State Department
Diplomatic Security's Recent Growth Warrants Strategic Review Gao ID: GAO-10-156 November 12, 2009State Department's (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security) is responsible for the protection of people, information, and property at over 400 foreign missions and domestic locations. Diplomatic Security must be prepared to counter threats such as crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud, technological intrusions, political violence, and terrorism. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to assess (1) how Diplomatic Security's mission has evolved since 1998, (2) how its resources have changed over the last 10 years, and (3) the challenges it faces in conducting its missions. GAO analyzed Diplomatic Security data; reviewed relevant documents; and interviewed officials at several domestic facilities and 18 international missions.
Diplomatic Security's mission, toensure a safe environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, involves activities such as the protection of people, information, and property overseas, and dignitary protection and passport and visa fraud investigations domestically. These activities have grown since 1998 in reaction to a number of security incidents. Diplomatic Security funding and personnel have also increased considerably over the last 10 years. In 1998, Diplomatic Security's budget was about $200 million; by fiscal year 2008, it had grown to approximately $1.8 billion, of which over $300 million was for security in Iraq. In addition, the size of Diplomatic Security's direct-hire workforce has doubled since 1998 and will likely continue to expand. Recently, Diplomatic Security's reliance on contractors has grown to fill critical needs in high-threat posts. Diplomatic Security faces several challenges that could affect the bureau's ability to provide security and use its resources efficiently. First, State's policy to maintain missions in increasingly dangerous posts requires a substantial amount of resources. Second, although Diplomatic Security's workforce has grown considerably over the last 10 years, staffing shortages in domestic offices and other operational challenges--such as inadequate facilities, language deficiencies, experience gaps, and balancing security needs with State's diplomatic mission--further tax its ability to implement all of its missions. Finally, Diplomatic Security's tremendous growth has been in reaction to events and does not benefit from adequate strategic guidance. Neither State's departmental strategic plan nor Diplomatic Security's bureau strategic plan specifically addresses the bureau's resource needs or management challenges.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-10-156, State Department: Diplomatic Security's Recent Growth Warrants Strategic Review
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Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
November 2009:
State Department:
Diplomatic Security's Recent Growth Warrants Strategic Review:
GAO-10-156:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-156, a report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of
Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
State Department‘s (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic
Security) is responsible for the protection of people, information, and
property at over 400 foreign missions and domestic locations.
Diplomatic Security must be prepared to counter threats such as crime,
espionage, visa and passport fraud, technological intrusions, political
violence, and terrorism. GAO was asked to assess (1) how Diplomatic
Security‘s mission has evolved since 1998, (2) how its resources have
changed over the last 10 years, and (3) the challenges it faces in
conducting its missions. GAO analyzed Diplomatic Security data;
reviewed relevant documents; and interviewed officials at several
domestic facilities and 18 international missions.
What GAO Found:
Diplomatic Security‘s mission, to ensure a safe environment for the
conduct of U.S. foreign policy, involves activities such as the
protection of people, information, and property overseas, and dignitary
protection and passport and visa fraud investigations domestically.
These activities have grown since 1998 in reaction to a number of
security incidents.
Diplomatic Security funding and personnel have also increased
considerably over the last 10 years. In 1998, Diplomatic Security‘s
budget was about $200 million; by fiscal year 2008, it had grown to
approximately $1.8 billion, of which over $300 million was for security
in Iraq (see figure). In addition, the size of Diplomatic Security‘s
direct-hire workforce has doubled since 1998 and will likely continue
to expand. Recently, Diplomatic Security‘s reliance on contractors has
grown to fill critical needs in high-threat posts.
Figure: Diplomatic Security Budget, 1998-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Year: 1998: (Bombings of U.S. Embassies in Africa);
Budget: $172 million.
Year: 1999:
Budget: $784 million.
Year: 2000:
Budget: $538 million.
Year: 2001: (September 11 attacks);
Budget: $571 million.
Year: 2002:
Budget: $579 million.
Year: 2003:
Budget: $630 million.
Year: 2004: (State initiates diplomatic presence in Iraq);
Budget: $836 million.
Year: 2005:
Budget: $1,274 million.
Year: 2006:
Budget: $1,657 million.
Year: 2007:
Budget: $1,678 million.
Year: 2008:
Budget: $1,760 million.
Year: 2009:
Budget: $2,266 million.
Source: GAO analysis of Diplomatic Security data.
[End of figure]
Diplomatic Security faces several challenges that could affect the
bureau‘s ability to provide security and use its resources efficiently.
First, State‘s policy to maintain missions in increasingly dangerous
posts requires a substantial amount of resources. Second, although
Diplomatic Security‘s workforce has grown considerably over the last 10
years, staffing shortages in domestic offices and other operational
challenges”such as inadequate facilities, language deficiencies,
experience gaps, and balancing security needs with State‘s diplomatic
mission”further tax its ability to implement all of its missions.
Finally, Diplomatic Security‘s tremendous growth has been in reaction
to events and does not benefit from adequate strategic guidance.
Neither State‘s departmental strategic plan nor Diplomatic Security‘s
bureau strategic plan specifically addresses the bureau‘s resource
needs or management challenges.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State review the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security”as part of the Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Development Review (QDDR) or separately”to ensure that its mission
addresses the department‘s priority needs. This review should address
challenges such as: (1) operating with adequate staff, (2) securing
facilities that do not meet security standards, (3) staffing foreign
missions with officials who have appropriate language skills, (4)
operating programs with experienced staff, and (5) balancing security
with State‘s diplomatic mission.
State agreed with GAO‘s recommendation and stated that it is completely
committed to ensuring that Diplomatic Security's mission will benefit
from the QDDR.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-156] or key
components. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Diplomatic Security's Mission Has Grown in Reaction to a Number of
Major Security Incidents:
Diplomatic Security Funding Has Increased Considerably, and Personnel
Has Doubled Since 1998:
Dangerous Environments, Staffing Shortages, and Reactive Planning
Challenge Diplomatic Security:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Diplomatic Security Service:
Appendix III: Security Infrastructure:
Appendix IV: Countermeasures:
Appendix V: Executive Office:
Appendix VI: Office of Foreign Missions:
Appendix VII: Funding Allocations, Other:
Appendix VIII: Diplomatic Security Collaborates with Other U.S.
Government Agencies to Meet Its Mission:
Appendix IX: Attacks against U.S. Embassies and Consulates (excluding
Baghdad), 1998-2008:
Appendix X: Comments from the U.S. Department of State:
Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Overview of Diplomatic Security Personnel, Fiscal Year 2008:
Table 2: Change in Perimeter Patrol Requirements by Threat Level:
Table 3: Attacks against U.S. Embassies and Consulates:
Figures:
Figure 1: Organization of Diplomatic Security:
Figure 2: Diplomatic Security Budget, by Program Area, Fiscal Year
2008:
Figure 3: Timeline of Events Affecting Diplomatic Security:
Figure 4: Historical Trend in Diplomatic Security Budget:
Figure 5: Growth of Security Specialist Workforce: 1998-2009:
Figure 6: Diplomatic Security Reliance on Contractors:
Figure 7: Evacuations of U.S. Missions, 1997-2008:
Figure 8: Trend in Number of Posts with Danger Pay, 1997-2009:
Abbreviations:
ARSO: Assistant Regional Security Officer:
ARSO-I: ARSO-Investigator:
ATA: Antiterrorism Assistance:
Diplomatic Security: Bureau of Diplomatic Security:
DSS: Diplomatic Security Service:
GPRA: Government Performance and Reporting Act:
JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Force:
LES: Locally Employed Staff:
MSD: Mobile Security Deployment:
OBO: Bureau of Overseas Building Operations:
OSAC: Overseas Security Advisory Council:
QDDR: Quadrennial Diplomatic and Development Review:
RPG: Rocket Propelled Grenade:
RSO: Regional Security Officer:
SPS: Security Protection Specialist:
State: U.S. Department of State:
WPPS: Worldwide Personal Protective Services:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
November 12, 2009:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka, Chairman:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich, Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
On August 7, 1998, terrorists detonated truck bombs almost
simultaneously outside the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,
killing over 300 people, including 12 Americans, and injuring over
5,000. The 1998 bombings marked a pivotal moment in the conduct of U.S.
diplomacy, as it became clear that terrorist networks had the ability
and intent to exploit security vulnerabilities at American diplomatic
missions. Since 1998, the scope and complexity of threats facing
Americans abroad and at home has continued to increase.
The State Department's (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(Diplomatic Security) is responsible for the protection of people,
information, and property at State's 285 foreign missions and 122
domestic locations. In addition to terrorism, Diplomatic Security must
also be prepared to counter threats such as crime, espionage, visa and
passport fraud, technological intrusions, political violence, and
weapons of mass destruction.
In this light, we examined (1) how Diplomatic Security's mission has
evolved since the embassy attacks in 1998, (2) the change in human and
financial resources for Diplomatic Security over the last 10 years, and
(3) the challenges Diplomatic Security faces in conducting its
missions.
To address these objectives, we (1) interviewed numerous officials at
Diplomatic Security headquarters, several domestic facilities, and 18
international postings; (2) analyzed Diplomatic Security and State
budget and personnel data; and (3) assessed challenges facing
Diplomatic Security through analysis of interviews with personnel
positioned domestically and internationally, budget and personnel data
provided by State and Diplomatic Security, and planning and strategic
documentation.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to November
2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. (See
appendix I for a more complete description of our objectives, scope,
and methodology.)
Background:
State established Diplomatic Security's predecessor in 1916 to conduct
sensitive investigations, particularly on the operations of foreign
agents and their activities in the United States. Two years later, when
Congress passed legislation requiring passports for Americans traveling
abroad and visas for aliens wishing to enter the United States, the
office's responsibilities grew to include investigating passport and
visa fraud. Diplomatic Security special agents also began protecting
distinguished visitors to the United States at that time. In the 1940s,
State began posting special agents overseas to manage security issues
at diplomatic missions.
Diplomatic Security's mission is to provide a safe and secure
environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy worldwide. (See
figure 1.)
Figure 1: Organization of Diplomatic Security:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Bureau:
* Bureau of Diplomatic Security:
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the law enforcement and security arm
of the U.S. Department of State (State), provides a secure environment
for the conduct of American diplomacy. Diplomatic Security protects
people, property, and information at more than 285 State missions
worldwide and 122 domestic facilities.
Unit:
* Diplomatic Security Service.
Directorate/Office:
* International Programs Directorate:
* Domestic Operations Directorate:
* Training Directorate:
* Threat Investigations and Analysis Directorate:
Activities: for the above four directorates:
- Formulates and implements security programs and policies.
- Oversees the worldwide law enforcement and protective security
responsibilities of Diplomatic Security.
- Manages the day-to-day security operations at U.S. diplomatic and
consular missions.
* Security Infrastructure Directorate:
Activities:
- Manages information security, computer security, and personnel
security and suitability.
* Countermeasures Directorate:
Activities:
- Manages all Diplomatic Security‘s physical and technical
countermeasures security programs.
* Executive Office Directorate:
Activities:
- Responsible for management, policy, administrative, planning, and
resource issues.
* Office of Foreign Missions:
Activities:
- Provides services to the foreign diplomatic and consular community
related to motor vehicles, taxes, customs entry, property acquisition,
and travel.
- Fosters reciprocal treatment of U.S. diplomats overseas.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[End of figure]
The Diplomatic Security Service is the bureau's most expansive
division--both in terms of funding and personnel--and is responsible
for: personal protection, protection of facilities, investigations,
threat analysis, and training. The other divisions provide important
support functions, such as the protection of information. (See
appendices II through VII.)
Personal protection: Diplomatic Security provides protection to the
Secretary of State, foreign dignitaries visiting the United States, and
several other U.S. government officials.[Footnote 1] Diplomatic
Security dedicates 72 special agents to provide a 24-hour protective
detail for the Secretary of State.[Footnote 2] The bureau pulls
additional support from field offices when the Secretary travels and
relies on the support of Regional Security Officers to provide advance
work for the Secretary's travels overseas. Providing protection to
dignitaries visiting the United States requires similar levels of
resources. Diplomatic Security also protects U.S. athletes at several
international events such as the Olympic Games and the World Cup.
[Footnote 3] As with other protective duties, Diplomatic Security draws
special agents primarily from its field offices to cover these periodic
events.
Protection of facilities: Diplomatic Security Service, in conjunction
with the Countermeasures Directorate, ensures that physical security
standards are met at more than 285 diplomatic missions overseas and 122
domestic facilities. The physical security features at many of State's
diplomatic facilities overseas include: a 100-foot setback from
uncontrolled areas, high perimeter walls or fences that are difficult
to climb, antiram barriers to ensure that vehicles cannot breach the
facility perimeter, blast-resistant construction techniques and
materials, and controlled access of pedestrians and vehicles at the
perimeter of a compound. Diplomatic Security uses similar physical
security measures to secure 122 domestic facilities, including State's
headquarters, the President's guest quarters, the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations, 9 Diplomatic Security field offices, 14 resident agent
offices, and 20 passport agency offices. Diplomatic Security's
uniformed protection officers, a standing force of 750, ensure the
controlled access to these domestic facilities. [Footnote 4]
Investigations: Diplomatic Security is responsible for conducting
investigations on visa and passport fraud, domestically and
internationally, as well as other State matters. Domestically,
Diplomatic Security has Foreign Service special agents and civil
service Criminal Investigators in field offices and resident offices
across the country, responsible for investigating visa and passport
fraud, threats and suspicious activity against State personnel and
facilities, and allegations of criminal and administrative misconduct
among State personnel.[Footnote 5] Special agents also conduct
counterintelligence investigations. Overseas, special agents in part
work with their law enforcement counterparts to pursue leads on U.S.
fugitives wanted for crimes such as homicide, narcotics trafficking,
and pedophilia. Special agents also conduct visa and passport fraud
investigations at posts. (See appendix VIII for more information on
Diplomatic Security's collaboration with other agencies on
investigations.)
Threat analysis: In May 2008, Diplomatic Security created the Threat
Investigations and Analysis Directorate, which consolidated the
monitoring, analysis, and distribution of both open source and
classified intelligence on terrorist activities directed toward U.S.
citizens and U.S. diplomatic and consular facilities abroad. The Threat
Investigations and Analysis Directorate monitors, analyzes, and
investigates threats made against the Secretary of State, senior U.S.
officials, visiting foreign dignitaries, resident foreign diplomats,
and foreign missions in the United States for whom Diplomatic Security
has protective security responsibility. In addition, the Threat
Investigations and Analysis Directorate helps to determine threat
ratings for U.S. diplomatic missions that affect security preparedness.
Training: Diplomatic Security trains its law enforcement and technical
security specialists and runs several specialized programs that enhance
Diplomatic Security's capacity overseas. Diplomatic Security is in the
process of establishing an integrated training center that would house
most of its training programs that are currently located in several
different states. Through its Office of Antiterrorism Assistance,
Diplomatic Security also enhances the antiterrorism awareness and
skills of foreign law enforcement officials and civilians.[Footnote 6]
As part of its training mission, Diplomatic Security has a Mobile
Security Deployment Office that deploys teams to provide three core
services: on-site security training, tactical security, and enhanced
security support. Available courses provide embassy personnel training
in protective tactics such as terrorist surveillance, hostage survival,
and defensive driving. Tactical security missions provide
counterassault capability for Diplomatic Security protective security
details operating both domestically and overseas. These missions are
unscheduled deployments, requested by senior Diplomatic Security
officials based on assessed threats to the dignitary or official being
protected. Finally, security support missions provide emergency support
to overseas posts experiencing civil disorder, armed conflict, or
increased threat of attack.
Protection of information: Diplomatic Security administers a number of
programs designed to protect State's information. Diplomatic Security
manages a robust information security program, staffed by security
engineers and technicians, to detect and prevent the loss of sensitive
information from technical espionage. Diplomatic Security also
collaborates with Marine Security Guards who provide a cleared, 24-hour
American presence at the facilities to protect classified
information,[Footnote 7] and also operates a courier service to ensure
the secure movement of classified U.S. government materials across
international borders through the use of the diplomatic pouch. In 2008,
the courier service delivered more than 55 million pounds of classified
diplomatic pouch materials to U.S. embassies and consulates throughout
the world.
Coordination and Establishment of Security Standards:
Diplomatic Security coordinates its work overseas with a number of
actors. The head special agent, known as the Regional Security Officer
(RSO), works closely with the Chief of Mission (Ambassador or Principal
Officer) who is ultimately responsible for the security of facilities,
information, and all personnel under Chief of Mission authority at the
post. The Chief of Mission and RSO are assisted by an Emergency Action
Committee in planning and preparing for crises. Diplomatic Security
also coordinates with State's Bureau of Overseas Building Operations
(OBO) on security measures for State's facilities.[Footnote 8]
According to State, Diplomatic Security creates the Diplomatic Security
Vulnerability List each year, which ranks facilities according to their
vulnerability across a wide variety of security threats. OBO uses this
list to prioritize its projects. In addition, Diplomatic Security
created the building standards that OBO has used to complete 68 major
construction projects since 2001. Diplomatic Security also works with
host country governments who are required by the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations to provide security to the U.S. missions.[Footnote
9]
The security standards that form the basis for Diplomatic Security's
work at posts overseas were created by the Overseas Security Policy
Board, which includes representatives from several U.S. government
agencies that have a presence overseas and is chaired by the Assistant
Secretary for Diplomatic Security. Diplomatic Security, in consultation
with posts, other State bureaus, and other government agencies, uses
these standards, called the Security Environment Threat List, to assign
threat levels to each post. There are six threat categories:
international terrorism, indigenous terrorism, political violence,
crime, human intelligence, and technical threat. Each post is assigned
one of four threat levels for each threat category. A post's threat
level dictates what security measures should be in place. The levels
are as follows:
* Critical: grave impact on American diplomats:
* High: serious impact on American diplomats:
* Medium: moderate impact on American diplomats:
* Low: minor impact on American diplomats:
Diplomatic Security Budget Overview:
Approximately 60 percent of Diplomatic Security's budget is dedicated
overseas. Diplomatic Security domestic operations include funding for
protection operations and investigations at 25 domestic offices.
Diplomatic Security international activities include security upgrades
to residences and existing diplomatic posts, as well as Diplomatic
Security guard forces. Approximately 20 percent of the Diplomatic
Security budget is for the Countermeasures Directorate, which provides
physical and technical security enhancements at posts, as well as
diplomatic courier services for all of State. Diplomatic Security also
funds Security Infrastructure activities, which provide for the
security of all of State's classified and sensitive information
(including computer networks), as well as background investigations on
all State personnel. Funding for Management is primarily for the
Executive Directorate, which provides management and administrative
support functions to all of Diplomatic Security. The majority of
funding for Training is for operating the Diplomatic Security training
center, which provides training to security specialists, as well as
counterterrorism training for State diplomats assigned to certain high-
risk posts. (See figure 2.)
Figure 2: Diplomatic Security Budget, by Program Area, Fiscal Year
2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Training: 3%;
Security infrastructure: 5%;
Domestic operations: 7%;
DS management: 9%;
Countermeasures: 18%;
International Activities: 58%.
Source: Diplomatic Security.
Note: The figure depicts Diplomatic Security's financial plan for
fiscal year 2008, which was based on regularly appropriated funds and
fees and does not include supplemental appropriations intended solely
for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[End of figure]
Diplomatic Security Workforce Overview:
Diplomatic Security employs a broad workforce of over 40,000 to carry
out its missions and activities. Diplomatic Security utilizes a
combination of direct-hire employees, other U.S. government support
staff, and contractors. Table 1 below details the position name, number
of employees, and description of Diplomatic Security positions for
fiscal year 2008.
Table 1: Overview of Diplomatic Security Personnel, Fiscal Year 2008:
Direct-hires:
Position: Special agents;
Number: 1,585;
Description: Special agents are the lead operational employees of
Diplomatic Security. About 40 percent serve as RSOs (and assistants)
overseas, managing all post security requirements. About 60 percent
serve domestically, conducting investigations and providing protective
details to foreign dignitaries. Special agents also serve in
headquarters positions that support and manage Diplomatic Security
operations.
Position: ARSO-Investigator; (ARSO-I);
Number: [Empty];
Description: ARSO-Is are special agents that focus on investigations
into passport and visa fraud at posts with high levels of fraud. ARSO-
Is also augment post security on an as needed basis. In 2008, 50
special agents were assigned as ARSO-Is.
Position: Criminal Investigator;
Number: 44;
Description: Diplomatic Security posts civil service Criminal
Investigators at domestic field offices to conduct criminal
investigations--including visa and passport fraud cases--alongside the
Foreign Service special agents.
Position: Security engineers and technicians;
Number: 293;
Description: Engineers and technicians are responsible for technical
and informational security programs domestically and at overseas posts.
They service and maintain security equipment at posts overseas, such as
cameras, alarms, and screening systems that help to secure posts, among
other responsibilities.
Position: Couriers;
Number: 98;
Description: Couriers ensure the secure movement of classified U.S.
government materials across international borders.
Position: Security Protection Specialists (SPS);
Number: 0[A];
Description: SPS agents are intended to serve as supervisory agents on
protective details in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
Direct-hires: Locally Employed Staff (LES)[B];
Number: 350;
Description: LES at overseas posts support Diplomatic Security
operations. LES staff remain at the same post and provide continuity
and institutional knowledge for the Regional Security Offices at posts.
Position: Management support staff;
Number: 548;
Description: Management support staff includes nonagent civil service
employees who provide managerial and administrative services.
Subtotal:
Number: 2,918.
Other U.S. government support staff:
Position: Marine Security Guards;
Number: 1,134;
Description: Marine Security Guards' primary role is to protect
classified information at posts. Marine Security Guards control access
to State facilities overseas.
Position: Seabees;
Number: 166;
Description: Seabees are active duty Navy construction personnel with
skills in building construction, maintenance, and repair essential to
State facilities and security programs located worldwide.
Subtotal:
Number: 1,300.
Contract and support staff:
Position: Private security contractors;
Number: 2,000[C];
Description: Private security contractors provide protective services
for dignitaries in critical threat environments in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Israel.
Position: Diplomatic Security guards and surveillance detection;
Number: 33,491;
Description: Diplomatic Security guards provide perimeter security to
post compounds, as well as residential security. Surveillance detection
teams augment post security by identifying suspicious activity outside
of post compounds.
Position: Support contractors;
Number: 1,300;
Description: Diplomatic Security also employs contractor support staff
at headquarters, who provide administrative support.
Position: Uniformed protective officers;
Number: 775;
Description: Officers provide security at domestic facilities, such as
State's headquarters.
Subtotal:
Number: 37,566.
Total:
Number: 41,784.
Source: GAO review of documentary and testimonial evidence provided by
State and Diplomatic Security.
[A] the SPS position is currently under development. There were no SPSs
in 2008. The first four entered duty on July 29, 2009.]
[B] State uses the term "Locally Employed Staff" to characterize
employees hired locally who do not have diplomatic status and can
either be from the host country, a third country, or the United States.
[C] The number of private security contractors is an estimate provided
by senior Diplomatic Security officials.]
[End of table]
Diplomatic Security's Mission Has Grown in Reaction to a Number of
Major Security Incidents:
Over the last decade, Diplomatic Security's mission and activities have
grown in reaction to a number of security incidents. These include 39
attacks on embassies, consulates, or official U.S. personnel--starting
with the 1998 attacks against the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania;
the attacks on September 11, 2001; and the U.S. involvement in Iraq
starting in 2003. (See figure 3 for a timeline of significant events
affecting Diplomatic Security missions and activities.)
Figure 3: Timeline of Events Affecting Diplomatic Security:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
1998:
Incidents:
* 7 Rocket Propelled Grenades, (RPG) fired at Embassy, Beirut;
* Both embassies simultaneously attacked with truck bombs, Nairobi and
Dar-es-Salaam.
1999:
Incidents:
* Attempted RPG attack; gunmen fire on Embassy, Moscow;
* Bombing near U.S./UK Consulate General, Yekaterinburg;
* Tribesmen attempt to kidnap embassy employee, Sana‘a;
* Terrorist launch RPG at Consulate, Istanbul;
* Rockets launched at Embassy, injuring local guard, Islamabad.
Diplomatic Security Response:
* Physical and technical security upgrades initiated;
* Armored vehicles provided for all posts worldwide;
* Increased Diplomatic Security guard forces to implement enhanced
security procedures.
Congressional Action:
* Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999;
* FY 99 Emergency Security Supplemental.
2000:
Diplomatic Security Response:
* First WPPS contract awarded.
2001:
Incidents:
* September 11 Terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon.
2002:
Incidents:
* Gunmen attack Consulate, Calcutta;
* Two grenades thrown at Embassy, Sana‘a;
* U.S. diplomat killed in attack near Embassy, Islamabad;
* Car bomb explodes near Embassy, Lima;
* Truck bomb detonates outside Consulate, Karachi;
* Consular Office bombed as part of the Bali bombings, Denpasar;
* Al-Qa‘ida assassinates USAID Director, Amman.
2003:
Incidents:
* U.S. led invasion of Iraq;
* Gunmen attack Embassy, Islamabad.
2004:
Incidents:
* Truck bomb fails to detonate near Consulate, Karachi;
* Suicide bomber attacks Embassy, Tashkent;
* U.S. diplomat injured in bombing at hotel, Islamabad;
* Gunmen raid diplomatic compound, Jeddah.
Diplomatic Security Response:
* Protection responsibilities for Mission Iraq begin;
* Signed MOU with Consular Affairs for the assignment of Diplomatic
Security special agents to conduct fraud investigations in consular
sections abroad.
Congressional Action:
* Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act passed;
* $3.2 billion in supplemental funding for Iraq Security (2004-2009).
2005:
Incident:
* Bomb damages U.S. Embassy vehicle, wounds two, Kabul.
2006:
Incidents:
* Suicide bomber kills U.S. diplomat near Consulate, Karachi;
* INL motorcade attacked by suicide car bomb, Herat;
* INL vehicle destroyed by roadside bomb, Kabul;
* Suicide car bomb detonates outside Embassy, Kabul;
* Gunmen raid U.S. Embassy, Damascus.
Diplomatic Security Response:
* Diplomatic Security Passport and Visa Strategic Plan submitted to
Congress.
2007:
Incidents:
* RPG fired at Embassy, Athens;
* Fire on helicopter carrying Ambassador, Batticaloa;
* Suicide bomber destroys embassy vehicle, Kabul;
* Two suicide bombers target U.S. diplomatic facilities, Casablanca;
* Maoists attack ambassador‘s vehicle, Kathmandu;
* Terrorists launch mortars at Consulate (October and December),
Peshawar.
2008:
Incidents:
* Terrorist assassinates USAID employee, Khartoum;
* Gunmen fire on Ambassador during ceremony, Kabul;
* Armed attack against Consulate, Istanbul;
* Bullets and grenade shot at U.S. Consulate, Monterrey;
* Gunmen attempt to kidnap Principal Officer, Peshawar;
* Two car bombs outside U.S. Embassy in Yemeni capital, Sana'a.
Diplomatic Security Response:
* Diplomatic Security‘s Threat Investigations and Analysis Directorate
established.
2009:
Diplomatic Security Response:
* Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative fully implemented.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[End of figure]
1998 Bombings Created a New Focus on the Physical Security of Posts
Overseas:
In response to the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania, Diplomatic Security sought to improve U.S. security and
antiterrorism efforts worldwide. Following the 1998 attacks, State
determined that more than 85 percent of diplomatic facilities did not
meet security standards at that time and were also vulnerable to
terrorist attacks. In response, Diplomatic Security added many of the
physical security measures currently in place at most U.S. missions
worldwide such as additional barriers, alarms and public address
systems, and enhanced access procedures such as mandatory inspections
of vehicles entering the U.S. diplomatic facilities. Diplomatic
Security also introduced the concept of "surveillance detection teams"
at nearly all of their diplomatic postings. These teams look for
terrorist surveillance directed against diplomatic facilities. In
addition, Diplomatic Security expanded antiterrorism training to aid
foreign police in combating terrorism, and determined that it was
imperative that each Chief of Mission and Principal Officer be provided
with a fully armored vehicle. Prior to the 1998 bombings, 50 armored
vehicles were provided to chiefs of mission at critical and high-threat
posts. Now there are more than 3,600 armored vehicles worldwide,
including 246 armored vehicles for Chiefs of Mission and over 1,100 for
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Diplomatic Security also increased
its security personnel and hired additional local guards and assigned
additional security personnel to missions abroad.
Since 1998, there have been 39 attacks aimed at U.S. Embassies or
Consulates or Chief of Mission personnel, not including regular attacks
against the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad since 2004. The nature of some of
these attacks has led Diplomatic Security to adapt its security
measures. (See appendix IX for a list of attacks.) The December 6,
2004, attack on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, provides a
specific example of how Diplomatic Security adjusts its security
procedures. According to State, the attackers gained entry into the
U.S. consulate by running through the vehicle access gate. While
Diplomatic Security had installed a device to force vehicles to stop
for inspection before entering a compound, it did not prevent the
attackers from entering the compound by foot once the barrier was
lowered. To correct that vulnerability, Diplomatic Security has
incorporated "man-traps" in conjunction with the vehicle barriers at
vehicle entry points at most high and critical threat posts,[Footnote
10] whereby, when the barrier is lowered, the vehicle enters a holding
pen, or "man-trap," for inspection before a second barrier in front of
the vehicle opens into the compound. In addition to the direct attacks
on U.S. facilities and personnel overseas, Diplomatic Security's
workload has also been affected by the recent attacks aimed at hotels
frequented by Westerners in Pakistan, India, and Indonesia.[Footnote
11] To address these security threats, Diplomatic Security has a
increased its focus on security awareness training to employees
traveling outside of the official State compound. In addition, the
emergence of terrorist tactics in targeting nongovernment personnel and
facilities led to the rapid expansion of another Diplomatic Security
program, the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). Formed in 1985
to improve the exchange of security information between the government
and the private sector, OSAC has formed councils in more than 100
cities around the world to improve security for American organizations
operating outside of the United States.
After 2001, Diplomatic Security Increased Focus on Domestic Security:
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks underscored the importance of
Diplomatic Security upgrading its domestic security programs and
enhancing its investigative capacity. Following the attacks, Diplomatic
Security significantly upgraded its domestic technical and procedural
security programs and strengthened its counterintelligence program. In
addition, Diplomatic Security acquired additional security personnel to
provide added perimeter control and surveillance detection to address
the changing threat environment, and hired and deployed additional
security engineers, to provide necessary technical expertise in support
of Diplomatic Security's technical security programs. In addition, in
2006, Diplomatic Security submitted to Congress a strategic plan that
entailed significantly expanding the bureau's investigative capacity.
[Footnote 12] For example, Diplomatic Security expanded its liaison and
task force efforts with several federal law enforcement agencies and
intelligence organizations and assigned additional special agents to
Consular Affairs' Fraud Prevention offices, the National Passport
Center, the National Visa Center, and the Kentucky Consular Center to
ensure the timely investigation of suspected fraudulent travel
documents.
U.S. Involvement in Iraq Was Followed by a Policy of Maintaining
Diplomatic Missions in War-Torn, Hostile Environments:
Following the onset of U.S. operations in Iraq in 2003, Diplomatic
Security has had to provide security in the Iraq war zone and other
increasingly hostile environments. On June 28, 2004, Diplomatic
Security assumed protection responsibilities of the U.S. Embassy in
Baghdad. The Embassy is located within the International Zone, an area
in the center of Baghdad completely surrounded by high concrete blast
walls and barbed wire, which was controlled by United States and other
Coalition forces, until January 2009 when the Iraqi government assumed
responsibility. A bilateral security agreement between the United
States and the new government of Iraq requires the United States to
remove all of its remaining forces by December 31, 2011, which will
impact Diplomatic Security's operations.[Footnote 13]
Conducting diplomacy in a war zone was part of a Bush administration
initiative called "Transformational Diplomacy." Former Secretary of
State Rice stated that the objective of transformational diplomacy was
to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond
to the needs of those nations' people and conduct themselves
responsibly in the international system. State's transformational
diplomacy initiative has required a shift of human resources to
increasingly critical regions such as Africa, East Asia, and the Middle
East and, in turn, Diplomatic Security has been required to provide
security to more dangerous posts in these regions, such as in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Diplomatic Security Funding Has Increased Considerably, and Personnel
Has Doubled Since 1998:
In response to the growing Diplomatic Security mission, Diplomatic
Security funding and personnel have increased considerably since the
1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Prior to the
bombings, Diplomatic Security operated on an annual budget of about
$170 million;[Footnote 14] by fiscal year 2008, the Diplomatic Security
budget was approximately $1.8 billion, of which over $300 million was
for security in Iraq. In addition to major increases in funding,
Diplomatic Security has doubled the size of its direct-hire workforce
since 1998 and continues to increase levels of direct-hires and
contract support personnel to address growing security needs.
The Diplomatic Security Budget Has Increased Considerably Since 1998,
though Total Security Costs Are Not Captured in Diplomatic Security
Data:
Diplomatic Security reports that its budget[Footnote 15] has increased
from about $200 million in 1998 to $1.8 billion in 2008. The budget
increased largely due to new security procedures put in place after the
1998 bombings in Africa, as well as the need to provide security for
diplomats in the conflict zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. Diplomatic
Security budget data does not capture all of the expenses related to
the bureau. In fiscal year 2008, State allocated approximately $2.2
billion for all Diplomatic Security functions.
In response to the 1998 embassy attacks, Diplomatic Security received a
considerable increase in funds to immediately address security
vulnerabilities at posts worldwide and, since then, funding for
worldwide operations outside of conflict zones has grown steadily.
Prior to the bombings, from 1995-1998, the Diplomatic Security budget
averaged about $173 million annually. In 1999, the Diplomatic Security
budget spiked to $784 million after Congress provided Diplomatic
Security with emergency supplemental funding to begin an overhaul of
security standards at posts worldwide.[Footnote 16] Diplomatic Security
has continued to receive funding to implement and maintain security
upgrades. (See figure 4.) Funding is provided through annual
appropriations for Worldwide Security Protection.[Footnote 17]
Worldwide Security Protection funds are used primarily for: (1)
physical and technical security upgrades at posts,[Footnote 18] (2)
replacement of armored vehicles at posts worldwide, (3) increased
diplomatic security guard forces to implement enhanced security
procedures, and (4) additional direct-hire personnel and crisis
management training. State's foreign affairs budget allocated for
security more than tripled from 1998 to 1999, from 9 percent of the
total foreign affairs budget to 22 percent.
Figure 4: Historical Trend in Diplomatic Security Budget:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Year: 1998: (Bombings of U.S. Embassies in Africa);
Budget: $172 million.
Year: 1999:
Budget: $784 million.
Year: 2000:
Budget: $538 million.
Year: 2001: (September 11 attacks);
Budget: $571 million.
Year: 2002:
Budget: $579 million.
Year: 2003:
Budget: $630 million.
Year: 2004: (State initiates diplomatic presence in Iraq);
Budget: $836 million.
Year: 2005:
Budget: $1,274 million.
Year: 2006:
Budget: $1,657 million.
Year: 2007:
Budget: $1,678 million.
Year: 2008:
Budget: $1,760 million.
Year: 2009:
Budget: $2,266 million.
Source: GAO analysis of Diplomatic Security data.
Note: This figure represents the Diplomatic Security annual budget for
fiscal years 1998-2009 and does not include Antiterrorism Assistance
funding, personnel salaries, or support costs for overseas agents.
Budget data is presented in nominal dollars. However, when adjusting
for inflation, the Diplomatic Security budget still had tremendous
growth from 1998 to 2009. For example, using the chain-weighted GDP
Price Index, the 1998 budget figure of $172 million would be $222
million in 2009 dollars.
[End of figure]
A large portion of the increase in the Diplomatic Security budget is
due to security requirements associated with State operations in the
conflict areas of Iraq and Afghanistan. Diplomatic Security received
approximately $3.5 billion to provide security in Iraq and Afghanistan
from 2004-2009, about 40 percent of the budget for all security
operations domestically and worldwide during this time period. In
fiscal year 2009, the Diplomatic Security budget for Iraq security
alone is estimated at $900 million, representing approximately 40
percent of the total Diplomatic Security budget. Much of the funding
for Iraq is dedicated to contractor support personnel for protective
details and compound security. For example, the department obligated
over $1.1 billion from fiscal years 2006 through 2008 to fund five task
orders under the Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract,
employing approximately 1,400 private security contractors who provide
high-threat protection to U.S. officials traveling in Iraq. In
addition, Diplomatic Security funds over 1,800 contract guards in Iraq
under the Baghdad Embassy Security Force contract, and over 600 guards
and private security contractors in Afghanistan. Spending on Diplomatic
Security guards worldwide has also nearly doubled since 2003, from $267
million per year to $490 million in 2009.
The Diplomatic Security budget does not capture all the funding
directed to the bureau and its employees, which was approximately $2.2
billion in fiscal year 2008. This estimate includes salaries of all
Diplomatic Security employees, support costs, antiterrorism training
provided to overseas partners, and indirect funding for Diplomatic
Security personnel operating overseas.[Footnote 19] The Diplomatic
Security budget is composed of direct funding through appropriations,
fees collected through visa processing, and reimbursements from other
bureaus and agencies. However, Diplomatic Security receives indirect
funding through State regional bureaus, which as of fiscal year 2008,
provided for the salaries and expenses of over 600 special agents and
350 Locally Employed Staff (LES) posted overseas.[Footnote 20]
Additionally, Diplomatic Security, along with the State Office of
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, manages funds under the Antiterrorism
Assistance Program, which provides partner nations with
counterterrorism training and equipment.[Footnote 21]
Diplomatic Security Has Doubled Its Direct-Hire Workforce Since 1998
and Become Increasingly Reliant on Contractor Support:
The size of the direct-hire workforce has doubled since 1998, and
Diplomatic Security plans to continue to expand its workforce. At the
same time, Diplomatic Security's reliance on contractors has grown,
largely to fill critical needs in the high-threat posts of Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Diplomatic Security Has More than Doubled the Number of Direct-Hire
Security Specialists Since 1998:
The size of Diplomatic Security's direct-hire security specialist
workforce (special agents, engineers, technicians, and couriers) has
doubled since 1998. The number of direct-hire security specialists
increased from just under 1,000 in 1998 to over 2,000 in 2009. In
response to the bombings in 1998, the Worldwide Security Protection
program provided for the first major increase in Diplomatic Security
personnel in 13 years, and personnel numbers continued to climb
throughout the decade as U.S. diplomatic missions and official U.S.
personnel overseas faced 39 attacks between 1998 and 2008. Diplomatic
Security had an almost 60 percent increase in the security specialist
workforce from 1998-2002. The initial funding for the Worldwide
Security Protection program provided an additional 271 security
specialists and 89 support personnel. Diplomatic Security requested
additional staff in 2001 in order to bolster its investigative
capabilities at domestic field offices, as well as the many global
security programs. Diplomatic Security also requested additional
domestic personnel at program offices at headquarters to coordinate
Diplomatic Security programs. Since 2002, Diplomatic Security personnel
numbers have continued to grow steadily. Much of the growth has been
among special agents, which increased from 1,244 agents in 2002 to
1,702 agents in 2009 (about 37 percent). (See figure 5.) Diplomatic
Security is projected to add over 350 security positions in fiscal year
2010, in part to increase the number of security personnel in high-
threat environments.
Figure 5: Growth of Security Specialist Workforce: 1998-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Actual employees:
Year: 1998;
Special agents: 785;
Couriers: 75;
Security engineers: 126;
Security technicians: 0.
Year: 1999;
Special agents: 985;
Couriers: 96;
Security engineers: 140;
Security technicians: 0.
Year: 2000;
Special agents: 990;
Couriers: 97;
Security engineers: 141;
Security technicians: 33.
Year: 2001;
Special agents: 1,022;
Couriers: 95;
Security engineers: 150;
Security technicians: 36.
Year: 2002;
Special agents: 1,244;
Couriers: 95;
Security engineers: 177;
Security technicians: 53.
Year: 2003;
Special agents: 1,261;
Couriers: 92;
Security engineers: 206;
Security technicians: 77.
Year: 2004;
Special agents: 1,348;
Couriers: 85;
Security engineers: 198;
Security technicians: 87.
Year: 2005;
Special agents: 1,382;
Couriers: 94;
Security engineers: 186;
Security technicians: 82.
Year: 2006;
Special agents: 1,441;
Couriers: 89;
Security engineers: 196;
Security technicians: 92.
Year: 2007;
Special agents: 1,478;
Couriers: 101;
Security engineers: 197;
Security technicians: 95.
Year: 2008;
Special agents: 1,585;
Couriers: 98;
Security engineers: 186;
Security technicians: 107.
Year: 2009;
Special agents: 1,702;
Couriers: 100;
Security engineers: 179;
Security technicians: 112.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[End of figure]
Since 1998, Diplomatic Security has increased the size of the civil
service workforce and has positioned many additional special agents
domestically. Between 1998 and 2008, the number of civil service
personnel more than doubled, from 258 to 592 personnel. Diplomatic
Security identified the need for more domestically based security
personnel to allow maximum control and flexibility of resources, as
well as to provide more personnel to conduct investigations and staff
protection details for foreign dignitaries and the Secretary of State.
Additionally, Diplomatic Security noted in 2001 that domestic offices
were facing backlogs and were frequently understaffed due to protective
detail and emergency overseas requirements and wanted to increase the
size of the domestic offices to better meet program requirements.
In 2004, Congressional legislation mandated Diplomatic Security to
enhance its efforts to provide for greater visa and passport security
in order to target and disrupt terrorist travel.[Footnote 22] In
response, Diplomatic Security has increased the number of special
agents at domestic field offices, and has also increased the number of
civil service Criminal Investigator positions that only work
domestically.[Footnote 23] From 2004 to 2009, Diplomatic Security
increased the number of criminal investigators from 17 to 59.
Diplomatic Security Has Become Increasingly Reliant on Contractors:
Diplomatic Security has increased its use of contractors to support
security operations worldwide, specifically through increases in the
Diplomatic Security guard force and the use of contractors to provide
protective details for American diplomats in high-threat environments.
Diplomatic Security also utilizes contractors in management support
positions. Approximately 90 percent of all Diplomatic Security
personnel are contractors. (See figure 6.)
Figure 6: Diplomatic Security Reliance on Contractors:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Contractors: 90%;
Direct Hires: 10%.
Source: GAO analysis of Diplomatic Security data.
[End of figure]
The majority of Diplomatic Security contractors are part of the global
Diplomatic Security guard force. Diplomatic Security uses contracts for
diplomatic guard forces that provide physical protection at overseas
posts. While host governments are required to provide security for U.S.
facilities overseas, Diplomatic Security augments security with
Diplomatic Security guards at posts, two-thirds of which are provided
through contracts with guard companies with the rest hired through
Personal Service Agreements, where individuals contract directly with
the U.S. mission to provide security.[Footnote 24] Following the 1998
bombings, Diplomatic Security increased staffing under the Diplomatic
Security guard program to help implement new security procedures. For
example, State made inspection of all vehicles entering all U.S. posts
abroad mandatory, and new Diplomatic Security guard teams were
established to detect terrorist surveillance of U.S. personnel and
facilities. Diplomatic Security guards are usually composed of host
country nationals, and their numbers are largely driven by the threat
level and security situation in the host country. For example, Mexico
has one of the largest guard programs in the world, with 563 guards
covering the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, six Consulates General, two
Consulates, and two Consular Agencies.
State has acknowledged that it relies on thousands of private security
contractors to meet the agency's increasing requirements for protective
details, specifically in conflict zones. Over the past 10 years, State
has increasingly assigned Diplomatic Security to provide protective
services in conflict zones, and Diplomatic Security has been unable to
do so from the limited cadre of special agents. State's Worldwide
Personal Protective Services (WPPS) program began in 2000 to provide
contractor support for such protective details. Diplomatic Security
uses contractors for functions it does not have the personnel capacity
to support, and in situations where it may have to increase or decrease
the number of personnel rapidly. Persistent turmoil in the Middle East
and prolonged postwar stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq
have required the continuous deployment of WPPS contractors, with the
largest growth in contract usage beginning in 2004 due to operations in
Iraq. Diplomatic Security has spent over $2.1 billion on 581 separate
WPPS contracts to date. As of October 2008, there are 1,400 WPPS
contractors in Iraq alone. According to State, the use of contractors
is critical in quickly placing needed personnel in high-threat
environments.
Diplomatic Security utilizes contractors to fill administrative support
positions but is planning to replace some contractor roles with full-
time positions. In addition to guards and security contractors,
Diplomatic Security uses over 1,000 contractors to provide
administrative functions. According to Diplomatic Security officials,
the previous administration advocated for the increased use of
contractor support; however, the current administration is reexamining
this approach and is seeking to reduce expenses related to contractors.
Diplomatic Security officials said the bureau is seeking to increase
the number of civil service positions intended in part to replace some
contractors in key positions.
Dangerous Environments, Staffing Shortages, and Reactive Planning
Challenge Diplomatic Security:
Diplomatic Security faces several policy and operational challenges.
First, according to Diplomatic Security officials, State is maintaining
missions in countries where it would have previously evacuated
personnel, which requires more resources and, therefore, makes it more
difficult for Diplomatic Security to provide a secure environment.
Second, although Diplomatic Security has grown considerably in staff
over the last 10 years, staffing shortages in domestic offices and
other operational challenges further tax Diplomatic Security's ability
to implement all of its missions. Finally, State has expanded
Diplomatic Security without the benefit of solid strategic planning;
neither State's departmental strategic plan nor Diplomatic Security's
bureau strategic plan specifically addresses the bureau's resource
needs or its management challenges.
Maintaining Missions in Iraq and Other Increasingly Dangerous Posts
Significantly Affects Diplomatic Security's Work:
Maintaining diplomatic missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other
increasingly dangerous environments has required an unprecedented
amount of security resources, straining Diplomatic Security's ability
to provide security.
Iraq:
In 2004, when the U.S. government and Coalition forces transferred
sovereignty to the interim Iraqi government, security for the U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad transferred from the U.S. Department of Defense to
Diplomatic Security. Since then, keeping staff secure, yet productive,
in Iraq has been one of Diplomatic Security's largest challenges
because the mission is subject to regular threats and attacks. The U.S.
mission in Baghdad--with 1,300 authorized U.S. civilian personnel--is
one of the largest in the world. Maintaining Diplomatic Security
operations in Iraq has required approximately 36 percent of its entire
budget each fiscal year since 2004 and, as of September 2008, it
required 81 special agents to manage security operations. In order to
support the security operations in Iraq, Diplomatic Security has had to
draw staff and other resources away from other programs and activities.
Special agents posted in Baghdad report that one of the most difficult
aspects of their work--and, therefore, an area that has required many
physical and staff resources--is protecting embassy personnel from
attacks when traveling outside the embassy. Due to the dangerous
security environment, Diplomatic Security provides a protective detail
for embassy officials when they leave the embassy compound. This has
required Diplomatic Security to maintain a costly transportation
network, which includes an air wing, a fleet of armored vehicles, and
the appropriate contract staff to operate the aviation equipment. Iraq
is the only country where Diplomatic Security maintains an aviation
program, which is needed to provide transportation for U.S. officials
to other cities within Iraq, quick reaction to security incidents,
search and rescue missions, and motorcade surveillance. Diplomatic
Security stated that, as of October 2009, there were 914 armored
vehicles in service in Iraq--approximately 32 percent of all armored
vehicles Diplomatic Security has in service worldwide. Each armored
vehicle costs, on average, approximately $173,000 and, according to
Diplomatic Security, has a useful life of about 3 years due to constant
use in Iraq's difficult terrain.
Diplomatic Security constantly needs agents to fill the positions in
Iraq, which draws from other programs and activities. The Iraq mission
has more special agents than any other post in the world[Footnote 25]
in part because State has required that Diplomatic Security include a
special agent in all contractor convoys to provide better oversight of
the contractors who provide the personal security details.[Footnote 26]
Furthermore, the assignments are only 1-year long due to the dangerous
nature of the post. In an effort to decrease the number of special
agents needed to staff the mission in Iraq, Diplomatic Security
officials stated that the bureau has created a new employee position,
Security Protection Specialists (SPS), that is trained only to provide
oversight to protection details.
Diplomatic Security's operations in Iraq will again be affected as the
U.S. military withdraws its troops from the country. State has relied
on support from the U.S. military to secure the embassy personnel and
safeguard embassy information in Iraq; however, under the November 2008
bilateral security agreement between the United States and Iraq, the
United States must remove all of its remaining forces by December 31,
2011. Earlier in 2009, GAO reported that Diplomatic Security's
workload--and thus its resource requirements--will likely increase as
the U.S. military transitions out of Iraq;[Footnote 27] GAO will
continue to monitor the plans as part of our engagement on civilian
planning for the drawdown of U.S. troops in Iraq.
Afghanistan:
U.S. policymakers' increased focus on Afghanistan poses another
significant challenge for Diplomatic Security. The security situation
in Afghanistan has deteriorated since 2005, and the number of attacks
increased from 2,388 in 2005 to 10,889 in 2008. As with Iraq, the
special agents in Afghanistan reported that the greatest challenge for
them is safely transporting American officials from the embassy to
other locations. Afghanistan is currently Diplomatic Security's second
largest overseas post with a staff of 16 special agents in 2008, which
increased to 22 special agents in 2009. As of April 2009, Diplomatic
Security was responsible for the security of approximately 300
authorized U.S. civilian personnel, although Diplomatic Security
expects that number to increase if State opens consular offices in the
cities of Herat and Mazar-e-Sherif. While Diplomatic Security has not
been placing a special agent in every contractor-led convoy, as in
Iraq, Diplomatic Security plans to increase the use of Diplomatic
Security staff for all convoys. To address these changes, Diplomatic
Security plans to add an additional 25 special agents in 2010,
effectively doubling the number of agents in Afghanistan.
State Operates in More Dangerous Environments Than 10 Years Ago, Which
Affects Diplomatic Security's Work:
In addition to operating in war zones, State is maintaining missions in
countries where it would have previously evacuated personnel. According
to Diplomatic Security officials, maintaining missions in these
dangerous environments requires more resources and, therefore, makes it
more difficult for Diplomatic Security to provide a secure environment.
(Figure 7 shows that the number of posts evacuated for security-related
reasons increased after significant events in 1998, 2001, and 2003, and
has subsequently decreased since 2003; it also shows that State did not
close any posts between 2003 and 2008.)
Figure 7: Evacuations of U.S. Missions, 1997-2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Year: 1997;
Authorized: 4;
Ordered: 5;
Post closure: 3;
Total: 12.
Year: 1998;
Authorized: 10;
Ordered: 10;
Post closure: 4;
Total: 24.
Year: 1999;
Authorized: 1;
Ordered: 4;
Post closure: 0;
Total: 5.
Year: 2000;
Authorized: 3;
Ordered: 4;
Post closure: 0;
Total: 7.
Year: 2001;
Authorized: 14;
Ordered: 1;
Post closure: 0;
Total: 15.
Year: 2002;
Authorized: 9;
Ordered: 9;
Post closure: 1;
Total: 19.
Year: 2003;
Authorized: 20;
Ordered: 9;
Post closure: 0;
Total: 29.
Year: 2004;
Authorized: 7;
Ordered: 1;
Post closure: 0;
Total: 8.
Year: 2005;
Authorized: 4;
Ordered: 1;
Post closure: 0;
Total: 5;.
Year: 2006;
Authorized: 4;
Ordered: 2;
Post closure: 0;
Total: 6.
Year: 2007;
Authorized: 1;
Ordered: 1;
Post closure: 0;
Total: 2.
Year: 2008;
Authorized: 2;
Ordered: 3;
Post closure: 0;
Total: 5.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: GAO did not include evacuations for weather, pandemic, or
technological (Y2K) reasons and evacuations for nonofficial Americans
in this tabulation. In addition, only the most serious action is
counted. For example: if there was an authorized evacuation followed by
an ordered evacuation, we counted that as an ordered evacuation only.
[End of figure]
Several Diplomatic Security officials cited the agency's
Transformational Diplomacy Initiative as a reason that State maintains
missions in areas where previously it would have evacuated.
Implementing Transformational Diplomacy involved repositioning U.S.
diplomats from countries where the United States had established
partnerships, such as those in Western Europe, to those where
democratic governance needed support, such as China and India.
According to one official, for example, prior to the Transformational
Diplomacy Initiative, State would have evacuated the post in Peshawar,
Pakistan, 2 years ago. However, the U.S. government considers its
operations in Pakistan to be critically important.
Another indication that State is operating in an increasing number of
hostile environments is its growing use of danger pay.[Footnote 28]
Despite the fluctuation in the number of posts warranting danger pay,
there is a statistically significant trend to maintain operations in
more countries warranting danger pay.[Footnote 29] (See figure 8.)
Peshawar is one example of a post that has become increasingly more
volatile over the last 10 years. While the danger pay rating for
Peshawar decreased from 25 percent in 1997 to 15 percent in 1998, the
rating has subsequently increased three times, returning to 25 percent
in 2002, increasing to 30 percent in 2008, and increasing again in 2009
to 35 percent. Sana'a, Yemen, is another example: prior to 2002, U.S.
officials living in Sana'a did not receive a danger pay differential.
State instituted a 15 percent differential for Sana'a in 2002, which
increased to 20 percent in 2006 and to 30 percent in 2009.
Figure 8: Trend in Number of Posts with Danger Pay, 1997-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Year: 1997;
Danger pay posts: 74;
Trend line: 66.
Year: 1998;
Danger pay posts: 81;
Trend line: 68.
Year: 1999;
Danger pay posts: 61;
Trend line: 71.
Year: 2000;
Danger pay posts: 60;
Trend line: 72.
Year: 2001;
Danger pay posts: 58;
Trend line: 74.
Year: 2002;
Danger pay posts: 73;
Trend line: 76.
Year: 2003;
Danger pay posts: 96;
Trend line: 79.
Year: 2004;
Danger pay posts: 80;
Trend line: 81.
Year: 2005;
Danger pay posts: 85;
Trend line: 83.
Year: 2006;
Danger pay posts: 90;
Trend line: 86.
Year: 2007;
Danger pay posts: 91;
Trend line: 89.
Year: 2008;
Danger pay posts: 93;
Trend line: 91.
Year: 2009;
Danger pay posts: 88;
Trend line: 94.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: The trend line in this figure assumes a constant exponential rate
of growth over time. Data for 2009 is as of June 2009.
[End of figure]
In addition to exposing employees to riskier situations, maintaining
posts in dangerous environments requires more security resources.
Diplomatic Security recognizes a post's deteriorating security
environment by increasing its security threat level rating. Each threat
level requires different security measures, as laid out in the Overseas
Security Policy Board interagency coordinated standards. Below is one
example of how more is required of the local guard force as the
security threat heightens. (See table 2.)
Table 2: Change in Perimeter Patrol Requirements by Threat Level:
Threat level: Low;
Requirement for local guards to patrol the perimeter of official
facilities: No provision for foot patrol of official facilities'
perimeters[A].
Threat level: Medium;
Requirement for local guards to patrol the perimeter of official
facilities: 12-hour foot patrol of perimeter during the day and at
residences at night, where required, to supplement host country support
at official facilities.
Threat level: High;
Requirement for local guards to patrol the perimeter of official
facilities: 24-hour foot patrol at official facilities and residences
for the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Principal Officers, and
Marine Security Guards.
Threat level: Critical;
Requirement for local guards to patrol the perimeter of official
facilities: 24-hour foot patrol at official facilities and residences
for the Ambassador, Deputy Chief of Mission, Principal Officers, and
Marine Security Guards. Guards are to be armed unless prohibited by
law.
Source: Foreign Affairs Handbook (12 FAH 6, H-110 through H-114).
[A] Except in unusual, individual circumstances.
[End of table]
Very dangerous environments might require Diplomatic Security to
provide additional resources beyond what the security standards
require. For instance, to maintain the consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan,
Diplomatic Security officials stated that they had to enhance the
compound's physical security by deploying two Security Support Teams.
Diplomatic Security usually uses these teams as emergency support to
overseas posts experiencing civil disorder, armed conflict, or
increased threat of attack. However, because the security situation in
Peshawar is so critical, Diplomatic Security has had two teams posted
there since late 2008. In addition, Diplomatic Security provided $4
million toward the improvement of access controls to the diplomatic
enclave in Islamabad, Pakistan. According to Diplomatic Security, these
improvements are part of a collective effort to improve highly
vulnerable locations.
Diplomatic Security Faces Operational Challenges That Negatively Affect
Its Ability to Implement Important Activities:
Diplomatic Security's ability to fully carry out its mission of
providing security worldwide is hindered by staffing shortages in
domestic offices--even in light of its workforce growth--and other
operational challenges such as inadequate facilities, pervasive
language proficiency shortfalls, and host-country constraints, among
others.
Some Diplomatic Security Offices Operate with Severe Shortages of
Staff:
Despite Diplomatic Security's growth in staff over the last 10 years,
some offices have been operating with severe staffing shortages. Some
of the shortages are caused by unpredictable circumstances--like visits
from foreign dignitaries who require protection details--however, the
annual staffing cycle, while predictable, also affects staffing
shortages. Diplomatic Security has taken some steps to address the
staffing shortage, but challenges remain.
In 2008, approximately one-third of Diplomatic Security's domestic
suboffices operated with a 25 percent vacancy rate or higher. Several
offices report that this shortage of staff affected their ability to
conduct their work:
* The Houston field office reported that for 6 months of the year, it
operated at 50 percent capacity of nonsupervisory agents or lower and
for 2 months during the summer, it dipped down to a low of 35 percent.
This staffing gap happened while the field office was experiencing a
significant increase in its caseload due to the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative. As a result, the Houston field office management
reported that this combination overwhelmed its capabilities and
resulted in a significant backlog of cases.[Footnote 30]
* The New York field office reported that the number of special agents
dropped to 66 in 2008 from more than 110 agents in 2007. As a result,
the office had to draw special agents from other field offices to cover
their heavy dignitary protection load.
* In 2008, the Mobile Security Deployment (MSD) Office was authorized
to have 94 special agent positions, but only 76 were filled.
Furthermore Diplomatic Security officials noted that not all filled
staff positions are available for duty. For example, in 2009, 22 agents
assigned to MSD were in training. As a result of the low level of
available staff, Diplomatic Security reported that many posts go for
years without updating their security training.[Footnote 31] Officials
noted that this lack of available teams is particularly problematic
given the high number of critical threat posts that are only 1-year
tours that would benefit from frequent training.
* Officials in the Professional Responsibility Office stated in
February 2009 that only 60 percent of its positions were filled. They
also stated that their staff allocation was insufficient in comparison
with sister organizations with similar functions, noting that
Diplomatic Security staffs their office with 1 professional
responsibility investigator for every 2,000 employees, while the Drug
Enforcement Agency maintains a 1:288 ratio, and the Department of
Justice maintains a 1:170 ratio.
Diplomatic Security officials maintain that most of the special agent
staffing shortages are in domestic offices. However, three overseas
posts we visited also reported staffing gaps:
* New Delhi, India: The Regional Security Office had only two of seven
allocated special agents until late fall of 2008, which embassy
officials reported was insufficient to carry out its full workload.
* Tunis, Tunisia: Because one special agent curtailed his tour to go to
Iraq, there was a 6-week gap before the replacement RSO could arrive.
During that 6-week gap a first tour ARSO handled all the RSO duties.
* Abuja, Nigeria: There was a period of 2 months when the Regional
Security Office only had one of four staff members assigned. Because of
the lack of staff, the RSO was unable to properly oversee the
surveillance detection program, which relied on contractors who were no
longer fulfilling their duties.
State officials attributed these shortages to three main factors:
staffing the Iraq mission, protection details, and the annual staffing/
training cycle.
* Staffing the Iraq mission: As previously discussed, staffing the
large number of special agents at the Iraq embassy has drawn staff away
from other missions and offices. Iraq is a critical threat post;
therefore, Diplomatic Security fills it and other critical threat posts
first. In 2008, 81 Diplomatic Security special agents--or 16 percent of
Diplomatic Security staff--were posted to Iraq for 1-year tours. To
fill this need, State officials reported that special agents frequently
leave positions in other countries before completing the end of their
tours to serve in Iraq. In 2008, we reported that, in order to provide
enough Diplomatic Security special agents in Iraq, Diplomatic Security
had to move agents from other programs, and those moves have affected
the agency's ability to perform other missions, including providing
security for visiting dignitaries and visa, passport, and identity
fraud investigations.[Footnote 32]
* Protection details: Diplomatic Security draws agents from field
offices, headquarters, and overseas posts to participate in protective
details and special events. At least three field offices provided 12 or
more agents for temporary duty assignment during 2008 on the
Secretary's protective detail that often lasted 30 days or more. One
field office noted that the number of details doubled from the previous
year. Field offices also provided agents to protect a number of
visiting foreign dignitaries. In addition, Diplomatic Security's role
in providing protection at major events--such as the Olympics--has
grown, which will require more staff to cover these events. Several
field offices reported that they provided multiple agents for the 2008
Olympics in Beijing, China, for tours that lasted between 30 and 60
days.
* Normal rotations: Staff take home leave between postings and
sometimes are required to take training before starting the next
assignment. This process regularly creates a labor shortage, which
affects Diplomatic Security's ability to meet the increased security
demands placed on the bureau. For example, Diplomatic Security reported
that, in November 2004, 100 special agents were in training, on
temporary duty, or leave-without-pay, leaving the duties of those
positions unperformed. Our fieldwork confirmed that this situation
continues. In 2005, Diplomatic Security identified the need for a
training float--additional staff that would allow the bureau to fill
critical positions and still allow staff time for critical job
training--but the bureau has not been able to implement one.
Diplomatic Security Efforts to Address Staffing Challenges:
Diplomatic Security has taken several steps to address the staffing
shortages, including doubling the staff size since 1998 and requesting
funding to hire over 350 security positions in fiscal year 2010. While
Diplomatic Security's staff size has increased dramatically, new hires
cannot be immediately deployed to critical overseas posts. According to
Diplomatic Security, it takes approximately 3 years to prepare a new
hire for his or her first tour overseas due to required law
enforcement, RSO, and on-the-job investigative training at a domestic
field office. According to Diplomatic Security officials, the bureau
has shortened the basic training requirements and the required time
spent in first rotation in order to get new hires overseas more
quickly.
In addition to hiring new special agents, Diplomatic Security created
the SPS position in February 2009. The bureau's intent was to hire, on
a limited-term basis, a cadre of professionals specifically trained in
personnel protection who would serve in Iraq and other high-threat
posts to provide oversight for the contractor-operated protective
details. Because of the more targeted training requirements, Diplomatic
Security would be able to deploy the SPS staff more quickly than new
hire special agents. However, Diplomatic Security has had difficulty
recruiting and hiring a sufficient number of SPS candidates. Diplomatic
Security originally intended to hire and train 25 SPSs and later add 20
more positions. Diplomatic Security officials reported having
difficulty filling the positions because they compete with private
security contractors for new hires and, at the end of September 2009,
only 10 positions had been filled. According to senior Diplomatic
Security officials, the bureau may cancel the program if they can not
recruit enough qualified candidates.
In order to make special agents available for critical posts,
Diplomatic Security has also enacted three administrative initiatives.
First, Diplomatic Security stated that it fills all positions in Iraq
and Afghanistan before filling any other positions. Second, Diplomatic
Security has identified a number of positions that it will not fill in
this year's staffing cycle. According to Diplomatic Security officials
the identified positions are usually at posts that have a number of
assistant RSOs (ARSO) and, therefore, are better able to distribute the
workload. Finally, Diplomatic Security stated that it has begun
restricting its employees' annual leave on a limited basis, during
major events requiring a large protective security commitment such as
the UN General Assembly. While these measures help ensure that critical
needs missions are adequately staffed, they can exacerbate staffing
shortages for other missions and offices.
Other Operational Challenges Also Impede Diplomatic Security's Ability
to Fully Implement Its Missions and Activities:
Diplomatic Security also faces a number of other operational challenges
that impede the full implementation of its missions and activities.
However, Diplomatic Security is not always able to implement security
programs to the established standard because of certain operational
challenges, including the following:
* Inadequate buildings: While State is in the process of updating and
building many new facilities, in a previously published report, GAO
identified many posts that are still situated in buildings that do not
meet all security standards delineated by the Overseas Security Policy
Board and in the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act
of 1999. For example, many buildings do not have a 100-foot setback,
increasing the risk of serious injury from bomb blasts.[Footnote 33] As
a result, many buildings and their occupants may remain vulnerable to
attack.
* Foreign language deficiencies: Earlier this year, GAO found that 53
percent of RSOs do not speak and read at the level required by their
positions. According to officials in Diplomatic Security, language
training for security officers is often cut short because many
ambassadors are unwilling to leave security positions vacant. However,
GAO concluded that these foreign language shortfalls could be
negatively affecting several aspects of U.S. diplomacy, including
security operations. For example, an officer at a post of strategic
interest said because she did not speak the language, she had
transferred a sensitive telephone call from a local informant to a
local employee, which could have compromised the informant's
identity.[Footnote 34]
* Experience gaps: Thirty-four percent of Diplomatic Security's
positions (not including those in Baghdad) are filled with officers
below the position's grade. In a previous publication, GAO reported
that experience gaps can compromise diplomatic readiness.[Footnote 35]
In addition, Diplomatic Security officials stated that these gaps
between the experience level required by the position and the
experience level of the employee assigned can affect the quality of
Diplomatic Security's work. For example, several ARSOs with whom we met
were in their first overseas positions and stated that they did not
feel adequately prepared for their job, particularly their
responsibility to manage large security contracts.
* Host country laws: At times, host country laws prohibit Diplomatic
Security from taking all the security precautions it would like outside
the embassy. For example, Diplomatic Security officials said that they
prefer to arm their local guard forces and their special agents;
however, several countries prohibit it. In cases of attack, this
prohibition limits Diplomatic Security's ability to protect the
compound.
* Balancing security with diplomatic mission: Diplomatic Security's
desire to provide the best security possible for State's diplomatic
corps has, at times, been in tension with State's diplomatic mission.
For example, Diplomatic Security has established strict policies
concerning access to U.S. facilities that usually include personal and
vehicle screening. Some public affairs officials--whose job it is to
foster relations with host country nationals--have expressed concerns
that the security measures discourage visitors from attending U.S.
embassy events or exhibits. In addition, the new embassies and
consulates, with their high walls, deep setback, and strict screening
procedures, have evoked the nickname, "Fortress America." State has
also received criticism from U.S. think tanks for adopting what seems
to be a "zero tolerance" for security incidents. Two are encouraging
State to change its security culture and practices from risk avoidance
to risk management.
Although Some Planning Initiatives Have Been Undertaken, Diplomatic
Security's Growth Has Been More Reactive Than Strategic:
Although some planning initiatives have been undertaken, neither
State's departmental strategic plan nor Diplomatic Security's bureau
strategic plan specifically address the bureau's resource needs or its
management challenges. Therefore, Diplomatic Security's tremendous
growth over the last 10 years has been in reaction to events and has
not benefited from adequate strategic guidance.
State's departmental strategic plan does not specifically address
Diplomatic Security's resource needs or management challenges. State is
required by the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) to
regularly submit a strategic plan for the department. GPRA requires
that a strategic plan contain six elements.[Footnote 36] The committee
report[Footnote 37] accompanying GPRA summarizes the requirements,
stating that a multiyear strategic plan should articulate the
fundamental mission (or missions) of an organization and lay out its
long-term general goals for implementing that mission, including the
resources needed to reach these goals. GAO has further suggested that
addressing management challenges, in addition to other factors, would
enhance the usefulness of agencies' strategic plans. While State's
strategic plan for 2007-2012 does have a section identifying security
priorities and goals, we found that it did not identify the resources
needed to meet these goals or address all of the management challenges
we identified in this report.
Diplomatic Security has undertaken some planning efforts at the bureau
and office level, but these efforts also have limitations. As with
every State bureau, Diplomatic Security produces an annual bureau
strategic plan.[Footnote 38] While the plan lists priorities, goals,
and indicators for the bureau, they do not always track. For example,
in the fiscal year 2011 plan, Diplomatic Security lists Foreign Affairs
security training center activities as a priority, but it does not list
corresponding goals or indicators that would track the bureau's
progress. In addition, the plan does not identify what staff,
equipment, or funding would be needed. Diplomatic Security has also
created a plan to guide its visa and passport fraud investigative work.
Diplomatic Security created the Visa and Passport Security Strategic
Plan to guide its efforts to disrupt individuals and organizations that
attempt to compromise the integrity of U.S. travel documents. According
to Diplomatic Security officials, in response to the plan, the bureau
has increased the number of domestic positions for investigators and
the number of investigators overseas through its ARSO-I program.
However, Diplomatic Security noted that it has not been able to expand
the overseas investigator portion to the extent planned due to resource
limitations.[Footnote 39] In addition, Diplomatic Security uses
established security standards and staffing matrixes to determine what
resources are needed for various activities. However, while the tools
help specific offices or missions plan their resource requests, they
are not useful for determining overall bureau needs.
Several senior Diplomatic Security officials noted that Diplomatic
Security remains reactive in nature. Diplomatic Security officials in
charge of workforce planning gave us several reasons for their lack of
long-term strategic planning. First, Diplomatic Security provides a
support function and, therefore, must react to the needs of State;
therefore, the bureau cannot plan its own resources until State
determines its policy direction. For example, given that the U.S.
military has helped provide security to U.S. diplomats in Iraq, the
planned drawdown of U.S. forces significantly affects Diplomatic
Security's workload. Diplomatic Security, however, could not provide us
a plan for how they will address that change because they must wait for
the department to decide what its overall footprint will be in the
country at that time. Diplomatic Security is, however, participating in
State's "2012" exercise to determine what its presence will look like
in Iraq when the U.S. military withdraws. Second, while State has a 5-
year workforce plan that addresses all bureaus, several senior
Diplomatic Security officials stated that Diplomatic Security does not
use the plan to determine their staffing needs. The officials also
stated that Diplomatic Security did not have its own workforce plan but
rather plans positions 2 years out--based on strategic priorities
developed by the Assistant Secretary--as part of the annual budget and
planning process. Finally, past efforts to further plan Diplomatic
Security resources have gone unheeded. Diplomatic Security's bureau
strategic plan for fiscal year 2006 (written in 2005) identified a need
to (1) develop a workforce strategy to recruit and sustain a diverse
and highly skilled security personnel base and (2) to establish a
training float to address recurring staffing problems. As of September
2009, Diplomatic Security had not addressed either of those needs.
However, Diplomatic Security reported that it is currently examining
all of its security programs to determine how funding and personnel
resources are distributed and supporting the bureau's strategic goals.
Diplomatic Security officials stated that they hope to participate in a
new department management initiative. On July 10, 2009, the Secretary
of State announced the creation of a new Quadrennial Diplomatic and
Development Review (QDDR). This review, which will be managed by a
senior leadership team under the direction of the Secretary of State,
is designed to provide the short-, medium-, and long-term blueprint for
State's diplomatic and development efforts, including how to transition
from approaches no longer commensurate with current challenges. It will
offer guidance on how State develops policies; allocates its resources;
deploys its staff; and exercises its authorities.
Conclusions:
In the last decade, Diplomatic Security's missions and responsibilities
have expanded internationally and domestically, largely in reaction to
security incidents and changing diplomatic priorities of the United
States. Internationally, Diplomatic Security has been required to
provide security at an ever-increasing number of posts in hostile
areas, including many facing conditions that historically may have
triggered evacuation. This has resulted in major security costs and
increased risks to American diplomats. Domestically, Diplomatic
Security's traditional responsibilities have expanded to include a more
prominent role in protecting the United States through increased
investigations of visa and passport fraud, as well as increased
protection responsibilities. Diplomatic Security resources have
significantly expanded in response to these changes. However, due to
mission priorities, several Diplomatic Security offices operate with
staffing shortages and important tasks--such as security training and
program oversight--may not get done. Diplomatic Security's Domestic
Operations have been particularly affected as the bureau often draws
security personnel from domestic offices to cover gaps at critical
posts overseas and to provide protection details. While this stopgap
measure prioritizes life and safety issues, it interrupts important
investigations needed to protect the United States and limits
specialized training for high-threat posts and investigations.
Moreover, Diplomatic Security faces human capital challenges, such as
inexperienced staff and foreign language proficiency shortfalls. The
implications of this growth--in conjunction with the potential for
increased challenges in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other hostile
environments as well as the management challenges listed above--have
not been strategically reviewed by the department. Nevertheless, State
leadership acknowledges the importance of broad strategic planning, as
evidenced by the Secretary's new QDDR, which is intended to ensure
people, programs, and resources serve the highest priorities at State.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of State--as part of the QDDR or as a
separate initiative--conduct a strategic review of the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security to ensure that its missions and activities address
the department's priority needs. This review should also address key
human capital and operational challenges faced by Diplomatic Security,
such as:
* operating domestic and international activities with adequate staff;
* providing security for facilities that do not meet all security
standards;
* staffing foreign missions with officials who have appropriate
language skills;
* operating programs with experienced staff, at the commensurate grade
levels; and:
* balancing security needs with State's need to conduct its diplomatic
mission.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to State for review and comment.
State agreed with the report's recommendation and noted that, although
it is currently not planning to perform a strategic review of the full
Diplomatic Security mission and capabilities in the QDDR, the Under
Secretary for Management and the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic
Security are completely committed to ensuring that Diplomatic
Security's mission will benefit from this initiative. State's official
comments are reprinted in appendix X. Technical comments provided by
the department were incorporated, as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested
congressional committees and to the Secretary of State. The report also
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact
Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff members who made contributions
to this report are listed in appendix XI.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To conduct our review of the Department of State's (State) Bureau of
Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security), we examined (1) how
Diplomatic Security's mission has evolved since the embassy attacks in
1998, (2) the change in human and financial resources for Diplomatic
Security over the last 10 years, and (3) the challenges Diplomatic
Security faces in conducting its missions.
In order to address all three objectives, we interviewed senior
Diplomatic Security officials in each of the directorates and most of
the suboffices. We interviewed Diplomatic Security special agents at
the New York and Washington, D.C., field offices and the San Diego
resident office. We selected the New York and Washington, D.C.,
domestic field offices because they are the largest Diplomatic Security
field offices. We selected the San Diego resident office to allow for
observation of activities along the border region, including
coordination between Diplomatic Security and the Department of Homeland
Security, as well as the U.S. Attorney's Office. In addition, we
observed Diplomatic Security protection activities at the UN General
Assembly and attended the annual meeting of the Overseas Security
Advisory Council (OSAC).
We met with the Regional Security Officers (RSO), Chiefs of Mission,
other State officials, and representatives from other U.S. law
enforcement agencies at 15 diplomatic posts in 9 countries: Egypt
(Cairo and Alexandria), Germany (Frankfurt), India (New Delhi and
Mumbai), Mexico (Mexico City, Tijuana, and Merida), Tunisia (Tunis),
Turkey (Ankara and Istanbul), Saudi Arabia (Riyadh and Jeddah), the
Philippines (Manila), and Indonesia (Jakarta). We also conducted video-
teleconferences with RSOs in 3 additional posts: Iraq (Baghdad),
Afghanistan (Kabul), and Pakistan (Islamabad). We selected the overseas
posts we visited based on multiple criteria that allowed us to observe
a variety of different types of posts. Post selection criteria included
post size (small, medium, and large), the number of posts in the same
country, threat levels (low, medium, high, critical), new embassy
construction, the presence of an ARSO-Investigator, and whether posts
were unaccompanied or restricted. We conducted video-teleconferences
with officials in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan because a significant
amount of Diplomatic Security resources are dedicated to these
countries, and because Diplomatic Security considers these locations to
have the most challenging security environments.
In order to determine how Diplomatic Security's mission has evolved
since the embassy attacks in 1998, we discussed the growth of mission
and activities with cognizant Diplomatic Security officials. We also
reviewed relevant documents including State Congressional Budget
Justifications; briefing materials provided by Diplomatic Security;
Diplomatic Security performance/strategic plans for fiscal years 2002-
2011 (for an overview of the planned growth for the bureau at that time
and to provide the context under which strategic shifts were made); the
State Foreign Affairs Manual (to determine the organization
responsibilities and authorities of Diplomatic Security); and House
hearings on State Appropriations for fiscal years 1999-2004 (to
determine how the Diplomatic Security mission and activities expanded
during this period).
In order to determine the change in human and financial resources for
Diplomatic Security over the last 10 years, we interviewed cognizant
officials in both Diplomatic Security and State's Management Bureau. We
reviewed data from both of those offices and from State's Congressional
Budget Justification. To determine the growth of Diplomatic Security
personnel since 1998, we reviewed Diplomatic Security human resources
data that presented total career full-time permanent security
specialist employees and positions (both Foreign Service and civil
service) as of the end of each fiscal year. We also reviewed data on
all domestic career full-time permanent employees by major occupational
category, as of the end of each fiscal year. To determine staffing gaps
over time, we analyzed the differences between employees and positions.
To determine the growth of civil service security specialists over
time, we reviewed historical data provided by Diplomatic Security's
Executive Directorate. To determine the total Diplomatic Security
workforce for fiscal year 2008, we collected data from Diplomatic
Security on direct-hire employees, other U.S. government support staff,
and contractor and support staff.
To determine the growth of Diplomatic Security's budget over time, we
reviewed Diplomatic Security financial data, including bureau managed
funds, contract costs, and historical budget data. We also reviewed
annual State Congressional Budget Justifications and House Hearings on
State Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1999-2004, including details of
the fiscal year 1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, which provided for a major increase in funding to
Diplomatic Security. To determine all State expenditures for Diplomatic
Security operations, we used data from the fiscal year 2010
Congressional Budget Justification that presents actual numbers for
fiscal year 2008. Diplomatic Security and State officials told us
financial data provided by Diplomatic Security does not reflect
salaries for personnel, while the Congressional Budget Justifications
always reflect salaries. We experienced challenges in receiving budget
and personnel data from Diplomatic Security. In addition, budget and
personnel data contained inconsistencies, and we encountered difficulty
in seeking clarification on the numbers.
In order to determine the challenges Diplomatic Security faces in
conducting its missions we interviewed numerous officials from State
(listed earlier), the State Office of Inspector General, and
collaborating agencies (such as Secret Service, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement). We reviewed bureau planning and reporting
documents from Diplomatic Security including: field office reports from
all 12 field offices for 2006 and 2008 and briefing materials from
several Diplomatic Security offices. We also reviewed reports on
security issues conducted by GAO, the State Office of Inspector
General, several think tanks, and the Congressional Research Service.
To determine the trend in post evacuations, we analyzed State
evacuation data through September 8, 2008. We tabulated the number of
evacuations due to security reasons and excluded those due to
earthquakes, hurricanes, cyclones, flooding, other environmental
factors, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or Y2K computer program
design problems. In cases where post evacuations were listed as more
than one type (authorized, ordered, or post closure), we only recorded
the most serious action. For example, if there was an authorized
evacuation followed by an ordered evacuation, we counted that as an
ordered evacuation only.
To determine the trend in danger pay time series, we analyzed State
data regarding Danger Pay Allowance Percentage of Basic Compensation
and estimated a time series model of the number of danger pay posts in
a given year (from 1997-2009). We estimated a simple model with an
intercept and time trend. We estimated a total of four models with
combinations of the following four factors: linear vs. exponential
model and independent and identically distributed (iid) normal errors
vs. Newey-West errors. (Linear model: y = á + bt + e ; Exponential
model: y = áeBT + e (equivalent to ) ) where y is the number of danger
pay posts, e is the error term, and á, b are coefficients to be
estimated. We first estimated exponential and linear models of the data
with iid normal errors and found visual evidence of autocorrelation, so
we then estimated exponential and linear models with Newey-West
standard errors, which slightly altered the standard errors and
therefore degree of statistical significance (but did not change
coefficient values).
To evaluate State and Diplomatic Security's strategic planning for
security activities, we compared State and Diplomatic Security planning
documents with standards established in the Government Performance and
Reporting Act (GPRA). We reviewed State's strategic plan for 2007-2012;
Diplomatic Security's bureau strategic/performance plans for fiscal
years 2001 through 2011; Diplomatic Security's Visa and Passport
Security Strategic Plan; and planning documents for Diplomatic
Security's initiative to create a strategic plan for their
International Programs Directorate.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 to November
2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Diplomatic Security Service:
Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) was established pursuant to Title II
of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986. DSS
is principally responsible for managing Diplomatic Security‘s day-to-
day security operations.
Unit: Diplomatic Security Service: Directorate/Office: International
Programs Directorate;
Activities:
* Serves as the focal point within Diplomatic Security for coordinating
international security programs.
* Manages and directs the formulation, planning, coordination, policy
development, and implementation of security programs that protect U.S.
missions abroad from physical, electronic, and chemical/biological
attack.
Unit: Diplomatic Security Service: Directorate/Office: Domestic
Operations Directorate;
Activities:
* Protects the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials and certain
foreign dignitaries visiting the United States.
* Conducts criminal investigations concerning passport and visa
issuance, as well as professional responsibility and
counterintelligence investigations.
* Manages the operational security programs for State‘s domestic
facilities.
Unit: Diplomatic Security Service: Directorate/Office: Training
Directorate;
Activities:
* Provides all training programs and policies for Diplomatic Security.
* Provides training and related equipment assistance to foreign
government security and law enforcement personnel to deter and counter
terrorism.
Unit: Diplomatic Security Service: Directorate/Office: Threat
Investigations and Analysis Directorate;
Activities:
* Researches and analyzes, and distributes all-source intelligence on
terrorist activities and threats that may affect official U.S.
personnel and U.S. facilities, both domestic and overseas.
* Investigates threats to the Secretary of State, visiting and resident
foreign officials in the United States, and State employees and
facilities worldwide.
* Acts as the interface between Diplomatic Security and the U.S.
intelligence community on intelligence and threat issues.
* Coordinates with the private sector on threats/security matters to
U.S. member businesses, educational, and nongovernmental organizations
through the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC).
* Coordinates the Rewards for Justice program that provides rewards for
information related to terroristic threats to U.S. persons or property
worldwide.
* Operates the Diplomatic Security Command Center 24 hours a day in
support of law enforcement duties and as a central command and
communications platform for monitoring security at State‘s domestic and
international locations.
Funding allocation:
Total financial plan: $905.5[A] FY 2008 (dollars in millions);
Diplomatic Security Service: $523.9 (58%).
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[A] The total depicts Diplomatic Security's financial plan for fiscal
year 2008, as well as the budget for the Office of Foreign Missions,
which are based on regularly appropriated funds and fees. The total
does not include salaries or other expenses for special agents
overseas, Antiterrorism Assistance funds, or supplemental
appropriations intended for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Security Infrastructure:
Security Infrastructure handles security for State‘s classified and
sensitive information and computer networks. In addition, Security
Infrastructure conducts background investigations for State employees
and critical contractors supporting such missions as Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Office of Information Security:
Activities:
* Manages State‘s information protection programs.
Office of Computer Security:
Activities:
* Recommends, develops, and coordinates cyber security policy
standards and guidelines.
Office of Personnel Security and Suitability:
Activities:
* Manages State‘s personnel security and suitability programs.
* Administers the contract background security investigator program.
* Manages State‘s policy on personnel security investigations and their
subsequent adjudication.
Funding allocation:
Total financial plan: $905.5[A] FY 2008 (dollars in millions);
Security Infrastructure Directorate: $46.6 (5%).
Countermeasures Directorate:
Manages all of Diplomatic Security‘s physical and technical
countermeasures security programs.
Office of Security Technology:
Activities:
* Directs the development of standards, policies, and procedures
associated with technical countermeasures, security technology
operations, and facility security engineering programs domestically
and abroad. Manages and supports Security Engineering Officers and
Technicians.
Office of Physical Security Programs:
Activities:
* Directs and assists in the development of standards, policies, and
procedures for protecting personnel, facilities, and national security
information domestically and abroad.
* Ensures implementation of and compliance with the Overseas Security
Policy Board physical security standards and Interagency Security
Committee Physical Security Criteria for Federal Facilities.
* Implements requirements of the Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act of 1999.
* Conducts construction security certifications and accreditations.
* Evaluates, procures, and supplies special protective equipment
worldwide and manages the armored vehicle program.
Office of Diplomatic Courier Service:
Activities:
* Provides secure transmission of classified and sensitive
correspondence, equipment, and materials worldwide.
Funding allocation:
Total financial plan: $905.5[A] FY 2008 (dollars in millions);
Countermeasures Directorate: $164.1 (18%).
Executive Office Directorate:
Develops and implements administrative and management policies, plans,
and procedures to ensure that Diplomatic Security resources are
allocated, administered, and accounted for in accordance with U.S. law
and government regulations.
Office of Management Services:
Activities:
* Provides management and administrative services to Diplomatic
Security, including: general services, contracting and procurement
services, policy analysis and planning, and human resource
management.
Office of the Chief Financial Officer:
Activities:
* Directs all aspects of Diplomatic Security‘s financial resources.
Office of the Chief Technology Officer:
Activities:
* Provides consolidated automated systems support for Diplomatic
Security.
* Manages the program for processing requests for Diplomatic Security
documents under the Freedom of Information Act and the records
management programs.
Funding allocation:
Total financial plan: $905.5[A] FY 2008 (dollars in millions);
Executive Director: $43.8 (5%).
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[A] The total depicts Diplomatic Security's financial plan for fiscal
year 2008, as well as the budget for the Office of Foreign Missions,
which are based on regularly appropriated funds and fees. The total
does not include salaries or other expenses for special agents
overseas, Antiterrorism Assistance funds, or supplemental
appropriations intended for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Countermeasures:
Manages all of Diplomatic Security‘s physical and technical
countermeasures security programs.
Office of Security Technology:
Activities:
* Directs the development of standards, policies, and procedures
associated with technical countermeasures, security technology
operations, and facility security engineering programs domestically
and abroad. Manages and supports Security Engineering Officers and
Technicians.
Office of Physical Security Programs:
Activities:
* Directs and assists in the development of standards, policies, and
procedures for protecting personnel, facilities, and national security
information domestically and abroad.
* Ensures implementation of and compliance with the Overseas Security
Policy Board physical security standards and Interagency Security
Committee Physical Security Criteria for Federal Facilities.
* Implements requirements of the Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act of 1999.
* Conducts construction security certifications and accreditations.
* Evaluates, procures, and supplies special protective equipment
worldwide and manages the armored vehicle program.
Office of Diplomatic Courier Service:
Activities:
* Provides secure transmission of classified and sensitive
correspondence, equipment, and materials worldwide.
Funding allocation:
Total financial plan: $905.5[A] FY 2008 (dollars in millions);
Countermeasures Directorate: $164.1 (18%).
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[A] The total depicts Diplomatic Security's financial plan for fiscal
year 2008, as well as the budget for the Office of Foreign Missions,
which are based on regularly appropriated funds and fees. The total
does not include salaries or other expenses for special agents
overseas, Antiterrorism Assistance funds, or supplemental
appropriations intended for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Executive Office:
Executive Office Directorate:
Develops and implements administrative and management policies, plans,
and procedures to ensure that Diplomatic Security resources are
allocated, administered, and accounted for in accordance with U.S. law
and government regulations.
Office of Management Services:
Activities:
* Provides management and administrative services to Diplomatic
Security, including: general services, contracting and procurement
services, policy analysis and planning, and human resource
management.
Office of the Chief Financial Officer:
Activities:
* Directs all aspects of Diplomatic Security‘s financial resources.
Office of the Chief Technology Officer:
Activities:
* Provides consolidated automated systems support for Diplomatic
Security.
* Manages the program for processing requests for Diplomatic Security
documents under the Freedom of Information Act and the records
management programs.
Funding allocation:
Total financial plan: $905.5[A] FY 2008 (dollars in millions);
Executive Director: $43.8 (5%).
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[A] The total depicts Diplomatic Security's financial plan for fiscal
year 2008, as well as the budget for the Office of Foreign Missions,
which are based on regularly appropriated funds and fees. The total
does not include salaries or other expenses for special agents
overseas, Antiterrorism Assistance funds, or supplemental
appropriations intended for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Office of Foreign Missions:
Office of Foreign Missions:
Provides for the formulation and implementation of policies designed to
provide for reciprocity of treatment between U.S. missions abroad and
foreign missions in the United States. Ensures compliance of diplomatic
privileges and immunities in order to safeguard the American public.
Office of Property Acquisition, Tax, Travel Services, and Customs
Programs:
Activities:
* Manages acquisitions, alterations, and sales of real property by
foreign missions.
* Manages travel restrictions and controls on foreign missions for
reasons of national security and reciprocity.
* Manages the diplomatic tax and customs program and ensures
reciprocity is considered when providing such privileges to foreign
missions in the United States.
* Assists U.S. missions in negotiating the reduction or elimination of
tax and customs duties for State's overseas operations.
Office of Diplomatic Motor Vehicles, Enforcement, Outreach and Customer
Service:
Activities:
* Oversees the responsibilities assigned to the Enforcement, Compliance
and Reciprocity program, the Vehicle Documentation program, and the
Diplomatic Customer Service Center.
Information Management:
Activities:
* Advises, assists, and performs planning, acquisition, and deployment
of all information technology hardware and systems to support the
mission of the office.
Administration:
Activities:
* Provides administrative services to the Office of Foreign Missions,
including: contracting, administration of custodial bank accounts,
budget, and general services support.
Funding allocation:
Total financial plan: $905.5[A] FY 2008 (dollars in millions);
Office of Foreign Missions: $8.5 (1%).
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[A] The total depicts Diplomatic Security's financial plan for fiscal
year 2008, as well as the budget for the Office of Foreign Missions,
which are based on regularly appropriated funds and fees. The total
does not include salaries or other expenses for special agents
overseas, Antiterrorism Assistance funds, or supplemental
appropriations intended for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Funding Allocations, Other:
In addition to funding specifically allocated to its directorates and
offices, Diplomatic Security's financial plan includes cross-cutting
categories such as: Diplomatic Security Central Costs, Bureau Wide
Costs, and support for the Assistant Secretary's office. Those
categories are represented below as ’Other.“
Funding allocation:
Total financial plan: $905.5[A] FY 2008 (dollars in millions):
Diplomatic Security Service, $523.9: 58%;
Countermeasures, $164.0: 18%;
Security Infrastructure, $46.5: 5%;
Executive Director, $43.8: 5%;
Office of Foreign Missions, $8.5: 1%;
Other, $118.7: 12%.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[A] The total depicts Diplomatic Security's financial plan for fiscal
year 2008, as well as the budget for the Office of Foreign Missions,
which are based on regularly appropriated funds and fees. The total
does not include salaries or other expenses for special agents
overseas, Antiterrorism Assistance funds, or supplemental
appropriations intended for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Diplomatic Security Collaborates with Other U.S.
Government Agencies to Meet Its Mission:
Diplomatic Security collaborates with a number of other federal and
local law enforcement agencies in order to carry out its investigation
and protection activities.
Investigations:
Domestically, Diplomatic Security participates in a number of
multiagency task forces to enhance their ability to investigate visa
and passport fraud. Some of those collaborative efforts include the
following:
* Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF): The Federal Bureau of
Investigation brings together more than 40 federal, state, and local
agencies to pursue criminal investigations involving terrorist
activities. Diplomatic Security special agents participate in 26 JTTFs
and the National JTTF. A Department of Justice official noted that it
is useful to have a Diplomatic Security presence on the JTTF because if
the Department of Justice cannot arrest a suspected criminal on
terrorism charges, frequently they can arrest them on visa or passport
fraud charges.
* Document and Benefit Fraud Task Forces: Led by U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, the document and benefits fraud task forces bring
investigators together from a variety of agencies to target two types
of crimes: (1) document fraud refers to the manufacture, sale, or use
of counterfeit identity documents--such as Resident Alien cards, birth
certificates, Social Security cards, or passports--for immigration
fraud or other criminal activity, including efforts to obtain genuine
identity documents through fraudulent means, and (2) benefit fraud
refers to the misrepresentation or omission of material facts on an
application to obtain an immigration benefit one is not entitled to--
such as U.S. citizenship, political asylum or a valid visa. Any case in
which a sufficient nexus to terrorism is discovered will be referred to
the JTTFs. Diplomatic Security has special agents assigned to 11
document and benefit fraud task forces.
* High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Fusion Center: Diplomatic
Security participates in the New York/New Jersey High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area Fusion Center. Supported with funding from the Office
of National Drug Control Policy, Diplomatic Security is one of the
local and federal law enforcement organizations within the fusion
center that combats the production, manufacture, transportation,
distribution, and chronic use of illegal drugs and money laundering.
Several officials from the other collaborating agencies noted that
Diplomatic Security is an asset to the task forces because it has
access to a global network of colleagues posted in the embassies and
consulates around the world. According to two U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement officials we met with, other U.S. law enforcement
agencies are able to leverage the contacts and other valuable
information gleaned overseas through Diplomatic Security's expansive
global network of law enforcement agents.
Diplomatic Security participates in several other collaborative
initiatives such as the following:
* Border Initiatives: Diplomatic Security stated that the bureau has
posted several Diplomatic Security agents to high traffic border
crossing points, such as at San Ysidro, California, to work with the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Attorney's Office to
identify, investigate, and prosecute visa and passport fraud. In 2008,
a representative from the U.S. Attorney's office in San Diego reported
that his unit prosecuted 167 passport cases in 2008 compared to an
average of 25 to 30 cases in past years. He attributed this increase in
cases, in part, to greater collaboration with Diplomatic Security and
Diplomatic Security's involvement on the border.
* Global Pursuit Initiative: Through Diplomatic Security's Global
Pursuit Initiative, Diplomatic Security special agents are assigned to
major international airports throughout the United States to assist the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security in investigating visa and passport
irregularities.
Protection:
Diplomatic Security collaborates with local law enforcement agencies
and the U.S. Secret Service to conduct its protection activities.
Diplomatic Security officials stated that the bureau relies on state
and local police for assistance with crowd control and extra patrols at
consulates when there is an indication of a threat. For special events,
Diplomatic Security relies on local police forces. For example, every
year, Diplomatic Security works with the New York police force to
provide security at the UN General Assembly.
Diplomatic Security also collaborates with U.S. Secret Service when the
Secretary of State and the President travel together and other joint
missions, such as coordination between Diplomatic Security Regional
Security Officers and the Secret Service when their protectees travel
overseas. Diplomatic Security is responsible for providing protection
to the Secretary of State and visiting dignitaries at the Secretary's
level, while the Secret Service provides protection to the President
and visiting heads of state. These two agencies frequently have to work
together when, for example, the Secretary of State and the President
travel together. Secretary Clinton has brought a new level of
coordination between the two agencies given her unique status as both a
former first lady--whose protection falls under the purview of Secret
Service--and as the current Secretary of State--whose protection falls
under the purview of Diplomatic Security.
Overseas:
At overseas posts, Diplomatic Security collaborates closely with other
U.S. law enforcement agencies that have a presence at a particular
post. Diplomatic Security has the widest representation of security and
law enforcement officials overseas; however, other law enforcement
agencies may place agents in embassies or consulates in areas with
specific needs. For example, the Drug Enforcement Agency has officers
in many U.S. missions to work with the host governments on combating
drug trafficking. To coordinate the various agencies' work, some posts
have established a Law Enforcement Working Group. The RSO chairs a
working group.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: Attacks against U.S. Embassies and Consulates (excluding
Baghdad), 1998-2008:
There were 39 attacks against U.S. embassies and consulates and
official U.S. personnel overseas between 1998 and 2008, in addition to
regular attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad since 2004 (see table
3).[Footnote 40]
Table 3: Attacks against U.S. Embassies and Consulates:
Year: 1998:
Date: June 21, 1998;
City: Beirut;
Description of attack: 7 rocket propelled grenades (RPG) fired at
embassy.
Date: Year: August 7, 1998;
City: Nairobi; Dar-es-Salaam;
Description of attack: Both embassies simultaneously attacked with
truck bombs.
Year: 1999:
Date: March 28, 1999;
City: Moscow;
Description of attack: Attempted RPG attack;
gunmen fire on embassy.
Date: April 24, 1999;
City: Yekaterinburg;
Description of attack: Year: Bombing near U.S./UK Consulate General.
Date: May 27, 1999;
City: Sana'a;
Description of attack: Year: Tribesmen attempt to kidnap embassy
employee.
Date: June 4, 1999;
City: Istanbul;
Description of attack: Year: Terrorist launch RPG at Consulate.
Date: November 12, 1999;
City: Islamabad;
Description of attack: Year2002: Rockets launched at embassy, injuring
local guard.
Year: 2002:
Date: January 22, 2002;
City: Calcutta;
Description of attack: Gunmen attack Consulate.
Date: March 15, 2002;
City: Sana'a;
Description of attack: Two grenades thrown at embassy.
Date: March 17, 2002;
City: Islamabad;
Description of attack: U.S. diplomat killed in attack near embassy.
Date: March 22, 2002;
City: Lima;
Description of attack: Car bomb explodes near embassy.
Date: June 14, 2002;
City: Karachi;
Description of attack: Truck bomb detonates outside Consulate.
Date: October 12, 2002;
City: Denpasar;
Description of attack: Consular Office bombed as part of the Bali
bombings.
Date: October 28, 2002;
City: Amman;
Description of attack: Al-Qa'ida assassinates USAID Director.
Year: 2003:
Date: February 28, 2003;
City: Islamabad;
Description of attack: Gunmen attack embassy.
Year: 2004:
Date: March 15, 2004;
City: Karachi;
Description of attack: Truck bomb fails to detonate near consulate.
Date: June 30, 2004;
City: Tashkent;
Description of attack: Suicide bomber attacks embassy.
Date: October 28, 2004;
City: Islamabad;
Description of attack: Year: U.S. diplomat injured in bombing at hotel.
Date: December 6, 2004;
City: Jeddah;
Description of attack: Gunmen raid diplomatic compound.
Year: 2005:
Date: August 21, 2005;
City: Kabul;
Description of attack: Bomb damages U.S. embassy vehicle, wounds two.
Year: 2006:
Date: March 2, 2006;
City: Karachi;
Description of attack: Suicide bomber kills U.S. diplomat near
Consulate.
Date: May 19, 2006;
City: Herat;
Description of attack: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs motorcade attacked by suicide car bomb.
Date: August 29, 2006;
City: Kabul;
Description of attack: International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs vehicle destroyed by roadside bomb.
Date: September 8, 2006;
City: Kabul;
Description of attack: Suicide car bomb detonates outside embassy.
Date: September 12, 2006;
City: Damascus;
Description of attack: Gunmen raid U.S. embassy.
Year: 2007:
Date: January 12, 2007;
City: Athens;
Description of attack: RPG fired at embassy.
Date: February 27, 2007;
City: Batticaloa;
Description of attack: Fire on helicopter carrying Ambassador.
Date: March 19, 2007;
City: Kabul;
Description of attack: Suicide bomber destroys embassy vehicle.
Date: April 14, 2007;
City: Casablanca;
Description of attack: Two suicide bombers target U.S. diplomatic
facilities.
Date: May 25, 2007;
City: Kathmandu;
Description of attack: Maoists attack Ambassador's vehicle.
Date: October 27, 2007;
City: Peshawar;
Description of attack: Terrorists launch mortars at Consulate.
Date: December 9, 2007;
City: Peshawar;
Description of attack: Terrorists launch mortars at Consulate.
Year: 2008:
Date: January 1, 2008;
City: Khartoum;
Description of attack: Terrorist assassinate USAID employee.
Date: April 27, 2008;
City: Kabul;
Description of attack: Gunmen fire on Ambassador during ceremony.
Date: July 9, 2008;
City: Istanbul;
Description of attack: Armed attack against Consulate.
Date: October 12, 2008;
City: Monterrey;
Description of attack: Bullets and grenade shot at U.S. Consulate.
Date: August 26, 2008;
City: Peshawar;
Description of attack: Gunmen attempt to kidnap Principal Officer.
Date: September 17, 2008;
City: Sana'a;
Description of attack: Two car bombs outside U.S. embassy in Yemeni
capital.
Source: Diplomatic Security Office of Investigations and Threat
Analysis.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix X: Comments from the U.S. Department of State:
United States Department of State
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
November 2, 2009:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"State Department: Diplomatic Security's Recent Growth Warrants
Strategic Review," GAO Job Code 320607.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Paul
Ginsburg, Program Analyst, Bureau of Diplomatic Security at (571)345-
2742.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc:
GAO ” Miriam Carroll:
DS - Eric Boswell:
State/OIG ” Mark Duda:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments to GAO Draft Report:
State Department: Diplomatic Security's Recent Growth Warrants
Strategic Review: (GAO-10-156, GAO Code 320607):
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on GAO's
draft report, "State Department: Diplomatic Security's Recent Growth
Warrants Strategic Review."
The GAO recommends that the Secretary of State ” as part of the
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) or as a separate
initiative ” conduct a strategic review of the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security (DS) to ensure that its mission and activities address the
Department's priority needs. This review should also address key human
capital and operational challenges faced by DS such as:
* Operating domestic and international activities with adequate staff;
* Providing security for facilities that do not meet all security
standards;
* Staffing foreign missions with officials who have appropriate
language skills;
* Operating programs with experienced staff, at the commensurate grade
levels; and;
* Balancing security needs with State's need to conduct their
diplomatic mission.
The Department of State agrees with GAO's recommendation. The Secretary
of State announced her QDDR initiative in July 2009 and the QDDR
initiative will soon begin the critical process of analysis that will
strengthen and elevate diplomacy and development as key pillars of our
national security strategy. The aim is to make our diplomacy and
development tools and institutions more agile, responsive and
complementary. It will set institutional priorities and provide
strategic guidance on the capabilities we need in the 21st century, the
organizational structures best suited to our objectives, the most
efficient and effective allocation of resources, and the best
deployment models to maximize our impact on the range of challenges we
face.
This inaugural QDDR is just the beginning of a longer-term process to
institutionalize an ethic of review, analysis, and responsiveness
within our diplomatic and development agencies. Although the Department
of State is currently not planning to perform a strategic review of the
full DS mission and capabilities in the QDDR, the QDDR has five
strategic focus areas in process, including the strategic focus to
"building operational and resource platforms for success" which will
review how the Department can develop the people, processes and systems
for flexible, responsive operations and efficient use of resources.
However, we do not have all the specific detail in place at this time
given the QDDR is still in the early phase. The Under Secretary for
Management and the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security are
completely committed to working with the QDDR group to ensure that DS's
mission will benefit from this initiative.
[End of section]
Appendix XI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128, or fordj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, the following individuals
made key contributions to this report: Anthony Moran, Assistant
Director; Miriam Carroll Fenton; Jon Fremont; Antoine Clark; and Zina
Merritt. The following individuals provided technical assistance: Joe
Carney, Etana Finkler, Jena Sinkfield, Amanda Miller, and Grace Lui.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Department of State: Additional Steps Needed to Address Continuing
Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-874]. Washington, D.C.: September
17, 2009.
Department of State: Comprehensive Plan Needed to Address Persistent
Foreign Language Shortfalls.[hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-955]. Washington, D.C.: September
17, 2009.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-679SP]. Washington,
D.C.: May 27, 2009.
Iraq Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-294SP]. Washington, D.C.: March 24,
2009.
Rebuilding Iraq: DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and
Coordination of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further
Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-966]. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2008.
Combating Terrorism: Guidance for State Department's Antiterrorism
Assistance Program Is Limited and State Does Not Systematically Assess
Outcomes. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-875T].
Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2008.
Interagency Contracting: Need for Improved Information and Policy
Implementation at the Department of State. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-578] Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs
Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-336]. Washington, D.C.:
February 29, 2008.
Embassy Security: Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site Conditions
Prevent Full Adherence to Standards. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-162]. Washington, D.C.: January 18,
2008.
State Department: Evacuation Planning and Preparations for Overseas
Posts Can Be Improved. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-23]. Washington, D.C.: October 19,
2007.
Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist
Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-894]. Washington, D.C.: August 4,
2006.
Inspectors General: Activities of the Department of State Office of
Inspector General. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-138].
Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2007.
Overseas Security: State Department Has Not Fully Implemented Key
Measures to Protect U.S. Officials from Terrorist Attacks Outside of
Embassies. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-642].
Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005.
Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce
Planning. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39].
Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2003.
Overseas Presence: Rightsizing Framework Can Be Applied at U.S.
Diplomatic Posts in Developing Countries. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-396]. Washington, D.C.: April 7,
2003.
Overseas Presence: Conditions of Overseas Diplomatic Facilities.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-557T]. Washington, D.C.:
March 20, 2003.
Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat Terrorism
Abroad. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-1021].
Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2002.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] In addition to the Secretary, Diplomatic Security provides
protection to the Deputy Secretary of State, the U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations, and congressional delegations traveling overseas.
[2] Because Secretary Clinton is both the Secretary of State and a
former First Lady, Diplomatic Security shares protection
responsibilities with the Secret Service.
[3] Diplomatic Security has played a key protective role in all Olympic
Games since 1984.
[4] For a review of State's Bureau of Overseas Building Operations'
(OBO) Compound Security Upgrade Program see GAO, Embassy Security:
Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site Conditions Prevent Full
Adherence to Standards, GAO-08-162 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2008).
[5] State's Office of Inspector General is also authorized to conduct
investigations on alleged misconduct of State personnel. The Office of
Inspector General and Diplomatic Security are in the process of
delineating areas of responsibility. For more information, see GAO,
Inspectors General: Activities of the Department of State Office of
Inspector General, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-138]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 23, 2007).
[6] For GAO's review of Antiterrorism Assistance, see Combating
Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs Improved
Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-336] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 29,
2008).
[7] Currently, there are more than 130 Marine Security Guard
detachments with more than 1,200 officers assigned to diplomatic
missions throughout the world.
[8] OBO directs State's overseas building program; its mission is to
create more secure, safer, and well-maintained facilities for the
conduct of U.S. diplomacy worldwide.
[9] The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, of 1961, outlines
several security items for which the host country government is
responsible, namely: (1) protecting the premises of the mission,
including private residences of all diplomats, (2) ensuring diplomats'
freedom of movement and travel in its territory; and (3) in the case of
armed conflict, enabling diplomats to evacuate the country at the
earliest possible moment. Diplomatic Security overseas agents enhance
security measures provided by host governments.
[10] OBO incorporates man-traps into the design of new embassy
compounds and as part of major physical security upgrade projects at
existing facilities. Diplomatic Security, in coordination with OBO and
the Overseas Security Policy Board, is in the process of formalizing
physical security standards mandating the construction of man-traps at
all existing embassy and consulate compounds to the maximum extent
feasible.
[11] Recent attacks on hotels frequented by Westerners occurred in
Pakistan on September 20, 2008 (Islamabad) and June 9, 2009 (Peshawar);
in India on November 26, 2008 (Mumbai); and in Indonesia on July 17,
2009 (Jakarta).
[12] In December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act to implement the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission report. The 9/11 Commission had identified a number of
factors that allowed terrorists to exploit the vulnerabilities of U.S.
travel documents. The act mandated Diplomatic Security to devise a
strategic plan to target individuals involved in the fraudulent
production, disruption, and use of U.S. travel documents.
[13] GAO has ongoing work regarding the drawdown of U.S. military in
Iraq and its impact on civilian organizations.
[14] Diplomatic Security noted that the $170 million figure for fiscal
year 1998 does not include fees, reimbursements, and other funds.
Diplomatic Security did not provide us with other data for this fiscal
year.
[15] By "budget," we are referring to what Diplomatic Security calls
"Bureau Managed Funds," which is composed of funds received through
annual appropriations, fees collected through visa processing,
reimbursements from other agencies, and appropriated funds carried over
from prior fiscal years. Diplomatic Security has management authority
over Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) programs, but did not provide ATA
funding data and, therefore, ATA funds are not included in the
discussion of the Diplomatic Security budget.
[16] The increase in funding for Diplomatic Security in fiscal year
1999 was part of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, which provided State with a total of $1.4 billion
to reestablish diplomatic facilities in Kenya and Tanzania and to
overhaul overseas security standards.
[17] The Worldwide Security Protection program was initially named the
Worldwide Security Upgrades program; however, the name changed in 2007.
[18] Physical and technical improvements have been implemented
continually over the course of many years.
[19] The $2.2 billion estimate for fiscal year 2008 is based on actual
2008 appropriations as reported in the Fiscal Year 2010 Congressional
Budget Justification document for State.
[20] Special agents posted overseas as RSOs and assistant RSOs are
assigned to the State regional bureaus, and salaries and expenses are
paid for out of regional bureau funds. For example, the State Western
Hemisphere Affairs Bureau pays salaries and expenses for special agents
assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City.
[21] In fiscal year 2008, approximately $128 million was provided for
the Antiterrorism Assistance program. For more information on the
Antiterrorism Assistance Program, see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-336].
[22] The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
mandated Diplomatic Security to produce a strategic plan to target
individuals involved in the fraudulent production, distribution, and
use of U.S. travel documents.
[23] Foreign Service specialists rotate assignments every 1-3 years and
may not serve in a domestic capacity longer than 5 consecutive years.
Civil service Criminal Investigators work at domestic field offices and
are not required to serve overseas, thereby providing continuity and
leadership in domestic investigations.
[24] Personal Service Agreements are individual contracts between a
U.S. diplomatic post and a person hired to work as a Diplomatic
Security guard. Under a Personal Service Agreement, guards are paid
directly by the post, and the Regional Security Officer is responsible
for providing training.
[25] While the majority of State posts have between 1 and 3 special
agents, there are 81 special agents assigned to Iraq.
[26] On September 16, 2007, an incident involving a personal security
contractor firm working for the Department of State resulted in the
deaths of 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad. For GAO's review of security
contractors in Iraq, see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-966].
[27] GAO, Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-294SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24,
2009).
[28] Danger pay is additional compensation above basic compensation
given to all U.S. government civilian employees for service in foreign
areas where there exists conditions of civil insurrection, civil war,
terrorism, or wartime conditions that threaten the health or well-being
of an employee.
[29] The relationship between the number of danger pay posts and time
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In other words,
the likelihood of seeing this trend over time if there were no
relationship is roughly 1 percent.
[30] Houston field office planned to use an increased number of agents
scheduled to arrive in early 2009 to address the backlog of cases.
[31] Currently, the MSD Office has two teams posted in Peshawar,
Pakistan, and one in Iraq supplementing security. The office must use
its four remaining teams to (1) prepare to relieve one of the sitting
teams in Peshawar and Baghdad and (2) cover the other parts of its
mission.
[32] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-966].
[33] For a review of OBO's Compound Security Upgrade Program see
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-162].
[34] For GAO's review of language training at State, see GAO,
Department of State: Comprehensive Plan Needed to Address Persistent
Foreign Language Shortfalls, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-955] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17,
2009).
[35] For GAO's review on experience gaps at hardship posts, see GAO,
Department of State: Additional Steps Needed to Address Continuing
Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-874] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17,
2009).
[36] The six elements are: (1) Mission Statement, (2) General (also
known as Strategic or Long-Term) Goals and Objectives, (3) Approaches
or Strategies to Achieve Goals and Objectives, (4) Relationship between
General Goals and Annual Goals, (5) External Factors, and (6) Program
Evaluations.
[37] S. Rpt. 103-58.
[38] Bureau strategic plans were previously called bureau performance
plans. State changed the document's name in fiscal year 2009.
[39] As of October 2009, Diplomatic Security reported that several
directorates were also in various stages of developing their own
strategic plans; however, they provided us with limited information
regarding these efforts.
[40] Diplomatic Security does not include attacks against U.S. Embassy
in Baghdad in its significant incident report. Iraq is a war zone and
inclusion of each incident that occurs there would overshadow the
overall number of significant attacks that have been conducted against
other embassy facilities around the world.
[End of section]
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