Afghanistan Security
Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National Security Forces Gao ID: GAO-09-267 January 30, 2009The Department of Defense (Defense), through its Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and with the Department of State (State), directs international efforts to train and equip Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). As part of these efforts, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) and the Navy spent about $120 million to procure small arms and light weapons for ANSF. International donors also provided weapons. GAO analyzed whether Defense can account for these weapons and ensure ANSF can safeguard and account for them. GAO reviewed Defense and State documents on accountability procedures, reviewed contractor reports on ANSF training, met with U.S. and Afghan officials, observed accountability practices, analyzed inventory records, and attempted to locate a random sample of weapons.
Defense did not establishclear guidance for U.S. personnel to follow when obtaining, transporting, and storing weapons for the Afghan National Security Forces, resulting in significant lapses in accountability. While Defense has accountability requirements for its own weapons, including serial number tracking and routine inventories, it did not clearly specify whether they applied to ANSF weapons under U.S. control. GAO estimates USASAC and CSTC-A did not maintain complete records for about 87,000, or 36 percent, of the 242,000 U.S.-procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan. For about 46,000 weapons, USASAC could not provide serial numbers, and GAO estimates CSTC-A did not maintain records on the location or disposition of about 41,000 weapons with recorded serial numbers. CSTC-A also did not maintain reliable records for about 135,000 weapons it obtained for ANSF from 21 other countries. Accountability lapses occurred throughout the supply chain and were primarily due to a lack of clear direction and staffing shortages. During our review, CSTC-A began correcting some shortcomings, but indicated that its continuation of these efforts depends on staffing and other factors. Despite CSTC-A's training efforts, ANSF units cannot fully safeguard and account for weapons and sensitive equipment. Defense and State have deployed hundreds of trainers and mentors to help ANSF establish accountability practices. CSTC-A's policy is not to issue equipment without verifying that appropriate supply and accountability procedures are in place. Although CSTC-A has not consistently assessed ANSF units' ability to account for weapons, mentors have reported major accountability weaknesses, which CSTC-A officials and mentors attribute to a variety of cultural and institutional problems, including illiteracy, corruption, and unclear guidance. Further, CSTC-A did not begin monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices until 15 months after issuing them to Afghan National Army units.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-267, Afghanistan Security: Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to Afghan National Security Forces
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2009:
Afghanistan Security:
Lack of Systematic Tracking Raises Significant Accountability Concerns
about Weapons Provided to Afghan National Security Forces:
GAO-09-267:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-267, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Defense (Defense), through its Combined Security
Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and with the Department of
State (State), directs international efforts to train and equip Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF). As part of these efforts, the U.S.
Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) and the Navy spent about $120
million to procure small arms and light weapons for ANSF. International
donors also provided weapons. GAO analyzed whether Defense can account
for these weapons and ensure ANSF can safeguard and account for them.
GAO reviewed Defense and State documents on accountability procedures,
reviewed contractor reports on ANSF training, met with U.S. and Afghan
officials, observed accountability practices, analyzed inventory
records, and attempted to locate a random sample of weapons.
What GAO Found:
Defense did not establish clear guidance for U.S. personnel to follow
when obtaining, transporting, and storing weapons for the Afghan
National Security Forces, resulting in significant lapses in
accountability. While Defense has accountability requirements for its
own weapons, including serial number tracking and routine inventories,
it did not clearly specify whether they applied to ANSF weapons under
U.S. control. GAO estimates USASAC and CSTC A did not maintain complete
records for about 87,000, or 36 percent, of the 242,000 U.S.-procured
weapons shipped to Afghanistan. For about 46,000 weapons, USASAC could
not provide serial numbers, and GAO estimates CSTC-A did not maintain
records on the location or disposition of about 41,000 weapons with
recorded serial numbers. CSTC-A also did not maintain reliable records
for about 135,000 weapons it obtained for ANSF from 21 other countries.
Accountability lapses occurred throughout the supply chain and were
primarily due to a lack of clear direction and staffing shortages.
During our review, CSTC-A began correcting some shortcomings, but
indicated that its continuation of these efforts depends on staffing
and other factors.
Despite CSTC-A‘s training efforts, ANSF units cannot fully safeguard
and account for weapons and sensitive equipment. Defense and State have
deployed hundreds of trainers and mentors to help ANSF establish
accountability practices. CSTC-A‘s policy is not to issue equipment
without verifying that appropriate supply and accountability procedures
are in place. Although CSTC-A has not consistently assessed ANSF units‘
ability to account for weapons, mentors have reported major
accountability weaknesses, which CSTC-A officials and mentors attribute
to a variety of cultural and institutional problems, including
illiteracy, corruption, and unclear guidance. Further, CSTC-A did not
begin monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices until 15
months after issuing them to Afghan National Army units.
Figure: Types and Quantities of U.S.-Procured Weapons Shipped to
Afghanistan for ANSF (December 2004-June 2008):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Weapons category: Rifles;
Quantity shipped: 117,163.
Weapons category: Pistols;
Quantity shipped: 62,055.
Weapons category: Machine guns;
Quantity shipped: 35,778.
Weapons category: Grenade Launchers;
Quantity shipped: 18,656.
Weapons category: Shotguns;
Quantity shipped: 6,704.
Weapons category: Rocket-propelled grenade launchers;
Quantity shipped: 1,620.
Weapons category: Mortars and other weapons;
Quantity shipped: 227.
Weapons category: Total;
Quantity shipped: 242,203.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
To improve weapons accountability, GAO recommends the Secretary of
Defense (1) establish clear accountability procedures, including serial
number tracking and routine physical inventories, for weapons in U.S.
control and custody; (2) direct CSTC A to assess and verify each ANSF
unit‘s capacity to safeguard and account for weapons; and (3) provide
adequate resources to CSTC-A to train, mentor, and assess ANSF in
equipment accountability matters. Defense concurred with these
recommendations, but did not state when the shortcomings we identified
would be addressed. State provided no comments.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-267]. For more
information, contact Charles M. Johnson, Jr. at (202) 512-7331 or
johnsoncm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Defense Cannot Fully Account for Weapons:
Despite CSTC-A Training Efforts, ANSF Cannot Fully Safeguard and
Account for Weapons:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: International Donations Obtained for ANSF by CSTC-A:
Appendix III: Timeline of Key Weapons Accountability Events:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Quantities and Estimated Value of Weapons Provided by
International Donors for ANSF (June 2002 through June 2008):
Figures:
Figure 1: Weapons Obtained for ANSF through U.S. Procurement and
International Donations by Calendar Year (June 1, 2002-June 30, 2008):
Figure 2: Types and Quantities of U.S.-Procured Weapons Shipped to
Afghanistan for ANSF (December 2004-June 2008):
Figure 3: Accountability Process for Weapons Provided to ANSF by the
United States and International Donors:
Figure 4: Timeline of Key Events Relating to Accountability for ANSF
Weapons and Other Sensitive Equipment (June 2002 to January 2009):
Abbreviations:
ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces:
CSTC-A: Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:
DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency:
FMS: Foreign Military Sales:
IPO: International Programs Office:
SAO: security assistance organization:
USASAC: U.S. Army Security Assistance Command:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 30, 2009:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
As part of international efforts to train and equip the Afghan National
Army and the Afghan National Police, collectively referred to as the
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the U.S. Department of Defense
(Defense) obtained and provided or intends to provide about 380,000
small arms and light weapons[Footnote 1], as well as other equipment
and supplies. Defense and 21 donor nations report the value of these
weapons at over $223 million. Given the unstable security conditions in
Afghanistan, the risk of loss and theft of these weapons is
significant.
The United States has provided most of the U.S.-procured weapons to
Afghanistan using an adaptation of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
program,[Footnote 2] which is managed by the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) in cooperation with other U.S. military
organizations, including the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
(USASAC) and the Navy International Programs Office (IPO).[Footnote 3]
Defense purchased weapons using funds appropriated by Congress for the
Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, funds drawn down under authority
provided in the Afghan Freedom Support Act, and Foreign Military
Financing funds.[Footnote 4] The Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a joint service, coalition organization under the
command and control of Defense's U.S. Central Command, is primarily
responsible for the training and equipping of ANSF with support from
the Department of State (State).[Footnote 5] As part of that
responsibility, CSTC-A receives and stores weapons provided by the
United States and international donors and distributes them to ANSF
units. In addition, CSTC-A is responsible for conducting U.S.
government security assistance activities in Afghanistan, including
monitoring the end use of U.S.-procured weapons and other sensitive
equipment.
At your request, we reviewed the accountability for weapons that
Defense obtained, transported, stored, and distributed to ANSF.
[Footnote 6] In particular, we examined (1) whether Defense can account
for weapons intended for ANSF, and (2) the extent to which CSTC-A has
ensured that ANSF can properly safeguard and account for weapons and
other sensitive equipment issued to ANSF.
To address these objectives, we reviewed documentation and interviewed
officials from Defense, U.S. Central Command, CSTC-A, USASAC, and Navy
IPO. On the basis of records provided to us, we compiled detailed
information on weapons reported as shipped to CSTC-A in Afghanistan by
the United States and other countries from June 2002 through June 2008.
We traveled to Afghanistan in August 2008 to examine records and meet
with officials at CSTC-A headquarters, visit the two central depots
where the weapons provided for ANSF are stored, and meet with staff at
an Afghan National Army unit that had received weapons.[Footnote 7]
While in Afghanistan we attempted to determine the location or
disposition of a random sample of weapons in order to reach general
conclusions about CSTC-A's ability to account for weapons purchased by
the United States for ANSF.[Footnote 8] We also discussed equipment
accountability with cognizant officials from the Afghan Ministries of
Defense and Interior, the U.S. Embassy, and contractors involved in
building ANSF's capacity to account for and manage its weapons
inventory.[Footnote 9] We also met with officials from Defense's Office
of Inspector General to discuss an audit it had completed relating to
weapons accountability in Afghanistan during 2008 and reviewed the
related report.[Footnote 10]
We performed our work from November 2007 through January 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. A detailed description of
our scope and methodology is included in appendix I of this report.
Results in Brief:
Defense did not provide clear guidance to U.S. personnel as to what
accountability procedures applied when handling, transporting, and
storing weapons obtained for the ANSF, resulting in significant lapses
in accountability for these weapons. Although Defense has
accountability procedures for its own weapons, including tracking by
serial number and conducting routine physical inventories, it did not
clearly establish to what extent these procedures would apply to
weapons obtained for ANSF. USASAC and CSTC-A did not maintain complete
inventory records for an estimated 87,000 weapons--or about 36 percent-
-of the 242,000 weapons that the United States procured and shipped to
Afghanistan from December 2004 through June 2008.[Footnote 11] For
about 46,000 of these weapons USASAC and CSTC-A could not provide
serial numbers, and for an estimated 41,000 weapons with recorded
serial numbers,[Footnote 12] CSTC-A did not maintain any records of
their location or disposition. Furthermore, CSTC-A did not maintain
reliable records, including serial numbers, for any of the weapons it
obtained from international donors from June 2002 through June 2008,
which, according to CSTC-A, totaled about 135,000 weapons. Lapses in
accountability occurred throughout the supply chain. For example,
during the transportation of U.S.-procured weapons into Afghanistan,
USASAC and Navy IPO did not provide serial number information to CSTC-
A to verify receipt. Additionally, after receiving weapons in Kabul,
CSTC-A did not record their serial numbers or routinely conduct
physical inventories at the central depots where the weapons were
stored. This was primarily due to a lack of clear direction from
Defense and staffing shortages. Although the weapons were in CSTC-A
control and custody until they were issued to ANSF units, U.S. Central
Command and CSTC-A officials did not have a common understanding of
when the weapons were considered formally transferred to ANSF and thus
no longer subject to Defense accountability procedures. During the
course of our review, USASAC indicated that it would begin recording
serial numbers for all weapons it procures for ANSF, and in June 2008
CSTC-A established standard operating procedures to track weapons by
serial number in Afghanistan and began conducting routine physical
inventories of the weapons stored at the central depots. However, CSTC-
A has indicated that its continued implementation of these new
accountability procedures is not certain, considering staffing
constraints and other factors.
Despite CSTC-A training efforts, ANSF units cannot fully safeguard and
account for weapons. As a result, weapons CSTC-A has provided to ANSF
are at serious risk of theft or loss. Also, CSTC-A did not begin
monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices until about 15
months after issuing them to Afghan National Army units.
* Development of ANSF equipment accountability. CSTC-A's policy is not
to issue equipment to ANSF without verifying that appropriate supply
and accountability procedures are in place. Recognizing the need for
weapons accountability at ANSF units, CSTC-A and State have deployed
hundreds of U.S. military trainers and contract mentors to help the
Afghan army and police establish equipment accountability practices,
among other things. Although CSTC-A has not consistently assessed ANSF
units' ability to safeguard and account for weapons and other
equipment, contract mentors have reported extensively on major ANSF
accountability weaknesses. Contractors and CSTC-A officials have
attributed these weaknesses to a variety of cultural and institutional
problems, including illiteracy, corruption, and unclear guidance from
Afghan ministries.
* End use monitoring. According to DSCA officials, U.S.-procured
weapons and sensitive equipment provided to ANSF are subject to end use
monitoring, which is meant to provide reasonable assurances that ANSF
is using equipment for its intended purposes. DSCA has published end
use monitoring guidance that calls for, among other things, intensive
controls over sensitive defense items, such as night vision devices,
which are considered dangerous to the public and U.S. forces in the
wrong hands.[Footnote 13] In May 2008, CSTC-A developed an end use
monitoring plan and began implementing it in July 2008, but has not had
sufficient staff to conduct the monitoring envisioned. CSTC-A also
began monitoring the end use of sensitive and potentially dangerous
night vision devices in October 2008--15 months after it had first
issued them to the Afghan National Army. Of the 2,410 devices issued,
10 are currently unaccounted for, according to CSTC-A. DSCA had not
ensured that the appropriate end use monitoring was performed for these
devices because it was not aware that CSTC-A had purchased them. To
address this matter, DSCA and CSTC-A have established procedures to
prohibit CSTC-A's procurement of weapons and sensitive equipment in-
country without DSCA involvement.
We are making several recommendations to help improve accountability
for weapons and other sensitive equipment that the United States
provides to ANSF. In particular, we recommend that the Secretary of
Defense (1) establish clear accountability procedures for weapons while
they are in the control and custody of the United States and direct
USASAC, CSTC-A, and other military organizations involved in providing
these weapons to track all weapons by serial number and conduct routine
physical inventories; (2) direct CSTC-A to specifically assess and
verify each ANSF unit's capacity to safeguard and account for weapons
and other sensitive equipment before providing such equipment, unless a
specific waiver or exception is granted; and (3) devote adequate
resources to CSTC-A's effort to train, mentor, and assess ANSF in
equipment accountability matters.
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to Defense
and State. Defense concurred with our recommendations and provided
additional information on its efforts to help ensure accountability for
weapons intended for the ANSF. However, Defense did not state when it
planned to address the shortcomings we identified. Defense also
provided technical corrections, which we incorporated into the report
as appropriate. State did not provide comments.
Background:
From fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2008, the U.S. government provided
approximately $16.5 billion for the training and equipping of Afghan
National Security Forces. State and Defense officials told us they will
request over $5.7 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police
in fiscal year 2009. The goal of these efforts is to transfer
responsibility for the security of Afghanistan from the international
community to the Afghan government. As part of this effort, from June
2002 through June 2008, CSTC-A obtained about 380,000 small arms and
light weapons from the United States and other countries for the Afghan
army and police. The United States purchased over 240,000 of these
weapons for about $120 million and shipped them to Afghanistan
beginning in December 2004. Also, CSTC-A reported that it coordinated
the donation of about 135,000 additional weapons from 21 countries,
which valued their donations at about $103 million (see appendix II).
[Footnote 14] Figure 1 illustrates the number of weapons obtained for
ANSF by USASAC, Navy IPO, and international donors since June 2002.
[Footnote 15]
Figure 1: Weapons Obtained for ANSF through U.S. Procurement and
International Donations by Calendar Year (June 1, 2002-June 30, 2008):
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Calendar year: 2002 (June 1 -December 31):
U.S. procured: None;
International donations: 2,644.
Calendar year: 2003;
U.S. procured: None;
International donations: 29,480.
Calendar year: 2004[A];
U.S. procured: 137;
International donations: 6,741.
Calendar year: 2005;
U.S. procured: 21,013;
International donations: 42,087
Calendar year: 2006;
U.S. procured: 79,837;
International donations: 19,474.
Calendar year: 2007;
U.S. procured: 70,023;
International donations: 34,874.
Calendar year: 2008 (January 1 -June 30)[B]:
U.S. procured: 71,193;
International donations: 6.
Source: GAO analysis of USASAC, Navy, and CSTC-A data.
[A] Includes 137 U.S.-procured weapons:
[B] Includes 60 weapons from international donors:
[End of figure]
The United States and international donors have provided rifles,
pistols, machine guns, grenade launchers, shotguns, rocket-propelled
grenade launchers, and other weapons. About 80 percent of the U.S.-
procured weapons were "non-standard" weapons, which are not typically
supplied by Defense.[Footnote 16] Many non-standard weapons, including
about 79,000 AK-47 rifles,[Footnote 17] were received from former
Warsaw Pact countries or were obtained from vendors in those countries.
(See figure 2 for details on U.S.-procured weapons shipped to
Afghanistan for ANSF.)
Figure 2: Types and Quantities of U.S.-Procured Weapons Shipped to
Afghanistan for ANSF (December 2004-June 2008):
[Refer to PDF for image]
Weapons category: Rifles;
Quantity shipped: 117,163.
Weapons category: Pistols;
Quantity shipped: 62,055.
Weapons category: Machine guns;
Quantity shipped: 35,778.
Weapons category: Grenade Launchers;
Quantity shipped: 18,656.
Weapons category: Shotguns;
Quantity shipped: 6,704.
Weapons category: Rocket-propelled grenade launchers;
Quantity shipped: 1,620.
Weapons category: Mortars and other weapons[A];
Quantity shipped: 227.
Weapons category: Total;
Quantity shipped: 242,203.
Source: GAO analysis of Defense data.
[A] This category includes missile and rocket launchers.
[End of figure]
USASAC and Navy IPO procured most of the 242,000 weapons for ANSF
through an adaptation of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program
referred to by Defense as "pseudo-FMS." As in traditional FMS, pseudo-
FMS procurements are overseen by DSCA. However, in contrast to
traditional FMS procurements, for Afghanistan, Defense primarily used
funds appropriated by the Congress for the Afghanistan Security Forces
Fund to purchase weapons to train and equip ANSF.[Footnote 18] USASAC
procured about 205,000 (85 percent) of these weapons, including about
135,000 non-standard weapons purchased from four U.S.-based
contractors. Navy IPO provided the remaining 37,000 (15 percent) M-16
rifles for the Afghan National Army.
After procuring weapons for ANSF, Defense or its contractors
transported them to Afghanistan by air, and CSTC-A received the weapons
at Kabul International Airport.[Footnote 19] The Afghan National Army
transported the weapons from the airport to one of two central storage
depots in Kabul--one for the Afghan National Army and another for the
Afghan National Police.[Footnote 20] Due to the limited operational
capacity of the Afghan army and police and the extremely hostile
environment in which they operate, CSTC-A retains control and custody
of the weapons provided by the United States and international donors
during storage at the central depots until the weapons are issued to
ANSF units. In addition to maintaining the security and control of
weapons stored at the central depots, CSTC-A trains ANSF in inventory
management and weapons accountability. To this end, the central depots
are staffed by U.S. and coalition military personnel, U.S. contractors,
contract Afghan staff, and ANSF personnel.
According to DSCA officials, equipment provided to ANSF is subject to
end use monitoring,[Footnote 21] which is meant to provide reasonable
assurances that the ANSF is using the equipment for its intended
purposes. CSTC-A serves as the security assistance organization (SAO)
for Afghanistan, with responsibility for monitoring the end use of U.S.-
procured weapons and other equipment provided to ANSF, among other
security assistance duties.[Footnote 22]
DSCA's Security Assistance Management Manual provides guidance for end
use monitoring, which is classified as either "routine" or "enhanced,"
depending on the sensitivity of the equipment and other factors, as
follows:[Footnote 23]
* Routine end use monitoring. For non-sensitive equipment provided to a
trusted partner, DSCA guidance calls for SAOs to conduct routine
monitoring in conjunction with other required security assistance
duties. As such, according to DSCA officials, DSCA expects SAOs to
record relevant end use monitoring observations made during
interactions with host country military and defense officials, such as
visits to defense facilities, meetings or telephone conversations,
military ceremonies, and dignitary visits.
* Enhanced end use monitoring. For sensitive defense articles and
technology transfers made within sensitive political situations, DSCA
guidance calls for more intensive and formal monitoring. This includes
providing DSCA with equipment delivery records with serial numbers,
conducting routine physical inventories of the equipment by serial
number, and quarterly reporting on inventory results.
Figure 3 illustrates the accountability process for weapons that CSTC-
A provides to ANSF.
Figure 3: Accountability Process for Weapons Provided to ANSF by the
United States and International Donors:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Acquisition:
* USASAC and Navy IPO procure weapons.
Transport:
* Defense and its contractors ship weapons to Kabul by air;
* Afghan army transfers weapons to central storage depots in Kabul.
Storage:
* CSTC-A manages two central storage depots (one for Afghan army and
one for police);
* CSTC-A obtains weapons from international donors.
Distribution:
* CSTC-A issues weapons to Afghan army and police units.
Monitoring:
* CSTC-A is responsible for conducting end use monitoring.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by Defense and CSTC-A.
[End of figure]
Defense Cannot Fully Account for Weapons:
Defense did not establish clear guidance on what accountability
procedures apply when it is handling, transporting, and storing weapons
obtained for ANSF through U.S. procurements and international
donations. As a result, our tests and analysis of inventory records
show significant lapses in accountability for these weapons. Such
accountability lapses occurred throughout the weapons supply process.
First, when USASAC and CSTC-A initially obtained weapons for ANSF, they
did not record all the corresponding serial numbers. Second, USASAC and
CSTC-A did not maintain control or visibility over U.S.-procured
weapons during transport to the two ANSF central storage depots in
Kabul. Third, CSTC-A did not maintain complete and accurate inventory
records or perform physical inventories of weapons stored at the
central depots. Finally, inadequate U.S. and ANSF staffing at the
central depots along with poor security and persistent management
challenges have contributed to the vulnerability of stored weapons to
theft or misuse. These lapses have hampered CSTC-A's ability to detect
weapons theft or other losses. CSTC-A has recently taken steps to
correct some of the deficiencies we identified, but CSTC-A has
indicated that its continued implementation of the new accountability
procedures is not certain, considering staffing constraints and other
factors.
Lack of Clear Accountability Procedures:
Defense did not clearly establish what accountability procedures
applied to the physical security of weapons intended for ANSF. As a
result, the Defense organizations involved in providing weapons for
ANSF, including DSCA, USASAC, Navy IPO, U.S. Central Command, and CSTC-
A, did not have a common understanding of what accountability
procedures to apply to these weapons while they were in U.S. control
and custody.
Defense guidance on weapons accountability lays out procedures for
Defense organizations to follow when handling, storing, protecting,
securing, and transporting Defense-owned weapons.[Footnote 24] These
procedures include (1) serial number registration and reporting and (2)
100 percent physical inventories of weapons stored in depots by both
quantity and serial number at least once annually. The objective of
serial number registration and reporting procedures, according to
Defense guidance, is to establish continuous visibility over weapons
through the various stages of the supply process, including "from the
contractor to depot; [and] in storage."[Footnote 25] However, Defense
did not specifically direct U.S. personnel to apply these or any
alternative weapons accountability procedures for the weapons in their
control and custody intended for ANSF, and CSTC-A officials we spoke to
were uncertain about the applicability of existing Defense guidance.
In August 2008, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
emphasized the importance of safeguarding weapons in accordance with
existing accountability guidance until they are formally transferred to
ANSF, stating that "the security of conventional [arms, ammunition, and
explosives] is paramount, as the theft or misuse of this material would
gravely jeopardize the safety and security of personnel and
installations world-wide."[Footnote 26] However, in October 2008,
Defense's Inspector General reported that U.S. Central Command had not
clearly defined procedures for accountability, control, and physical
security of U.S.-supplied weapons to ANSF, and as a result,
misplacement, loss, and theft of weapons may not be prevented.[Footnote
27] The Inspector General recommended, among other things, that U.S.
Central Command issue formal guidance directing the commands and forces
in its area of responsibility, including CSTC-A, to apply existing
Defense weapons accountability procedures. U.S. Central Command and the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence concurred
with this recommendation. Nonetheless, U.S. Central Command officials
we spoke to in December 2008 did not have a common understanding of
when formal transfer of the weapons to ANSF is considered to have
occurred, and hence up to what point to apply Defense accountability
procedures, if at all. As of December 2008, U.S. Central Command had
not decided what new guidance to issue.
In July 2007, we made Defense and the Multinational Force-Iraq aware
that they had not specified which accountability procedures applied for
weapons provided to Iraq under the train-and-equip program in that
country.[Footnote 28] To help ensure that U.S.-funded equipment reaches
the Iraqi security forces as intended, we recommended that the
Secretary of Defense determine which accountability procedures should
apply to that program. In January 2008, the Congress passed
legislation[Footnote 29] requiring that no defense articles may be
provided to Iraq until the President certifies that a registration and
monitoring system has been established and includes, among other
things, the serial number registration of all small arms to be provided
to Iraq, and a detailed record of the origin, shipping, and
distribution of all defense articles transferred under the Iraq
Security Forces Fund or any other security assistance program.[Footnote
30]
USASAC and CSTC-A Did Not Maintain Complete Inventory Records for
Weapons:
On the basis of our data analysis and tests of weapons inventory
records, we estimate that USASAC and CSTC-A did not maintain complete
records for about 87,000 weapons--about 36 percent of over 242,000
weapons they procured for ANSF and shipped from December 2004 through
June 2008.[Footnote 31] For about 46,000 weapons, USASAC did not
maintain serial number records--information fundamental to weapons
accountability--and for an estimated 41,000 weapons, CSTC-A did not
maintain documentation on the location or disposition, based on our
testing of a random sample of available serial number records.[Footnote
32] Weapons for which CSTC-A could not provide complete accountability
records were not limited to any particular type of weapon or a specific
shipment period. Records were missing for six of the seven types of
weapons we tested and from shipments made during every year from 2004
to 2008.[Footnote 33]
In addition, CSTC-A did not maintain complete or reliable records for
the weapons it reported it had obtained from international donations
from June 2002 through June 2008. According to CSTC-A, this totals
about 135,000 weapons.
Lapses in Accountability Began When Weapons Were Obtained:
USASAC and Navy IPO records indicate that they procured over 242,000
weapons and shipped them to Afghanistan from December 2004 through June
2008. However, USASAC did not record and maintain the serial numbers
for over 46,000 of the weapons it purchased.[Footnote 34] USASAC's
records were incomplete because it did not require contractors to
submit serial numbers for non-standard weapons they provided--a
standard practice in traditional Foreign Military Sales. In July 2008,
USASAC indicated that it would begin recording serial numbers for all
weapons it procures for ANSF. (See appendix III for a timeline of key
events relating to accountability for ANSF weapons and other sensitive
equipment.) However, as of December 2008 USASAC had not yet included
provisions in its procurement contracts requiring the vendors of
nonstandard weapons to provide these serial numbers.
Furthermore, CSTC-A did not record the serial numbers for the weapons
it received from international donors and stored in the central depots
in Kabul for eventual distribution to ANSF. In a July 2007 memorandum,
the Commanding General of CSTC-A noted that for international donations
there was "no shipping paperwork to confirm receipt, and equipment was
not inventoried at arrival for validation." By not recording serial
numbers for weapons upon receipt, USASAC and CSTC-A could not verify
the delivery and subsequent control of weapons in Afghanistan. In July
2008, CSTC-A began to record serial numbers for all the weapons it
received, including U.S.-procurements and international donations.
However, CSTC-A had indicated that its continued recording of serial
numbers was not certain. In the standard operating procedures it
established in July 2008, CSTC-A indicated that it would record these
numbers "if conditions are favorable with enough time and manpower
allotted to inventory." In December 2008, CSTC-A officials told us that
to date they were fully implementing these new procedures.
Defense and CSTC-A Did Not Maintain Control or Oversight of Weapons
during Transport or Document Title Transfer:
USASAC, Navy IPO, CSTC-A, Defense shippers, and contractors have been
involved in arranging the transport of U.S.-procured weapons into Kabul
by air. However, these organizations did not communicate adequately to
ensure that accountability was maintained over weapons during
transport. In particular, according to CSTC-A officials:
* USASAC and Navy IPO did not always provide CSTC-A with serial number
records for weapons shipped to Afghanistan against which CSTC-A could
verify receipt.[Footnote 35]
* Defense shippers sometimes split weapons shipments among multiple
flights, making it difficult for CSTC-A to reconcile partial shipments
received at different times with the information the suppliers provided
for the entire order.
* Suppliers did not always label weapons shipments clearly, leading to
confusion over their contents and intended destinations.
* CSTC-A did not always send confirmation of its receipt of weapons to
the supplying organizations.
Without detailed information about weapons shipments it was difficult
for USASAC, Navy IPO, and CSTC-A to detect discrepancies, if any,
between what weapons suppliers reported as shipped and those CSTC-A
received.
According to CSTC-A, when weapons arrived at the Kabul Afghanistan
International Airport, CSTC-A personnel typically identified and
counted incoming pallets of weapons but did not count individual
weapons or record serial numbers. CSTC-A then temporarily gave physical
custody of the weapons to the Afghan National Army for unescorted
transport from the airport to the central depots in Kabul. Because CSTC-
A did not conduct physical inventory checks on weapons arriving at the
airport, due to security concerns at that facility, CSTC-A had limited
ability to ensure that weapons were not lost or stolen in transit to
the depots.
After the Afghan National Army transported weapons to the central
depots, CSTC-A did not document the transfer of title for weapons to
ANSF. Since no Afghan officers were present at the depots to take
possession of the weapons, CSTC-A personnel received the weapons and
processed them into inventory for storage. Although Defense did not
provide direction to CSTC-A on how and when to transfer title to ANSF,
CSTC-A officials told us they considered title transfer to have
occurred, without any formal documentation, when information about the
weapons was typed into computer inventory systems at the central
depots. In February 2008, a revision to DSCA's Security Assistance
Management Manual called for U.S. government officials delivering
equipment to a foreign nation under pseudo-FMS to keep documentation
showing when, where, and to whom delivery was made and report this
information to the military organization responsible for procurement.
[Footnote 36] CSTC-A officials told us that they were not certain
whether this revised guidance applied to ANSF weapons and therefore
have not provided any title transfer documentation to USASAC or Navy
IPO, the procuring organizations. However, regardless of how and when
title passed to ANSF and how title transfer was documented, because
ANSF officials were not present at the depots to take possession, CSTC-
A retained control and custody of the weapons at the depots.
CSTC-A Did Not Maintain Inventory Controls or Adequate Security at
Storage Depots:
CSTC-A did not maintain complete and accurate inventory records for
weapons at the central storage depots and allowed poor security to
persist. Until July 2008, CSTC-A did not track all weapons at the
depots by serial number or conduct routine physical inventories.
Moreover, CSTC-A could not identify and respond to incidents of actual
or potential compromise, including suspected pilferage, due to poor
security and unreliable data systems. Specific gaps in accountability
controls include the following:
* Incomplete serial number recording. For over 5 years, CSTC-A stored
weapons in the central depots and distributed them to ANSF units
without recording their serial numbers. In August 2007, nearly 10
months after CSTC-A's Commanding General mandated serial number
control, CSTC-A began registering weapons by serial number as they were
issued to ANSF units.[Footnote 37] While this established some
accountability at the point of distribution, thousands of weapons under
CSTC-A control had no uniquely identifiable inventory record. CSTC-A
initiated comprehensive serial number tracking in July 2008, recording
the serial numbers of all weapons in inventory at that time and
beginning to register additional weapons upon receipt at the central
depots. Nonetheless, CSTC-A officials told us that staff shortages made
serial number recording challenging.
* Lack of physical inventories. CSTC-A did not conduct its first full
inventory of weapons in the central depots until June 2008. Without
conducting regular physical inventories, it was difficult for CSTC-A to
maintain accountability for weapons at the depots and detect weapons
losses.
* Poor security. CSTC-A officials have reported concerns about the
trustworthiness of Afghan contract staff and guards at the central
depot that serves the Afghan National Army. We also observed
deficiencies in facility security at this depot, including Afghan
guards sleeping on duty and missing from their posts. Demonstrating the
importance of conducting physical inventories, in June 2008, within 1
month of completing its first full weapons inventory, CSTC-A officials
identified the theft of 47 pistols from this depot. CSTC-A officials
also told us that a persistent lack of CSTC-A and responsible ANSF
personnel at the central depots had increased the vulnerability of
inventories to pilferage.
* Unreliable inventory information systems. The information systems
CSTC-A uses for inventory management at the central depots are
rudimentary and have introduced data reliability problems. CTSC-A
officials told us that for items received before 2006, they had only
"limited data" from manual records at the Afghan National Army central
depot. In 2006, CSTC-A's contractor installed a commercial-off-the-
shelf inventory management database system. However, the system permits
users to enter duplicate serial numbers, allowing data entry mistakes
to compromise critical data. Furthermore, due to a limited number of
user licenses, multiple users enter information using the same account,
resulting in a loss of control and accountability for key inventory
management records. CSTC-A also established an Excel spreadsheet record-
keeping system in 2006 for the central depot where Afghan National
Police weapons are stored. However, training of Afghan National Police
personnel at that depot has not yet begun, and training Afghan National
Army personnel in the use of depot information systems has been
problematic due to illiteracy and a lack of basic math skills. In a
report about operations at the central depot that serves the Afghan
National Army, CSTC-A's logistics training contractor noted that only
"one in four [Afghan National Army personnel] have the basic education
to operate either the manual or automated systems."
Staffing and Other Management Challenges at Storage Depots Increased
Weapons Vulnerability:
According to CSTC-A, inadequate staffing of U.S. and Afghan personnel
at the central storage depots along with persistent management concerns
have contributed to the vulnerability of stored weapons to theft or
misuse. Although CSTC-A originally envisioned that ANSF would assume
responsibility for the majority of central depot operations, ANSF has
not asserted ownership of the central depots as planned, leaving U.S.
personnel to continue exercising control and custody over the stored
weapons. In addition, CSTC-A officials told us this resulted in
ambiguities regarding roles and responsibilities and increased risk to
stored weapons supplies. Specific challenges in this area include the
following.
* Difficulty providing adequate U.S. staff to maintain full
accountability. CSTC-A officials told us that the increasing volumes of
equipment moving through the central depots had compounded the
management challenges they faced, which included insufficient U.S.
personnel on site to keep up with the implementation of equipment
accountability procedures. They specifically cited staff shortages as
having limited CSTC-A's capacity to conduct full depot inventories,
maintain security, and invest in the training of ANSF personnel.
* Lack of accountable Afghan officers and staff. CSTC-A accountability
procedures call for ANSF officers to be on site at the central depots
to take responsibility for ANSF property. However, according to CSTC-A,
the Afghan ministries did not consider the central depots to be ANSF
facilities, given the high level of CSTC-A control. Thus, ANSF was
reluctant to participate in central depot operations and did not post
any officers or sufficient Afghan staff to the depots. According to
CSTC-A officials, these problems resulted in ambiguities regarding
roles and responsibilities at the central depots and placed an
increased burden on limited U.S. forces to fulfill mandatory
accountability and security procedures.
* Difficulties raising the capacity of ANSF depot personnel. According
to CSTC-A officials, efforts to develop the capabilities of ANSF
personnel to manage the central depots have been hampered by the lack
of basic education or skills among ANSF personnel and frequent turnover
of Afghan staff. As of December 2008, no Afghan National Police
personnel have been trained at the police depot. Contractors
responsible for Afghan National Army equipment accountability training
told us that their efforts have been hampered by the Afghans'
reluctance to attend training and by a lack of basic literacy and math
skills needed to carry out depot operations. CSTC-A officials also told
us that their embedded military trainers were frequently unable to
focus on training and mentoring at the Afghan National Army depot,
given their operational imperatives.
Despite CSTC-A Training Efforts, ANSF Cannot Fully Safeguard and
Account for Weapons:
CSTC-A and State have deployed hundreds of U.S. military trainers and
contract mentors to help ANSF units, among other things, establish and
implement equipment accountability procedures. Although CSTC-A has
instituted a system for U.S. and coalition military trainers to assess
the logistics capacity of ANSF units, they have not always assessed
equipment accountability capabilities specifically. However, as part of
their reporting to CSTC-A and State, contract mentors have documented
significant weaknesses in the capacity of ANSF units to safeguard and
account for weapons. As a result, the weapons CSTC-A has provided are
at serious risk of theft or loss. Furthermore, CSTC-A did not begin
monitoring the end use of sensitive night vision devices until about 15
months after issuing them to Afghan National Army Units.
CSTC-A Has Sponsored Training for ANSF on Weapons Accountability:
CSTC-A has recognized the critical need to develop ANSF units' capacity
to account for weapons and other equipment issued to them. In February
2008, CSTC-A acknowledged that it was issuing equipment to Afghan
National Police units before providing training on accountability
practices and ensuring that effective controls were in place. In June
2008, Defense reported to the Congress that it was CSTC-A's policy not
to issue equipment to ANSF units unless appropriate supply and
accountability procedures were verified.[Footnote 38]
As of June 2008, CSTC-A employed over 250 U.S. military or coalition
personnel and contractors to advise ANSF on logistics matters,
including establishing and maintaining a system of accountability for
weapons. CSTC-A has also helped the Afghan Ministries of Defense and
Interior establish decrees, modeled after U.S. regulations, requiring
ANSF units to adopt accountability procedures. These procedures include
tracking weapons by serial number using a "property book" to record
receipt and inventory information, and conducting routine physical
inventories of weapons. CSTC-A and State, with support from their
respective contractors, MPRI and DynCorp, have conducted training for
Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police personnel on the
implementation of these decrees.[Footnote 39] CSTC-A has also assigned
contract mentors and U.S. and coalition embedded trainers to work
closely with property book officers and other logistics staff in ANSF
units to improve accountability practices. In addition, State assigns
contract mentors to monitor Afghan National Police units that have
received accountability training. These mentors visit the units and
evaluate, among other things, the implementation of basic
accountability procedures and concepts, such as maintenance of property
books and weapons storage rooms. We previously reported that Defense
has cited significant shortfalls in the number of fielded embedded
trainers and mentors as the primary impediment to advancing the
capabilities of the Afghan Security Forces.[Footnote 40] According to
information provided by CSTC-A officials, as of December 2008, CSTC-A
had only 64 percent of the 6,675 personnel it required to perform its
mission overall and only about half of the 4,159 mentors it required.
CSTC-A Has Not Consistently Assessed ANSF Accountability Capacity, but
Significant Weaknesses Have Been Reported:
While CSTC-A has established a system for assessing the logistics
capacity of ANSF units, it has not consistently assessed or verified
ANSF's ability to properly account for weapons and other equipment.
* Afghan National Army. As Afghan National Army units achieve greater
levels of capability, embedded U.S. and coalition military trainers are
responsible for assessing and validating their progress.[Footnote 41]
Trainers used various checklists in 2008 to assess and validate Afghan
National Army units. One checklist we reviewed addressed seven
dimensions of logistics capacity and performance, but did not
specifically mention accountability for weapons or other equipment. The
assessment category in the checklist most relevant to equipment
accountability was a rating on whether a unit "understands the [the
Ministry of Defense] logistical process and utilizes it with reasonable
effectiveness." Another checklist we reviewed addressed 15 dimensions
of "sustainment operations" and was used to assess units' overall
demonstration of logistics management capacity and "ability to
effectively receive, store, and issue supplies." However, the checklist
did not address weapons or equipment accountability specifically.
Furthermore, more detailed notes accompanying the completed checklists
we reviewed provided virtually no information on equipment
accountability as a factor in the logistics ratings the CSTC-A training
team assigned to the unit.
* Afghan National Police. CSTC-A has also introduced a monthly
assessment tool to be used by its mentors to evaluate Afghan National
Police capability and identify strengths and weaknesses.[Footnote 42]
Prior to June 2008, CSTC-A did not specifically evaluate the capacity
of police units to account for weapons and other equipment. CSTC-A
changed the format of its police assessment checklist to specifically
address four dimensions of equipment accountability. According to the
reformatted assessments we reviewed, as of September 30, 2008, some
trained and equipped Afghan National Police units had not yet
implemented accountability procedures required by the Afghan Ministry
of Interior. These assessments indicated that of the first seven police
districts to receive intensive training and weapons under CSTC-A's
Focused District Development Program, which began in November 2007, two
districts were not maintaining property accountability, including
property books, and one was not conducting audits and physical
inventories periodically or when directed.
Contract mentors employed by CSTC-A and State have reported extensively
on weaknesses they observed in ANSF units' capacity to safeguard and
account for weapons and other equipment. Reports we reviewed, prepared
by MPRI and DynCorp mentors between October 2007 and August 2008,
indicated that ANSF units throughout Afghanistan had not implemented
the basic property accountability procedures required by the Afghan
Ministries of Defense and Interior. Although these reports did not
address accountability capacities in a consistent manner that would
allow a systematic or comprehensive assessment of all units, they did
highlight common problems relating to weapons accountability, including
a lack of functioning property book operations and poor physical
security.
* Lack of functioning property book operations. Mentors reported that
many Afghan army and police units did not properly maintain property
books, which are fundamental tools used to establish equipment
accountability and are required by Afghan ministerial decrees. In a
report dated March 2008, a MPRI mentor to the property book officer for
one Afghan National Army unit stated, "for 3 years, the unit property
books have not been established properly" and that "a lack of
functionality existed in every property book operation." Another
report, from March 2008, concluded, "equipment accountability and
equipment maintainability is a big concern; equipment is often lost,
damaged, or stolen, and the proper procedures are not followed to
properly document and/or account for equipment." In a 2008 MPRI
quarterly progress report on Afghan National Police in Kandahar, a
mentor noted that property book items were issued but not posted to any
records, because personnel did not know their duties and
responsibilities. The report further states that "at present the
property managers are not tracking any classes of supplies at all
levels" and that "ANSF is very basic in its day to day function,"
exhibiting no consideration for property accountability.
* Poor security. MPRI reports also indicated that some Afghan National
Police units did not have facilities adequate to ensure the physical
security of weapons and protect them against theft in a high-risk
environment. For example, a March 2008 MPRI report on Afghan National
Police in one northern province stated that the arms room of the police
district office was behind a wooden door and had only a miniature
padlock, and that this represented "basically the same austere
conditions as in the other districts."
Defense and State contractor reports identified various causes of ANSF
accountability weaknesses, including illiteracy, corruption, desertion,
and unclear guidance from Afghan ministries.
* Illiteracy. Mentors reported that widespread illiteracy among Afghan
army and police personnel had substantially impaired equipment
accountability. For instance, a March 2008 MPRI report on an Afghan
National Army unit noted that illiteracy was directly interfering with
the ability of supply section personnel to implement property
accountability processes and procedures, despite repeated training
efforts. In July 2008, a police mentor in the Zari district of Balkh
province stated that, "a lack of personnel [at the district
headquarters] who can read and write is hampering efficient
operations," and added that there is currently one literate person
being mentored to take charge of logistics. In addition, an August 2008
DynCorp report on the Afghan National Police noted that in Kandahar,
"concerns [have been] expressed over [the supply officer] maintaining
control over the storage facility keys. He cannot read or write, does
not record anything that is being given out or have a request form for
supplies filled out. [He] is the same individual that was handing out
automatic weapons to civilians the previous week."
* Corruption. Reports of alleged theft and unauthorized resale of
weapons are common. During 2008, DynCorp mentors reported multiple
instances of Afghan National Police personnel, including an Afghan
Border Police battalion commander in Khost province, allegedly selling
weapons to anti-coalition forces. In a March 2008 report, mentors noted
that despite repeated requests, the Afghan National Police Chief
Logistical Officer for Paktika province would not produce a list of
serial numbers for weapons on hand. The DynCorp mentors suggested this
reluctance to share information could be part of an attempt to conceal
inventory discrepancies. In addition, a May 2008 DynCorp report on
police cited corruption in Helmand as that province's most significant
problem, noting that the logistics officer had been named in all
allegations of theft, extortion, and deceit reported to mentors by
their Afghan National Police contacts.
* Desertion. DynCorp mentors also reported cases of desertion in the
Afghan National Police, which resulted in the loss of weapons. For
instance, in July 2008, mentors reported that when Afghan Border Police
officers at a Faryab province checkpoint deserted to ally themselves
with anti-coalition forces, they took all their weapons and two
vehicles with them. Another DynCorp mentor team training police in
Ghazni province reported in July 2008 that 65 Afghan National Police
personnel had deserted and would not be coming to the base to be
processed. The police officers that did arrive came without their
issued weapons.
* Unclear guidance. MPRI mentors reported that Afghan ministry
logistics policies were not always clear to Afghan army and police
property managers. A MPRI report dated April 2008 stated that approved
Ministry of Interior policies outlining material accountability
procedures were not widely disseminated and many logistics officers did
not recognize any of the logistical policies as rule. Additionally, a
MPRI mentor to the Afghan National Army told us that despite the new
decrees, Afghan National Army logistics officers often carried out
property accountability functions using Soviet-style accounting methods
and that the Ministry of Defense was still auditing army accounts
against those defunct standards.
Senior Afghan Ministry of Defense officials we met with also described
similar accountability weaknesses. In a written statement provided in
response to our questions about Afghan National Army weapons
accountability, the ministry officials indicated that soldiers
deserting with their weapons had a negative effect on the Afghan
National Army and reduced supplies on hand in units. They also
indicated that Afghan National Army units in the provinces of Helmand,
Kandahar, and Paktika have been particularly vulnerable to equipment
theft.
CSTC-A Has Recently Begun Conducting End Use Monitoring of Weapons and
Sensitive Night Vision Devices:
According to DSCA officials, U.S.-procured weapons and sensitive
equipment provided to ANSF are subject to end use monitoring, which is
meant to provide reasonable assurances that ANSF is using the equipment
for intended purposes. Under DSCA guidance, weapons are subject to
routine end use monitoring, which, according to DSCA officials, entails
making and recording observations on weapons usage in conjunction with
other duties and during interactions with local defense officials. For
specified sensitive defense items, such as night vision devices, DSCA
guidance calls for additional controls and enhanced end use monitoring.
This includes providing equipment delivery records with serial numbers
to DSCA, conducting routine physical inventories, and reporting on
quarterly inventory results. For night vision devices this also
includes the establishment of a physical security and accountability
control plan.
In July 2007, CSTC-A began issuing 2,410 night vision devices to Afghan
National Army units without establishing the appropriate controls or
conducting enhanced end use monitoring. According to U.S. Central
Command, these devices pose a special danger to the public and U.S.
forces if in the wrong hands. DSCA did not ensure that CSTC-A followed
the end use monitoring guidance because CSTC-A purchased these devices
directly and without the knowledge or involvement of DSCA officials. To
address this, DSCA and CSTC-A established procedures in April 2008 to
prohibit CSTC-A's procurement of weapons and sensitive equipment in-
country without DSCA involvement.
In May 2008, CSTC-A first developed an end use monitoring plan that
established both routine and enhanced monitoring procedures. The plan
calls for the use of U.S. trainers and mentors embedded in ANSF units
to provide reasonable assurances that the recipients are complying with
U.S. requirements on the use, transfer, and security of the items. CSTC-
A informed us that it began implementing the plan in July 2008, but
noted it did not have sufficient staff or mentors to conduct the
monitoring envisioned. CSTC-A officials told us they started to conduct
and document routine end use monitoring for weapons provided to the
Afghan police in 31 of Afghanistan's 365 police districts.[Footnote 43]
CSTC-A had not been able to undertake any monitoring in the remaining
334 police districts due to security constraints.
During the course of our review, CSTC-A began following DSCA's enhanced
end use monitoring guidance for the night vision devices it had issued.
CSTC-A started conducting inventories of these devices in October 2008,
about 15 months after it began issuing them, and plans to conduct full
physical inventories by serial number quarterly. As of December 2008,
CSTC-A had accounted for all but 10 of the devices it had issued.
DSCA and CSTC-A attributed this limited end use monitoring to a
shortage of security assistance staff and expertise at CSTC-A,
exacerbated by frequent CSTC-A staff rotations. Defense's Inspector
General similarly reported in October 2008 that CSTC-A did not have
sufficient personnel with the necessary security assistance skills and
experience and that short tours of duty and different rotation policies
among the military services hindered the execution of security
assistance activities.[Footnote 44] We also noted these problems in
2004, when we reported that the Office of Military Organization-
Afghanistan, CSTC-A's predecessor, did not have adequate personnel
trained in security assistance procedures to support its efforts and
that frequent personnel rotations were limiting Defense's efforts to
train key personnel in defense security assistance procedures and
preserve institutional knowledge.[Footnote 45] CSTC-A officials told us
that the addition of a USASAC liaison to the CSTC-A staff in Kabul had
helped to offset some of these challenges, as the liaison was
knowledgeable in security assistance procedures and had been able to
provide some basic training for CSTC-A staff.
Conclusions:
Oversight and accountability for weapons is critical in high-threat
environments, especially in Afghanistan, where potential theft and
misuse of lethal equipment pose a significant danger to U.S. and
coalition forces involved in security, stabilization, and
reconstruction efforts. Because Defense organizations throughout the
weapons supply chain have not had a common understanding of what
procedures are necessary to safeguard and account for weapons,
inventory records, including serial numbers, are not complete and
accurate. As a result, Defense cannot be certain that weapons intended
for ANSF have reached those forces. Further, weapons stored in poorly
secured central depots are significantly vulnerable, and the United
States has limited ability to detect the loss of these weapons without
conducting routine inventories. Although CSTC-A established new weapons
accountability procedures during the course of our review, it is not
yet clear that, without a mandate from Defense and sufficient
resources, CSTC-A will consistently implement these procedures. Because
Afghan army and police units face significant challenges in controlling
and accounting for weapons, it is essential that Defense enhance its
efforts in working with ANSF units in this area. Systematically
assessing ANSF's ability to implement required weapons accountability
procedures is particularly important for gaining reasonable assurances
that ANSF units are prepared to receive and safeguard weapons as well
as for evaluating overall progress in developing ANSF's accountability
capacity. Moreover, adequately monitoring night vision devices and
other sensitive equipment after it is transferred to ANSF will help to
ensure that such equipment is used for its intended purposes. As
development of the Afghan security forces continues, it is vital that
clear oversight and accountability mechanisms are in place to account
for weapons and other sensitive equipment.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that the United States can account for weapons that it
procures or receives from international donors for ANSF, we recommend
that the Secretary of Defense establish clear accountability procedures
for weapons in the control and custody of the United States, and direct
USASAC, CSTC-A, and other military organizations involved in providing
these weapons to (1) track all weapons by serial number and (2) conduct
routine physical inventories.
To help ensure that ANSF units can safeguard and account for weapons
and other sensitive equipment they receive from the United States and
international donors, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct
CSTC-A to (1) specifically and systematically assess the ability of
each ANSF unit to safeguard and account for weapons in accordance with
Afghan ministerial decrees and (2) explicitly verify that adequate
safeguards and accountability procedures are in place, prior to
providing weapons to ANSF units, unless a specific waiver or exception
is granted based on due consideration of practicality, cost, and
mission performance.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense devote the necessary
resources to address the staffing shortages that hamper CSTC-A's
efforts to train, mentor, and assess ANSF in equipment accountability
matters.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Defense provided written comments on a draft of this report (see
appendix IV). Defense concurred with our recommendations and provided
additional information on its efforts to help ensure accountability for
weapons intended for the ANSF. Defense also provided technical
corrections, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate.
State did not provide comments.
Defense concurred with our recommendation to establish clear
accountability procedures for weapons intended for ANSF. It noted that
Defense requirements and procedures exist for small arms tracking by
serial number. However, Defense went on to state that DSCA, in
conjunction with U.S. Central Command, has been directed to implement
in Afghanistan congressionally-mandated controls that Defense is
implementing in Iraq. These include (a) the registration of serial
numbers of all small arms, (b) an end-use monitoring program for all
lethal assistance, and (c) the maintenance of detailed records for all
defense articles transferred to Afghanistan. As we indicated in our
report, Defense organizations did not have a common understanding of
whether existing accountability procedures applied to weapons obtained
for ANSF, underscoring the importance of these controls. Defense did
not state when these measures would be implemented; however, if Defense
follows through on these actions and, in addition, clearly requires
routine inventories of weapons in U.S. custody and control, our
concerns will be largely addressed.
Defense also concurred with our recommendation to systematically assess
each ANSF unit's capacity to account for and safeguard weapons and to
ensure that adequate procedures are in place prior to providing
weapons. Defense indicated that embedded mentors and trainers are
assessing ANSF units' accountability capacity. It also stated that for
the Afghan National Army, weapons are only issued with coalition
mentors present to provide oversight at all levels of command; and for
the Afghan National Police, most weapons are currently being issued to
selected units that have received focused training, including
instruction on equipment accountability. We note that at the time of
our review, ANSF unit assessments did not systematically address the
units' capacity to safeguard and account for weapons in its possession.
We also note that Defense has cited significant shortfalls in the
number of personnel required to train and mentor ANSF units. Unless
these matters are addressed, we are not confident the shortcomings we
reported will be adequately addressed.
Finally, Defense also concurred with our recommendation that it address
the staffing shortfalls that hamper CSTC-A's efforts to train, mentor,
and assess ANSF in weapons accountability matters. Defense commented
that it is looking into ways to address the shortages, but did not
state how or when additional staffing would be provided.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretaries of Defense and State and interested congressional
committees. The report will also be available at no charge on the GAO
Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have
any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-
7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors
to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.,
Director International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To determine whether Defense and the Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) could account for weapons obtained,
transported, stored, and distributed to Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF), we conducted the following work.
* We sought to determine which Defense accountability procedures are
generally applicable to Defense equipment by reviewing documents and
meeting with officials from U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida;
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and Defense's Office of
Inspector General in Arlington, Virginia; and CSTC-A in Kabul,
Afghanistan. We also reviewed relevant Defense regulations,
instructions, and manuals.
* We compiled detailed information on 242,203 weapons the United States
procured for ANSF and shipped to Afghanistan from December 2004 through
June 2008. We identified the types, quantity, shipment dates, and cost
of these weapons by reviewing and analyzing pseudo-FMS case
documentation provided by DSCA and data provided by the U.S. Army
Security Assistance Command (USASAC) in New Cumberland, Pennsylvania,
and Navy IPO in Arlington, Virginia. To ensure we had a complete record
of all weapons ordered and shipped during this time period, we checked
USASAC and Navy shipment details against line-item details in Letters
of Offer and Acceptance provided to us by DSCA. For each shipment of
weapons we isolated in the USASAC and Navy International Programs
Office (IPO) files, we compiled lists of serial numbers or determined
the total number of weapons for which no serial number records were
available. We identified 195,671 weapons for which USASAC and Navy IPO
could provide serial numbers and 46,532 for which they could not. In
some cases, quantities of weapons required by the Letter of Offer and
Acceptance differed from those recorded as shipped; we followed up on
these discrepancies with officials at USASAC, who explained that such
differences were due to changes in market pricing between the time of
the request and the time of purchase. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
* To assess Defense's ability to account for the location or
disposition of weapons, we selected a stratified random probability
sample of 245 weapons from the population of 196,671 U.S.-procured
weapons for which Defense could provide serial numbers. The sample
population of weapons included all years in which U.S.-procured weapons
had been shipped to ANSF and seven specific categories of weapons
obtained. Our random sample did not include certain miscellaneous
weapon types, which we categorized as "other." Each weapon in the
population had a known probability of being included in our probability
sample. We divided the weapons into two strata, based on the format of
the weapons lists we obtained. About half of the serial numbers were
available to us in electronic databases, allowing us to select a simple
random sample of 96 weapons from those records. The remaining 98,462
serial numbers were provided to us in paper lists or electronic scans
of paper files. From those records we selected a random systematic
sample of 149 weapons by choosing a random start and selecting every
subsequent 679th serial number. Each weapon selected in the sample was
weighted in the analysis to account statistically for all the weapons
in the population, including those that were not selected. In
Afghanistan, we attempted either to physically locate each weapon in
our sample or obtain documentation confirming that CSTC-A had recorded
its issuance to ANSF or otherwise disposed of it. We used the results
of our work to generalize to the universe of weapons from which we drew
our sample and derive an estimated number of weapons for which CSTC-A
cannot provide information on location or disposition. Because we
followed a probability procedure based on random selections, our sample
is only one of a large number of samples that we might have drawn.
Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we express
our confidence in the precision of our results as a 95 percent
confidence interval (e.g. plus or minus 5 percentage points). This is
the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95
percent of the samples we could have drawn. As a result, we are 95
percent confident that each of the confidence intervals we have
reported will include the true values in the study.
* We compiled detailed information on the approximately 135,000 weapons
CSTC-A obtained for ANSF from international donors. We identified the
estimated dollar values, types, quantities, and sources of these
weapons by analyzing records from the office of CSTC-A's Deputy
Commanding General for International Security Cooperation. We assessed
the reliability of these data by interviewing CSTC-A officials
knowledgeable about the data and by analyzing the records they provided
to identify problems with completeness or accuracy. CSTC-A officials
told us the dollar amounts they track for the value of weapons
donations had been provided by the donors and were of questionable
accuracy, as they had not been independently verified by CSTC-A. We
also reviewed CSTC-A's records on the types, quantities, and sources of
weapons donations. CSTC-A officials told us that due to a long-standing
lack of accountability procedures for handling weapons donations
received at the central storage depots, they had been unable to
independently verify the quantities reported by donors. After our visit
to Kabul, we continued to work closely with CSTC-A officials to
identify additional data concerns. When we found discrepancies, such as
data entry errors, we brought them to CSTC-A's attention and worked
with its officials to correct the discrepancies, to the extent that we
could, before conducting our descriptive analyses. While CSTC-A's
procedures for ensuring the accuracy of these data have improved during
the past year, documentation on procedures was lacking prior to March
2007, which made it impossible for us to independently assess the
data's accuracy. Because we still have concerns about the reliability
of these data, we are only reporting them as background information and
in an appendix to provide a sense of who donated the weapons and when.
* We documented weapons accountability practices and procedures by
examining records and meeting with officials from DSCA, USASAC, Navy
IPO, and CSTC-A--the organizations directly involved with obtaining,
transporting, storing, and distributing weapons for ANSF. In
Afghanistan, we observed weapons accountability practices at the Kabul
Afghanistan International Airport and the two ANSF central storage
depots in Kabul where weapons intended for the Afghan National Army and
the Afghan National Police are stored before distribution to ANSF
units. While at the central depots, we discussed weapons management
with CSTC-A officials and mentors employed by MPRI, Defense's ANSF
development contractor. We also observed depot operations, including
security procedures, storage conditions, and inventory information
systems. In addition, we examined weapons inventory records at CSTC-A
headquarters in Kabul.
* We met with officials from Defense's Inspector General to discuss two
audits it conducted during 2008 relating to weapons accountability in
Afghanistan and reviewed a related report it issued in October 2008.
To assess the extent to which CSTC-A has ensured that ANSF can properly
safeguard and account for weapons and other sensitive equipment issued
to it, we conducted the following work.
* We obtained information on ANSF weapons accountability practices by
meeting with cognizant officials from the Afghan Ministries of Defense
and Interior. The Ministry of Defense also provided written responses
to our questions on this subject. In addition, we reviewed ministerial
decrees documenting equipment accountability requirements applicable to
the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police and discussed the
development and the implementation status of those decrees with CSTC-A
and MPRI.
* We obtained information on CSTC-A's efforts to train, mentor, and
assess ANSF units on accountability for weapons and other equipment by
reviewing documents and meeting with officials from CSTC-A and MPRI in
Kabul. We reviewed all available weekly, monthly, quarterly, and ad hoc
reports submitted by MPRI logistics mentors from October 2007 to August
2008 that included observations regarding ANSF equipment accountability
practices. We also reviewed all available reports, including checklists
and assessment tools, prepared by CSTC-A's embedded military trainers
to assess the logistics capabilities of Afghan army and police units.
To gain a better understanding of ANSF weapons accountability practices
and challenges, we visited an Afghan National Army commando unit near
Kabul that had received weapons and night vision devices from CSTC-A
and met with the unit's property book officer and MPRI mentors assigned
to that unit. Due to travel restrictions imposed by CSTC-A based on
heightened security threats during our visit to Afghanistan, we were
unable to travel outside of the Kabul area, as planned, to visit other
ANSF units in the country that had also received weapons from CSTC-A.
* We obtained information on State's efforts to ensure accountability
for weapons provided to the Afghan National Police by reviewing
documents and meeting with officials from the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and
State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
in Washington, D.C. We also reviewed all weekly reports submitted to
State between January and August 2008 by State's Afghan National Police
development contractor, DynCorp, that included observations regarding
police equipment accountability practices.
* We determined the end use monitoring procedures generally applicable
to weapons transferred to foreign countries under Foreign Military
Sales by reviewing DSCA's Security Assistance Management Manual. We
sought clarification on this guidance and views on its applicability to
U.S. procured weapons and internationally donated weapons in
Afghanistan from officials at DSCA and U.S. Central Command.
* We determined end use monitoring policies and practices in
Afghanistan by reviewing documents and meeting with officials from U.S.
Central Command, CSTC-A, DSCA, and State. In Afghanistan, we met with
officials in CSTC-A's Security Assistance Office, including the USASAC
liaison to CSTC-A. We reviewed all available documentation of the end
use monitoring CSTC-A had conducted as of December 2008 for weapons and
other sensitive equipment, including night vision devices, provided to
ANSF.
[End of section]
Appendix II: International Donations Obtained for ANSF by CSTC-A:
Since June 2002, CSTC-A's office of the Deputy Commanding General for
International Security Cooperation has vetted, tracked, and coordinated
the delivery of weapons donated to ANSF by the international community.
CSTC-A officials reported to us that they had obtained about 135,000
weapons for ANSF in this manner, though we were unable to independently
confirm that figure. CSTC-A officials also told us they had not
evaluated the reliability of the dollar values assigned by donors for
these weapons and noted that some quantities may be overstated, as many
of the donated weapons were damaged or unusable. (See table 1 for a
summary of the data CSTC-A reported to us on weapons provided by
international donors.)
Table 1: Quantities and Estimated Value of Weapons Provided by
International Donors for ANSF (June 2002 through June 2008):
Donor: Hungary;
Quantity: 46,944;
Donor-estimated value: $16.5 million.
Donor: Egypt;
Quantity: 17,199;
Donor-estimated value: $5.5 million.
Donor: Slovenia;
Quantity: 12,033;
Donor-estimated value: $5.0 million.
Donor: Romania;
Quantity: 11,390;
Donor-estimated value: $7.6 million.
Donor: Lithuania;
Quantity: 10,000;
Donor-estimated value: $3.3 million.
Donor: Germany;
Quantity: 10,000;
Donor-estimated value: $2.5 million.
Donor: Bosnia;
Quantity: 4,930;
Donor-estimated value: $2.9 million.
Donor: Turkey;
Quantity: 4,088;
Donor-estimated value: $8.4 million.
Donor: Estonia;
Quantity: 4,000;
Donor-estimated value: $1.3 million.
Donor: India;
Quantity: 3,864;
Donor-estimated value: $31.1 million.
Donor: Canada;
Quantity: 2,500;
Donor-estimated value: $2.0 million.
Donor: Montenegro;
Quantity: 1,600;
Donor-estimated value: $0.8 million.
Donor: Slovakia;
Quantity: 1,524;
Donor-estimated value: $3.4 million.
Donor: Bulgaria;
Quantity: 1,224;
Donor-estimated value: $3.1 million.
Donor: Croatia;
Quantity: 1,012;
Donor-estimated value: $0.3 million.
Donor: Albania;
Quantity: 918;
Donor-estimated value: $0.5 million.
Donor: Pakistan;
Quantity: 801;
Donor-estimated value: $1.9 million.
Donor: Ukraine;
Quantity: 666;
Donor-estimated value: $0.4 million.
Donor: Greece;
Quantity: 300;
Donor-estimated value: $0.1 million.
Donor: Spain;
Quantity: 259;
Donor-estimated value: $6.0 million.
Donor: Poland;
Quantity: 108;
Donor-estimated value: $0.1 million.
Donor: Total;
Quantity: 135,360;
Donor-estimated value: $102.8 million.
Source: GAO analysis of CSTC-A data.
[End of table]
While CSTC-A's procedures for ensuring the accuracy of these data have
improved during the past year, documentation was lacking prior to March
2007, which made it impossible for us to independently assess the
data's accuracy. Because we have concerns about the reliability of
these data, we are only reporting them here to provide a sense of who
donated the weapons.
Included in CSTC-A's records were details indicating that weapons
donations have included rifles, pistols, light and heavy machine guns,
grenade launchers, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and mortars.
According to this information, about 79 percent of the weapons donated
were AK-47 assault rifles.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Timeline of Key Weapons Accountability Events:
Since international donors began providing weapons for ANSF in June
2002, CSTC-A and others have taken a variety of steps to improve
accountability. Many of these steps occurred during the course of our
review. Figure 4 provides a timeline of key events relating to
accountability for ANSF weapons and other sensitive equipment.
Figure 4: Timeline of Key Events Relating to Accountability for ANSF
Weapons and Other Sensitive Equipment (June 2002 to January 2009):
[Refer to PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the Timeline of Key Events Relating
to Accountability for ANSF Weapons and Other Sensitive Equipment (June
2002 to January 2009):
1/1/2002-mid-2009: International donations shipped to Afghanistan;
Late 2004-1/30/2009: U.S.-procured weapons shipped to Afghanistan;
November 2006: CSTC-A‘s Commanding General mandates serial number
control for weapons issued to ANSF;
July 2007: CSTC-A issues night vision devices to Afghan army units
without establishing end use monitoring controls; GAO reports on
accountability lapses for weapons provided to Iraq;
August 2007: CSTC-A begins recording serial numbers for weapons issued
to ANSF units;
November 16, 2007: GAO review begins;
January 2008: National Defense Authorization Act mandates serial number
registration and monitoring of small arms provided to Iraq;
May 2008: CSTC-A establishes end use monitoring plan;
June 2008: CSTC-A completes first 100% weapons inventories at central
depots; CSTC detects pistols missing from the Afghan army storage
depot;
July 2008: CSTC-A begins recording serial numbers for weapons received
at central depots; CSTC-A begins to implement end use monitoring plan;
CSTC-A introduces standard operating procedures for weapons
transactions at central depots;
Mid-August 2008: GAO team visits Afghanistan;
October 2008: CSTC-A begins enhanced end use monitoring of night vision
devices; Defense Office of Inspector General issues report addressing
accountability and control of weapons in Afghanistan.
January 30, 2009: GAO Review ends.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by Defense and CSTC-A.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Although the comments the Department of Defense provided to us were
undated, we received them on January 23, 2009.
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Asian and Pacific Affairs:
2700 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2700:
Mr. Charles Johnson Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Mr. Johnson:
The following are Department of Defense (DoD) comments to the GAO draft
report (GAO-09-267), "Afghanistan Security: Lack of Systematic Tracking
Raises significant Accountability Concerns about Weapons Provided to
Afghan National Security Forces," dated 24 December, 2008 (GAO Code
320556). DoD Comments are directed towards the draft report's three
recommendations.
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
establish clear accountability procedures for weapons in the control
and custody of the United States, and direct U.S. Army Security
Assistance Command (USASAC), Combined Security Transition Command-
Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and other military organizations involved in
providing these weapons to (1) track all weapons by serial number and
(2) control routine physical inventory. (p. 22/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: DoD concurs with the recommendation, although notes that
accountability requirements and procedures for small arms tracking and
accountability currently exist in the Defense Logistics Management
System Manual (DoD 4000.25-M Volume 2) and the U.S. Army's Inventory
Management Asset and Transaction Reporting System Regulation (AR 710-
3). These instructions delineate the requirement to enter the serial
number of any weapon (standard and non-standard) into the DoD Small
Arms Serialization Program.
DoD has also taken measures to establish a clear directive on weapons
accountability in Afghanistan. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency,
in conjunction with U.S. Central Command and the military departments,
has been directed to implement in Afghanistan the best practices of
section 1228 (b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2008, Public Law 110-181 (NDAA) which lays out controls for Iraq.
These include:
1. The registration of the serial numbers of all small arms to be
provided to the Islamic Government of Afghanistan or to other groups,
organizations, citizens, or residents of Afghanistan;
2. A program of end-use monitoring of all lethal defense articles
provided to such entities or individuals; and;
3. The maintenance of detailed record of the origin, shipping, and
distribution of all defense articles transferred under the Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund or other security assistance program to such
entities or individuals.
DoD also notes that as a result of guidance issued by CENTCOM in July
2008, CSTC-A currently tracks serial numbers of all U.S. procured and
internationally donated weapons per guidance in DOD regulation 4000.25-
2-M (C18.7.4.3). Routine inventories are conducted by the U.S. military
forces at the national, depot, and unit levels. Units with no coalition
members present conduct monthly inventories that are reported to CSTC-A
through a training readiness report. Afghan National Army leadership
has confirmed that they have performed 100% physical serial number
inventories of weapons annually and the Afghan National Police is
currently in the process of conducting their first 100% weapon
inventory.
The U.S. military forces also use the same measures to ensure
accountability of weapons donated by outer countries when we have
visibility of them.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
direct CSTC-A to:
1. specifically and systematically assess the ability of each Afghan
National Security Forces (ANSF) unit to safeguard and account for
weapons in accordance with Afghan ministerial decrees; and;
2. explicitly verify that adequate safeguards and accountability
procedures are in place, prior to providing weapons to ANSF units,
unless a specific waiver or exception is granted based on due
consideration of practicality, cost, and mission performance. (p.
22/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: DoD concurs with the recommendation. As stated in the
report, as of June 2008 CSTC-A has assisted the Afghan Ministries of
Defense and Interior establish decrees requiring the Afghans to adopt
accountability procedures and direct who is accountable for weapons at
all levels of the command. DoD also notes that CSTC-A uses mentors and
embedded training teams to assess the ability of the ANSF units to
safeguard and account for weapons as established in accordance with
Afghan Ministerial decrees. For the Afghan National Army, weapons are
only issued with Coalition mentors present who provide oversight at all
level of command. For the Afghan National Police most weapons are being
issued through the Focused District Development (FDD) and the Focused
Border Development (FBD) programs. The FDD and FBD programs ensure that
the weapons are properly issued and that training is done on property
accountability and sensitive items. CSTC-A issues weapons to police
outside of these venues including the Crises Response Unit and the
Counter Narcotic Unit which both have mentors to oversee these
processes
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense
devote the necessary resources to address the staffing shortages that
hamper CSTC-A's efforts to train, mentor, and assess ANSF in equipment
accountability matters. (p. 22/GAO Draft Report)
DOD Response: DoD concurs with the comment and is looking at ways to
address these shortfalls.
My point of contact is Ms. Cara Negrette, (703) 695-2859, or email:
cara.negrette@osd.mil.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Mitchell Shivers:
Acting:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgments:
Key contributors to this report include Albert H. Huntington III,
Assistant Director; James B. Michels; Emily Rachman; Mattias Fenton;
James Ashley; Mary Moutsos; Joseph Carney; Etana Finkler; Jena
Sinkfield; and Richard Brown.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] These include grenade launchers, machine guns, rocket-propelled
grenade launchers, mortars, pistols, rifles, and shotguns. For the
purposes of this report, we use the term "weapons" to refer to these
small arms and light weapons.
[2] Defense refers to this adaptation of FMS as "pseudo-FMS."
[3] USASAC and Navy IPO implement U.S. security assistance programs,
including Foreign Military Sales of defense articles and services, to
eligible foreign governments.
[4] See Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, P.L. 107-327, Dec. 4,
2002. Funds were appropriated to the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
starting in 2005 in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for
Defense, the Global War on Terror and Tsunami Relief, 2005, P.L. 109-
13, May 11, 2005. FMS cases are typically funded with participating
countries' own resources or by Foreign Military Financing funds
generally appropriated in the annual foreign operations and export
financing appropriations acts. Foreign Military Financing funds were
used to purchase only about 550 weapons for ANSF.
[5] For more information on this effort, see GAO, Afghanistan Security:
Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a
Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security
Forces, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]
(Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008).
[6] Defense defines accountability as the obligation imposed by law,
lawful order, or regulation, accepted by an organization or person for
keeping accurate records, to ensure control of property, documents, or
funds, with or without physical possession (DODI 5000.64,
Accountability and Management of DOD-Owned Equipment and Other
Accountable Property, E2.2).
[7] Due to travel restrictions imposed by CSTC-A based on heightened
security threats during our visit to Afghanistan in August 2008, we
were only able to travel to one ANSF unit located near Kabul.
[8] All percentage estimates from this sample have a margin of error of
plus or minus 5 percent or less, at the 95 percent confidence level.
All numeric estimates have a margin of error of plus or minus 10,000
weapons at the 95 percent confidence level.
[9] The Ministry of Defense has authority over the Afghan National
Army, while the Ministry of Interior has authority over the Afghan
National Police.
[10] Department of Defense Inspector General, Assessment of Arms,
Ammunition, and Explosives Accountability and Control; Security
Assistance; and Sustainment for the Afghan National Security Forces
(Report No. SPO-2009-001), Oct. 24, 2008.
[11] December 2004 reflects USASAC's earliest reported shipment of U.S.-
procured weapons for ANSF, and June 2008 reflects the latest shipment
data available prior to our August 2008 fieldwork in Afghanistan.
[12] This estimated amount reflects the results of our testing of a
generalizable sample selected randomly from 195,671 U.S.-procured
weapons for which Defense could provide serial numbers; the estimate
has a margin of error of +/-10,000 weapons at the 95 percent confidence
level. See appendix I for more detail about the random sample.
[13] DoD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual, Oct. 3,
2003, Chapter 8.
[14] CSTC-A officials told us they had not evaluated the reliability of
the values assigned by donors for these weapons and noted that some
values may be overstated, as many of the items donated were used,
damaged, or unusable. Furthermore, we were unable to independently
verify the weapons quantities that CSTC-A reported to us.
[15] CSTC-A also received weapons from the disarmament of Afghan
militias, but we did not include these in our analysis.
[16] For the purposes of this report, we use the term "non-standard
weapons" to indicate weapons that have not been assigned a U.S.
National Stock Number. Defense Logistics Agency uses those numbers to
identify items that are repeatedly bought, stocked, stored, issued, and
used throughout the federal supply system.
[17] Included in this sum are AMD-65 rifles, which are AK-47 variants.
[18] FMS cases are typically funded with participating countries' own
resources or by Foreign Military Financing funds generally appropriated
in the annual foreign operations and export financing appropriations
acts. Foreign Military Financing funds were used to purchase only about
550 weapons for ANSF.
[19] Weapons are flown into Kabul by the Defense Transportation
System's Special Assignment Airlift Mission and commercial flights (for
weapons procured by contractors working for USASAC).
[20] One depot (called Depot 1) contains Afghan National Army weapons,
while the other depot (called 22 Bunkers) contains Afghan National
Police weapons as well as ammunition for both the army and police.
[21] This includes weapons and other equipment provided through FMS and
pseudo-FMS.
[22] When no SAO is established in a country, security assistance
functions are normally handled by the Defense attaché office, either as
an additional duty or with augmented personnel. In a small number of
embassies (primarily in developing countries) where there is no Defense
attaché representation, the security assistance program is managed by
Foreign Service personnel from State.
[23] DoD 5105.38-M, Chapter 8.
[24] This guidance includes DoD 5100.76-M, Physical Security of
Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition and Explosives, August 12,
2000; DoD 4140.1-R, DoD Material Management Regulation, May 1, 1998;
and DoD 4000.25-M, Defense Logistics Management System, March 2008.
[25] DoD 4000.25-M, Vol. 2, Chapter 18, C18.3.1.
[26] The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence clarified the
applicability of existing Defense guidance, specifically DoD 5100.76-M,
indicating that "the policy remains unchanged as it applies to all
[Defense] components involved in any procurement, use, shipment,
storage, inventory control, disposal by sale, or destruction of any
conventional arms, ammunition, and explosives. [Defense] components
possessing or having custody of [these items] shall comply with
protection requirements until formal transfer to a foreign nation."
[27] See SPO-2009-001.
[28] See GAO, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure that U.S.-Funded
Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-771] (Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2007).
[29] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, P.L. 110-
181, Jan. 28, 2008.
[30] In April 2008, the Multinational Transition Command-Iraq issued
logistics accountability standard operating procedures to implement
U.S. law and policy and provide mandatory direction to all of its
personnel for the maintenance of materiel accountability through the
process of acquisition, receipt, storage, and distribution up to and
including the point of issuance to the Government of Iraq.
[31] December 2004 reflects USASAC's earliest reported shipment of U.S.-
procured weapons for ANSF, and June 2008 reflects the latest shipment
data available prior to our August 2008 fieldwork in Afghanistan.
[32] This estimated amount reflects the results of our testing of a
generalizable sample selected randomly from 195,671 U.S.-procured
weapons for which Defense could provide serial numbers; we could not
conduct similar testing for about 46,000 U.S.-procured weapons for
which serial number records were not available; the estimate has a
margin of error of +/-10,000 weapons at the 95 percent confidence
level.
[33] Our random sample did not include any weapons from the "other"
category.
[34] Navy IPO kept a complete serial number accounting of all the M-16s
it provided.
[35] Transferring serial number records in this way is an element of
the weapons accountability procedures defined in DoD 4000.25-M, Vol. 2,
C18.2.2.
[36] DoD 5105.38-M, Chapter 5, Table C5.T5.
[37] In a November 2006 memorandum, the CSTC-A commanding general
issued command guidance for fiscal year 2007, which stated, among other
things, that "CSTC-A will not accept risk in— accountability of all
equipment (to include issuing and serial number accountability) issued
to the ANSF." The memo also established as a priority effort to
"institute an accountability system throughout the [Afghan National
Police] which ensures serial number accountability of all sensitive
items and major end items and ensures that accountability of all
equipment issued to the [police] (Total asset visibility and
accountability)."
[38] See Department of Defense, Report to Congress in Accordance with
2008 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1231, P.L. 110-181),
United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security
Forces (Washington, D.C.: June 2008), p. 13.
[39] CSTC-A obtains MPRI's services through delivery orders issued
under a contract between the U.S. Army Research, Development and
Engineering Command Contracting Center and MPRI, Inc.
[40] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661].
[41] However, as we reported in June 2008 (see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]), the shortage of U.S. embedded
trainers and coalition mentors assigned to Afghan National Army units
delays this validation process and lengthens the amount of time it will
take the Afghan National Army to achieve full capability.
[42] However, as we reported in June 2008 (see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661]), CSTC-A identified extremely
limited mentor coverage of the police as a significant challenge to
using this tool to generate reliable assessments.
[43] CSTC-A has only been able to conduct routine end use monitoring in
Afghan police districts where Focused District Development training has
been provided. This training was initiated in November 2007 to address
widespread corruption, lack of capacity, and inadequate training in the
Afghan National Police.
[44] SPO-2009-001, p. 32.
[45] GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police
Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-575] (Washington, D.C.:
June 30, 2005).
[End of section]
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