Nuclear Nonproliferation
Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program Gao ID: GAO-09-275 March 5, 2009A key mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through its Technical Cooperation (TC) program, which provides equipment, training, fellowships, and other services to its member states. The United States provides approximately 25 percent of the TC program's annual budget. This report addresses the (1) extent to which the United States and IAEA have policies limiting member states' participation in the TC program on the basis of nuclear proliferation and related concerns; (2) extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns; and (3) any limitations and challenges in IAEA's management of the TC program. To address these issues, GAO interviewed relevant officials at the Departments of State (State) and Energy (DOE) and IAEA; analyzed IAEA, DOE, and national laboratory data; and assessed State and IAEA policies toward the TC program.
Neither State nor IAEA seeks to systematically limit TC assistance to countries the United States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism--Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria--even though under U.S. law these countries are subject to sanctions. Together, these four countries received more than $55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 2007. In addition, TC funding has been provided to states that are not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)--India, Israel, and Pakistan--and neither the United States nor IAEA has sought to exclude these countriesfrom participating in the TC program. Finally, IAEA member statesare not required to complete comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements with IAEA--which allow IAEA to monitor declared nuclear activities and detect clandestine nuclear programs--to be eligible for TC assistance, even though U.S. and IAEA officials have stressed the need for all countries to bring such arrangements into force as soon as possible. The proliferation concerns associated with the TC program are difficult for the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve for several reasons. While State has implemented an interagency process to review proposed TC projects for proliferation risks, the effectiveness of these reviews is limited because IAEA does not provide the United States with sufficient or timely information on TC proposals. Of the 1,565 TC proposals reviewed by DOE and the U.S. national laboratories for possible proliferation risks from 1998 through 2006, information for 1,519 proposals, or 97 percent, consisted of only project titles. IAEA faces several limitations and challenges in effectively managing the TC program. First, the TC program's impact in meeting development and other needs of member states is unclear because IAEA has not updated and revised the program's performance metrics since 2002. Second, the TC program is limited by financial constraints, including the failure of many member states to pay their full share of support to the program's Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF). In 2007, the TCF experienced a shortfall of $3.5 million, or 4 percent, of the $80 million total target budget, because 62 member states did not pay their full expected contributions, including 47 states that made no payment at all. Furthermore, IAEA has not developed a policy for determining when countries should be graduated from receiving TC assistance, including those defined by the UN as high-income countries. Finally, the TC program's long-term viability is uncertain because of limitations in IAEA efforts to track how project results are sustained and because of shortcomings in strategies to develop new TC program partners and donors.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-275, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-275
entitled 'Nuclear Nonproliferation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to
Address Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical
Cooperation Program' which was released on March 31, 2009.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2009:
Nuclear Nonproliferation:
Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address Proliferation and Management
Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program:
GAO-09-275:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-275, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
A key mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is
promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through its Technical
Cooperation (TC) program, which provides equipment, training,
fellowships, and other services to its member states. The United States
provides approximately 25 percent of the TC program‘s annual budget.
This report addresses the (1) extent to which the United States and
IAEA have policies limiting member states‘ participation in the TC
program on the basis of nuclear proliferation and related concerns; (2)
extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and monitor TC
projects for proliferation concerns; and (3) any limitations and
challenges in IAEA‘s management of the TC program. To address these
issues, GAO interviewed relevant officials at the Departments of State
(State) and Energy (DOE) and IAEA; analyzed IAEA, DOE, and national
laboratory data; and assessed State and IAEA policies toward the TC
program.
What GAO Found:
Neither State nor IAEA seeks to systematically limit TC assistance to
countries the United States has designated as state sponsors of
terrorism”Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria”even though under U.S. law these
countries are subject to sanctions. Together, these four countries
received more than $55 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 2007.
In addition, TC funding has been provided to states that are not party
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”India,
Israel, and Pakistan”and neither the United States nor IAEA has sought
to exclude these countries from participating in the TC program.
Finally, IAEA member states are not required to complete comprehensive
safeguards or additional protocol agreements with IAEA”which allow IAEA
to monitor declared nuclear activities and detect clandestine nuclear
programs”to be eligible for TC assistance, even though U.S. and IAEA
officials have stressed the need for all countries to bring such
arrangements into force as soon as possible.
The proliferation concerns associated with the TC program are difficult
for the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve for
several reasons. While State has implemented an interagency process to
review proposed TC projects for proliferation risks, the effectiveness
of these reviews is limited because IAEA does not provide the United
States with sufficient or timely information on TC proposals. Of the
1,565 TC proposals reviewed by DOE and the U.S. national laboratories
for possible proliferation risks from 1998 through 2006, information
for 1,519 proposals, or 97 percent, consisted of only project titles.
IAEA faces several limitations and challenges in effectively managing
the TC program. First, the TC program‘s impact in meeting development
and other needs of member states is unclear because IAEA has not
updated and revised the program‘s performance metrics since 2002.
Second, the TC program is limited by financial constraints, including
the failure of many member states to pay their full share of support to
the program‘s Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF). In 2007, the TCF
experienced a shortfall of $3.5 million, or 4 percent, of the $80
million total target budget, because 62 member states did not pay their
full expected contributions, including 47 states that made no payment
at all. Furthermore, IAEA has not developed a policy for determining
when countries should be graduated from receiving TC assistance,
including those defined by the UN as high-income countries. Finally,
the TC program‘s long-term viability is uncertain because of
limitations in IAEA efforts to track how project results are sustained
and because of shortcomings in strategies to develop new TC program
partners and donors.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is asking Congress to consider requiring State to withhold a
proportionate share of its contributions to the TCF for TC program
assistance provided to U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism or
to report to Congress on its rationale for not withholding a
proportionate share of its TCF contribution for such countries. State
opposed a proportionate withholding requirement. State agreed with the
majority of GAO‘s other recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-275]. For more
information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
The United States and IAEA Do Not Systematically Limit or Prevent TC
Assistance to Countries Posing Potential Terrorism and Proliferation
Concerns:
The United States Faces Difficulties in Identifying, Assessing, and
Resolving TC Program Proliferation Concerns:
Long-Term TC Program Effectiveness Is Limited by Outdated Program
Metrics, Financial Resource Constraints, and Sustainability Concerns:
Conclusions:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: 2007 Technical Cooperation Assistance Recipient States and
Territories:
Appendix III: Numbers of Technical Cooperation Proposals Reviewed by
U.S. National Laboratories, Categorized by Level of Proliferation Risk,
by Year, 1998 through 2006:
Appendix IV: 2007 Member State Contributions to the Technical
Cooperation Fund:
Appendix V: 2007 Technical Cooperation Disbursements, by Agency
Program:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: TC Assistance Disbursed to U.S.-designated State Sponsors of
Terrorism, 1997 through 2007:
Table 2: TC Assistance Disbursed to Countries Not Party to the NPT,
1997 through 2007:
Table 3: TC Assistance Received by States and Territories without IAEA
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in Force, 2007:
Table 4: TC Assistance Received by States and Territories without IAEA
Additional Protocols in Force, 2007:
Figure:
Figure 1: TC Program Disbursements, by Technical Area, 2007:
Abbreviations:
DOE: Department of Energy:
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization:
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency:
LANL: Los Alamos National Laboratory:
NPT: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:
ORNL: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:
State: Department of State:
TC: Technical Cooperation:
TCF: Technical Cooperation Fund:
UN: United Nations:
U.S. Mission: U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna:
WMD: weapons of mass destruction:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 5, 2009:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an independent
international organization based in Vienna, Austria, that is affiliated
with the United Nations (UN), has the dual mission of promoting the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy and verifying that nuclear technologies
and materials intended for peaceful purposes are not diverted to
weapons development efforts. IAEA promotes peaceful uses of nuclear
energy through its Technical Cooperation (TC) program, to support the
development of nuclear power, applications in human health, food and
agriculture, and nuclear safety, among other areas. All 145 IAEA member
states are eligible for TC assistance; however, not all countries
request assistance. The United States participates as a donor and is
the largest financial contributor to the TC program, providing
approximately 25 percent of its budget, or about $19.8 million, in
2007.
The TC program's mission is to help IAEA member states achieve their
sustainable development priorities by furnishing them with relevant
nuclear technologies and expertise. This mission is derived from
Articles II and III of IAEA's statute. IAEA provides TC support to
member states through individual projects, which may be implemented on
a national, regional, or interregional basis. A few nonmember states
receive assistance under some regional TC projects.
The TC program also plays a role in facilitating Article IV of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which affirms
that all states party to the treaty have a right to participate in the
exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological
information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The NPT also requires
nonnuclear weapon state parties to the NPT (defined as those countries
that had not manufactured and detonated a nuclear device before January
1, 1967) to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material used in
peaceful activities so that the agency can verify that their nuclear
programs are not being used for weapons purposes.[Footnote 1] Most
countries have concluded "comprehensive safeguards agreements" with
IAEA, under which governments declare their nuclear materials and
activities to IAEA. The agency then verifies and monitors these
declarations. IAEA has sought to further strengthen its verification
efforts through a complementary "additional protocol" to a country's
comprehensive safeguards agreement. Under such protocols, states must
provide IAEA with broader information and wider access rights on all
aspects of their activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle.[Footnote
2]
In 2007, the TC program disbursed over $93 million in nuclear technical
assistance to 122 countries and territories. TC projects have supported
efforts to eradicate tsetse flies and other insect pests in certain
regions, control communicable diseases in developing countries, and
develop higher-yielding agricultural crops. As of June 2008, 1,290 TC
projects were under way, with each project lasting, on average, 3 to 4
years. A TC project typically has several components, including
equipment procurement, provision of expert services, training, and
fellowships. Each year, about 1,600 individuals around the world are
granted fellowships by the TC program, allowing them to pursue
specialized nuclear studies at universities, institutes, and other
facilities outside their home countries.[Footnote 3]
All TC projects are considered by the Technical Assistance and
Cooperation Committee of IAEA's Board of Governors--the 35-member
policy-making body for IAEA programs--before they are approved by the
Board of Governors. This approval covers the entire life cycle of the
project. The TC Department and other departments within IAEA's
Secretariat begin working with the member states to develop project
concepts and proposals approximately 1 year before the project is
approved.[Footnote 4]
Financing of TC projects is generally supported through the annual
voluntary contributions of member states to IAEA's Technical
Cooperation Fund (TCF).[Footnote 5] Each member state is expected to
meet an annual financial pledge to the TCF, which is set as a
percentage of the total fund's target budget. The U.S. target rate has
been set at 25 percent, while many of the least developed countries are
expected to contribute less than 1 percent of the TCF budget.
Contributions to the TCF are fungible--that is, they are not designated
for, and cannot be traced to, specific TC projects.
In the United States, the two principal agencies involved in TC issues
are the Departments of State (State) and Energy (DOE). U.S. funding to
the TC program--including its contribution to the TCF, extrabudgetary
funding for specific projects, and "in-kind" contributions[Footnote 6]-
-is provided from State's budget as part of the overall annual U.S.
"voluntary contribution" to IAEA.[Footnote 7] In addition to providing
funding to IAEA, State coordinates U.S. policy toward the TC program by
working through the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in
Vienna (U.S. Mission).
We reviewed the TC program in 1997 and found that while the vast
majority of TC projects did not involve the transfer of sensitive
nuclear materials and technologies, nuclear assistance was provided to
countries that posed a proliferation risk.[Footnote 8] Proliferation
concerns about the TC program have persisted because of the assistance
it has provided to certain countries and because nuclear equipment,
technology, and expertise can be dual-use--capable of serving peaceful
purposes, such as the production of medical isotopes, but also useful
in contributing to nuclear weapons development. For example, in 2006,
IAEA refused to support a TC proposal from Iran requesting assistance
for a heavy water reactor near the town of Arak. Iran stated that the
reactor was intended for the production of medical isotopes. The United
States and other IAEA members objected due to concerns that the plant
could serve as a source of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.
In our 1997 report, we recommended that the Secretary of State direct
the U.S. interagency group on IAEA technical assistance to
systematically review all proposals for TC projects in countries of
concern prior to their approval by IAEA to determine whether the
projects are consistent with U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals. In
response, an interagency process was established, involving State, DOE,
and the DOE national laboratories,[Footnote 9] to evaluate proposed and
active TC projects for proliferation risks. State leads the reviews of
TC project proposals and ongoing projects. DOE provides technical input
to this process using the technical expertise of the national
laboratories to assess the projects' proliferation risks and reports
its findings to State.
As agreed with your office, this report assesses the (1) extent to
which the United States and IAEA have policies limiting member states'
participation in the TC program on the basis of nuclear proliferation
and related concerns; (2) extent to which the United States and IAEA
evaluate and monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns; and (3)
any limitations and challenges in IAEA's management of the TC program.
The scope of our review covered the period from 1997 through 2007
because our previous report on the TC program analyzed programmatic and
financial data through 1996. To address these objectives, we
interviewed key U.S. officials at State, DOE, and the U.S. Mission and
analyzed documentation, such as cables, reports and analyses of the TC
program, financial information, and statements and speeches by U.S.
officials. We interviewed other individuals in the United States
involved in TC program issues, including U.S. national laboratory
representatives involved in conducting proliferation risk assessments
of TC projects and proposals; Argonne National Laboratory staff who
support State's oversight of the TC program and facilitate TC training
and fellowship programs in the United States; and the U.S.
representative to IAEA's Standing Advisory Group on Technical
Assistance and Cooperation.
We also interviewed officials at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria,
including representatives from the TC Department and other agency
departments--specifically, the Departments of Management, Safeguards,
and Nuclear Safety and Security. We obtained and analyzed documentation
and data from IAEA, including annual reports, financial data, program
guidance and strategy documents, auditor reports, and speeches and
other statements pertaining to the TC program. We interviewed
knowledgeable IAEA officials on the reliability of TC financial data
and data on the numbers of TC projects and determined that the data
were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
As initially agreed with your office, we intended to assess the extent
to which TC projects have contributed to the safety and security of
nuclear installations around the world. We developed a judgmental
sample of TC projects to serve as the basis for our assessment and
interviews with relevant IAEA officials. However, because IAEA did not
provide us with an opportunity to interview relevant IAEA officials who
oversee these projects, we were unable to sufficiently assess the
contributions of the TC program in improving the worldwide safety and
security of nuclear facilities. In addition, because IAEA restricted
our access to information relating to reviews of TC projects by its
Safeguards Department, we were unable to draw conclusions on the
effectiveness of IAEA's internal review of TC projects for
proliferation concerns. As agreed, we revised the objectives of our
review accordingly.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 to March 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides more
detailed information on our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
Neither State nor IAEA has sought to systematically limit or prevent TC
assistance to countries that (1) have been identified as sponsors of
terrorism, (2) are not parties to the NPT, and (3) have not completed
comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements with IAEA.
Specifically:
* State officials told us that the United States does not
systematically try to limit TC projects in Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and
Syria--which the department lists as sponsors of terrorism. These four
countries received more than $55 million in TC assistance from 1997
through 2007. Moreover, IAEA officials told us that the agency does not
seek to limit or condition TC assistance in countries such as Iran and
Syria that have been found or suspected by IAEA of having violated
their safeguards commitments and may be engaged in undeclared nuclear
activities. Under U.S. law, however, State withholds a portion of its
contributions, except for certain projects, to the TCF equal to the
U.S. proportionate share of TC expenditures in Cuba. In the past, State
has withheld a proportionate share of its TCF contribution for Iran,
Libya, and the Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian
Authority. Regarding Iran, State reported in 2007 that three TC
projects in that country were directly related to the Iranian nuclear
power plant at Bushehr. IAEA's Deputy Director General for the TC
program told us that "there are no good countries and there are no bad
countries" participating in the program and that it is more important
for the program to engage as many countries as possible than to exclude
some nations on the basis of political factors.
* From 1997 through 2007, the TC program disbursed approximately $24.6
million in assistance to India, Israel, and Pakistan, although these
states are not party to the NPT. IAEA officials told us that NPT
membership is not required for IAEA member states to receive TC
assistance under the agency's statute. State officials told us that the
United States does not attempt to systematically limit TC program
support to countries that are not signatories to the NPT.
* Nonnuclear weapon state members of IAEA are not required to complete
comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements with IAEA to
be eligible for TC assistance, even though U.S. and IAEA officials have
stressed the need for all countries to bring such arrangements into
force as soon as possible. We found that 17 states and territories
without comprehensive safeguards agreements in force in 2007 received
approximately $6.7 million in TC program assistance that year, while 62
states and territories without an additional protocol in force in 2007
received approximately $43.2 million in assistance that same year.
The proliferation concerns associated with the TC program are difficult
for the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve for the
following reasons:
* Limited information on TC project proposals. State, DOE, and national
laboratory officials told us that there is no formal mechanism for
obtaining TC project information from IAEA during the proposal
development phase. Of the 1,565 proposed TC projects DOE and the
national laboratories reviewed for possible proliferation risks from
1998 through 2006, information for 1,519 proposals, or 97 percent,
consisted of only project titles.
* Limited State documentation on how proliferation concerns of TC
proposals were resolved. From 1998 through 2006, DOE and the national
laboratories identified 43 of the 1,565 TC proposals they reviewed as
having some degree of potential proliferation risk. IAEA approved 34 of
these 43 proposals. However, we were unable to determine if State
addressed DOE's and the national laboratories' concerns because--with
the exception of one case--State could not document how it responded to
these findings. State officials told us that as a result of a 2005
reorganization of the department's arms control and nonproliferation
bureaus, the office that monitors TC program issues has fewer staff to
conduct IAEA oversight.
* Shortcomings in U.S. policies and IAEA procedures related to TC
program fellowships. State's Office of Multilateral Nuclear and
Security Affairs lacks a formal policy and specific criteria to serve
as the basis for approving or rejecting requests from TC fellows to
study nuclear issues in the United States. In addition, we found
shortcomings in the extent to which IAEA monitors the proliferation
risks of TC fellowships. Specifically, IAEA does not systematically
track individuals who have completed fellowships to determine whether
they are still working on peaceful nuclear programs in their home
country.
We identified challenges limiting the TC program's long-term
effectiveness in three areas: program performance metrics, financial
resource constraints, and project and program sustainability.
Specifically:
* Inadequate program performance metrics. IAEA does not have adequate
metrics for measuring the impact of the TC program. For example, IAEA
officials told us that performance metrics developed in 2002 did not
assess the impact of TC projects in meeting specific member state
development and other needs, such as the number of additional cancer
patients treated or the number of new nuclear security safety
regulations promulgated. IAEA's internal auditor has also reported that
the TC program lacks appropriate performance indicators.
* Financial resource constraints. Many member states do not pay their
full share of support to the TCF but nevertheless receive TC
assistance, while some high-income countries also receive support from
the TC program. The TCF experienced a shortfall in 2007 of $3.5
million, or 4 percent, of the $80 million total target budget because
62 member states did not pay their full contributions, including 47
countries that made no payment at all. In addition, 13 member states
that the UN has defined as high-income received TC assistance in 2007,
but IAEA has not developed a policy or criteria for determining when
such countries should be graduated from assistance.
* TC project and program sustainability challenges. IAEA does not
systematically review completed TC projects to determine or verify
whether the host country is sustaining project activities and results.
In addition, the TC program overall faces sustainability challenges
because program funding is distributed across 18 different technical
areas, making it difficult for IAEA to set clear program priorities and
to maximize the impact of limited program resources. Finally, IAEA has
developed outreach strategies to engage new potential partners and
donors--primarily from international development organizations--to help
sustain the TC program. However, this effort faces several limitations
and shortcomings.
We are asking Congress to consider directing State to withhold a share
of future annual contributions to the TCF that is proportionate to the
amount of funding provided from the fund for U.S.-designated state
sponsors of terrorism and other countries of concern, as it currently
does with Cuba and has done in the past with Iran, Libya, and the
Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. We are
also recommending that the Secretary of State, working with IAEA and
other member states through the Board of Governors, explore a number of
actions to address other proliferation and management concerns in the
TC program, including (1) developing formal mechanisms for timely
information sharing on TC project proposals between IAEA and the United
States early in the project development phase; (2) strengthening
mechanisms for collecting member state contributions to the TCF; and
(3) establishing criteria and processes for graduating high-income
countries from further TC program support.
We provided a draft of this report to State and DOE for formal comment.
We also provided IAEA with a detailed summary of the facts contained in
the draft report. DOE and IAEA provided technical comments that we
incorporated as appropriate. State agreed with 7 of our 10
recommendations, neither agreed nor disagreed with the other three
recommendations, and strongly opposed the matter for congressional
consideration. State objected to the matter for congressional
consideration for a number of reasons, stating that (1) it would be
counterproductive to a separate recommendation we made encouraging all
states to pay their full share to the TCF; (2) it would not stop TC
projects in targeted countries because TCF funding is fungible; (3)
Congress has exempted IAEA contributions from this type of
proportionate withholding; (4) none of the TC projects in state
sponsors of terrorism have been shown to have contributed to a weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) program; (5) there are adequate safeguards
within IAEA to prevent TC projects from contributing to a WMD program;
and (6) it would negatively impact the ability of the United States to
achieve other critical objectives within IAEA.
We do not believe the matter for congressional consideration is unique
or unprecedented. Congress currently requires the withholding of a
proportionate share of the U.S. contribution to the TCF for certain
projects in Cuba, and has required withholding in the past for Iran,
Libya, and the Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian
Authority. However, in order to give Congress greater flexibility and
more information, we have broadened the matter for congressional
consideration to give Congress the option of requiring State to report
on its rationale for not withholding a proportionate share of the U.S.
contribution to the TCF for U.S.-designated state sponsors of
terrorism.
Notwithstanding our modification to the matter for congressional
consideration, we still disagree with State's specific objections to it
for the following reasons. First, we do not believe it is
counterproductive to our other recommendation, which is geared toward
strengthening mechanisms for collecting contributions to the TCF from
member states that are receiving TC assistance, not from major donors
such as the United States. Second, we believe that withholding a
proportionate share of the U.S. contribution to the TCF for state
sponsors of terrorism and other countries that the United States has
sanctioned is a matter of fundamental principle and intended to foster
a more consistent U.S. policy toward such nations. Third, while U.S.
contributions to IAEA were exempted from the proportionate share
withholding requirement in 1994, we note that the law was subsequently
amended to require State to withhold a proportionate share of funding
to IAEA for certain projects in Cuba and for all projects in Iran if
State determines that such projects in Iran are inconsistent with U.S.
nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals, will provide Iran with
training or expertise relevant to the development of nuclear weapons,
or are being used as a cover for the acquisition of sensitive nuclear
technology. Fourth, given the limited information available on TC
projects and the dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies and
expertise, we do not believe State can assert with complete confidence
that TC assistance has not advanced WMD programs in U.S.-designated
state sponsors of terrorism. Fifth, we do not share State's confidence
in IAEA's internal safeguards to prevent TC projects from contributing
to weapons development, since IAEA's information restrictions prevented
us from assessing the effectiveness of its TC project review system.
Lastly, neither we nor State can determine how other states might react
to an increase in the United States' proportionate withholding of
funding to the TCF and how it would affect U.S. ability to achieve
other objectives within the agency.
Background:
Overall policy direction for the TC program is set by IAEA's policy-
making bodies--the General Conference and the Board of Governors. The
United States is a permanent member of the Board of Governors, which
typically meets 5 times per year. IAEA's Secretariat--led by a Director
General and structured into six functional departments--is responsible
for implementing policies established by the Board of Governors and the
General Conference. The Department of Technical Cooperation, which is
headed by a Deputy Director General, is structured primarily around
four regional divisions: Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and
Latin America and the Caribbean. The department also includes a
Division of Programme Support and Coordination, which is responsible
for developing TC program strategies, communications, and partnerships,
and managing relevant information systems and TC financial resources.
In addition, an external auditor and IAEA's Office of Internal
Oversight Services conduct annual audits and reviews of the TC program.
Several individuals are involved in the TC project team responsible for
developing and overseeing the project. The team includes (1) a project
officer within the TC Department; (2) a technical officer from each
relevant IAEA department (such as the Department of Nuclear Sciences
and Applications); and (3) a national liaison officer at the country
level who represents the member state, serves as coordinator for TC
projects in the host country, and acts as liaison with host country
governments and institutes.
Typically, the TC program develops and approves new projects on a 2-
year cycle. The most recent set of new proposals were approved in fall
2008.[Footnote 10] Member states begin submitting project proposal
concepts to IAEA in September of the year prior to approval. IAEA
officials screen concepts through the fall, and member states develop
and refine their proposals through March of the approval year. By July,
IAEA's Secretariat comes to a final agreement on TC project proposals
that it will back for approval by the Technical Assistance and
Cooperation Committee and the Board of Governors. The TC project
proposals are discussed with member states in bilateral and regional
group meetings during IAEA's General Conference, which is held in
September; in November, the Technical Assistance and Cooperation
Committee and the Board of Governors give final approval to the
proposed TC projects.
The United States and IAEA Do Not Systematically Limit or Prevent TC
Assistance to Countries Posing Potential Terrorism and Proliferation
Concerns:
Neither the United States nor IAEA seeks to systematically limit or
deny TC assistance to countries designated as state sponsors of
terrorism, even though under U.S. law these countries are subject to
sanctions. In addition, TC assistance has been provided to countries
that are not party to the NPT, and neither the United States nor IAEA
has sought to exclude these nations from TC assistance. Finally, while
the United States has encouraged IAEA to condition TC assistance to
countries according to their safeguards status, IAEA does not take this
factor into account when allocating program funds. Appendix II provides
more detailed information on the states and territories that received
TC assistance in 2007.
Four Countries Designated by the United States as State Sponsors of
Terrorism Receive TC Assistance:
Countries deemed by State as state sponsors of terrorism--meaning the
Secretary of State has determined that the countries' governments have
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism--have
been provided nuclear equipment and other assistance through the TC
program. The United States has designated four countries--Cuba, Iran,
Sudan, and Syria--as state sponsors of terrorism, pursuant to several
U.S. laws.[Footnote 11] According to our review of IAEA data and
financial records, 111 TC projects were approved for these four
countries from 1997 through 2007, and they received approximately $55.7
million in TC assistance over that period. These projects ranged across
a number of areas, from applying nuclear technologies to treat diseases
and improve crop productivity to assisting nuclear power development.
Table 1 shows the dollar amount of TC assistance each U.S.-designated
state sponsor of terrorism received from 1997 through 2007.
Table 1: TC Assistance Disbursed to U.S.-designated State Sponsors of
Terrorism, 1997 through 2007:
Dollars in thousands:
U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba;
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $13,740.8.
U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism: Islamic Republic of Iran;
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $15,571.7.
U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism: Sudan;
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $11,913.9.
U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism: Syrian Arab Republic;
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $14,469.0.
U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism: Total;
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $55,695.4.
Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data.
[End of table]
According to State, the United States has applied several types of
sanctions to these four countries, including restrictions on U.S.
foreign assistance, a ban on defense exports and sales, certain
controls over exports of dual-use items,[Footnote 12] and miscellaneous
financial and other restrictions. These sanctions notwithstanding,
direct U.S. nuclear trade with these countries involving the types of
technologies provided by the TC program might not be permitted under
U.S. adherence to other international nonproliferation controls. For
instance, in a 2007 report to Congress, State concluded that three TC
projects involving technology transfer for the operation and
maintenance of the Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr could be
subject to multilateral export controls if Iran were to procure such
technology directly from suppliers. The State report noted, "under the
Nonproliferation Principle of the NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group]
[Footnote 13] Guidelines the United States and other responsible
members of the NSG would deny such direct transfers."
The United States has not sought to systematically exclude or limit the
four U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism from TC assistance.
State officials told us that the department would not recommend
withholding U.S. funding to the TC program because of the support that
IAEA provides to these four countries. They said that it is a long-
standing department policy to pay the full share of U.S. support to the
TC program because doing so helps maintain international political
support for and participation in IAEA, including international support
for safeguards. In addition, because TCF resources are fungible, State
officials asserted that withholding U.S. contributions to the TCF to
punish state sponsors of terrorism would have no practical impact on
the TC funding these nations receive. A U.S. Mission official told us
that once the United States provides its contribution to the TCF, it
cedes control over how the funds are disbursed by IAEA.
Several laws govern U.S. support to the TC program. One restriction
under these laws prohibits U.S. funds contributed to IAEA from being
used for projects in Cuba, except in certain circumstances.
Accordingly, State withholds a portion of its voluntary contribution to
the TCF equal to the U.S. proportionate share of the TC program's
expenditures in Cuba.[Footnote 14] In the past, the United States also
withheld a proportionate share of its TCF contribution for Iran, Libya,
and Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority.
State also must report annually to Congress on all IAEA programs or
projects in certain countries, including Burma (Myanmar), Cuba, Iran,
North Korea, and Syria.[Footnote 15]
IAEA officials told us that the TC program does not attempt to exclude
countries on the basis of their status as U.S.-designated state
sponsors of terrorism or other political considerations. Under the TC
program's guiding principles, for example, the provision of TC
assistance is not subject to any political, economic, military, or
other conditions that are inconsistent with IAEA's statute. Moreover,
according to the Deputy Director General for the TC program, requests
for TC assistance are evaluated strictly on technical merits and the
contributions of proposed projects to a nation's development
priorities, subject to the conditions of the IAEA statute, IAEA guiding
principles and operating rules pertaining to technical assistance, and
any relevant decisions by the Board of Governors and the UN Security
Council. This official added that the program seeks to include as many
countries as possible and that "there are no good countries and there
are no bad countries" participating in the program. In her view,
denying or limiting participation of member states in the TC program
was a matter for the Board of Governors to consider.
Other IAEA officials told us that under the agency's statute, IAEA's
Secretariat is powerless to limit or condition TC assistance to
specific countries, even in cases where countries have been deemed by
the Board of Governors to be violating their IAEA obligations or in
cases where recipient countries were suspected of being engaged in
undeclared, clandestine nuclear activities. For instance, the Board of
Governors determined in September 2005 that Iran had breached its
safeguards obligations and was not complying with IAEA's statute.
However, TC projects in Iran were not restricted until February 2007
following a UN Security Council resolution on Iran's nuclear
activities.[Footnote 16] In addition, in 2008, IAEA's Director General
stated it would be inappropriate to block approval of a TC project in
Syria for a nuclear power plant feasibility study before IAEA verified
claims concerning Syria's alleged construction of an undeclared nuclear
reactor. According to State officials, several countries, including the
United States, asserted that the approval of this project would be
"wholly inappropriate" when Syria had not provided all of the
cooperation required by IAEA to investigate these allegations. IAEA's
Board of Governors ultimately approved the project in November 2008.
The United States did not attempt to block approval of the project
after receiving assurances that IAEA would monitor the project closely,
report as appropriate, and ensure that any equipment provided under the
project would be used only for the intended purposes.
Finally, in addition to providing assistance to the four countries the
United States has designated as state sponsors of terrorism, the TC
program has also provided nuclear technology and expertise to other
countries that the United States has sanctioned or taken other punitive
actions against. Examples of such countries and the total amounts of TC
assistance provided to them from 1997 through 2007 include the
following:
* Approximately $7.3 million for Burma, which is subject to targeted
U.S. trade, financial, and other sanctions. The Secretaries of State
and of Energy have declared jointly that the development of nuclear
infrastructure of any kind in Burma would be inappropriate. TC projects
have been approved for Burma to improve nuclear instrument repair and
maintenance services, enhance pest control, and apply nondestructive
testing techniques in construction projects.
* Approximately $9.7 million for Belarus, which the United States has
characterized as "a regime of repression in the heart of Europe" and
against which the United States has imposed targeted financial
sanctions and travel restrictions. TC support has been provided to
assist Belarus in minimizing threats posed by radioactive waste at
former military sites, establishing a center of competence on radiation
oncology, and remediating areas affected by the Chernobyl accident.
* Approximately $6.1 million for Venezuela, which, among other things,
State has determined to be engaging in diplomacy designed to
deliberately undermine U.S. interests, including deepening relations
with Iran and publicly supporting Iran's nuclear program. IAEA has
approved TC assistance for Venezuela to help it strengthen its
technical capabilities in radiotherapy, nuclear medicine, and
radiopharmaceutical services, and to more effectively apply nuclear
techniques in managing water resources.
Based on our review of recent project summaries, the TC assistance
provided to these countries does not appear to involve support that
could have direct weapons applications. However, as we discuss in the
following section, given the dual-use nature of some nuclear technology
and the absence of more complete information from IAEA, it is difficult
for the United States to make firm judgments about the proliferation
risks of TC proposals and projects.
Non-NPT Countries Are Receiving TC Assistance:
U.S. and IAEA officials have described the NPT as the cornerstone of
the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a key legal
barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation. However, states that are not
party to the NPT--India, Israel, and Pakistan--received approximately
$24.6 million in TC assistance from 1997 through 2007. India has not
received TC assistance through national-level TC projects but has
received TC support as a participant in regional TC projects. Israel
and Pakistan have received support for 63 national-level projects, as
well as for regional TC projects. For example, national TC projects in
Israel and Pakistan have included assistance to control fruit flies and
suppress other pests, enhance nuclear medicine practices and establish
radiation physics courses, and improve nuclear safety. Table 2 shows
the total amount of TC assistance provided to each of these countries
from 1997 through 2007.
Table 2: TC Assistance Disbursed to Countries Not Party to the NPT,
1997 through 2007:
Dollars in thousands:
Non-NPT states: India;
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $3,419.1.
Non-NPT states: Israel;
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $3,891.5.
Non-NPT states: Pakistan;
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $17,254.9.
Non-NPT states: Total;
Total TC assistance received, 1997 through 2007: $24,565.5.
Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data.
[End of table]
The TC program does not differentiate between states based on their NPT
status. IAEA officials told us that creation of IAEA predates the entry
into force of the NPT, and treaty membership is not obligatory for IAEA
membership and receipt of TC assistance under the agency's statute.
India, Israel, and Pakistan joined IAEA before the NPT entered into
force.
State officials told us that the United States does not seek to
systematically limit TC program support to countries that are not
signatories to the NPT. State officials also told us that, in
accordance with statutory requirements, State must annually determine
and report to Congress that Israel's right to participate in IAEA
activities is not being denied. However in its annual funding pledge to
IAEA, State asks that IAEA give preference to states that are party to
the NPT in allocating the U.S. contribution to the TC program.
IAEA Does Not Condition TC Assistance on the Basis of the Recipient
Country's Safeguards Status:
While U.S. and IAEA officials have stressed the need for all countries
to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional
protocols with IAEA as soon as possible, neither the United States nor
IAEA has sought to limit TC funding to countries that have not
implemented such agreements. Together, these safeguards measures allow
IAEA to provide assurances that all declared nuclear material is being
used for peaceful purposes and that a country has declared all of its
nuclear material and activities.
Nearly all states receiving TC assistance are nonnuclear weapon state
parties to the NPT. Under Article IV of the NPT, all states party to
the treaty have the right to participate in the exchange of equipment,
materials, and scientific and technological information for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. According to IAEA, Article III of the
NPT also makes it mandatory for all nonnuclear-weapon states to
conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the agency. These
agreements are to be concluded by such states within 18 months of their
accession to the treaty. The United States and IAEA have recognized an
inherent linkage between nonnuclear weapon states' rights to access
peaceful nuclear technology and their obligation to accept safeguards
on their nuclear activities, although State officials told us that to
limit TC funding to states that have not completed comprehensive
safeguards agreements with IAEA could be seen as inconsistent with
IAEA's statute.
IAEA has not conditioned TC assistance provided to recipient states on
the basis of their safeguards status. According to our analysis of IAEA
records, 17 countries and territories that did not have comprehensive
safeguards agreements in force with the agency at the end of 2007
received approximately $6.7 million, or about 7 percent, of the $93.3
million in TC assistance disbursed in 2007. This list includes three
states and one nonstate territory that are not party to the NPT--India,
Israel, Pakistan, and the Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the
Palestinian Authority. The remaining 13 states have all been party to
the NPT longer than 18 months--in most cases for more than 10 years--
meaning they have not fulfilled their NPT Article III obligation. Table
3 shows the states and territories that did not have comprehensive
safeguards agreements in effect in 2007 and the amounts of TC
assistance they received that year.
Table 3: TC Assistance Received by States and Territories without IAEA
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements in Force, 2007:
Dollars in thousands:
States and territories without IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements
in force, 2007:
Angola;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $495.5.
Benin;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $371.6.
Central African Republic;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $365.3.
Chad;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $143.3.
Eritrea;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $242.2.
Gabon;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $159.1.
India;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $252.8.
Israel;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $251.6.
Kenya;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,093.5.
Islamic Republic of Mauritania;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $156.1.
Montenegro;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $18.9.
Mozambique;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $17.5.
Pakistan;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $2,233.9.
Qatar[A];
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $232.8.
Saudi Arabia[B];
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $321.5.
Sierra Leone;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $348.4.
Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $26.3.
Total;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $6,730.3.
Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data.
[A] Qatar brought a comprehensive safeguards agreement into force in
January 2009.
[B] Saudi Arabia brought a comprehensive safeguards agreement into
force in January 2009.
[End of table]
In addition, we found that 62 states and territories without an
additional protocol agreement in effect with IAEA received
approximately $43.2 million, or approximately 46 percent, of TC
assistance in 2007. Without additional protocols in force, IAEA has
limited ability to detect clandestine nuclear programs, and its
inspection efforts remain focused on verifying declared nuclear
material, activities, and facilities.[Footnote 17] Both State and IAEA
officials have asserted that the additional protocol should become the
new universal safeguards standard. Table 4 lists the states and
territories without additional protocols in effect as of the end of
2007 and the amounts of TC assistance they received that year.
Table 4: TC Assistance Received by States and Territories without IAEA
Additional Protocols in Force, 2007:
Dollars in thousands:
States and territories without IAEA additional protocols in force,
2007:
Albania;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $784.1.
Algeria;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,361.4.
Angola;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $495.5.
Argentina;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,543.2.
Belarus;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $969.8.
Belize;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $61.4.
Benin;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $371.6.
Bolivia;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $817.4.
Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $399.2.
Brazil;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: v1,480.4.
Brunei Darussalam;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $0.5.
Burma (Myanmar);
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $670.4.
Cambodia;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $0.9.
Cameroon;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $412.3.
Central African Republic;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $365.3.
Chad;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $143.3.
Colombia;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $778.0.
Costa Rica;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $749.6.
Côte d'Ivoire;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $253.8.
Dominican Republic;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $256.9.
Egypt;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,280.9.
Eritrea;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $242.2.
Ethiopia;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $2,187.5.
Gabon;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $159.1.
Gambia;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $3.5.
Guatemala[A];
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $435.6.
Honduras;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $394.5.
India;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $252.8.
Islamic Republic of Iran;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,000.0.
Iraq;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $190.6.
Israel;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $251.6.
Kenya;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,093.5.
Kyrgyzstan;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $542.6.
Lebanon;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $502.3.
Malaysia;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,012.8.
Islamic Republic of Mauritania;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $156.1.
Mexico;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $962.8.
Republic of Moldova;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $905.4.
Montenegro;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $18.9.
Morocco;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $996.9.
Mozambique;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $17.5.
Namibia;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $421.1.
Pakistan;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $2,233.9.
Philippines;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,510.7.
Qatar;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $232.8.
Saudi Arabia;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $321.5.
Senegal;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $983.9.
Serbia;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $2,129.4.
Sierra Leone;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $348.4.
Singapore[B];
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $137.8.
Sri Lanka;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $810.8.
Sudan;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,148.1.
Syrian Arab Republic;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,525.4.
Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $26.3.
Thailand;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,057.4.
Tunisia;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $789.0.
United Arab Emirates;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $158.7.
Venezuela;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $681.3.
Vietnam;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,770.8.
Yemen;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $1,179.2.
Zambia;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $618.3.
Zimbabwe;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $571.0.
Total;
Total TC assistance received in 2007: $43,177.9.
Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data.
[A] Guatemala brought an additional protocol into force in May 2008.
[B] Singapore brought an additional protocol into force in March 2008.
[End of table]
In its annual pledge of funding to the TC program, State asks that IAEA
consider whether a recipient country has in force a comprehensive
safeguards agreement and an additional protocol when it allocates TC
funds. However, according to IAEA officials, IAEA's Secretariat is not
in a position to take such considerations into account in the absence
of a decision by its policy-making bodies. The Deputy Director General
for the TC program, for example, told us that such guidelines would
need to be developed by the Secretariat after consultation with and
approval by the member states. IAEA officials stated that while IAEA's
statute, TC program guidance, and TC program agreements with individual
member states include project-and technology-specific safeguards
conditions and peaceful use obligations, these documents do not require
that member states have comprehensive safeguards agreements or
additional protocols in force to receive assistance.
The United States Faces Difficulties in Identifying, Assessing, and
Resolving TC Program Proliferation Concerns:
The proliferation concerns associated with the TC program are difficult
for the United States to fully identify, assess, and resolve for
several reasons. First, while State has implemented an interagency
process to review proposed TC projects for proliferation risks,
consistent with the recommendation in our 1997 report, the
effectiveness of these reviews is limited because IAEA does not provide
the United States with sufficient or timely information on TC
proposals. Second, for TC proposals that DOE and the national
laboratories have identified as having possible proliferation risks,
State was unable to provide us with documentation explaining how those
proliferation concerns were addressed. Finally, State lacks a formal
policy that identifies countries from which the United States will not
accept TC fellows, and IAEA does not systematically monitor former TC
fellows to determine whether they still reside in their home country
and are still involved in peaceful nuclear research related to their
fellowship studies.
The United States Does Not Comprehensively Evaluate TC Proposals for
Proliferation Concerns because IAEA Does Not Provide Sufficient and
Timely Information:
DOE and the national laboratories began reviewing TC proposals for
possible proliferation concerns and providing their findings to State
as the result of a recommendation in our 1997 report on the TC program.
[Footnote 18] However, this review process is deficient because DOE and
the national laboratories receive limited information to conduct their
proliferation assessments and have little time to complete them.
According to State, DOE, and national laboratory officials, the United
States has had difficulty in obtaining detailed information on proposed
TC projects during the proposal development phase. The initial proposal
development process is internal to IAEA's Secretariat and information
is kept confidential between the recipient country and the agency and
is not releasable to third parties, including the United States.
According to State, DOE, and national laboratory officials, IAEA member
state representatives, including U.S. Mission staff, do not have a
formal mechanism to obtain information on project proposals while they
are under development.
DOE and national laboratory officials told us that they attempt to make
the best possible determination of TC proposal proliferation risks on
the basis of all available information. However, in the vast majority
of cases, the information they receive on TC proposals is very limited,
according to our analysis of DOE and national laboratory data.
Specifically, we found that national laboratory officials received only
the title of proposed projects for 97 percent--or for 1,519 of 1,565--
of proposed TC projects they reviewed from 1998 through 2006. For the
remaining 3 percent, or 46 of the proposed projects, DOE and the
national laboratories were able to obtain some additional information
on the proposed projects. See appendix III for more specific
information on the number of TC proposals reviewed by DOE and the
national laboratories from 1998 through 2006.
DOE and national laboratory officials told us that a TC project
proposal title can occasionally raise proliferation concerns but that
the title alone is generally insufficient to reliably assess
proliferation risk. Moreover, proposal titles can be misleading and
obscure more serious proliferation implications. For instance, the 2006
TC proposal from Iran requesting assistance for the completion of the
Arak heavy water research reactor--a type of reactor that could be a
source of plutonium for nuclear weapons--was entitled "Strengthening
Safety Capabilities for the Construction of a Research Reactor." Iran
asserted that the reactor was intended for the production of medical
isotopes, and the proposal was approved for funding by IAEA's
Secretariat. However, as a result of objections by the United States
and other nations, the Board of Governors ultimately did not approve
this proposal.
In addition to the limited information on TC proposals available to the
national laboratories, the dual-use nature of some nuclear technology
also complicates efforts to assess TC proposals for proliferation
risks. IAEA applies safeguards to nuclear material, equipment, and
facilities provided through the TC program in four "sensitive
technological areas"--uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing,
heavy water production, and handling of plutonium and mixed uranium-
plutonium fuel. These four areas relate to the production and handling
of fissile material. However, according to DOE and national laboratory
officials, these four sensitive areas do not address all technologies
related to the production of fissile material. For example,
"nonsensitive" technology associated with the design and operation of
civilian, light water power reactors might prove useful to countries
seeking to design and build a plutonium production reactor. TC projects
providing such technology might therefore raise proliferation concerns.
Other "nonsensitive" skills and expertise that states acquire through
TC assistance might provide basic knowledge useful to weapons, such as
radioactive materials handling, familiarity with chemical processes and
properties of nuclear materials, and use of various instruments and
control systems.
Even in cases where more information on TC proposals was obtained,
national laboratory officials told us that they still often lacked
crucial details--such as equipment specifications--to reliably assess
the proliferation risks. As an example, national laboratory officials
told us that some TC proposals could include requests for procurement
of "hot cells" to produce isotopes--a technology with dual-use
implications.[Footnote 19] However, without specific technical details
of the hot cell, it would not be possible to determine the potential
proliferation risks associated with such a device.
In addition, DOE and national laboratory officials told us that in
recent years, they have received less information about proposed TC
projects. Moreover, DOE and national laboratory officials told us that
such information is arriving closer to the time when such projects must
be approved by the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee and
the Board of Governors. The lack of full and timely information on TC
project proposals complicates efforts by the United States and other
IAEA member states to make informed decisions about TC proposals,
including whether they raise proliferation concerns. State, DOE, and
national laboratory officials told us that it is preferable to raise
potential proliferation concerns about TC proposals with IAEA officials
early in the development cycle, when such project proposals can be
modified more readily.
In 2004, IAEA's Safeguards Department began reviewing TC projects for
possible proliferation risks. This review process includes evaluating
proliferation risks of TC project proposals and reviewing all
procurement requests made to the agency under ongoing TC projects.
However, IAEA officials told us that the results of the Safeguards
Department reviews are confidential and are not shared with the United
States or other governments. IAEA officials declined to provide us with
certain basic information regarding the results of these reviews,
including the total number of TC proposals that the Safeguards
Department identified as having possible proliferation concerns.
State Could Not Substantiate How It Addressed TC Proposals Identified
by DOE as Having Possible Proliferation Risks:
Under the interagency process for reviewing TC proposals for
proliferation concerns, DOE and the national laboratories provide State
with their assessments of the proposals. State, however, was unable to
provide us with documentation describing the actions it took on the
basis of DOE's and the national laboratories' findings or how, if at
all, it raised their concerns with IAEA. According to DOE and the
national laboratories' assessment of TC proposals from 1998 through
2006, 43 of the 1,565 TC proposals reviewed had some degree of
potential proliferation concern or required additional information to
more clearly establish potential proliferation risk. The 43 project
proposals for which the national laboratories raised potential concerns
included, for example, projects to assist countries in various aspects
of developing nuclear power reactors and research reactors, handling
nuclear fuel, and using nuclear techniques in materials testing and
other industrial practices.
We found that IAEA approved at least 34 of these 43 proposals. Of the
remaining 9 proposals, 4 were not approved internally by IAEA's
Secretariat or--in the case of Iran's 2006 Arak heavy water reactor
proposal--by the Board of Governors, and 5 proposals in 1998 were
reviewed by ORNL in a classified assessment. We did not determine
whether those 5 proposals were approved by IAEA.
We requested information from State's Office of Multilateral Nuclear
and Security Affairs describing how it responded to DOE's and the
national laboratories' findings of potential proliferation concerns
among the TC proposals they reviewed. However, with the exception of
documentation pertaining to U.S. objections on the Iranian heavy water
reactor proposal in 2006, State was unable to provide us with any
records documenting policy discussions or actions it took to address
concerns in other TC proposals highlighted by DOE and the national
laboratories. As a result, it is unclear what actions, if any, State
took to address potential proliferation concerns of specific TC
proposals identified by DOE and the national laboratories. State
officials told us that records substantiating discussions within State
on the DOE and national laboratory findings existed but could not be
retrieved from State's data and document management systems.
State officials told us that a 2005 reorganization of the department's
arms control and nonproliferation bureaus resulted in the loss of staff
in the office overseeing IAEA issues, limiting its ability to
effectively monitor TC program developments. Specifically, they said
that prior to the 2005 reorganization, there were 14 full-time
equivalent personnel working on IAEA-and NPT-related issues, but that
this number was reduced to 5 full-time equivalent personnel due to the
reassignment and retirement of personnel following the reorganization.
U.S. Policies and IAEA Procedures for TC Program Fellowships Have
Several Shortcomings:
State has not developed a formal policy that identifies countries that
would not be eligible to send TC fellows to the United States to study
nuclear issues. In addition, IAEA does not have a systematic process in
place to track and monitor former TC fellows to determine, for
instance, whether they still reside in their home country and are still
involved in peaceful nuclear research related to their fellowship
studies.
The United States accepts TC fellows and TC project participants from
foreign countries. The acceptance process involves several steps.
First, foreign nationals interested in a TC fellowship apply to IAEA's
TC Department, which reviews the applications and decides which
candidates to accept or reject. IAEA identifies fellows who would be
appropriate to place in the United States for studies. For approved
applications, IAEA then sends a formal request to the U.S. Mission
asking that the applicants be permitted to study in the United States
at a specific institute.
The U.S. Mission forwards the applications to State's Office of
Multilateral Nuclear and Security Affairs within the International
Security and Nonproliferation Bureau and to the Argonne National
Laboratory. The State office reviews and approves or rejects the
applications, and shares them with other members of the U.S.
interagency committee on IAEA TC issues. In addition, State officials
told us that foreign nationals requesting TC fellowships at DOE
facilities would be reviewed against requirements in DOE orders. The
Argonne National Laboratory, under a contract with State, facilitates
placement of fellows approved by State at the institutes proposed by
IAEA or at alternative facilities. The applicants are notified by IAEA
of their fellowship's acceptance by State and placement at institutes
in the United States.
Once the foreign candidates confirm their acceptance, IAEA instructs
them to apply for a U.S. nonimmigrant visa. State's Bureau of Consular
Affairs handles the adjudication of these visa applications, and in
some cases, the consular officers will request a security advisory
opinion, known as a Visas Mantis, if there are concerns that a visa
applicant may engage in the illegal transfer of sensitive
technology.[Footnote 20] According to State, the key role of the Visas
Mantis process is to protect U.S. national security, particularly in
combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their
delivery systems, and conventional weapons.[Footnote 21]
Data provided to us by State indicated that 1,022 TC program fellows
have studied nuclear issues at universities and other organizations in
the United States from 1997 through 2007. In our review of this data,
we found that 23 of the 1,022 fellows were from countries that were not
NPT member states, such as Israel and Pakistan, or were from U.S.-
designated state sponsors of terrorism, such as Syria. The fields of
study pursued by these fellows included entomology, soil and plant
science, analytical nuclear physics, and nuclear medicine.
We questioned State and Argonne National Laboratory officials to
clarify the guidance and criteria State's Office of Multilateral
Nuclear and Security Affairs uses to approve TC fellowship applicants
for the study of nuclear issues in the United States. State officials
told us that there is no formal policy or set of criteria they use to
accept or reject TC fellowship requests on the basis of an applicant's
country of origin. However, in response to our inquiry, State prepared
a written description of the informal guidelines and preferences it
uses to evaluate fellowship requests. According to this description,
individuals from countries that have not signed the NPT are not
eligible to pursue TC fellowships in the United States, although
fellows from Israel and Pakistan were accepted by the United States as
recently as 2002. Individuals from countries that have signed the NPT,
however, may still "be excluded on the basis of such things as
institutional affiliation or previous history or other political
factors such as human rights concerns in such countries."
The lack of a formal State policy or guidance on this matter has led to
differing views among U.S. officials about the countries of origin from
which State will approve TC fellows. For instance, Argonne National
Laboratory officials told us that they believed State's policy was to
exclude fellows from any country the United States had designated as a
state sponsor of terrorism. However, the description prepared for us by
State does not explicitly prohibit fellows from such countries. The
most recent TC program fellow to study nuclear issues in the United
States from one of the U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism--
Syria--was in 2001.
In addition, the broad nature of the criteria to exclude fellows--
including "other political factors" in their home countries--could
leave fellowship decisions open to State officials' subjective
interpretation. For example, State officials told us that one country
in Asia would no longer be permitted to send TC fellows to the United
States because it is considered a wealthy, high-income nation, even
though the description of the informal guidelines provided to us by
State do not indicate that economic conditions in a TC fellow's home
country are a basis for rejection.
With regard to IAEA's management of TC fellows, the agency does not
have a policy to exclude individuals from certain countries from
participating in the TC fellowship program, including individuals from
nations about which the United States has terrorism or proliferation
concerns. For example, in 2007, IAEA approved 48 fellows and scientific
visitors from Cuba, 12 from Iran, 36 from Syria, and 30 from Sudan.
[Footnote 22] IAEA's data did not indicate the countries and institutes
where these fellows and scientific visitors pursued their studies.
We also found shortcomings in IAEA oversight of TC fellowships for
potential proliferation concerns--specifically in detecting the
possible involvement of former TC fellows in weapons-related research
activities after they completed their studies abroad. IAEA officials
told us that the agency does not have a systematic process for tracking
the status, whereabouts, and activities of former TC fellows to
determine, for example, if they remain involved in research related to
their TC project, changed institutes, or have immigrated to other
countries.
In 2005, however, IAEA officials surveyed fellows from 2001 and 2002 to
determine their current activities and their views on the quality and
impact of the fellowship program. IAEA followed up with a more in-depth
survey of a sample of former fellows from seven countries. IAEA
officials told us that they hope to conduct more analysis of former TC
fellows, primarily to facilitate networking between former fellows and
establish lessons learned for improved implementation of the program,
not to determine whether former TC fellows could be involved in nuclear
weapons efforts.
Long-Term TC Program Effectiveness Is Limited by Outdated Program
Metrics, Financial Resource Constraints, and Sustainability Concerns:
IAEA faces several limitations in effectively managing the TC program.
Specifically, IAEA has not been able to accurately portray the TC
program's achievements in meeting the development and other needs of
member states in a meaningful way because it has not updated and
revised the metrics for assessing program results. In addition, the
program's impact is limited by financial resource constraints,
including the failure of many member states to pay their full share of
support to the TCF. Finally, the TC program's long-term effectiveness
could be undermined by shortcomings in IAEA efforts to monitor how TC
projects have been sustained and in recent efforts to sustain the TC
program overall by reaching out to new partners and donors.
IAEA Lacks Adequate Metrics to Fully Assess TC Program's Impact:
The goal of the TC program is to help member states achieve their
sustainable development needs through the peaceful application of
nuclear energy. However, IAEA has not updated and revised TC program
performance metrics so that it can more accurately track and assess the
program's overall impact in meeting member states' needs. Under a 2002
TC program strategy, IAEA established four strategic objectives and 12
performance metrics to assess program performance between 2002 and
2007. These four objectives were (1) establishing greater linkages
between TC projects and national development plans and greater
government commitment and support to projects; (2) expanding strategic
partnerships to improve the TC program's visibility in resolving
development problems; (3) increasing the level of funding for technical
cooperation activities; and (4) strengthening the capacity of
institutions in member states using nuclear technologies to become more
technically and financially self-reliant. The 12 program performance
metrics included having TC projects create an unspecified number of new
partnerships with development organizations and having an increasing
number of member states pay their full target share of funding to the
TCF.
IAEA officials declined to provide us with detailed information
explaining how these performance indicators were established or data
substantiating how they were met. However, according to the TC
program's 2006 annual report summarizing the program's progress against
each indicator, IAEA met or exceeded 6 of the 12 performance
indicators, did not meet 1, could not measure 1, and did not provide
any assessment information on the remaining 4 performance goals.
The metrics developed for the program in 2002 are not meaningful
indicators of program results and, therefore, do not provide sufficient
information on the program's progress in meeting the sustainable
development and related needs of member states. For example, the
performance metric on member state contributions to the TCF conveys
information on program management but does not measure fulfillment of
member state needs, such as the number of additional cancer patients
treated or the number of new nuclear safety regulations promulgated.
Similarly, in its 2007 evaluation of TC activities, IAEA's internal
auditor--the Office of Internal Oversight Services--found that the TC
program lacks a robust, consistent process for assessing the
effectiveness of TC projects, particularly after projects are
completed.
IAEA officials acknowledged these weaknesses in the 2002 metrics,
recognized they were out of date, and said that they wanted to develop
more effective results-based metrics. However, to date, the TC program
has not developed new program objectives or performance measures. The
officials noted that a new TC information technology system--the
Program Cycle Management Framework--to plan, implement, monitor, and
report on TC projects will eventually collect information to assess
project results against specific goals and metrics. In addition,
according to the 2009-2011 TC program guidelines, the program needs to
operate under results-based management principles and emphasize the
importance of having program objectives and outcomes be linked to
performance metrics to help measure progress in achieving results in
technical cooperation.
IAEA officials told us that implementing a system of results-based
metrics for the TC program faces challenges--particularly in obtaining
reliable baseline information from member states about the scope of the
problems or needs they hope to address by participating in the TC
program. Without such information, they told us, IAEA cannot establish
reliable long-term performance targets. For example, according to a
2007 evaluation by IAEA's internal auditor, almost half of the project
performance metrics in the sample of projects it reviewed were not
supported with baseline information and half did not indicate target
values.
Many Member States Do Not Provide Financial Contributions to the TCF
and Some High-Income Countries Receive TC Assistance:
We found that the TC program faces financial constraints and
limitations due to, among other things, shortfalls in member state
payments to the TCF and high-income nations receiving TC support. IAEA
officials told us that the TC program is underfunded, while IAEA's
Director General has commented that program resources are insufficient
to keep pace with country requests for support. Although the size of
the TCF and overall level of funding paid by member states have
increased in recent years,[Footnote 23] many countries that receive TC
assistance still do not pay their full share of support to the TCF that
IAEA expects them to contribute. Specifically, the TCF experienced a
funding shortfall in 2007 of $3.5 million, or 4 percent, of the $80
million total target budget because 62 member states did not pay their
full contributions. Of these 62 countries, 47 states made no payment at
all.[Footnote 24] Appendix IV lists member states and the amounts they
contributed to the TCF in 2007.
In addition, 13 member states that the UN defined as high-income
countries in 2007--including Israel, Portugal, and Saudi Arabia--
received a total of approximately $3.8 million in assistance from the
program, or 4 percent of the $93.3 million in total TC disbursements
that year. Recognizing that the emphasis of the TC program is on
providing nuclear assistance to developing countries, IAEA officials
told us that it would be helpful if more developed countries shifted
from TC recipients to donors, which could allow the program to provide
greater support to developing countries. For example, they stated that
some member states have helped ease budget pressures within the TC
program by voluntarily reducing the assistance they receive and
gradually becoming donors. However, IAEA has not sought to formulate
guidelines or criteria for determining when countries should be
graduated from further TC assistance, and IAEA officials have not
reached a consensus on how to pursue this matter. According to the
Deputy Director General for the TC program, IAEA does not seek to
retire specific countries from TC support regardless of their financial
or development status. Nevertheless, other IAEA officials told us that
determining program graduation criteria is a good idea. Appendix II
identifies the countries designated by the United Nations in 2007 as
high-income and the amount of TCF assistance they received that year.
In addition, IAEA officials told us that broader issues should be
considered in graduating high-income or highly-developed countries from
TC assistance. Specifically, IAEA officials said that developed nations
with more experience on nuclear issues could play a helpful role in
providing nuclear expertise to less-developed nations in the same
region. According to IAEA officials, this could entail reducing
national-level TC project support to developed member states while
continuing to provide support to them through regional projects. These
officials also asserted that graduating states is complicated because
the benefits provided by TC assistance keep countries involved in IAEA,
including the safeguards program.
State and U.S. Mission officials told us that State does not have an
official position on graduating member states from TC assistance.
However, these officials said the idea merited consideration and
suggested some countries whose economic wherewithal and level of
nuclear development could justify graduation, including Brazil, China,
Russia, and South Korea.
IAEA Faces Challenges Sustaining the TC Program:
IAEA efforts to sustain TC project results and the TC program overall
face several significant limitations and challenges. First, at the
project level, IAEA does not conduct systematic follow-up to verify
that member states are sustaining the results and activities of
completed TC projects. IAEA's goal in providing technical cooperation
is to help countries become technically and financially self-reliant so
that they do not require future IAEA assistance to sustain peaceful
nuclear skills and technologies. The Deputy Director General of the TC
program stated that achieving sustainability hinges on having member
states commit adequate financial support, infrastructure, and personnel
once the project is completed.
IAEA officials told us that the program does assess sustainability
potential of projects in the proposal development phase. As projects
are being developed, IAEA uses a planning tool, known as a "country
programme framework," to evaluate how TC project proposals contribute
to the host country's national development priorities and to assess the
host government's likely commitment to the project. However, we found
that IAEA does not systematically review completed TC projects to
verify whether the project results are being sustained by the recipient
country, through government or other support. For example, the TC
program does not conduct any assessments 2, 3, or 5 years past project
completion, to see whether and how a country is maintaining established
TC nuclear technologies and related skills.
Second, IAEA faces challenges in sustaining the TC program over the
long term because TC funding is distributed across 18 different
technical areas--including nuclear power, nuclear security, food and
agriculture, water resources, and human health--making it difficult for
IAEA to set clear TC program priorities and to maximize the impact of
limited program resources. Appendix V provides a complete list of all
the technical areas to which TC program funding was allocated in 2007.
Figure 1 shows the percentage of funds disbursed by project area.
Figure 1: TC Program Disbursements, by Technical Area, 2007:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Human health: 28.3%;
Food and agriculture: 12.8%;
Nuclear science: 8.2%.
Management of radioactive waste: 7.7%.
Radioisotope production and radiation technology: 7.5%;
Radiation and transport safety: 7.3%;
Safety of nuclear installations: 6%;
Management of technical cooperation for development: 4.6%;
Water resources: 4%;
Nuclear power: 3.6%;
Assessment and management of marine and terrestrial environments: 3.5%;
Capacity building and nuclear knowledge maintenance for sustainable
energy development: 2.4%;
Nuclear security: 2.1%;
Emergency preparedness: 1.2%;
Other: 0.8%.
Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data.
Note: Percentages based on total 2007 TC disbursements of $93,316,600.
The "Other" category represents four separate technical areas: nuclear
fuel cycle and materials technologies; safeguards; public information
and communication; and executive management, policy making and
coordination.
[End of figure]
According to U.S. Mission officials, this allocation of TC funding
across multiple technical areas and the absence of clear program
priorities reduces overall program effectiveness. U.S. Mission
officials told us that IAEA should work to consolidate these areas and
identify four or five future TC program priorities. IAEA officials
agreed, but told us that they have little flexibility to set TC program
priorities because they must be responsive to member state needs which
vary across countries and regions. Nevertheless, TC program officials
said they are attempting to promote priority-setting at the project
level--for example, by limiting the number of projects member states
were permitted to submit in 2008, and by moving away from funding
mature nuclear technologies that no longer require development or in
which member states have acquired sufficient capability to sustain on
their own.
In addition, in 2007, IAEA initiated a fundamental review of the
challenges and opportunities facing its programs to 2020 and beyond. As
part of this review, IAEA's Secretariat identified priorities for the
TC program and other IAEA programs. IAEA also convened a Commission of
Eminent Persons to provide recommendations on the future role and
activities of the agency, including the TC program. In its background
report to the commission, IAEA identified future TC priorities in three
main areas--disease prevention and control, food safety and security,
and sustainable management of natural resources and ecosystems--with a
lesser focus on a fourth area, industrial process management. However,
IAEA officials told us that the restructuring of TC priorities and
implementing other recommendations from this review would be contingent
on the Board of Governors' approval.
Finally, IAEA officials told us that meeting member states' future
demands for TC assistance--especially as interest in nuclear power
grows--will strain program resources and pose a fundamental long-term
sustainability challenge. As a result, IAEA is developing outreach
strategies and has created an outreach team to attract the support and
involvement of donor organizations and new partners--such as the UN
Development Program--in the TC program. However, this effort faces
several limitations and shortcomings.
The TC program outreach effort is narrowly focused on attracting donors
and partners involved in international economic and social development.
Although TC program guidance encourages private sector partnerships,
IAEA officials told us that the new partner outreach effort will not
extend to the private sector because they believed the level of effort
to establish such partnerships would outweigh the expected benefits.
Furthermore, while IAEA's internal auditors have reported on cases
where member states successfully obtained private sector support to
sustain TC projects--thus alleviating the need for further support from
IAEA or the host government--IAEA officials told us that the TC program
does not systematically assess TC proposals with respect to their
commercial potential. IAEA officials told us that member states are not
required to submit information in their TC proposals--such as a market
analysis, a summary of business plans, or potential private sector
investors in project activities--that IAEA could use to evaluate the
long-term commercial prospects of a TC project.
The TC program's strategy of focusing its outreach primarily on
international development organizations carries risks because IAEA is
not well recognized as a development organization within the broader
development community. According to the Deputy Director General of the
TC Department, the development community largely perceives IAEA as a
nuclear enforcement body and its development contributions are
overlooked or unknown. In addition, some of the previous partnerships
the TC program has built with international development organizations
have been called into question. For example, a 2007 independent
evaluation of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
concluded that FAO's long-standing partnership with IAEA on the use of
nuclear techniques in food and agriculture has ceased to yield a high
return on investment and, therefore, recommended that FAO withdraw
future funding from the joint FAO-IAEA unit. Furthermore, according to
the U.S. representative to the Standing Advisory Group on Technical
Assistance and Cooperation, the TC program faces difficulties in
building relationships with development organizations at the project
and country levels because it does not have a presence in the host
countries to promote the program. For example, this representative told
us that the national liaison officers--who serve as intermediaries on
TC projects between IAEA and the host governments and collaborating
institutes--tend to be technical specialists who do not understand
their country's development needs, do not network with other
development organizations, and are not involved in the governmental
processes that set national development plans and priorities.
Conclusions:
The world today is dramatically different than when IAEA was created
over 50 years ago. Therefore, certain IAEA policies related to the TC
program, as well as the rights, expectations, and obligations of IAEA
member states that are beneficiaries of the program, merit careful
consideration and, as appropriate, re-examination. In our view, TC
proposals should not be evaluated simply on their technical merits in
isolation from political considerations concerning the countries making
the requests, particularly since the assistance in question involves
supplying nuclear equipment, training, and expertise, some of which is
dual-use in nature. In that regard, we believe that State's policy of
not encouraging IAEA to systematically limit TC projects in countries
that are U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism communicates a
mixed message on the acceptability of transferring nuclear technologies
and expertise to countries the United States has deemed inherently
dangerous.
We recognize that the TC program provides IAEA member states that are
developing countries with many benefits and that not every project
funded by the program poses a proliferation risk. However, the United
States does not have the necessary information available on a timely
basis to make sound judgments about the proliferation risks of many of
these projects, particularly in the project proposal development phase.
A better system, with more complete and timely data provided by IAEA,
would help ensure that projects are fully and appropriately vetted by
U.S. agencies and those that pose a potential proliferation risk are
identified early in the project development process. Until that
happens, we will continue to have concerns about the potential
proliferation risks posed by TC projects, particularly those linked to
countries of concern.
With greater transparency and earlier information from IAEA on TC
project proposals, the United States government and other countries
could raise and address proliferation concerns with IAEA's Secretariat
before it endorses projects for approval by the Board of Governors. We
are also concerned by IAEA's refusal to share information with the
United States and other member states on findings from its internal
proliferation reviews of TC projects. Furthermore, deficiencies in
State's record-keeping on TC program matters is troubling because we
could not determine what, if any, actions State took to address
concerns identified by DOE and the national laboratories.
Regarding TC fellowships, State has not established a formal policy
governing the approval of TC fellows from foreign countries interested
in studying nuclear issues in the United States. The absence of such a
policy has allowed individuals from non-NPT countries and individuals
from countries that are U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism who
obtain visas to study in the United States and potentially acquire
valuable information. We also believe IAEA should take steps to improve
monitoring of individuals who have completed fellowships, to track
their whereabouts and ongoing research, and to determine if the
knowledge and information they obtained on TC projects is being applied
to strictly peaceful purposes.
Regarding our management concerns associated with the TC program, we
believe that all member states receiving TC support should provide
their full contribution to the TCF. We also question the need to
provide TC assistance to high-income countries that have the apparent
economic means to finance their nuclear research and development needs
independently. In our view, IAEA could enhance the impact of its
limited resources by developing and applying reasonable "means testing"
criteria in future allocation of TC funding and consider ways in which
high-income countries can be graduated from continued TC assistance. In
addition, the metrics IAEA has used to track TC program performance do
not provide the United States and other member states with sufficient
information on the TC program's overall value. Development of more
meaningful results-based performance measures could allow IAEA to more
effectively demonstrate the TC program's impact.
Finally, IAEA could enhance the impact of the TC program's limited
resources by formally setting priorities for future TC funding, as well
as identifying areas that are less urgent because of the availability
of mature nuclear technologies and other donors. In terms of IAEA's
outreach to potential new TC donors, we believe that the private sector
could be a crucial partner in supporting the TC program generally and
in sustaining the results of TC projects so that member states can
become technically and financially less dependent on IAEA. In our view,
IAEA should also assess TC proposals not only for technical feasibility
and host government support, but also for potential private sector
support to sustain project activities and results.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
If Congress wishes to make known that the United States does not
support IAEA's policy of permitting TC projects in countries that State
has designated as state sponsors of terrorism, or other countries where
other concerns persist, it could explicitly require--as it currently
does with Cuba and has done in the past with Iran, Libya, and the
Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority--that
State withhold a proportionate share of the U.S. voluntary contribution
to the TC program that is equivalent to the amounts of TCF funding that
would otherwise be made available to these countries. Alternatively, if
Congress wishes to obtain additional information before making this
decision, it could require State to report to Congress explaining its
rationale for not withholding a proportionate share of the U.S.
contribution to the TCF for U.S.-designated state sponsors of
terrorism.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To address the range of proliferation and management concerns related
to the TC program, we recommend that the Secretary of State, working
with IAEA and member states through the Board of Governors, explore
undertaking the following eight actions:
* Establish a formal mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely
information sharing on TC project proposals between IAEA and the United
States and other countries--including detailed information on the TC
proposals themselves, as well as the results of IAEA's internal
proliferation reviews of the proposals--so that proliferation and other
concerns can be identified and addressed early in the project
development cycle.
* Promote a regular and systematic process for obtaining, retaining,
and updating information on prior TC project fellows to better track
where and how the knowledge and expertise they have obtained is being
applied.
* Strengthen the TC program's mechanisms for collecting member states'
contributions to the TCF to include withholding from nonpaying states a
percentage of TC assistance equivalent to the percentage of their
target rate that they fail to contribute to the TCF.
* Establish criteria for determining when member states, especially
those defined as high-income countries, no longer need TC assistance in
particular fields and when such states could be graduated from further
TC support altogether.
* Seek to implement new results-based performance metrics for the TC
program that establish specific national, regional, and interregional
social and economic needs and measure the collective impact of TC
projects in meeting those objectives.
* Focus the TC program on a more limited number of high-priority
technical areas to maximize the impact of program resources.
* Encourage the TC program to reach out to private sector entities as
part of its new partner and donor development strategy.
* Request member states to assess in their TC project proposals the
prospects for commercialization of and private sector investment in the
results of the projects. Such steps could include requiring information
in the proposals on potential business plans, marketing strategies, and
strategies for attracting commercial partners once IAEA support has
concluded.
Finally, to clarify and improve U.S. oversight of the TC program, we
recommend that the Secretary of State undertake the following two
actions:
* Enhance record-keeping and formally document management actions
regarding the discussion, action, and disposition of TC project
proposals that DOE and the national laboratories identify as having
potential proliferation concerns.
* Issue formal guidance with well-defined criteria--such as countries
designated by State as sponsors of terrorism or gross human rights
violators--that State should use as the basis for approving or
rejecting TC fellowship requests for nuclear studies in the United
States. This guidance could include, among other things, a list of
specific countries from which State would not approve TC fellows that
could be updated and revised annually, or as other circumstances
warrant.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to State and DOE for formal comment.
We also provided IAEA with a detailed summary of facts contained in the
draft report. State provided written comments on the draft report,
which are presented in appendix VI. DOE and IAEA provided technical
comments that we incorporated as appropriate.
State strongly opposed the matter for congressional consideration to
require State to withhold a proportionate share of the U.S. voluntary
contribution to the TC program that is equivalent to the amounts of TCF
funding that would otherwise be made available to U.S.-designated state
sponsors of terrorism and or other countries of concern. State objected
for a number of reasons, contending that (1) it would be
counterproductive to a separate recommendation we made in the report
encouraging all states to pay their full share to the TCF; (2) it would
not stop TC projects in targeted countries because TCF funding is
fungible; (3) Congress has exempted IAEA contributions from this type
of proportionate withholding; (4) none of the TC projects in state
sponsors of terrorism have been shown to have contributed to a WMD
program; (5) there are adequate safeguards within IAEA's Secretariat to
prevent TC projects from contributing to a WMD program; and (6) it
would negatively impact the ability of the United States to achieve
other critical objectives within IAEA.
We do not believe the matter for congressional consideration is unique
or unprecedented. As we noted in our report, U.S. law currently
requires the withholding of a proportionate share of the U.S.
contribution to the TCF for certain projects in Cuba, and has required
withholding in the past for Iran, Libya, and the Territories Under the
Jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. However, in order to give
Congress greater flexibility and more information, we have broadened
the matter for congressional consideration to give Congress the option
of requiring State to report on its rationale for not withholding a
proportionate share of the U.S. contribution to the TCF for U.S.-
designated state sponsors of terrorism.
Notwithstanding our modification to the matter for congressional
consideration, we still disagree with State's specific objections to it
for the following reasons:
* We do not believe the matter for congressional consideration is
counterproductive to our recommendation to strengthen mechanisms for
collecting member state contributions to the TCF. That recommendation
is geared toward strengthening mechanisms for collecting contributions
to the TCF from member states that are receiving TC assistance. The
United States is the largest donor to the TC program, providing
approximately 25 percent of the TCF annual budget, and is not a
beneficiary of TC assistance.
* While contributions to the TCF are fungible, we believe there is a
fundamental principle at stake. As we described in our report, the
United States has applied several types of sanctions limiting foreign
assistance and trade to states it has designated as sponsors of
terrorism and to other countries. To avoid the appearance of an
inconsistent approach and to foster greater cohesion in U.S. policy
toward such nations, we believe that it is fair for Congress to
consider requiring State to withhold a share of the U.S. contribution
to the TCF for program activities in countries that the United States
chooses not to engage directly in trade, assistance, and other forms of
cooperation.
* We are aware that in 1994 U.S. contributions to IAEA were exempted
from the law requiring State to withhold proportionate shares of
funding to international organizations for programs in certain
countries. However, we note that the IAEA exemption was enacted in
1994. In our view, the proliferation concerns about some countries
receiving TC assistance--such as Iran and Syria--have increased rather
than diminished since that time. Furthermore, we note that since the
enactment of the 1994 exemption, the law has been further amended to
require State to withhold a proportionate share of funding to IAEA for
certain projects in Cuba and for all projects in Iran if State
determines that such projects in Iran are inconsistent with U.S.
nuclear nonproliferation and safety goals, will provide Iran with
training or expertise relevant to the development of nuclear weapons,
or are being used as a cover for the acquisition of sensitive nuclear
technology.
* We do not believe that State can assert with confidence that TC
projects have not contributed to WMD programs in state sponsors of
terrorism. The absence of evidence showing that TC projects have
assisted nuclear weapons development in U.S.-designated state sponsors
of terrorism does not, in our view, constitute proof that such
countries have not exploited TC assistance to advance possible weapons
development skills and activities. Based on findings in our report--
including the limited information available to DOE and the national
laboratories on TC projects and the inherent dual-use nature of some
nuclear expertise and technology--we believe it is difficult to say
with confidence that TC projects are not contributing indirectly to
weapons-related knowledge and expertise in such countries.
* We do not have the same level of confidence as State in the
safeguards within IAEA's Secretariat to prevent TC projects from
contributing to weapons development. As we stated in the report, we
were unable to assess the effectiveness of IAEA's internal process for
reviewing TC proposals and projects for proliferation concerns because
IAEA's Secretariat declined to provide us with basic information and
documentation regarding the results of its reviews. Furthermore, as
described in the report, IAEA's Secretariat approved at least one TC
project proposal--involving the Iranian heavy water reactor at Arak--
that State later objected to.
* Finally, neither we nor State can conclude with certainty how other
states might react to an increase in the United States' proportionate
withholding of funding to the TCF and how this would affect U.S.
ability to achieve other objectives within the agency.
State agreed with 7 of our 10 recommendations to improve TC program
management and oversight. It neither agreed nor disagreed with the
three other recommendations that called on State, working with IAEA and
member states through the Board of Governors, to explore (1)
establishing a formal mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely
information sharing on TC proposals between IAEA, the United States,
and other countries; (2) strengthening TC program mechanisms for
collecting member state contributions to the TCF, including withholding
a percentage of TC assistance to recipient countries that fail to pay
their target contribution; and (3) establishing criteria for
determining when member states no longer require TC assistance and
could be graduated from further TC support.
Regarding the recommendation concerning the establishment of a formal
mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely information sharing on
TC project proposals between IAEA and the United States and other
countries, State noted that it would be difficult to implement through
IAEA's Board of Governors because TC proposals are considered
confidential between IAEA and the recipient state. State commented that
a more achievable goal could be to work with IAEA to ensure that it
publishes a complete listing of project proposals earlier. Because TC
projects can involve transfer of equipment, technology, and expertise
that could potentially contribute to nuclear weapons development, we
continue to believe that TC proposals demand the highest level of
scrutiny, transparency, and information sharing. We question why
details of TC proposals are considered confidential, and believe the
United States and other major donors should have a full understanding
of the proposals that they are being asked to support through their TCF
contributions. Finally, as noted in the report, we found that the
quantity of information about TC proposals currently available to DOE
and the national laboratories is insufficient in many cases--especially
in cases where DOE and the national laboratories obtained only lists of
proposal titles--to make accurate determinations of potential
proliferation risks. It is unclear whether State's suggestion to work
with IAEA to publish the complete listing of proposed projects earlier
would result in sufficient details being provided to DOE and the
national laboratories to allow them to more reliably assess
proliferation risks.
On our recommendation to strengthen the mechanisms for collecting
member state contributions to the TCF, State commented that the rate of
payment to the TCF by member states has improved in recent years.
However, as we noted in the report, many states receiving assistance
are still not paying their full share of contributions to the TCF. We
believe there is room for continued improvement and that mechanisms
should continue to be strengthened toward that end. We believe the
recommendation is sound and should be implemented.
Finally, concerning the recommendation to establish criteria for
determining when member states no longer require further TC assistance
and could be graduated from further TC support, State observed that a
proposal for graduating higher-income TC recipient states based on
their per capita gross national product was put forward in 1997. State
noted that one member state objected to graduating countries based
solely on such criteria. We recognize the political and practical
challenges of implementing a graduation strategy for member states
receiving TC assistance. However, as noted in our report, both State
and IAEA officials supported the principle of graduating countries that
no longer require TC assistance. Moreover, our recommendation does not
identify specific graduation criteria or specify that a member state's
income ranking be the sole factor to serve as the basis for graduating
a state from further TC support.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested congressional committees and Members of Congress, the
Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Energy. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix VII.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Gene Aloise:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To review the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Technical
Cooperation (TC) program we assessed the (1) extent to which the United
States and IAEA have policies limiting member states' participation in
the TC program on the basis of nuclear proliferation and related
concerns; (2) extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and
monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns; and (3) limitations and
challenges in IAEA's management of the TC program. We employed several
methodologies to address these objectives.
Our review of the TC program covered the years 1997 through 2007. We
chose this period because our previous report on the TC program
reported on TC programmatic and financial data through 1996. We
interviewed key officials and analyzed documentation, such as cables,
presentations, financial information, and reports and analyses of TC
program issues from the Departments of State (State) and Energy (DOE).
State officials also provided us with relevant IAEA documentation and
information, such as copies of IAEA's annual "white books" identifying
TC projects approved by IAEA, as well as information on specific TC
projects from IAEA's "TC-PRIDE" database. We also interviewed officials
in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office of International Programs
who participate in U.S. interagency meetings on IAEA TC issues. In
addition, we met with representatives from five national laboratories
involved in the DOE Interdiction Technical Analysis Group, a
multilaboratory team providing DOE with technical analysis of
proliferation-related issues, including the TC program. We also visited
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to obtain documentation and
interview current and former ORNL staff involved in previous and
ongoing assessments of TC proposals and active projects for potential
proliferation concerns. In addition, we visited the Argonne National
Laboratory to interview representatives who provide support and
analytical services to State on TC issues, organize training seminars
for foreign nationals involved in TC projects, and facilitate TC
fellowships for foreign nationals to study nuclear issues in the United
States.
We also interviewed officials at IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria,
including representatives from the TC Department and other IAEA
departments, including the Departments of Management, Safeguards, and
Nuclear Safety and Security; the Office of Internal Oversight Services;
and the Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination. We
reviewed and analyzed information provided by IAEA officials, including
presentation slides, annual reports, internal and external auditor
reports, and TC project brochures. We also reviewed speeches and other
statements by IAEA officials on the TC program and related IAEA issues.
IAEA officials provided us with data on the number of TC projects by
year, country, and technical area, as well as financial information on
the TC program over the past decade. We interviewed knowledgeable IAEA
officials on the reliability of these data, including issues such as
data entry, access, quality control procedures, and the accuracy and
completeness of the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this review.
Furthermore, we interviewed officials at the U.S. Mission to
International Organizations in Vienna (U.S. Mission) regarding TC
program policies and processes. We also met with officials from the
Canadian Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna
who work on IAEA issues to gain their perspectives on the TC program.
We also conducted interviews with several nongovernmental experts who
have monitored IAEA and developments in the TC program, and met with
and obtained documentation from the U.S. representative to IAEA's
Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation.
We discussed U.S. and IAEA policies and criteria with State and IAEA
officials on the extent to which countries are limited from receiving
TC assistance because of proliferation and related concerns. We also
reviewed (1) speeches, articles, and other statements made by IAEA
officials; (2) annual State reports to Congress on IAEA assistance
provided to some states that the United States has identified as
countries of concern; (3) speeches and statements by U.S. officials;
and (4) cables between State and the U.S. Mission outlining U.S. policy
toward the TC program. We obtained and analyzed the lists of countries
that (1) are designated by the United States as state sponsors of
terrorism, (2) are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and (3) have comprehensive safeguards agreements
and additional protocols in force with IAEA. We cross-referenced each
of these lists against IAEA financial records to determine how much TC
support has been provided to countries that the United States has
listed as state sponsors of terrorism, are not party to the NPT, or do
not have comprehensive safeguards or additional protocol agreements in
force with IAEA.
To assess the extent to which the United States and IAEA evaluate and
monitor TC projects for proliferation concerns, we interviewed State
and DOE officials regarding their TC program review processes. We also
interviewed representatives from five of the U.S. national laboratories
involved in past and current evaluations of TC proposals and projects
for proliferation concerns. Through DOE, we obtained and analyzed
information from ORNL and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to
determine the numbers of TC proposals the national laboratories
reviewed each year between 1998 and 2006. We reviewed and verified
these data with DOE and the national laboratory officials, and
discussed and verified the proliferation risks DOE and the national
laboratory officials identified in specific TC proposals. We used IAEA
records of approved TC projects to determine whether TC proposals that
the national laboratories had identified as having possible
proliferation risks were approved by IAEA. Because of IAEA policies
that restricted our access to data and related information on TC
proposal and project reviews by IAEA's Safeguards Department, we were
unable to assess the effectiveness of IAEA's internal review of TC
proposals and projects for proliferation concerns.
To determine the challenges and limitations in IAEA's management of the
TC program, we interviewed officials from State, Argonne National
Laboratory, and IAEA, as well as the U.S. representative to IAEA's
Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation. We
obtained and reviewed relevant IAEA documentation addressing TC program
metrics, such as TC program guidance and strategy documents, IAEA
internal audit reports, and meeting reports by IAEA's Technical
Assistance and Cooperation Committee. To assess financial resource
challenges facing the TC program, we analyzed financial data from TC
program annual reports between 1997 and 2007--including annual budgets
of the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), annual contributions by member
states to the TCF, and amounts of annual TC assistance provided to
recipient countries and territories--to determine the level of funding
countries contributed to the TCF and the amounts some countries
received from the TC program over the past decade. We used the United
Nation's (UN) annual Human Development Reports to determine country
income classifications. For each country, we cross-referenced TC
financial data against country income classifications to determine the
amounts of funding countries designated by the UN as "high-income"
contributed to and received from the TC program. Additionally, we
reviewed TC program annual reports to determine the technical areas
covered and funded by the program.
As initially agreed with your office, we intended to assess the extent
to which TC projects have contributed to the safety and security of
nuclear installations around the world. Toward that end, using data
provided by State from IAEA's TC-PRIDE database, identifying all TC
projects funded in the nuclear security and safety fields since 1997,
we developed a judgmental sample of 22 TC projects (17 national
projects and 5 regional projects) to serve as the basis for our
assessment and interviews with relevant IAEA officials. We selected
this judgmental sample by focusing on projects completed since 2005.
Using the data provided by State, we calculated the average cost of
national-level nuclear security and safety projects completed since
that time and selected the 17 projects that exceeded this average cost.
The 5 regional projects in our judgmental sample were selected by
identifying the highest budget project in each of the five TC program
regions completed since 2005. We briefed IAEA officials on our project
selection methodology, and they agreed that it was fair and unbiased.
However, IAEA officials declined to make additional information
available to us on these projects and did not provide us with an
opportunity to interview relevant IAEA officials who oversaw these
projects to discuss their impact and results. As a result of these
restrictive policies, we were unable to sufficiently assess the TC
program's contributions to improving the safety and security of nuclear
facilities around the world.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 to March 2009,
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: 2007 Technical Cooperation Assistance Recipient States and
Territories:
Dollars in thousands:
Africa region:
Country: Algeria;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,361.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Angola;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $495.5;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Benin;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $371.6;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Botswana;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $393.1;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Burkina Faso;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $567.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Cameroon;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $412.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Central African Republic;
Total 2007 TC funding received: 365.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No; 2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Chad;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $143.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Côte d'Ivoire;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $253.8;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $699.1;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Egypt;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,280.9;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Eritrea;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $242.2;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Ethiopia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $2,187.5;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Gabon;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $159.1;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Gambia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $3.5;
IAEA member state?: No;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Ghana;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,184.1;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Kenya;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,093.5;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $894.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Madagascar;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $870.6;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Malawi;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $35.2;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Mali;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,021.9;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Islamic Republic of Mauritania;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $156.1;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Mauritius;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $368.9;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Morocco;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $996.9;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Mozambique;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $17.5;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Namibia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $421.1;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Niger;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $596.5;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Nigeria;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,527.0;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Senegal;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $983.9;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Seychelles;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $100.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Sierra Leone;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $348.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: South Africa;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,142.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Sudan;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,148.1;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: Yes;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Tunisia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $789.0;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Uganda;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $689.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: United Republic of Tanzania;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,925.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Zambia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $618.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Zimbabwe;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $571.0;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Subtotal, Africa;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $26,435.6.
Asia and the Pacific region:
Country: Afghanistan;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $111.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Bangladesh;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,130.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Brunei Darussalam;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $0.5;
IAEA member state?: No;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: High.
Country: Burma (Myanmar);
Total 2007 TC funding received: $670.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Cambodia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $0.9;
IAEA member state?: No;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: China;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $2,007.1;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: [A];
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: India;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $252.8;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: No;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Indonesia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,168.6;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Islamic Republic of Iran;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,000.0;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: Yes;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Iraq;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $190.6;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Israel;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $251.6;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: No;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: High.
Country: Jordan;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $930.6;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Republic of Korea;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $636.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: High.
Country: Kuwait;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $152.2;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: High.
Country: Lebanon;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $502.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Malaysia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,012.8;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Marshall Islands;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $0.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Mongolia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $697.2;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Pakistan;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $2,233.9;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: No;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Philippines;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,510.7;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Qatar;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $232.8;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No[B];
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: High.
Country: Saudi Arabia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $321.5;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No[C];
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: High.
Country: Singapore;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $137.8;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No[D];
2007 UN income category: High.
Country: Sri Lanka;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $810.8;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Syrian Arab Republic;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,525.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: Yes;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Territories Under the Jurisdiction of the Palestinian
Authority;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $26.3;
IAEA member state?: No;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: No;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Thailand;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,057.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: United Arab Emirates;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $158.7;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: High.
Country: Vietnam;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,770.8;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Yemen;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,179.2;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Subtotal, Asia and the Pacific; Total 2007 TC funding
received: $21,681.3.
Europe region:
Country: Albania;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $784.1;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Armenia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,308.7;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Azerbaijan;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $312.1;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Belarus;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $969.8;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $399.2;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Bulgaria;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $898.7;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Croatia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,141.6;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Cyprus;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $140.5;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: High.
Country: Czech Republic;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $564.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Estonia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $808.9;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Georgia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $811.5;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Greece;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $332.5;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: High.
Country: Hungary;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $389.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Kazakhstan;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,303.1;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Kyrgyzstan;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $542.6;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Latvia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $247.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Lithuania;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $2,607.0;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Malta;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $405.7;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: High.
Country: Montenegro;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $18.9;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: No;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Poland;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,553.8;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Portugal;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $504.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: High.
Country: Republic of Moldova;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $905.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Romania;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,276.5;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Russian Federation;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $919.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: [A];
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Serbia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $2,129.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Slovakia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $628.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Slovenia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $481.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: High.
Country: Tajikistan;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $855.9;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $642.0;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Turkey;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $466.7;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Ukraine;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $2,466.2;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Uzbekistan;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,015.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Subtotal, Europe;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $27,830.6.
Latin America region:
Country: Argentina;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,543.2;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Belize;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $61.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Bolivia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $817.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Brazil;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,480.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Chile;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,112.6;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Colombia;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $778.0;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Costa Rica;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $749.6;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Cuba;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,323.7;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: Yes;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Dominican Republic;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $256.9;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Ecuador;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $849.1;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: El Salvador;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $531.9;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Guatemala;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $435.6;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No[E];
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Haiti;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $450.1;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Low.
Country: Honduras;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $394.5;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Jamaica;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $298.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Mexico;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $962.8;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Nicaragua;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $1,516.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Panama;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $549.4;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Paraguay;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $384.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Peru;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $670.8;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Uruguay;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $655.6;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: Yes;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Venezuela;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $681.3;
IAEA member state?: Yes;
U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism?: No;
NPT state party?: Yes;
Comprehensive safeguards agreement in force?: Yes;
Additional protocol in force?: No;
2007 UN income category: Middle.
Country: Subtotal, Latin America;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $16,503.3.
Interregional and global TC funding:
Country: Interregional;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $24.3.
Country: Global;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $842.6.
Country: Subtotal, Interregional and Global;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $866.9.
Country: Total;
Total 2007 TC funding received: $93,317.7.
Source: GAO analysis of State, IAEA, and UN data.
[A] As nuclear-weapon states, China and Russia are not obligated under
the NPT to accept comprehensive safeguards on their nuclear activities.
[B] Qatar brought a comprehensive safeguards agreement into force in
January 2009.
[C] Saudi Arabia brought a comprehensive safeguards agreement into
force in January 2009.
[D] Singapore brought an additional protocol into force in March 2008.
[E] Guatemala brought an additional protocol into force in May 2008.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Numbers of Technical Cooperation Proposals Reviewed by
U.S. National Laboratories, Categorized by Level of Proliferation Risk,
by Year, 1998 through 2006:
National laboratory assessment of TC proposal proliferation risks:
Review year: 1998;
Lead reviewer: ORNL;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: No concern: 3;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Some concern but
insufficient data to assess: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Low, minimal concern:
0;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Medium, moderate
concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: High concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: No
concern: 12;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Some
concern but insufficient data to assess: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Low,
minimal concern: 3;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Medium,
moderate concern: 2;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: High
concern: 0.
Review year: 2000;
Lead reviewer: ORNL;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: No concern: 270;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Some concern but
insufficient data to assess: 2;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Low, minimal concern:
0;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Medium, moderate
concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: High concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: No
concern: 1;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Some
concern but insufficient data to assess: 1;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Low,
minimal concern: 6;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Medium,
moderate concern: 1;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: High
concern: 0.
Review year: 2002;
Lead reviewer: ORNL;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: No concern: 86;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Some concern but
insufficient data to assess: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Low, minimal concern:
0;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Medium, moderate
concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: High concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: No
concern: 1;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Some
concern but insufficient data to assess: 1;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Low,
minimal concern: 1;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Medium,
moderate concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: High
concern: 0.
Review year: 2004;
Lead reviewer: ORNL;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: No concern: 478;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Some concern but
insufficient data to assess: 1;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Low, minimal concern:
0;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Medium, moderate
concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: High concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: No
concern: 12;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Some
concern but insufficient data to assess: 1;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Low,
minimal concern: 2;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Medium,
moderate concern: 1;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: High
concern: 1.
Review year: 2006;
Lead reviewer: LANL;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: No concern: 659;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Some concern but
insufficient data to assess: 20;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Low, minimal concern:
0;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Medium, moderate
concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: High concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: No
concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Some
concern but insufficient data to assess: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Low,
minimal concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Medium,
moderate concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: High
concern: 0.
Review year: Total;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: No concern: 1,496;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Some concern but
insufficient data to assess: 23;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Low, minimal concern:
0;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: Medium, moderate
concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, title only review: High concern: 0;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: No
concern: 26;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Some
concern but insufficient data to assess: 3;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Low,
minimal concern: 12;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: Medium,
moderate concern: 4;
Number of proposals reviewed, additional information obtained: High
concern: 1.
Source: GAO analysis of ORNL, LANL, and DOE data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: 2007 Member State Contributions to the Technical
Cooperation Fund:
In U.S. dollars:
Member state: Holy See;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: $2,632;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 329%.
Member state: Iceland;
TCF target share: $26,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $34,256;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 130.
Member state: Canada;
TCF target share: $2,171,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $2,389,558;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 110.
Member state: Lithuania;
TCF target share: $18,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $19,500;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 106.
Member state: Belgium;
TCF target share: $824,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $860,215;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 104.
Member state: United Republic of Tanzania;
TCF target share: $4,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $5,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 104.
Member state: Syrian Arab Republic;
TCF target share: $29,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $30,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 101.
Member state: Egypt;
TCF target share: $92,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $92,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Liechtenstein;
TCF target share: $4,000;
Amount paid to TCF: $4,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Australia;
TCF target share: $1,228,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $1,228,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Albania;
TCF target share: $4,000;
Amount paid to TCF: $4,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Austria;
TCF target share: $663,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $663,200;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Bangladesh;
TCF target share: $8,000;
Amount paid to TCF: $8,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: China;
TCF target share: $1,584,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $1,584,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Cuba;
TCF target share: $32,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $32,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Cyprus;
TCF target share: $30,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $30,400;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Czech Republic;
TCF target share: $140,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $140,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Denmark;
TCF target share: $554,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $554,400;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Finland;
TCF target share: $411,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $411,200;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: France;
TCF target share: $4,653,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $4,653,600;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Hungary;
TCF target share: $96,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $96,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: India;
TCF target share: $324,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $324,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Japan;
TCF target share: $15,024,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $15,024,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Jordan;
TCF target share: $8,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $8,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Malaysia;
TCF target share: $156,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $156,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Netherlands;
TCF target share: $1,304,000;
Amount paid to TCF: $1,304,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Norway;
TCF target share: $524,000;
Amount paid to TCF: $524,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Pakistan;
TCF target share: $42,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $42,400;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Poland;
TCF target share: $356,000;
Amount paid to TCF: $356,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Romania;
TCF target share: $46,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $46,400;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Slovakia;
TCF target share: $39,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $39,200;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Slovenia;
TCF target share: $63,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $63,200;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: South Africa;
TCF target share: $225,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $225,600;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Sweden;
TCF target share: $770,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $770,400;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Switzerland;
TCF target share: $924,000;
Amount paid to TCF: $923,975;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Thailand;
TCF target share: $160,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $160,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Tunisia;
TCF target share: $24,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $24,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: United Kingdom;
TCF target share: $4,728,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $4,728,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Vietnam;
TCF target share: $16,000;
Amount paid to TCF: $16,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Zimbabwe;
TCF target share: $5,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $5,600;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Sri Lanka;
TCF target share: $12,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $12,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Republic of Korea;
TCF target share: $1,386,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $1,386,400;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Turkey;
TCF target share: $287,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $287,200;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Ireland;
TCF target share: $270,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $270,400;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Spain;
TCF target share: $1,944,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $1,944,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Bulgaria;
TCF target share: $12,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $12,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Afghanistan;
TCF target share: $1,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $1,600;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Armenia;
TCF target share: $1,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $1,600;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Belarus;
TCF target share: $13,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $13,600;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Cameroon;
TCF target share: $6,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $6,400;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Croatia;
TCF target share: $28,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $28,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Ecuador;
TCF target share: $14,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $14,400;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Estonia;
TCF target share: $9,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $9,600;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Ethiopia;
TCF target share: $3,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $3,200;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Germany;
TCF target share: $6,684,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $6,684,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Greece;
TCF target share: $408,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $408,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Haiti;
TCF target share: $2,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $2,400;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Italy;
TCF target share: $3,770,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $3,770,400;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Kazakhstan;
TCF target share: $19,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $19,200;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Kenya;
TCF target share: $7,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $7,200;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Kuwait;
TCF target share: $124,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $124,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Luxembourg;
TCF target share: $59,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $59,200;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Mauritius;
TCF target share: $8,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $8,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Mongolia;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: $800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Nicaragua;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: $800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Niger;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: $800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Singapore;
TCF target share: $299,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $299,200;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Uganda;
TCF target share: $4,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $4,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Ukraine;
TCF target share: $30,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $30,400;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: United Arab Emirates;
TCF target share: $181,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $181,600;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Yemen;
TCF target share: $4,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $4,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Zambia;
TCF target share: $1,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $1,600;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Latvia;
TCF target share: $11,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $11,200;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Malta;
TCF target share: $10,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $10,400;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Republic of Moldova;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: $800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Angola;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: $800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Burkina Faso;
TCF target share: $1,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $1,600;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Tajikistan;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: $800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Botswana;
TCF target share: $9,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $9,600;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Kyrgyzstan;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: $800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Serbia;
TCF target share: $14,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $14,400;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: Belize;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: $800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 100.
Member state: United States of America;
TCF target share: $20,000,000;
Amount paid to TCF: $19,775,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 99.
Member state: Algeria;
TCF target share: $58,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $58,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 99.
Member state: Namibia;
TCF target share: $4,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $4,650;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 97.
Member state: Russian Federation;
TCF target share: $848,800;
Amount paid to TCF: $821,231;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 97.
Member state: Burma (Myanmar);
TCF target share: $8,000;
Amount paid to TCF: $7,714;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 96.
Member state: Indonesia;
TCF target share: $109,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $104,458;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 95.
Member state: Venezuela;
TCF target share: $132,000;
Amount paid to TCF: $118,800;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 90.
Member state: Colombia;
TCF target share: $119,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $105,856;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 89.
Member state: Chile;
TCF target share: $172,000;
Amount paid to TCF: $140,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 81.
Member state: Portugal;
TCF target share: $362,400;
Amount paid to TCF: $289,662;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 80.
Member state: Mexico;
TCF target share: $1,453,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $1,109,294;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 76.
Member state: Israel;
TCF target share: $360,000;
Amount paid to TCF: $140,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 39.
Member state: Brazil;
TCF target share: $1,175,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $450,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 38.
Member state: Argentina;
TCF target share: $737,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $113,084;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 15.
Member state: Philippines;
TCF target share: $73,600;
Amount paid to TCF: $5,000;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 7.
Member state: Morocco;
TCF target share: $36,000;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Nigeria;
TCF target share: $32,000;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Paraguay;
TCF target share: $9,600;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Sudan;
TCF target share: $6,400;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Uruguay;
TCF target share: $36,800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Islamic Republic of Iran;
TCF target share: $120,800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Bolivia;
TCF target share: $7,200;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Bosnia and Herzegovina;
TCF target share: $2,400;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Costa Rica;
TCF target share: $23,200;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Côte d'Ivoire;
TCF target share: $8,000;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Democratic Republic of Congo;
TCF target share: $2,400;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Dominican Republic;
TCF target share: $27,200;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: El Salvador;
TCF target share: $16,800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Gabon;
TCF target share: $7,200;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Georgia;
TCF target share: $2,400;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Ghana;
TCF target share: $3,200;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Guatemala;
TCF target share: $23,200;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Iraq;
TCF target share: $12,000;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Jamaica;
TCF target share: $6,400;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Lebanon;
TCF target share: $18,400;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Liberia;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;
TCF target share: $101,600;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Madagascar;
TCF target share: $2,400;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Mali;
TCF target share: $1,600;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Marshall Islands;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Monaco;
TCF target share: $2,400;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: New Zealand;
TCF target share: $170,400;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Panama;
TCF target share: $14,400;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Peru;
TCF target share: $71,200;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Qatar;
TCF target share: $49,600;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Saudi Arabia;
TCF target share: $550,400;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Senegal;
TCF target share: $4,000;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Sierra Leone;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia;
TCF target share: $4,800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Uzbekistan;
TCF target share: $10,400;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Benin;
TCF target share: $1,600;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Central African Republic;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Azerbaijan;
TCF target share: $4,000;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Eritrea;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Honduras;
TCF target share: $4,000;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Seychelles;
TCF target share: $1,600;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Islamic Republic of Mauritania;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Chad;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Montenegro;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Malawi;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Mozambique;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Palau;
TCF target share: $800;
Amount paid to TCF: 0;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 0.
Member state: Total;
TCF target share: $80,003,200;
Amount paid to TCF: $76,491,085;
Percentage of target share paid[A]: 96%.
Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data.
[A] IAEA defines the percentage of target share paid as the "rate of
attainment," a percentage arrived at by taking the total voluntary
contributions paid to the TCF by member states for a particular year
and dividing them by the TCF target for the same year.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: 2007 Technical Cooperation Disbursements, by Agency
Program:
In U.S. dollars:
Program: Nuclear power;
Disbursement amount: $3,346,800;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 3.6%.
Program: Nuclear fuel cycle and materials technologies;
Disbursement amount: $319,200;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 0.34.
Program: Capacity building and nuclear knowledge maintenance for
sustainable energy development;
Disbursement amount: $2,273,900;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 2.4.
Program: Nuclear science;
Disbursement amount: $7,611,300;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 8.2.
Program: Food and agriculture;
Disbursement amount: $11,911,500;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 12.8.
Program: Human health;
Disbursement amount: $26,410,000;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 28.3.
Program: Water resources;
Disbursement amount: $3,718,300;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 4.0.
Program: Assessment and management of marine and terrestrial
environments;
Disbursement amount: $3,310,900;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 3.5.
Program: Radioisotope production and radiation technology;
Disbursement amount: $6,991,000;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 7.5.
Program: Safety of nuclear installations;
Disbursement amount: $5,601,200;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 6.0.
Program: Radiation and transport safety; Disbursement amount:
6,830,100; Percentage of total TC disbursements: 7.3.
Program: Management of radioactive waste;
Disbursement amount: $7,177,000;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 7.7.
Program: Nuclear security;
Disbursement amount: $1,982,100;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 2.1.
Program: Safeguards;
Disbursement amount: $55,100;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 0.06.
Program: Public information and communication;
Disbursement amount: $2,400;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 0.003.
Program: Management of technical cooperation for development;
Disbursement amount: $4,291,300;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 4.6.
Program: Executive management, policy-making and coordination;
Disbursement amount: $405,500;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 0.43.
Program: Emergency preparedness; Disbursement amount: 1,079,000;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 1.2.
Program: Total;
Disbursement amount: $93,316,600;
Percentage of total TC disbursements: 100.0%.
Source: GAO analysis of IAEA data.
Note: Percentages might not add to 100 due to rounding.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
February 17, 2009:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Nuclear
Nonproliferation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address
Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation
Program," GAO Job Code 360915.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Stephen Adams, Physical Scientist, Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation at (202) 647-3302.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc:
GAO - Glen Levis:
ISN - Eliot Kang (Acting):
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
[End of letter]
Department Of State Comments On GAO Draft Report:
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address
Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation
Program (GAO-09-275, GAO Code 360915):
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report
"Nuclear Nonproliferation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address
Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation
Program."
Recommendation #1:
Establish a formal mechanism to facilitate greater and more timely
information sharing on TC project proposals between IAEA and the United
States and other countries-including detailed information on the TC
proposals themselves as well as the results of IAEA's internal
proliferation reviews of the proposals-so that proliferation and other
concerns can be identified and addressed early in the project
development cycle.
We appreciate the GAO's recommendation to establish a formal mechanism
to facilitate greater and more timely information sharing on TC project
proposals. We would welcome receiving detailed information on IAEA TC
proposals and its internal proliferation reviews. The information
sharing envisioned in this recommendation would occur without the
recipient State's express approval. Such information, however, is
viewed by the IAEA and the recipient state to be confidential. Any
proposal to change this situation would need to be approved by the IAEA
Board of Governors. We believe the political realities of the Board of
Governors make it unlikely that such a proposal for formal information-
sharing would be adopted at this time. The recommendation would be
viewed as inconsistent with the IAEA Statute by many Member States (and
the IAEA Secretariat) and an unreasonable "micromanagement" of the
IAEA's professional staff. A more achievable goal could be to work to
ensure that the IAEA publishes its complete listing of projects earlier
than has been the norm, e.g., two months prior to the meeting of the
Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee meeting, instead of the
customary two weeks.
Recommendation #2:
Promote a regular and systematic process for obtaining, retaining, and
updating information on prior TC project fellows to better track where
and how the knowledge and expertise they have obtained is being
applied.
We endorse the recommendation to promote a regular and systematic
process for obtaining, retaining, and updating information on prior TC
project fellows to better track where and how the knowledge and
expertise they have obtained is being applied. We believe that, if the
IAEA were to implement this recommendation fully, it would help
highlight the value of IAEA Technical Cooperation and Assistance
projects in individual member states, as well as provide a resource for
future projects, and contribute to the improvement of the efficiency
and effectiveness of the program. TC has also been working on
implementing an In-Touch Platform -- a system to establish, maintain
and intensify contacts between the IAEA and potential, current and
former stakeholders in the TC program which include experts and
trainees. The capability of this system could potentially be expanded
to obtain, retain, and update information on prior TC project fellows.
However, on average, there are over 1,500 TC fellows and over 2,000
training course participants each year. Tracking such a large number of
individuals regularly will require additional IAEA personnel and fiscal
resources.
Recommendation #3:
Strengthen the TC program's mechanisms for collecting member states'
contributions to the TCF to include withholding from non-paying states
a percentage of TC assistance equivalent to the percentage of their
target rate that they fail to contribute the TCF.
The Department of State believes that this recommendation is intended
to ensure that the recipient state is a true partner in the project and
will help that state work toward sustainability. TC has already applied
since 1995 the Due Account Mechanism. GOV/INF/2008/6 has shown the
effectiveness of this mechanism. The rate of attainment has increased
from 81.2% in 2001 to 95.7% in 2007. Some member states, however, that
have not paid their contributions were the least developing countries
(LDC) and we are concerned that withholding assistance to LDCs could
negatively impact these countries. The Board will have to weigh
carefully the questions relating to whether additional options such as
this proposed recommendation can be applied efficiently and cost-
effectively since the current mechanism is considered to function
reasonably well.
Recommendation #4:
Establish criteria for determining when member states, especially those
defined as high-income countries, no longer need technical cooperation
assistance in particular fields and when such states could be graduated
from further TC support altogether.
This recommendation, which would benefit LDCs, was also made by the
Senior Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation (SAGTAC)
at its meeting in November 1997. Specifically, SAGTAC recommended that
higher income recipient Member States that reached a certain per capita
GNP threshold should "graduate" and no longer be eligible for Technical
Co-operation Fund (TCF) financed activities. At that time, one Member
State representative on SAGTAC contended that it was premature to
consider "graduation" solely on the basis of per capita GDP. Since all
IAEA Member States, even those in the developed world, may receive IAEA
assistance under the Statute, this recommendation would have to be
implemented on a voluntary basis.
Recommendation #5:
Seek to implement new results-based performance metrics for the TC
program that establish specific national, regional, and interregional
social and economic needs and measure the collective impact of TC
projects in meeting those objectives.
At U.S. encouragement, TC has made significant progress over the last
several years in implementing performance matrixes when planning,
monitoring and evaluating projects. TC used the Programme Cycle
Management Framework (PCMF) for the first time in 2006 to finalize the
2007-2008 TC Program. The PCMF is an interactive on-line system for
planning and managing national and regional TC projects, which
facilitates real-time collaboration between all relevant parts of the
Secretariat and the stakeholders in Member States. This has enabled the
development of better screened, higher quality projects. As a web-based
platform, the PCMF has made the planning process more participatory and
more transparent. This system incorporates the results-based management
approach/project framework matrix. The GAO recommendation could be
considered as an additional, next step in this system.
Recommendation #6:
Focus the TC program on a more limited number of high priority
technical areas to maximize the impact of program resources.
The Department of State agrees with this recommendation, which appears
to be consistent with "the bigger and fewer projects approach" to TC.
In this vein, the Department of State recommends that the TC Strategy
(2002 Review) should be revisited in accordance with the Report of the
Commission of Eminent Persons on the Future of the Agency.
Recommendation #7:
Encourage the TC program to reach out to private sector entities as
part of its new partner and donor development strategy.
The Department of State agrees with this recommendation. The TC program
has already engaged with private sectors (non-traditional partners) in
recent years as part of its strategic partnerships and the IAEA's
effort to look at its future requirements in the Report of the
Commission of Eminent Persons on the Future of the Agency.
Recommendation #8:
Request member states to assess in their TC project proposals the
prospects for commercialization of and private sector investment in the
results of the projects. Such steps could include requiring information
in the proposals on potential business plans, marketing strategies, and
strategies for attracting commercial partners once IAEA support has
concluded.
The Department of State believes this is a good recommendation, but it
could be difficult to include business plans and marketing strategies
given the relatively small size of the average TC project, i.e., $150K
for 2009-2011. We suggest that this proposal be pursued at the program
area level.
Recommendation #9:
That the Secretary of State enhance record keeping and formally
document management actions regarding the discussion, action, and
disposition of TC project proposals that DOE and the national
laboratories identify as having potential proliferation concerns.
The Department of State endorses this recommendation and can establish
a process consistent with the availability of necessary personnel and
funds.
Recommendation #10:
That the Secretary of State issue formal guidance with well-defined
criteria-such as countries designated by State as sponsors of terrorism
or gross human rights violators-that State should use as basis for
approving or rejecting TC fellowship requests for nuclear studies in
the United States. This guidance could include, among other things, a
list of specific countries from which State would not approve TC
fellows which could be updated and revised annually, or as other
circumstances warrant.
The Department of State supports this recommendation. Guidance can be
formalized which determines how decisions are made with respect to TC
fellowship requests for nuclear studies in the United States from
countries not party to the NPT, from countries that are on the list as
state sponsors of terrorism, and from countries that are deemed gross
human rights violators.
GAO Recommendation to Congress:
In addition to its recommendations that State explore undertaking a
number of actions, including encouraging greater IAEA information
sharing on TC projects, GAO is "considering asking Congress to consider
requiring State to withhold a proportionate share of its contributions
to the TCF for TC program assistance provided to U.S.-designated state
sponsors of terrorism." The Department of State strongly opposes such a
proposed recommendation to Congress for a number of reasons. First,
this proposed recommendation is counterproductive to the GAO's own
recommendation that states pay their full contribution to the TCF. The
United States needs to set an example by paying its contribution in
full and on time. Without this leverage, the U.S. will undermine its
ability to persuade states with fewer financial resources to pay their
share of the TCF. As GAO noted in the report, states failed to
contribute about $3.5M of their share for the TCF during 2007. If the
United States had been required to withhold a proportionate share of
its contribution for TC programs for state sponsors of terrorism during
2007, this would have increased the delinquency amount by approximately
40 percent. Moreover, the GAO report found, inter alia, that the IAEA
Technical Cooperation Fund is fungible; therefore, this proposed
recommendation would not necessarily stop IAEA TC projects in the
targeted countries but instead diminish overall TCF funding. By
targeting the entire TCF, the U.S. will anger states in the developing
world. The proposed recommendation would be, thus, difficult to explain
as being targeted solely at state sponsors of terrorism, and not at the
TCF itself. Finally, Congress has specifically exempted the IAEA
contribution from this type of proportionate withholding, which is
applied to other contributions for international organizations, which
we believe reflects a Congressional recognition of the importance of
the IAEA program. We note that none of the IAEA TC projects benefiting
state sponsors of terrorism to date have been shown to have contributed
to a WMD program. Indeed, a large percentage of TC programs are for
projects related to human health and other purposes related to
development. While we recognize we should not wait for the system to
"fail," we believe that there are adequate safeguards within the
Secretariat. Finally, if the United States were required to implement
the GAO's proposed recommendation, we believe it would have a
significant and demonstrable negative impact in the ability of the
United States to achieve its critical objectives with regard to the
investigation of nuclear noncompliance cases such as Iran and Syria and
improvements that we seek to make to the IAEA's safeguards and nuclear
security systems.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Glen Levis (Assistant
Director), Eugene Gray, Simon Hirschfeld, and William Hoehn made key
contributions to this report. Other technical assistance was provided
by Jeffrey Phillips, Carol Herrnstadt Shulman, Jay Smale, and Jeanette
Soares.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The five nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT--China,
France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United
States--are not obligated under the treaty to accept safeguards,
although each nation has completed voluntary agreements with IAEA that
allow varying degrees of verification at specifically designated
facilities. Other countries that have not joined the NPT--India,
Israel, and Pakistan--also do not have comprehensive safeguards
agreements with IAEA but do have limited safeguards arrangements with
IAEA on some of their specific nuclear facilities and material
stockpiles.
[2] For more information, see GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has
Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but
Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-93] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7,
2005).
[3] TC fellowships in the United States may be funded entirely by the
TC program (referred to as Type I fellowships) or from U.S. funds
(referred to as Type II fellowships) to reduce or eliminate the cost to
IAEA. In addition to fellowships, the TC program also supports
"scientific visits," which are shorter-term scholarships awarded to
senior scientists, heads of research groups, and directors of research
centers, allowing them to visit foreign nuclear institutes, observe
nuclear research, and make professional contacts with other nuclear
scientists and experts.
[4] The other IAEA departments are the Departments of Management,
Nuclear Sciences and Applications, Safeguards, Nuclear Energy, and
Nuclear Safety and Security.
[5] A TC project may be funded in whole or in part from the TCF.
Projects that IAEA approves but that cannot be supported by available
TCF resources are referred to as "footnote a/" projects and can be
supported through extrabudgetary funding provided by member states or
international organizations. Extrabudgetary funding can be allocated
directly to specific footnote a/projects.
[6] In-kind is defined by IAEA as "gifts" of services, equipment and
facilities made available to IAEA by member states or other donors,
such as providing experts and training course lecturers, sponsoring
training courses, donating equipment, and sponsoring certain types of
fellowships.
[7] The U.S. voluntary contribution to IAEA also supports other IAEA
programs and activities, including safeguards, nuclear safety, and
nuclear security.
[8] See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Concerns With the
International Atomic Energy Agency's Technical Cooperation Program,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-97-192] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 16, 1997).
[9] DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world.
Originally created to design and build atomic weapons, DOE's 22
laboratories have expanded their missions to conduct research in many
disciplines--from high-energy physics to advanced computing.
[10] Occasionally, a small number of TC projects are approved out of
cycle; for instance, three new TC projects were approved at the fall
2007 meeting. In addition, in 2008, the TC program cycle shifted
temporarily to a 3-year cycle, in which new projects were approved for
2009 through 2011, in order to synchronize future TC cycles with the
planning cycle of IAEA's "regular program."
[11] On October 11, 2008, the United States rescinded North Korea's
designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. However, North Korea
withdrew its membership in IAEA in 1994 and has not received TC program
assistance since then.
[12] Dual-use refers to equipment or technology that can contribute
both to nuclear energy and other peaceful nuclear applications or
nuclear weapons development or production.
[13] The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a group of nuclear supplier
countries that seeks to contribute to the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons through the implementation of guidelines for nuclear exports
and nuclear-related exports.
[14] In March 1997, we reported on IAEA's technical assistance to Cuba.
See GAO, Nuclear Safety: International Atomic Energy Agency's Technical
Assistance for Cuba, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-97-72] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24,
1997).
[15] Between 2003 and 2008, State had two additional, nearly duplicate
reporting obligations. First, it had to undertake a comprehensive
annual review of the IAEA programs and projects in Burma, Cuba, Iran,
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria and submit it to Congress. Annual
reviews of programs and projects in Iraq and Libya were only required
until 2006 and 2008, respectively. Second, it had to submit to Congress
a report detailing certain aspects of IAEA programs in Iran and
describing IAEA programs and projects in the countries covered by the
first reporting requirement. Both of these reports had to address
inconsistencies between IAEA programs and projects and U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation and safety goals in those countries.
[16] In December 2006, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1737,
sanctioning Iran, in part, for its failure to suspend its uranium
enrichment activities. One of the resolution's provisions prohibited
technical cooperation provided to Iran by IAEA that relates to
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities. Pursuant to this
resolution, IAEA's Director General provided a report in February 2007
identifying 22 TC projects in Iran that could not proceed or proceed
only on a case-by-case basis, based on an evaluation of the projects'
contributions to proliferation-sensitive activities.
[17] As we noted in 2005, IAEA faced a number of challenges that
hampered its ability to implement strengthened safeguards, including
that almost two-thirds of NPT signatories had not brought additional
protocols into force. See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has
Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but
Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-93](Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2005).
[18] For TC proposals approved between 1998 and 2004, the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL) was primarily responsible for conducting
technical reviews of proposed TC projects for proliferation concerns.
In the 2006 cycle, the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) led the
technical reviews of TC proposals. For the 2008 review of TC proposals,
DOE initiated a multilaboratory approach to assessing potential TC
project proliferation concerns.
[19] Hot cells are shielded containment boxes or rooms with remote
handling equipment for examining and processing radioactive materials.
[20] Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, an applicant is
rendered inadmissible if a consular officer knows or has reason to
believe that the applicant seeks to enter the United States to violate
any law prohibiting the export of goods, technology, or sensitive
information from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(i)(II).
[21] For further information on the visa adjudication process and Visas
Mantis, see GAO, Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time
Taken to Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-371] (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 25, 2004).
[22] In data IAEA provided to us, the numbers of TC fellows and
scientific visitors were not counted separately.
[23] The size of the TCF increased from approximately $56.4 million in
2003 to $76.5 million in 2007. The rate of total payment of member
state contributions to the TCF rose from 75 percent of the overall TCF
target in 2003 to 96 percent in 2007.
[24] The United States contributes 99 percent of its TCF target amount
on an annual basis because of the proportionate share of funding it
withholds for TC projects in Cuba.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
