Contingency Contracting
DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan Gao ID: GAO-10-1 October 1, 2009The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on contractors to provide a range of services in Iraq and Afghanistan, but as GAO has previously reported, the agencies have faced challenges in obtaining sufficient information to plan and manage their use of contractors. As directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, GAO analyzed DOD, State, and USAID data for Iraq and Afghanistan for FY 2008 and the first half of FY 2009 on the (1) status of agency efforts to track information on contracts and contractor personnel; (2) number of contractor personnel; (3) number of killed and wounded contractors; and (4) number and value of contracts and extent to which they were awarded competitively. GAO reviewed selected contracts and compared personnel data to other available sources to assess the reliability of agency-reported data.
In response to a statutory requirement to increase contractor oversight, DOD, State, and USAID agreed to use the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) system to track information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the exception of USAID in Afghanistan, the agencies are in the process of implementing the system and require contractor personnel in both countries to be entered into SPOT. However, the agencies use differing criteria to decide which personnel are entered, resulting in some personnel not being entered into the system as required. Some agency officials also questioned the need to track detailed information on all contractor personnel, particularly local nationals. Further, SPOT currently lacks the capability to track all required data elements, such as contract dollar value and the number of personnel killed and wounded. As a result, the agencies rely on other sources for contract and contractor personnel information, such as periodic surveys of contractors. DOD, State, and USAID reported nearly 226,500 contractor personnel, including about 28,000 performing security functions, in Iraq and Afghanistan, as of the second quarter of FY 2009. However due to their limitations, the reported data should not be used to identify trends or draw conclusions about contractor personnel numbers. Specifically, we found that the data reported by the three agencies were incomplete. For example, in one quarterly contractor survey DOD did not include 26,000 personnel in Afghanistan, and USAID did not provide personnel data for a $91 million contract. The agencies depend on contractors to report personnel numbers and acknowledge that they cannot validate the reported information. USAID and State reported that 64 of their contractors had been killed and 159 wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period. DOD officials told us they continue to lack a system to reliably track killed or wounded contractor personnel and referred us to the Department of Labor's Defense Base Act (DBA) case data for this information. However, because DBA is a worker's compensation program, Labor's data include cases such as those resulting from occupational injuries and do not provide an appropriate basis for determining how many contractor personnel were killed or wounded while working on DOD, State, or USAID contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the data provide insights into contractor casualties. According to Labor, 11,804 DBA cases were filed for contractors killed or injured in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period, including 218 deaths. Based on our review of 150 randomly selected cases, we estimate that 11 percent of all FY 2008 DBA cases for the two countries resulted from hostile actions. DOD, State, and USAID reported obligating $38.6 billion on nearly 85,000 contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period. DOD accounted for more than 90 percent of the contracts and obligations. The agencies reported that 97 percent of the contracts awarded during our review period, accounting for nearly 71 percent of obligations, were competed.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-10-1, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2009:
Contingency Contracting:
DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking
Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan:
GAO-10-1:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-1, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on
contractors to provide a range of services in Iraq and Afghanistan, but
as GAO has previously reported, the agencies have faced challenges in
obtaining sufficient information to plan and manage their use of
contractors.
As directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
(FY) 2008, GAO analyzed DOD, State, and USAID data for Iraq and
Afghanistan for FY 2008 and the first half of FY 2009 on the (1) status
of agency efforts to track information on contracts and contractor
personnel; (2) number of contractor personnel; (3) number of killed and
wounded contractors; and (4) number and value of contracts and extent
to which they were awarded competitively. GAO reviewed selected
contracts and compared personnel data to other available sources to
assess the reliability of agency-reported data.
What GAO Found:
In response to a statutory requirement to increase contractor
oversight, DOD, State, and USAID agreed to use the Synchronized
Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) system to track
information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan. With the exception of USAID in Afghanistan, the agencies
are in the process of implementing the system and require contractor
personnel in both countries to be entered into SPOT. However, the
agencies use differing criteria to decide which personnel are entered,
resulting in some personnel not being entered into the system as
required. Some agency officials also questioned the need to track
detailed information on all contractor personnel, particularly local
nationals. Further, SPOT currently lacks the capability to track all
required data elements, such as contract dollar value and the number of
personnel killed and wounded. As a result, the agencies rely on other
sources for contract and contractor personnel information, such as
periodic surveys of contractors.
DOD, State, and USAID reported nearly 226,500 contractor personnel,
including about 28,000 performing security functions, in Iraq and
Afghanistan, as of the second quarter of FY 2009. However due to their
limitations, the reported data should not be used to identify trends or
draw conclusions about contractor personnel numbers. Specifically, we
found that the data reported by the three agencies were incomplete. For
example, in one quarterly contractor survey DOD did not include 26,000
personnel in Afghanistan, and USAID did not provide personnel data for
a $91 million contract. The agencies depend on contractors to report
personnel numbers and acknowledge that they cannot validate the
reported information.
USAID and State reported that 64 of their contractors had been killed
and 159 wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period. DOD
officials told us they continue to lack a system to reliably track
killed or wounded contractor personnel and referred us to the
Department of Labor‘s Defense Base Act (DBA) case data for this
information. However, because DBA is a worker‘s compensation program,
Labor‘s data include cases such as those resulting from occupational
injuries and do not provide an appropriate basis for determining how
many contractor personnel were killed or wounded while working on DOD,
State, or USAID contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the
data provide insights into contractor casualties. According to Labor,
11,804 DBA cases were filed for contractors killed or injured in Iraq
and Afghanistan during our review period, including 218 deaths. Based
on our review of 150 randomly selected cases, we estimate that 11
percent of all FY 2008 DBA cases for the two countries resulted from
hostile actions.
DOD, State, and USAID reported obligating $38.6 billion on nearly
85,000 contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan during our review period. DOD
accounted for more than 90 percent of the contracts and obligations.
The agencies reported that 97 percent of the contracts awarded during
our review period, accounting for nearly 71 percent of obligations,
were competed.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends the agencies implement a plan to, among other matters,
ensure consistent criteria for entering information into SPOT and
improve its reporting capabilities to track statutorily required
contracting data. DOD and State disagreed that a plan is needed, citing
current coordination efforts. A plan with time frames would help to
translate their coordination efforts into actions to address the issues
GAO identified.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1] or key
components. For more information, contact John P. Hutton at (202) 512-
4841 or huttonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
SPOT Not Yet fully Implemented to Track Contractor Personnel and
Contracts:
DOD, State, and USAID Lack Reliable Data on Contractor Personnel in
Iraq and Afghanistan:
Agencies' Ability to Track Contractor Personnel Killed or Wounded in
Iraq and Afghanistan Varies:
DOD, State, and USAID Obligated Tens of Billions of Dollars on
Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: DOD-Reported Quarterly Data on the Number of Contractor
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half
of Fiscal Year 2009:
Table 2: State-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in
Iraq and Afghanistan:
Table 3: USAID-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in
Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2009:
Table 4: Numbers of DOD, State, and USAID Contractor Personnel in SPOT
Compared to Agency-Reported Survey Numbers, as of March 31, 2009:
Table 5: USAID-and State-Reported Data on Contractor Personnel Killed
and Wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First
Half of Fiscal Year 2009:
Table 6: Defense Base Act Cases for Deaths and Injuries in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2009:
Table 7: DOD Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan,
Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009:
Table 8: DOD New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009:
Table 9: DOD's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts (Excluding
Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year
2009:
Table 10: DOD's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2009:
Table 11: State Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009:
Table 12: State New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009:
Table 13: State's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2009:
Table 14: State's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2009:
Table 15: USAID Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009:
Table 16: USAID New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009:
Table 17: USAID's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2009:
Table 18: USAID's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2009:
Figures:
Figure 1: DOD, State, and USAID Obligations on Active Contracts for
Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2009:
Figure 2: DOD, State, and USAID Percentage of Contracts and Obligations
on Awards for Iraq and Afghanistan:
Figure 3: Competition for DOD, State, and USAID Iraq and Afghanistan
Contracts Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year
2009:
Abbreviations:
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command:
DBA: Defense Base Act:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulation:
FPDS-NG: Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation:
LOA: letter of authorization:
MEJA: Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act:
MOU: memorandum of understanding:
NDAA for FY2008: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008:
SPOT: Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker:
UCMJ: Uniform Code of Military Justice:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 1, 2009:
Congressional Committees:
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) have relied extensively on
contractors to support troops and civilian personnel and to oversee and
carry out reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the use
of contractors to support military operations is not new, the extent to
which the three agencies are relying on contractors in the two
countries is unprecedented--both in terms of the number of contractors
and the range of services they are providing. We and others have
reported that the agencies have faced challenges in obtaining
information on contracts and contractor personnel to plan and manage
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 1] Absent complete and
accurate information on contractors supporting contingency operations,
the agencies are limited in their ability to develop a complete picture
of their reliance on contractors, the tasks being performed, and their
associated costs. The importance of such information is heightened by
the evolving U.S. efforts in the two countries as the agencies reduce
their presence in Iraq while expanding their presence in Afghanistan.
Reliable and meaningful data on contractors and the services they
provide are a starting point for agency decisions on when and how to
effectively use contractors; support contractors in terms of housing,
transportation, security, and other services; and ensure that
contractors are properly managed and overseen.
Congress has taken a number of actions to increase oversight of
contracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. Among these, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA for
FY2008) directed DOD, State, and USAID to sign a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) regarding matters relating to contracting in the
two countries, including maintaining common databases of information on
contracts and contractor personnel.[Footnote 2] In their July 2008 MOU,
the agencies designated the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational
Tracker (SPOT) database as their system of record for information on
contracts and contractor personnel working in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Congress directed us to annually review DOD, State, and USAID contracts
in Iraq and Afghanistan and report on these reviews through 2010.
[Footnote 3] This is our second report issued pursuant to that mandate.
[Footnote 4] We are providing the results of our analyses of agency-
reported data for fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year
2009 regarding (1) the agencies' implementation of SPOT, (2) the number
of contractor personnel, including those performing security functions,
[Footnote 5] working on DOD, State, and USAID contracts with
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, (3) the number of contractor
personnel killed or wounded, and (4) the number and value of contracts
[Footnote 6] that were active and awarded[Footnote 7] during our 18-
month review period and the extent of competition for new contract
awards.
We used the following methodologies to develop our findings:
* To assess SPOT's implementation, we reviewed DOD, State, and USAID's
MOU and interviewed officials responsible for implementing SPOT to
determine the agencies' criteria and practices for entering information
into SPOT and the system's current and planned capabilities. We
reviewed agency guidance and policy documents regarding the use of SPOT
and took training courses designed for personnel who expect to use the
system. We then compared the uses and capabilities of SPOT to the MOU
requirements to determine the extent to which SPOT fulfills the terms
of the MOU.
* For the number of contractor personnel, we obtained DOD, State, and
USAID data on the number of U.S., third country, and local nationals
working on contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan, including those performing
security functions, during our review period. The agencies provided
data from surveys of their contractors as well as the SPOT database. We
assessed the reported data by comparing them to other available
sources. Based on comparisons of each source, we concluded that the
agency-reported data should not be used to draw conclusions about the
actual number of contractor personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan or trends
over time. However, we are presenting the reported data along with
their limitations as they establish a minimum number of contractor
personnel during our period of review.
* For contractor personnel killed or wounded during our review period,
we analyzed State and USAID data; DOD did not collect and could not
provide these data. We could not independently verify the completeness
of the data reported by USAID and State. However, we report State's and
USAID's data as they provide insight into the number of contractor
personnel who were killed or wounded during our review period. In
addition, we analyzed Department of Labor data on Defense Base Act
(DBA) cases for incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year
2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. We determined the DBA data
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report based on our
prior reliability assessments. We also reviewed a random sample of 150
DBA case files, from a population of 2,500 cases, for incidents that
occurred during fiscal year 2008 to determine, for example, whether the
case was the result of a hostile incident and the severity of the
contractor's injury.
* For the contracts, we obtained data from DOD, State, and USAID on the
number of active and awarded contracts with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan during our review period, the amount of funds obligated on
those contracts, and the extent of competition for new contract awards.
Data were provided from the Federal Procurement Data System - Next
Generation (FPDS-NG), agency-specific databases, and manually compiled
lists of contract actions. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable to determine the minimum number of active and
awarded contracts and obligation amounts, as well as the number of
competed contracts, based on our prior reliability assessments,
interviews with agency officials, and verification of some reported
data.
A more detailed description of our scope and methodology is included in
appendix I. We conducted this performance audit from November 2008
through September 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Section 861 of the NDAA for FY2008 directed the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, and the USAID Administrator to sign an MOU
related to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The law specified a
number of issues to be covered in the MOU, including the identification
of each agency's roles and responsibilities for matters relating to
contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, responsibility for establishing
procedures for the movement of contractor personnel in the two
countries, responsibility for collecting and referring information
related to violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or
the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), and
identification of common databases to serve as repositories of
information on contract and contractor personnel. The NDAA for FY2008
requires the databases to track at a minimum:
* for each contract,
* a brief description of the contract,
* its total value, and:
* whether it was awarded competitively; and:
* for contractor personnel working under contracts in Iraq or
Afghanistan,
* total number employed,
* total number performing security functions, and:
* total number who have been killed or wounded.
DOD, State, and USAID signed the MOU in July 2008.[Footnote 8] The
agencies agreed that SPOT, a Web-based system initially designed and
used by DOD, would be the system of record for the statutorily-required
contract and contractor personnel information. The MOU specified that
SPOT would include information on DOD, State, and USAID contracts with
more than 14 days of performance in Iraq or Afghanistan or valued at
more than the simplified acquisition threshold, which the MOU stated
was $100,000, as well as information on the personnel working under
those contracts. In contrast, the NDAA for FY2008 established a 14-day
threshold for inclusion in the database but did not specify a minimum
dollar value.
As agreed in the MOU, DOD is responsible for all maintenance and
upgrades to the SPOT database.[Footnote 9] The agencies further agreed
to negotiate funding arrangements for any agency-unique requirements
and for specialized training requirements. Each agency is to ensure
that data elements related to contractor personnel, such as the number
of personnel employed on each contract in Iraq or Afghanistan, are
entered into SPOT and to require its contractors to enter that
information accurately. Information entered into SPOT is more detailed
than the number of contractor personnel as it is designed to track
individuals by name and record information such as the contracts they
are working under, deployment dates, and next of kin. Data elements,
such as contract value and whether it was awarded competitively, are to
be imported into SPOT from FPDS-NG, the federal government's system for
tracking information on contracting actions.
SPOT Not Yet fully Implemented to Track Contractor Personnel and
Contracts:
While implementation of SPOT is still under way, DOD, State, and
USAID's criteria for deciding which contractor personnel to enter into
the system differed from what was agreed to in the MOU and varied by
country. This has resulted in not all contractor personnel being
entered into SPOT as agreed to in the MOU. Further, SPOT currently does
not have the capability to track all of the required contract
information or readily generate reports on the total number of killed
or wounded contractor personnel.
Agency Implementation and Criteria for Using SPOT Varied:
For the majority of our review period, DOD, State, and USAID were
phasing in the MOU requirement to use SPOT to track information on
contracts and the personnel working on them in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
January 2007, DOD designated SPOT as its primary system for collecting
data on contractor personnel deployed with U.S. forces and directed
contractor firms to enter personnel data for contracts performed in
Iraq and Afghanistan. State started systematically entering information
for both Iraq and Afghanistan into SPOT in November 2008. In January
2009, USAID began requiring contractors in Iraq to enter personnel data
into SPOT. However, USAID has not yet imposed a similar requirement on
its contractors in Afghanistan and has no time frame for doing so.
In implementing SPOT, DOD's, State's, and USAID's criteria for
determining which contractor personnel are entered into SPOT varied and
were not consistent with those contained in the MOU, as the following
illustrate.
* Regarding contractor personnel in Iraq, DOD, State, and USAID
officials stated that the primary factor for deciding to enter
contractor personnel into SPOT was whether a contractor needed a SPOT-
generated letter of authorization (LOA). Contractor personnel need SPOT-
generated LOAs to, among other things, enter Iraq, receive military
identification cards, travel on U.S. military aircraft, or, for
security contractors, receive approval to carry weapons.[Footnote 10]
However, not all contractor personnel, particularly local nationals, in
Iraq need LOAs and agency officials informed us that such personnel
were not being entered into SPOT. In contrast, DOD officials informed
us that individuals needing LOAs were entered into SPOT even if their
contracts did not meet the MOU's 14-day or $100,000 thresholds.
* For Afghanistan, DOD offices varied in their treatment of which
contractor personnel should be entered into SPOT. Officials with one
contracting office stated that the need for an LOA determined whether
someone was entered into SPOT. As in Iraq, since local nationals
generally do not need LOAs, they are not being entered into SPOT. In
contrast, DOD officials with another contracting office stated that
they follow DOD's 2007 guidance on the use of SPOT.[Footnote 11]
According to the guidance, contractor personnel working on contracts in
Iraq and Afghanistan with more than 30 days of performance and valued
over $25,000 are to be entered into SPOT--as opposed to the MOU
threshold of 14 days of performance or valued over $100,000.
Agency officials have raised questions about the need to enter detailed
information into SPOT on all contractor personnel. Some DOD officials
we spoke with questioned the need to individually track all contractor
personnel as opposed to their total numbers given the cost of
collecting these detailed data compared to the benefit of having this
information. Similarly, USAID officials questioned the need to enter
detailed information as agreed to because personnel working on its
contracts in Afghanistan generally do not live or work in close
proximity to U.S. government personnel and typically do not receive
support services from the U.S. government. USAID officials also cited
security concerns as one factor affecting their decision on who should
be entered into SPOT. USAID officials explained that they have held off
entering Iraqi or Afghan nationals into SPOT because identifying local
nationals who work with the U.S. government by name could put those
individuals in danger should the system be compromised. To help address
this concern, DOD officials said that they have begun developing a
classified version of SPOT. However, USAID officials told us the agency
would most likely not be able to use a classified system due to limited
access to classified computers.
Because of the varying criteria on who should be entered into the
system, the information in SPOT does not present an accurate picture of
the total number of contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. For
example, officials from all three agencies expressed confidence that
the SPOT data were relatively complete for contractor personnel who
need an LOA in Iraq. Conversely, agency officials acknowledged that
SPOT does not fully reflect the number of local nationals working on
their contracts. Agency officials further explained that ensuring that
information on local nationals is in SPOT is challenging because their
numbers tend to fluctuate due to the use of day laborers and because
local firms do not always keep track of the individuals working on
their projects. DOD officials also explained that they have had to
develop workarounds to deal with the fact that SPOT requires a first
and last name to be entered for each individual along with a birth date
and unique identification number. The officials noted that many Afghan
laborers have only one name, do not know their birth dates, and lack
identification numbers.
SPOT Not Capable of Tracking All Required Information:
SPOT currently lacks the capability to track all of the contract data
elements as agreed to in the MOU. While the MOU specifies that contract
values, competition information, and descriptions of the services being
provided would be pulled into SPOT from FPDS-NG, this capability is not
expected to be available until 2010. In the interim, the DOD officials
overseeing SPOT's development told us that SPOT users can manually
enter competition information and descriptions, but there is no
requirement for them to do so. Since SPOT is not designed to let users
enter contract dollar values, the DOD officials stated that SPOT and
FPDS-NG are being periodically merged to identify contract values.
Even when the direct link is established, pulling FPDS-NG data into
SPOT may present challenges because of how data are entered into SPOT.
First, information from the two systems can only be merged if the
contract has been entered into SPOT. If no contractor personnel working
on a particular contract have been entered, then the contract will not
appear in SPOT and its information cannot be linked with the
information in FPDS-NG. Second, while contract numbers are the unique
identifiers that will be used to match records in SPOT to those in FPDS-
NG, SPOT users are not required to enter contract numbers in a
standardized manner. In our review of SPOT data, we determined that at
least 12 percent of the contracts had invalid contract numbers and,
therefore, could not be matched to records in FPDS-NG.[Footnote 12]
Additionally, contract numbers may not be sufficient to identify unique
contracts. Specific orders placed on task order contracts are
identified through a combination of the contract number and task order
number. However, SPOT users are not required to enter task order
numbers. For example, one SPOT entry only contained the contract number
without an order number. In reviewing FPDS-NG data, we determined that
DOD had placed 12 different orders--ranging from a few thousand dollars
to over $129 million--against that contract. Based on the information
in SPOT, DOD would not be able to determine which order's value and
competition information should be imported from FPDS-NG.
SPOT, as currently designed, also lacks the capability to readily
generate reports on the number of killed or wounded contractor
personnel. SPOT was upgraded in January 2009 to fulfill the NDAA for
FY2008 requirement to track such information. Contractors can now
update the status of their personnel in the system, including whether
they have been killed or wounded, while agencies can run queries to
identify the number of personnel with a current status of killed or
wounded. However, the standard queries can only generate a list of
personnel currently identified as killed or wounded and cannot be used
to identify individuals who previously had the status of killed or
wounded and whose records have become inactive or whose injured status
changed when they returned to work. For example, if an individual has
an injured status today and a query were run, that individual would be
included in the report. If that individual then returned to work, the
status would change and that individual would not appear on any
subsequent injury reports, with the agencies having no means of
determining whether the individual was ever injured.
DOD, State, and USAID Lack Reliable Data on Contractor Personnel in
Iraq and Afghanistan:
DOD, State, and USAID reported to us that there were 226,475 contractor
personnel, including 27,603 performing security functions, in Iraq and
Afghanistan as of the second quarter in fiscal year 2009. Over the
period of our review, DOD reported significantly more contractors than
State and USAID, most of whom were working in Iraq. For example, as of
the second quarter in fiscal year 2009, DOD reported over 200,000
contractor personnel while State and USAID reported almost 9,000 and
over 16,500, respectively. However, due to limitations with the
reported data, we determined the data reported by the agencies should
not be used to identify trends or draw conclusions about the number of
contractor personnel in either country. Specifically, we found that
personnel information reported by the three agencies was incomplete
and, for DOD, additional factors raise questions about the reported
numbers' reliability. Further, the agencies could not verify whether
the reported data were accurate or complete; although, they indicated
that the data for certain types of contractors, such as those providing
security functions, were more complete than other data, such as those
for local nationals.
DOD Contractor Personnel:
According to DOD officials, the most comprehensive information on the
number of DOD contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan comes from
the U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) quarterly census.[Footnote 13]
CENTCOM initiated its quarterly census of contractor personnel in June
2007 as an interim measure until SPOT is fully implemented. The census
relies on contractor firms to report their personnel data to DOD
components, which then aggregate the data and report them to CENTCOM at
the end of each quarter. As shown in table 1, DOD's reported number of
contractor personnel for our review period ranged from 200,111 to
231,698, with approximately 7 percent performing security functions
over the entire period, on average.
Table 1: DOD-Reported Quarterly Data on the Number of Contractor
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half
of Fiscal Year 2009:
Iraq: All contractors;
Fiscal year 2008: First quarter: 163,591;
Fiscal year 2008: Second quarter: 149,378;
Fiscal year 2008: Third quarter: 162,428;
Fiscal year 2008: Fourth quarter: 163,446;
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 148,050;
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 132,610.
Iraq: Contractors providing security;
Fiscal year 2008: First quarter: 9,952;
Fiscal year 2008: Second quarter: 7,259;
Fiscal year 2008: Third quarter: 7,704;
Fiscal year 2008: Fourth quarter: 10,446;
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 9,218;
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 12,942.
Afghanistan: All contractors;
Fiscal year 2008: First quarter: 36,520;
Fiscal year 2008: Second quarter: 52,336;
Fiscal year 2008: Third quarter: 41,232;
Fiscal year 2008: Fourth quarter: 68,252;
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 71,755;
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 68,197.
Afghanistan: Contractors providing security;
Fiscal year 2008: First quarter: 2,998;
Fiscal year 2008: Second quarter: 6,982;
Fiscal year 2008: Third quarter: 3,537;
Fiscal year 2008: Fourth quarter: 3,847;
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 3,689;
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 4,373.
Total all contractors;
Fiscal year 2008: First quarter: 200,111;
Fiscal year 2008: Second quarter: 201,714;
Fiscal year 2008: Third quarter: 203,660;
Fiscal year 2008: Fourth quarter: 231,698;
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 219,805;
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 200,807.
Total contractors providing security;
Fiscal year 2008: First quarter: 12,950;
Fiscal year 2008: Second quarter: 14,241;
Fiscal year 2008: Third quarter: 11,241;
Fiscal year 2008: Fourth quarter: 14,293;
Fiscal year 2009: First quarter: 12,907;
Fiscal year 2009: Second quarter: 17,315.
Source: GAO analysis of CENTCOM census data.
[End of table]
DOD officials acknowledge that the census numbers represent only a
rough approximation of the actual number of contractor personnel that
worked in either country. Specifically, these officials told us that
because of how the data were collected and reported by the various DOD
components, it was difficult to compile and obtain an accurate count of
contractor personnel. We determined that over the course of our review
period the following data issues existed.
* Contractor personnel information was sometimes incomplete. Most
notably, an Army-wide review of fiscal year 2008 third quarter census
data determined that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers did not include
approximately 26,000 Afghan nationals working on contracts. However,
information on these contractors was included in subsequent censuses.
As a result, comparing third quarter and fourth quarter data would
incorrectly suggest that there was an increase in the number of
contractors in Afghanistan, when in fact the increase is attributable
to more accurate counting of personnel.
* Contractor personnel were being double counted. For example, the
system used to record contractor personnel numbers for the Joint
Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan was found to have duplicates. As a
result, DOD reported a 10 percent decrease in personnel in Iraq in the
first quarter of fiscal year 2009 and a 5 percent decrease in
contractor personnel in Afghanistan in the second quarter of fiscal
year 2009 when duplicates were removed.
* The process used to collect data changed. For example, a 3 percent
decrease in personnel numbers reported in the first quarter of fiscal
year 2009 compared to the previous quarter was attributed to the Joint
Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan's decision to begin using a
monthly data call to contractors to collect personnel numbers.
* Data submitted by the DOD components were often of poor quality or
inaccurate, which created challenges for CENTCOM to compile quarterly
totals. During our review of quarterly census data submissions, we
identified a DOD component in Afghanistan that provided invalid
contract numbers for about 30 percent of its contracts in the second
quarter for fiscal year 2009. Also, it was not possible to determine
for some submissions how many contractors were working in a specific
country. In such cases, the CENTCOM official responsible for the census
told us he would either seek clarification from the DOD component that
provided the data or use his judgment to determine the correct
personnel numbers.
State Contractor Personnel:
In response to our request for information on its contractor personnel
in Iraq and Afghanistan, State officials informed us that prior to
fiscal year 2009 the department did not systematically track contractor
personnel. Instead, State bureaus conducted periodic surveys of their
contractors; however, each bureau's survey covered different time
periods. Based on these surveys, which at least one bureau supplemented
with SPOT data, State reported that 8,971 contractor personnel, the
majority of whom performed security functions, worked on contracts in
Iraq and Afghanistan during the first half of fiscal year
2009.[Footnote 14] Only one bureau provided comparable information for
fiscal year 2008, reporting 3,514 personnel working on its contracts in
Iraq and Afghanistan over the course of the year.
Table 2: State-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in
Iraq and Afghanistan:
Iraq: All contractors;
First half of fiscal year 2009: 5,376.
Iraq: Contractors providing security;
First half of fiscal year 2009: 3,632.
Afghanistan: All contractors;
First half of fiscal year 2009: 3,595.
Afghanistan: Contractors providing security;
First half of fiscal year 2009: 1,559.
Total all contractors;
First half of fiscal year 2009: 8,971.
Total contractors providing security;
First half of fiscal year 2009: 5,191.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: If a bureau provided the results of more than one survey
conducted in fiscal year 2009, the table includes the results of the
most recent survey. Of the five bureaus that provided data, one
provided data that covered the entire first half of fiscal year 2009
and the other four provided data as of a specific date or month.
[End of table]
Even relying on a combination of periodic surveys and SPOT, which State
implemented in fiscal year 2009, it appears that State underreported
its contractor personnel numbers. Specifically, in our analysis of
State contract and personnel data, we identified a number of contracts
with performance in Iraq or Afghanistan for which contractor personnel
numbers were not reported. For example, although State provided
obligation data on a $3 million contract for operation and maintenance
services in Iraq as well as a $5.6 million contract for support
services in Afghanistan, information on the number of personnel working
on these contracts was not contained in the agency's periodic surveys
or the SPOT data we received.
USAID Contractor Personnel:
For the personnel numbers reported to us, USAID relied entirely on
periodic surveys of its contractors. USAID provided contractor
personnel numbers for both Iraq and Afghanistan for all of fiscal year
2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. The agency reported that
16,697 personnel, including 5,097 performing security functions, worked
on its contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan during the first half of
fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 15]
Table 3: USAID-Reported Data on the Number of Contractor Personnel in
Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2009:
Iraq: All contractors;
Fiscal year 2008: 2,707;
First half of fiscal year 2009: 2,668.
Iraq: Contractors providing security;
Fiscal year 2008: 901;
First half of fiscal year 2009: 1,010.
Afghanistan: All contractors;
Fiscal year 2008: 12,955;
First half of fiscal year 2009: 14,029.
Afghanistan: Contractors providing security;
Fiscal year 2008: 3,818;
First half of fiscal year 2009: 4,087.
Total all contractors;
Fiscal year 2008: 15,662;
First half of fiscal year 2009: 16,697.
Total contractors providing security;
Fiscal year 2008: 4,719;
First half of fiscal year 2009: 5,097.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[End of table]
USAID relied on the results of surveys sent to its contractors in Iraq
and Afghanistan to respond to our request for contractor personnel
information.[Footnote 16] However, this information appeared to be
incomplete. Specifically, agency officials acknowledged the periodic
surveys most likely underreported the total number of contractor
personnel. For example, an official in Afghanistan informed us that if
a USAID contractor firm did not respond to a survey for personnel
information, which is sometimes the case since there is no contractual
requirement to do so, then personnel working for that firm were not
included in the reported numbers. Our analysis of USAID personnel and
contract data also indicates that USAID's numbers are incomplete.
Specifically, USAID provided us with personnel data for about 83
percent of its contracts that were active during the period of our
review and had performance in Iraq or Afghanistan. We identified a
number of contracts for which contractor personnel information was not
provided, including contracts to refurbish a hydroelectric power plant
and to develop small and medium enterprises in Afghanistan worth at
least $6 million and $91 million, respectively.
Agency-Reported Data Not Verified but More Complete Than SPOT:
DOD, State, and USAID could not verify the accuracy or completeness of
the contractor personnel data they provided to us, and officials
acknowledged that they are likely undercounting the actual number of
contractors working in Iraq and Afghanistan. Officials from the three
agencies stated they lack the resources to verify the information being
reported by their contractors, their primary source of data. Officials
we met with indicated this is particularly true for contracts that
involve work at remote sites, where security conditions make it
difficult for U.S. government officials to regularly visit. However,
the agency officials stated that personnel information on certain types
of contractors is likely more reliable than others. In particular,
officials from DOD, State, and USAID told us that the personnel numbers
provided for their private security contractors are the most accurate
and reliable. This is due in part to the increased scrutiny these
contractors receive. Conversely, these same officials told us obtaining
accurate information on local nationals is especially difficult. For
example, one DOD official told us some local national contractors
hesitate or simply refuse to submit information on their personnel
because of safety concerns, among others. Further, the number of local
nationals working on a particular contract on a daily basis can vary
greatly depending on the type of work being performed.
Despite the limitations we identified with the agencies' use of
surveys, the survey data were more complete than the data in SPOT for
our review period. For example, as shown in table 4, in the second
quarter fiscal year 2009 census, DOD reported 83,506 more contractor
personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan than were entered into SPOT. An even
smaller portion of USAID's contractor personnel were entered into SPOT
because the agency did not enter any personnel for any contracts in
Afghanistan and was generally not entering Iraqis into the system.
While the difference between SPOT and the surveys was smaller for
State, there still were a number of contracts for which personnel
information was available from State's surveys but was not in SPOT.
Table 4: Numbers of DOD, State, and USAID Contractor Personnel in SPOT
Compared to Agency-Reported Survey Numbers, as of March 31, 2009:
DOD:
Source of contractor personnel information:
SPOT: 117,301;
Surveys: 200,807;
Differences between SPOT and surveys: 83,506.
State[A]:
Source of contractor personnel information:
SPOT: 7,022;
Surveys: 8,971[B];
Differences between SPOT and surveys: 1,949.
USAID[B]:
Source of contractor personnel information:
SPOT: 445[A];
Surveys: 16,697;
Differences between SPOT and surveys: 16,252.
Total:
Source of contractor personnel information:
SPOT: 124,768;
Surveys: 226,475;
Differences between SPOT and surveys: 101,707.
Source: GAO analysis of SPOT and agency-reported data.
[A] State's survey number reflects the number of contractor personnel
in SPOT and personnel identified through bureau surveys, as well as
individuals working on personal services contracts.
[B] USAID's numbers for SPOT are only for Iraq since the agency did not
use SPOT in Afghanistan, while the survey numbers reflect personnel in
both countries, including those working on personal services contracts.
[End of table]
Agencies' Ability to Track Contractor Personnel Killed or Wounded in
Iraq and Afghanistan Varies:
Although USAID, State, and DOD are required to collect data on the
total number of contractor personnel who have been killed or wounded
while working on contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan, only USAID and
State tracked this information during our review period. USAID reported
59 contractor personnel were killed and 61 wounded during fiscal year
2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009, while State reported that
5 of its contractors were killed and 98 more were wounded (see table
5). These data were based on reports submitted by contractors and then
tracked by the agencies. In tracking this information, USAID and State
noted in some cases, but not all, whether the death or injury was the
result of a hostile action or an accident. However, due to the lack of
other available and reliable sources, we could not independently verify
whether USAID's and State's data were accurate.
Table 5: USAID-and State-Reported Data on Contractor Personnel Killed
and Wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First
Half of Fiscal Year 2009:
USAID: Killed;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 6; Iraq:
First half of fiscal year 2009: 2;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 38;
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 13;
Total: 59.
USAID: Wounded;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 7;
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 0;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 35;
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 19;
Total: 61.
USAID Total;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 13;
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 2;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 73;
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 32;
Total: 120.
State: Killed;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 3;
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 1;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 1;
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 0; Total: 5.
State: Wounded;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 68;
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 13;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 14;
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 3; Total: 98.
State Total:
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 71;
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 14;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 15;
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 3; Total: 103.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID and State data.
Note: USAID reported that an additional 12 contractors were kidnapped
in Iraq and Afghanistan during this period.
[End of table]
DOD officials informed us that their department continued to lack a
system for tracking information in a manner that would allow the
department to provide us with reliable data on killed or wounded
contractor personnel. Although DOD did not maintain departmentwide
data, some individual components within the department received reports
on killed or wounded contractor personnel. However, the components did
not consistently track these reports in a readily accessible or
comprehensive manner. For example, officials with the Defense Contract
Management Agency in Iraq and the Joint Contracting Command - Iraq/
Afghanistan explained that they received reports when contractor
personnel were killed or wounded, but this information was not recorded
in a manner that made it readily retrievable. In addition, an Army
Corps of Engineers official in Afghanistan told us that he tracked data
on contractor illnesses and injuries resulting from workplace accidents
but did not track data on contractor personnel killed or wounded as a
result of hostile incidents. Absent DOD-wide data and as was the case
for our prior report,[Footnote 17] DOD officials referred us to Defense
Base Act (DBA) case data, which are maintained by the Department of
Labor, as a means of obtaining information on killed and wounded
contractor personnel.
Labor DBA Data Are Not a Good Proxy for Contractor Personnel Killed or
Wounded:
Labor's DBA case data do not provide an appropriate basis for
determining the number of contractor personnel killed or wounded in
Iraq and Afghanistan while working on DOD, State, or USAID contracts.
Under the NDAA for FY2008, Labor--unlike DOD, State, and USAID--has no
responsibilities for tracking killed or wounded contractor personnel,
and as such, its data were not designed to do so. Instead, Labor
maintains data on DBA cases to fulfill its responsibilities for
overseeing DBA claims by providing workers' compensation protection to
contractor personnel killed or injured while working on U.S. government
contracts overseas, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote
18]
After analyzing Labor's DBA data and case files, we determined that DBA
data are not a good proxy for determining the number of killed and
wounded contractor personnel. This is, in part, because, as Labor
officials explained, not all deaths and injuries reported under DBA
would be regarded as contractors killed or wounded within the context
of the NDAA for FY2008. Many nonhostile-related deaths and injuries,
such as strains, sprains, and cases arising from auto accidents and
other common occupational injuries, are compensable under DBA and are
routinely reported to Labor. In addition, during our file reviews, we
noted that many cases, particularly those submitted for injuries, were
for medical conditions, such as pregnancy, cancer, and appendicitis,
determined not to be related to the individual's employment in Iraq or
Afghanistan, and compensation claims for many of these cases were
denied because the conditions were not work-related. While employers
must notify Labor of all work-related contractor deaths and injuries
resulting in time lost from work, one Labor official told us that some
employers report all medical-related conditions, regardless of their
severity and the nature of the incidents that caused them. In addition,
some contractor deaths and injuries may not be reported to Labor as
required. In particular, Labor officials have indicated that deaths and
injuries to local and third-country contractors may be underreported.
Additionally, because Labor does not track cases by agency or contract,
DBA data cannot be analyzed to determine how many cases involved
contractor personnel working specifically on DOD, State, or USAID
contracts. As a result, the data may include cases for contractor
personnel working for agencies other than DOD, State, and USAID. During
our review of 150 DBA case files, we noted that the files did not
always contain contract information and did not consistently identify
the contracting agency. While we identified 103 case files for
personnel working on DOD or State contracts, we did not identify any
files for USAID contractor personnel. In addition, 1 case file
specified an agency other than DOD, State, or USAID, while 46 files did
not specify which agency the contractor worked for.
Despite their limitations for determining the number of contractor
personnel killed or wounded, Labor's DBA case data provide insight into
contractor personnel deaths and injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan.
According to Labor, there were 11,804 DBA cases, including 218 cases
reporting contractor deaths, which resulted from incidents that
occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2008 and the first
half of fiscal year 2009. As shown in table 6, overall both the total
number of DBA cases and the number of death cases decreased from fiscal
year 2007 to fiscal year 2008, though the number of death cases in
Afghanistan increased.
Table 6: Defense Base Act Cases for Deaths and Injuries in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2009:
Deaths:
Iraq: Fiscal year 2007: 337;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 122;
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 31;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2007: 40;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 47;
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 18.
Injuries:
Iraq: Fiscal year 2007: 9,148;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 7,735;
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 2,306;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2007: 1,962;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 1,100;
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 445.
Total:
Iraq: Fiscal year 2007: 9,485;
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: 7,857;
Iraq: First half of fiscal year 2009: 2,337;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2007: 2,002;
Afghanistan: Fiscal year 2008: 1,147;
Afghanistan: First half of fiscal year 2009: 463.
Source: GAO analysis of Labor data.
Note: Cases may be filed for contractor personnel working on contracts
with U.S. government agencies other than DOD, State, and USAID.
[End of table]
Based on our review of 150 randomly selected DBA case files, we
estimated that about 11 percent of the deaths and injuries reported to
Labor for incidents that occurred in fiscal year 2008 resulted from
hostile actions.[Footnote 19] Only 16 of the 150 files we reviewed were
for cases related to hostile actions.[Footnote 20] Further, about one-
third of the 11,586 DBA injury cases that occurred during our review
period resulted in the affected contractor losing time from work. For
example, we reviewed a case in which a contractor lost time from work
after receiving multiple injuries when an ammunition pallet fell and
wedged him against the side of a container, while another contractor
suffered fractures and spinal injuries caused by an improvised
explosive device and small arms fire.
DOD, State, and USAID Obligated Tens of Billions of Dollars on
Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan:
DOD, State, and USAID reported obligating nearly $39 billion on 84,719
contracts with performance in Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year
2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009 (see figure 1 for
obligation data). DOD accounted for the vast majority of both the
contracts and obligations. Approximately two-thirds of the total number
of contracts and obligations were for performance in Iraq. Task orders
were the most common contract vehicle that the agencies used during our
review period and accounted for most of the obligations. A relatively
small number of task orders accounted for a large portion of each
agency's obligations. For example, during our review period, DOD
obligated more than $6.5 billion on two task orders that provide food,
housing, and other services for U.S. military personnel, while more
than a third of State's obligations were on three task orders for
police training and criminal justice programs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
See appendix II for detailed information on each agencies' Iraq and
Afghanistan contracts and obligations during our review period.
Figure 1: DOD, State, and USAID Obligations on Active Contracts for
Iraq and Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal
Year 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Agency: DOD;
Amount of Obligations, Iraq: $25,322.1 million;
Amount of Obligations, Afghanistan: $8,464.1 million;
Amount of Obligations, Other: $926.8 million.
Agency: State;
Amount of Obligations, Iraq: $1,057 million;
Amount of Obligations, Afghanistan: $715 million;
Amount of Obligations, Other: $70 million.
Agency: USAID;
Amount of Obligations, Iraq: $706.7 million;
Amount of Obligations, Afghanistan: $1,347.2 million;
Amount of Obligations, Other: $0 million.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
Note: Some contracts included performance in countries other than Iraq
and Afghanistan, such as the United States. It was not possible, based
on the data reported for us, to isolate which portion of the
obligations was specific to Iraq and/or Afghanistan. Therefore, if a
contract had performance in Iraq and other countries (not including
Afghanistan), we set the place of performance as Iraq. We set the place
of performance as Afghanistan for contracts with performance in
Afghanistan and other countries (not including Iraq). We set the place
of performance as "other'" for contracts that were reported as having
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan or for which the country was not
specified in the agency-reported data.
[End of figure]
The NDAA for FY2008 mandated that we identify the total number and
value of all contracts, defined to include prime contracts, task or
delivery orders, and subcontracts at any tier. While we obtained data
on prime contracts and orders, DOD, State, and USAID were unable to
provide data on the number or value of individual subcontracts.
Contract files may contain information on subcontracts, but none of the
agencies systematically tracked this information. The value of
subcontracts is captured in the total value of the prime contract, but
the agencies were unable to provide us with data on what portion of the
total contract value went to subcontractors.
Of the almost 85,000 contracts, including task and delivery orders,
which were active during our review period, 97 percent were awarded
during fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009.
However, more than a third of the funds obligated during our review
period were on contracts originally awarded before fiscal year 2008.
There were some variations between the agencies, as shown in figure 2.
For example, most of USAID's obligations were on contracts awarded
prior to fiscal year 2008. In contrast, most of State's active
contracts were awarded during our period of review, but more than half
the obligations were on a small portion of previously awarded
contracts.
Figure 2: DOD, State, and USAID Percentage of Contracts and Obligations
on Awards for Iraq and Afghanistan:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Agency: DOD;
Contracts:
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year
2009: $97.7 million;
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2008: $2.3 million;
Obligations:
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year
2009: $70 million;
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2008: $30 million.
Agency: State;
Contracts:
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year
2009: $91.7 million;
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2008: $8.3 million;
Obligations:
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year
2009: $46 million;
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2008: $54 million.
Agency: USAID;
Contracts:
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year
2009: $46.1 million;
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2008: $53.9 million;
Obligations:
Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 or the first half of fiscal year
2009: $21.3 million;
Contracts awarded prior to fiscal year 2008: $78.7 million.
Source: GAO analysis of agency data.
[End of figure]
Majority of New Contract Awards Were Competed:
DOD, State, and USAID reported that they used competitive procedures to
award nearly all contracts awarded in our review period, with the
exclusion of task and delivery orders. Generally, contracts should be
awarded on the basis of full and open competition.[Footnote 21]The
agencies reported that most of their new contracts were awarded using
full and open competition, but in some cases the agencies reported a
contract as competed without indicating whether full and open or
limited competition occurred. The agencies reported that approximately
3 percent of contracts awarded during our period of review, accounting
for 29 percent of the obligations, were not competed (see figure 3).
Figure 3: Competition for DOD, State, and USAID Iraq and Afghanistan
Contracts Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year
2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Extent of competition: Competed;
Contracts: 96.6%;
Obligations: 71.2%.
Extent of competition: Not competed;
Contracts: 3.1%;
Obligations: 28.5%.
Note: Excludes task and delivery orders. In addition, for less than 1
percent of contracts and obligations the agencies did not report
whether the contract was competed.
[End of figure]
Most of the 1,143 contracts reported to us as not competed had
relatively small obligations during our review period.[Footnote 22]
Approximately 90 percent of them had obligations of less than $100,000
and 80 percent had obligations less than $25,000. In contrast, only 27
of the 1,143 contracts reported as not competed had over $1 million in
obligations.These 27 contracts accounted for 99 percent of obligations
for contracts that were not competed.
The law authorizes agencies to use limited competition in certain
situations. There may be circumstances under which full and open
competition would be impracticable, such as when contracts need to be
awarded quickly to respond to urgent and compelling needs or when there
is only one source for the required product or service. In such cases,
agencies may award contracts without providing for full and open
competition (e.g., using limited competition or on a sole-source basis)
if the proposed approach is appropriately justified, approved, and
documented. Similarly, simplified acquisition procedures allow for
limited competition when awarding certain contracts, and the use of
these procedures is determined based on dollar thresholds contained in
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).[Footnote 23] These dollar
thresholds vary depending on where and for what purpose the contract
was awarded and performed, its dollar value, and the contracting method
used. Additionally, contracts valued below the micropurchase threshold,
which is $25,000 for contracts awarded and performed outside the United
States in support of contingency operations, may be awarded without
soliciting competitive quotations if the authorized purchase official
considers the price to be reasonable.
To determine the circumstances in which the agencies awarded contracts
using other than full and open competition, we reviewed 79 DOD and
State contracts[Footnote 24] awarded in fiscal year 2008 that had more
than $100,000 in obligations during our review period and were reported
as not competed or for which no competition information was provided.
[Footnote 25] During our review, we discovered that 8 of these had
actually been awarded after a full and open competition and 14 had been
awarded after a limited competition (i.e., they were not sole-source
awards). Of the 71 files we reviewed that were not awarded under full
and open competition, the most common justification for limiting
competition or awarding a sole-source contract was that only one source
could provide the good or service being acquired. In some of these
cases, the incumbent contractor was awarded the new contract. For
example, State awarded a sole-source contract for communication
equipment in Iraq because only one company offered radios that were
compatible with State's existing communication network. The second most
common reason for limiting competition was DOD's enhanced authority to
acquire products and services from Iraq and Afghanistan[Footnote 26].
Congress granted DOD this authority, which allows DOD to limit
competition or provide preferences for products and services from Iraq
or Afghanistan, to provide a stable source of jobs and employment in
the two countries. According to DOD contracting officials in Iraq and
Afghanistan, they are increasing their use of this authority. However,
officials in Afghanistan explained that in doing so they generally have
some level of competition among local firms as opposed to doing a sole-
source award. They explained that limited competitions are being
conducted to not only ensure better prices and products but also to
help instill Western business practices and develop local business
capacity.
Competition requirements generally do not apply to the process of
issuing task and delivery orders.[Footnote 27] However, where there
were multiple awardees under the underlying contract, the FAR requires
the contracting officer in most instances to provide each awardee a
fair opportunity to be considered for each order exceeding $3,000. The
agencies reported that 99 percent of the orders issued during our
review period were competed.
Conclusions:
Congress has directed DOD, State, and USAID to track specific
information regarding contractor personnel and contracts with
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such data are a starting point for
providing decision makers with a clearer understanding of the extent to
which they rely on contractors and for facilitating oversight to
improve planning and better account for costs. Implementing SPOT, as
agreed to in the MOU, has the potential of providing the agencies and
Congress with data on contracts, contractor personnel, and those
personnel who have been killed or wounded. However, the agencies'
implementation of SPOT currently falls short of that potential.
Specifically, there is a lack of consistency as to which contractor
personnel are entered into SPOT. Not withstanding the MOU, some agency
officials have questioned the need or feasibility of entering detailed
information on individual contractor personnel into SPOT beyond the
requirement of the NDAA for FY2008 or the MOU. Furthermore, SPOT does
not currently have the capability to accurately import contract data
and its report generating capabilities limit the agencies' access to
information that has been entered, particularly with respect to killed
or wounded contractor personnel. Until SPOT is fully implemented, the
agencies will continue to rely on multiple alternative sources of data,
which are also unreliable and incomplete, for information related to
contractor personnel and contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a
result, the agencies and Congress will continue to be without reliable
information on contracts and contractor personnel to help improve
oversight and decision making at a critical juncture as agencies draw
down their efforts in Iraq and expand them in Afghanistan.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that the agencies and Congress have reliable information on
contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, we
recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State and the USAID
Administrator jointly develop and execute a plan with associated time
frames for their continued implementation of the NDAA for FY2008
requirements, specifically:
* ensuring that the agencies' criteria for entering contracts and
contractor personnel into SPOT are consistent with the NDAA for FY2008
and with the agencies' respective information needs for overseeing
contracts and contractor personnel;
* establishing uniform requirements on how contract numbers are to be
entered into SPOT so that contract information can accurately be pulled
from FPDS-NG as agreed to in the MOU; and:
* revising SPOT's reporting capabilities to ensure that they fulfill
statutory requirements and agency information needs, such as those
related to contractor personnel killed or wounded.
In developing and executing this plan, the agencies may need to revisit
their MOU to ensure consistency between the plan and what has
previously been agreed to in the MOU.
Agency Comments:
We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOD, State, and
USAID. In its written comments, DOD did not agree with our
recommendation that the agencies jointly develop and execute a plan for
continued implementation of the NDAA for FY2008. According to DOD, the
current MOU, existing regulations, and ongoing coordination among the
agencies should be sufficient to meet legislative mandates. DOD noted
that additional direction beyond the implementation of the MOU may
require statutory action. DOD further explained that it is planning
upgrades to SPOT that may address some of the issues we identified,
particularly related to the entry of contract numbers and reporting
features. State, in its written comments, also disagreed with the need
for the agencies to develop and execute a plan to address the issues we
identified. Nevertheless, State acknowledged that the agencies need to
continue meeting to review their progress in complying with the NDAA
for FY2008, revisit the MOU, address issues to ensure consistency in
meeting the MOU criteria, and discuss SPOT's future reporting
capability. Similarly, while USAID's written comments did not address
our overarching recommendation for the agencies to develop and
implement a plan or indicate whether it agreed with the specific issues
to be included in their plan, it noted that it plans to continue
regularly meeting with DOD and State officials concerning the NDAA for
FY2008 and the existing MOU.
We agree that coordination among the three agencies is critical, but
given the findings in this report, coordination alone is not
sufficient. Instead, the agencies need to take action to resolve the
issues we identified in their implementation of SPOT. In their comments
the agencies recognized the importance of having reliable information
on contracts and contractor personnel and acknowledged that corrective
measures are needed. However, the agencies did not explain in their
comments how they plan to translate their coordination efforts and
upgrades into actions to resolve the issues we identified. By jointly
developing and executing a plan with time frames, the three agencies
can identify the concrete steps they need to take and assess their
progress in ensuring that the data in SPOT are sufficiently reliable to
fulfill the requirements of the NDAA for FY2008 and their respective
agency needs. Further, the extent to which the steps necessary to
implement the MOU and the recommended plan are consistent with the NDAA
for FY2008, no additional statutory action would be required.
DOD's, State's and USAID's comments, along with our supplemental
responses, are reprinted in appendixes III, IV, and V, respectively.
Additionally, we provided a draft of this report to Labor for its
review and comment. Labor provided technical comments that we
incorporated into the final report as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the Secretary of Labor, and interested
congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at
no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this
report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
John Hutton:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein:
Chair:
The Honorable Christopher S. Bond:
Vice Chairman:
Select Committee on Intelligence:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Edolphus Towns:
Chairman:
The Honorable Darrell Issa:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter Hoekstra:
Ranking Member:
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Section 863 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 directs GAO to review and report on matters relating to Department
of Defense (DOD), Department of State, and U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In
response to this mandate, we analyzed agency-reported data for fiscal
year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009 regarding (1) the
status of the agencies' implementation of the Synchronized
Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) database, (2) the number
of contractor personnel, including those performing security functions,
working on DOD, State, and USAID contracts with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan, (3) the number of personnel killed or wounded, and (4) the
number and value of contracts that were active and awarded during our
period of review and the extent of competition for new contract awards.
Implementation of SPOT:
To address our first objective, we reviewed DOD, State, and USAID's
July 2008 MOU relating to contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan and
interviewed DOD, State, and USAID officials responsible for
implementing SPOT regarding the current and planned capabilities of the
system. We also interviewed agency officials who use SPOT, including
officials in Iraq and Afghanistan, to determine the criteria the
agencies use to determine what information is entered into SPOT. We
reviewed agency guidance and policy documents regarding the use of SPOT
and took training courses designed for government and contractor
personnel who expect to use the system. We then compared the
information we collected on the use and capabilities of SPOT to the
requirements identified in the agencies' MOU to determine the extent to
which SPOT fulfilled the terms of the MOU.
Contractor Personnel:
To address our second objective, we obtained data from DOD, State, and
USAID on the number of U.S. nationals, third-country nationals, and
local nationals working on contracts with performance in Iraq or
Afghanistan in fiscal year 2008 and/or the first half of fiscal year
2009. These data included individuals reported to be performing
security functions.
* DOD reported data from the U.S. Central Command's quarterly census
and SPOT for both fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year
2009. Of the two sources, DOD officials said that the quarterly census
was the most complete source of information on contractor personnel.
Given that and the limitations we identified with SPOT, we used the
quarterly census data to develop our DOD-related findings for this
objective.
* State reported data gathered from periodic surveys of its contractors
for fiscal year 2008. For the first half of fiscal year 2009, State
reported contractor personnel information gathered from SPOT as well as
through surveys.
* USAID reported data gathered from periodic surveys of its contractors
for fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. USAID also
reported SPOT data for some contracts with performance in Iraq for the
first half of fiscal year 2009.
We compared these data to the list of contracts we compiled to address
our objective on the number and value of agency contracts. Furthermore,
we interviewed agency officials regarding their methods for collecting
data to determine the number of contractor personnel, including those
providing security functions, in Iraq and Afghanistan. We also assessed
the completeness of the SPOT data that we received from each agency by
comparing them to data from other sources, such as the agency surveys.
Based on our analyses and discussions with agency officials, we
concluded that the agency reported data should not be used to draw
conclusions about the actual number of contractor personnel in Iraq or
Afghanistan for any given time period or trends in the number of
contractor personnel over time. However, we are presenting the reported
data along with their limitations as they establish a minimum number of
contractor personnel during our period of review.
Killed or Wounded Contractor Personnel:
To address our third objective, we analyzed USAID and State data on the
number of contractor personnel killed or wounded in Iraq and
Afghanistan during the period of our review. DOD did not collect and
could not provide such data. USAID provided us with information on
deaths and injuries it had compiled from its implementing partners,
including contractors. Similarly, State provided data on contractors
who were killed or wounded based on reports from its contractors, which
were compiled by department personnel. Due to the lack of other
available and reliable data sources, we could not independently verify
whether USAID's and State's data were accurate. Nevertheless, we are
providing them as they provide insight into the number of contractor
personnel who were killed or wounded during our period of review. After
informing us that they did not have a reliable system for tracking
killed or wounded personnel, DOD officials referred us to use the
Department of Labor's data on Defense Base Act (DBA) cases.
We analyzed data from Labor on DBA cases arising from incidents that
occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan in fiscal year 2008 or the first half
of fiscal year 2009. We obtained similar DBA data from Labor for our
previous report, for which we determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable, when presented with appropriate caveats, for
providing insight into the number of contractor personnel killed or
wounded.[Footnote 28] As a result, we did not reassess the reliability
of the data we received for this report. We also selected a random two-
stage cluster sample of 150 DBA case files from a population of 2,500
cases files submitted to Labor's 10 district offices for incidents that
occurred during fiscal year 2008 and resulted in the affected
contractor losing time from work. Labor provided us with DBA case data
on all incidents that occurred in fiscal year 2008 through February 26,
2009. Because there may be a lag between when an incident occurred and
when Labor was notified, we limited our sample to cases arising from
incidents that occurred in fiscal year 2008. As a result, the findings
from our file review are generalizable only to fiscal year 2008 cases.
Labor provided us with a second data set for fiscal year 2008 and the
first half of fiscal year 2009 as of July 9, 2009, which included cases
that were in the first data set. The second data set included an
additional 367 cases resulting from incidents that occurred in fiscal
year 2008 that were not in the population from which we drew our sample
due to a lag in when Labor was notified of the incidents. Because these
additional cases were within the scope of our review, we included them
in the total number of DBA cases presented in objective three; however,
these cases were not included in the population of cases from which we
drew our random sample.
The first stage of our sample selection was comprised of 5 clusters,
selected randomly with replacements, which came from 4 of the 10 Labor
district offices. In the second stage, we randomly selected 30 files
from each cluster. Thus, our final sample consisted of 150 DBA case
files. We reviewed these files to determine the circumstances of the
incident resulting in the death or injury, whether the incident was the
result of a hostile or nonhostile incident, and the severity of the
contractor's injury, where applicable.
Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections,
our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have
drawn. Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we
express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample's
results as a 95 percent confidence interval (e.g., plus or minus 7
percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the actual
population value for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As
a result, we are 95 percent confident that the confidence interval in
this report will include the true value in the study population.
Contracts:
To address our fourth objective, we obtained data from DOD, State, and
USAID on the number of active and awarded contracts with performance in
Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal year 2008 and the first half of
fiscal year 2009, the amount of funds obligated on those contracts
during our review period, and the extent to which new contracts were
competitively awarded. We also interviewed agency officials to discuss
the reported contract data. The agencies provided data from the Federal
Procurement Data System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG), agency specific-
databases, and manually compiled lists of obligations and
deobligations. We determined that the data each agency reported were
sufficiently reliable to determine the minimum number of active and
awarded contracts and obligation amounts, as well as the extent of
competition, based on prior reliability assessments, interviews with
agency officials, and verification of some reported data compared to
information in contract files.
We took steps to standardize the agency-reported data and removed
duplicates and contracts that did not have obligations or deobligations
during our review period. DOD provided us with 32 separate data sets,
State provided 7, and USAID provided 9. The reported data included
multiple numbering conventions for each agency. We reformatted each
data set and combined them to create a single, uniform list of
contracts, orders, and modifications for each agency. We excluded the
base contracts under which task and delivery orders were issued. This
was done, in part, because such contracts do not have obligations
associated with them as the obligations are incurred with the issuance
of each order. We also excluded grants, cooperative agreements, and
other contract vehicles such as leases, sales contracts, and notices of
intent to purchase as these instruments do not include performance by
contractor personnel in Iraq or Afghanistan. For all contracts within
our scope, we summed the reported obligations for each contract and
order for fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. Some
contracts had obligations in both fiscal year 2008 and the first half
of fiscal year 2009, so the number of active contracts for the entire
18-month period was lower than the combined number of contracts that
were active in each fiscal year.
We reviewed contract files to identify the justification cited by the
agencies for not awarding the contract using full and open competition
for a subset of DOD and State contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008
that were reported as not competed and that had total obligations
during our review period greater than $100,000. We did not review the
files for all contracts that met our criteria, in part, due to the
location of some of the files. For example, while we reviewed files
located in Baghdad, Camp Victory, Kabul, and Bagram Air Base, we did
not review files for contracts located in other areas of Iraq and
Afghanistan. In total, we reviewed information on 68 DOD contracts and
11 State contracts. At the time of our contract file reviews, USAID had
not reported any new contracts with obligations over $100,000 as not
competed. After our file reviews were completed, USAID provided us with
additional data, including data on two contracts with obligations over
$100,000 that were not awarded competitively. Due to when we received
these data, we did not review these two contracts. However, we reviewed
12 other USAID contracts to verify the contract information reported to
us.
We conducted this performance audit from November 2008 through
September 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan:
DOD Contracts:
Table 7 shows all DOD contracts, along with the associated obligations,
reported to us as active in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both during fiscal
year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. For last year's
review, DOD reported obligating $18,996 million on 37,559 contracts in
fiscal year 2007.
Table 7: DOD Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and Afghanistan,
Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009 )Dollars in
millions):
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 16,154;
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $6,646.6;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 14,354[B];
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $1,817.5;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active
contracts: 30,353[C];
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$8,464.1.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 30,219;
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $19,536.4;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 22,268[B];
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $5,785.7;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active
contracts: 52,207[C];
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$25,322.1.
Other[A]:
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 272;
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $798.7;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 601[B];
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $128.1;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active
contracts: 870[C];
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$926.8.
Total:
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 46,645;
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $26,981.6;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 37,223[B];
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $7,731.4;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active
contracts: 83,430[C];
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$34,713.1.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] "Other" represents contracts with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan or contracts that DOD reported as having performance in
Iraq or Afghanistan but did not specify which country:
[B] One DOD component changed the way it reported its contracts in
fiscal year 2009. Orders that had been previously combined were
reported separately. A DOD official explained that what appeared to be
an increase in contracts was due to the reporting change rather than an
actual increase in the number of orders.
[C] Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2008 and the first
half of fiscal year 2009. As a result, the total number of active
contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the
number that was active each year added together. Obligation amounts are
unique to each fiscal year so total obligations for the entire period
are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year.
[End of table]
Table 8 provides information on the number of contracts awarded by DOD
and associated obligations made during our review period. The majority
of DOD's active contracts were awarded during our review period and 70
percent of DOD's obligations were made on the new contract awards.
Table 8: DOD New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009
(Dollars in millions):
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 15,724;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $5,051.6;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 14,137;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $1,313.3.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 28,941;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $15,305.3;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 21,869;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $1,794.1.
Other:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 245;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $614.1;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 596;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $110.0.
Total:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 44,910;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $20,971.0;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 36,602;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $3,217.4.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded,
not when the obligations occurred so some obligations for contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal year
2009.
[End of table]
Table 9 shows competition information for the DOD contracts (excluding
task and delivery orders) that were awarded during our review period.
DOD reported that 97 percent of its contracts were competed, including
33,143 (93 percent) that were awarded using full and open competition.
For 74 contracts, DOD either provided no competition information or
what was provided was not sufficient to determine whether the contract
was competed.
Table 9: DOD's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts (Excluding
Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year
2009 (Dollars in millions):
Competed:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 28,459;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $5,193.3;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 6,356;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $939.5;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 34,815;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$6,132.8.
Not Competed:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 143;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $2,501.7;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 768;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $27.3;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 911;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$2,528.9.
Not Reported:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 61;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $4.4;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 13;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $1.1;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 74;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$5.5.
Total:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 28,663;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $7,699.4;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 7,137;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $967.8;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 35,800;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$8,667.2.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we
excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were
issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have
obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred with
the issuance of each order.
[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded,
not when the obligations occurred; some obligations for contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal year
2009.
[End of table]
As shown in table 10, most of the DOD contracts reported as awarded
without competition had relatively small obligations during our review
period.
Table 10: DOD's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2009:
Contract Value by Obligated Amount: Less than or equal to $25,000;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009:
Number of awarded contracts: 756;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount
(in millions): $5.3.
Contract Value by Obligated Amount: Greater than $25,000 and less than
or equal to 100,000;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 72;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount
(in millions): $3.6.
Contract Value by Obligated Amount: Greater than $100,000 and less than
or equal to $1 million;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 60;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount
(in millions): $16.6.
Contract Value by Obligated Amount: Greater than $1 million; Fiscal
year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009:
Number of awarded contracts: 23;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount
(in millions): $2,503.4.
Contract Value by Obligated Amount: Total;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 911;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount
(in millions): $2,528.9.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we
excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were
issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have
obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred with
the issuance of each order.
[End of table]
State Contracts:
Table 11 shows all State contracts, along with the associated
obligations, reported to us as active in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both
during fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. For
last year's review, State reported obligating $1,550.4 million on 773
contracts in fiscal year 2007.
Table 35: State Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009
(Dollars in millions):
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 272;
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $625.5;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 11;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $92.1;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active
contracts: 275[A];
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$717.6.
Iraq:
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 469;
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $781.8;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 102;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $279.5;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active
contracts: 544[A];
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$1,061.3.
Other[B]:
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 105;
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $68.4;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 8;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $1.9;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active
contracts: 112[A];
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$70.3.
Total:
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 846;
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $1,475.7;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 121;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $373.5;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active
contracts: 931[A];
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$1,849.2.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2008 and the first
half of fiscal year 2009. As a result, the total number of active
contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the
number that was active each year added together. Obligation amounts are
unique to each fiscal year so total obligations for the entire period
are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year.
[B] "Other" represents contracts with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan or contracts that State reported as having performance in
Iraq or Afghanistan but did not specify which country.
[End of table]
Table 12 provides information on the number of contracts awarded by
State and associated obligations made during our review period. The
majority of State's active contracts were awarded during our review
period and 46 percent of State's obligations were made on the new
contract awards.
Table 12: State New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009
(Dollars in millions):
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 250;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $265.0;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 2;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $0.6.
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 419;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $559.0;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 69;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $15.1.
Other:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 98;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $11.7;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 4;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $0.8.
Total:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 767;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $835.8;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 75;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $16.5.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded,
not when the obligations occurred; some obligations for contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal year
2009.
[End of table]
Table 13 shows competition information for the State contracts
(excluding task and delivery orders) that were awarded during our
review period. State reported that 70 percent of its contracts were
competed, including 358 (47 percent) that were awarded using full and
open competition. For 10 contracts, State either provided no
competition information or what was provided was not sufficient to
determine whether the contract was competed.
Table 13: State's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2009 (Dollars in millions):
Competed:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 494;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $47.0;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 41;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $1.8;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 535;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$48.9.
Not competed:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 199;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $21.4;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 20;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $1.1;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 219;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$22.4.
Not reported:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 5;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $6.1;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 5;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $1.0;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 10;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$7.1.
Total:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 698;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $74.5;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 66;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $3.8;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 764;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$78.4.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task
orders and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we
excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were
issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have
obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred with
the issuance of each order.
[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded,
not when the obligations occurred; some obligations for contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal year
2009.
[End of table]
As shown in table 14, most of the State contracts reported as awarded
without competition had relatively small obligations during our review
period.
Table 14: State's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2009:
Contract value by obligated amount: Less than or equal to $25,000;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 149;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount
(in millions): $1.2.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $25,000 and less than
or equal to 100,000;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 52;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount
(in millions): $2.7.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $100,000 and less than
or equal to $1 million;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 14;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount
(in millions): $4.6.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $1 million;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 4;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount
(in millions): $13.9.
Contract value by obligated amount: Total;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 219;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount
(in millions): $22.4.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we
excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were
issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have
obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred with
the issuance of each order.
[End of table]
USAID Contracts:
Table 15 shows all USAID contracts, along with the associated
obligations, reported to us as active in Iraq or Afghanistan during
fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal year 2009. For last
year's review, USAID reported obligating $1,194.8 million on 190
contracts in fiscal year 2007.
Table 15: USAID Active Contracts and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009
(Dollars in millions):
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 149;
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $1,018.6;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 71;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $328.6;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active
contracts: 191[A];
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation Amount:
$1,347.2.
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 128;
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $638.1;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 51;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $68.6;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active
contracts: 167[A];
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation Amount:
$706.7.
Total:
Fiscal year 2008: Number of active contracts: 277;
Fiscal year 2008: Obligation amount: $1,656.7;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active contracts: 122;
First half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount: $397.2;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of active
contracts: 358[A];
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation Amount:
$2,053.9.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] Some contracts were active in both fiscal year 2008 and the first
half of fiscal year 2009. As a result, the total number of active
contracts during the 18-month period of our review is less than the
number that was active each year added together. Obligation amounts are
unique to each fiscal year so total obligations for the entire period
are the sum of obligations in each fiscal year.
[End of table]
Table 16 provides information on the number of contracts awarded and
associated obligations made during our review period. The majority of
USAID active contracts were awarded prior to our review period and
obligations on these previously awarded contracts accounted for nearly
79 percent of USAID's obligations during fiscal year 2008 and the first
half of fiscal year 2009.
Table 16: USAID New Contract Awards and Obligations for Iraq and
Afghanistan, Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of Fiscal Year 2009
(Dollars in millions):
Afghanistan:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 67;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $176.1;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 17;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $24.7.
Iraq: Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 52;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $233.3;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 29;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $4.2.
Total:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 119;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $409.4;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 46;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $28.8.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding.
[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded,
not when the obligations occurred; some obligations for contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal year
2009.
[End of table]
Table 17 shows competition information for the USAID contracts
(excluding task and delivery orders) that were awarded during our
review period. USAID reported that 90 percent of its contracts were
competed, including 126 (82 percent) that were awarded using full and
open competition. For 3 contracts, USAID either provided no competition
information or what was provided was not sufficient to determine
whether the contract was competed.
Table 17: USAID's Competition of Iraq and Afghanistan Contracts
(Excluding Orders) Awarded in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2009 (Dollars in millions):
Competed:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 102;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $163.1;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 35;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $27.2;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 137;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$190.3.
Not Competed:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 4;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $0.3;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 9;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $0.2;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 13;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$0.6.
Not Reported:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 3;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $12.1;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 0;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $0;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 3;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$12.1.
Total:
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 109;
Fiscal year 2008[A]: Obligation amount: $175.5;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Number of awarded contracts: 44;
First half of fiscal year 2009[A]: Obligation amount: $27.5;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 153;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$203.0.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we
excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were
issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have
obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred with
the issuance of each order.
[A] The fiscal year indicates the year that each contract was awarded,
not when the obligations occurred; some obligations for contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2008 occurred in the first half of fiscal year
2009.
[End of table]
As shown in table 18, there were only 13 contracts that USAID reported
as awarded without competition and none had obligations greater than $1
million during our review period.
Table 18: USAID's Contracts (Excluding Orders) in Iraq and Afghanistan
Awarded without Competition in Fiscal Year 2008 and the First Half of
Fiscal Year 2009:
Contract value by obligated amount: Less than or equal to $25,000;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 8;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$71,327.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $25,000 and less than
or equal to 100,000;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 3;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$196,146.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $100,000 and less than
or equal to $1 million;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 2;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$286,163.
Contract value by obligated amount: Greater than $1 million;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 0;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$0.
Contract value by obligated amount: Total;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Number of awarded
contracts: 13;
Fiscal year 2008 and first half of fiscal year 2009: Obligation amount:
$553,636.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: Total obligations may not add due to rounding. We excluded task
and delivery orders because they are not subject to the same
competition requirements as other contract vehicles. Further, we
excluded the base contracts under which task or delivery orders were
issued. This was done, in part, because such contracts do not have
obligations associated with them as the obligations are incurred with
the issuance of each task order.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense:
Acquisition, Technology And Logistics:
3000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-3000:
September 28, 2009:
Mr. John Hutton:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Hutton:
This is the Department of Defense (DOD) response to the GAO draft
report GAO10-01, "Contingency Contracting: DOD, State and USAID
Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and
Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan," dated August 27, 2009 (GAO Code
120790).
Detailed comments on the report recommendations are enclosed.
Sincerely,
Signed by: [Illegible], for:
Shay D. Assad:
Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy:
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
GAO Draft Report Dated August 27, 2009:
GAO-10-01 (GAO CODE 120790):
"Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, And USAID Continue To Face
Challenges In Tracking Contractor Personnel And Contracts In Iraq And
Afghanistan"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Defense
and State and the Administrator of USAID jointly develop and execute a
plan with associated timeframes for their continued implementation of
the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 requirements by
ensuring that the agencies' criteria for entering contracts and
contractor's personnel into SPOT are consistent with the NDAA for
FY2008 and with the agencies' respective information needs for
overseeing contracts and contractor personnel
DOD Response: Non concur. The Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense (Program Support) (ADUSD (PS)) is the DOD lead on
implementation of the Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational
Tracker (SPOT) to meet the requirements of section 861 of the 2008
NDAA. The DoD has made a concerted effort to meet the requirements
outlined. We acknowledge the importance of having reliable information
on contracts and contractors' personnel operating in Iraq and
Afghanistan. DoD has successfully integrated SPOT with the contract
writing system and registration module for all contracted companies of
the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq /Afghanistan (JCC I/A), automating
the upload of contract data directly into SPOT.
Since DoD signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the
Department of State and the USAID, the registered contractor population
in SPOT has grown from 68,000 to over 180,000 active contractor
employees operating in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. [See comment
1] CENTCOM published a fragmentary order (FRAGO) in August 2008,
requiring all contractors meeting the minimum thresholds be registered
in SPOT. Further, if contractors require government furnished services,
they are required to have a SPOT-generated Letter of Authorization
(LOA). [See comment 2] Today, approximately 93,000 active U.S., third
country nationals, and local national contractor employees possess
system-generated LOAs, and the remaining 87,000 have standard
registrations in SPOT. DoD is requiring all U.S. contractor employees
to be registered in SPOT if their contract meets the threshold of 30
days and $25,000 in contract value.
DoD does not agree with the requirement for the Secretaries of Defense
and State and the Administrator of USAID to jointly develop and execute
a plan with associated timeframes for continued implementation. The
present MOU, along with DFARs and FAR requirements, and ongoing
coordination among the three parties should be sufficient to meet
legislative mandates. Additional direction beyond the implementation of
the MOU may require further statutory action.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Defense
and State and the Administrator of USAID jointly develop and execute a
plan with associated timeframes for their continued implementation of
the NDAA for FY 2008 requirements by establishing uniform requirements
on how contract numbers are to be entered into SPOT so that contract
information can accurately be pulled from FPDS-NG as agreed to in the
MOU
DOD Response: [See comment 3] Non Concur. DoD, through the Director of
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP), is working to create
standard contract number formats in contract writing systems, the
Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDSNG), and SPOT.
Currently, SPOT allows contract data not normally transmitted digitally
to be entered using a free text field. This field in SPOT is free text
to allow for the capture of grants data and contract data of other
government agencies and organizations such as AAFES, using non-standard
contract number formats. DoD is working to standardize the contract
field in SPOT and add additional fields for non-standard contract
numbers and grants. SPOT currently validates contract numbers against
FPDS-NG on a scheduled daily basis. In 2010, SPOT will connect directly
with FPDS-NG to enable contract information entered into SPOT to be
validated immediately. Additionally, the SPOT unclassified reporting
(NIPR) and the SPOT classified reporting (SIPR) systems will be able to
report cumulative obligated dollar values at the prime contract level
in November 2009.
DoD does not agree with the requirement for the Secretaries of Defense
and State and the Administrator of USAID to jointly develop and execute
a plan with associated timeframes for continued implementation. The
present MOU, along with DFARs and FAR requirements, and ongoing
coordination among the three parties should be sufficient to meet
legislative mandates. Additional direction beyond the implementation of
the MOU may require further statutory action.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretaries of Defense
and State and the Administrator of USAID jointly develop and execute a
plan with associated timeframes for their continued implementation of
the NDAA for FY 2008 requirements by revising SPOT's reporting
capabilities to ensure that they fulfill statutory requirements and
agency information needs, such as those related to contractor personnel
killed or wounded.
DOD Response: [See comment 4] Non Concur. The DoD implemented new
functionality in the SPOT system in January 2009 to meet many of the
requirements of section 861 of the NDAA for FY 2008. The SPOT program
created the ability to track contractor employees who were killed,
wounded or missing. This functionality began in January 2009, and it
was not intended to report on information prior to upgrade in SPOT
system software. The completeness of this information in the SPOT is
reliant upon contractors' inputs of this information when closing out
deployments. SPOT will provide the ability for government users to run
query reports on contractors killed or wounded in November 2009.
Further, the classified version of SPOT and the Total Operational
Pictures Support System (TOPSS) business intelligence tool will have
the ability to connect to other authoritative data systems via web-
services and generate additional desired reports.
DoD does not agree with the requirement for the Secretaries of Defense
and State and the Administrator of USAID to jointly develop and execute
a plan with associated timeframes for continued implementation. The
present MOU, along with DFARs and FAR requirements, and ongoing
coordination among the three parties should be sufficient to meet
legislative mandates. Additional direction beyond the implementation of
the MOU may require further statutory action.
The following are GAO's supplemental comments on the Department of
Defense's letter dated September 28, 2009.
GAO Comments:
1. DOD cites the number of contractor personnel in SPOT for the entire
CENTCOM area of responsibility, which extends beyond Iraq and
Afghanistan. Consistent with our mandate, we report 117,301 DOD
contractor personnel identified in SPOT as being in Iraq or Afghanistan
as of March 31, 2009. However, we did not use SPOT as our primary data
source for contractor personnel data. We found that the quarterly
census was a more comprehensive source--containing approximately 84,000
personnel more than SPOT as of March 31, 2009 for Iraq and Afghanistan.
2. In signing the MOU, DOD agreed to track contractor personnel in Iraq
or Afghanistan if their contract is more than 14 days or over $100,000.
As described in its comments, however, DOD's regulations contain
different thresholds on which contractors should be entered into SPOT.
In practice, we found that the need for an LOA--rather than the
thresholds in the MOU or DOD's regulations--served as the primary
determinate as to whether or not a contractor was entered in SPOT.
These variations reinforce our finding and recommendation that the
agencies ensure they have consistent criteria--both in policy and
practice--on which contractor personnel are entered into SPOT.
3. DOD's comments recognize the need to develop a standardized contract
field in SPOT. However, any effort to create a standardized field needs
to involve DOD, State, and USAID to ensure consistency with their
contract numbering systems and a common understanding of how data must
be entered into the system. Further, each agency must ensure that the
way contract and task order numbers are entered into SPOT are identical
with how those numbers are entered into FPDS-NG.
4. Our report recognizes that SPOT was upgraded in January 2009 to
track contractor personnel who have been killed or wounded. As
discussed in the report, however, this upgrade does not provide
agencies with the capability to readily generate reports on the total
number of contractor personnel killed or wounded within a given
timeframe; instead, the current capability is limited to generating a
report of personnel identified as killed or wounded on the day the
report is generated. DOD does not specify in its comments as to whether
or how the planned November 2009 upgrade would address this reporting
limitation. Also, it is not clear from DOD's comments as to whether
this planned upgrade will apply to both the unclassified and classified
versions of SPOT. State's comments suggest that based on information it
received from DOD, the improved reporting features will be limited to
the classified version.
Additionally, while DOD notes that the completeness of data on killed
or wounded personnel is reliant on contractor input, it is the
responsibility of DOD and the other agencies to ensure that such
information is tracked as required by the NDAA for FY2008:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, DC 20520:
September 24, 2009:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Contingency
Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face Challenges in
Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan,"
GAO Job Code 120790.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Cynthia Andreotta, Logistics Management Specialist, Bureau of
Administration at (703) 875-5803.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc:
GAO - Johana Ayers:
A - Steven Rodriguez:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue to Face
Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan (GAO-10-01, GAO Code 120790):
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) draft report titled, ’
Contingency Contracting: DOD, State and USAID Continue to Face
Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.“
Recommendation: To ensure that the agencies and Congress have reliable
information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan, we recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and State and
the Administrator of USAID jointly develop and execute a plan with
associated timeframes for their continued implementation of the NDAA
for FY2008 requirements, specifically:
* Ensuring that the agencies‘ criteria for entering contracts and
contractor personnel into the Synchronized Predeployment and
Operational Tracker (SPOT) are consistent with the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2008 and with the agencies‘ respective
information needs for overseeing contracts and contractor personnel;
* Establishing uniform requirements on how contract numbers are to be
entered into SPOT so that contract information can accurately be pulled
from FPDS-NG as agreed to in the MOU; and;
* Revising SPOT‘s reporting capabilities to ensure that they fulfill
statutory requirements and agency information needs, such as those
related to contractor personnel killed or wounded. In developing and
executing this plan, the agencies may need to revisit their MOU to
ensure consistency between the plan and what has previously been agreed
to in the MOU.
Response: The Bureau of Administration (A) has the lead on agency
implementation of SPOT and the NDAA. We acknowledge the importance of
reliable information on contracts and contractor personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan reported jointly with the Secretary of Defense (DOD) and
the Administrator of USAID to implement NDAA FY2008 requirements. We
agree that the agencies need to continue to meet to review progress and
intent of the MOU to comply with NDAA FY2008, but do not agree with the
recommendation that a new plan needs to be developed. We do agree that
the current MOU needs to be revisited as well as some issues to ensure
consistency meeting the criteria it already contains as specified in
NDAA 2008, section 861.
However, we are concerned with the interpretation of certain
information in the GAO draft report on Contingency Contracting. For
example, page 6 states:
’regarding contractor personnel in Iraq, DOD, State, and USAID
officials stated that the primary factor for deciding to enter
contractor personnel into SPOT was whether a contractor needed a SPOT-
generated letter of authorization (LOA). Contractor personnel need SPOT-
generated LOAs to, among other things, enter Iraq, receive military
identification cards, travel on U.S. military aircraft, or, for
security contractors, receive approval to carry weapons. However, not
all contractor personnel, particularly local nationals, in Iraq need
LOAs and agency officials informed us that such personnel were not
being entered into SPOT. In contrast, DOD officials informed us that
individuals needing LOAs were entered into SPOT even if their contracts
did not meet the MOU‘s 14 day or $100,000 thresholds.“
State personnel advised the GAO during an interview that company
administrators were told verbally and in writing to enter all United
States citizens, Third Country Nationals, and Locals Nationals into
SPOT. Due to security concerns about entering data on Local Nationals,
company administrators were given a blind identity scheme to aid with
accountability of entering the information. We continue to urge that
actual information be entered on all Local Nationals because SPOT would
be used for NDAA 1248, repatriation requests. [See comment 1]
Also, the MOU signed by the three agencies stipulate that contracts
under the simplified acquisitions threshold of $100,000 and 14 working
days would not be entered into SPOT (Section VII B). The GAO was
advised by State personnel during the interview that it lacked
resources to enter every acquisition into SPOT and support the higher
threshold. However, there may be confusion because an earlier Section
II A of the MOU only states ’longer than 14 days“. We agree that the
three agencies need to discuss this issue to determine one standard.
[See comment 2]
Another example is on page 8 of the report which states:
’while contract numbers are the unique identifiers that will be used to
match records in SPOT to those in FPDS-NG, SPOT users are not required
to enter contract numbers in a standardized manner. In our review of
SPOT data, we identified that at least 12 percent of the contracts had
invalid contract numbers and, therefore, could not be matched to
records in FPDS-NG.“
When implementing SPOT, State used the configuration guidance which
complies with FPDS-NG given by DOD to enter all contract numbers. The
user guide posted on the Department‘s intranet was shared with GAO; the
business rules in it state the configuration to be used when entering a
contract number into SPOT. We contacted DOD on September 9, 2009, and
they informed us they are already working on a standardized
configuration. [See comment 3]
Recently, DOD conducted user acceptance testing for implementation of
enhanced reporting in SPOT, but we were told it would only be on its
secure network. However, all the information input to date into SPOT is
in an unclassified network. The agencies need to discuss future
reporting capability for non-classified SPOT.
The following are GAO's supplemental comments on the Department of
State's letter dated September 24, 2009.
GAO Comments:
1. Notwithstanding State's guidance to contractors, we found that not
all contractor personnel are being entered into SPOT as required. In
practice, we found that the need for an LOA is the primary determinate
for whether or not contractor personnel are entered into SPOT. For
example, a State contracting officer informed us that Iraqis working on
his contracts are not in SPOT because they do not need LOAs, which is
not consistent with State's guidance, the MOU criteria, or the NDAA for
FY2008.
2. As reflected in our recommendation, we agree that the agencies need
to determine a single standard on which contracts should be entered
into SPOT. This is not only due to State's observation regarding
inconsistencies in the MOU, but also due to the inconsistencies we
found between the MOU and NDAA for FY 2008 and the varying criteria
being used by the agencies. Until there is a single agreed upon
standard--both in guidance and practice, the agencies will continue
track data differently and, as a result, the data for all three
agencies will be incomplete.
3. Our finding pertained to how data are actually being entered into
SPOT, which as we report allows users to enter invalid contract numbers
and does not require the entry of task order numbers. For example, we
found that none of State's task orders in SPOT provided both the
contract and task order numbers. If such data entry issues are not
resolved in the near future, then the planned connection with FPDS-NG
may present challenges and prevent contract data from being accurately
imported into SPOT.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
USAID:
From The American People:
U.S. Agency for International Development:
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW:
Washington, DC 20523:
[hyperlink: http://www.usiad.gov]
September 22, 2009:
Mr. John Hutton:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Hutton:
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's
(USAID) written comments in response to the GAO draft report No. 10-01
entitled "Contingency Contracting: DOD, State and USAID Continue to
Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in Iraq
and Afghanistan."
We strongly support the goal to develop consistent and reliable
information for contracts and assistance awards as well as maintain the
numbers of contracting personnel supporting USAID programs in Iraq and
Afghanistan. During the period of GAO's review for this draft report,
USAID diligently worked with our interagency partners, Department of
Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) to address the practical
implications, resource requirements, and technical challenges necessary
to utilize the Synchronized Pre-deployment Operational Tracker (SPOT).
We have used lessons learned from our Iraq efforts to understand how we
can best roll out this new system in Afghanistan.
Originally designed to allow DOD to track pre-assignment
qualifications, process logistics and security support personnel, and
monitor physical locations and DOD-provided services used in-theater,
SPOT and its implementation presented some challenges for USAID. [See
comment 1] The program proves to be labor intensive when used as a
daily administrative tool in the locations of operations. USAID
officials must closely monitor the information entered into the SPOT
database. However, the largest burden of the SPOT implementation effort
falls upon our contracting and assistance partners. As a personnel
management and tracking system, SPOT is strictly additive to our
partners' existing human resources administration and project
management systems. While we are pleased that they are cooperating with
our efforts to introduce SPOT, we do understand that the impact of
these resource requirements on overall development program
administration will need to be re-evaluated in the future.
In regards to the recommendations put forth in the draft report, we
provide the below comments:
Recommendation 1 relates to "ensuring that the agencies' criteria for
entering contracts and contractor personnel into SPOT are consistent
with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2008 and with
the agencies' respective information needs for overseeing contracts and
contractor personnel." As the GAO's draft report indicates, the primary
output of SPOT is the Letter of Authorization (LOA), which has varying
degrees of application depending upon DOD's on-the-ground support in
Iraq and Afghanistan. SPOT, however, also provides for non-LOA
deployments and-through these available database features personnel
numbers can be rolled up and reporting products can be obtained and
shared without invoking the relatively labor-intensive LOA process.
USAID will further investigate this functionality of SPOT as a means
for complying with the MOO terms within our available resources. [See
comment 2]
Recommendation 2 suggests "ensuring uniform requirements on how
contract numbers are to be entered into SPOT so that contract
information can accurately be pulled from FPDS-NG as agreed to in the
MOU." We are pleased to note that our existing USAID-specific contract
numbering system is fully compatible with both SPOT and FPDS-NG. USAID
already meets the uniform requirements described. [See comment 3]
Recommendation 3. states "revising SPOT's reporting capabilities to
ensure that they fulfill statutory requirements and agency information
needs, such as those related to contractor personnel killed or
wounded." USAID must rely upon DOD, as the system owner, to
appropriately manage SPOT development. We will await the necessary
enhancements to capabilities in order to meet our needs. [See comment
4]
In closing, allow me to emphasize the importance USAID places upon
interagency cooperation. Both DOD and DOS have assisted USAID in moving
forward with this new system, and we will continue to meet regularly
with our interagency colleagues concerning NDAA FY 2008 and FY 2009
requirements and our existing MOU.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO report and for the
courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this review.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Drew W. Luten:
Acting Assistant Administrator:
Bureau for Management:
cc: Peter Orszag, Director, OMB:
The following are GAO's supplemental comments on USAID's letter dated
September 22, 2009.
GAO Comments:
1. While building off the lessons learned in Iraq has merit, we note
that USAID does not provide a time frame for when it will begin
requiring contractors in Afghanistan to use SPOT to fulfill the
requirements of the NDAA for FY2008 and what it agreed to in the MOU.
2. Our report explains that the need for the LOA--as opposed to what
was agreed to in the MOU or contained in the NDAA for FY2008--has
become the primary factor for determining which contractor personnel
are entered into SPOT. USAID's comment that it will explore SPOT's
functionality to track personnel who do not need LOAs is consistent
with our recommendation that the agencies work together to ensure that
the requirements of the NDAA for FY2008 and their respective
information needs are fulfilled.
3. While USAID has a standard contract numbering system, the issue we
identified pertains to how SPOT allows contract and task order numbers
to be entered inconsistently. The agencies need to work together to
ensure that contract and task orders numbers are entered into SPOT so
that data can be accurately pulled from FPDS-NG.
4. While DOD is responsible for maintaining and upgrading SPOT, the
three agencies have a shared responsibility to ensure that the database
they agreed to use in their MOU fulfills the requirements of the NDAA
for FY2008. Rather than deferring to DOD as the system owner to manage
SPOT's development, USAID should work with the other agencies to
identify and agree on their information and reporting needs and ensure
that the necessary upgrades are made to SPOT.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John Hutton, (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov.
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact above, Johana R. Ayers, Assistant Director;
Noah Bleicher; E. Brandon Booth; Justin Fisher; Art James, Jr.;
Christopher Kunitz; Jean McSween; Alise Nacson; Jason Pogacnik; Karen
Thornton; Gabriele Tonsil; and Robert Swierczek made key contributions
to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See GAO, Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Are Taking
Actions to Track Contracts and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-538T]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2009).
[2] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 861, as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-417, §
854 (2008).
[3] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 863. While the mandate and our report
address DOD, State, and USAID contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,
other federal agencies such as the Departments of Agriculture, Justice,
and the Treasury have contracts with performance in Iraq and
Afghanistan that are not included in the scope of the mandate or our
report.
[4] For our first report issued pursuant to the mandate, see GAO,
Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts and Contractor
Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1,
2008).
[5] The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 854(d) amended section 864 of the
NDAA for FY2008 to add a definition of "contractor personnel" as "any
person performing work under contract for the Department of Defense,
the Department of State, or the United States Agency for International
Development, in Iraq or Afghanistan, including individuals and
subcontractors at any tier." Section 864 of the NDAA for FY2008 defines
private security functions as the "guarding of personnel, facilities or
property of a Federal agency, the contractor or subcontractor, or a
third party" and "any other activity for which personnel are required
to carry weapons in the performance of their duties."
[6] Section 864(a)(2) of the NDAA for FY2008 defines a "contract in
Iraq or Afghanistan" as "a contract with the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, or the United States Agency for International
Development, a subcontract at any tier issued under such a contract, or
a task order or delivery order at any tier issued under such a contract
(including a contract, subcontract, or task order or delivery order
issued by another Government agency for the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, or the United States Agency for International
Development) if the contract, subcontract, or task order or delivery
order involves worked [sic] performed in Iraq or Afghanistan for a
period longer than 14 days." The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)
defines a subcontract as a contract entered into by a subcontractor to
furnish supplies or services for performance of a prime contract or
other subcontracts. The FAR defines a task order as an order for
services placed against an established contract or government sources.
For purposes of this report, when we use the term contract, we intend
it to refer to a "contract in Iraq or Afghanistan" as defined in the
NDAA for FY2008.
[7] Since the NDAA for FY2008 did not define what constitutes an
"active" contract, we considered a contract active if funds were
obligated or deobligated on that contract in fiscal year 2008 and/or
the first half of fiscal year 2009. There were other contracts that had
performance in Iraq or Afghanistan during that time period but had no
obligations or deobligations; such contracts were not included in our
analyses. Contracts awarded in fiscal year 2008 and the first half of
fiscal year 2009 are a subset of the active contracts. Throughout the
report, the term award refers to the issuance of a task or delivery
order or the award of a new contract.
[8] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 854 amended section 861 of the NDAA for
FY2008 by specifying additional matters to be included in the MOU
regarding UCMJ and MEJA offenses and requiring the agencies to modify
their MOU to address these additional matters by February 11, 2009.
However, according to DOD officials, the required modifications to the
MOU are still pending final approval.
[9] DOD, as the system owner, currently pays all development and
maintenance costs for SPOT. However, DOD officials we spoke with said
they are exploring options for having the agencies that use SPOT pay
for some maintenance costs.
[10] An LOA is a document issued by a government contracting officer or
designee that authorizes contractor personnel to travel to, from, and
within a designated area and to identify any additional authorizations,
privileges, or government support the contractor is entitled to under
the contract.
[11] This guidance was implemented in DOD FAR Supplement section
252.225-7040(g), which specified that contractors are to enter
information into SPOT for all personnel authorized to accompany the
U.S. Armed Forces. However, Class Deviation 2007-O0010 excluded
contracts with performance in the U.S. Central Command's area of
responsibility that did not exceed $25,000 or had less than 30 days of
performance.
[12] Contract numbers consist of 13 alphanumeric characters. We
considered a contract number invalid if the contract number entered
into SPOT had a different number of characters.
[13] CENTCOM is one of DOD's unified combatant commands. It is
responsible for overseeing U.S. security interests in 20 countries--
including Iraq and Afghanistan--that stretch from the Arabian Gulf
region into Central Asia.
[14] In addition to the survey and SPOT numbers provided to us, we
included individuals working on personal services contracts in State's
totals. State is authorized under section 2 of the State Department
Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as amended, to contract for personal
services. 22 U.S.C. § 2669(c) and (n). The FAR defines "personal
services contracts" as contracts that, by their express terms or as
administered, make the contractor personnel appear to be, in effect,
government employees.
[15] In addition to the survey numbers provided to us, we included
individuals working on personal services contracts in USAID's totals.
USAID is authorized under section 636 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended, to contract for personal services. 22 U.S.C. §
2396(a)(3).
[16] USAID officials informed us that in March 2009 its mission in Iraq
began requiring contractors to provide quarterly personnel updates.
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19].
[18] Congress enacted the DBA in 1941. The insurance required under the
DBA provides employees with uniform levels of disability and medical
benefits or, in the event of death, provides benefits to eligible
dependents. Contractors, including subcontractors, are required to
provide DBA insurance coverage for all of their employees, regardless
of their nationality, working outside the United States on U.S.
military bases or under a contract with the U.S. government for public
works or national defense. Labor initiates a case when it receives a
notice of death or injury. Notices include reports filed by employers
and claims for benefits submitted by injured employees or their
survivors.
[19] This estimate based on our sample is subject to sampling error. We
reviewed 150 DBA case files for incidents that occurred in fiscal year
2008. The margin of error for the percentage of reported deaths and
injuries resulting from hostile actions is no more than plus or minus 7
percentage points at the 95 percent level of confidence. For more
detailed information on this file review, see appendix I.
[20] While the majority of the 16 case files in our sample that
resulted from hostile actions were submitted for injuries, as opposed
to deaths, we could not reliably estimate for all DBA cases the portion
of hostile actions that occurred in fiscal year 2008 that resulted in
injuries compared to the portion that resulted in deaths.
[21] See 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (applicable to DOD) and 41 U.S.C. § 253
(applicable to other executive agencies discussed in this report).
Section 403(6) of title 41, U.S. Code, defines "full and open
competition" as when all responsible sources are permitted to submit
sealed bids or competitive proposals on a procurement. The competition
requirements are implemented in FAR Part 6 and corresponding agency
acquisition regulation supplements.
[22] We obtained obligation data for each contract with performance in
Iraq and Afghanistan in fiscal year 2008 and the first half of fiscal
year 2009. Obligations, however, may not be equivalent to the full
contract value as contracts may be incrementally funded over multiple
years.
[23] Section 2.101 of the FAR defines the simplified acquisition
threshold (SAT). For contracts in support of a contingency operation,
the SAT during our review period was $1 million for contracts awarded
and performed outside the United States and $250,000 for contracts
awarded and performed in the United States. Contracts awarded and
performed in the United States were not in the scope of our review.
Additionally, FAR subpart 13.5 provides higher thresholds if the
acquisition is for commercial items. For example, the SAT for
commercial items in support of a contingency operation is $11 million.
FAR § 13.500(e).
[24] At the time of our contract file review, none of the contracts
awarded in fiscal year 2008 that USAID reported as not competed had
over $100,000 in obligations during our review period. USAID
subsequently provided us with additional data in which two contracts
met our review criteria; these contracts were not included in our file
reviews due to when we received the data.
[25] We did not evaluate whether the justifications that the agencies
provided for awarding contracts without full and open competition were
adequate.
[26] Section 886 of the NDAA for FY2008 authorizes DOD, in certain
circumstances, to limit competition to products and services from Iraq
and Afghanistan, award a contract to a particular source or sources
from Iraq or Afghanistan using other than competitive procedures, or
give preference to products and services from Iraq and Afghanistan.
Pub. L. No. 110-181 § 886.
[27] FAR 16.505(b)(1)(ii).
[28] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19].
[End of section]
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