Afghanistan's Security Environment
Gao ID: GAO-10-178R November 5, 2009In March 2009, out of concern that the overall security situation in Afghanistan had not improved after more than 7 years of U.S. and international efforts, the administration completed a 60-day strategic review of U.S. policy and the security environment in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Based on this review, and recognizing the vital U.S. interest in addressing security threats posed by extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the administration announced a strategic goal of disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating these extremists and eliminating their safe havens in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Subsequently, in August 2009, the United States issued an integrated civilian-military campaign plan for support to Afghanistan. The strategy and campaign plan call for, among other things, the execution of an integrated counterinsurgency mission and continued efforts to build the capacity of military and civilian elements of the Afghan government to lead counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts and provide internal security for the Afghan people. Accordingly, the focus for U.S. forces in Afghanistan will be to (1) secure Afghanistan from insurgent and terrorist threats and (2) rapidly train Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) to lead military and law enforcement operations.
Afghanistan's security situation has deteriorated significantly since 2005, affecting all aspects of U.S. and allied reconstruction operations. As we reported in April 2009, the rise in enemy-initiated attacks on civilians and on U.S., Afghan, and coalition security forces has resulted from various factors, including a resurgence of the Taliban, the limited capabilities of Afghan security forces, a thriving illicit drug trade, and threats emanating from insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. Since 2005, attacks on civilians, as well as on Afghan and coalition forces, have increased every year. The most recent data available, as of August 2009, showed the highest rate of enemy-initiated attacks since Afghanistan's security situation began to deteriorate. Overall, nearly 13,000 attacks were recorded between January and August 2009--more than two and a half times the number experienced during the same period last year and more than five times the approximately 2,400 attacks reported in all of 2005. Violence has generally been concentrated in the eastern and southern regions of Afghanistan where U.S. forces operate, with insurgents making increasing use of improvised explosive devices, suicide attacks, and attacks targeting infrastructure and development projects. As figure 1 illustrates, the pattern of attacks is seasonal, generally peaking from June through September each year. Although never reaching the highest level of attacks in Iraq, the number of attacks in Afghanistan surpassed those in Iraq for the first time in July 2008 and has continued to exceed levels in Iraq in recent months. Developing a self-reliant Afghanistan is a key end-state goal articulated in the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan, which notes that achieving such an outcome will enable the United States to withdraw combat forces and make a sustained commitment to Afghan political and economic development. While U.S. and international development projects in Afghanistan have made some progress, the deterioration of security has impeded efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country. In particular, U.S. officials have cited poor security as having caused delays, disruptions, and even abandonment of certain reconstruction projects, while also hampering management and oversight of such efforts. For instance, the administration's Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan has identified the need for more security in order for civilian personnel and contractors to do their work in Afghanistan. Similarly, the commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. forces in Afghanistan testified in his June 2009 confirmation hearing that improving security was a prerequisite for the development of local governance and economic growth in Afghanistan. As of November 2009, there were reportedly about 67,000 U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan--an increase of more than 90 percent from the force level of 35,000 we previously reported as of February 2009. According to DOD, by the end of 2009 U.S. troop levels will rise further to about 68,000. Additionally, as of October 2009, there were reportedly about 36,000 non-U.S. military personnel in ISAF--an increase from the reported February 2009 force level of about 32,000. Furthermore, as of September 2009, DOD reported 95,000 Afghan National Army personnel assigned to the ANSF. According to DOD, the ANSF will reach its authorized end-strength of 230,000 army and police personnel by October 2010.
GAO-10-178R, Afghanistan's Security Environment
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-10-178R
entitled 'Afghanistan's Security Environment' which was released on
November 5, 2009.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
GAO-10-178R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 5, 2009:
Congressional Committees:
Subject: Afghanistan's Security Environment:
In March 2009, out of concern that the overall security situation in
Afghanistan had not improved after more than 7 years of U.S. and
international efforts, the administration completed a 60-day strategic
review of U.S. policy and the security environment in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.[Footnote 1] Based on this review, and recognizing the vital
U.S. interest in addressing security threats posed by extremists in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the administration announced a strategic goal
of disrupting, dismantling, and eventually defeating these extremists
and eliminating their safe havens in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
[Footnote 2] Subsequently, in August 2009, the United States issued an
integrated civilian-military campaign plan for support to Afghanistan.
[Footnote 3] The strategy and campaign plan call for, among other
things, the execution of an integrated counterinsurgency mission and
continued efforts to build the capacity of military and civilian
elements of the Afghan government to lead counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism efforts and provide internal security for the Afghan
people. Accordingly, the focus for U.S. forces in Afghanistan will be
to (1) secure Afghanistan from insurgent and terrorist threats and (2)
rapidly train Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF)[Footnote 4]
to lead military and law enforcement operations.
We have previously reported on security conditions in Afghanistan and
the need for additional personnel to help build capable ANSF.[Footnote
5] This report provides updated information on (1) the security
situation as gauged by trends in enemy-initiated attacks, (2)
challenges for U.S. reconstruction efforts posed by security
conditions, and (3) the recent increase in U.S. and coalition troop
presence. To address these objectives, we incorporated information from
our past and continuing work; analyzed updated data on attacks, troop
numbers, and U.S. funding; and reviewed relevant documents from the
Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State), as well as the
administration‘s White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group‘s Report
on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan and the recently
developed civilian-military campaign plan for Afghanistan.
Afghanistan‘s Security Situation Continues to Worsen as Enemy-Initiated
Attacks Increase:
Afghanistan‘s security situation has deteriorated significantly since
2005, affecting all aspects of U.S. and allied reconstruction
operations. As we reported in April 2009, the rise in enemy-initiated
attacks on civilians and on U.S., Afghan, and coalition security forces
has resulted from various factors, including a resurgence of the
Taliban, the limited capabilities of Afghan security forces, a thriving
illicit drug trade, and threats emanating from insurgent safe havens in
Pakistan.
Since 2005, attacks on civilians, as well as on Afghan and coalition
forces, have increased every year. The most recent data available, as
of August 2009, showed the highest rate of enemy-initiated attacks
since Afghanistan‘s security situation began to deteriorate. Overall,
nearly 13,000 attacks were recorded between January and August 2009”
more than two and a half times the number experienced during the same
period last year and more than five times the approximately 2,400
attacks reported in all of 2005. Violence has generally been
concentrated in the eastern and southern regions of Afghanistan where
U.S. forces operate, with insurgents making increasing use of
improvised explosive devices, suicide attacks, and attacks targeting
infrastructure and development projects. As figure 1 illustrates, the
pattern of attacks is seasonal, generally peaking from June through
September each year.
Figure 1: Average Daily Reported Enemy-Initiated Attacks by Type in
Afghanistan, May 2003 to August 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Date: June, 2003;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.5;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.57;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 0.67;
Total average daily attacks: 3.73.
Date: July, 2003;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.45;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.16;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 0.65;
Total average daily attacks: 3.26.
Date: August, 2003;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.42;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.52;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 1.06;
Total average daily attacks: 4.
Date: September, 2003;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.43;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.03;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 1.1;
Total average daily attacks: 3.57.
Date: October, 2003;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.19;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.45;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 1;
Total average daily attacks: 3.65.
Date: November, 2003;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.6;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 0.93;
Total average daily attacks: 4.53.
Date: December, 2003;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.81;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.23;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 0.77;
Total average daily attacks: 3.81.
Date: January, 2004;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.71;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 0.87;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 1.68;
Total average daily attacks: 4.26.
Date: February, 2004;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.34;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 0.79;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 1.1;
Total average daily attacks: 3.24.
Date: March, 2004;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.52;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.19;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 1.42;
Total average daily attacks: 4.13.
Date: April, 2004;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.5;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 0.83;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 1.87;
Total average daily attacks: 4.2.
Date: May, 2004;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.61;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 1.77;
Total average daily attacks: 5.39.
Date: June, 2004;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.9;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.23;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 2.23;
Total average daily attacks: 5.37.
Date: July, 2004;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3.16;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.1;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 2.03;
Total average daily attacks: 6.29.
Date: August, 2004;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2.03;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 2.39;
Total average daily attacks: 5.42.
Date: September, 2004;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2.37;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.8;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 2.77;
Total average daily attacks: 6.93.
Oct. 9, 2004: First democratic presidential election in Afghanistan.
Date: October, 2004;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3.9;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.9;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 3.68;
Total average daily attacks: 9.48.
Date: November, 2004;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.03;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.43;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 2.07v
Total average daily attacks: 4.53.
Date: December, 2004;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.16;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.16;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 2;
Total average daily attacks: 4.32.
Date: January, 2005;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.06;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.16;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 1;
Total average daily attacks: 3.23.
Date: February, 2005;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 0.43;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 0.82;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 0.96;
Total average daily attacks: 2.21.
Date: March, 2005;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.26;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.06;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 1.65;
Total average daily attacks: 3.97.
Date: April, 2005;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.67;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.1;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 2;
Total average daily attacks: 5.77.
Date: May, 2005;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2.65;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.03;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 2.1;
Total average daily attacks: 6.77.
Date: June, 2005;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2.9;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.17;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 3.1;
Total average daily attacks: 8.17.
Date: July, 2005;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2.23;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 2.74;
Total average daily attacks: 6.97.
Date: August, 2005;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2.39;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.81;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 3.94;
Total average daily attacks: 9.13.
Sept. 18, 2005: Elections for lower house of National Assembly and
provincial councils.
Date: September, 2005;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2.87;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 3.1;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 5.13;
Total average daily attacks: 11.1.
Date: October, 2005;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.03;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 4.13;
Total average daily attacks: 8.16.
Date: November, 2005;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.83;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.13;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 3.07v
Total average daily attacks: 7.03.
Date: December, 2005;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.9v
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.48;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 2.39v
Total average daily attacks: 5.77.
Date: January, 2006;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.35;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 1.94;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 2.26v
Total average daily attacks: 5.55.
Date: February, 2006;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.71;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.64;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 3.43;
Total average daily attacks: 7.79.
Date: March, 2006;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 1.71;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.71;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 3.94;
Total average daily attacks: 8.35.
Date: April, 2006;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2.2;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.83;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 5.67;
Total average daily attacks: 10.7.
Date: May, 2006;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2.77;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.81;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 5;
Total average daily attacks: 10.58.
Date: June, 2006;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3.17;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.97;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 7.53;
Total average daily attacks: 13.67.
Date: July, 2006;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 4.65;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 3.71;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 10.52;
Total average daily attacks: 18.87.
Date: August, 2006;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 5.26;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 4.81;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 12.84;
Total average daily attacks: 22.9.
Date: September, 2006;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 4.6;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 4.27;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 14.43;
Total average daily attacks: 23.3.
Date: October, 2006;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 4.58;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 4.16;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 9.97;
Total average daily attacks: 18.71.
Date: November, 2006;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3.4;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 3.7;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 8.3;
Total average daily attacks: 15.4.
Date: December, 2006;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2.77;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.84;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 5.45v
Total average daily attacks: 11.06.
Date: January, 2007;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3.23;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 3.1;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 5.58;
Total average daily attacks: 11.9.
Date: February, 2007;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2.57;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.07;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 5;
Total average daily attacks: 9.64.
Date: March, 2007;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3.58;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.84;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 9.16;
Total average daily attacks: 15.58.
Date: April, 2007;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3.9;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 4.23;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 9.37;
Total average daily attacks: 17.5.
Date: May, 2007;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3.42;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 3.97;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 12.16;
Total average daily attacks: 19.55.
Date: June, 2007;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3.33;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 4.77;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 14.43;
Total average daily attacks: 22.53.
Date: July, 2007;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 4.06;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 5.13;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 14.35v
Total average daily attacks: 23.55.
Date: August, 2007;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3.71;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 4.87;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 18.1;
Total average daily attacks: 26.68.
Date: September, 2007;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3.17;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 4.97;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 18.43;
Total average daily attacks: 26.57.
Date: October, 2007;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 3.13;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 15.68;
Total average daily attacks: 21.81.
Date: November, 2007;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2.57;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 3.17;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 14.17;
Total average daily attacks: 19.9.
Date: December, 2007;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2.65;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 3.68;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 9.87;
Total average daily attacks: 16.19.
Date: January, 2008;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3.35v
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.32;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 6.71;
Total average daily attacks: 12.39.
Date: February, 2008;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 2.76;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 2.14;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 7.34;
Total average daily attacks: 12.24.
Date: March, 2008;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3.58;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 3.29;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 11.06;
Total average daily attacks: 17.94.
Date: April, 2008;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 3.1;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 4.7;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 11.97;
Total average daily attacks: 19.77.
Date: May, 2008;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 5.77;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 5.26;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 17.84;
Total average daily attacks: 28.87.
Date: June, 2008;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 4.83;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 6.8;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 18.47;
Total average daily attacks: 30.1.
Date: July, 2008;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 7.9;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 7.39;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 19.32;
Total average daily attacks: 34.61.
Date: August, 2008;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 9.45;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 7.48;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 27.84;
Total average daily attacks: 44.77.
Date: September, 2008;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 12.63;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 9.8;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 22.53;
Total average daily attacks: 44.97
Date: October, 2008;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 11.32;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 9.58;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 19.16;
Total average daily attacks: 40.06.
Date: November, 2008;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 12.97;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 8.93;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 17.8;
Total average daily attacks: 39.7.
Date: December, 2008;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 9.42;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 6.55;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 15;
Total average daily attacks: 30.97.
Date: January, 2009;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 9.32;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 4.97;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 12.97;
Total average daily attacks: 27.26.
Date: February, 2009;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 9.96;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 4.46;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 14.82;
Total average daily attacks: 29.25.
Date: March, 2009;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 11.35;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 4.58;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 22;
Total average daily attacks: 37.94.
Date: April, 2009;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 12.4;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 3.63;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 19.33;
Total average daily attacks: 35.37.
Date: May, 2009;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 14.29;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 8;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 26.77;
Total average daily attacks: 49.06.
Date: June, 2009;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 19.42;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 8.29;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 38;
Total average daily attacks: 65.71.
Date: July, 2009;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 18.87;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 10.1;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 45.74;
Total average daily attacks: 74.71.
Aug. 20, 2009: Elections for president and provincial councils.
Date: August, 2009;
Average daily attacks-civilians: 27.71;
Average daily attacks-Afghan security forces: 11.71;
Average daily attacks-ISAF/coalition forces: 56.1;
Total average daily attacks: 95.52.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
Note: Data on attacks against civilians include attacks against Afghan
nationals and other civilians, U.S. and non-U.S. contractors,
nongovernmental organizations, and Afghan government personnel. Data on
attacks against the International Security Assistance Force and
coalition forces include attacks against U.S. and International
Security Assistance Force military personnel.
[End of figure]
Although never reaching the highest level of attacks in Iraq, the
number of attacks in Afghanistan surpassed those in Iraq for the first
time in July 2008 and has continued to exceed levels in Iraq in recent
months (see figure 2).[Footnote 6]
Figure 2: Average Daily Reported Enemy-Initiated Attacks in Iraq and
Afghanistan, May 2003 to August 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Number of average daily attacks per month:
Date: 2003:
May;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 3.71;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 3.9.
June;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 11.87;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 3.73.
July;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 15.23;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 3.26.
August;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 17.13;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 4.
September;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 23;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 3.57.
October;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 31.74;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 3.65.
November;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 34.3;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 4.53.
December;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 24.06;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 3.81.
Date: 2004:
January;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 24.06;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 4.26.
February;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 25.41;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 3.24.
March;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 30.16;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 4.13.
April;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 58.53;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 4.2.
May;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 60.81;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 5.39.
June;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 55.07;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 5.37.
July;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 54.61;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 6.29.
August;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 94.06;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 5.42.
September;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 69.3;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 6.93.
October;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 76.87;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 9.48.
November;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 93.2;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 4.53.
December;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 63.29;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 4.32.
Date: 2005:
January;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 90.55;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 3.23.
February;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 61.89;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 2.21.
March;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 50.13;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 3.97.
April;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 58.2;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 5.77.
May;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 68.29;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 6.77.
June;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 68.4;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 8.17.
July;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 76.16;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 6.97.
August;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 83.68;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 9.13.
September;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 83.5;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 11.1.
October;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 98.74;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 8.16.
November;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 68.7;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 7.03.
December;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 80.84;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 5.77.
Date: 2006:
January;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 71.39;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 5.55.
February;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 86.14;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 7.79.
March;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 94.29;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 8.35.
April;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 109.23;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 10.7.
May;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 118.03;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 10.58.
June;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 121.13;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 13.67.
July;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 141.68;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 18.87.
August;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 136.42;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 22.9.
September;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 166.8;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 23.3.
October;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 176.32;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 18.71.
November;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 158.97;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 15.4.
December;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 162.48;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 11.06.
Date: 2007:
January;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 165.94;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 11.9.
February;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 162.32;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 9.64.
March;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 157.26;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 15.58.
April;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 163.07;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 17.5.
May;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 172.32;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 19.55.
June;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 177.43;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 22.53.
July;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 154.87;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 23.55.
August;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 123.42;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 26.68.
September;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 101.73;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 26.57.
October;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 81.39;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 21.81.
November;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 62.97;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 19.9.
December;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 61.77;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 16.19.
Date: 2008:
January;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 57.65;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 12.39.
February;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 48.55;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 12.24.
March;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 68.48;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 17.94.
April;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 65.3;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 19.77.
May;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 44.58;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 28.87.
June;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 30.67;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 30.1.
July;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 29.94;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 34.61.
August;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 31.26;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 44.77.
September;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 32.43;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 44.97.
October;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 24;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 40.06.
November;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 23.1;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 39.7.
December;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 26.68;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 30.97.
Date: 2009:
January;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 34.68;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 27.26.
February;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 30.14;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 29.25.
March;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 29.45;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 37.94.
April;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 33.1;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 35.37.
May;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 30.81;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 49.06.
June;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 29.23;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 65.71.
July;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 24.74;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 74.71.
August;
Average daily attacks in Iraq: 24.32;
Average daily attacks in Afghanistan: 95.52.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.
[End of figure]
Security Situation Continues to Challenge U.S. Efforts in Afghanistan:
Developing a self-reliant Afghanistan is a key end-state goal
articulated in the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan, which notes that
achieving such an outcome will enable the United States to withdraw
combat forces and make a sustained commitment to Afghan political and
economic development. While U.S. and international development projects
in Afghanistan have made some progress, the deterioration of security
has impeded efforts to stabilize and rebuild the country. In
particular, U.S. officials have cited poor security as having caused
delays, disruptions, and even abandonment of certain reconstruction
projects, while also hampering management and oversight of such
efforts. For instance, the administration‘s Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan has identified the need for more security in
order for civilian personnel and contractors to do their work in
Afghanistan. Similarly, the commander of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF)Footnote 7] and U.S. forces in Afghanistan
testified in his June 2009 confirmation hearing that improving security
was a prerequisite for the development of local governance and economic
growth in Afghanistan. The following list provides some specific
examples of how the security situation in Afghanistan hampers U.S.
efforts:
* Development programs delayed or abandoned. U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) staff in Afghanistan cited security
as a major challenge to implementing development projects. According to
USAID, programs ranging from road reconstruction to power generation
and agricultural development face significant cost increases and have
been delayed or abandoned due to a lack of security. For example,
because attacks prevented contractors from working on an Afghan road to
the Kajaki dam, USAID terminated the road contract after it had spent
about $5 million on it.[Footnote 8] USAID further noted in its comments
on this report that supplies for the Kajaki dam project must now be
flown in due to the deteriorating security environment. Additionally,
DOD has reported that, although progress has been made in completing
construction of the ’ring road“”Afghanistan‘s major highway”a lack of
security has increased the risk of using Afghan roads.
* Disruption of supply lines. Supply transportation operations in
Afghanistan continue to depend on treacherous overland routes. Although
sensitive equipment is flown in by plane, supply convoys moving
overland from Pakistan have been subject to repeated threats and
attacks.
* Development of Afghan security forces impeded by security problems.
U.S. officials have reported that efforts to train ANSF have been
hindered by security problems. For example, despite the fact that the
Afghan National Army is charged with defeating the insurgency and
terrorism, Afghan National Police are often reassigned from their
training courses to provide immediate assistance with the
counterinsurgency effort, thus delaying the completion of their
training. Additionally, DOD officials have indicated that distributing
equipment to police in the field has been challenged in part by the
unstable security situation.
* Counternarcotics operations challenged by insurgent activity. About
98 percent of Afghanistan‘s opium poppy cultivation is concentrated in
the southern provinces where insurgent activity has been heaviest.
Recognizing the nexus between the drug trade and the insurgency, in
December 2008 DOD adopted policies that allow the U.S. military to
increase its involvement in counternarcotics operations.
* Oversight of ongoing programs restricted. Afghanistan‘s security
situation has contributed to U.S. funds being expended with limited
U.S. government oversight. For example, USAID officials told us their
ability to monitor and evaluate ongoing programs has been restricted by
security constraints. In comments on this report, USAID noted that due
to deteriorating security in southern and eastern Afghanistan,
monitoring of the delivery of health services has been significantly
hindered or stopped in some areas. Similarly, State officials told us
that poor security has considerably inhibited the oversight of
counternarcotics efforts outside Kabul, including programs such as
opium eradication, alternative livelihoods, and public information.
Increased U.S. and Coalition Troop Presence Is Intended to Help Secure
Afghanistan and Develop ANSF Capacity:
As of November 2009, there were reportedly about 67,000 U.S. military
personnel in Afghanistan”an increase of more than 90 percent from the
force level of 35,000 we previously reported as of February 2009.
[Footnote 9] According to DOD, by the end of 2009 U.S. troop levels
will rise further to about 68,000. Additionally, as of October 2009,
there were reportedly about 36,000 non-U.S. military personnel in ISAF”
an increase from the reported February 2009 force level of about
32,000. Furthermore, as of September 2009, DOD reported 95,000 Afghan
National Army personnel assigned to the ANSF.[Footnote 10] According to
DOD, the ANSF will reach its authorized end-strength of 230,000 army
and police personnel by October 2010. Figure 3 shows the reported
increase in U.S., coalition, and Afghan military troop strength between
February 2009 and November 2009.
Figure 3: Increase in Reported U.S., Coalition, and Afghan Military
Troop Strength between February 2009 and November 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Location: United States:
Troop strength as of February 2009: 35,000;
Increase since February 2009: 32,000;
Total: 67,000.
Location: ISAF (non-U.S.):
Troop strength as of February 2009: 32,000;
Increase since February 2009: 4,000;
Total: 36,000.
Location: Afghan National Army:
Troop strength as of February 2009: 79,000;
Increase since February 2009: 16,000;
Total: 95,000.
Source: DOD and ISAF data.
Note: U.S. figures are as of November 2009. ISAF figures are as of
October 2009. Afghan National Army figures are as of September 2009.
[End of figure]
Since 2001, more than half of the U.S. funding provided to support
Afghanistan‘s security, governance, reconstruction, and
counternarcotics goals as set out in the Afghanistan National
Development Strategy (ANDS) has been dedicated to supporting the
development of ANSF. As shown in figure 4, the United States has
provided more than $38.6 billion[Footnote 11] to support the ANDS goals
since 2001, of which more than $21 billion has been dedicated to ANSF
development. In its 2010 budget request, DOD asked Congress to provide
$7.5 billion for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund,[Footnote 12]
representing an almost 34 percent increase over 2009 funding levels.
Figure 4: Breakdown of $38.6 Billion in U.S.-Provided Support to
Afghanistan for Fiscal Years 2002 to 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Security ($21.6 billion): 56%;
Economic and social development ($11 billion): 29%;
Counternarcotics ($3.5 billion): 9%;
Governance, rule of law, and human rights ($2.5 billion): 8%.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State data.
[End of figure]
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DOD, USAID, and State. DOD and
USAID provided written comments, which are reprinted in enclosures I
and II of this report, respectively. In response to DOD‘s comment that
the report should be labeled ’For Official Use Only,“ we modified
sections of the report, resulting in DOD‘s determination that the
report was no longer ’For Official Use Only.“ DOD stated that the facts
presented in our report are accurate but asserted that our report
treats security and development as independent entities rather than
interrelated activities. We agree with DOD that security and
development are interrelated activities, and our report illustrates
several ways in which Afghanistan‘s unstable security situation
challenges development. For additional details, see GAO comments that
follow enclosure I. DOD also provided technical comments, which we
incorporated where appropriate. USAID provided updated information on
the impact of Afghanistan‘s deteriorating security situation on
implementation and oversight of U.S. reconstruction efforts. State did
not provide written comments.
Scope and Methodology:
This report represents an update to our prior work on security
conditions in Afghanistan and is based on past and continuing work. To
address our objectives, we incorporated updated information from
current budget and program documents, including updated financial data
from DOD. We also incorporated updated attack data from DOD, which we
used to assess the level of enemy-initiated attacks on civilians and on
U.S., Afghan, and coalition security forces. We have assessed the
reliability of these financial and attack data as part of our previous
work and have determined that they are sufficiently reliable for our
purposes. Because DOD uses similar methodologies to derive the attack
data it reports for Afghanistan and Iraq, we were able to compare both
sets of data. The report also incorporates updated data on troop
numbers for the Afghan National Army, ISAF, and the United States. We
have assessed these data as part of our previous and ongoing work and
have determined that they are sufficiently reliable for broad
comparative purposes to identify changes in troop numbers over time.
However, the report also notes our previously reported concerns with
regard to the reliability of figures on the number of Afghan National
Police. In addition to incorporating updated data, we also reviewed
relevant documents from DOD and State, as well as the administration‘s
White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group‘s Report on U.S. Policy
toward Afghanistan and Pakistan and the recently developed civilian-
military campaign plan for Afghanistan.
We conducted our work from August 2009 to November 2009 in accordance
with all sections of GAO‘s Quality Assurance Framework that are
relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan and
perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to
meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work.
We believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis
conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, DOD, State, and USAID. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in enclosure III.
Signed by:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Enclosures:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chair:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chair:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chair:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Chair:
The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chair:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chair:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Edolphus Towns:
Chair:
The Honorable Darrell E. Issa:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Chair:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John Tierney:
Chair:
The Honorable Jeff Flake:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Enclosure I: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Under Secretary Of Defense:
Intelligence:
5000 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-5000:
November 2, 2009:
Mr. Charles M. Johnson, Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Johnson:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-09-995R, "Afghanistan's Security Environment," dated
September 15, 2009 (GAO Code 320709).
While the Draft Report does not contain recommendations to the DoD,
general comments are provided in the enclosure to assist you in
improving the accuracy and clarity of the Draft Report. Most
significantly, the Department believes that the Draft Report should be
labeled "For Official Use Only" and not releasable for public review.
The rationale for this is due to the inconclusive nature of the
information contained in the Draft Report. The language in the Draft
Report treats security and development as independent entities, rather
than interrelated activities, and allows for open-ended arguments for
individuals to establish inappropriate cause and effect relationships.
[See comment 1]
The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the Draft
Report and requests that the enclosed comments be made a part of the
final report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James R. Clapper, Jr.
Enclosure: As stated:
[End of letter]
Enclosure: DoD Comments:
GAO Draft Report, "Afghanistan Security Environment"
GAO Code 320709:
Page 3. "Afghanistan's Security Situation Continues to Worsen as Enemy
Initiated Attacks Increase. Afghanistan's security situation has
deteriorated significantly since 2005..." Stating the security
situation has "deteriorated since 2005" is accurate but the attack
metrics do not measure the enemy's ability to influence the population,
hold geographic terrain, or set the conditions needed for insurgent
success. The metrics themselves are not that meaningful for today's
fight without being placed in context. The overall increase in
International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) operational tempo
(OPTEMPO) and expanded area of operations this year is putting
increased pressure on the Taliban. The Taliban are fighting hard to
hang onto influence in a number of areas and are increasingly
challenged in others. This limited portal into the security environment
skews the overall picture of what is happening on the ground. Higher
levels of incidents are one measure but they do not reflect the scope,
character and impact of the incidents. The higher number of incidents
can reflect a worsening situation for the enemy. [See comment 2]
Page 5. "Although never reaching the highest level of attacks in Iraq,
the number of attacks in Afghanistan surpassed those in Iraq for the
first time in July 2008 and has continued to exceed levels in Iraq in
recent months (see fig. 2)." The graph shows attacks in Aug 09
surpassed those in Iraq, but are nowhere near the overall highs in Iraq
shown on the graph in 2006/2007. The scope and character of violence
and the drivers of instability were far more complex and deep rooted in
Iraq than in Afghanistan. The comparison between Iraq and Afghanistan
in this instance is inaccurate and loses the context without further
explanation. [See comment 3]
Page 7. "Development of Afghan Security Forces Impeded by Security
Problems: U.S officials have reported efforts to train Afghan National
Security Force (ANSF) have been hindered by security problems." The
enemy has hindered ANSF development, but what is required is deeper
analysis identifying the scope and character of the impact. Illustrate
how this has affected training time lines and ANSF preparedness to
address/assume security in the future. [See comment 4]
Page 8. Change the authorized end strength of the ANSF from 216K to
230K (per U.S. Central Command). [See comment 5]
General Comments:
This report treats security and development as independent entities,
rather than interrelated. Human Terrain integrates security and
development, which must be analyzed holistically as a system of systems
vice discreet activities. The report presents accurate facts; however,
DoD would like a more thorough holistic evaluation of the situation in
Afghanistan. Treating security and development as a "cause and effect"
scenario is a logical fallacy that fails to reflect the complex nature
of instability in Afghanistan. [See comment 6]
The following are GAO‘s comments on DOD‘s written responses, dated
November 2, 2009, to our draft report.
GAO Comments:
1. We modified sections of the report in response to DOD‘s technical
comments. DOD subsequently agreed that our report did not need to be
labeled ’For Official Use Only.“
2. DOD states that higher levels of security incidents are one measure
of the security situation but do not reflect the scope, character, and
impact of the incidents. Although a full characterization of attacks in
Afghanistan is beyond the scope of this report, we provide several
examples of how instability affects U.S. efforts. Furthermore, while we
acknowledge DOD‘s position that a higher number of attacks can reflect
a worsening situation for the enemy, the commander of ISAF and U.S.
forces in Afghanistan stated in his August 2009 initial assessment of
the situation in Afghanistan that the insurgency is resilient and
growing.
3. DOD asserts that the comparison between attack levels in Iraq and
Afghanistan is inaccurate. However, all attack figures found in our
report are based on DOD data that Defense Intelligence Agency officials
consider a reliable and consistent source of information that can be
used to identify trends in enemy activity and the overall security
situation. DOD further asserts that the comparison between Iraq and
Afghanistan loses context without further explanation. However, a
detailed evaluation of factors affecting the levels of violence in Iraq
and Afghanistan would involve sensitive information that could not be
included in this report.
4. DOD acknowledges that the enemy has hindered ANSF development but
notes that a deeper analysis identifying the scope and character of the
impact is needed. Although we did not include such an analysis in this
update, our prior work on the ANSF has identified specific ways in
which the lack of security has affected ANSF development. For example,
we noted in March 2009 that a new program to retrain the Afghan
National Police and build professional and fully capable police units
was taking longer than DOD initially projected, due in part to growing
security threats affecting the program.[Footnote 13] In addition, we
are currently conducting a separate review of U.S. efforts to develop
capable Afghan National Army forces. We look forward to working with
DOD on that review to examine in further detail how the security
situation has impeded development of the Afghan National Army, to
include training timelines.
5. We have modified our report to note that the authorized end-strength
of the ANSF is now 230,000.
6. DOD contends that this report treats security and development as
independent entities rather than interrelated activities. We agree with
DOD that security and development are interrelated activities, and our
report illustrates several ways in which Afghanistan‘s unstable
security situation challenges development.
[End of section]
Enclosure II: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
[End of section]
Enclosure III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Hynek Kalkus (Assistant
Director), Aniruddha Dasgupta, Emily Rachman, Gloria Leila Mahnad,
Joseph Carney, Martin de Alteriis, and Mark Dowling made key
contributions to this report. Sarah McGrath, Jeremy Sebest, and Cynthia
Taylor provided technical assistance.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] A subsequent assessment of the situation in Afghanistan by the
commander of the International Security Assistance Force and U.S.
forces in Afghanistan is currently under way. The commander‘s initial
assessment was completed in August 2009.
[2] The President announced his strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan
on March 27, 2009.
[3] GAO is currently performing a separate congressionally mandated
review of the U.S. campaign plan for Afghanistan.
[4] The ANSF consists of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan
National Police. We reported on U.S. efforts to develop capable ANSF in
June 2008. See GAO, Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action
May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and
Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-661] (Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2008).
[5] See GAO, Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-473SP] (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009).
[6] According to Defense Intelligence Agency officials, attack data in
figures 1 and 2 do not include violent incidents that coalition or
Afghan security forces initiated, but represent a reliable and
consistent source of information that can be used to identify trends in
enemy activity and the overall security situation.
[7] As of October 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-led ISAF
consisted of troops from 42 countries engaged in efforts to secure and
stabilize Afghanistan.
[8] We reported in July 2008 about U.S. and donor efforts to build
roads in Afghanistan. See GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Progress
Made in Constructing Roads, but Assessments for Determining Impact and
a Sustainable Maintenance Program Are Needed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-689] (Washington, D.C.: July 8,
2008).
[9] Part of the increase in U.S. troop levels is a result of the
President‘s February 2009 approval to deploy more than 21,000
additional troops to Afghanistan this year. Of these 21,000 troops,
about 17,700 are intended to stabilize southern Afghanistan and about
4,000 are intended to support the ANSF development mission.
[10] DOD also indicated that there were about 93,000 Afghan National
Police assigned to the ANSF as of September 2009. We previously
reported in June 2008 that Afghanistan‘s Ministry of Interior produces
the number of police assigned and that, according to DOD, these numbers
may not be reliable. Subsequently, in March 2009, we noted that DOD was
working with the Afghan government to identify and validate all police
personnel on the payroll. See GAO-08-661 and GAO, Afghanistan Security:
U.S. Programs to Further Reform Ministry of Interior and National
Police Challenges by Lack of Military Personnel and Afghan Cooperation,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-280] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 9, 2009).
[11] This figure does not include funding for U.S. military operations
in Afghanistan.
[12] The Afghan Security Forces Fund is used to plan, program, and
implement structural, institutional, and management reforms of the
ANSF.
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-280].
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
