Nuclear Detection
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities Gao ID: GAO-09-257 January 29, 2009In April 2005, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling domestically and overseas. DNDO was directed to develop, in coordination with the departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and State (State), a global strategy for nuclear detection--a system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities domestically and abroad. GAO was asked to examine (1) DNDO's progress in developing programs to address critical gaps in preventing nuclear smuggling domestically, (2) DNDO's role in supporting other agencies' efforts to combat nuclear smuggling overseas, and (3) the amount budgeted by DHS, DOD, DOE, and State for programs that constitute the global nuclear detection strategy. To do so, GAO analyzed agency documents; interviewed agency, state, and local officials; and visited select pilot program locations.
DNDO has made some progress in strengthening radiation detection capabilities to address critical gaps and vulnerabilities in combating nuclear smuggling, which include the land border area between ports of entry into the United States, aviation, and small maritime vessels. However, DNDO is still in the early stages of program development, and has not clearly developed long term plans, with costs and time frames, for achieving its goal of closing these gaps by expanding radiological and nuclear detection capabilities. For example, DNDO and Customs and Border Protection have been collaborating on radiological and nuclear detection options to better secure the land borders between ports of entry. However, DNDO-sponsored field evaluations to test radiation detection equipment are still not complete and DNDO and CBP may not have all radiation detection equipment in place until 2012. In addition, DNDO is in the first year of a 3-year maritime pilot program, working with the Coast Guard and local law enforcement agencies in the Puget Sound, Washington, area to field test equipment and to develop radiological and nuclear screening procedures. However, DNDO has made little progress in (1) developing criteria for assessing the success of the pilot to help determine whether it should be expanded to other locations, and (2) resolving some of the challenges it faces in the pilot program, such as technological limitations of the detection equipment and sustaining current detection efforts. Although DNDO has no authority over other federal agencies' programs to combat radiological and nuclear smuggling overseas, it has worked with DOD, DOE, and State to provide subject matter expertise and exchange lessons learned on radiological and nuclear detection. However, most of DNDO's efforts are modest in scope, reflecting the fact that these agencies have well-established programs to combat nuclear smuggling. For example, DNDO has been working with State's Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to develop model guidelines that other nations can use to establish their own nuclear detection programs. According to DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted by DHS, DOD, DOE, and State in fiscal year 2007 for programs included in the global strategy for nuclear detection. Of this amount, approximately $1.1 billion was budgeted for programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas, $1.1 billion was budgeted for nuclear detection programs at the U.S. border and within the United States, and approximately $577 million was budgeted to fund cross-cutting activities, such as providing technical support to users of the radiation detection equipment. DNDO collected budget data and published them in the Joint Annual Interagency Review, an annual report required by Congress. DOD, DOE, and State officials told GAO that this information is used primarily as a status report of individual programs to combat nuclear smuggling. It is not used as a tool to help plan for or inform the future direction of the strategy or to help establish current or future priorities.
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Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-257, Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
January 2009:
Nuclear Detection:
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve Planning to Better
Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities:
GAO-09-257:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-257, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In April 2005, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was
established within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance
and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear
smuggling domestically and overseas. DNDO was directed to develop, in
coordination with the departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), and
State (State), a global strategy for nuclear detection”a system of
radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities domestically
and abroad. GAO was asked to examine (1) DNDO‘s progress in developing
programs to address critical gaps in preventing nuclear smuggling
domestically, (2) DNDO‘s role in supporting other agencies‘ efforts to
combat nuclear smuggling overseas, and (3) the amount budgeted by DHS,
DOD, DOE, and State for programs that constitute the global nuclear
detection strategy. To do so, GAO analyzed agency documents;
interviewed agency, state, and local officials; and visited select
pilot program locations.
What GAO Found:
DNDO has made some progress in strengthening radiation detection
capabilities to address critical gaps and vulnerabilities in combating
nuclear smuggling, which include the land border area between ports of
entry into the United States, aviation, and small maritime vessels.
However, DNDO is still in the early stages of program development, and
has not clearly developed long term plans, with costs and time frames,
for achieving its goal of closing these gaps by expanding radiological
and nuclear detection capabilities. For example, DNDO and Customs and
Border Protection have been collaborating on radiological and nuclear
detection options to better secure the land borders between ports of
entry. However, DNDO-sponsored field evaluations to test radiation
detection equipment are still not complete and DNDO and CBP may not
have all radiation detection equipment in place until 2012. In
addition, DNDO is in the first year of a 3-year maritime pilot program,
working with the Coast Guard and local law enforcement agencies in the
Puget Sound, Washington, area to field test equipment and to develop
radiological and nuclear screening procedures. However, DNDO has made
little progress in (1) developing criteria for assessing the success of
the pilot to help determine whether it should be expanded to other
locations, and (2) resolving some of the challenges it faces in the
pilot program, such as technological limitations of the detection
equipment and sustaining current detection efforts.
Although DNDO has no authority over other federal agencies‘ programs to
combat radiological and nuclear smuggling overseas, it has worked with
DOD, DOE, and State to provide subject matter expertise and exchange
lessons learned on radiological and nuclear detection. However, most of
DNDO‘s efforts are modest in scope, reflecting the fact that these
agencies have well-established programs to combat nuclear smuggling.
For example, DNDO has been working with State‘s Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism to develop model guidelines that other nations
can use to establish their own nuclear detection programs.
According to DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted by DHS, DOD,
DOE, and State in fiscal year 2007 for programs included in the global
strategy for nuclear detection. Of this amount, approximately $1.1
billion was budgeted for programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas,
$1.1 billion was budgeted for nuclear detection programs at the U.S.
border and within the United States, and approximately $577 million was
budgeted to fund cross-cutting activities, such as providing technical
support to users of the radiation detection equipment. DNDO collected
budget data and published them in the Joint Annual Interagency Review,
an annual report required by Congress. DOD, DOE, and State officials
told GAO that this information is used primarily as a status report of
individual programs to combat nuclear smuggling. It is not used as a
tool to help plan for or inform the future direction of the strategy or
to help establish current or future priorities.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DHS (1) develop a plan for the domestic part of the
global strategy, and (2) in coordination with DOD, DOE, and State, use
the Joint Annual Interagency Review to guide future strategic efforts
to combat nuclear smuggling. GAO also has two recommendations related
to maritime planning. DHS did not directly comment on the
recommendations, but said they aligned with DNDO‘s efforts.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-257]. For more
information, contact David Maurer at (202) 512-3841 or maurerd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DNDO Is in the Early Stages of Enhancing Domestic Initiatives for
Nuclear Detection:
DNDO Has Limited Role in Influencing U.S. Efforts to Combat
Radiological and Nuclear Smuggling Overseas:
A Total of $2.8 Billion Was Budgeted in Fiscal Year 2007 for Programs
Associated with Detecting Radiological and Nuclear Materials:
DNDO Has Not Yet Implemented Recommendation from July 2008 Testimony:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
GAO Comments:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Table:
Table 1: Distribution of Fiscal Year 2007 Budget for Detecting
Radiological and Nuclear Weapons or Materials:
Figures:
Figure 1: Elements of the Global Nuclear Detection Strategy:
Figure 2: Cargo Vehicle Passing through Radiological Detection
Equipment at Dulles International Airport:
Figure 3: A Coast Guard Officer Wearing Standard Boarding Team
Equipment:
Figure 4: Budgets by Program Focus and Agency:
Abbreviations:
ASP: advanced spectroscopic portal (monitor):
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DNDO: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOE: Department of Energy:
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency:
NYPD: New York Police Department:
RIID: radioactive isotope identification device:
SAFE Port Act: Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006:
State: Department of State:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 29, 2009:
Congressional Requesters:
Preventing terrorists from using radiological or nuclear material to
carry out an attack in the United States is a top national priority. If
terrorists were to carry out such an attack, the consequences could be
devastating to national security. Since the events of September 11,
2001, there is heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle
radiological and nuclear materials or a nuclear weapon into the United
States or obtain such materials within the United States. In 2002,
Congress established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and gave
it authority to, among other things, develop and deploy technologies to
detect, prevent, and interdict nuclear materials or devices from being
transported into and used within the United States.
In April 2005, the President issued a directive establishing the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), within DHS, to enhance and
coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to prevent radiological
and nuclear attacks. Congress subsequently passed the Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act), which
established DNDO in statute.[Footnote 1] Among other things, DNDO is
required to develop, in coordination with the Department of Defense
(DOD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of Justice, and
the Department of State (State), an enhanced global nuclear detection
architecture--essentially a strategy involving radiation detection
equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in
foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United
States.[Footnote 2] DNDO is responsible for coordinating the
implementation of the domestic portion (at the U.S. border and within
the United States) of the global strategy, including the efforts of
federal, state, and local governments. It is also responsible for
developing and acquiring radiation detection equipment to support the
domestic efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. The directive and
the SAFE Port Act reaffirmed that DOD, DOE, and State, among other
agencies, are responsible for programs to combat radiological and
nuclear smuggling outside the United States.
In its initial approach, DNDO categorized existing nuclear detection
programs into three main geographic regions--overseas, U.S. border, and
U.S. interior--which it further divided into nine more specific
geographic segments. In addition, agencies identified other programs
that support more than one segment; DNDO categorizes these as cross-
cutting. While DNDO is responsible for developing the global strategy
for nuclear detection, each federal agency that has a role in combating
nuclear smuggling is responsible for implementing its own programs.
DNDO identified 73 federal programs, which are primarily funded by DOD,
DOE, and DHS, that engage in radiological and nuclear detection
activities.
Since its inception about 4 years ago, DNDO has been examining nuclear
detection strategies along potential pathways--such as air, land, or
sea--for smuggling radiological or nuclear material and identified
opportunities to improve the likelihood of detection and interdiction.
Through these studies, DNDO concluded that potential smuggling pathways
outside of traditional ports of entry--where U.S. government efforts
have been focused--represented critical gaps in the existing nuclear
detection strategy. Specifically, DNDO identified several gap areas,
among others, with respect to detecting potential nuclear smuggling and
prioritized its efforts on three primary pathways: (1) land border
areas between ports of entry into the United States, (2) aviation, and
(3) small maritime craft.[Footnote 3]
These pathways are important because of their size, volume of traffic,
and limited deployment of radiological and nuclear detection
capabilities. Specifically, the United States has more than 6,000 miles
of land border with many locations where people and vehicles can easily
enter the United States. Nuclear weapons and material also can be small
and portable enough to be carried on most aircraft. On average, nearly
2,000 international commercial flights and over 400 international
general aviation flights land in the United States each day.[Footnote
4] In the maritime environment, a Coast Guard risk assessment revealed
that small boats pose a greater threat for nuclear smuggling than
container ships. There are at least 13 million registered domestic
pleasure craft in the United States and 110,000 commercial fishing
vessels. These small boats have traditionally been used to smuggle
drugs and people, but, as occurred in the attack on the U.S.S. Cole,
can be used to deliver a weapon.
GAO was asked to examine (1) DNDO's progress in developing programs to
address critical gaps in preventing nuclear smuggling domestically, (2)
DNDO's role in supporting other agencies' efforts to combat nuclear
smuggling overseas, and (3) the amount budgeted by DHS, DOD, DOE, and
State for programs that constitute the global nuclear detection
strategy and the extent to which the budget information is used for
planning purposes. In addition, we are providing an update on DNDO's
efforts to implement the recommendation made in our July 2008
testimony, which presented preliminary observations on the global
strategy for nuclear detection.[Footnote 5]
To evaluate the status of DNDO's progress in developing programs to
address critical gaps and its role in supporting other agencies'
efforts to combat nuclear smuggling overseas, we reviewed and analyzed
documents DNDO used to help create the baseline, or initial strategy,
as well as DNDO-sponsored studies on gaps identified in the strategy.
We also reviewed our previous reports on nuclear and radiological
detection.[Footnote 6] We interviewed officials from DNDO about steps
taken to develop and improve upon the existing strategy for nuclear
detection and interviewed agency officials from DOD, DOE, and State who
manage programs that are part of the global strategy to obtain their
perspectives on how these programs fit into the global strategy and to
learn about any new initiatives to address gaps and vulnerabilities. In
addition, we interviewed officials from a variety of federal, state,
and local agencies--including Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the
Coast Guard, the New York City Police Department, and local law
enforcement participating in the Puget Sound maritime pilot--to obtain
their views on DNDO's initiatives to combat nuclear smuggling. We chose
the New York City Police Department because of its efforts to enhance
nuclear detection capabilities through the Securing the Cities
initiative and Puget Sound because that was the first location chosen
for the maritime radiological and nuclear detection pilot program. We
also interviewed subject matter experts from the academic and nonprofit
sectors, as well as representatives from the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), to gain their perspective on efforts to develop
and implement the strategy. To examine the amount budgeted for the
programs that constitute the global strategy for nuclear detection, we
analyzed budget data submitted by DHS, DOD, DOE, and State to DNDO as
part of DNDO's Joint Annual Interagency Review and spoke with officials
from these agencies to discern how this information was used. We
assessed the reliability of these data and determined it was sufficient
for the purposes of this analysis. We conducted this performance audit
from November 2007 through January 2009 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
Results in Brief:
DNDO has made some progress in strengthening radiation detection
capabilities to address critical gaps and vulnerabilities in combating
nuclear smuggling, which include the land border areas between ports of
entry into the United States, aviation, and small maritime vessels.
However, DNDO is still in the early stages of program development, and
has not clearly developed long-term plans, with costs and time frames,
for achieving its goal of closing these gaps by expanding radiological
and nuclear detection capabilities. Specifically, we found:
* Land border areas between ports of entry. DNDO and CBP, both agencies
within DHS, have been collaborating on radiological and nuclear
detection options to better secure the border areas between ports of
entry. CBP is responsible for developing and implementing screening
procedures; DNDO provides the equipment for these operations. DNDO and
CBP plan to have radiation detection equipment in place at all 20 CBP
sectors by fiscal year 2012. However, DNDO-sponsored laboratory and
field evaluations to identify and test radiation detection equipment
are still not complete, DNDO has fallen behind on its original test
schedule, critical testing has been postponed owing to problems with
the detection technology being tested, and DNDO has not estimated the
total cost of this effort. In addition, DNDO has not provided CBP with
the equipment needed in a timely manner to improve radiation detection
capabilities either at ports of entry or land border areas between
ports of entry.
* Aviation. DNDO is still in the early stages of developing programs to
achieve its goal of screening all incoming international planes, cargo,
and passengers for nuclear weapons and material. Although some
initiatives in the aviation arena are under way, it is unclear how long
this effort will take or how much it will cost. Since December 2007,
CBP has been screening 100 percent of passengers and baggage on
arriving international general aviation flights (approximately 400
flights per day), as well as the aircraft, for radiological or nuclear
materials. However, CBP efforts to screen international cargo have not
proceeded as smoothly. Jurisdictional and operational issues between
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), CBP, and the local
airport authority delayed efforts to screen international cargo at the
initial airport selected for screening until September 2008. Planned
expansion of this screening to a total of 30 U.S. airports, which
represent 99 percent of incoming international cargo, is not projected
to be fully achieved until 2014.
* Small maritime vessels. DNDO has developed and tested equipment for
detecting nuclear material on small maritime vessels. However, efforts
to use this equipment in a port area have been limited to pilot
programs for demonstrating the feasibility of screening small vessels.
Whereas initiatives to combat smuggling at land border areas between
formal ports of entry and through aviation routes are being integrated
into already existing CBP screening operations, initiatives in the
maritime environment require developing and testing new equipment and
new procedures with the Coast Guard and local law enforcement agencies.
DNDO is currently in the first year of a 3-year pilot program in Puget
Sound and San Diego to design, field test, and evaluate equipment and
is working with CBP and Coast Guard as they develop procedures for
screening. This review is scheduled to end in 2010, when DNDO will
decide whether screening of small vessels for radiological and nuclear
material is feasible. However, DNDO has not established criteria for
assessing the success of this pilot effort to help determine whether it
should be expanded to other locations. In addition, should DNDO decide
to continue this program, it does not currently have a plan detailing
which locations it would target for maritime radiological and nuclear
detection programs, nor has it estimated the total cost of this
initiative. Although DNDO is providing state, tribal, and local
agencies with initial equipment, support, and training during the
pilot, DNDO expects them to seek funding from federal grant programs to
sustain these initiatives. For many state and local agency officials we
spoke with, the uncertainty of federal resources jeopardizes their
ability to continue radiological and nuclear detection activities.
Although DNDO has no authority over other federal agencies' programs to
combat radiological and nuclear smuggling, it has worked with DOD, DOE,
and State to support these agencies' efforts to combat nuclear
smuggling overseas by, for example, providing subject matter expertise
and exchanging lessons learned on radiological and nuclear detection.
However, most of DNDO's efforts are modest in scope, reflecting the
fact that DOD, DOE, and State have well-established programs to combat
nuclear smuggling. Some of the areas in which DNDO has been able to
contribute to other agencies' overseas programs include (1) working
with State's Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to develop
model guidelines that other nations can use to establish their own
nuclear detection programs and sponsoring a related workshop, and (2)
exchanging lessons learned with DOE from its efforts to develop
operations to screen for radiological and nuclear materials in the
aviation arena. In addition, DNDO has been collecting information and
developing an inventory of radiation detection equipment deployed
overseas. DNDO subsequently has shared this information with relevant
agencies, and agencies have used this information to guide equipment
placement decisions.
According to DNDO, approximately $2.8 billion was budgeted by DHS, DOD,
DOE, and State in fiscal year 2007 for programs included in the global
strategy for nuclear detection; however, agencies are not analyzing
this budget information to ensure that resources are clearly aligned
with overarching priorities. Of this $2.8 billion, approximately $1.1
billion was budgeted for programs designed to combat nuclear smuggling
and secure materials overseas. Approximately $220 million was budgeted
for programs to support the detection of radiological and nuclear
material at the U.S. border; an additional $918 million funded security
and detection activities within the United States. Finally,
approximately $577 million was budgeted for a number of cross-cutting
activities that support many different layers of the strategy, such as
those focused on research and development or technical support to users
of the detection equipment. When analyzed by agency, the majority of
the $2.8 billion--$1.8 billion, or 62 percent--was budgeted for DOE
programs, primarily those related to securing nuclear weapons and
weapons material at its source and deploying radiological and nuclear
detection systems at international border crossings, airports, and
seaports. DNDO collected these program-level budget data in response to
a statutory requirement that select agencies, including DHS, DOD, DOE,
and State, annually assess their capacity to implement their portion of
the global nuclear detection strategy. DNDO's June 2008 report
discusses, among other things, programs and budgets in support of the
global nuclear detection effort. The report provides an overview of the
global nuclear detection strategy and discusses programs and budgets
for combating nuclear smuggling domestically and overseas. Agency
officials from DOD, DOE, and State said that this information is used
primarily to provide agencies and Congress with a picture of the
already established roles and responsibilities within the layered
structure of the strategy. The information is not being used, however,
as a tool to look more broadly across the global strategy, to help
assess the overall strategic direction of global detection efforts, or
help establish current or future global priorities, according to these
officials.
In July 2008, we testified that DNDO had not developed an overarching
strategic plan to guide its development of a more comprehensive global
strategy for nuclear detection.[Footnote 7] We recommended that DHS, in
coordination with DOD, DOE, and State, develop a strategic plan to
guide the development of a more comprehensive global nuclear strategy
including (1) clearly defining objectives, (2) identifying the roles
and responsibilities for meeting each objective, (3) identifying
funding necessary to achieve those objectives, and (4) employing
monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and identify
needed improvements. DNDO agreed with the need for an overarching
strategic plan and believes that many elements of such a plan exist in
DHS and other agency documents, but that there are gaps and
vulnerabilities for which solutions are still under development. As of
December 2008, DNDO had not yet established detailed plans to address
those gaps and vulnerabilities, nor had it integrated all the plan
elements into an overarching strategic plan as recommended.
To complement our July 2008 recommendation, we are recommending that
the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a strategic plan for the
domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy to help ensure
the future success of initiatives aimed at closing gaps and
vulnerabilities. This plan should focus on, among other things,
establishing time frames and costs for the three areas of recent focus-
-land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and small maritime
vessels. In addition, to enhance DNDO's future efforts to combat
nuclear smuggling via small maritime vessels, we are recommending that
the Secretary of Homeland Security develop criteria to assess the
effectiveness, cost, and feasibility of its maritime radiological and
nuclear pilot program. Furthermore, should the Secretary decide to
expand the program beyond the pilot, we recommend that DHS undertake
additional planning to identify next steps, including how and where a
broader strategy would be implemented, what technology would be needed,
what organizations should be involved, and how such efforts would be
sustained.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOD, DOE, and State for
comment. DHS and DOD provided written comments, which are presented in
appendixes I and II, respectively. DOE and State provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD concurred with the
recommendation that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination
with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Secretary of
State, use the Joint Annual Interagency Review to guide future
strategic efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. DOD stated that greater
use could be made of the review associated with the development of this
annual report to guide U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. DHS
did not directly comment on our recommendations but noted that the
recommendations aligned with DNDO's past, present, and future actions.
DHS pointed out what, in its view, were a number of shortcomings in the
draft report. Specifically, the department believes that we did not
give enough credit to DNDO's strategic planning efforts. Furthermore,
the department believes that we did not clearly and adequately explain
the background and context of DNDO's efforts to develop a global
strategy, what has been accomplished so far, what remains to be done,
and what challenges it faces. Finally, DHS asserted that the draft
contained a number of inaccuracies and omissions that make it less
reliable and useful than it could be. DHS also provided a number of
more detailed comments on specific issues presented in the draft
report. We have addressed those comments in our detailed responses in
appendix I and incorporated changes, where appropriate.
We believe that our report fairly and accurately presents DNDO efforts
to develop and implement a global strategy to enhance nuclear detection
efforts. We have reported DNDO's key initiatives to improve radiation
detection capabilities in the areas of land borders between the ports
of entry, aviation, and maritime. For example, the report acknowledges
how DNDO has helped highlight the need to address these critical gaps
and has also made some progress in developing and supporting
initiatives to close these gaps. In our view, DNDO needs better
planning to improve the chances that the strategy will be successfully
implemented and sustained in the future. In its comments, DNDO agreed
that the overarching strategic plan we had previously recommended in
our July 2008 testimony based on our preliminary findings on this very
issue was valuable and that work on such a plan has begun.
Background:
According to IAEA, between 1993 and 2006, there were 1,080 confirmed
incidents of illicit trafficking and unauthorized activities involving
nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. Eighteen of these cases
involved weapons-usable material--plutonium and highly enriched
uranium--that could be used to produce a nuclear weapon. IAEA also
reported that 124 cases involved materials that could be used to
produce a device that uses conventional explosives with radioactive
material (known as a "dirty bomb"). Past confirmed incidents of illicit
trafficking in highly enriched uranium and plutonium involved seizures
of kilogram quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material but most have
involved very small quantities. In some of these cases, it is possible
that the seized material was a sample of larger quantities available
for illegal purchase. IAEA concluded that these materials pose a
continuous potential security threat to the international community,
including the United States.
Nuclear material could be smuggled into the United States in a variety
of ways: hidden in a car, train or ship; sent through the mail; carried
in a private aircraft or small boat; carried in personal luggage
through an airport; or walked across the border. In response to these
threats, U.S. agencies--including DHS, DOD, DOE, and State--fund,
manage, and implement programs to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign
countries and the United States. DOD, DOE, and State are responsible
specifically for the overseas programs. Many of these programs started
operations prior to DNDO's creation and collectively cover all of the
geographic regions of the global strategy. (See figure 1.)
Figure 1: Elements of the Global Nuclear Detection Strategy:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map]
This figure is a world map depicting the following elements of the
global nuclear detection strategy:
Overseas:
1. Foreign origin: Locations in foreign countries where nuclear weapons
or material, or radiological material are stored, used, or created.
2. Foreign transit: Any transport of radiological or nuclear material
within or between foreign countries from its site of origin to its
point of departure to the U.S.
3. Foreign departure: Points of departure to the U.S. including
seaports and airports.
U.S. Border:
4. Transit to United States: Actual ship passage or airplane flight
from the point of departure to the port of entry.
5. U.S. Border: Radiation detection at all land borders with Canada and
Mexico, the coastal and inland waterway borders, and international
airports.
U.S. Interior:
6. U.S. origin: Places within the U.S. where nuclear weapons, nuclear
material or radiological material are stored, used, or processed.
7. U.S. Regional: Capabilities that detect or identify radiation
sources between the entry into the United States (or the U.S. point of
origin) and the ultimate target.
8. Target Vicinity: Detectors located ’near“ targets but with
sufficient standoff to protect the targets, or at least mitigate
damage, if a device is detonated.
9. Target: Detect devices delivered to the target but not yet
detonated.
9Sources: GAO analysis of DNDO data and Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
For example, DOE's Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting
program, initiated in 1995, provides support to the Russian Federation
and other former Soviet Union countries to secure nuclear weapons and
weapons material that may be at risk of theft or diversion.[Footnote 8]
In addition, during the 1990s, the United States began deploying
radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the former
Soviet Union. DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction program was
established in the early 1990s to help address proliferation concerns
in the former Soviet Union, including helping secure sites where
nuclear weapons are located.[Footnote 9] Two other DOD programs have
provided radiation portal monitors, hand-held equipment, and radiation
detection training to countries in the former Soviet Union and in
Eastern Europe. Similarly, DOE's Second Line of Defense program,
initiated in 1998, supplies radiation detection equipment, training,
and communication systems to Russia and other countries.[Footnote 10]
DOE's Megaports Initiative, also part of the Second Line of Defense
program, began in 2003 and is focused on providing radiation detection
systems at major international seaports. Once the equipment is
installed, it is then operated by foreign government officials and port
personnel working at these ports.[Footnote 11] State also has programs
that provide radiation detection equipment and training to numerous
countries.
Domestically, DHS, in conjunction with other federal, state, and local
agencies, is responsible for combating nuclear smuggling in the United
States and has provided radiation detection equipment, including portal
monitors, personal radiation detectors (known as pagers), and
radioactive isotope identifiers at U.S. ports of entry, as well as in
other settings. For example, DHS has equipped Coast Guard boarding and
inspection teams with portable detection systems and has provided
equipment, training, and assistance in other maritime, air, and land
venues. In addition, DOE has programs to secure nuclear and radioactive
sources domestically. For example, the U.S. Radiological Threat
Reduction program recovers and manages excess and unwanted radioactive
sources that belong to U.S. licensees. In addition, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, as well as 35 states that have signed an
agreement with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, are responsible for
regulating the security of radioactive and nuclear materials within the
United States through its Radiological Materials and Reactor Security
Programs.
Several types of radiation detection equipment are used by CBP, the
Coast Guard, and other agencies involved in radiological and nuclear
detection activities: radiation portal monitors, radioactive isotope
identification devices (RIID), and personal radiation detectors, among
others. Portal monitors are stationary or mobile pieces of equipment
that can detect radioactive materials carried by vehicles or
transported in cargo containers. RIIDs are a type of handheld radiation
detection equipment that can detect radiation as well as identify the
specific isotope of the radioactive source. Personal radiation
detectors are worn by CBP officials, Coast Guard boarding teams, and
other law enforcement agents. Unlike portal monitors and RIIDs,
personal radiation pagers function primarily as personal safety devices
to alert the individual wearer when he or she is exposed to an
increased level of radiation. Under certain circumstances these devices
also could be used to detect smuggled nuclear material. However, they
can only indicate variations in the general level of radiation and
their sensitivity is limited because of the small size of the detector.
Therefore, they should not be relied upon for that purpose.
All radiation detection devices have limitations in their ability to
detect and identify nuclear material. Detecting attempted nuclear
smuggling is difficult because many sources of radiation are legal and
not harmful when used as intended. These materials can trigger alarms-
-known as nuisance or innocent alarms--that may be difficult to
distinguish in some cases from alarms that could sound in the event of
a true case of nuclear smuggling without a thorough secondary
inspection. Nuisance or innocent alarms can be caused by patients who
have recently had cancer treatments, a wide range of cargo with
naturally occurring radiation (e.g., fertilizer, ceramics, and food
products), and legitimate shipments of radiological sources for use in
medicine and industry. Additionally, detecting actual cases of illicit
trafficking in weapons-useable nuclear material is complicated: one of
the materials of greatest concern in terms of proliferation--highly
enriched uranium--is among the most difficult materials to detect
because of its relatively low level of radioactivity.
DNDO is currently testing the next generation of radiation portal
monitors--the advanced spectroscopic portal monitor, or ASP. We have
repeatedly raised concerns about DNDO's efforts to develop and test
ASPs. Specifically, we found that testing of ASPs at DOE's Nevada Test
Site did not represent an objective or rigorous assessment because DNDO
used biased test methods that enhanced the apparent performance of the
ASPs and did not test the limitations of the ASPs' detection
capabilities.[Footnote 12] In 2008, we also found that DNDO's cost
estimate to equip U.S. ports of entry with radiation detection
equipment is unreliable because it omits major project costs and relies
on a flawed methodology. Furthermore, the agency is no longer following
the original project execution plan, the scope of the agency's current
ASP deployment strategy has changed, and DNDO now plans a much more
limited deployment of the ASP than initially proposed.[Footnote 13] The
current ASP testing is expected to continue into 2009.
DNDO Is in the Early Stages of Enhancing Domestic Initiatives for
Nuclear Detection:
DNDO's ultimate goal is to expand radiological and nuclear detection
capabilities to areas identified as vulnerable to nuclear smuggling. To
that end, in 2005, DNDO identified critical gaps in domestic efforts to
prevent and detect radiological and nuclear smuggling, including, but
not limited to: (1) land border areas between ports of entry into the
United States, (2) aviation, and (3) small maritime craft. However,
DNDO is still in the early stages of developing initiatives to address
these vulnerabilities, and it has not clearly articulated a long-term
plan for how to achieve its goal of closing these gaps by expanding
radiological and nuclear detection capabilities in the time frames
identified.
Land border areas between ports of entry. The United States has more
than 6,000 miles of land border susceptible to illegal crossings by
people and vehicles. DNDO began addressing this gap in 2005 and
currently is jointly working with CBP to equip Border Patrol agents--
who are responsible for patrolling the U.S. borders with Canada and
Mexico--with portable radiological and nuclear detection equipment by
2012. Portability is critical to strengthening radiation detection
efforts because it expands the opportunity to detect a potential
radiological threat should a Border Patrol agent encounter one. To
date, as part of a phased approach, DNDO and CBP have tested and
evaluated radiation detection equipment and CBP developed operating
procedures for using the equipment and resolving radiation alarms along
the southern U.S. border. However, similar tests along the northern
U.S. border have been postponed.[Footnote 14] Specifically, DNDO and
CBP originally scheduled equipment testing along the southern border
for January 2008 and along the northern border for March 2008. However,
they did not actually begin testing along the southern border until May
2008. According to a CBP official, DNDO explained that this schedule
slip was caused by a delay in selecting the equipment for the test.
DNDO told us that it chose to conduct an additional review of
commercially available detection equipment before field testing, which
caused these tests to be delayed. As a result of preliminary findings
from the field tests, DNDO and CBP decided in November 2008 to
indefinitely postpone the previously scheduled tests along the northern
border. According to these agencies, the preliminary test results
indicated that further technological improvements will be necessary
before the portable radiation detection equipment can be distributed
more widely for use in this environment. Full distribution of equipment
along the land border areas between ports of entry is contingent on
completing these field evaluations and entails providing detection
equipment and operating procedures to all 20 Border Patrol sectors
across the United States. Assuming no further schedule and
technological delays, the radiation detection equipment to help secure
the U.S. land border areas between ports of entry may not be fully in
place until fiscal year 2012. According to DNDO, the agency requested a
total of $33.6 million in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for such
initiatives, but it has not estimated the total cost for this effort
beyond those years.
One of DNDO's roles in supporting the effort to close gaps in the land
border area between ports of entry is to procure and supply detection
equipment to CBP. However, according to CBP officials, in fiscal year
2008, DNDO did not procure needed radiation detection equipment in a
timely manner. Specifically, CBP's Office of Field Operations--
responsible for official ports of entry--and its Office of Border
Patrol requested approximately 240 additional RIIDs. However, according
to CBP officials, DNDO did not fill its procurement needs. As of
November 2008, only 64 of the 240 devices requested had been delivered
to CBP. This situation is particularly problematic for the Border
Patrol because its agents do not have enough RIIDs to meet their
current patrol needs, according to a Border Patrol official.
Aviation. Because nuclear weapons and material can be small and
portable enough to be carried on most aircraft, CBP, with the support
of DNDO, has been working on initiatives to screen all incoming
international planes, cargo, and passengers. Although progress has been
made on screening international general aviation, many of the other
initiatives are either in their initial phases or still on the drawing
board and it is unclear how long it will take or how much it will cost
to complete these initiatives. In fiscal years 2008 and 2009, DNDO has
requested a total of $35 million for aviation-related activities;
[Footnote 15] however, it has not estimated the costs of these
initiatives beyond the near term.
Since December 2007, CBP has been screening 100 percent of arriving
international general aviation aircraft (approximately 400 flights per
day) for radiological and nuclear material. According to DNDO
officials, such efforts are being included in the strategy for the
first time. To assist with the international general aviation
initiative, DNDO managed the testing and evaluation of radiation
detection devices in close coordination with CBP officials to ensure
that the technology and operating procedures would be consistent with
CBP's responsibilities to screen all aircraft arriving from outside the
United States.[Footnote 16] Specifically, in 2008, DNDO, in partnership
with CBP, tested portable radiation detection equipment for use in
scanning small, medium, and large international general aviation
aircraft and assessed whether CBP screening procedures needed to be
modified.
While CBP has made progress in ensuring that appropriate operating
procedures for using the equipment and resolving radiation alarms are
established and all international general aviation is screened, its
other aviation initiatives have not proceeded as smoothly or have not
yet begun. CBP is working with DNDO on an initiative to screen
international air cargo for radiological and nuclear material and has
chosen Dulles International Airport as the first location for this
screening. According to DNDO, this airport was chosen first because it
has one gate through which all cargo travels. However, because both
international and domestic cargo pass through this gate, the start of
operations was delayed until September 2008 due to jurisdictional
issues between CBP and TSA--CBP is responsible for screening
international cargo for radiological and nuclear material and TSA for
scanning domestic cargo for explosives. The two agencies had to reach
an agreement allowing CBP to screen all cargo for radiological and
nuclear material, regardless of origin. (Figure 2 shows cargo moving
through a stationary radiation portal monitor at Dulles International
Airport.)
Figure 2: Cargo Vehicle Passing through Radiological Detection
Equipment at Dulles International Airport:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In October 2008, we visited Dulles to observe this operation, including
a demonstration of radiation detection capabilities. CBP sent a vehicle
containing a small sample of Cesium-137--a radiological material that
is considered a highly attractive source for the purpose of a
radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb--through the detection
equipment. Cesium-137, which is generally in the form of a powder
similar to talc, is highly dispersible. CBP uses this sample to
routinely test equipment. However, the detection equipment failed to
sound an alarm until the material had passed through it for a third
time. CBP officials told us that this source material triggered an
alarm during a test earlier that week, and attributed the problems with
this demonstration to either the shielding of the source material by
the vehicle or to a weak signal given off by the material because it
may be nearing the end of its usable life.
CBP plans to have cargo screening at the 30 U.S. airports that account
for 99 percent of incoming international cargo by 2014. However,
because cargo processing at Dulles is simpler than at other airports,
due to the configuration of its cargo area, CBP officials acknowledged
that their plan is very ambitious. According to CBP officials,
expanding the cargo screening initiative to larger, more complicated
airports will require CBP to devise different operational procedures
and possibly develop new detection technology. DNDO and CBP also plan
to cooperate with other federal agencies on an initiative to screen
passengers and baggage from international commercial flights. However,
according to DNDO, it is still working on the basic approach for this
initiative, such as where to locate passenger and baggage scanning
equipment in an airport. To date, DNDO and CBP have initiated a pilot
program for screening international passengers and their baggage at
airports. In fiscal year 2008, they completed site surveys at five
airports in order to develop requirements for testing planned for
fiscal year 2009.
Current aviation initiatives focus on radiation detection both prior to
departure from a foreign location and after the aircraft lands in the
United States. Ultimately, DNDO and CBP would like the detection of
radiological and nuclear materials to occur as far outside of U.S.
borders as possible--at the point of departure instead of the point of
entry. For example, rather than screening international general
aviation once the plane arrives in the United States, it would be
preferrable to screen the plane at the country from which it departs.
However, such a strategy would rely on negotiating agreements with
foreign governments, which could prove challenging given concerns about
sovereignty and rights of access. Furthermore, DNDO officials were
uncertain when and if agreements could be reached with enough foreign
governments to establish a more effective aviation strategy. As of
December 2008, DHS has concluded agreements with Ireland and Aruba to
include radiological and nuclear screening of international general
aviation aircraft in these countries.
Small maritime vessels. A Coast Guard analysis revealed that small
boats pose a greater threat for nuclear smuggling than transporting
illicit material in shipping containers, according to a senior Coast
Guard official.[Footnote 17] These small boats, which include maritime
craft less than 300 gross tons, number in the millions. DNDO efforts
related to radiological and nuclear detection on small maritime vessels
are part of a larger DHS effort--the Small Vessel Security Strategy.
This strategy recognizes a number of risks that small vessels pose,
including serving as a vehicle to smuggle weapons or terrorists into
the United States, and using the boat itself as an improvised explosive
device. DHS is working to develop a Small Vessel Security Strategy
implementation plan, which will, among other things, identify needed
research, development, and testing, and recommend actions for future
efforts and put the strategy into action. To address one of the
vulnerabilities, DNDO has been working since 2005 with multiple federal
agencies, including the Coast Guard and CBP, as well as state and local
agencies, to develop and expand capabilities to detect radiological and
nuclear materials that could be smuggled on small maritime craft. Coast
Guard and CBP are responsible for developing the screening procedures
and making decisions about what vessels are to be screened; DNDO
provides the radiological and nuclear detection equipment. Coast Guard
and DNDO have entered into a Joint Acquisition Strategy to update the
current Coast Guard detection technology inventory, as well as to
acquire new equipment if necessary.
There are a number of challenges associated with radiological detection
capabilities in the maritime environment that have limited DNDO's
ability to roll this initiative out widely. Specifically, these
agencies have a pilot project underway in Puget Sound, Washington, to
field-test equipment and develop standard operating procedures for
detecting and interdicting radiological and nuclear materials on small
vessels. DNDO chose Puget Sound because of its proximity to Vancouver,
Canada, the host of the 2010 Winter Olympics; its military and economic
significance; and the large number of commercial and recreational
vessels. DNDO is also expanding this pilot to San Diego, California,
where it has conducted an initial assessment of the area and briefed
officials about the program. DNDO selected San Diego as a pilot
location because of its proximity to Mexico, geographic configuration,
and many military facilities. DNDO is currently in the first year of a
3-year pilot program; the Puget Sound and San Diego operations are
scheduled to be completed in December 2010. According to DNDO's data
for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, the agency requested $14.7 million for
the pilot project and a total of $54.2 million for these and other
maritime initiatives.
One significant challenge in developing maritime radiological and
nuclear detection efforts is sustaining them beyond the original pilot
projects; DNDO has not yet developed plans for doing so. In addition to
the Coast Guard and CBP, state and local governments play a key role in
maritime law enforcement activities. For example, in Puget Sound, the
majority of the law enforcement personnel and equipment available for
radiological and nuclear detection belong to the 15 state, tribal, and
local agencies participating in the pilot.[Footnote 18] However, these
agencies generally have limited resources, making it difficult to
expand their mission to include radiological and nuclear detection.
Furthermore, these agencies have competing demands and could choose to
fund other priorities. Although DNDO is providing these agencies with
the initial equipment, support, training, and maintenance during the
Puget Sound and San Diego pilots, it is expecting them to seek funding
from federal grant programs to sustain these initiatives. For many
state and local agency officials we spoke with, the uncertainty of
federal resources jeopardizes their ability to continue radiological
and nuclear detection activities. According to one local sheriff from
Washington state, if funding to maintain and support radiation
detection equipment provided during the pilot disappears, his
department will not continue radiological and nuclear detection
activities.
Other state and local agencies participating in the Puget Sound pilot
also emphasized the difficulty in keeping personnel trained on
detection equipment without additional federal support beyond the
current pilot project. Because maritime law enforcement personnel may
not frequently need to use the equipment, future training is necessary
to ensure that that they maintain their skills. However, without the
additional resources currently provided by DNDO, state and local
agencies would have difficulty covering the costs associated with
ongoing training, including overtime salaries for personnel who have to
take on the regular duties of those being trained.
Given these state and local concerns, DNDO's strategy for sustaining
such programs appears problematic. According to DNDO officials,
sustaining the existing pilot programs will be the responsibility of
the local jurisdictions through a well-established federal grants
process. Specifically, DNDO anticipates that funding for these programs
will come from Homeland Security grants, Urban Areas Security
Initiative grants, and the DHS Port Security Grant Program. However,
DNDO currently does not have a plan detailing which locations it would
target next for the maritime program, nor has it estimated the total
cost of this initiative.
According to DNDO officials, the office has focused first on just two
locations in order to determine whether maritime screening of small
vessels for radiological and nuclear material is feasible and to gather
lessons learned that can be used to minimize challenges and develop
operating procedures for using the radiation detection equipment and
resolving radiation alarms in other areas. However, DNDO has not
established criteria for assessing the success of this pilot effort to
help determine whether it should be expanded to other locations. Should
its concept for detecting and interdicting radiological and nuclear
material smuggled on small maritime vessels prove feasible, DNDO plans
to develop guidance so that state and local law enforcement agencies
can implement their own maritime radiological and nuclear detection
programs.
In addition, unlike radiation detection technology for land or
aviation, technology in the maritime environment is relatively
undeveloped and poses unique challenges. For example, the level of
background radiation in water differs from the level of background
radiation on land, which affects the capability of equipment to detect
and identify certain types of radioactive material. Furthermore, the
equipment needs to be water resistant and designed so that it can be
used by agents who need their hands free to board and climb around
ships. To date, DNDO has, among other things, tested boat-mounted
radiation detectors, detection equipment that can be carried in a
backpack, and handheld radiological detection and identification
devices that can withstand exposure to water. Nevertheless, the
effectiveness of radiation detection equipment in the maritime
environment remains limited. For example:
* The boat-mounted radiation equipment is unable to indicate the
direction of the radioactive material causing the alarm, making it
difficult to identify the potential threat in an open sea with many
small vessels, according to a local law enforcement officer we spoke
with. CBP Air and Marine officers also expressed uncertainty about how
boat-mounted detection equipment, which has been tested only in a
fairly controlled lake environment, will work in a more turbulent open
sea environment, where it is more difficult to detect and determine
radioactive material. DNDO officials told us that a fiscal year 2009
initiative will assess boat-mounted detection systems in real-world
environments.
* The backpack radiation equipment works best when physically worn by
someone, according to a DNDO official. However, Coast Guard officers
already have a difficult time maneuvering through the small passageways
on boats with the current equipment they must wear. (Figure 3 shows a
Coast Guard officer wearing standard boarding team equipment, without a
backpack.) The backpacks have the potential to further decrease
officers' maneuverability and their ability to inspect boats.
* If a hand-held radiological detection and identification device is
accidentally dropped overboard, it does not float and can withstand
being submerged under only 30 feet of water. These handheld devices
cost $15,000 per unit, making them expensive to replace.
Figure 3: A Coast Guard Officer Wearing Standard Boarding Team
Equipment:
[Refer to PDF for image: photographs, front and side views]
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
DNDO has also delayed in rolling out radiation detection equipment to
the agencies engaged in its maritime initiatives. Although federal,
state, and local agencies in the Puget Sound pilot determined their
equipment needs in April 2008 and submitted this request to DNDO, they
have received little equipment. According to a DNDO official, DNDO was
slow to process the order and once it was placed, the manufacturer was
unable to fill the order in a timely manner and did not immediately
notify DNDO of this delay. According to DNDO, once it was notified of
the delay from the vender, it borrowed units from the Coast Guard so
that the pilot could proceed. Of the 362 personal radiation detectors
ordered, 95 had been delivered as of October 2008. However, the order
may not be completely filled until early 2009.
DNDO, in coordination with the Coast Guard, the New York City Police
Department (NYPD), and other state and local agencies, is also engaged
in maritime nuclear detection activities in the New York City area as
part of the Securing the Cities initiative. This initiative is intended
to enhance protection and response capabilities in and around high-risk
urban areas by designing a system to detect and interdict illicit
radioactive materials that may be used as a weapon. As with the Puget
Sound pilot, the agencies involved in the initiative's maritime
activities do not presently have enough equipment to meet their needs,
according to officials participating in the Securing the Cities
initiative. For example, the Coast Guard has one boat, with radiation
detection equipment provided by DOE, and the NYPD has two boats with
radiation detection equipment. However, NYPD officials told us that the
NYPD has another 28 boats that need to be equipped with radiation
detection technology and these equipment purchases depend on the
availability of future federal grant funding.
DNDO Has Limited Role in Influencing U.S. Efforts to Combat
Radiological and Nuclear Smuggling Overseas:
Although DNDO has no authority over other federal agencies' programs to
combat radiological and nuclear smuggling overseas, it has exchanged
lessons learned with DOD, DOE, and State and provided technical
expertise on radiological and nuclear detection equipment. However,
most of DNDO's efforts are modest in scope and reflect the fact that
DOD, DOE, and State have well-established programs to combat nuclear
smuggling overseas. DNDO officials told us that their efforts to
develop a more comprehensive approach to global nuclear detection are
very complex because each agency has a distinct area of authority.
Areas in which DNDO has been able to contribute to other agencies'
overseas programs include the following:
* DOD. DNDO has been working with DOD, among other agencies, to develop
radiation detection equipment and to minimize duplication of research
efforts. For example, DNDO and DOD are collaborating through the
National Institute for Standards and Technology to develop interagency
standards and common practices for testing and evaluating radiation
detection systems. These standards will be threat based and will state
the minimum detection capability that certain radiation detection
systems should have to perform their purpose.
* DOE. DNDO has been collaborating with DOE to develop strategies for
addressing gaps in DOE's overseas radiation detection programs that are
similar to those DNDO has been working on domestically. For example,
DOE's Second Line of Defense program had focused more on placing fixed
detectors at particular sites. However, as a result of DOE's review of
its existing nuclear detection programs and its discussion with other
agencies, including DNDO, DOE officials told us the agency has begun to
work with law enforcement officials in other countries to improve
detection capabilities for the land between ports of entry. DOE
officials said they also are considering assisting other countries with
the implementation of mobile detection technologies, similar to those
used domestically by CBP. DNDO and DOE also are exchanging lessons
learned from both agencies' efforts to screen aviation, specifically
the development of standard operating procedures for using hand-held
radiation detection equipment.
* State. DNDO is working with State on the Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism--which provides 75 countries with an opportunity to
integrate resources and share information and expertise on nuclear
smuggling prevention, detection, and response--to develop model
guidelines that other countries can use to establish their own nuclear
detection strategies. DNDO sponsored a Global Initiative workshop in
March 2008 to help 25 countries develop a draft of the model guidelines
document. This document, among other things, is intended to raise
awareness about the elements of an effective nuclear detection strategy
and build consensus for its implementation. In addition, DNDO personnel
have traveled with officials from State to countries involved in the
department's Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, a program to assess
and improve the capabilities of countries to combat smuggling of
nuclear and radiological materials, in order to provide advice to these
countries on how to build their own capabilities to counter nuclear
smuggling. DNDO also helped State develop questions that these
countries could use to assess their own vulnerabilities.
In addition to providing the U.S. government agencies engaged in
international nuclear detection programs with knowledge gained from
domestic nuclear detection initiatives, DNDO has been directed by these
agencies to develop an inventory of radiation detection equipment
deployed overseas. In a March 2006 report, we recommended that State,
working with DOD and DOE, create, maintain, and share a comprehensive
list of all U.S.-funded radiation detection equipment provided to
foreign governments.[Footnote 19] In December 2006, State, in
coordination with DOD, DOE, and DHS, issued a strategic plan giving
DNDO responsibility for gathering data on the deployment of radiation
detection equipment overseas, including portal monitors and handheld
devices.[Footnote 20] As part of DNDO's efforts to develop the global
strategy for nuclear detection, it is charged with maintaining this
database, share information from it at interagency meetings, and
provide other relevant government agencies with access to the database.
According to DNDO, it collected information on radiation detection
equipment from DOD, DOE, and State most recently in 2007 and is
updating some of the information in 2008 and 2009. A DNDO official also
said that the agency analyzed these data to determine the proximity of
radiation detection equipment to areas with nuclear facilities.
A Total of $2.8 Billion Was Budgeted in Fiscal Year 2007 for Programs
Associated with Detecting Radiological and Nuclear Materials:
DHS, DOD, DOE, and State budgeted a total of $2.8 billion in fiscal
year 2007 for the programs included in the global strategy for
radiological and nuclear detection, according to DNDO. Nearly the same
amount of funds--$1.1 billion--were budgeted for programs and
activities to (1) combat nuclear smuggling overseas and (2) detect
nuclear materials primarily at U.S. borders and ports of entry; a
smaller portion was budgeted for cross-cutting programs. By agency, the
majority of 2007 budgeted funds for the global strategy for
radiological and nuclear detection went to DOE--62 percent. Although
DNDO has detailed information on the budgets for various security and
detection programs, it is not using this information to coordinate with
other agencies on the overall strategic direction of these detection
efforts.
Amounts Budgeted for Programs to Combat Nuclear Smuggling Overseas and
to Detect Nuclear Materials Primarily at U.S. Borders and Ports of
Entry Were Nearly the Same:
According to our analysis of DNDO's data, of the approximately $2.8
billion agencies budgeted in fiscal year 2007, about 39 percent went to
combat nuclear smuggling overseas, while 41 percent went to programs to
detect and secure radiological and nuclear materials at and within U.S.
borders; another 20 percent went to programs that cut across foreign
and domestic activities. Figure 4 shows budgets by program focus and by
agency.
Figure 4: Budgets by Program Focus and Agency:
[See PDF for image: pie-charts]
FY 2007 Budget by Program Focus:
Unites States: 41%;
Overseas: 39%;
Cross-cutting: 20%.
FY 2007 Budget by Agency:
DOE: 62%;
DHS: 24%;
DOD: 11%;
State: 3%.
Source: GAO analysis of DNDO data.
[End of figure]
Table 1 shows the allocation of these funds by programs to combat
nuclear smuggling overseas and within the United States.
Table 1: Distribution of Fiscal Year 2007 Budget for Detecting
Radiological and Nuclear Weapons or Materials (Dollars in Millions):
Geographic focus: Overseas;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: DHS: $139.77;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: DOD: $161.90;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: DOE: $736.74;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: State[A]: $81.13;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: Total: $1,119.54.
Geographic focus: United States[B];
Fiscal year 2007 budget: DHS: $274.65;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: DOD: $1.60;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: DOE: $871.49;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: State[A]: 0.00;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: Total: $1,147.74.
Geographic focus: Cross-cutting;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: DHS: $271.18;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: DOD: $137.07;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: DOE: $168.86;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: State[A]: 0.00;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: Total: $577.12.
Dollars in millions: Geographic focus: Total;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: DHS: $685.60;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: DOD: $300.57;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: DOE: $1,777.09;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: State[A]: $81.13;
Fiscal year 2007 budget: Total: $2,844.39.
Source: GAO analysis of DNDO data.
[A] State does not sponsor domestic programs to combat nuclear
smuggling and did not provide budget amounts for its cross-cutting
programs because these programs do not provide direct financial
assistance and generally leverage resources from other federal agencies
and international partners.
[B] United States includes efforts at the border as well as within the
interior of the country.
[End of table]
Programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas. DOE received the
majority of the budget for programs to combat international nuclear
smuggling--$737 million (or approximately 67 percent) of the $1.1
billion total in fiscal year 2007. For all the agencies, the
international programs are largely intended to secure nuclear and
radiological materials at their source or detect them in transit. By
agency, key programs include the following:
* DHS budgeted $139 million for its Container Security Initiative,
which provides multidisciplinary teams--agents, intelligence analysts,
and CBP officers--to selected foreign seaports in order to protect the
United States from potential terrorist attacks using maritime cargo
shipments and to help secure the primary system of containerized
shipping for international trade.[Footnote 21] Another DHS program, the
Secure Freight Initiative,[Footnote 22] is important to the global
strategy for nuclear detection because it provides foreign countries
with radiation scanning systems for containers at ports of departure
and communications infrastructure to transmit radiological and nuclear
material data to the United States. This program is designed to test
the feasibility of 100 percent scanning of U.S.-bound container cargo
at seven overseas seaports and involves the deployment of integrated
scanning systems, consisting of radiation portal monitors and RIIDs.
* At DOD, 98 percent of its budget for combating nuclear smuggling
overseas went to three programs that are part of the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program--a program that protects national security by
reducing the present threat and preventing the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.[Footnote 23] The Nuclear Weapons Safety and
Security Program had a budget of $92.8 million to enhance Russia's
security systems at nuclear weapons storage sites and capability to
account for and track nuclear weapons scheduled for dismantlement. The
Proliferation Prevention Initiative had a budget of $32.4 million to
help countries of the former Soviet Union prevent the smuggling of
weapons of mass destruction or related materials across their borders;
this initiative provides equipment, logistics support, and training.
Finally, the Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security Program had a
budget of $32.7 million to enhance safe and secure transport of nuclear
weapons from operational sites and storage areas to enhanced security
storage sites and dismantlement sites throughout Russia.
* At DOE, two programs account for about 81 percent of the department's
budget to combat nuclear smuggling overseas. First, the Materials
Protection, Control, and Accounting Program had a budget of $414
million.[Footnote 24] This program provides support to the Russian
Federation and other countries of the former of Soviet Union to secure
nuclear weapons and weapons material that may be at risk of theft or
diversion from their current location. Second, DOE's Second Line of
Defense--a cooperative assistance program for deploying radiological
and nuclear detection systems and associated training at international
border crossings, airports, and seaports--had a budget of $183 million.
[Footnote 25]
* State budgeted approximately $42 million for its Export Control and
Related Border Security program to help stem the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and conventional
weapons by assisting recipient countries in detecting, deterring,
preventing, and interdicting illicit trafficking in weapons and weapons-
related items.[Footnote 26] The program is also designed to provide a
wide range of assistance and support, such as offering licensing and
legal and regulatory technical workshops, and providing detection
equipment and training for border control and enforcement agencies.
Programs to combat radiological and nuclear smuggling at and within
U.S. borders. As with programs to combat nuclear smuggling overseas,
DOE received most of the budget for programs to combat radiological and
nuclear smuggling domestically--$871 million (or 76 percent) of the
$1.1 billion budgeted in fiscal year 2007. By agency, key programs
include the following:
* At DHS, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portals/Radiological Portal
Monitors program had a budget of $209 million to provide systems
development, acquisition, and deployment of these technologies to ports
of entry. The Securing the Cities initiative, with a fiscal year 2007
budget of $8.47 million, is intended to enhance protection and response
capabilities in and around the nation's highest risk urban areas.
Starting with New York City, the department will work with state and
local officials to develop urban and regional deployment and operations
strategies, identify appropriate detection equipment, establish the
necessary support infrastructure, and develop incident management and
response protocols. In addition, DHS budgeted $1.1 million for the West
Coast Maritime Radiation Detection Program, which is evaluating general
radiation detection capabilities to be deployed aboard Coast Guard or
other law enforcement vessels that participate in vessel-boarding
activities.
* DOD budgeted $1.6 million for domestic radiation detection programs,
with $1.1 million directed to its Radiation Protection Program. This
program uses the best available detection technologies to prevent or
mitigate the effects of radiation exposure on Pentagon personnel and
structures. The remaining funds were budgeted for the department's
Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense, which installed radiological
and nuclear sensors at Camp Lejeune.
* At DOE, $846 million (or 97 percent) of the $871 million budgeted to
combat nuclear smuggling went to the Nuclear and Radiological Materials
Security Program, which is intended to protect DOE's critical assets--
nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, special nuclear materials,
classified information, and DOE facilities from such threats as
terrorist activity, theft, diversion, loss, or unauthorized access.
Cross-cutting activities that simultaneously support multiple programs.
DHS had nearly half of the $577 million budgeted for cross-cutting
activities--about $271 million. By agency, key programs include the
following:
* At DHS, the Human Portable Radiation Detection System had a budget of
$18.1 million to support the development of detection systems and the
acquisition of advanced, hand-held radiation detectors. In addition,
DHS budgeted about $11 million for the Technical Reachback Program,
which provides technical assistance to help personnel operating
radiation detection equipment identify the source that triggered the
alarm. Finally, the Joint Analysis Center had a budget of $1.75 million
to collect and notify appropriate federal, state, and local agencies as
early as possible of:
radiological and nuclear threats and coordinate technical support to
federal, state, and local authorities.
* DOD budgeted $94.5 million of the $137 million of its funds budgeted
for cross-cutting programs to support its Weapons of Mass Destruction
Civil Support Teams. These 55 teams are deployed nationwide to support
civil authorities during domestic chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-yield explosives incidents.[Footnote 27] In addition,
the Nuclear Detection Technologies Division of DOD's Defense Threat
Reduction Agency was budgeted $28 million in fiscal year 2007 to
develop technologies to detect, locate, and identify radiological and
nuclear weapons and materials to support search and interdiction
missions.
* At DOE, nearly all of the $168 million DOE budgeted for cross-cutting
programs went to one program--the Proliferation Detection Program. This
program, budgeted at $148 million, provides technical expertise and
leadership toward the development of next generation nuclear detection
technologies and methods to detect foreign nuclear materials and
weapons production. This program develops the tools, technologies, and
techniques for detecting, locating, and analyzing the global
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, with a special emphasis
on nuclear weapons technology and the diversion of special nuclear
materials.
* Because many of State's efforts to combat nuclear smuggling leverage
resources from other federal agencies and international partners, or
these efforts do not provide direct financial assistance, State does
not have a budget for all of its efforts. However, it still oversees a
number of crosscutting programs. For example, the Nuclear Trafficking
Response Group is responsible for coordinating responses to
international nuclear and radiological alarms; its mission is to
protect the United States by resolving incidents of nuclear smuggling
and by interdicting materials in transit. The National Combating
Terrorism Research Program works to develop prototypes for technology
with specific applications to detect and characterize nuclear
materials. This program is not a financial assistance program, and
therefore has no formal budget.
DNDO's Joint Annual Interagency Report Is Not Used for Analysis or to
Focus Nuclear Detection Priorities:
In July 2007, Congress passed the "Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007," which required DHS, DOD, DOE, the
Department of Justice, and the Director of National Intelligence to
coordinate the preparation of a Joint Annual Interagency Review of the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. DNDO collected these program-
level budget data in response to a statutory requirement that select
agencies, including DHS, DOD, DOE, and State, annually assess their
capacity to implement their portion of the global nuclear detection
strategy. DNDO issued this report in June 2008 after gathering data
from relevant agencies on programs and budgets in support of each layer
of the global nuclear detection effort. The report provides an overview
of the global nuclear detection strategy and discusses programs and
budgets for combating nuclear smuggling domestically and overseas.
DNDO has collected these data since 2006. It used these data to
identify areas in which new domestic initiatives may be needed. For
example, in the most recent review, DNDO said that programs focused on
the land border areas between ports of entry, aviation, and maritime
pathways will need to grow substantially in the years ahead. However,
the Joint Annual Interagency Review does not serve as a tool to analyze
nuclear detection budgets across agencies in order to ensure that the
level and nature of resources devoted to combating nuclear smuggling
are going toward the highest priority gaps and are aligned with the
overall strategic direction of global detection efforts.
Agency officials said that their program decisions and budget requests
are primarily guided by their agencies' mission-related needs, rather
than by the overarching goals and priorities of a broader, more
comprehensive global detection strategy. In addition, DOD, DOE, and
State officials told us that the information in the review is primarily
used to provide agencies and Congress with an overview of already
established programmatic roles and responsibilities across the range of
programs to combat nuclear smuggling. Finally, agency officials told us
that they do not use the specific budget data included in the Joint
Annual Interagency Review to help determine whether funding levels are
reasonable in terms of individual agency or governmentwide needs.
DNDO Has Not Yet Implemented Recommendation from July 2008 Testimony:
In July 2008, we testified on the preliminary findings of our work.
[Footnote 28] Specifically, we found that while DNDO's initiatives are
a step in the right direction for improving the current efforts to
combat nuclear smuggling, they are not being undertaken within the
larger context of an overarching strategic plan. Although each agency
with a role in combating nuclear smuggling has its own planning
documents, an overarching strategic plan is needed to guide these
efforts to address the gaps and move to a more comprehensive global
nuclear detection strategy. Our past work has discussed the importance
of strategic planning.[Footnote 29] We have reported that strategic
plans should clearly define objectives to be accomplished, identify the
roles and responsibilities for meeting each objective, ensure that the
funding necessary to achieve the objectives is available, and employ
monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify needed
improvements. For example, such a plan would define how DNDO would
monitor the goal of detecting the movement of radiological and nuclear
materials through potential smuggling routes, such as small maritime
craft or land border areas in between ports of entry. Moreover, this
plan would include agreed-upon processes and procedures to guide the
improvement of the efforts to combat nuclear smuggling and coordinate
the activities of the participating agencies.
DNDO agreed with the need for an overarching strategic plan and
believes that many elements of such a plan exist in DHS and other
agency documents, but noted that solutions for addressing gaps and
vulnerabilities are still under development. As of December 2008, DNDO
had not yet established detailed plans to address those gaps and
vulnerabilities, nor had it integrated all the plan elements into an
overarching strategic plan, as we recommended.
Conclusions:
Preventing terrorists from obtaining and smuggling radiological or
nuclear material into the United States is a national security
imperative. DNDO has an important and complex task in this regard--
develop a global nuclear detection strategy to combat nuclear smuggling
and to keep radiological and nuclear material and weapons from entering
the United States. However, DNDO has not yet taken steps to work with
DOE, DOD, and State to develop an overarching strategic plan, as we
recommended in July 2008. Given the national security implications and
urgency attached to combating nuclear smuggling globally, we continue
to believe that such a plan needs to be established as soon as
possible. Without an overarching plan that ties together the various
domestic and international efforts to combat nuclear smuggling and
clearly describes goals, responsibilities, priorities, resource needs,
and performance metrics, it is unclear how the strategy will evolve or
whether it is evolving in the right direction.
While DNDO has gathered useful program and budget information in its
Joint Annual Interagency Review, we believe it has missed an
opportunity to use this information as a basis for working with other
agencies--most notably DOD, DOE and State--to identify future
priorities, and analyze and help determine future resource allocations.
We are not suggesting that any of the agencies participating in U.S.
efforts to combat nuclear smuggling cede authority to manage its own
programs. However, this information could be used as a tool to better
ensure that limited resources are leveraged to promote program
effectiveness and avoid potential duplicative efforts. By doing so, we
believe the federal government will be better positioned to take a
holistic view of global nuclear detection and develop a plan that helps
safeguard investments to date, more closely links future goals with the
resources necessary to achieve those goals, and enhances the agencies'
ability to operate in a more cohesive and integrated fashion.
DNDO, for its part, has helped highlight the need to address critical
gaps in efforts to combat nuclear smuggling domestically. It also has
made some progress in developing and supporting initiatives to close
these gaps. However, remaining challenges are great, funding is
uncertain, time frames are unclear, and the technology may not be
available any time soon to bridge some of these vulnerabilities.
Without a plan to guide development of initiatives to address domestic
gaps, it is unclear how DNDO plans to achieve its objectives of closing
these critical gaps, particularly in three key areas--land border areas
between ports of entry, aviation, and small maritime vessels.
Maritime detection efforts pose unique technological and operational
challenges. DNDO's maritime pilot is a sensible first step to
addressing this vulnerability. However, DNDO should establish criteria
for assessing the effectiveness of this effort and use the result of
this evaluation to determine the feasibility of expanding this program
beyond the pilot stage. Should the pilot prove worthy of replicating,
we believe that DNDO will need to engage in additional planning to
identify next steps to help ensure that it will be able to roll the
program out to other locations in a timely manner.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that U.S. governmentwide efforts to secure the homeland
are well coordinated, well conceived, and properly implemented, we
reiterate the recommendation we made in our July 2008 testimony to
develop an overarching strategic plan. We also recommend that the
Secretary of Homeland Security take the following four actions:
* In coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
Energy, and the Secretary of State, use the Joint Annual Interagency
Review to guide future strategic efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.
This effort should include analyzing overall budget allocations to
determine whether governmentwide resources clearly align with
identified priorities to maximize results and whether there is
duplication of effort across agencies.
* Develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear
detection strategy to help ensure the future success of initiatives
aimed at closing gaps and vulnerabilities. This plan should focus on,
among other things, establishing time frames and costs for the three
areas of recent focus--land border areas between ports of entry,
aviation, and small maritime vessels.
* Develop criteria to assess the effectiveness, cost, and feasibility
of the maritime radiological and nuclear pilot program.
* Should the decision be made to expand the maritime radiological and
nuclear program beyond the pilot, undertake additional planning to
identify next steps, including how and where a broader strategy would
be implemented, what technology would be needed, what organizations
should be involved, and how such efforts would be sustained.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOD, DOE, and State for
comment. DHS and DOD provided written comments, which are presented in
appendixes I and II, respectively. DOE and State provided technical
comments which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD concurred with the
recommendation that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination
with the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and Secretary of
State, use the Joint Annual Interagency Review to guide future
strategic efforts to combat nuclear smuggling. DOD stated that greater
use could be made of the review associated with the development of this
annual report to guide U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.
DHS did not directly comment on our recommendations but noted that the
recommendations aligned with DNDO's past, present, and future actions.
The department agreed, however, that planning can always be improved
and that the office will seek to continue to do so. DHS also reiterated
that it agreed with a recommendation that we made in our 2008 testimony
on the need for an overarching strategic plan to guide future efforts
to combat nuclear smuggling and move toward a more comprehensive global
nuclear detection strategy. In its comments, DHS noted that work had
already begun on an overarching plan.
DHS also pointed to what, in its view, were a number of shortcomings in
the draft report. Specifically, the department believes that we did not
give enough credit to DNDO's strategic planning efforts. The department
asserted that we did not clearly and adequately explain the background
and context of DNDO's efforts to develop a global strategy, what has
been accomplished so far, what challenges it faces, and what remains to
be done. Finally, DHS asserted that the draft contained a number of
inaccuracies and omissions that make it less reliable and useful than
it could be. DHS also provided a number of more detailed comments on
specific issues presented in the draft report. We have addressed those
comments in our detailed responses and incorporated changes where
appropriate.
First, we found no evidence that DNDO engaged in long-term strategic
planning to carry out its initiatives to address gaps in domestic
nuclear detection. During the course of our review, we specifically
asked DNDO for strategic planning documents used to develop and
implement a global radiation detection strategy. In response, DNDO
officials referred to the more than 4,000 pages of documents provided
and stated in their comments on the report that this material was the
basis for their plan. Although this information documented the efforts
put forth by DNDO in developing its initial strategy and identifying
gaps and vulnerabilities, it did not constitute a plan with clear
goals, time frames, and costs. More specifically, DNDO commented that
we did not mention the DNDO-Coast Guard Joint Acquisition Strategy as a
cornerstone of its small maritime strategy, that we only mention DHS
Small Vessel Security Strategy in passing in the back of the report,
and that we do not mention the DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy
implementation plan. We revised the report to include references to the
Joint Acquisition Strategy and the implementation plan. However, we
disagree with DNDO's characterization that we failed to give the Small
Vessel Security Strategy adequate attention. In fact, the report
describes the strategy and how it relates to efforts to combat nuclear
smuggling. We would also point out, however, that these planning
documents cited by DNDO only apply to one specific critical gap area
identified--the small maritime vessel threat.
Second, we disagree with the department's comment that we did not
clearly and adequately explain the background and context of DNDO's
efforts to develop a global strategy, what has been accomplished so
far, what remains to be done, and what challenges it faces.
Specifically, our report contains an overview of DNDO's initial
approach in developing a global strategy, including providing
information on steps DNDO has taken to identify potential pathways for
radiological and nuclear material. In addition, the report identified
some of DNDO's accomplishments in specific areas, such as working with
the other agencies to develop new radiation detection technologies.
Furthermore, we recognize that DNDO has helped highlight the need to
address critical gaps in efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, and we
have reported DNDO's key initiatives to improve radiation detection
capabilities in areas that had previously received insufficient
attention--land borders between the ports of entry, aviation, and
maritime. The report also recognizes the many challenges that DNDO
faces as it attempts to enhance nuclear detection capabilities,
including technological limitations of detection equipment and
sustaining initiatives beyond their pilot phase. We also believe that
DNDO needs to undertake additional planning so that it can be in a
better position to determine the work that remains. That is why our
recommendation to develop a strategic plan for the domestic part of the
global nuclear detection strategy is so crucial.
Finally, where appropriate, we have incorporated a variety of technical
comments provided by DHS to better characterize DNDO's role and
accomplishments, and the challenges it faces in developing a global
nuclear detection strategy to combat nuclear smuggling. We do not
believe that any of the comments that we incorporated represented a
serious flaw in the content or quality of the draft report and in fact
improve the technical accuracy of the report. In the few areas where
DHS commented that we were factually incorrect, we have made minor
changes to the report to clarify our point, to correct technical
inaccuracies, or to avoid confusion. Where appropriate, we have
provided additional information to further support our point, in some
cases using information contained in DHS's letter.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested
congressional committees and Members of Congress, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy,
and the Secretary of State. The report will also be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3841 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this
report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
David Maurer:
Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Bart Gordon Chairman:
Committee on Science and Technology:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Edolphus Towns:
Chairman:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Charles E. Schumer:
United States Senate:
The Honorable James R. Langevin:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov]
January 14, 2009:
Mr. David Maurer:
Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Maurer:
RE: Draft Report GAO-09-257, Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and
Vulnerabilities (360896)
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) appreciates the
opportunity to review and comment on the draft report referenced above.
While the U.S. Government Accountability Office's (GAO's)
recommendations align with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's
(DNDO's) past, present, and future actions, DNDO does not believe that
GAO gave due credit to DNDO's strategic planning efforts and
significant accomplishments, as detailed below. DNDO agrees that
planning, like all endeavors, can always be improved and that office
will continue to do so. However, considering GAO's report as a whole,
GAO does not clearly and accurately explain (I) the background and
context of DNDO's efforts to develop an enhanced global nuclear
detection architecture, (2) what has been accomplished thus far, (3)
what still remains to be done, and (4) what challenges DNDO faces in
addressing this portion of its mission. In addition, the report
contains a number of inaccuracies and omissions that make it less
reliable and useful than it could be.
Because DNDO's comments are lengthy, the response is divided into two
parts. The first part consists of general comments. The second part,
contained in the ten-page attachment, consists of a page-by-page
listing, with details on specific issues and concerns relative to the
draft report. The Department believes that these comments are more than
technical in nature. The comments provide balance, context,
explanation, and address omissions and both parts should be considered
as the Department's formal response.
General Comments:
DNDO has developed and in conjunction with its partners is implementing
a sound strategy for enhancing the global nuclear detection
architecture, one of its core missions. While more remains to be done,
DNDO has already made substantial progress toward implementing this
strategy.
Beginning in 2005, DNDO and its interagency partners analyzed the then-
existing or baseline detection architecture and identified serious gaps
and vulnerabilities that were not being adequately addressed by then-
existing detection programs in any agency. To address the gaps, a
series of significant new initiatives has been launched and adjustments
to existing programs have been introduced. Particularly noteworthy are
four major sets of gaps that previously had received insufficient
attention: general aviation, small maritime craft, the land borders
between designated ports of entry, and gaps within the domestic
interior layer of the architecture (i.e., areas of the U.S. not on the
borders). New initiatives have been launched in all of these areas and
substantial progress has been made.
Putting these gaps on the agenda, in many cases for the first time, and
launching new programs to address them, has in itself been a major
achievement. DNDO and its partners have begun to shift the emphasis
from a nuclear detection strategy that previously had focused almost
exclusively on ports of entry, to a more balanced and comprehensive
architecture that addresses a much broader spectrum of credible
pathways by which adversaries could attack the United States.
None of these gaps has a "quick fix." In many cases, new technology and
new concepts of operations will be needed to fully address the
vulnerabilities. These new approaches will need to be adapted and
refined based on lessons learned in the field to withstand the
practical demands of deploying detection systems in challenging new
settings. In some cases, a sustained effort over many years will be
necessary.
As is often the case with challenging, long-term problems, not every
detail can be spelled out at the beginning, and not every solution is
in hand at the outset. Although much remains to be done, DNDO and its
partners have identified the important vulnerabilities, are pursuing
sound strategies for reducing them, and are making significant progress
toward their solutions.
GAO's explanation of the status of these efforts does not present a
complete and balanced picture of what has been accomplished and what is
being done to address remaining vulnerabilities. For example, one of
the cornerstones of the small maritime strategy is the DNDO-Coast Guard
Joint Acquisition Strategy, a joint plan to procure and sustain the
radiological and nuclear detection equipment needed for hundreds of
Coast Guard boarding teams. This plan has already achieved its initial
goals, providing full operational capability to the Coast Guard by the
end of fiscal year 2007, and the sustainment phase is proceeding
smoothly. GAO does not mention the Joint Acquisition Strategy in their
report. A second example, also concerning the small maritime vessel
threat, concerns the DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy and the
accompanying DHS Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan. GAO
mentions the Strategy in passing far back in the report, but not in the
introductory or summary sections. The Implementation Plan is not
mentioned at all.
DNDO agrees with GAO on the need for better documentation. It should be
noted that there is no lack of documentation. DNDO provided GAO with
more than 4000 pages of documents, numerous briefings with charts and
handouts, and extensive written answers to questions contained in GAO
questionnaires. However, better summary documents, including the
overarching strategic plan recommended by GAO, will be valuable. Work
has already begun on the overarching plan and additional supporting
documents.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael E. McPoland, for:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
Detailed Comments:
On the highlights page, GAO states: "However, DNDO-sponsored field
evaluations to test radiation detection equipment are still not
complete and DNDO may not have all radiation detection equipment in
place until 2012." [See comment 1] GAO does not clearly state why the
field evaluations are not complete. The reason is that the first round
of evaluations has shown that the existing commercial-off-the-shelf
technology would not be effective in the intended application. Going
ahead and continuing the evaluations, or proceeding to deploy
ineffective equipment, just to meet the original field evaluation
schedule, would have been inappropriate. Although not mentioned in the
draft report, the Border Patrol has told GAO that lessons learned from
the field evaluations have helped avert the expenditure of large
amounts of taxpayer funds for equipment that would not have been
effective. GAO states that DNDO may not have all radiation detection
equipment in place until 2012. This statement does not make clear that
this project is a joint effort with Customs and Border Protection
(CBP). DNDO does not unilaterally put equipment in place. Furthermore,
neither CBP nor DNDO will agree to put in place equipment that is not
effective. [See comment 2]
At the end of that same paragraph, in connection with the Puget Sound
small maritime pilot, GAO states that: "However, DNDO has made little
progress in ... resolving some of the challenges it faces in the pilot
program, such as technological limitations of the detection equipment
and sustaining current detection efforts." GAO does not explain the
reasons behind these observations, thereby leaving a misleading
impression that little is being accomplished. Not every challenge has a
quick fix. [See comment 3] An important part of DNDO's charter is to
develop mid-term and long-term solutions when quick fixes are not
available or effective. DNDO believes this work is vitally important
and complementary to work focused on near-term solutions. In
characterizing as a lack of progress those mid-term and long-term
technology development efforts that have not yet "resolved the
challenges," GAO understates the value, importance, and challenge of
technology development efforts needed to arrive at effective solutions.
With regard to GAO's statement that little progress is being made on
"sustaining current detection efforts," the assertion is incorrect.
Further related comments are mentioned later. [See comment 4]
On page 5, in the section on "Land border between ports of entry," GAO
does not clearly acknowledge that DNDO and CBP developed a joint
"Phased Deployment Implementation Plan," which was approved by senior
management in both DNDO and CBP. [See comment 5] Furthermore, GAO does
not acknowledge that that plan specifically called for a phased
approach, as its title indicates, whereby (1) each step was intended to
be contingent on the results of previous steps, and (2) it was clearly
understood at the outset that schedule adjustments would be made if the
results of field evaluations so indicated. Similarly, the original plan
had preliminary cost estimates, based on a set of working assumptions
that were intended to be updated periodically based on the results of
the field evaluations. GAO's report does not recognize that this type
of phased approach is in fact appropriate for problems where simple,
off-the-shelf solutions are not available, including for example the
particularly challenging environment for radiation detection on the
land border between ports of entry. Not every problem has a quick fix.
As the Border Patrol has stated to GAO, this careful, step-by-step
approach has averted the expenditure of large amounts of taxpayer funds
on ineffective or inappropriate solutions. DNDO and CBP are working
diligently to develop solutions that are effective and suitable for
their intended applications.
On page 5, in the section on "Aviation," GAO does not acknowledge that
DNDO has put some of these issues on the agenda for the first time. If
not for DNDO's work on aviation gaps and vulnerabilities, some of these
issues (e.g., the issue of radiological and nuclear detection for
international general aviation) would have received little or no
attention. [See comment 6]
Second, GAO does not clearly explain the roles and responsibilities of
DNDO, CBP and other government agencies in this section. The first two
sentences refer to DNDO and to "DNDO initiatives." The next part of the
paragraph then refers to CBP and states that CBP's "efforts to screen
international cargo have not proceeded as smoothly" because of
jurisdictional and operational issues between CBP and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the local airport
authority. The paragraph then states that these jurisdictional issues
have "delayed DNDO's efforts...." GAO's account creates confusion about
who is responsible for what. In fact, DNDO has no substantive
involvement in jurisdictional issues between CBP and TSA, and the
efforts to screen international cargo (which GAO refers to as "DNDO's
efforts") are in fact a complex joint effort, involving multiple
agencies. The paragraph should be rewritten to clarify roles and
responsibilities. [See comment 7]
On page 5, in the section entitled "Small maritime vessels," GAO
mischaracterizes the differences between detection in the small
maritime setting and detection in the aviation and land border
settings, saying that "...initiatives in the maritime environment
require developing and testing new equipment and new procedures...," in
contrast to the land border and aviation where the initiatives "are
being integrated into already existing CBP screening operations." This
supposed distinction is inaccurate. Many of the detection activities
for the land border and for aviation do in fact require new procedures
and new equipment (although existing equipment can be used in some
instances). In the small maritime vessels setting, the Coast Guard has
been doing maritime radiological and nuclear detection for years, and
so existing equipment and procedures are being used there. In all
settings, it is usually desirable to overlay radiological and nuclear
detection operations onto existing law enforcement activities. This is
being done for aviation, small maritime vessels and land applications.
[See comment 8]
Later in that same paragraph, GAO does not provide essential context
and perspective, and reaches conclusions that are not correct. GAO
states: "DNDO has not established criteria for assessing the success of
this pilot effort to help determine whether it should be expanded to
other locations. In addition, should DNDO decide to continue this
program, it does not currently have a plan detailing which locations it
would target for maritime radiological and nuclear detection programs,
nor has it estimated the total cost of this initiative." GAO also
inaccurately implies that nothing is being or has been done about
sustaining detection programs: "DNDO expects them [state, tribal, and
local agencies] to seek funding from federal grant programs to sustain
these initiatives. For many state and local agency officials we spoke
with, the uncertainty of federal resources jeopardizes their ability to
continue radiological and nuclear detection activities." [See comment
9]
GAO may have misunderstood what is intended here, perhaps because of
the complexity of the grant process, although they acknowledge that
Department of Homeland Security grant programs are the prescribed
mechanism for extending these detection programs beyond the pilots.
Congress has established the grant programs for precisely these kinds
of activities. Congress does not provide funding to DNDO to pass
through to State and local governments, except for certain pilot
programs. If that Congressional policy is taken as the starting point
(GAO has not recommended otherwise), then the operative question is how
to adapt the grant process to address the small maritime vessel
detection challenge. That is precisely what DNDO is working on. [See
comment 10]
GAO does not acknowledge that DNDO has already worked closely with the
Coast Guard and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to craft
language in the DHS Fiscal Year 2009 Port Security Grant Guidance and
Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance that clearly makes funding for
preventive radiological/nuclear detection systems a priority and
encourages State and local agencies to consider this mission when
submitting grant applications. Planning, equipment, training and
exercise expenses are allowable under the grants, as well as specified
overtime expenses. DNDO has also recommended that FEMA expand allowable
maintenance costs and will continue to work with FEMA officials on
these issues.
In terms of criteria, the port security grant process relies on a well-
established risk scoring tool known as MSRAM (Maritime Security Risk
Assessment Model) to score grant applications and, in conjunction with
other factors, to determine whether they should be funded. Thus the
criteria are risk-based. DNDO is working with the Coast Guard to adapt
the MSRAM tool to accommodate more explicitly the radiological and
nuclear detection challenge so that grant applications can be properly
evaluated, through an annual competitive process that has been in
routine use for several years.
Nominally, there are some 361 ports in the United States. In principle,
they might all be candidates for some form of radiological/nuclear
detection capabilities to guard against small maritime vessel threats.
As stated earlier, however, the basic criteria are risk-based and not
all ports will score equally. Basic data to estimate risk scores for
ports are already included in the MSRAM model, and thus will be
factored into the scoring; as noted above, the model is also being
refined to better address radiological and nuclear scenarios.
In practice, the mechanism DNDO and the Coast Guard have adopted for
outreach to the ports is via the Area Maritime Security Committees, of
which there are some 46, generally covering multiple ports. (This
fundamental element of DNDO's small maritime strategy is not mentioned
anywhere in GAO's report.) It is DNDO's expectation that grant
applications will ultimately come from participants in some fraction of
these 46 AMSCs; the AMSCs are the organizing framework, and already
have a well-established role. At present, we cannot estimate how many
will apply, what specific assistance and funding they will seek, nor
how their grant applications will score in comparison to others. Thus,
it is not possible at present to estimate the total cost of the
initiative. One of the principal purposes of the pilot projects is to
establish a solid technical and analytic foundation so that those kinds
of estimates can eventually be prepared. By not explaining this
context, and calling for details that cannot possibly exist at this
stage, GAO is presenting an incomplete picture of the situation.
Also on page 6, in the paragraph on international activities, GAO does
not recognize DNDO's recommendations for stronger international efforts
on "Megaports for Air," small maritime vessel threats, general
aviation, land borders between designated border crossings, and
interior law enforcement in foreign countries. These represent
significant gaps that DNDO has highlighted in the existing
international programs and thus deserve explicit mention. [See comment
11]
On page 7, in a paragraph about budgets, GAO states that the budget
crosscut information is not used to examine whether programs are
aligned with priorities or to help establish current or future
priorities. [See comment 12] However, GAO says the opposite later in
the report (on page 32), where it notes that "[DNDO] used these data to
identify areas in which new initiatives may be needed. For example, in
the most recent review, DNDO said that programs focused on the land
border between ports of entry, aviation, and maritime pathways will
need to grow substantially in the years ahead." Other examples could
also be cited. In addition, GAO does not provide context and
explanation for the comment, and does not mention here an essential
point, clearly recognized by Senators in the July 16 hearing before the
Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee: DNDO has no
authority over the budgets of other agencies. There is no requirement
for other agencies to accept or act on recommendations or advice
emerging from the budget crosscut.
On page 8, GAO states that "DNDO has not yet established detailed plans
to address those gaps and vulnerabilities...." GAO's statement is
misleading, since it suggests DNDO has no plans or strategy to address
the gaps and vulnerabilities. That is not correct. DNDO has identified
gaps and vulnerabilities that previously were not being addressed, and
we are systematically working to identify and develop workable
solutions. The supposed lack of "detailed" plans, as GAO characterizes
them, reflects the fact that solutions are not yet in hand for some of
the key gaps and vulnerabilities. That does not mean there are no plans
or strategy. We have already commented on this point in connection with
the small maritime discussion on page 6, and we will return to it
several times in the remainder of these comments. [See comment 13]
On page 11, GAO states: "In addition, DOE has programs to secure
nuclear and radiological sources domestically. For example, the U.S.
Radiological Threat Reduction program recovers and manages excess and
unwanted radioactive sources that belong to U.S. licensees." GAO does
not recognize the important role of many other agencies in domestic
security. For radioactive materials, for example, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the Agreement States play a far more
fundamental role than the DOE program mentioned by GAO, although that
program is a valuable part of the overall picture. [See comment 14]
On page 12, GAO states: "Portal monitors are stationary or mobile
pieces of equipment that can detect radioactive materials carried by
vehicles." This statement is incomplete, overlooking other important
uses of portal monitors to monitor pedestrians or packages, for example.
At the end of that same paragraph, GAO states: "Under certain
circumstances, these devices [personal radiation detectors, or
"pagers"] could also be used to detect smuggled nuclear material.
However, they can only indicate variations in the general level of
radiation and their sensitivity is limited because of the small size of
the detector. Therefore, they should not be used for that purpose."
This statement requires qualification and correction, because there are
accepted applications in which pagers are used as a `"tripwire," as
part of a more complex inspection process. Although the limitations of
pagers are significant and must be kept in mind, GAO overstates the
case in saying "they should not be relied upon." Pagers have a
legitimate role in some circumstances. [See comment 15]
Also on page 12, in a paragraph about the limitations of radiation
detection devices, GAO states that "highly enriched uranium ... is
among the most difficult materials to detect because of its relatively
low level of radioactivity." Although this is true for passive
radiation detection, it is not true for all types of radiation
detection devices, for example, active interrogation techniques or x-
ray and gamma-ray imaging. Since this purports to be a generic
discussion of radiation detection, GAO should take the extra effort to
make its account technically precise by adding one word, "passive,"
before radiation detection. DNDO and other agencies are devoting
significant R&D resources to active interrogation methods. Nonintrusive
imaging techniques (e.g., x-ray and gamma ray) are also a significant
focus of programs such as the Secure Freight Initiative. There is an
important reason these techniques are receiving such emphasis-to solve
the very problem that GAO raises but does not accurately describe:
limitations of passive radiation detection. To suggest, as GAO's
language does, that the problem is intractable (i.e., that HEU cannot
be detected at all) is incorrect. [See comment 16]
On the bottom of page 12, GAO has inserted a paragraph on Advanced
Spectroscopic Portals (ASP). This subject is outside the agreed scope
of this audit and the paragraph should be removed. GAO officials agreed
that ASP would not be a part of this audit. At the entrance conference
on October 18, 2007, Mr. F. James Shafer, Jr, accompanied by Messrs.
Daren K. Sweeney and Eugene W. Wisnoski, explicitly stated that they
would be pursuing "two separate jobs," namely this audit and an audit
on the life cycle cost estimate for ASP. In response to DNDO questions
about the scope of the two audits, Mr. Shafer further emphasized that
for the audit of the global nuclear detection architecture (i.e., this
audit) "I don't want to focus on ASP." In the earlier March 1, 2007
entrance conference, Mr. Shafer was equally clear about the scope-it
would be a separate audit. In 2007 and 2008, Congressional staff who
requested the audit told us the same thing: they wanted to have a
separate audit on the global nuclear detection architecture. [See
comment 17]
We had the opportunity to review GAO's draft testimony prior to the
July 16 hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and Government
Affairs Committee. We questioned the inclusion of ASP matters in that
testimony, for the same reasons we have stated here. Indeed, during the
course of this audit, including extensive written questions and answers
and numerous briefings, GAO did not ask us a single question about ASP,
and, as such, ASP should not be included within the scope of this
report.
On page 13, GAO states: DNDO is still in the early stages of developing
initiatives to address these vulnerabilities, and it has not clearly
articulated a long term plan for how to achieve its goal of closing
these gaps by expanding radiological and nuclear detection capabilities
in the time frames identified." This is similar to the comment on page
8. Again GAO's statement is misleading, since it suggests DNDO has no
plans or strategy to address the gaps and vulnerabilities. That is not
accurate. DNDO has identified gaps and vulnerabilities that previously
were not being addressed, and we are systematically working to identify
and develop workable solutions. The supposed lack of "long term plans"
as GAO states here reflects the fact that solutions are not yet in hand
for some of the key gaps and vulnerabilities. Not every problem has a
quick fix. That does not mean there are no plans or strategy. In the
very next paragraph, GAO even talks about the joint plan with the
Border Patrol extending to 2012 (as mentioned earlier, this plan is
known as the Phased Deployment Implementation Plan). We have already
commented on this point several times, and we will return to it again
several times in the remainder of these comments. [See comment 18]
Beginning at the bottom of page 14, GAO's account of the work on the
land border between ports of entry paints an incomplete picture, and
does not clearly explain the real issues that DNDO and CBP are
attempting to address. The key challenge is not simply to buy
equipment. DNDO and CBP, including the Border Patrol, are engaged in a
deliberate, systematic program to identify effective and workable
solutions, and at the same time avoid wasteful expenditures on systems
that would not work or that would not be suited for the intended
application. GAO's heavy focus on alleged schedule delays, without
clearly explaining the context and the challenges, is an
oversimplification of a complex and important problem. For example, GAO
does not mention the challenges posed by 4th Amendment legal issues,
which have an important impact on some of the technical and operational
options. GAO does not mention the four-layer, defense-in-depth concept
for the land border between ports of entry, and the technical needs
that each layer entails. GAO briefly mentions portability as a
consideration in selecting equipment, but does not clearly explain the
severe demands this places on hardware choices, and the consequent
implications for wide scale deployment of equipment in the near term.
[See comment 19]
At the bottom of page 14, GAO reports incomplete information about the
procurement of radioactive isotope identification devices (RIIDs), and
confuses several distinct issues and programs. [See comment 20]
With regard to the purchase of radioactive isotope identification
devices (RIIDs) for the Border Patrol, the joint DNDO-CBP Phased
Deployment Implementation Plan originally did not call for the purchase
of any RIIDs for the Border Patrol in FY08. Therefore, GAO's statement
(attributed to "CBP officials") that "in fiscal year 2008, DNDO did not
procure needed detection equipment in a timely manner" requires
explanation.
The FY08 procurements for the Border Patrol were initiated by DNDO and
the Border Patrol in an effort to accelerate the milestones in the
original Phased Deployment Implementation Plan, in order to meet the
Border Patrol's urgent needs. Of course, by definition, in meeting
urgent needs, faster is always better, but GAO's implication that there
were inordinate delays and a lack of responsiveness on the part of DNDO
is not an accurate account of what actually happened.
Although not in the original plan agreed to by DNDO and CBP, DNDO (in
response to discussions with Border Patrol counterparts) became aware
and recognized the importance of the acute shortage of detectors at the
Office of Border Patrol (OBP). Since this procurement was not in the
original plan or budget, DNDO took steps during the summer of 2008 to
identify a source of funds at DNDO to accelerate purchase of RIIDs from
FY09 to FY08. Because it was not part of the original approved plan,
the DNDO Phased Deployment Implementation Plan (PDIP) representative
asked for and received a written request from the OBP representative
for 64 RIIDs to be procured at the earliest possible time. This request
was approved by DNDO management, and a procurement request was
processed. The detectors are scheduled to arrive early in fiscal year
2009. If they had not been ordered until FY09, as originally planned,
they would have been delivered later, probably sometime in the second
or third quarter in CY09. Thus, instead of delaying the procurements,
DNDO expedited them.
DNDO similarly accelerated FY09 purchases for the Border Patrol, again
responding to urgent Border Patrol requirements and going beyond the
quantities specified in the PDIP. On December 16, we initiated a
purchase order for an additional 169 RIIDs. Delivery of the first ten
units is scheduled on January 23. After that, 10 systems a week will be
shipped from January 30 through May 8, 2009, with the last delivery
being 8 systems.
GAO reports statements by CBP officials about procurement delays, but
does not mention the background or reasons. In FY 08, DNDO placed an
order for 240 RIIDs, as GAO stated. It should be noted that this was a
combined procurement for the Office of Field Operations (OFO) as well
as for the Border Patrol. The status of RIIDs at ports of entry raises
a different set of issues than the Border Patrol application, which GAO
does not clearly explain. The Border Patrol aspect of the issue was
discussed in the previous comments above, and as explained there, DNDO
actually accelerated the procurement ahead of the original schedule. In
any case, 240 RIIDs were ordered and the first 2 shipments were found
during receiving inspection to have many failed units. Corrective
actions were therefore necessary. In direct consultation with CBP, it
was determined that a back-up RIID (a different make and model) should
be explored so that if the original vendor could not fix its production
problems, DNDO and CBP could then switch to a new device and thereby
meet OFO and OBP needs. A field evaluation was planned for the new
device. Fifty new units were to be procured and tested at 2 CBP ports
of entry. Steps were also taken in parallel to have the original vendor
upgrade quality control procedures. All of these actions were taken
with complete CBP involvement and cooperation. In summary, the root
cause of these procurement issues was reliability problems with the
equipment, a point not mentioned by GAO.
On page 15, in the section on aviation, GAO has not clearly delineated
the roles and responsibilities of the agencies involved in these
programs. First, GAO states: "CBP, with the support of DNDO, has been
working since 2005, on initiatives to screen all incoming international
planes, cargo, and passengers." Then GAO states: "While DNDO has made
progress in ensuring that appropriate operating procedures ... are
established, its other aviation initiatives have not proceeded as
smoothly or have not yet begun." Later in the same section, GAO
discusses the efforts to screen air cargo, saying "DNDO is working with
CBP...," and also referring to jurisdictional disputes between CBP and
TSA. The air cargo project was originally a CBP initiative that
predated DNDO. It was part of CBP's Radiation Portal Monitoring
Program. It is true that progress has been slow, for a variety of
reasons. However, to attribute the delays to DNDO ("its other aviation
initiatives have not proceeded as smoothly") is not correct. The
reported jurisdictional disputes between CBP and TSA, for example, are
not the responsibility of DNDO. This section should be rewritten to
clarify roles and responsibilities. [See comment 21]
At the bottom of page 16, GAO describes a "demonstration of radiation
detection capabilities" at Dulles airport. This anecdote, as presented,
does not have a sound technical foundation, since the activity of the
137Cs' radiation source may not have been suitable for this type of
dynamic test. First, GAO does not explain that the Cesium-137 check
source used in the demonstration is tiny compared to the amounts that
would constitute a serious concern. In the IAEA Code of Conduct, a
category 3 quantity of Cesium-137 is 3 curies (or 0.1 TeraBecquerel),
orders of magnitude larger than the check source in question. Most
check sources are exempt-quantity amounts characterized by very low
activity levels. These levels are far below the portal's design
threshold when carried by a moving vehicle. [See comment 22]
Furthermore, GAO's statement that "CBP uses this sample to routinely
test equipment" is misleading. It is a check source, not a test source.
The procedures for the use of a check source versus a test source are
different. A check source is used to validate detector response to a
source of radiation or possibly a calibration point, and is typically
placed on the surface of the detector. This is the reason that check
sources contain very little radioactive material. A test source is used
to verify the operation of a detector by using it in the configuration
that mimics the material in normal commerce. (e.g., in a car, in
luggage) Thus a test source would contain a larger amount of
radioactive material and more closely approximate the category 1 or 2
quantity that would be of concern. The demonstration, as described, has
no technical basis.
In the last paragraph on page 17, GAO states: "DNDO and CBP would like
the detection of radiological and nuclear materials to occur as far
outside U.S. borders as possible...." There is in fact a compelling
security imperative here, which GAO minimizes by describing it as a
mere preference by DNDO and CBP ("DNDO and CBP would like"). This is
one of the largest and most important vulnerabilities in the existing
detection architecture. [See comment 23]
On page 18, in the discussion of small maritime vessels, GAO's
statement of the reasons that Puget Sound was chosen is incomplete. One
of the major drivers behind the selection of Puget Sound is the volume
of traffic from Asia, an important potential source of radiological and
nuclear threats that pass through and near the Pacific Northwest. [See
comment 24]
On page 18, the last sentence states: "According to DNDO's data for
fiscal years 2008 and 2009, the agency requested $54.2 million for
these and other maritime initiatives." This comment is misleading since
it is at the bottom of a paragraph highlighting details of the West
Coast Maritime Pilot project, leading the reader to infer the majority
of this funding went to pilot project. For fiscal years 2008 and 2009
funding allocated for the pilot project is $14.7M. [See comment 25]
On page 19, GAO states that "DNDO has not yet developed plans for
[sustaining maritime radiological and nuclear detection efforts]." This
statement is inaccurate. As discussed earlier, DNDO plans to leverage
the grant process and has already taken steps to make this happen,
including working with the Coast Guard and FEMA to craft suitable grant
guidance, and working with the Coast Guard to refine the MSRAM risk
scoring tool to better represent radiological and nuclear detection
scenarios. Furthermore, GAO does not recognize the role and clear
direction of Congress in establishing grant programs as the mechanism
for supporting State and local efforts. GAO's repeated statements that
DNDO does not have a plan are incorrect. For example, the ongoing
effort to update the MSRAM tool would not be happening in the absence
of a plan to leverage the grant process. [See comment 26]
In the middle paragraph on page 20, GAO states: `"Should its concept
for detecting and interdicting radiological and nuclear material
smuggled on small maritime vessels prove feasible, DNDO plans to
develop guidance so that state and local law enforcement agencies can
implement their own maritime radiological and nuclear detection
programs." This has already been done. The "maritime module" of the
Preventive Radiological and Nuclear Detection Handbook has been
developed with the input of more than thirty state and local entities.
The draft is currently under review and will be completed early in
calendar year 2009. [See comment 27]
On page 21, GAO makes a number of incomplete statements about detection
technologies in the maritime environment. First, GAO states that: "The
boat-mounted radiation detection equipment is unable to indicate the
direction of the radioactive material causing the alarm, making it
difficult to identify the potential threat in an open sea with many
small vessels, according to a local law enforcement officer we spoke
with." The same problem occurs in the land and aviation vectors, and is
addressed by applying appropriate concepts of operations (CONOPS). This
is not a limitation that is unique to the maritime environment, nor is
it intractable. Second, GAO implies serious problems with backpack
detectors, because of the difficulties Coast Guard officers supposedly
have maneuvering with these detectors. Difficulties notwithstanding,
the Coast Guard has adopted, and routinely uses, backpack detectors.
They determined several years ago that backpacks provide, on balance, a
reasonable tool for meeting certain needs in the Coast Guard boarding
team environment. Third, GAO implies that a serious problem exists
because handheld detectors do not float if dropped overboard. The same
can be said of many other tools used in the maritime environment, e.g.,
firearms, radios and other communication equipment, cameras and video
equipment, etc. Simple solutions such as tethering the equipment are
readily available and in some cases, have already been applied in the
maritime environment to minimize loss or damage. [See comment 28]
On page 22, GAO asserts that "According to a DNDO official, DNDO was
slow to process the order." Equipment delivery delays for the West
Coast Pilot involved a number of challenges. For example when a pager,
was ordered, the vendor did not have sufficient units in stock (the
vendor actually had none) and did not notify DNDO. Upon discovery, DNDO
took immediate action. Delivery of this equipment has begun, and with
the exception of the backpacks, will be completed over the next several
months with no adverse impact on the overall pilot timeline expected.
[See comment 29]
On page 23, GAO states "However, NYPD officials told us that NYPD has
another 28 boats that need to be equipped with radiation detection
technology and these equipment purchases depend on the availability of
future federal grant funding." NYPD was a major participant in
developing the Securing the Cities initiative maritime concept of
operations (CONOPS), which for the nine identified maritime
chokepoints, called for "...2 boat-mounted detectors per chokepoint at
a minimum with a minimum of 1 RIID at each chokepoint to obtain
spectrum..." Sufficient funding exists within the STC initiative to
achieve this CONOPS if NYPD so desires. [See comment 30]
On page 23, GAO states: "DNDO officials told us that their efforts are
very complex because each agency has a distinct area of authority."
This quote is incomplete. There are many other reasons contributing to
the complexity, besides the one GAO mentions, and we have raised those
issues with GAO. [See comment 31]
On page 27, GAO states: "According to DNDO, it collected information on
radiation detection equipment from DOD, DOE and State most recently in
2007." DNDO collected such information beginning in 2005 and is
updating some of the information in 2008 and 2009. [See comment 32]
At the bottom of page 25, GAO states: "Although DNDO has detailed
information on the budgets for various security and detection programs,
it is not using this information to ensure that agencies efforts are
directed toward the highest priorities." GAO does not note that DNDO
has no authority to "ensure that agencies efforts are directed toward
the highest priorities." This issue was a major point of discussion at
the July 16 hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and Government
Affairs Committee; GAO does not address it. [See comment 33]
On page 34, GAO states that "DNDO has not yet taken steps to work with
DOE, DOD, and State to develop an overarching strategic plan, as we
recommended in July 2008." GAO's statement is incorrect. For example,
we included a call for strategic planning information as part of the
data call issued for the next edition of the Joint Annual Interagency
Review of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. [See comment 34]
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland
Security's letter dated January 14, 2009.
GAO Comments:
1. We agree with DHS that deploying or purchasing ineffective equipment
would be inappropriate. We also agree with DHS that, as we reported,
field evaluations are not complete and that the necessary equipment may
not be deployed until 2012. We discuss the reasons for these delays on
page 14 of the report. In addition, we disagree with DHS's assertion
that Border Patrol told us that lessons learned from field evaluations
"would help avert large amounts of taxpayer funds for equipment that
would not have been effective." We do not dispute the importance of
spending taxpayer dollars wisely; however, it was not expressed to us
as such until this letter.
2. We added language on the highlights page to clarify that CBP is also
responsible for putting radiation detection equipment in place.
3. We discuss in more depth the technological limitations of detection
equipment and sustaining detection efforts on pages 19 through 21 of
the report.
4. DHS commented that we have understated the value, importance, and
challenge of technology development efforts needed to arrive at
effective solutions. We disagree. We acknowledge these challenges in
the body of the report and discuss some of the measures DNDO has taken
to develop needed equipment. Furthermore, we disagree with DNDO's
statement about our findings regarding the status of sustainability
planning. We describe at more length on pages 19 and 20 of the report
our concerns with DNDO's efforts to sustain maritime initiatives into
the future.
5. While we do not mention the Phased Deployment Implementation Plan by
name, on page 14 we state that DNDO and CBP are jointly working on
measures to better secure the border areas between ports of entry and
that these efforts are part of a phased approach. We have added
clarifying language to the paragraph on page 4 to more clearly
delineate the different roles CBP and DNDO play in this regard.
Furthermore, while we do not disagree with taking a phased approach,
DNDO has not kept to its original schedule and if such delays continue,
it is uncertain whether DNDO and CBP will meet their original goal of
full deployment of equipment by 2012.
6. We have modified the text on page 16 to include a reference that
efforts to screen aviation for radiological and nuclear materials are
being included in the strategy for the first time.
7. We have modified the language on page 5 to clarify the roles and
responsibilities of DNDO and CBP.
8. DHS may have misunderstood the point we were making concerning
maritime screening as compared with land and aviation screening. We
agree that non-port of entry screening will require modifications to
existing screening operations and new equipment. However, we were told
that maritime screening posed unique challenges, which we have
documented on pages 18-21 of this report.
9. We disagree with DHS that the conclusions we reach regarding the
maritime program are incorrect. Although DHS comments that our
conclusions are incorrect, DHS does not dispute the facts we present.
Namely, DNDO has not established criteria for assessing the success of
pilot efforts and it has no plan detailing which locations it would
target next. Furthermore, during the course of our work we heard
repeated concerns about the sustainability of the maritime radiological
and nuclear screening from state and local law enforcement.
Specifically, we asked the maritime mission area manager if a
sustainability plan existed and we were told no. After our visit to
Puget Sound, we received an e-mail from the manager stating DNDO would
begin to develop a sustainability plan should the decision be made to
continue the initiative.
10. We understand the role of grants in funding these types of
activities and agree with DHS that, according to DNDO, grants are the
primary mechanism it plans to rely on for sustaining radiological and
nuclear detection activities in the maritime environment. We agree with
DNDO efforts to work with the Coast Guard to adapt the Maritime
Security Risk Assessment Model to accommodate more explicitly
radiological and nuclear detection challenges. However, we maintain our
concern that DNDO does not have any detailed plans, including how and
where a broader strategy would be implemented, what technology would be
needed, what organizations should be involved, and how such efforts
would be sustained for this important national security issue.
11. DNDO incorrectly asserted that we did not recognize its
contributions to international efforts. On page 23 of the report we
acknowledged DNDO's efforts to look for opportunities to work with
other agencies to help strengthen their radiological and nuclear
detection efforts, despite the fact that these programs to combat
nuclear smuggling are well established and are under the purview of
another agency.
12. DNDO has misunderstood the reference to its annual assessment of
the global nuclear detection strategy and we believe the text that now
appears on page 6 is consistent with our discussion later in the
report. Our discussion on page 6 focuses on the global strategy,
encompassing radiological and nuclear detection activities across all
relevant government agencies. The reference DNDO makes to text later in
the report focuses specifically on actions taken by DNDO to enhance
domestic detection capabilities. However, we have modified the language
to be clearer about what is being discussed in each place. We
acknowledge that DNDO does not have authority over the budgets of other
agencies and we would not advocate for such authority to be provided to
it. However, DNDO is responsible for enhancing and coordinating
federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling
domestically and overseas. We believe that the analysis we are
recommending--that DNDO undertake using data collected as part of the
Joint Annual Interagency Review--is consistent with this requirement.
13. We recommended that DNDO develop a strategic plan to guide the
development of a more comprehensive global nuclear strategy and
delineated what such a plan should contain, including clearly defined
objectives, roles, and responsibilities for meeting the objectives;
necessary funding; and monitoring mechanisms to determine progress in
meeting goals. However, DNDO has not yet produced such a strategic
plan. We acknowledge that combating nuclear smuggling on a global scale
is a large and complex undertaking. We repeatedly asked DNDO for
detailed plans, containing the elements described above, but did not
receive any.
14. We have modified the text on page 12 to recognize the role of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
15. DNDO commented that portal monitors can also be used to monitor
pedestrians, but according to CBP, it does not currently use portal
monitors for this purpose. However, we have modified the text to
reflect that portal monitors are used for screening cargo containers.
With regard to the use of pagers to detect smuggled nuclear material,
we have reported in the past on the limitations of using these devices
and that pagers should not be relied upon to detect smuggled nuclear
material.
16. None of the radiation detection devices discussed in this report
use the active interrogation techniques cited by DHS.
17. DHS commented that including a paragraph on ASPs (now on page 13)
was beyond the scope of this audit and should be removed from this
report. The scope of our review is presented on pages 3 and 4 of the
report. As such, we agree with DHS that our review did not include an
assessment of DNDO's efforts to test and procure ASP technology.
However, several prior GAO reports have found significant problems with
DNDO's work in this area. Reporting the results of our prior work in
the background of this report is appropriate and germane because portal
monitors are a key component of the global nuclear detection strategy.
18. DHS commented that our findings on DNDO's lack of long-term plans
are misleading and suggest DNDO has no plans or strategies. We agree
that DNDO has identified gaps and vulnerabilities and has taken some
steps to address these, including jointly working with CBP as mentioned
on page 14 of our report. However, DHS does not dispute our finding
that it has not developed a detailed plan, which clearly conveys the
goals, responsibilities, resource needs, and performance metrics needed
to further its detection efforts. Identifying gaps and initiating
programs are positive steps toward enhancing detection capabilities,
but these efforts alone do not constitute a long-term plan. Without a
detailed, documented plan, DNDO will be unable to determine whether
these new programs are actually succeeding and addressing the
identified gaps.
19. We believe DHS had misconstrued our description of efforts to
implement radiological and nuclear screening at the border areas in
between official ports of entry. We acknowledge that there are a number
of challenges associated with implementing portable detection equipment
for use in the field and appreciate DNDO and CBPs efforts to develop
this capability. However, the fact remains that DNDO has not kept to
its original schedule, and if such delays continue, it is uncertain
whether DNDO and CBP will meet their original goal of full deployment
of such equipment by 2012.
20. Our description of the procurement challenges faced by DNDO and CBP
is an accurate summary of the information we were provided. One of
DNDO's primary roles is to test and procure needed radiological and
nuclear detection equipment for use by CBP and other agencies. We were
informed by CBP that it did not receive the equipment it had originally
ordered in the agreed upon time frames. Regardless of whether the
equipment was for use at an official border crossing or for use by
Border Patrol officers in the field, the needed equipment was not
procured as requested. In CBP's technical comments on a draft of this
report, it stressed that its radiological and nuclear detection
equipment procurement funding was handed over to DNDO in 2006. CBP
further stated that it believes that the most effective way to procure
commercial off-the-shelf equipment is for CBP to have its own radiation
and nuclear equipment budget.
21. We have modified the text on pages 15 through 17 to more clearly
delineate roles and responsibilities.
22. We have accurately described what we observed during our visit to
Dulles International Airport. We were told by CBP officials that the
source used in the demonstration was what they use to routinely check
the responsiveness of the portal monitor and successfully did just that
earlier in the week.
23. We believe DHS has misconstrued our statement about detecting
radiological and nuclear material outside the U.S. borders. We are not
minimizing the importance of such a goal. In fact, since DNDO believes
that it is one of the largest and most important vulnerabilities in the
existing detection architecture, it will be even more important that
DNDO develop detailed plans for securing such arrangements with as many
nations as possible.
24. We have listed on page 18 of the report a number of other factors
we were told by DHS officials influenced the decision to pilot the
maritime program in the Puget Sound area. In response to the draft
report, DHS provided an additional reason for the selection of Puget
Sound.
25. We modified the text on page 19 to include the actual funding
amount for the pilot project.
26. See comments 9 and 10.
27. DHS provided new information that the Preventative Radiological and
Nuclear Detection handbook is under development and that DNDO reached
out to state and local entities in its development. This is another
positive step. However, as DNDO stated, this handbook is currently in
draft, undergoing review, and not yet finalized or in use by any
locale.
28. We believe DNDO has incorrectly characterized our finding regarding
detection technologies in the maritime environment. On pages 20 and 21,
our report delineates some of the technological limitations, as they
were presented to us by the users of the equipment. We do not assert
that these limitations are insurmountable; only that they exist and
should be taken into consideration when crafting a plan for
radiological and nuclear detection in the maritime environment.
29. The information contained in the report on page 22 is factually
accurate.
30. The information contained on pages 22 and 23 of the report was
obtained through interviews with NYPD officials in the presence of a
DNDO representative. The primary purpose of the statement was to point
out the number of boats with boat-mounted radiation detection equipment
in use at the time of our review.
31. While there are other complexities with developing a global nuclear
detection strategy, DNDO officials repeatedly told us during the course
of our review that a primary complicating factor is the office's
limited ability to influence other agencies' programs to combat nuclear
smuggling.
32. We modified the text on page 25 to reflect DNDO's efforts to update
some of the information.
33. We modified the text on page 25 to reflect the fact that DNDO
should coordinate with other agencies on the overall strategic
direction of detection efforts.
34. In response to our July 2008 recommendation that DNDO develop an
overarching strategic plan, DNDO commented that it has included a
request for strategic planning information as part of its efforts to
develop the next edition of the Joint Annual Interagency Review.
However, DHS did not comment on how this will inform or contribute to
an overarching strategic plan to guide future enhancement to global
nuclear detection.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Assistant To The Secretary Of Defense
Nuclear And Chemical And Biological Defense Programs
3050 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3050:
January 13, 2009:
Mr. David Maurer:
Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Maurer:
The following submission is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to
the GAO draft report GAO-09-257, "Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and
Vulnerabilities. Detailed comments on the report recommendations are
enclosed.
DoD appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on this draft
report. After reviewing the report, DoD concurs with the
recommendation.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Illegible, for:
Fred S. Celec:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated December 18, 2008:
GAO-09-257 (GAO Code 360896):
"Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve
Planning To Better Address Gaps And Vulnerabilities"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of Energy, and the Secretary of State, use the Joint Annual Interagency
Review to guide future strategic efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.
DOD Response: DoD concurs with this recommendation. Greater use could
be made of the review associated with the development of this annual
report to guide U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David Maurer, 202-512-3841 or maurerd@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact person named above, Glen Levis (Assistant
Director), Elizabeth Erdmann, Rachel Girshick, Sandra Kerr, Omari
Norman, Kim Raheb, Rebecca Shea, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, and Tommy
Williams made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Securing Nuclear and Radiological Material Overseas:
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Focusing on the Highest Priority Radiological
Sources Could Improve DOE's Efforts to Secure Sources in Foreign
Countries. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-580T].
Washington, D.C.: March 13, 2007.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security at
Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-Funded
Security Upgrades Is Uncertain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-404]. Washington, D.C.: February 28,
2007.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's International Radiological Threat
Reduction Program Needs to Focus Future Efforts on Securing the Highest
Priority Radiological Sources. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-282]. Washington, D.C.: January 31,
2007.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and
Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-93]. Washington, D.C.:
October 7, 2005.
Radiological Sources in Iraq: DOD Should Evaluate Its Source Recovery
Efforts and Apply Lessons Learned to Future Recovery Missions.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-672]. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 2005.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to
Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-638]. Washington, D.C.: May 16,
2003.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to
Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-482]. Washington, D.C.:
March 24, 2003.
Securing Nuclear and Radiological Material in the United States:
Nuclear Security: DOE and NRC Have Different Security Requirements for
Protecting Weapons-Grade Material from Terrorist Attacks. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1197R]. Washington, D.C.: September
11, 2007.
Nuclear Security: Actions Taken by NRC to Strengthen Its Licensing
Process for Sealed Radioactive Sources Are Not Effective. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1038T]. Washington, D.C.: July 12,
2007.
National Nuclear Security Administration: Security and Management
Improvements Can Enhance Implementation of the NNSA Act. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-428T]. Washington, D.C.: January 31,
2007.
Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: Poor Planning Has Complicated DOE's
Plutonium Consolidation Efforts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-164T]. Washington, D.C.: October 7,
2005.
Nuclear Security: DOE Needs Better Information to Guide Its Expanded
Recovery of Sealed Radiological Sources. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-967]. Washington, D.C.: September
22, 2005.
Nuclear Security: Actions Needed by DOE to Improve Security of Weapons-
Grade Nuclear Material at Its Energy, Science and Environment Sites.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-934T]. Washington, D.C.:
July 26, 2005.
Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: DOE Needs to Take Action to Safely
Consolidate Plutonium. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-665]. Washington, D.C.: July 20,
2005.
Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy,
Science, and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to
Meet the New Design Basis Threat. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-611]. Washington, D.C.: July 15,
2005.
Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security
of Sealed Radioactive Sources. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-804]. Washington, D.C.: August 6,
2003.
Radiation Detection Programs Overseas:
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Challenges Facing U.S. Efforts to Deploy
Radiation Detection Equipment in Other Countries and in the United
States. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-558T].
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination
Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection
Equipment to Other Countries. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-311]. Washington, D.C.: March 14,
2006.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign
Seaports. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-375].
Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-426]. Washington, D.C.:
May 16, 2002.
Container Security:
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One
Year Later. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-126T].
Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port
Act. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-754T]. Washington,
D.C.: April 26, 2007.
Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-466T]. Washington, D.C.:
May 26, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, But Implementation and
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-448T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2005.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment
Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-557]. Washington, D.C.:
April 26, 2005.
Radiation Detection Technology:
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Phase 3 Test Report on Advanced
Portal Monitors Does Not Fully Disclose the Limitations of the Test
Results. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-979].
Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2008.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Program to Procure and Deploy
Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed the
Department's Previous Cost Estimates. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1108R]. Washington, D.C.: September
22, 2008.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure
Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T]. Washington,
D.C.: September 18, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Decision to Procure and Deploy the
Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not Supported by
Its Cost-Benefit Analysis. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-581T]. Washington, D.C.: March 14,
2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the
National Laboratories' Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in
Support of DNDO's Testing and Development Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-347R]. Washington, D.C.: March 9,
2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the
Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based on
Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the Monitors'
Costs and Benefits. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-133R]. Washington, D.C.: October 17,
2006.
Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and
Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities
Could Be Strengthened. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1015]. Washington, D.C.: September
21, 2006.
Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across
Our Nation's Borders at Two Locations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-940T]. Washington, D.C.: July 7,
2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation
Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-389]. Washington, D.C.:
March 22, 2006.
Technology Assessment: Securing the Transport of Cargo Containers.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-68SU]. Washington, D.C.:
January 25, 2006.
Homeland Security: Limited Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection
Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-963]. Washington, D.C.: September 4,
2003.
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security:
Nuclear Safety: Construction of the Protective Shelter for the
Chernobyl Nuclear Reactor Faces Schedule Delays, Potential Cost
Increases, and Technical Uncertainties. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-923]. Washington, D.C.: July 19,
2007.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Better Management Controls Needed for Some
DOE Projects in Russia and Other Countries. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-828]. Washington, D.C.: August 29,
2005.
Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved Its Management and
Internal Controls, but Challenges Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-329]. Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2005.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better
Integration. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-157].
Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005.
Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Effort to Close Russia's Plutonium
Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-662]. Washington, D.C.:
June 4, 2004.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No. 109-347, section 501, 120 Stat. 1884, 1932 (2006).
[2] Neither the presidential directive nor the SAFE Port Act, which
established DNDO and directed the agency to develop a global nuclear
detection architecture, defined the term "architecture." DNDO has
interpreted "architecture" as a time-phased, geographic approach to
reducing the risk of a radiological or nuclear attack. For the purposes
of this report, we refer to the architecture as a strategy.
[3] Small maritime craft are vessels less than 300 gross tons and can
include recreational boats, commercial fishing vessels, and tug boats.
These vessels are subject to few security regulations. For example,
they do not have to provide a 96-hour advance notice of arrival.
[4] International general aviation applies to noncommercial,
nonmilitary aircraft traveling to the United States from an
international location. International general aviation aircraft can
range in size from small planes (such as a Cessna 182) to planes as
large as a DC-9 or even an Airbus A380.
[5] GAO, Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office's Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-999T] (Washington, D.C.: July 16,
2008).
[6] See the list of related GAO products at the end of this report.
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-999T].
[8] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security
at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.-
Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-404] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28,
2007).
[9] GAO, Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved Its Management
and Internal Controls, but Challenges Remain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-329] (Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2005).
[10] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and
Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation
Detection Equipment to Other Countries, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-311] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14,
2006). Since its initial deployment of equipment in 1998, the Second
Line of Defense program has grown to include cooperation with countries
throughout the Former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus,
providing radiation detection equipment at land border crossings,
international airports, and feeder seaports.
[11] GAO, Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress
in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign
Seaports, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-375]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005).
[12] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to
Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection
Equipment, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007).
[13] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Program to Procure and
Deploy Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed
the Department's Previous Cost Estimates, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1108R] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22,
2008).
[14] The southern U.S. border tests occurred in the Border Patrol's El
Paso, Texas, and Tucson, Arizona, sectors. The northern U.S. border
test was planned for the Border Patrol's Swanton, Vermont, sector.
[15] This number includes the fiscal year 2007 Supplemental
Appropriation which provided $22 million for aviation initiatives into
fiscal year 2009.
[16] 6 U.S.C. section 202.
[17] From testimony delivered by Vice Admiral Thad Allen on the role of
Coast Guard in border and maritime security, Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, U.S. Senate, Apr. 6,
2006.
[18] The state and local agencies are Washington Department of Fish and
Wildlife, Washington State Patrol, Washington Department of Health,
Whatcom County Sheriff, Pierce County Sheriff, Seattle Fire Department,
Seattle Police Department, Port of Seattle Police, Everett Police
Department, Bainbridge Island Police Department, Port Orchard Police
Department, Tacoma Police Department, Suquamish Tribal Police, Port of
Everett, and Skagit County Sheriff.
[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-311].
[20] U.S. Department of State, Strategic Plan For Interagency
Coordination of U.S. Government Nuclear Detection Assistance Overseas
(Washington, D.C., Dec. 1, 2006).
[21] GAO, Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at
Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and
Performance Measures Are Needed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-187] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25,
2008).
[22] GAO, Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of
U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-533T] (Washington, D.C.: June 12,
2008).
[23] GAO, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need
Better Integration, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-157]
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2005).
[24] GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Progress Made in Improving Security
at Russian Nuclear Sites, but the Long-term Sustainability of U.S.
Funded Security Upgrades Is Uncertain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-404] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28,
2007).
[25] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and
Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation
Detection Equipment to Other Countries, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-311] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14,
2006).
[26] GAO, Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Networks
Need Better Data on Proliferation Risks and Program Results,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-21] (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 31, 2007).
[27] Each state, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, and Guam, has their own Civil Support Teams and
California has two. Civil Support Teams are National Guard assets and
are under the direction of the governor of that state.
[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-999T].
[29] GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance
Information for Management Decision Making, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-927] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9,
2005); Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005); Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related
to Terrorism, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-519T]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2003); and Executive Guide: Effectively
Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[End of section]
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Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
