addition, not later than
May 1 of each year, the U.S. chief of mission (acting or permanent) to
each country under consideration for inclusion in the Visa Waiver
Program, must certify to the appropriate congressional committees that
the information described in the report is accurate, and must provide a
copy of the certification to the congressional committees.
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-854].
[17] According to CBP, the Immigration Advisory Program aims to enhance
the safety of air travel by, among other things, reducing the number of
improperly documented passengers traveling from or through a country to
the United States. As of August 2008, the program operates in airports
in Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Frankfurt, Germany; London, England
(Heathrow Airport and Gatwick Airport); Manchester, England; Madrid,
Spain; Seoul, South Korea; Tokyo, Japan; and Warsaw, Poland.
[18] Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 required the Secretary
of State to develop a proposal for the President's approval for
enhancing cooperation with certain foreign governments--beginning with
those countries for which the United States has waived visa
requirements--to establish appropriate access to the participating
governments' terrorism screening information. State determined that the
most effective way to obtain this information was to seek bilateral
agreements to share information on a reciprocal basis. In May 2008, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Visa Services testified that
State anticipates completing these agreements with all of the Road Map
countries by the end of September 2008. See, The White House, Homeland
Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6, Subject: Integration and Use of
Screening Information (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2003).
[19] GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of Homeland
Security's Plan to Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-458T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
28, 2008).
[20] Air carriers transmit visitor manifest information, which is
obtained directly from government-issued passports, to CBP through the
Advanced Passenger Information System. This system includes arrival and
departure manifest information, such as name, date of birth, travel
document issuing country, gender, U.S. destination address, entry date,
and departure date. As of February 19, 2008, commercial carriers are
required to transmit manifest information to be vetted by DHS prior to
departure of the aircraft.
[21] This includes changes and extensions of the visits of lawfully
admitted, nonimmigrant foreign nationals.
[22] This could include foreign nationals who departed after their
authorized period of admission expired, as well as those foreign
nationals who may have remained in the country as overstays.
[23] According to ICE officials at DHS, this type of information
provides a more complete history of an alien and is useful for law
enforcement purposes, such as criminal prosecution and documenting
activities.
[24] A DHS official told us that the system functions by matching the
departure record with an alien's "account," which may contain numerous
prior arrivals, departures, and immigration benefit transaction
records. The official also stated that a specific departure record
match may not fall chronologically in the alien's account after an
arrival; it may fall, for example, after a record that an immigrant
benefit was granted to extend the alien's stay for an additional 6
months.
[25] DHS's US-VISIT program collects, maintains, and shares data,
including biometric identifiers like digital fingerprints, on selected
foreign nationals entering the United States to verify their identities
as they arrive at U.S. air, sea, and land ports of entry. DHS currently
operates the entry portion of the US-VISIT program at more than 300
U.S. air, sea, and land ports of entry. When fully implemented, US-
VISIT is also intended to capture the same information from foreign
nationals as they depart the country. The program aims to, among other
things, identify foreign nationals who have overstayed or violated the
terms of their visit.
[26] DHS has not implemented long-standing GAO recommendations to
collect departure information and make new estimates of overstays by
air. See GAO, Illegal Immigration: INS Overstay Estimation Methods Need
Improvement, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/PEMD-95-
20] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 1995); and Illegal Aliens: Despite
Data Limitations, Current Methods Provide Better Population Estimates,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/PEMD-93-25]
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 3, 1993).
[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-854].
[28] Conference Report on H.R. 1, Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (July 25, 2007).
[29] DHS attorneys stated that the department also hopes to certify
ESTA as fully operational in early November. In addition, as we have
previously mentioned, to consider admitting countries into the program
with refusal rates between 3 percent and 10 percent, DHS must also
certify that the air exit system is in place.
[30] GAO, Border Security: State Department Should Plan for Potentially
Significant Staffing and Facilities Shortfalls Caused by Changes in the
Visa Waiver Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-
08-623] (Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2008).
[31] As of May 2008, DHS had provided State with preliminary data that
suggest how many names might be rejected by ESTA, on the basis of
rejection rates from CBP's Advance Passenger Information System;
however, we found that DHS had not developed any estimates of the
number of people who would choose to proactively apply for visas rather
than submit an application to ESTA. According to consular officials,
the percentage of travelers who choose to obtain a visa could exceed
potential ESTA rejection rates of 1 percent to 3 percent. See GAO-08-
623.
[32] According to DHS, ESTA is designed to allow third parties to file
applications on behalf of other persons.
[33] GAO, Homeland Security: Prospects For Biometric US-VISIT Exit
Capability Remain Unclear, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1044T] (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2007); Border
Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and
Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-248] (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
6, 2006).
[34] In June 2003, ICE's Office of Investigations established the
Compliance Enforcement Unit, which focuses on preventing criminals and
terrorists from exploiting the nation's immigration system by
developing cases for investigation on the basis of information provided
from other DHS components, including US-VISIT.
[35] The disqualification rate is the total for a given fiscal year of
(1) those nationals of the country who were admitted as nonimmigrants
and violated the terms of their admission--this would include
overstays--and (2) the number of foreign nationals who were denied
admission upon arrival in the United States, compared with the total
number of nationals of that country who applied for admission as
nonimmigrant visitors during the same period. According to the visa
waiver statute, the country must be terminated at the beginning of the
2d fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the determination of
the disqualification rate was made. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(f).
[36] For more than 10 years, we have recommended the collection of
departure information and the development of estimates of overstays by
air. See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/PEMD-93-25]
and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/PEMD-95-20].
[37] According to DHS officials, the mandated country assessments
include a placeholder for data on overstay rates, but these data are
not included in the 2003-2004 or 2005-2006 assessments. The May 2002
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act increased the
frequency--from once every 5 years to once every 2 years--of mandated
assessments of the effect of each country's continued participation in
the Visa Waiver Program on U.S. security, law enforcement, and
immigration interests. See Pub. L. No. 107-173.
[38] Due to limitations in DHS's data, U.S. VISIT officials also noted
that some individuals who appear in DHS's systems as being in-country
legally may actually be overstays, and that country-specific
information is not available for about 2 percent of records.
[39] Validation studies are traditionally conducted over the telephone,
with the embassy contacting nationals who traveled to the United
States. According to a State consular official, 200 posts have access
to DHS's Automated Departure Information System database. This database
contains records of foreign nationals' arrival and departure data
received from air and sea carrier manifests. DHS's data will assist
embassies in conducting validation studies and may preclude the need
for telephone calls to foreign nationals, while also improving the
accuracy of departure data assessed for these studies. Access to these
records will allow consular posts to more accurately determine whether
a foreign national departed the United States.
[40] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-854].
[41] GAO, Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and
Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-854] (Washington, D.C.: July
28, 2006).
[42] Pub. L. No. 99-603.
[43] Pub. L. No. 106-396.
[44] GAO, Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver
Program, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-38]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002).
[45] All passports issued to visa waiver travelers after October 26,
2006, must be electronic. Travelers with passports issued after the
deadline that do not meet these requirements must obtain a visa from a
U.S. embassy or consulate overseas before departing for the United
States.
[46] GAO, Visa Waiver Program: Limitations with Department of Homeland
Security's Plan to Verify Departure of Foreign Nationals, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-458T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
28, 2008).
[End of section]
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