Department of State
Undercover Tests Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in State's Passport Issuance Process Gao ID: GAO-09-447 March 13, 2009A genuine U.S. passport is a vital document, permitting its owner to travel freely in and out of the United States, prove U.S. citizenship, obtain further identification documents, and set up bank accounts, among other things. Unfortunately, a terrorist or other criminal could take advantage of these benefits by fraudulently obtaining a genuine U.S. passport from the Department of State (State). There are many ways that malicious individuals could fraudulently obtain a genuine U.S. passport, including stealing an American citizen's identity and counterfeiting or fraudulently obtaining identification or citizenship documents to meet State requirements. GAO was asked to proactively test the effectiveness of State's passport issuance process to determine whether the process is vulnerable to fraud. To do so, GAO designed four test scenarios that simulated the actions of a malicious individual who had access to an American citizen's personal identity information. GAO created counterfeit documents for four fictitious or deceased individuals using off-the-shelf, commercially available hardware, software, and materials. An undercover GAO investigator then applied for passports at three United States Postal Service (USPS) locations and a State-run passport office.
GAO's investigation shows that terrorists or criminals could steal an American citizen's identity, use basic counterfeiting skills to create fraudulent documentation for that identity, and obtain a genuine U.S. passport from State. GAO conducted four tests simulating this approach and was successful in obtaining a genuine U.S. passport in each case. In the most egregious case, an undercover GAO investigator obtained a passport using counterfeit documents and the Social Security Number (SSN) of a man who died in 1965. In another case, the investigator obtained a passport using counterfeit documents and the genuine SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old child GAO created for a previous investigation--even though the investigator's counterfeit documents and application indicated he was 53 years old. All four passports were issued to the same GAO investigator, under four different names. In all four tests, GAO used counterfeit and/or fraudulently obtained documents. State and USPS employees did not identify GAO's documents as counterfeit. GAO's investigator later purchased an airline ticket under the name used on one of the four fraudulently obtained U.S. passports, and then used that passport as proof of identity to check in to his flight, get a boarding pass, and pass through the security checkpoint at a major metropolitan-area airport. At a briefing on the results of GAO's investigation, State officials agreed with GAO that the investigation exposes a major vulnerability in State's passport issuance process. According to State officials, State's fraud detection efforts are hampered by limitations to its information sharing and data access with other federal and state agencies. After GAO's briefing, State officials notified GAO that they identified and revoked GAO's four fraudulently obtained U.S. passports, and were studying the matter to determine the appropriate steps for improving State's passport issuance process.
GAO-09-447, Department of State: Undercover Tests Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in State's Passport Issuance Process
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2009:
Department Of State:
Undercover Tests Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in State's Passport
Issuance Process:
GAO-09-447:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-447, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
A genuine U.S. passport is a vital document, permitting its owner to
travel freely in and out of the United States, prove U.S. citizenship,
obtain further identification documents, and set up bank accounts,
among other things. Unfortunately, a terrorist or other criminal could
take advantage of these benefits by fraudulently obtaining a genuine
U.S. passport from the Department of State (State).
There are many ways that malicious individuals could fraudulently
obtain a genuine U.S. passport, including stealing an American
citizen‘s identity and counterfeiting or fraudulently obtaining
identification or citizenship documents to meet State requirements. GAO
was asked to proactively test the effectiveness of State‘s passport
issuance process to determine whether the process is vulnerable to
fraud.
To do so, GAO designed four test scenarios that simulated the actions
of a malicious individual who had access to an American citizen‘s
personal identity information. GAO created counterfeit documents for
four fictitious or deceased individuals using off-the-shelf,
commercially available hardware, software, and materials. An undercover
GAO investigator then applied for passports at three United States
Postal Service (USPS) locations and a State-run passport office.
What GAO Found:
GAO‘s investigation shows that terrorists or criminals could steal an
American citizen‘s identity, use basic counterfeiting skills to create
fraudulent documentation for that identity, and obtain a genuine U.S.
passport from State. GAO conducted four tests simulating this approach
and was successful in obtaining a genuine U.S. passport in each case.
In the most egregious case, an undercover GAO investigator obtained a
passport using counterfeit documents and the Social Security Number
(SSN) of a man who died in 1965. In another case, the investigator
obtained a passport using counterfeit documents and the genuine SSN of
a fictitious 5-year-old child GAO created for a previous
investigation”even though the investigator‘s counterfeit documents and
application indicated he was 53 years old. All four passports were
issued to the same GAO investigator, under four different names. In all
four tests, GAO used counterfeit and/or fraudulently obtained
documents. State and USPS employees did not identify GAO‘s documents as
counterfeit.
Figure: Genuine U.S. Passports Obtained with Counterfeit or
Fraudulently Obtained Documents:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration of passports]
Source: GAO (presentation); and the U.S. State Department (image).
[End of figure]
GAO‘s investigator later purchased an airline ticket under the name
used on one of the four fraudulently obtained U.S. passports, and then
used that passport as proof of identity to check in to his flight, get
a boarding pass, and pass through the security checkpoint at a major
metropolitan-area airport.
At a briefing on the results of GAO‘s investigation, State officials
agreed with GAO that the investigation exposes a major vulnerability in
State‘s passport issuance process. According to State officials,
State‘s fraud detection efforts are hampered by limitations to its
information sharing and data access with other federal and state
agencies. After GAO‘s briefing, State officials notified GAO that they
identified and revoked GAO‘s four fraudulently obtained U.S. passports,
and were studying the matter to determine the appropriate steps for
improving State‘s passport issuance process.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-447] or key
components. For more information, contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 512-
6722 or kutzg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Undercover Investigator Obtained Four Genuine U.S. Passports Using
Counterfeit or Fraudulently Obtained Documents:
Corrective Action Briefing:
Tables:
Table 1: Counterfeit or Fraudulently Obtained Documents Used to Obtain
Genuine U.S. Passports:
Figures:
Figure 1: Boarding Pass Used to Pass through Airport Security:
Abbreviations:
D.C.: District of Columbia:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
SSA: Social Security Administration:
SSN: Social Security Number:
USPS: United States Postal Service:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 13, 2009:
The Honorable Jon Kyl:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security:
Committee on the Judiciary:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein:
United States Senate:
A U.S. passport not only allows an individual to travel freely in and
out of the United States, but also can be used to obtain further
identification documents, prove U.S. citizenship, and set up bank
accounts, among other things. Because passports issued under a false
identity help enable individuals to conceal their movements and
activities, there is great concern that passport fraud could facilitate
acts of terrorism. In fact, the 9/11 Commission stated that "for
terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons," and further
noted that terrorists need to travel "to meet, train, plan, case
targets, and gain access to attack."[Footnote 1] Further, passport
fraud facilitates other crimes such as illegal immigration, money
laundering, drug trafficking, tax evasion, and alien smuggling.
Malicious individuals may seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the
Department of State's (State) current passport issuance process, such
as a lack of due diligence on the part of examiners who screen
applications, by using counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents
as proof of identity and U.S. citizenship[Footnote 2] to obtain genuine
U.S. passports. For example, between July 2005 and August 2008, State
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identified 112
individuals who had fraudulently obtained U.S. passports by using the
birth certificates of deceased Americans. Individuals who fraudulently
obtained passports included fugitives, sex offenders, and delinquent
taxpayers, all of whom wanted to use a U.S. passport to conceal
themselves from law enforcement authorities. State and the FBI
identified these 112 individuals by matching State passport records
against state-level death records.
In 2005, we reported that using the stolen identities and documentation
of U.S. citizens is the primary tactic of those fraudulently applying
for U.S. passports, and that passport fraud is often linked to other
crimes.[Footnote 3] Our report mentioned a number of ways in which a
person might fraudulently obtain a U.S. passport, including using an
assumed identity that is supported by genuine but fraudulently obtained
identification documents; submitting false claims of lost, stolen, or
mutilated passports; using counterfeit citizenship documents; and using
the identity of a deceased person. We also reported weaknesses in
State's information sharing with other federal agencies. For example,
we stated that the information that State received and used from the
Social Security Administration (SSA) was limited and outdated. In the
report, we stated that although State and SSA signed a memorandum in
April 2004 that gave State access to SSA's main database to help verify
passport applicants' identity, the memorandum had not been implemented
as of March 2005. Moreover, we reported that the memorandum did not
include access to SSA's death records, but that State officials said
they were exploring the possibility of obtaining these records in the
future.[Footnote 4]
In 2007 we reported on the risk of fraud that exists in the lack of
State's oversight of the more than 8,000 passport acceptance facilities
nationwide that it designates to provide passport application services
to the American public.[Footnote 5] Passport acceptance facilities are
located at certain United States Postal Service (USPS) locations,
courthouses, and other institutions, and do not employ State personnel.
The passport acceptance agents at these facilities are responsible for,
among other things, verifying whether an applicant's identification
document (such as a driver's license) actually matches the applicant,
and sending each applicant's proof of citizenship and passport
application to State. Although we found that State had taken some steps
to address weaknesses identified in the training of acceptance agents,
we found that additional measures were needed to ensure adequate
controls over the application acceptance process.
This report responds to your request that we proactively test the
effectiveness of the current passport issuance process to determine
whether malicious individuals could use counterfeit or fraudulently
obtained documents to obtain a genuine U.S. passport. To perform this
work, we designed four test scenarios that would simulate the actions
of a malicious individual who had access to another person's identity
information (a practice commonly known as identity theft). We then
attempted to obtain four genuine U.S. passports by using counterfeit or
fraudulently obtained documents, such as birth certificates and
drivers' licenses, and the Social Security Numbers (SSN) of fictitious
or deceased individuals. We created all of these counterfeit documents
with off-the-shelf, commercially available hardware, software, and
materials. In addition, we used some of these counterfeit documents to
obtain a genuine District of Columbia (D.C.) identification card, which
we subsequently used to obtain a U.S. passport in one test.
The fictitious identities we used in our first two tests were based on
information and SSNs we had previously obtained from SSA for the
purpose of conducting undercover tests. These tests were meant to
simulate a malicious individual stealing another person's identity and
using it to obtain a passport. On our third test, we used the genuine
SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old child we created for a previous
investigation[Footnote 6] to simulate a malicious individual stealing
the identity of a real child to get a passport. Finally, on our fourth
test, we used the SSN of an individual who died in 1965 to simulate a
malicious individual using a deceased person's identity to obtain a
passport.[Footnote 7] For three of our four tests, we submitted our
passport applications and supporting materials at USPS locations that
accept passport applications. For one of our four tests, we submitted
our application and materials at State's regional Washington, D.C.,
passport-issuing office.[Footnote 8]
We conducted the work for this investigation from May 2008 through
March 2009 in accordance with quality standards for investigations as
set forth by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
Undercover Investigator Obtained Four Genuine U.S. Passports Using
Counterfeit or Fraudulently Obtained Documents:
Our investigator was easily able to obtain four genuine U.S. passports
using counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents. In the most
egregious case, our investigator obtained a U.S. passport using
counterfeit documents and the SSN of a man who died in 1965. In another
case, our undercover investigator obtained a U.S. passport using
counterfeit documents and the genuine SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old
child--even though his counterfeit documents and application indicated
he was 53 years old. State and USPS employees did not identify our
documents as counterfeit in any of our four tests. Although we do not
know what checks, if any, State performed when approving our fraudulent
applications, it issued a genuine U.S. passport in each case. All four
passports were issued to the same GAO investigator, under four
different names.
Our tests show a variety of ways that malicious individuals with even
minimal counterfeiting capabilities and access to another person's
identity could obtain genuine U.S. passports using counterfeit or
fraudulently obtained documents. Table 1 below shows the month of
passport application, type of counterfeit or fraudulently obtained
documents used, and the number of days that passed between passport
application and passport issuance for each of our four tests.
Table 1: Counterfeit or Fraudulently Obtained Documents Used to Obtain
Genuine U.S. Passports:
Test number: 1;
Month of application: July 2008;
Documents submitted as part of passport application process:
* Counterfeit West Virginia driver's license;
* Counterfeit New York birth certificate;
* Passport application form;
Number of days between application and issuance: 8 days.
Test number: 2;
Month of application: August 2008;
Documents submitted as part of passport application process:
* Genuine District of Columbia identification card obtained with
fraudulent documentation;
* Counterfeit New York birth certificate;
* Passport application form;
Number of days between application and issuance: Same day (passport
issued the date of application).
Test number: 3;
Month of application: October 2008;
Documents submitted as part of passport application process:
* Counterfeit West Virginia driver's license;
* Counterfeit New York birth certificate;
* Passport application form containing SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old
child, which we obtained on a previous investigation;
Number of days between application and issuance: 7 days.
Test number: 4;
Month of application: December 2008;
Documents submitted as part of passport application process:
* Counterfeit Florida driver's license;
* Counterfeit New York birth certificate;
* Passport application form containing SSN of a deceased individual;
Number of days between application and issuance: 4 days.
Source: GAO.
Note: In all four tests, our investigator also submitted two color
photographs and a passport application fee. For the second test, the
investigator also submitted an e-ticket for an August 2008 flight to
Germany.
[End of table]
Our investigator used a genuine U.S. passport obtained by using
counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents to pass through airport
security. In January 2009, our investigator purchased an airline ticket
for a domestic flight using the fictitious name from one of our test
scenarios. He then used the fraudulently obtained passport from that
test as proof of identity to check in to his flight, get a boarding
pass, and pass through the security checkpoint at a major metropolitan-
area airport. Figure 1 below shows the boarding pass. After our
investigator successfully passed through the checkpoint, he left the
airport and canceled his airline ticket.
Figure 1: Boarding Pass Used to Pass through Airport Security:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO (presentation), and Delta Airlines (image).
[End of figure]
Test One: Investigator Obtained Passport Using Counterfeit
Identification Documents:
Our first test found that USPS did not detect the counterfeit West
Virginia driver's license our undercover investigator presented as
proof of his identity during the passport application process. Further,
State issued our investigator a genuine U.S. passport despite the
counterfeit New York birth certificate he used as proof of his U.S.
citizenship. In July 2008, our investigator entered a USPS office in
Virginia and approached a USPS employee to apply for a passport. The
USPS employee greeted the investigator and took his application form,
counterfeit New York birth certificate, and counterfeit West Virginia
driver's license. On these documents, we used a fictitious identity and
a SSN that we had previously obtained from SSA for the purpose of
conducting undercover tests. The USPS employee reviewed the application
materials line by line to make sure that the information on the
application form matched the information on the birth certificate and
driver's license. After she completed her review of the application
materials, the USPS employee took the investigator's birth certificate
and funds to pay for the application fee. She administered an oath, and
then told the investigator that he should receive the passport within 1
to 4 weeks.
State issued a genuine U.S. passport to our undercover investigator 8
days after he submitted his application. About a week after State
issued the passport, it arrived at the mailing address indicated on the
application materials.
Test Two: Investigator Obtained Passport Using a Genuine but
Fraudulently Obtained State Identification Card:
Our second test found that State did not detect a counterfeit New York
birth certificate our undercover investigator presented to prove his
U.S. citizenship in support of a passport application. In July 2008,
our investigator--the same investigator as in the first test above--
obtained a genuine identification card from the Washington, D.C.,
Department of Motor Vehicles using counterfeit documents, which he then
used to apply for a U.S. passport.
In August 2008, the same investigator entered State's regional
Washington, D.C., passport-issuing office with a completed passport
application form, a counterfeit New York birth certificate, the genuine
D.C. identification card, two passport photographs, sufficient funds to
pay for the application fee, and an electronic ticket (e-ticket)
confirming that he had a flight to Germany.[Footnote 9] For this test,
we used a fictitious identity and SSN that we had previously obtained
from SSA for the purpose of conducting undercover investigations. The
investigator presented his application form and materials to a State
employee, who went line by line through the application form matching
the information to the accompanying documents. The State employee
provided the investigator with a number and instructed him to wait
until his number was called. After his number was called, the
investigator proceeded to a window to speak with another State
employee. The second employee looked over his materials to make sure
that he had all of the necessary documentation, took his birth
certificate and money, and administered an oath.
A few days later, the investigator returned to the same passport
facility and picked up his passport. State issued the passport on the
same day that the investigator submitted his application, in the
fictitious name presented on the fraudulently obtained and counterfeit
documents.
Test Three: Investigator Obtained Passport Using Social Security Number
for a Fictitious 5-Year-Old Child:
As with our first test, our third test found that USPS did not detect
the counterfeit West Virginia driver's license our undercover
investigator presented as proof of his identity during the passport
application process. Further, State issued our investigator a genuine
U.S. passport based on a counterfeit New York birth certificate as
proof of U.S. citizenship. In October 2008, our investigator--the same
investigator as in the first two tests mentioned above--entered a USPS
office in Maryland to apply for a U.S. passport. A USPS employee
greeted the investigator and took his application form, as well as his
counterfeit New York birth certificate and counterfeit West Virginia
driver's license. The application materials used the name and genuine
SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old child, which we obtained from a previous
investigation. However, our investigator listed his age as 53 on the
application materials, which clearly did not match the date of birth
associated with the SSN used in this test. The USPS employee reviewed
the application materials, including meticulously matching the
information on the application form to the birth certificate and
driver's license. After she completed her review of the application
materials, the USPS employee took the investigator's birth certificate
and payment for the application fee, administered an oath, and told the
investigator that he should receive the passport within 2 to 4 weeks.
State issued a genuine U.S. passport to our investigator, in the
fictitious name based on the counterfeit documents, 7 days after he
submitted his application. The passport arrived at the mailing address
indicated by our investigator on the application materials a few days
after its issuance.
Test Four: Investigator Obtained Passport Using Social Security Number
of a Deceased Individual:
As with our first and third tests, our fourth test found that USPS did
not detect the counterfeit identification document--a bogus Florida
driver's license--our undercover investigator presented to support his
passport application. Further, State issued our investigator a genuine
U.S. passport based on a counterfeit New York birth certificate as
proof of U.S. citizenship. In December 2008, our investigator--the same
investigator as in the three tests mentioned above--entered a USPS
office in Maryland to apply for a U.S. passport. A USPS employee
greeted the investigator and took his application form, as well as his
counterfeit New York birth certificate and counterfeit Florida driver's
license. His application materials used a name and SSN that was issued
to a person who died in 1965, and who would have been 59 years old at
the time of our test had he still been alive.[Footnote 10] The USPS
employee reviewed the application materials, matching the information
on the application form to the birth certificate and driver's license.
After completing the review of application materials, the USPS employee
took the investigator's birth certificate and funds to pay for the
application fee. The USPS employee administered an oath then told the
investigator that he should receive the passport within 4 to 6 weeks.
Four days after our investigator submitted his application, State
issued a genuine U.S. passport in the fictitious name presented on the
counterfeit documents. The passport arrived at the mailing address
indicated by our investigator on the application materials.
Corrective Action Briefing:
We briefed State officials on the results of our investigation. They
agreed that our findings expose a major vulnerability in State's
passport issuance process. According to State officials, the
department's ability to verify the information submitted as part of a
passport application is hampered by limitations to its information
sharing and data access with other agencies at the federal and state
levels. They said that some federal agencies limit State's access to
their records due to privacy concerns or the fact that State is not a
law enforcement agency. In addition, they said that State does not
currently have the ability to conduct real-time verification of the
authenticity of birth certificates presented by passport applicants.
They added that birth certificates present an exceptional challenge to
fraud detection efforts, as there are currently thousands of different
acceptable formats for birth certificates. Further, they indicated that
there are difficulties with verifying the authenticity of drivers'
licenses. Moreover, they said that although State attempts to verify
SSN information submitted on passport applications on a daily basis
with SSA, the results of this data-sharing process are imperfect. For
example, State officials said that many of the mismatches identified
through this verification process are actually due to typos or other
common errors. However, they said that while these data checks may not
identify all cases in which an applicant's data do not match the
information in SSA's records, in some instances--such as cases in which
an SSN is tied to a deceased individual--investigators from the
Passport Fraud Branch of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security will
attempt to check publicly available databases to resolve the mismatch.
State officials acknowledged that they have issued other fraudulently
obtained passports but did not offer an estimate of the magnitude of
the problem. In order to improve State's current passport fraud
detection capabilities, officials said that State would need greater
cooperation from other agencies at both the federal and state levels,
and the ability to access other agencies' records in real time.
Subsequent to our briefing, State officials informed us that they
identified and revoked our four fraudulently obtained U.S. passports,
and that they would study the matter further to determine what steps
would be appropriate to improve passport issuance procedures. We did
not verify the accuracy of these State officials' statements. We also
briefed a representative of USPS on the results of our investigation,
who did not offer any comments at the time of our briefing.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of State and
other interested parties. The report will also be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you
or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report.
Signed by:
Gregory D. Kutz:
Managing Director Forensic Audits and Special Investigations:
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Government
Printing Office (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 22, 2004).
[2] As required by State's instructions on the Application for a U.S.
Passport, form DS-11, applicants must provide proof of U.S. citizenship
and proof of identity, along with two recent color photographs and
funds to cover the passport application fees.
[3] See GAO, State Department: Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S.
Passport Fraud Detection Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-477] (Washington, D.C.: May 20,
2005).
[4] On June 29, 2005, a State official testified before the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that the
initiative with SSA would be operational nationwide by early August
2005.
[5] See GAO, Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas
Enhanced, but More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1006] (Washington, D.C.:
Jul. 31, 2007).
[6] See GAO, Social Security Administration: Actions Taken to
Strengthen Procedures for Issuing Social Security Numbers to
Noncitizens, but Some Weaknesses Remain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-12] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15,
2003).
[7] We did not design a test scenario to simulate a malicious
individual attempting to obtain a passport by using the identity and
SSN of a person who already had a current U.S. passport, as this
scenario was beyond the scope of our investigation. According to
information provided to us by State for a previous report, about 28
percent of the U.S. population has a passport. See GAO, State
Department: Comprehensive Strategy Needed to Improve Passport
Operations, GAO-08-891 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 25, 2008).
[8] State operates 17 domestic passport-issuing offices, where most
passports are issued each year. These offices are located in Aurora,
Colorado; Boston; Charleston, South Carolina; Chicago; Honolulu;
Houston; Los Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; New York; Norwalk,
Connecticut; Philadelphia; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; San Francisco;
Seattle; and 2 offices in Washington, D.C.--a regional passport agency
and a special issuance agency that handles official U.S. government and
diplomatic passports. Fifteen of these offices are regional passport
agencies that process in-person applications in addition to
applications received by mail. The remaining 2 facilities--Charleston,
South Carolina, and Portsmouth, New Hampshire--are mega-processing
centers with no access to the public.
[9] We chose this office because it offers an expedited service--
passports are usually issued within 1-2 days--for travelers who present
a confirmed airline reservation to prove that they will be traveling
out of the United States within 14 days.
[10] We used SSA's Death Master File to obtain the identity of the
deceased individual.
[End of section]
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To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
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Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
