Iraqi Refugee Assistance
Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress, Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an International Strategic Plan Gao ID: GAO-09-120 April 21, 2009Iraqi refugees are one of the largest urban populations the UN has been called on to assist. The UN reports government estimates of up to 4.8 million Iraqis displaced within the last 5 years, with 2 million fleeing, primarily to Syria and Jordan. GAO examined challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in achieving U.S. goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for Iraqi refugees, and (4) developing an international strategic plan to address the Iraqi refugee situation. GAO analyzed reports and data; met with officials from the U.S. government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), international organizations, and NGOs; and did fieldwork in Jordan and Syria.
To implement its 2008 goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State primarily funded and monitored the efforts of its implementing partners, which include international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO). These activities provided Iraqi refugees and host country populations with education, vocational training, health care, food, and financial support. However, State did not clearly link program achievements to its stated goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees. As a result, State has limited information to assess and report its progress in reaching its goal and objectives and improve program effectiveness. Insufficient numbers of staff to monitor projects, difficulties gaining access to projects and refugees, and the lack of reliable data have challenged State's efforts to ensure that projects help the intended beneficiaries. U.S. and international efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries are impeded by the lack of reliable estimates on the needs of Iraqi refugees and data on the funding targeted at Iraqi refugee programs. Iraqi refugees live interspersed among the local urban populations and are not easily identified. Official government estimates on the number of Iraqi refugees in each country may be overstated. It is also difficult to determine the amount of funding provided for Iraqi refugee programs because the U.S. government and UNHCR, the largest bilateral and multilateral funding sources, do not report funding for Iraqi refugee programs separately from that provided for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance. The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges in offering solutions for Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the preferred solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for Iraqis to return. According to the International Organization for Migration, the Iraqi government has cited improvements in security and offered financial incentives to returning refugee families. Although another solution is integration and settlement in host countries, Syria and Jordan consider Iraqi refugees "guests" who should return to Iraq once the security situation improves. The U.S. government has made progress in resettling Iraqi refugees under its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, with 15,431 refugees resettled in the United States in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the international community lacks a comprehensive international strategy to address the Iraqi refugee situation. Although the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal showed progress in strategic planning, the UN and international community continue to lack a longer-term approach. First, the international community lacks a comprehensive independent assessment of the needs of vulnerable Iraqi refugees and the populations that host them. Second, State, UNHCR, and NGOs do not have a strategy that addresses factors that may affect assistance efforts. Third, the international community has lacked a coordination mechanism that involves all stakeholders.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-120, Iraqi Refugee Assistance: Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress, Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an International Strategic Plan
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2009:
Iraqi Refugee Assistance:
Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress, Assessing Needs, Tracking
Funds, and Developing an International Strategic Plan:
GAO-09-120:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-120, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Iraqi refugees are one of the largest urban populations the UN has been
called on to assist. The UN reports government estimates of up to 4.8
million Iraqis displaced within the last 5 years, with 2 million
fleeing, primarily to Syria and Jordan.
GAO examined challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in
achieving U.S. goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing
humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for
Iraqi refugees, and (4) developing an international strategic plan to
address the Iraqi refugee situation.
GAO analyzed reports and data; met with officials from the U.S.
government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
international organizations, and NGOs; and did fieldwork in Jordan and
Syria.
What GAO Found:
To implement its 2008 goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State
primarily funded and monitored the efforts of its implementing
partners, which include international organizations and nongovernmental
organizations (NGO). These activities provided Iraqi refugees and host
country populations with education, vocational training, health care,
food, and financial support. However, State did not clearly link
program achievements to its stated goal and objectives for Iraqi
refugees. As a result, State has limited information to assess and
report its progress in reaching its goal and objectives and improve
program effectiveness. Insufficient numbers of staff to monitor
projects, difficulties gaining access to projects and refugees, and the
lack of reliable data have challenged State‘s efforts to ensure that
projects help the intended beneficiaries.
U.S. and international efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to
Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries are impeded by the lack of
reliable estimates on the needs of Iraqi refugees and data on the
funding targeted at Iraqi refugee programs. Iraqi refugees live
interspersed among the local urban populations and are not easily
identified. Official government estimates on the number of Iraqi
refugees in each country may be overstated. It is also difficult to
determine the amount of funding provided for Iraqi refugee programs
because the U.S. government and UNHCR, the largest bilateral and
multilateral funding sources, do not report funding for Iraqi refugee
programs separately from that provided for all Iraq-related
humanitarian assistance.
The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges in offering solutions for
Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the
preferred solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for
Iraqis to return. According to the International Organization for
Migration, the Iraqi government has cited improvements in security and
offered financial incentives to returning refugee families. Although
another solution is integration and settlement in host countries, Syria
and Jordan consider Iraqi refugees ’guests“ who should return to Iraq
once the security situation improves. The U.S. government has made
progress in resettling Iraqi refugees under its U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program, with 15,431 refugees resettled in the United States in fiscal
years 2007 and 2008.
According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the
international community lacks a comprehensive international strategy to
address the Iraqi refugee situation. Although the 2009 UN Consolidated
Appeal showed progress in strategic planning, the UN and international
community continue to lack a longer-term approach. First, the
international community lacks a comprehensive independent assessment of
the needs of vulnerable Iraqi refugees and the populations that host
them. Second, State, UNHCR, and NGOs do not have a strategy that
addresses factors that may affect assistance efforts. Third, the
international community has lacked a coordination mechanism that
involves all stakeholders.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, with relevant others, (1)
develop performance measures to assess and report progress in achieving
overall U.S. goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees; (2) track and
report funding apportioned, obligated, and expended for Iraqi refugee
programs in each host country; (3) assess the number and needs of Iraqi
refugees and the related needs of countries hosting them; and (4)
develop a comprehensive international strategy for assistance and
solutions for Iraqi refugees. The Department of State generally
concurred with our recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-120]. For more
information, contact Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or
christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Iraqis Benefit from Assistance, but State Has Not Measured Progress in
Meeting Its Overall Goals, and State and Its Partners Face Monitoring
Challenges:
Lack of Reliable Needs Estimates and Funding Data Affects U.S. and
UNHCR Efforts to Assist Iraqi Refugees:
The U.S. Government and UNHCR Face Challenges in Offering Permanent
Solutions for Iraqi Refugees:
Lack of Comprehensive International Strategic Planning Has Hindered
Efforts to Assist and Protect Iraqi Refugees:
Conclusion:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Special Immigrant Visa Programs:
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix III: Status of U.S. Appropriation Funds Apportioned to Iraq-
Related Humanitarian Assistance, and Intended Beneficiaries, as of
September 30, 2008:
Appendix IV: U.S. Contributions to UNHCR Appeals for Iraq-Related
Humanitarian Assistance, and Intended Beneficiaries, Calendar Years
2003 through 2008:
Appendix V: Individual Iraqi Refugee Beneficiaries of UNHCR Assistance
in Syria and Jordan, Calendar Year 2008:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Iraqi Refugees Registered with UNHCR and Neighboring Host
Government Estimates of Iraqi Refugees, as Reported by UNHCR, as of
September 30, 2008:
Table 2: U.S. Government Iraqi Refugee Processing and Admissions under
USRAP, Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008:
Table 3: Iraqi Refugee Resettlement Departures by Country of
Resettlement, Calendar Years 2007 through 2008, as of September 30,
2008:
Table 4: U.S. Special Immigrant Visas Issued for Iraqi and Afghan
Translators/Interpreters and Their Dependents, under Section 1059, as
of September 30, 2008:
Table 5: U.S. Special Immigrant Visas Issued for Iraqis and Afghans and
Their Dependents, under Section 1244, as of September 30, 2008:
Figures:
Figure 1: Neighboring Countries Hosting Iraqi Refugees:
Figure 2: Types of Assistance Provided to Iraqi Refugees and Vulnerable
Host Country Populations:
Figure 3: Outreach Volunteer Conducting a Home Visit in Jordan:
Figure 4: PRM-Funded Clinic in Syria:
Figure 5: Comparison of State Department 2008 Performance Management
Procedures for Iraqi Refugee Assistance with Leading Results-Oriented
Management Practices:
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
IDP: internally displaced person:
IOM: International Organization for Migration:
NGO: nongovernmental organization:
OFDA: Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance:
OPE: overseas processing entity:
PRM: Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration:
SARC: Syrian Arab Red Crescent:
SIV: special immigrant visa:
UN: United Nations:
UNDP: United Nations Development Program:
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees:
UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund:
USAID: United States Agency for International Development:
USCIS: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services:
USRAP: United States Refugee Admissions Program:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 21, 2009:
Congressional Committees:
According to the United Nations (UN), Iraqi refugees represent one of
the largest urban refugee populations the organization has been called
upon to assist and pose an unprecedented burden on the countries
hosting them. The UN reports that regional governments estimate that
over the last 5 years about 4.8 million Iraqis have been displaced from
their homes in search of safety, with about 2 million fleeing to
neighboring countries, primarily Syria and Jordan. According to the
Department of State (State), because of its unique role in Iraq, the
United States has recognized the need to take the lead in mitigating
the effects of this humanitarian crisis.
GAO is assessing U.S. and international efforts to protect and assist
Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP). In this report,
we examine challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in
achieving U.S. goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing
humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for
Iraqi refugees, and (4) developing an international strategic plan to
address the Iraqi refugee situation.[Footnote 1] In addition, we
reviewed the progress made in implementing special immigrant visa
programs for Iraqis, which may also benefit some refugees but are not
designed specifically for them (see appendix I). We plan a subsequent
review that will examine challenges faced in assisting internally
displaced Iraqis. Because of broad congressional interest in the U.S.
engagement in Iraq, we are completing this report under the Comptroller
General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed reports and data
from the U.S. government, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), other UN
agencies, foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and
research institutes. During our fieldwork in Washington, D.C., we met
with officials from State and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
regarding refugee assistance, refugee admissions, and special immigrant
visa programs and the challenges they have encountered. We also met
with research institutions and NGOs and held discussion groups with
NGOs conducting work in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq to discuss strategic
planning and program implementation challenges. Through our fieldwork
in Geneva, Switzerland; Rome, Italy; Amman, Jordan; and Damascus,
Syria, we met with officials from the U.S., Jordanian, Syrian, and
Iraqi governments; UNHCR and other UN umbrella agencies, including the
World Food Program and IOM; international and local NGOs; and research
institutions. Also, with the help of UNHCR, we held discussion groups
with Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria to discuss their situations,
needs, assistance received, and challenges encountered. We toured and
observed assistance projects and activities in resettlement processing
centers. We analyzed U.S. funding, refugee admissions, and visa data,
and found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report. Appendix II contains a more detailed description of our scope
and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to January 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
To implement its 2008 goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State
primarily funded and monitored the efforts of its implementing
partners, which include international organizations and NGOs.[Footnote
2] These State-funded activities provided Iraqi refugees and the
populations of the countries that host them with primary education,
vocational training, health care, psychosocial services, distribution
of food and household items, and financial support, among other
efforts. However, based on our review of State's assessment of progress
in fiscal year 2008, it was difficult to determine the extent to which
State achieved its overall goal and objectives.[Footnote 3] For
example, State reported on a number of individual projects but did not
specifically measure these accomplishments against benchmarks or report
how these project-level accomplishments helped State achieve its
overall goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees. As a result, State has
limited information to judge progress in reaching its goal and
objectives for Iraqi refugee programs and improve effectiveness.
Assessing progress is complicated by difficulties State confronts in
overseeing refugee projects that it funds in Jordan and Syria--the
countries with the largest number of Iraqi refugees. Insufficient
quantity of staff to monitor projects, difficulties gaining access to
projects and refugees, and the lack of reliable data on education and
health needs have hindered State's efforts to ensure that projects are
helping the intended beneficiaries. For example, in April 2008, State
reported that UNHCR was able to effectively monitor approximately 40 to
59 percent of its implementing partners in Jordan. In November 2008,
State officials reported that the refugee coordinator did not complete
annual reviews of UNHCR programs in Syria and Lebanon because of
difficulties getting into each country as a result of visa and security
restrictions. In Jordan and Syria, difficulty obtaining reliable data
for the education and health sectors has hindered UN efforts to monitor
progress.
U.S. and international efforts to effectively provide humanitarian
assistance to Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries are impeded by
two key factors--the lack of reliable estimates on the needs of Iraqi
refugees and data on the funding targeted toward Iraqi refugee
programs. Iraqi refugees mostly live interspersed among the local urban
populations which has made them difficult to identify. First, official
government estimates on the number of Iraqi refugees in each country
may be overstated. Jordan and Syria, with the largest reported numbers
of Iraqi refugees, estimate 450,000 to 500,000 and 1,200,000 to
1,500,000 Iraqi refugees, respectively, in their countries. In
contrast, UNHCR reported officially registering 54,411 Iraqis in Jordan
and 221,506 Iraqis in Syria, as of September 30, 2008. Neither country
has enabled an independent and comprehensive survey of refugees to be
undertaken, asserting that assistance should not be targeted toward
Iraqi refugees while they have vulnerable populations that need help.
As a result, both countries have based requests for international
assistance primarily on the health and education needs of their
citizens rather than on the numbers of Iraqi refugees residing there.
Accordingly, the U.S. government and the UN have included the needs of
both Iraqi refugees and host country populations in their Iraqi refugee
programs. Second, it is difficult to determine the amount of funding
provided for Iraqi refugee programs because the U.S. government and
UNHCR, the largest bilateral and multilateral funding sources, do not
report funding for Iraqi refugee programs separately from that provided
for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance.[Footnote 4] For fiscal
years 2003 through 2008, the U.S. government made available about $1.6
billion and spent about $1.2 billion for all Iraq-related humanitarian
assistance. UNHCR funding appeals for calendar years 2003 through 2008
totaled about $730 million and resulted in about $542 million in
contributions for its Iraq Operation, which, in addition to Iraqi
refugees, also included internally displaced Iraqis and other
vulnerable populations in Iraq and host countries. The United States
contributed about $316 million, or about 58 percent, of these UNHCR
contributions. According to State, all multilateral and bilateral
donations from other countries met only a fraction of the needs inside
and out of Iraq. Representatives of donor countries raised concerns
regarding the uncertain number of Iraqi refugees and the extent of
their needs and noted that the lack of objective and complete
information made it difficult to garner support for funding. Some also
stated that the United States, given its role in the Iraqi humanitarian
crisis, and Iraq, given its budget surplus and that the refugees are
its citizens, should bear most of the costs. Although in 2007 the Iraqi
government pledged and later transferred $25 million to support the
assistance of Iraqi refugees in neighboring host countries, it is
unclear whether Iraq plans to provide additional funds to support Iraqi
refugees. Iraqi officials stated that the government is reluctant to
fund programs for Iraqi refugees because improving refugee conditions
in neighboring countries may discourage refugees from returning to
Iraq.
The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges in offering solutions for
Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the
preferred solution, but conditions in Iraq are not yet suitable for
Iraqis to return. According to IOM, the Iraqi government has cited
improvements in security and offered financial incentives (about 1
million Iraqi dinars) to returning refugee families. However, according
to UNHCR, refugees fear leaving the safety of their host countries for
the uncertain environment in Iraq, and there is no clear trend on the
number of Iraqis returning to or leaving their country. According to
the UN, a limited number of Iraqis may be returning, but this may be
due to increasing hardship in their host countries rather than
improvements in Iraq. Although another solution is integration and
settlement in host countries, both Syria and Jordan consider Iraqi
refugees "guests" who should return to Iraq once the security situation
improves. In Syria and Jordan, difficulties in renewing visas, a lack
of funds, and limited access to employment and public services affect
Iraqi refugees' decisions to stay or return to Iraq. According to
Jordanian and Syrian government officials, neither government
anticipated a long-term Iraqi presence. According to UNHCR, Syria and
Jordan are determined not to establish arrangements that might lead to
permanent residence, such as officially allowing employment of Iraqi
refugees. Resettlement to a third country is another option, but a
limited number of countries resettle refugees, according to UNHCR, and
less than 1 percent of registered refugees worldwide are resettled in
third countries, according to State. The U.S. government has made
progress in resettling Iraqi refugees to the United States under its
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, established in February 2007. In 2007,
the U.S. government admitted 1,608 Iraqi refugees but did not achieve
State's own expectation of resettling 2,000 to 3,000 refugees under the
program. However, the U.S. government surpassed its fiscal year 2008
goal of 12,000 with the admission of 13,823 Iraqi refugees. According
to UNHCR, as of September 30, 2008, other countries resettled a total
of 5,852 refugees in calendar years 2007 and 2008.
According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the
international community lacks a comprehensive international strategy to
address the Iraqi refugee situation.[Footnote 5] Although the
international community has recognized the need to strategically plan
for the Iraqi refugee situation, it has focused on the crisis within
Iraq and annual planning efforts while deferring strategic planning for
the refugee situation. Although the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for
Iraq and the Region showed significant progress in strategic planning,
the UN and the international community continue to lack a longer-term
approach. According to NGOs, the lack of an international strategy has
hindered efforts to effectively assist Iraqi refugees in Syria and
Jordan. First, the international community lacks a comprehensive
independent assessment of the needs of vulnerable Iraqi refugees and
the economically vulnerable populations that host them. Host countries'
unwillingness to enable these assessments impedes strategic planning
efforts. Without these assessments, it is difficult to determine the
scope of the problem and to appropriately prioritize and align
resources to address the Iraqi refugee situation. Second, State, UNHCR,
and NGOs do not have a strategy that addresses factors that may affect
assistance efforts. For example, according to NGOs, the annual budget
focus of UNHCR and key donor countries, including the United States,
makes it difficult for them to conduct longer-term planning because
they do not know whether their efforts will be funded from one year to
the next. Thus, they may focus on shorter-term efforts in lieu of more
effective long-term efforts. Third, the international community has
lacked a coordination mechanism involving all stakeholders--including
the governments hosting refugees, international organizations, NGOs,
and the donor community--that would help ensure effective delivery of
assistance. For example, NGOs in Jordan cited duplication of efforts
and competition for beneficiaries as impeding progress in helping Iraqi
refugees. NGOs cited the need for international strategic planning to
use resources efficiently and address coordination difficulties.
In this report, we make several recommendations. First, we recommend
that the Secretary of State develop performance measures to assess and
report progress in achieving U.S. goals and objectives for Iraqi
refugees. Performance goals, objectives, and measures should clearly
and transparently address the extent to which programs should target
Iraqi refugees and host government populations. Second, we recommend
that the Secretary of State and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) Administrator develop systems to separately track
and report funding apportioned, obligated, and expended for Iraqi
refugee programs in each host country, to the extent practicable.
Third, we recommend that the Secretary of State work with UNHCR and the
governments of Jordan, Syria, and other relevant host governments to
expedite efforts to conduct independent comprehensive assessments of
the number and needs of Iraqi refugees and the related needs of the
countries hosting them. Fourth, we recommend that the Secretary of
State, in conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies and in coordination
with the donor community, work with UNHCR and the governments of Iraq,
Jordan, Syria, and other relevant host governments, to build on the
efforts in the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region and
develop a comprehensive international strategy for providing assistance
and solutions for Iraqi refugees.
In written comments on a draft of this report, State generally agreed
with each of our recommendations and noted aspects that the department
believes might be difficult to implement. USAID commented that our
recommendation regarding tracking and reporting USAID funding was
resolved. However, we continue to believe that additional action is
needed. State's and USAID's written comments and our evaluation of
those comments are discussed in detail later in this report. State,
DHS, and UNHCR provided technical comments, which we incorporated where
appropriate.
Background:
According to IOM, the bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samara in
February 2006 triggered sectarian violence that increased the number of
displaced Iraqis. Although military operations, crime, and general
insecurity remained factors, sectarian violence became the primary
driver for population displacement.[Footnote 6] As displayed in figure
1, many Iraqis fled their country and immigrated to neighboring
countries, particularly to Syria and Jordan.
Figure 1: Neighboring Countries Hosting Iraqi Refugees:
[Refer to PDF for image: map]
Neighboring Countries Hosting Iraqi Refugees:
Egypt;
Europe;
Gulf States;
Islamic Republic of Iran;
Jordan;
Lebanon;
Syrian Arab Republic;
Turkey.
[End of figure]
According to UNHCR, the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol provide the foundation for modern
refugee protection. According to the Convention, a refugee is someone
who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group,
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country...." The 1951 Convention does not apply to
persons who have committed crimes against peace, war crimes, or crimes
against humanity. UNHCR recognizes and registers as refugees both those
persons who fall within the 1951 Convention criteria and those falling
within the extended definition of persons fleeing generalized armed
conflict or civil unrest. Registration allows UNHCR to identify Iraqis
in need of protection, offer them assistance, and screen them for
possible resettlement. According to the UN, of the countries hosting
Iraqi refugees in the Middle East, only Turkey, Egypt, and Iran are
parties to the 1951 Convention. Syria and Jordan, the two countries
hosting the largest number of Iraqi refugees, have not signed the 1951
Convention. As a result, according to the UN, although the refugees
have been able to access public services, they have not been able to
obtain legal employment and may face deportation if they do not comply
with visa requirements, which have become more restrictive over the
years.[Footnote 7] According to UNHCR, the identification,
registration, intervention in detention and deportation, and monitoring
of access to asylum are important UNHCR functions for refugees.
UNHCR coordinates the provision and delivery of shelter, food, water,
sanitation, and medical care to refugees throughout the world. UNHCR is
also mandated to find solutions to the plight of refugees. According to
UNHCR, three solutions are available:[Footnote 8]
* First, voluntary repatriation is the preferred solution for the
majority of refugees. Most refugees prefer to return home as soon as
circumstances permit (generally when a conflict has ended and a degree
of stability has been restored). UNHCR promotes, supports, and
facilitates voluntary repatriation as the best solution for displaced
people, provided it is safe and reintegration is viable.
* Second, UNHCR may help refugees integrate and settle in the "asylum,"
or host, country where they reside as refugees. Some refugees cannot or
are unwilling to return because they would face persecution. According
to UNHCR, relatively few countries allow refugees to settle.
* Third, UNHCR may assist refugees in permanently resettling in third
countries. According to UNHCR, only a small number of nations take part
in UNHCR resettlement programs worldwide and accept annual quotas of
refugees. According to State, historically, less than 1 percent of
registered refugees are resettled in third countries.
Within the U.S. government, the Department of State's Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has primary responsibility
for formulating U.S. foreign policy on population issues, protection
and assistance to refugees and conflict victims, and international
migration. It also administers U.S. refugee assistance and admission
programs. In this capacity, PRM has the lead role within the department
in responding to complex humanitarian emergencies around the world and
in working to resolve protracted refugee situations. According to
State, to protect and assist Iraqi refugees, PRM works closely with
regional bureaus, U.S. embassies, and U.S. missions to provide guidance
to its international organization and NGO implementing partners and to
engage with other donor countries and countries hosting Iraqi refugees.
PRM primarily implements its U.S. humanitarian assistance goals for
Iraqi refugees by funding and monitoring international organization and
nongovernmental organization projects. USAID also provides some
humanitarian assistance that benefits Iraqi refugees, but according to
State and USAID, most of its programs focus on efforts within Iraq. PRM
is also responsible for managing the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
(USRAP). Within this program, DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) is responsible for interviewing refugees and
adjudicating their applications for resettlement in the United States.
Iraqis Benefit from Assistance, but State Has Not Measured Progress in
Meeting Its Overall Goals, and State and Its Partners Face Monitoring
Challenges:
The Department of State and its international partners, including UN
agencies and NGOs, have funded and implemented a number of programs and
projects that benefit Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan. However,
although State has established a broad goal and objectives for its 2008
efforts to protect and assist Iraqi refugees, it did not establish
performance measures for assessing progress in achieving them. In
addition, State and its implementing partners face challenges in
monitoring their Iraqi refugee assistance projects.
State Department and UN Fund Assistance to Support Iraqi Refugees:
To implement its goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees, State
primarily funds and monitors the activities of its implementing
partners, which include international organizations and NGOs.[Footnote
9] According to State, U.S. funding through these organizations has
supported the most vulnerable refugees and host country populations.
UNHCR, other international humanitarian organizations, and NGO partners
provided education, health care, food, financial assistance, and other
assistance to Iraqi refugees and vulnerable host country populations
(see figure 2).
Figure 2: Types of Assistance Provided to Iraqi Refugees and Vulnerable
Host Country Populations:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
U.S. government and other international funding:
* UNHCR, other international humanitarian organizations, and
nongovernmental organizations;
* Nongovernmental organizations;
Organizations provide assistance to Iraqi refugees and vulnerable host
populations through direct implementation of projects or implementing
partners:
Types of assistance provided to beneficiaries:
Legal protection;
Food;
Nonfood items;
Vocational training;
Financial assistance;
Education;
Shelter;
Psychosocial services.
Sources: GAO analysis of Department of State and UNHCR data; GAO
(photo); Nova Development (clip art); Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
For example, in Syria, UNHCR and the World Food Program provided food
rations and nonfood items such as mattresses, blankets, and household
items to Iraqi refugees. Additionally, in Syria and Jordan, UNHCR
provided monthly cash assistance primarily to vulnerable Iraqi
refugees, including single female heads of households. In Syria, for
example, the heads of households received approximately $100 per month,
with an additional $10 for each dependent. Appendix V provides more
details on the number of Iraqis who benefited from UNHCR assistance in
2008.
In terms of health care, we visited a clinic in Jordan, funded through
the State Department's PRM bureau, which assisted Iraqi refugees, and
met with outreach workers. According to the program manager, the
project provided health care to Iraqis and stipends for some Iraqi
women conducting community outreach. (See figure 3, showing an Iraqi
volunteer conducting outreach.)
Figure 3: Outreach Volunteer Conducting a Home Visit in Jordan:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: International Relief and Development.
[End of figure]
In Syria, we visited another PRM-funded project that provided medical
assistance to Iraqi refugees and vulnerable host country populations
(see figure 4). According to the program manager, the clinic provided
primary health care, child health screening, chronic noncommunicable
disease care, maternal health care, and health education. We toured the
pharmacy, the dental unit, and the laboratory where basic tests are
performed.
Figure 4: PRM-Funded Clinic in Syria:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
At another NGO project site in Syria, we visited a summer school
program for Iraqi refugee children. According to the program manager,
in addition to the academic lessons provided in Arabic, English, math,
and science, Iraqi students participate in summer camp activities.
During our visit, we observed children participating in various camp
activities, including arts and crafts and a musical production.
According to the program manager, all of the participants were Iraqi
children. He also stated that the children received meals while
attending the activities. The program manager stated that these
activities were designed to promote the Iraqi students' emotional and
social well-being.
The State Department Has Not Linked Progress to Overall Goals and
Objectives:
It is difficult to determine the progress of U.S. efforts to assist and
protect Iraqi refugees because State's 2008 goal and regional
objectives were broad and difficult to measure. In addition, State did
not have corresponding performance measures that clearly linked the
achievements of its Iraqi refugee activities to progress in meeting its
overall 2008 goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees. Prior GAO work
suggests that leading organizations promote accountability by
establishing results-oriented goals and corresponding performance
measures by which to gauge progress. Measuring performance allows
organizations to track the progress they are making toward their goals
and give managers crucial information on which to base their
organizational and management decisions.[Footnote 10] Figure 5 provides
more information on State's 2008 performance management efforts for
Iraqi refugee assistance compared with leading results-oriented
practices.
Figure 5: Comparison of State Department 2008 Performance Management
Procedures for Iraqi Refugee Assistance with Leading Results-Oriented
Management Practices:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Leading results-oriented management practices:
Step 1:
Establish program goals and objectives;
Information flows to:
Step 2:
Establish performance measures to assess progress;
Information flows to:
Step 3:
Collect data on performance;
Information flows to:
Step 4:
Analyze data and report results;
Information flows to:
Step 5:
Adjust program goals and objectives to improve program efficiency and
effectiveness;
Information flows to Step 1.
State's 2008 procedures[A]:
Step 1:
Yes, State established program goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees
and efforts within Iraq.
Goals:
* Maintain humanitarian assistance and protection for Iraqi refugees;
* Within Iraq, support assistance and protection programs for non-Iraqi
refugees;
* Within Iraq, support international organization programs to assist
and protect returning refugees, internally displaced persons, and
conflict victims.
Regional objectives:
* Meet the assistance and protection needs of refugees and other
conflict victims through expanded engagement and funding of
international and nongovernmental organization partners;
* Contribute to regional stability by channeling humanitarian
assistance through primary international organization partners;
* Promote UNHCR to achieve solutions for non-Iraqi and Iraqi refugees;
* Ensure greater burden sharing among donors, including the Iraqi
government.
Information flow lacking to:
Step 2:
No, State did not develop performance measures to assess progress
toward its goals and objectives for Iraqi refugee efforts. Instead,
State measured global humanitarian assistance and protection efforts,
but these global performance measures were not linked to Iraq-specific
program goals and objectives.
Information flow lacking to:
Step 3:
No, State did not collect and compare performance data against
established performance measures for its goals and objectives.
Information flow lacking to:
Step 4:
N0, State did not analyze performance data and report results. State
prepared a descriptive report of partners' accomplishments but no
assessment of how these accomplishments helped achieve State's goals
and objectives for Iraqi refugees.
Information flow lacking to:
Step 5:
No, Without linkage between partners‘ accomplishments and State‘s
overall goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees, it was difficult to
assess progress and identify ways to improve program efficiency and
effectiveness.
Information flow lacking to Step 1.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.
[A] Department of State/Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration,
Policy and Implementation Paper for Iraq Refugees and Internally
Displaced Persons (IDP) for FY 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2008).
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 5, State established a goal and objectives for its
2008 efforts concerning Iraqi refugee efforts as part of its overall
goals and objectives for its efforts to assist refugees, internally
displaced persons, and other conflict victims.[Footnote 11] However, on
the basis of our review of State's assessment of progress achieved in
fiscal year 2008, it was difficult to determine the extent to which
State achieved its overall goal and objectives.[Footnote 12] Although
State reported progress achieved in 2008 by sector and at the country
level,[Footnote 13] it did not aggregate these data to demonstrate how
these activities that it funded helped State meet its overall goal of
assisting and protecting Iraqi refugees. Similarly, State did not
develop corresponding performance measures and milestones, nor did it
compile and aggregate the data it needed to assess and report on its
progress in achieving its objectives to expand engagement through
funding of NGOs and international organizations, contribute to regional
security by channeling humanitarian assistance through primary
international organization partners, promote UNHCR to achieve solutions
for Iraqi refugees, or ensure greater burden sharing.
State measures PRM's bureauwide progress for humanitarian assistance at
the global level, but this effort does not include specific performance
measures for assessing progress toward its goal and objectives for
Iraqi refugees. According to State officials, the goal and objectives
for Iraqi refugees are in line with the PRM bureau's overall
humanitarian response strategic goal for fiscal year 2008 and with its
performance goals for global refugee protection, solutions, and
assistance. State officials said that progress on its global efforts is
measured through bureauwide indicators, including acute malnutrition
and crude mortality rates. Similarly, progress on protection efforts by
PRM partners is measured at the global level through performance
relating to "non-refoulement," as reported in UNHCR's annual protection
reports.[Footnote 14] However, these indicators are not generally
applicable to specific programs targeting Iraqi refugees. According to
State, global acute malnutrition, for example, is used as a proxy of
the overall health and well-being of a population. PRM monitors
situations where more than 10 percent of refugee children are suffering
from wasting;[Footnote 15] where this occurs, high malnutrition levels
indicate a serious humanitarian crisis. However, according to State
officials, the absence of reports of acute malnutrition occurring among
Iraqi refugee children makes this indicator a poor choice for assessing
the effectiveness of State's Iraqi refugee programs.
State's implementing partners reported progress against agreed-upon
performance indicators for assessing Iraqi refugee-related activities.
[Footnote 16] However, State did not aggregate individual project or
program performance so that it could measure progress toward its
overall goal and objectives. GAO previously reported that leading
organizations seeking to become more results-oriented clearly define
desired outcomes, measure performance to gauge progress, and use
performance information as a basis for decision making.[Footnote 17]
For example, in its 2008 and 2009 policy papers on Iraqi refugees,
State reported on a number of individual projects but did not
specifically report how these project-level accomplishments helped
State achieve its overall goal and objectives for Iraqi refugees.
[Footnote 18] In addition, on the basis of our review of NGO monitoring
reports,[Footnote 19] State received information on its partners'
achievements but did not identify how it would use these data to
measure and report on overall progress for its Iraqi refugee goal and
objectives.[Footnote 20] For example, in its NGO guidelines, State
generally requires that a project demonstrate that at least 50 percent
of beneficiaries are Iraqi refugees.[Footnote 21] According to State
officials, NGO partners are required to submit beneficiary statistics
by objectives and indicators. Our review of the 13 available final NGO
reports showed that in 10 cases NGOs reported that 50 percent or more
of beneficiaries were Iraqi refugees,[Footnote 22] while in 3 cases
less than 50 percent were Iraqi refugees.[Footnote 23] However, these
data were not aggregated or reported as a measure of progress in
meeting the U.S. goal and objectives for assisting Iraqi refugees.
For 2009, State has made progress in articulating more results-oriented
goals and objectives; however, the elements that State identified as
corresponding performance indicators are not clearly linked to the
objectives and are not consistently measurable.[Footnote 24] State
reported that, on the basis of discussions with GAO, it established
more detailed objectives and indicators for fiscal year 2009 to measure
progress in providing assistance and protection to Iraqi refugees,
internally displaced persons, and conflict victims. According to State,
it has developed a spreadsheet to track progress toward these
objectives and indicators throughout the year.
State Department and Its Partners Face Challenges in Project
Monitoring:
The Department of State and its implementing partners use a number of
methods to monitor their refugee programs and activities; however,
according to State and its implementing partners, a lack of resources,
difficulty gaining physical access to projects and refugees, and a lack
of reliable data create challenges to their monitoring and evaluation
efforts. According to State officials, they monitor their partners'
programs and projects by conducting site visits, reviewing progress and
final reports, reviewing NGO project beneficiary statistics, meeting
and conducting follow-up with program managers, and consulting other
donors and humanitarian organizations. According to UNHCR officials,
they have an extensive monitoring system that includes field
monitoring, program evaluations, and financial account and document
reviews. State is working with its partners to improve their monitoring
and evaluation efforts. A Framework for Cooperation between State and
UNHCR noted that enhancement of the quality of monitoring and
evaluation activities that UNHCR undertakes deserved particular
attention.[Footnote 25] Additionally, in State's Framework for
Cooperation with IOM, both parties committed to strengthening
monitoring and evaluation capacity and to quantify program results and
impact more effectively.[Footnote 26]
While there are challenges to monitoring and evaluation, State has
taken steps to improve its oversight of NGO projects. For example, in
the fiscal year 2007 NGO cooperative agreements, State required NGOs to
provide two reports. The first report covered the first 4 months of the
project, and the second report covered the last 8 months of the
project. However, for NGOs funded in fiscal year 2008, State revised
the formal reporting requirements included in the cooperative
agreements. As a result, NGOs are required to provide quarterly reports
on project progress, including progress against objectives and
indicators. Additionally, State reported that it has expanded the
template used to track the progress made by NGOs on a quarterly basis.
However, according to State and implementing partner officials,
monitoring continues to be impeded by the following challenges.
* Insufficient monitoring resources: In April 2008, State reported that
UNHCR effectively monitored approximately 40 to 59 percent of its
implementing partners' program activity sites in Jordan.[Footnote 27]
State noted that it faced the same challenges, given that program
activities are conducted at more than 200 sites and that PRM's officer
would be able to visit only a fraction of these activities over the
course of a year. During our visit to a small project site in Jordan,
the embassy official responsible for monitoring in Jordan noted that
this was the first visit to the site, given that it was one of the
smaller projects and embassy staff had limited time to make site
visits. Moreover, State reported that it expected the problem to
increase for UNHCR as it continued with plans to decentralize its
services to Iraqi refugees to 18 locations throughout Jordan. In
commenting on a draft of this report, UNHCR noted that it has taken
steps to mitigate the lack of monitoring resources in Jordan.[Footnote
28] In Syria, monitoring efforts are limited by a lack of PRM
monitoring staff at the U.S. embassy. In August 2008, a senior U.S.
embassy official in Syria stated that the U.S. embassy had limited
staffing resources to monitor all Iraqi refugee program activities.
According to State, monitoring efforts for Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan
are carried out by two PRM staff based at the U.S. embassy in Jordan
and visiting PRM staff from Washington, D.C.
* Difficulty gaining physical access to projects: In November 2008,
State reported that the refugee coordinator did not complete annual
reviews of UNHCR programs in Syria and Lebanon because of difficulties
getting into each country because of visa and security restrictions.
According to State officials, the United States is constrained in
monitoring its assistance efforts in Syria because of its poor
relationship with the government of Syria and resulting restrictions on
the visas of U.S. government visitors. In addition, according to two
interim program evaluations, State personnel were unable to monitor the
two NGO projects in Lebanon because of security constraints. The U.S.
embassy in Beirut operates under strict security protocols that limit
the ability and flexibility of the mission to host visitors. State
monitoring officials planned to travel to Beirut in May 2008, but this
trip was canceled after violence escalated.
* Lack of reliable data: According to the UN, in both Syria and Jordan,
difficulty obtaining reliable data in the education and health sectors
has hindered efforts to monitor progress. For example, according to the
UN, student attendance data in Jordan are not disaggregated by gender
and age. According to the UN, information management systems in the
Syrian and Jordanian health sector need improvement to collect more
reliable data on beneficiaries served.
Lack of Reliable Needs Estimates and Funding Data Affects U.S. and
UNHCR Efforts to Assist Iraqi Refugees:
U.S. and UNHCR efforts to provide sufficient humanitarian assistance to
Iraqi refugees are challenged by the lack of reliable needs estimates
and data on funding targeted at Iraqi refugee programs. Without a
comprehensive assessment of the number and needs of Iraqi refugees in
Jordan and Syria, it is difficult to prioritize and fund efforts to
help ensure sufficient assistance and protection efforts. Donor
countries are resistant to providing funds without further information
on the needs. According to UN and donor representatives, they are also
resistant because they believe the United States and Iraq should fund
the majority of assistance efforts.
The Number of Iraqi Refugees and the Extent of Their Needs Are Unknown:
Efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees are
hindered by the lack of reliable information on their number, the
extent of their needs, and the needs of the countries hosting them.
Iraqi refugees primarily live interspersed among the local urban
populations, rather than concentrated in camps, and are not easily
identified. According to the UN, statistics on the number of Iraqi
refugees in neighboring countries vary and are difficult to verify. The
UN further notes that efforts are needed to improve data collection on
Iraqi refugees across the region.[Footnote 29] In contrast to official
host government estimates of Iraqi refugees, a significantly smaller
number of refugees have registered with UNHCR for protection and
assistance (see table 1). However, UNHCR officials stated that the
registration numbers may not be a true proxy of the number of Iraqi
refugees in each country because an unknown number of refugees do not
register or seek assistance.[Footnote 30] The actual number of Iraqi
refugees in need may be somewhere in between these figures.
Table 1: Iraqi Refugees Registered with UNHCR and Neighboring Host
Government Estimates of Iraqi Refugees, as Reported by UNHCR, as of
September 30, 2008:
Country hosting Iraqi refugees: Syrian Arab Republic;
Number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR: 221,506;
Host government estimates of number of Iraqi refugees: 1,200,000-
1,500,000[A].
Country hosting Iraqi refugees: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan;
Number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR: 54,411;
Host government estimates of number of Iraqi refugees: 450,000-500,000.
Country hosting Iraqi refugees: Lebanon;
Number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR: 10,764;
Host government estimates of number of Iraqi refugees: 50,000.
Country hosting Iraqi refugees: Egypt;
Number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR: 10,163;
Host government estimates of number of Iraqi refugees: Not available.
Country hosting Iraqi refugees: Turkey;
Number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR: 6,610;
Host government estimates of number of Iraqi refugees: Not available.
Country hosting Iraqi refugees: Islamic Republic of Iran;
Number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR: 4,861;
Host government estimates of number of Iraqi refugees: 27,725.
Country hosting Iraqi refugees: Gulf Cooperation Council countries[B];
Number of Iraqi refugees registered with UNHCR: 2,112; Host government
estimates of number of Iraqi refugees: 200,000.
Sources: UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN 2009 Consolidated
Appeal for Iraq and the Region.
[A] According to the UN, the total number of Iraqis in Syria remains
unconfirmed, with estimates ranging from 700,000 to 1.5 million people.
As of September 2008, the Syrian government reported that 1.2 million
Iraqis currently hold residence permits.
[B] Gulf Cooperation Council countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar,
Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
[End of table]
Further, neither Jordan nor Syria, the countries reporting the largest
number of Iraqi refugees, has enabled an independent, comprehensive
survey of refugees to be undertaken. As shown in table 1, as of
September 30, 2008, UNHCR reported that the estimated number of
refugees, as provided by the governments of Syria and Jordan, was 1.2
million to 1.5 million in Syria and 450,000 to 500,000 in Jordan.
[Footnote 31] However, State, NGOs, and international organizations
have questioned these high numbers.[Footnote 32] In 2007, the Jordanian
government tasked Fafo, a Norwegian research institute, to estimate the
number of Iraqi refugees living in the country.[Footnote 33] After Fafo
estimated that 161,000 Iraqi refugees resided in Jordan, the Jordanian
government disagreed with the institute's findings, citing conflicting
estimates. Fafo conducted further work with the Jordanian government
that resulted in an estimate of 450,000 to 500,000 Iraqi refugees as of
May 2007.[Footnote 34] According to State, while some NGOs agree with
this estimate, others believe the number may be as low as 200,000.
State further reported that although the Jordanian government initially
approved a UNHCR proposal for a joint study to assess Iraqi refugee
needs in September 2008, it has yet to take any action to initiate the
required work. In Syria, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
produced a preliminary study in January 2008 that was intended to
analyze the Syrian economy since 2003 and assess the macroeconomic
impact of Iraqi refugees. However, the report, which included estimates
of the numbers of Iraqi refugees in Syria, has not been released to the
public.[Footnote 35] According to a UNDP official, the study was only a
preliminary report pending the commissioning of a survey on the number,
geographic location, and socioeconomic characteristics of Iraqis in
Syria. UNDP received comments from the Syrian government and agreed to
incorporate them into the final report. UNDP also found that some of
the results were contradicted by other studies and agreed with the
Syrian government on the need to further analyze and validate the
preliminary results once a survey is conducted.
Moreover, government officials in Jordan and Syria stress that their
most vulnerable citizens as well as refugees need assistance. As a
result, both countries prohibit parallel assistance systems that would
provide refugees with increased aid and potentially create resentment
within their respective populations. Both countries have primarily
based their requests for international assistance on their countries'
overall health and education needs rather than on the numbers of Iraqi
refugees. In the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region,
the UN notes that host countries have drawn on their existing social
services to assist Iraqi refugees. The UN concludes that, therefore,
efforts should continue to reinforce basic needs such as health and
education, among others, for all refugees and local populations.
Although the figure has been debated,[Footnote 36] according to State,
the Jordanian government contends that Iraqi migration into Jordan has
cost it about $2 billion over the last 3 years because of increased
stress on its health, education, and water infrastructure in Amman,
Zarqa, and Irbid.
However, the extent to which Iraqi refugees affect these sectors is not
clear, government numbers are not clearly supported, and supporting
government assessments are not publicly available. For example,
according to State, the Jordanian government stated that a total of
24,000 Iraqis enrolled in public and private schools during the 2007 to
2008 school year, but some NGOs estimated that the public school
attendance figure may have been as low as 9,000 students. Both State
and the UN have reported that the Jordanian government has not made
disaggregated figures available and has declined to allow independent
confirmation of the number of students in the public school system.
Further, NGOs reported that outreach efforts in Syria were discouraged
by the Syrian government, limiting the ability to obtain information to
better understand the needs of Iraqi refugees in Syria. Similarly,
according to State, the Jordanian government has withheld permission
from UNHCR to conduct mobile registration drives and public outreach
campaigns.
In the absence of a comprehensive survey of the needs of all Iraqi
refugees and a transparent assessment of the impact of Iraqis on host
countries, the UN relied on available information to identify refugee
needs. In 2008, the UN expanded the efforts of its working groups and
relied on the UNHCR central registration system as the most effective
means for UN agencies to assess needs, estimate refugee movements, and
understand the changing circumstances of the Iraqi refugee community.
The UN also considered other information, such as public studies,
limited surveys, and host government data. As a result of its working
groups' assessments, in its 2009 Consolidated Appeal, the UN targeted
assistance in areas such as protection, health, education, sexual and
gender-based violence, food, psychosocial support and mental health,
and skills development. The UN tailored programs for what was known at
the time about the situation in each host country. According to UNHCR
and NGO officials, to ensure that these programs reach Iraqi refugees,
they target their assistance programs in Jordan and Syria in poor and
underserved areas where Iraqi refugees are known to live. However,
according to the UN, a growing number of Iraqi refugees are leaving
costly urban areas, resulting in a more dispersed population and
creating the need for further outreach.[Footnote 37]
The United States, Donors, and Iraq Have Funded Programs Benefiting
Iraqi Refugees, but the Total Amount of Funding Explicitly for Iraqi
Refugee Programs Is Unavailable:
The amount of U.S., UN, and other funding spent to assist Iraqi
refugees is not readily available. The U.S. government and UNHCR,
reportedly the largest bilateral and multilateral funding sources, do
not always designate and report funding solely for Iraqi refugee
programs, which target refugees and the vulnerable populations of the
countries that host them. Instead, the U.S. government reports funding
for all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance that may include
assistance to Iraqi refugees, internally displaced Iraqis, and other
vulnerable populations in Iraq and host countries. According to funding
data provided by State and USAID, for fiscal years 2003 through 2008,
the U.S. government has apportioned about $1.6 billion, obligated about
$1.5 billion, and expended about $1.2 billion for all Iraq-related
humanitarian assistance (see appendix III).
Similarly, UNHCR includes Iraqi refugees in its Iraq Operation and
obtains funding through a number of funding appeals made to the
international community. Some appeals, such as the 2008 UN Iraq
Consolidated Appeal, were for efforts inside Iraq; others, such as the
2008 UNHCR Iraq Situation Supplementary Appeal, were intended for
programs that benefit Iraqi refugees, internally displaced persons in
Iraq, non-Iraqi refugees in Iraq (such as Palestinian refugees in
Iraq), and Iraqi returnees. For calendar years 2003 through 2008, UNHCR
appeals for its Iraq operation, including Iraqi refugees, totaled about
$730 million and resulted in about $542 million in contributions (see
appendix IV). The United States contributed about 58 percent of the
donor contributions to these appeals.
Moreover, in addition to providing UNHCR funding, donor countries also
fund the appeals and efforts of other UN agencies and international
organizations that assist Iraqis and other conflict victims in the
region. Because of the number of overlapping appeals, it is difficult
to track the amount requested and funded for all Iraq-related
humanitarian assistance. To better coordinate efforts among UN
agencies, humanitarian organizations, and donors, in December 2008, for
the first time, the UN consolidated all of its Iraq-related appeals for
UN agencies and over 15 NGOs. The 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq
and the Region requests $547.3 million, of which $355 million is
requested for efforts to assist Iraqi refugees and host country
populations and $192.3 million is requested for efforts within Iraq.
In addition to multilateral funding, an unknown amount of bilateral
funding and private contributions is made to programs benefiting Iraqi
refugees and others. The UN's Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs reports data on multilateral and bilateral
contributions. However, it relies primarily on self-reporting, and the
data may be incomplete. According to State, all donations from other
countries meet a small fraction of the needs inside and out of Iraq.
State officials also noted that the department demarched both the Gulf
States and traditional donors in 2007 and 2008, asking for greater
support. However, representatives of donor countries raised concerns
regarding the uncertain numbers of Iraqi refugees and the extent of
their needs, and they noted that the lack of objective and complete
information made it difficult to garner support for funding. Some also
noted that the United States, given its role in the Iraqi humanitarian
crisis, and Iraq, given its budget surplus and that the refugees are
its citizens, should bear most of the funding costs.
Although the Iraqi government pledged funds in 2007 to support the
assistance of Iraqi refugees in neighboring host countries, it is
unclear whether additional funds will be provided. The Iraqi government
pledged $25 million to assist neighboring countries hosting Iraqi
refugees. Of this amount, the government provided $15 million to Syria,
$2 million to Lebanon, and $8 million to UNHCR in Jordan. For efforts
within Iraq, the Iraqi government donated $40 million, left over from
the Oil for Food Program, to the World Food Program through the UN's
2008 Iraq Consolidated Appeal. In August 2008, Iraq's Council of
Representatives passed a supplemental budget that included an
additional $208 million primarily for IDPs and Iraqi returnees. It is
unclear whether any of these funds are intended for or have been
expended for Iraqi refugees. Iraqi officials noted that the government
is reluctant to fund programs for Iraqi refugees because improving
refugee conditions in neighboring countries may discourage refugees
from returning to Iraq. Instead, the Iraqi government's position is to
improve conditions in Iraq to encourage returns and focus government
resources on those Iraqis who are displaced within the country.
According to the UN, in 2009, the Iraqi government plans to direct more
of its resources to the poorest Iraqi families in Iraq.
The U.S. Government and UNHCR Face Challenges in Offering Permanent
Solutions for Iraqi Refugees:
The U.S. government and UNHCR face challenges in offering permanent
solutions for Iraqi refugees. Conditions in Iraq are not suitable for
their return, and host countries such as Jordan and Syria prefer that
the refugees return to Iraq. Although the United States is making
progress resettling Iraqi refugees in the United States, a limited
number of Iraqi refugees are being resettled abroad.
Conditions Are Not Suitable for Repatriation, and Neighboring Host
Countries Resist Integrating Refugees:
According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation is the preferred permanent
solution for the majority of refugees worldwide. However, in the case
of Iraq, according to the UN and the IDP Working Group,[Footnote 38]
the conditions for their return are not yet suitable.[Footnote 39]
According to IOM, the Iraqi government has cited improvements in
security and offered financial incentives (about 1 million Iraqi
dinars) to returning refugee families. However, while the UN notes that
some improvements have been made, the UN cites major obstacles to large-
scale returns, including the uncertain security situation,[Footnote 40]
lack of a mechanism for restoring ownership of property, lack of access
to basic services, and the need for reconciliation among ethno-
religious groups and political solutions. According to the U.S. Senior
Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees and IDP Affairs, the most critical
challenge is the uncertain security environment. According to the UN,
although voluntary return is the preferred solution, Iraqi refugees
should not be encouraged to return until the security situation allows
for large-scale return and sufficient monitoring.
Nonetheless, according to the UN, a limited number of Iraqis may be
returning, but it may be more due to increasing hardship in the host
country and some recent improvements in security rather than
significant improvements in Iraq. According to UNHCR, there is no clear
trend regarding the number of Iraqis returning to or leaving their
country. In Jordan and Syria, difficulties in renewing visas and a lack
of funds, employment, and public services affect Iraqi refugees'
decisions to stay or return to Iraq. Moreover, according to UNHCR,
refugees may return to Iraq for religious holidays and school breaks or
to visit family and property. Returning refugees may become internally
displaced if their homes have been destroyed or occupied. In early
August 2008, the Iraqi Chairman of the Committee for the Displaced
noted the difficulties in removing the current occupants of homes owned
by Iraqi refugees who want to return. According to UNHCR and the IDP
Working Group, returnees primarily return to neighborhoods, districts,
and governates under control of the sects to which they belong, and as
of August 2008, few families had returned to areas under the control of
another sect. Moreover, some refugees, including many with whom we met
in Jordan and Syria, will not leave because they fear that they will be
unable to return to their host country, if needed, because of the
tightening of borders since they left Iraq. Others fear they cannot
safely return to Iraq because of their ethnic or religious identity or
employment by coalition forces. Although the Iraqi government, with the
support of UNHCR and others in the international community, has
initiated planning for the return of refugees, some international
organizations reported that it is unknown whether the Iraqi government
has the capacity to implement such plans.[Footnote 41]
Meanwhile, according to the UN, the continued willingness of countries
in the region to host Iraqi refugees is essential to ensuring refugee
protection; however, opportunities for local integration in neighboring
countries are limited for Iraqi refugees. The governments of Syria and
Jordan consider Iraqi refugees to be "guests" and have stated their
preference that the refugees return to Iraq once the security situation
in Iraq improves rather than integrate and settle in their countries.
On the one hand, a tradition of hosting and protecting Arab nationals
provides a political and moral imperative to accept Iraqis in need of
refuge, according to the UN and the international community. On the
other hand, Syria and Jordan are determined not to establish
arrangements that might lead to permanence, such as officially allowing
employment of Iraqi refugees, according to UNHCR. According to
Jordanian and Syrian government officials, neither government
anticipated a long-term Iraqi presence. According to the UN, most
countries in the region have provided Iraqi refugees with access to
education and health care even though social services and
infrastructure were already strained meeting the needs of the local
population.
Although the international community has commended both Syria and
Jordan--Syria in particular--for initially opening their borders to
refugees, both countries have now tightened their borders because of
security and economic factors and their own capacity to address the
situation. According to State, UNHCR, and host government officials,
both governments are concerned that the past Palestinian refugee
experience may repeat itself. According to State, UNHCR, and host
government officials, parallel assistance systems or institutions, such
as schools, camps, and social services that were created to serve the
Palestinian population became an incentive for Palestinians to stay in
Jordan or Syria. These parallel structures created resentment among the
host population, which led to a strong desire for these governments not
to do the same for the Iraqis.[Footnote 42] State reported that the
Jordanian government wishes to avoid the perception that Iraqis, like
Palestinians, intend to stay in Jordan and compete with Jordanians for
jobs and resources.
The United States Has Made Recent Progress in Resettlement Efforts, but
Limited Numbers of Refugees May Be Resettled Worldwide:
The U.S. government has made progress in resettling Iraqi refugees
under its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program; however, only a limited
number of other countries have admitted Iraqi refugees through
resettlement programs.[Footnote 43] Once the program was announced, in
February 2007, State estimated that if USRAP became fully operational,
then the U.S. government would be able to admit 2,000 to 3,000 refugees
in fiscal year 2007. For fiscal year 2008, the U.S. administration
formally established an admission goal of 12,000 Iraqi refugees.
Although the U.S. government did not meet State's fiscal year 2007
goal, admitting 1,608 Iraqi refugees, it surpassed its fiscal year 2008
goal, admitting 13,823 Iraqi refugees as of September 30, 2008 (see
table 2 for processing steps and progress made).
Table 2: U.S. Government Iraqi Refugee Processing and Admissions under
USRAP, Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008:
Key processing steps: Referrals and applications; received;
Fiscal Year 2007: 11,646;
Fiscal Year 2008: 28,886;
Total Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008: 40,532.
Key processing steps: Prescreened by State Department's overseas
processing entity (OPE);
Fiscal Year 2007: 7,519;
Fiscal Year 2008: 25,111;
Total Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008: 32,630.
Key processing steps: Applicants interviewed and adjudicated for
refugee status by DHS;
Fiscal Year 2007: 4,422;
Fiscal Year 2008: 24,845;
Total Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008: 29,267.
Key processing steps: Applicant pending final DHS; decision;
Fiscal Year 2007: 32;
Fiscal Year 2008: 1,073;
Total Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008: 1,105.
Key processing steps: Applicant denied by DHS;
Fiscal Year 2007: 819;
Fiscal Year 2008: 2,160;
Total Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008: 2,979.
Key processing steps: Applicant approved by DHS for refugee status (and
awaiting completion of outprocessing coordinated by OPE);
Fiscal Year 2007: 2,378;
Fiscal Year 2008: 21,812;
Total Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008: 24,190.
Key processing steps: Admitted to the United States;
Fiscal Year 2007: 1,608;
Fiscal Year 2008: 13,823;
Total Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008: 15,431.
Source: GAO analysis based on information from the Department of State,
Refugee Processing Center, Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing
System.
[End of table]
PRM is responsible for managing USRAP. PRM's regional refugee
coordinator accepts referrals from UNHCR, embassies, and certain NGOs
[Footnote 44] and provides them to an overseas processing entity (OPE).
[Footnote 45] Certain categories of Iraqis with U.S. affiliations may
apply directly for consideration under the USRAP program in Jordan,
Egypt, and Iraq.[Footnote 46] The OPEs, working under a cooperative
agreement with State, prescreen cases by collecting and verifying
personal and family information, details of persecution or feared harm,
and information for security name checks. State has cooperative
agreements with IOM, which operates processing centers in Damascus,
Amman, Cairo, and Baghdad, and the International Catholic Migration
Commission, which operates centers in Istanbul and Beirut.[Footnote 47]
Once the OPE prescreens the case, it is then provided to USCIS, of DHS,
which makes periodic visits to the regions to interview refugees and
adjudicate their applications for resettlement in the United States.
[Footnote 48] Once USCIS approves or conditionally approves cases, they
are returned to the OPE, which coordinates outprocessing, including
security clearances, medical examinations, cultural orientation, and
travel arrangements. Once the security background check and medical
examination are completed with no adverse findings, then the refugee
and eligible family members are cleared for departure to the United
States.
The U.S. government and UNHCR acknowledged that they initially faced
challenges setting up and expanding their resettlement programs for
Iraqi refugees. State's Office of Inspector General reported that State
had little processing infrastructure in place in the region when the
Iraqi resettlement program was announced in February 2007. According to
the Inspector General, State had no permanent OPE presence in Damascus
or Amman, UNHCR was not actively engaged in registering refugees, and
USCIS had no permanent presence in the region. According to DHS and
State, one reason for initial delays in processing resettlement
referrals in Syria was the Syrian government's delays in approving
visas for DHS officials and limitations set on IOM staffing and
operations. However, according to UNHCR and State, a significant
increase in the number of resettlement departures to the United States
has occurred since June 2008.[Footnote 49] According to State and IOM
officials, this has been due to increased processing capabilities after
the initial expansion of the U.S. refugee-processing program. According
to the Inspector General, on average, the total processing time from
case creation to arrival in the United States for Iraqi refugee cases
is 222 days. This is less than the average of 452 days for all other
refugee cases worldwide.[Footnote 50] According to State officials,
every case moves through USRAP at a different pace and can be delayed
at any step along the way; however, if serious delays occur in any one
case, they are generally due to the time it takes to complete security
clearances.[Footnote 51]
In contrast to U.S. efforts, only a small number of nations take part
in resettlement programs and accept annual quotas of refugees from
around the world, according to UNHCR. UNHCR refers cases to potential
resettlement countries. According to State officials, most of its USRAP
applicants come to the program through UNHCR referrals. According to
UNHCR, the numbers referred to each country are negotiated based on the
numbers each country is willing to consider for resettlement. In August
2008, UNHCR reported that since the first quarter of calendar year
2007, of the more than 40,000 Iraqis referred for resettlement, about
30,000 were referred to the United States. According to UNHCR, for
calendar years 2007 and 2008, the United States had resettled a total
of 15,170 Iraqi refugees, while other countries had resettled 5,852
Iraqi refugees, as of September 30, 2008 (see table 3).
Table 3: Iraqi Refugee Resettlement Departures by Country of
Resettlement, Calendar Years 2007 through 2008, as of September 30,
2008:
Resettlement country: Canada;
Calendar year 2007: 793;
Calendar year 2008 through September: 1,257;
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 2,050.
Resettlement country: Australia;
Calendar year 2007: 464;
Calendar year 2008 through September: 954;
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 1,418.
Resettlement country: Sweden;
Calendar year 2007: 856;
Calendar year 2008 through September: 427;
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 1,283.
Resettlement country: Netherlands;
Calendar year 2007: 124;
Calendar year 2008 through September: 162;
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 286.
Resettlement country: Finland;
Calendar year 2007: 23;
Calendar year 2008 through September: 113;
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 136.
Resettlement country: Norway;
Calendar year 2007: 54;
Calendar year 2008 through September: 32;
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 86.
Resettlement country: Others;
Calendar year 2007: 64;
Calendar year 2008 through September: 529;
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 593.
Resettlement country: Subtotal;
Calendar year 2007: 2,378;
Calendar year 2008 through September: 3,474;
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 5,852.
Resettlement country: United States;
Calendar year 2007: 2,615;
Calendar year 2008 through September: 12,555;
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 15,170.
Resettlement country: Total;
Calendar year 2007: 4,993;
Calendar year 2008 through September: 16,029;
Total calendar years 2007 and 2008 through September: 21,022.
Source: GAO analysis based on data compiled by UNHCR from resettlement
countries.
Note: While the U.S. government generally reports its data on a fiscal
year basis, the UN and many international organizations report their
data on a calendar year basis. According to UNHCR, data received from
resettlement countries has not been verified.
[End of table]
Lack of Comprehensive International Strategic Planning Has Hindered
Efforts to Assist and Protect Iraqi Refugees:
According to U.S., UN, foreign government, and NGO officials, the
international community lacks a comprehensive strategy to address the
Iraqi refugee situation. We previously reported that strategic planning
is a key element in results-oriented management.[Footnote 52] A
strategic plan should contain long-term goals that cover a period of
not less than 5 years from the year it is submitted and should be
updated and revised at least every 3 years.[Footnote 53] Although the
international community has recognized the need to strategically plan
for the Iraqi refugee situation, it has often focused on the crisis
within Iraq and annual planning efforts while deferring strategic
planning for the refugee situation. Specifically, the international
community lacks a comprehensive international strategy that fully
identifies and aligns the need with resources, identifies and addresses
factors that may affect planning efforts, and ensures coordination
among stakeholders.
UN Continues to Recognize Need for Comprehensive Strategic Planning for
Iraqi Refugees, but Focus Remains on Annual Country Operations Plans
and Funding Appeals:
Although the international community has recognized the need for
international strategic planning to address the Iraqi refugee
situation, its strategic planning efforts have focused on the situation
in Iraq while calling for more to be done for Iraqi refugees. In
January 2007, UNHCR stated that its operational and contingency plans
must be revised and undertaken as part of a wider effort that involves
other UN agencies and government and NGO stakeholders.[Footnote 54]
UNHCR further noted that the security, political, social, and financial
impact on Iraq, the region, and beyond would be felt for many years and
that the response to Iraqi displacement must incorporate a long-term
perspective to ensure protection for Iraqis and other displaced groups
and overall stability in the region. According to the UN, beginning in
January 2007, a series of high-level and technical consultations took
place, involving key humanitarian agencies, UN headquarters, and UN
member states, including the Iraqi government. These consultations
resulted in the broad recognition that a humanitarian crisis was
unfolding in Iraq and that a multisector interagency response was
required.
Accordingly, in April 2007, the UN Country Team for Iraq, under the
leadership of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, developed the Strategic
Framework for Humanitarian Action in Iraq as a basis for a coordinated
response by the international community.[Footnote 55] However, this
framework solely focused on the immediate measures needed to expedite
humanitarian assistance inside Iraq. It also called for a comprehensive
approach to addressing the concerns of the Iraqi population displaced
to neighboring countries, particularly Jordan and Syria. Moreover, when
governments in the region, donors, international organizations, and
NGOs convened in April 2007 at a UNHCR-initiated international
humanitarian conference on displaced Iraqis, the NGOs called for a
multifaceted international strategy to address the Iraqi refugee
situation.[Footnote 56] However, a comprehensive long term approach has
yet to be developed.
UNHCR and State have focused on UNHCR's annual planning efforts for
UNHCR and its implementing partners and myriad funding appeals rather
than on a comprehensive international strategic plan. State and UNHCR
note that planning for Iraqi and other refugees is done through the
annual UNHCR country operations plans. Each year, with donor input,
UNHCR develops country operations plans that provide a summary of
UNHCR's program goals and objectives for refugees in each country in
which it operates. However, these plans, focusing on the efforts of
UNHCR and its implementing partners, do not contain a mechanism to
measure longer term progress in achieving strategic goals. Further, the
complete plan has not always been made public.[Footnote 57] In January
2008, UNHCR issued its Iraq Situation Supplementary Appeal, which
sought funds and support to address the immediate protection and
assistance needs of Iraqi refugees, internally displaced Iraqis,
refugees returning to Iraq, and refugees from other countries living in
Iraq. Although the appeal provided information on activities,
objectives, and targets, it did not prioritize efforts for funding and
sets targets only for the immediate appeal. In February 2008, UNHCR
stated that the international community needed to develop strategies
and allocate resources that not only address immediate and medium-term
needs, but also acknowledge that, over the long term, a significant
portion of displaced Iraqis may never return.[Footnote 58] According to
the 2007 study by Fafo, a Norwegian research institute, only one in
five Iraqis in Jordan had concrete plans to immigrate to a third
country.[Footnote 59]
With the release of its 2009 Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the
Region in December 2008, the UN has shown progress in its strategic
planning efforts for Iraqi refugees. However, the 2009 UN Consolidated
Appeal is a 1-year funding request and plan and does not include or
refer to strategic plans for the longer term. According to the UN, the
2009 UN Consolidated Appeal's Pillar II, which focuses on Iraqi
refugees, targets Iraqi refugee needs in accordance with priorities
agreed to by all concerned humanitarian actors and, for the first time,
presents a comprehensive statement of their planned response. Rather
than have separate and sometimes overlapping appeals and strategies as
in the past, UN agencies came together, and with NGO and donor input,
developed one funding appeal and plan for the Iraqi refugee situation.
Pillar II states the mission,[Footnote 60] and the objectives of the
humanitarian action plans for each host country are clearly aligned
with the strategic objectives for the year and with UNHCR's overall
goals to protect and assist refugees.[Footnote 61] The UN expects its
2009 Consolidated Appeal to serve as a framework for UN and NGO
collaboration across the region. The 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal also
includes a monitoring and evaluation plan and notes that there will be
a midyear progress report in June 2009. However, the 2009 UN
Consolidated Appeal lacks long term goals, and while it uses available
information to assess needs, it is not based on a comprehensive needs
assessment and is unclear on how efforts will be prioritized if the
appeal is not fully funded. Further, the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal
relies on existing coordination mechanisms that the NGOs stated were
problematic.[Footnote 62]
Lack of International Strategic Planning Has Hindered Efforts to Assist
Iraqi Refugees in Neighboring Host Countries:
According to NGOs, the lack of a comprehensive international strategy
has hindered efforts to effectively assist Iraqi refugees in Jordan and
Syria. Specifically, the international community lacks a strategic
planning effort for the assistance of Iraqi refugees that includes (1)
a comprehensive assessment of the needs of Iraqi refugees and
vulnerable host government populations and uses this assessment to
prioritize activities for funding; (2) a discussion of the limitations
of annual budget cycles and efforts to mitigate these limitations; and
(3) a coordination mechanism involving all stakeholders, including host
country governments, international organizations, international and
local NGOs (including local churches), and donor countries.
First, the international community lacks a comprehensive assessment of
the needs of vulnerable Iraqi refugees and the economically vulnerable
populations that host them that would establish a baseline for
strategic planning. Without a comprehensive needs assessment in host
countries such as Jordan and Syria, it is difficult to determine the
scope of the problem and to appropriately prioritize and align
resources to address the Iraqi refugee situation. This is particularly
important given the limited amount of funding and resources, as well as
the decision to avoid developing parallel systems. However, to date,
host countries' unwillingness to enable completion of these assessments
impedes strategic planning.
Second, State, UNHCR, and NGOs do not have a strategy that addresses
concerns raised about factors that may impact assistance efforts, such
as the limitations of working with annual budget cycles and efforts to
mitigate these limitations. According to State, UNHCR, and NGOs, the
annual budget cycle of UNHCR and State's annual funding determinations
for NGOs impede strategic planning efforts. According to State,
planning is constrained by a reliance on donors whose contributions are
inconsistent from year to year and whose annual budget cycles undermine
multiyear planning on the part of UNHCR and other international
humanitarian organizations. According to a UNHCR official, the
organization is constrained by a supplementary budget process that has
to be approved and renewed each year, thus forcing UNHCR to focus on
annual objectives and targets. According to NGOs, the annual budget
focus of UNHCR and key donor countries, including the United States,
makes it difficult for them to conduct longer-term planning because
they do not know whether their efforts will be funded from one year to
the next. Thus, they may focus on shorter term efforts in lieu of more
effective long term efforts.
Third, NGOs noted that a comprehensive international strategy with long-
term goals is needed to improve coordination among all stakeholders to
provide humanitarian assistance, effectively use the limited resources
available, and prevent duplication of effort. On the basis of
discussions with NGOs and UNHCR and a review of NGO progress reports
and State's interim progress evaluations of its NGO implementing
partners, we found that the lack of coordination among stakeholders has
hindered progress. For example, according to interviews and reporting,
the international community in Syria lacks an adequate coordination
mechanism. UNHCR, to maintain a good working relationship with Syrian
authorities, will officially meet and coordinate only with NGOs
formally approved to work in the country by the Syrian Arab Red
Crescent (SARC). According to U.S., UNHCR, and NGO officials, the SARC
registration process is lengthy and nontransparent. Few NGOs have
obtained formal SARC approval, although the number of approvals is
increasing. According to NGOs, unapproved NGOs are not invited to UN
coordination meetings and attempts to meet with UN agencies in Syria
and develop formal beneficiary referral processes have been
unsuccessful, even for those implementing U.S. programs.
Moreover, NGOs in Syria further stated that there is limited
information sharing between church and other humanitarian organizations
and UNHCR and relevant UN organizations. The Syrian government has not
required SARC approval for assistance provided by churches in Syria.
Church officials stated that they were unaware of UNHCR coordination
meetings. According to UNHCR, its religious organization partners are
aware of coordination meetings but may not attend because they want to
maintain a low profile. An NGO that was approved by SARC reported to
State that the lack of full NGO participation, including that of
churches, means that coordination meetings do not include all NGO
activities assisting Iraqis in Syria. According to a State official,
the department ensures coordination among its NGO implementing
partners. NGOs noted that more needs to be done to coordinate efforts
in Syria as the number of NGOs increases.
In Jordan, UNHCR reported that implementing partners do not speak
directly with each other to coordinate areas and types of coverage. For
example, UNHCR reported in its Annual Program Interim Report for 2008
that its effort to decentralize the delivery of essential services and
humanitarian assistance in 17 geographical areas in Jordan was not
fully implemented and was delayed because of operational constraints
and lack of coordination among implementing partners. As a result,
UNHCR decided to decentralize fewer services in fewer locations and
conduct outreach to other locations. Also, according to NGOs in Jordan,
coordination is made difficult by the large number of NGOs operating in
Jordan on similar programs. NGO officials stated that at one point, the
same beneficiaries were attending multiple programs offering the same
services and that NGOs were competing for and taking beneficiaries from
each other's programs. UNHCR commented that as soon as the organization
became aware of the situation, it took immediate action. According to
NGOs, they are now working by sector (health, education, etc.) in
conjunction with UN agencies to prevent duplication that may have
occurred among their programs. UNHCR is also developing a database of
beneficiaries in Jordan--the Beneficiary Information System--that is
intended to make enrollment in NGO programs more transparent. However,
UNHCR encountered difficulties establishing the new system, including
delays in data entry, inconsistent use of the system, and noncompliance
with established procedures and guidelines on the part of implementing
partners. According to UNHCR's 2008 annual interim program report, it
has provided additional data entry staff and training for implementing
partners to address these issues.
According to international organization, NGO, and State officials, it
may be difficult to engage countries hosting Iraqi refugees in
international strategic planning efforts because these countries want
the refugees to be repatriated as soon as feasible. According to
Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi government officials, they did not
initially expect the refugee situation to be a long term problem.
However, Jordanian and Syrian government officials spoke of the long
term needs of their education and health sectors, which they said were
most affected by the refugee situation. In accordance with host country
requirements that parallel assistance systems not be developed, refugee
assistance programs have been targeted to both refugees and vulnerable
populations in each country. Moreover, according to UNHCR, although
repatriation is the primary goal, the return of refugees to Iraq will
need to be phased in over time. While NGOs praise Syria and Jordan for
hosting refugees, they also note that more needs to be done to
coordinate efforts to register refugees and facilitate the work of
relief and resettlement organizations.
Conclusion:
The global community is looking to the United States to address the
Iraqi refugee situation. However, without a comprehensive assessment of
the number and needs of Iraqi refugees in Jordan and Syria, it is
difficult to prioritize and fund efforts to help ensure assistance and
protection for these refugees. Given that programs and funding
currently target both refugees and vulnerable host country populations,
the lack of transparent and complete assessments of the impact of the
refugees on critical sectors, such as health and education, further
exacerbates planning efforts. Similarly, the lack of transparent data
on funding complicates efforts to make decisions regarding the
assistance to be provided for neighboring countries. Further, without
performance measures that assess overall progress in achieving U.S.
goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees, it is not possible to show the
full impact of U.S. assistance efforts. Moreover, without a
comprehensive international strategy with long-term goals and the
involvement of all stakeholders, it is difficult to effectively use the
limited resources available.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To enhance the ability of the Department of State to evaluate and
report progress toward its stated goals and objectives to assist Iraqi
refugees, we recommend that the Secretary of State develop performance
measures to fully assess and report progress in achieving U.S. goals
and objectives for Iraqi refugees. Performance measures and indicators
should be clearly linked to progress in achieving stated goals and
objectives. Performance goals, objectives, and measures should clearly
and transparently address the extent to which programs should target
refugees and host government populations, respectively, to the extent
practicable.
To provide more transparency in funding provided for Iraqi refugee
programs and help Congress and the Administration consider funding
requests for neighboring countries, we recommend that the Secretary of
State and the USAID Administrator develop systems to separately track
and report funding apportioned, obligated, and expended for Iraqi
refugee programs in each host country, to the extent practicable.
To enhance the ability of the U.S. government and the international
community to plan their assistance programs based on need and provide
longer term solutions for Iraqi refugees, we recommend that the
Secretary of State take the following two actions:
1. Work with UNHCR and the governments of Jordan, Syria, and other
relevant host governments to expedite efforts to conduct independent
comprehensive assessments of the number and needs of Iraqi refugees and
the related needs of the countries hosting them.
2. In conjunction with relevant U. S. agencies and in coordination with
the donor community, work with UNHCR and the governments of Iraq,
Jordan, Syria, and other relevant host governments to build on the
efforts in the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region and
develop a comprehensive international strategy for providing assistance
and solutions for Iraqi refugees.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
Homeland Security, USAID, and UNHCR. State and USAID provided written
comments, which are reprinted in appendixes VI and VII, respectively.
State, DHS, and UNHCR provided technical comments, which we
incorporated where appropriate.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State generally agreed with
our recommendations regarding the need for improvements in measuring
progress, assessing needs, tracking and reporting funding, and
developing an international strategic plan for Iraqi refugees. However,
State commented that it does not measure progress for specific refugee
populations because such specificity runs counter to State's principles
of universality and impartiality. We recognize throughout the report
that State's refugee programs help both Iraqi refugees and vulnerable
populations in the host countries. However, State's NGO guidelines
generally require that its projects demonstrate that at least 50
percent of beneficiaries are Iraqi refugees. Given the importance of
the Iraqi refugee situation to the United States, and the fact that
State established goals and objectives specifically for Iraqi refugees
and efforts within Iraq for 2008 and 2009, we believe that it is
important that State establish performance measures and indicators that
are clearly linked to its goals and objectives.
Additionally, regarding our recommendation to track and report U.S.
funding for Iraqi refugee programs, State noted that it is not
practicable to track and report multilateral contributions for Iraqi
refugees at the country level. We realize that State may not always be
able to specifically track and report funding that is comingled by
multilateral and international organizations before being apportioned
to projects in each host country. However, State could provide Congress
with information on the large percentage of U.S. contributions to UNHCR
appeals and information from UNHCR on projects funded in each country.
In addition, State should track and report bilateral funding for
neighboring countries hosting Iraqi refugees, funding for its NGO
implementing partners, and funding for specific multilateral and
international organization projects. As a result, Congress and the
Administration would be better able to assess funding requests from
Iraq's neighboring countries and incorporate funding data into future
planning efforts.
In response to our recommendation that the USAID Administrator develop
systems to separately track and report funding for Iraqi refugee
programs, USAID noted that the issue was resolved because the agency no
longer provides assistance to Iraqi refugees. We continue to believe
that USAID needs improvement in tracking and reporting funding for
Iraqi refugee assistance. First, based on data that USAID provided, it
appears that the agency is still expending funds on Iraqi refugee
programs. Second, the agency had considerable difficulty tracking,
reporting, and verifying the accuracy of its funding data when GAO
requested the information, resulting in a protracted effort that
extended over a period of months. USAID had difficulty reconciling its
funding data with amounts it previously reported to State as Iraq-
related humanitarian assistance. USAID officials stated that the agency
does not have a centralized system for tracking funding for Iraq-
related humanitarian assistance. To help Congress and the
Administration consider funding requests for neighboring countries and
to better incorporate these requests into planning efforts, USAID
should develop a system for tracking and reporting funding for Iraqi
refugee assistance.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Administrator for USAID. We will also make copies
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any questions about this
report, please contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors
to this report are listed in appendix VIII.
Signed by:
Joseph A. Christoff:
Director International Affairs and Trade:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chair:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chair:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chair:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chair:
The Honorable John M. McHugh:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chair:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Edolphus Towns:
Chair:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chair:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy:
United States Senate:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Special Immigrant Visa Programs:
Two U.S. special immigrant visa (SIV) programs afford qualified Iraqis
with opportunities to immigrate to the United States. Some Iraqi
refugees may qualify under these programs. The first SIV program,
established in fiscal year 2006, targeted Iraqi and Afghan translators
and their dependents and resulted in 2,130 visas issued in fiscal years
2007 and 2008.[Footnote 63] The second SIV program, established in
fiscal year 2008, targeted certain Iraqis who had been U.S. government
employees, contractors, or subcontractors and their dependents.
[Footnote 64] This program resulted in a total of 705 visas issued in
fiscal year 2008.
Management and Processing of Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqis:
The Department of State's (State) Bureau of Consular Affairs
administers laws, formulates regulations, and implements policies
relating to consular services and immigration. Consular Affairs
administers two SIV programs, in conjunction with the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), to further assist Iraqis wanting to
permanently immigrate to the United States. Principal applicants and
their families who meet the conditions may file a petition (Form I-360)
with DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The
petition is to include information about the petitioners and their
immediate family members, proof of nationality, a favorable
recommendation documenting their service, and other supporting
documents. USCIS examiners evaluate the petition and, if it is
approved, send it to State's National Visa Center. The center contacts
the applicants and sets an embassy or consulate location for a visa
interview, informs the applicant about the materials and documents
required, verifies by e-mail that applicants have collected all
required documents, and may request a security advisory opinion. The
applicants and family members formally submit their application to a
consular officer in person at the embassy or consulate. Consular
officers interview applicants and review documents submitted and
security and medical clearances and issue an immigrant visa if
candidates satisfy all criteria. Iraqi SIV recipients are eligible for
the same resettlement assistance, entitlement programs, and other
benefits as Iraqi refugees admitted under the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program (USRAP).[Footnote 65] Finally, DHS officers verify the entire
SIV package upon the applicants' arrival in the United States before
granting individuals admission as lawful permanent resident aliens.
Recipients of SIVs have lawful permanent residence status upon entry
into the United States and are eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship
after residing for 5 years in the United States.
State and DHS Implemented Two Special Immigrant Visa Programs That Were
Available to Qualified Iraqi Refugees and Others:
The Departments of State and Homeland Security have implemented two SIV
programs, established by Congress, to further assist qualified Iraqis
who worked for the U.S. government and want to immigrate to the United
States.[Footnote 66] Qualifying Iraqi refugees may apply for these
programs. However, the Departments of State and Defense have not
maintained a complete record of Iraqis working for the U.S. government.
In August 2008, the Congressional Budget Office reported that between
2003 and 2007, an estimated 70,500 Iraqi nationals worked as
contractors for the U.S. government. However, this number does not
include Iraqi subcontractors because the Department of State and the
U.S. Agency for International Development could not provide this
information.[Footnote 67]
The first SIV program, established under section 1059 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2006, targeted Iraqi and
Afghan translators and their dependents and resulted in a total of
2,130 visas issued in fiscal years 2007 and 2008, as of September 30,
2008. In January 2006, Congress authorized that up to 50 Iraqi or
Afghan translators who worked directly with U.S. armed forces and met
other conditions as outlined in the law could receive SIVs during any
fiscal year. Those who qualified are known as principal applicants.
Spouses and children of principal applicants could also receive SIVs,
but they were not counted against the authorized cap. In June 2007,
Congress amended the program, authorizing an increase in the limit to
500 SIVs for each fiscal year 2007 and 2008 and expanding it to cover
both translators and interpreters who worked directly for the U.S.
armed forces and those that worked under the chief of mission
authority.[Footnote 68] According to State, given that Congress
increased the limit late in the fiscal year, the department had little
time to notify and process an additional 450 applicants. Therefore,
according to State, it exercised its authority, under section 203(g) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, to estimate and
anticipate the future number of visa approvals and thus scheduled far
more applicants for interviews than the available number of SIVs.
According to State, this was done on the assumptions that some would
not appear for the interview, clearances would not be received, or some
might not qualify. State officials said that while a cutoff date is
usually imposed for other immigrant visa categories, it was not imposed
for this program because these applicants faced imminent danger and
State did not want to fall short of the cap. The result was that State
exceeded its 500 limit in fiscal year 2007 by issuing 526 SIVs for
principal applicants and in fiscal year 2008 by issuing 560 SIVs for
principal applicants (see table 4).
Table 4: U.S. Special Immigrant Visas Issued for Iraqi and Afghan
Translators/Interpreters and Their Dependents, under Section 1059, as
of September 30, 2008:
Fiscal year: 2007;
Authorized number of principal applicant visas: 500;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Iraqi: 429;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Afghan: 92;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Other: 5;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Total: 526;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Iraqi: 383;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Afghan: 69;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Other: 10;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Total: 462;
Total number of issued visas: 988.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Authorized number of principal applicant visas: 500;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Iraqi: 357;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Afghan: 202;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Other: 1;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Total: 560;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Iraqi: 350;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Afghan: 221;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Other: 11;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Total: 582;
Total number of issued visas: 1,142.
Fiscal year: Totals;
Authorized number of principal applicant visas: 1,000;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Iraqi: 786;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Afghan: 294;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Other: 6;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Total: 1,086;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Iraqi: 733;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Afghan: 290;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Other: 21;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Total: 1,044;
Total number of issued visas: 2,130.
Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.
Note: "Other" includes Iraqi and Afghani nationals who were born in a
country other than Afghanistan or Iraq. The State Department tracks
data by the applicant's country of birth.
[End of table]
The second SIV program, established under section 1244 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008, targets certain Iraqis
who have been U.S. government employees, contractors, or subcontractors
and their dependents[Footnote 69]. This program had resulted in 705
visas issued in fiscal year 2008. In January 2008, Congress authorized
up to 5,000 Iraqis, per year for the next 5 fiscal years, who worked
for or on behalf of the U.S. government in Iraq and had experienced or
are experiencing an ongoing serious threat as a consequence of that
employment and who meet other conditions outlined in the law, could
receive SIVs. Further, the law allowed that if the 5,000 ceiling was
not met in any given year, the unused authorized amounts could be
carried over to the following year. Additionally, spouses and children
of principal applicants are also eligible to receive SIVs, although
these are not counted against the 5,000 cap. In June 2008, Congress
amended section 1244 to allow processing to begin immediately and
authorized State to convert approved section 1059 SIV petitions filed
before October 1, 2008, for which a visa was not immediately available,
to section 1244 SIV petition[Footnote 70]s. As of September 30, 2008,
State had issued 371 visas to Iraqi and Afghan principal applicants
under section 1244, all of which were converted from section 1059
petitions (see table 5).
Table 5: U.S. Special Immigrant Visas Issued for Iraqis and Afghans and
Their Dependents, under Section 1244, as of September 30, 2008:
Fiscal year: 2008;
Authorized number of principal applicant visas: 5,000;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Iraqi: 169;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Afghan: 198;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Other: 4;
Number of principal applicants issued visas: Total: 371;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Iraqi: 125;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Afghan: 195;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Other: 14;
Number of spouses and children of principal applicants issued visas:
Total: 334;
Total number of issued visas: 705.
Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.
Notes: While petitions for these visas were approved under the section
1059 program, since visas were not immediately available under this
program, they were converted to the section 1244 program for issuance.
Authority to convert these petitions was given to State and DHS in Pub.
Law No. 110-242 in June 2008.
"Other" includes Iraqi and Afghan nationals who were born in a country
other than Afghanistan or Iraq. The State Department tracks data by the
applicant's country of birth.
[End of table]
According to a May 2008 State Department Office of Inspector General
report, several challenges may delay processing of Iraqi employees
under the second SIV program.[Footnote 71] Officials we spoke with
reiterated two key challenges:
* Eligibility screening takes time because no central repository or
database containing the names of the thousands of Iraqis that have been
employed on behalf of the U.S. government since March 2003 is
available.
* Embassies in Amman, Baghdad, and Damascus will require additional
staff and physical changes to their workspaces to accommodate the
increased workload, according to the Office of Inspector General and
consular officers we spoke with in Amman, Baghdad, and Damascus.
According to State's Bureau of Consular Affairs, since the publication
of the Office of Inspector General report, it has (1) added an officer
in Amman and is working with the embassy to add additional interview
space and an interviewing window, and (2) authorized an additional
officer and two locally employed staff for the consular section in
Baghdad.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To examine efforts to protect and assist Iraqi refugees, we assessed
challenges in (1) measuring and monitoring progress in achieving U.S.
goals for assisting Iraqi refugees, (2) providing humanitarian
assistance to Iraqi refugees, (3) offering solutions for Iraqi
refugees, and (4) developing an international strategic plan to address
the Iraqi refugee situation. In addition, we reviewed the progress made
in implementing special immigrant visa (SIV) programs for Iraqis, which
may also benefit some refugees but are not designed specifically for
them (see appendix I). We also conducted fieldwork in Washington, D.C.;
Geneva, Switzerland; Rome, Italy; Amman, Jordan; Damascus, Syria; and,
to a limited extent, Iraq.
To assess progress in achieving U.S. goals for Iraqi refugees, we
interviewed officials from the Department of State (State), the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and their implementing
partners and reviewed their policies, strategies, planning,
programming, progress reporting, and monitoring documents. We also
reviewed 13 Department of State interim program evaluation reports and
13 final nongovernmental organization (NGO) reports to assess progress
in meeting goals.[Footnote 72] In Washington, D.C., we met with
officials within State's Population, Refugee, and Migration (PRM)
bureau from the Office of Policy and Resource Planning and the Office
of Assistance for Asia and the Near East. We obtained and assessed
information on the general management of refugee assistance programs,
coordination with international partners, and progress and program
performance reporting. In Jordan and Syria, we interviewed U.S. embassy
officials responsible for monitoring the programs and their
implementing partners, including UNHCR and nongovernmental
organizations. We also toured U.S. and UNHCR projects and met with
project implementers. We discussed implementation and monitoring
challenges with NGOs in Washington, D.C.; Jordan; and Syria.
To assess U.S. government and international efforts to provide
humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees and to assess international
strategic planning efforts to address the Iraqi refugee situation, we
interviewed officials of the U.S., Jordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi
governments; UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM),
and other United Nations (UN) agencies; nongovernmental organizations;
and research institutes. We reviewed and analyzed relevant strategies,
funding appeals, planning and reporting documentation, studies, and
other related documents. We also held discussion groups with NGOs with
a presence in Jordan, Syria, and/or Iraq to discuss program and
overarching challenges and held discussion groups with Iraqi refugees
in Jordan and Syria to discuss their situations, needs, assistance
received, and challenges encountered. To further assess the numbers and
needs of Iraqi refugees, we reviewed and assessed the reliability of
available assessments and report data. To identify the nature and
extent of U.S. and international funding, we reviewed funding data
provided by State's PRM, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), the UN, UNHCR, and the Iraqi government. According to PRM, its
official data were obtained from its Global Financial Management
System. USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance provided its
official data from its Abacus and Phoenix systems, and USAID's Food for
Peace program provided its data from its Food for Peace Information
System, New Management System, and Phoenix system. UNHCR's Donor
Relations & Resource Mobilization Service, the UN's Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and State's PRM bureau provided
funding data for the UNHCR appeals and contributions received by the
United States and other donors. To verify our summarization of the
funding data, we sent out draft tables to agency and UN contributors
and made supported changes.
To assess the key challenges the U.S. government and UNHCR face in
offering solutions for Iraqi refugees and the special immigrant visa
program, we interviewed and assessed documentation from State's PRM;
State's Bureau of Consular Affairs; State's Office of Inspector
General; the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS); U.S. embassy officials in Jordan, Syria,
and Iraq; UNHCR, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
IOM, and other UN agencies; nongovernmental organizations; and research
institutes. In the United States, we held discussion sessions with
nongovernmental organizations with a presence in Iraq, Syria, and
Jordan. In Jordan and Syria, we held discussion sessions with Iraqi
refugees and visited U.S.-and UN-funded programs. To further assess the
U.S. Refugee Admissions program, we obtained and assessed data from
State's Worldwide Refugee Admissions Program System. We toured State's
overseas processing entities managed by IOM and reviewed processing
steps and data with IOM, USCIS, State, and U.S. embassy officials,
including refugee coordinators. We analyzed U.S. admissions data and
found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report. To further address the SIV programs, we reviewed the
legislative requirements for the two SIV programs found in Section 1059
of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act and Section
1244 of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. We
reviewed relevant documents from the Bureau of Consular Affairs
concerning Iraqi interpreter/translator SIV program planning,
processes, resources, and implementation. Also, we met with Consular
Affairs officials in Washington, D.C.; Iraq; Syria; and Jordan, who
provided information on general consular management and oversight, visa
processing and procedures, staffing, and resource needs. We analyzed
SIV data and found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this report.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to January 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Status of U.S. Appropriation Funds Apportioned to Iraq-
Related Humanitarian Assistance, and Intended Beneficiaries, as of
September 30, 2008:
Dollars in millions:
Source of funds: 2003 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 1)/P.L.
108-11; 2004 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2)/P.L. 108-106;
Agency/program: State/Population, Refugees, and Migration Bureau (PRM);
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $160.5; Funding: Obligated: $160.4; Funding:
Expended: $159.0;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: Internally displaced persons
(IDP) and vulnerable populations[B]; In region: Iraqi refugees and host
country populations[C].
Source of funds: [Empty];
Agency/program: USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
(OFDA);
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $129.3;
Funding: Obligated: $129.3;
Funding: Expended: $126.8;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: none.
Source of funds: Food for Peace/P.L. 480 Title II; 108-7, P.L. 108-
447, P.L. 110-5, P.L. 110-161; Agency/program: USAID/Office of Food for
Peace; Funding: Apportioned[A]: $218.2;
Funding: Obligated: $218.2;
Funding: Expended: $218.2;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs; In region: Iraqi
refugees and host country populations.
Source of funds: Food for Peace/P.L. 108-7[D];
Agency/program: USAID/Office of Food for Peace;
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $191.1;
Funding: Obligated: $191.1;
Funding: Expended: $191.1;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: Iraqi population; In region:
none.
Source of funds: Migration and Refugee Assistance/P.L. 108-7, P.L. 109-
102, P.L. 110-5, P.L. 110-161; Agency/program: State/PRM; Funding:
Apportioned[A]: $170.9;
Funding: Obligated: $170.8;
Funding: Expended: $124.7;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations.
Source of funds: Supplemental for Migration and Refugee Assistance/
P.L. 110-28, P.L.110-252; Agency/program: State/PRM; Funding:
Apportioned[A]: $173.5;
Funding: Obligated: $118.2;
Funding: Expended: $48.0;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations.
Source of funds: International Disaster and Famine Assistance/P.L. 108-
7, P.L 107-115, P.L. 108-447, P.L. 109-102, P.L. 110-28, P.L. 110-161,
P.L. 110-252; Agency/program: USAID/OFDA; Funding: Apportioned[A]:
$163.5;
Funding: Obligated: $127.7;
Funding: Expended: $59.4;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: none.
Source of funds: 2003 Economic Support Fund/P.L. 108-7;
Agency/program: USAID/OFDA;
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $12.0;
Funding: Obligated: $12.0;
Funding: Expended: $11.6;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: none.
Source of funds: 2006 Economic Support Fund/P.L. 109-234;
Agency/program: State/PRM;
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $50.0;
Funding: Obligated: $50.0;
Funding: Expended: $31.8;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: none; In region: Iraqi
refugees and host country populations in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and
Egypt.
Source of funds: 2007 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund/P.L. 110-
28;
Agency/program: USAID/Office of Middle Eastern Affairs;
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $10.3;
Funding: Obligated: $10.3;
Funding: Expended: $1.2;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: none; In region: government of
Jordan to meet the needs of Iraqi refugees and host country population.
Source of funds: 2008 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund/P.L. 110-
252;
Agency/program: State/PRM;
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $45.0;
Funding: Obligated: $45.0;
Funding: Expended: 0;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: none; In region: Iraqi
refugees in Jordan and host country population.
Source of funds: [Empty];
Agency/program: USAID/Office of Middle Eastern Affairs;
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $155.0;
Funding: Obligated: $155.0;
Funding: Expended: $110.0;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: none; In region: government of
Jordan to meet the needs of Iraqi refugees and host country population.
Source of funds: Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance[E]/
Presidential Determination (P.D.) 2003-17, P.D. 2003-13, and P.D. 2001-
22, P.D. 2007-31; Agency/program: State/PRM; Funding: Apportioned[A]:
$51.9;
Funding: Obligated: $51.6;
Funding: Expended: $48.8;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations.
Source of funds: Development Assistance/P.L. 108-7;
Agency/program: USAID/OFDA;
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $28.5;
Funding: Obligated: $28.5;
Funding: Expended: $26.3;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: none.
Source of funds: Child Survival and Health/P.L. 108-7;
Agency/program: USAID/OFDA;
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $5.8;
Funding: Obligated: $5.8;
Funding: Expended: $5.7;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs; In region: none.
Total:
Funding: Apportioned[A]: $1,565.5;
Funding: Obligated: $1,473.9;
Funding: Expended: $1,162.6.
Source: GAO analysis based on data and information from the Department
of State and USAID.
[A] USAID-apportioned funds also include funds recovered or unallocated
in prior years.
[B] Vulnerable populations in Iraq may include other Iraqis at risk;
Iraqis who have returned from other countries; refugees in Iraq from
other countries, such as Palestinians; and other conflict victims.
[C] U.S. refugee programs benefit the host country population because
countries hosting Iraqi refugees in the region, such as Jordan and
Syria, do not allow donors to provide assistance solely to Iraqi
refugees. Host countries receiving assistance are identified when the
information was made available. In instances where the host country is
not identified, a portion of the funds was contributed to international
organizations that may have spent the funds in one or a number of the
countries hosting Iraqis in the region.
[D] According to USAID, in 2003, USAID's Food for Peace Program
received $191.1 million, which was reallocated from funds originally
appropriated in P.L. 108-7 to Development Assistance, Economic Support
Fund, Child Survival and Health, and International Disaster and Famine
Assistance accounts.
[E] The U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) fund is
drawn upon by the President to meet unexpected urgent refugee and
migration needs whenever the President determines that it is in the
U.S. national interest to do so. Funds are appropriated annually to the
ERMA fund and remain available until expended.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: U.S. Contributions to UNHCR Appeals for Iraq-Related
Humanitarian Assistance, and Intended Beneficiaries, Calendar Years
2003 through 2008:
Dollars in millions:
UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: 2003 UNHCR Appeal for the Iraq
Situation, and UNHCR Iraq Revised Appeal--Ensuring Protection and
Enabling Return[C]; Amount of appeal: $90.6; Amount of appeal funded:
Carryover[A]: 0;
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $77.4;
U.S. portion of new contributions: $31.0;
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 40.1%;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: Internally displaced persons
(IDP) and vulnerable populations[D]; In region: Iraqi refugees and host
country populations[E].
UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: 2004 UNHCR Iraq Operation Appeal;
Amount of appeal: $74.1;
Amount of appeal funded: Carryover[A]: $20.2;
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $30.5;
U.S. portion of new contributions: $16.2;
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 53.1%;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations.
UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: 2005 UNHCR Iraq Operation
Supplementary Appeal;
Amount of appeal: $42.0;
Amount of appeal funded: Carryover[A]: $18.9;
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $21.7;
U.S. portion of new contributions: $19.2;
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 88.6%;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations.
UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: 2006 UNHCR Iraq Operation
Supplementary Appeal;
Amount of appeal: $29.8;
Amount of appeal funded: Carryover[A]: $8.9;
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $15.0;
U.S. portion of new contributions: $8.0;
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 53.3%;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations.
UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: 2007 UNHCR Iraq Situation Response,
and UNHCR Supplementary Appeal Iraq Situation Response[F]; Amount of
appeal: $123.7; Amount of appeal funded: Carryover[A]: $3.5;
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $112.2;
U.S. portion of new contributions: $36.0;
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 32.1%;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations.
UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: UNHCR Portion of 2007 UNHCR and
UNICEF Joint Appeal--Providing Education Opportunities to Iraqi
Children in Host Countries: A Regional Perspective[G]; Amount of
appeal: $99.0; Amount of appeal funded: Carryover[A]: 0;
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $39.9;
U.S. portion of new contributions: $30.0;
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 75.2%;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: none; In region: Iraqi
refugees and host country populations.
UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: 2008 UNHCR Iraq Situation
Supplementary Appeal[H];
Amount of appeal: $271.1;
Amount of appeal funded: Carryover[A]: $9.1;
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $245.0;
U.S. portion of new contributions: $175.4;
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 71.6%;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: Iraqi refugees and host country populations.
UNHCR appeals for Iraq Operation: Total;
Amount of appeal: $730.3;
Amount of appeal funded: Carryover[A]: Not applicable;
Amount of appeal funded: New contribution[B]: $541.7;
U.S. portion of new contributions: $315.8;
U.S. portion of new contributions (percentage): 58.3%.
Source: GAO analysis based on data and information from the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, and the U.S. State Department.
[A] Carryover includes funds contributed but not used from prior year.
[B] New contributions include funds from donors for that year's appeal.
[C] The 2003 UNHCR Iraq Revised Appeal reduced the original appeal from
$154.1 million to $90.6 million.
[D] Vulnerable populations in Iraq may include other Iraqis at risk;
Iraqis who have returned from other countries; refugees in Iraq from
other countries, such as Palestinians; and other conflict victims.
[E] Refugee programs benefit the host country population because
countries hosting Iraqi refugees in the region, such as Jordan and
Syria, do not allow donors to provide assistance solely to Iraqi
refugees.
[F] The 2007 UNHCR Iraq Situation Response appeal increased the appeal
from $59.7 million to $123.7 million. UNHCR's portion of a 2007 Joint
Health Sector Appeal and contributions made were folded into the 2007
UNHCR Iraq Situation Response appeal.
[G] The UNICEF portion of the Joint Education Appeal included
additional funding requirements for $31.0 million. The amount of this
portion of the appeal that was funded was $9.4 million, including $9.0
million in contributions from the United States, representing 95.7
percent of total contributions to the UNICEF portion of the Joint
Education Appeal.
[H] Contributions to the 2008 UNHCR Iraq Situation Supplementary Appeal
included here are as of December 10, 2008.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Individual Iraqi Refugee Beneficiaries of UNHCR Assistance
in Syria and Jordan, Calendar Year 2008:
Type of assistance provided: Food and nonfood items[A];
Syria (individuals): 144,900;
Jordan (individuals): 13,909.
Type of assistance provided: Cash assistance;
Syria (individuals): 38,234;
Jordan (individuals): 18,074.
Type of assistance provided: Health care;
Syria (individuals): 570,000;
Jordan (individuals): 25,498.
Type of assistance provided: Education support[B];
Syria (individuals): 35,224;
Jordan (individuals): 10,631.
Type of assistance provided: Students supported in public universities;
Syria (individuals): 154; Jordan (individuals): Data not available.
Type of assistance provided: Legal support;
Syria (individuals): 12,930;
Jordan (individuals): 1,380.
Type of assistance provided: Psychosocial services;
Syria (individuals): 13,861;
Jordan (individuals): 6,152.
Type of assistance provided: Outreach;
Syria (individuals): 72,000;
Jordan (individuals): 21,128.
Type of assistance provided: People with disabilities assisted;
Syria (individuals): 779;
Jordan (individuals): 912.
Source: UNHCR data.
Note: We did not assess the reliability of the data provided by UNHCR.
[A] Food (i.e., oil, rice, lentils, sugar, tea, tomato paste, pasta,
and cracked wheat ) and nonfood items (i.e., mattresses, blankets,
soap, detergent, and sanitary materials) provided to Iraqi refugees in
Jordan included 5,087 hygiene kits, nonfood items for 602 individuals,
and food for 8,220 persons.
[B] Education support provided to Iraqi refugees in Syria included
uniforms, shoes, and school materials. Education support provided to
Iraqi refugees in Jordan included 2,615 school kits, 1,685 school fees,
vocational training for 2,063 students, nonformal education for 2,493
individuals, and formal education provided to 1,775 students.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
March 31, 2009:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"Iraqi Refugee Assistance: Improvements Needed In Measuring Progress,
Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an International
Strategic Plan" GAO Job Code 320565.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Hilary Ingraham, Program Officer, Bureau of Population, Refugees and
Migration at (202) 663-3715.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc:
GAO - Audrey Solis:
PRM - Sam Witten (Acting):
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on Draft GAO Report:
Iraqi Refugee Assistance: Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress,
Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an International
Strategic Plan: (GAO-09-120, GAO Code 320565):
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report. The
Department of State appreciates that the GAO recognizes the multiple
challenges inherent in identifying durable solutions and providing
protection and humanitarian assistance for displaced Iraqis. The report
acknowledges that many of the challenges require the active
participation of non-U.S. government actors to achieve progress. The
report also recognizes the progress that has been made to date,
reflecting our efforts to continually look for ways to improve the
delivery of assistance and provide protection to Iraqi refugees.
However, the title of the GAO report only conveys the challenges
identified and not the broader scope of the report's findings. The
Department requests that the GAO change the title of the report in
order to better capture the report's findings and acknowledge both the
challenges and progress.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
The GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, with relevant others,
take four actions:
1. Develop performance measures to assess and report progress in
achieving overall U.S. goals and objectives for Iraqi refugees.
Performance measures and indicators should be clearly linked to
progress in achieving stated goals and objectives. Performance goals,
objectives, and measures should clearly and transparently address the
extent to which programs should target refugees and host government
populations, respectively, to the extent practicable.
2. In conjunction with the USAID Administrator, develop systems to
separately track and report funding apportioned, obligated, and
expended for Iraqi refugee programs in each host country.
3. Work with UNHCR and the governments of Jordan, Syria, and other
relevant host countries to expedite efforts to conduct independent
comprehensive assessments of the number and needs of Iraqi refugees and
the related needs of the countries hosting them.
4. In conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies and in coordination with
the donor community, work with UNHCR and the governments of Iraq,
Jordan, Syria, and other relevant host governments to build on the
efforts in the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region and
develop a comprehensive international strategy for providing assistance
and solutions for Iraqi refugees.
Develop Performance Measures:
The Department of State concurs with the recommendation to strengthen
the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration's (PRM) performance
planning, monitoring, and reporting. As reflected in its Congressional
Budget Justification, Congressional Presentation Document, and Bureau
Strategic Plan, PRM has established global performance goals and
measures, collects and analyzes performance results data on these
measures, and adjusts targets based on past performance. Moreover, as
noted in the GAO report, the Bureau has already developed more
specific, measurable goals and objectives for its assistance and
protection efforts for Iraqi refugees. The Bureau is working with both
international organization partners as well as non-governmental
organization (NGO) partners to continue strengthening program-level
indicators. PRM is also refining a standardized list of key
humanitarian indicators in an effort to collect information at the
program level which could be aggregated to capture performance by
sector at the program level, and, as appropriate, to inform the
existing global-level performance measures of the Bureau. All of these
activities and enhancements to our existing practices are fully
consistent with GAO's recommendation to strengthen performance
planning, monitoring, and reporting.
However, the GAO recommendation goes further and suggests that PRM's
performance planning, monitoring and reporting should focus on programs
defined by "refugee population" (e.g., Iraqi refugees). The Department
of State, and PRM in particular, does not define its programs in this
way for several reasons:
I) In many refugee situations - including the primarily urban
displacements of the Iraqi situation - it is not desirable, and
frequently not possible, to disentangle populations by nationality for
purposes of program planning and performance monitoring. Moreover, we
note that refugee populations vary significantly in terms of size,
geographic distribution, relevant policy concerns, and humanitarian
needs, and that international practice in assisting refugees does not
rely on metrics that are firmly limited to a particular nationality in
this kind of a complex situation.
2) Universality and impartiality are cardinal principles of
humanitarian assistance. PRM and its partners strive to meet the
assistance and protection needs of refugees around the world
(universality), regardless of nationality, ethnicity, religion or
political opinion (impartiality). To require goals and objectives that
are uniquely developed for a specific refugee population runs counter
to these humanitarian principles, as the U.S. and other international
donors have long maintained that assistance standards are universal.
3) Most PRM contributions to multilateral humanitarian organizations,
such as UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
are loosely earmarked at a regional level to maximize the flexibility
these organizations need to respond to dynamic and sometimes mixed
population movements, changing field conditions, and cross-border
operations. Many UN appeals are regional. (e.g., UNHCR appeals for the
Afghan or Sudanese repatriation operations, multiple relief operations
in Africa) Contributing to regional appeals is longstanding practice of
the United States in general and PRM in particular. Indeed, the
Bureau's authorities under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of
I962, as amended, and its policy approach emphasize this multilateral
support.
Track and Report Funding in Each Host Country:
The Department of State concurs with this recommendation, but notes
that in most cases it is not practicable to track and report
multilateral contributions at the country level. The Department takes
its fiscal and programmatic accountability responsibilities very
seriously. We agree that it is important to track and report funding
apportioned, obligated and expended. The Department will continue to
track and report funding for Iraqi refugee programs in each host
country when possible. For example, the Department of State and USAID
have tracked and reported on bilateral funding used specifically for
programs to assist Iraqi refugees in Jordan. The Department coordinates
its oversight with the appropriate host governmental authorities.
The Department affirms the GAO's understanding that programs assisting
Iraqi refugees should include assistance to vulnerable members of the
host population. Programs that only benefit refugees may lead to
animosity and discrimination from local communities, cause protection
concerns for refugees, and potentially destabilize what may be a
strained domestic political situation. Inclusive programs are also more
palatable to the host governments, which adamantly do not want to
establish separate systems to assist Iraqis.
The Department will continue to track funding contributed to NGO
programs at the country level (e.g., programming by specific NGOs
funded by PRM in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon). We will make sure this
information is available in the public domain through including it, as
appropriate, in press releases on USG support for humanitarian
assistance to Iraqis. We will also report on any multilateral
contributions we make at the country level. In general, country-
specific multilateral contributions are made to an appeal which is for
activities in a specific country. For example, in FY 2008 the U.S.
contributed to the World Food Program's Emergency Operation in Syria.
In most cases, it is not practicable to track multilateral funding at
the country level. In order to do this, we would either need to (i) ask
international organizations to issue country-specific appeals, or (ii)
earmark all regional appeal contributions to specific countries. For
the reasons that the GAO itself cites on page 28 of this report, we
agree that the UN should continue to recognize the regional context in
humanitarian situations and consolidate its appeals as it did in the
2009 UN Consolidated Appeal, thereby not issuing individual appeals for
each host country. Indeed, an integrated appeal framework helps to
inform a regional strategy, another of GAO's specific recommendations.
In this respect, as part of a collective effort to provide humanitarian
assistance more efficiently, the U.S. government has joined thirty-five
other donor governments in supporting the framework of principles and
standards which comprises the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)
initiative, co-chairing the group of governments in 2008. One of these
principles calls for donors to provide flexible funding, vice earmarked
funding, to multilateral organizations in order to give these
organizations the ability to prioritize beneficiaries' most urgent
needs and adapt to changing circumstances. The Department recognizes
the importance of giving international organizations flexibility in
responding to humanitarian needs of beneficiaries, and generally
strives to minimize earmarking contributions at the country level or
below (e.g., the sector or project level).
The Department does not believe that the benefits of being able to
track multilateral funding at the country level are outweighed by the
negative repercussions these changes would have on USG partners'
ability to effectively provide protection and assistance to Iraqi
refugees.
Independent and Comprehensive Assessments in Host Countries:
The Department of State concurs with this recommendation but notes that
our ability to take action on it requires the active concurrence of
host country governments. It has long been clear to the Department of
State, international organizations, and other donor countries that a
comprehensive assessment of the numbers and needs of Iraqi refugees in
host countries would greatly improve the international community's
ability to plan and implement assistance activities for Iraqi refugees.
The international humanitarian community has urged host countries to
facilitate an accurate count of Iraqi refugees and assess their needs.
Despite this, host countries have not permitted independent,
comprehensive assessments of the needs and numbers of Iraqis living
within their borders. We continue to look for ways to constructively
raise these issues with host governments.
The Department assesses needs for specific services and programs in
coordination with its implementing partners. UNHCR, other international
organizations, and NGOs analyze information they have gathered on the
needs and number of vulnerable Iraqi refugees through and use it to
develop assistance and protection programs. UNHCR relies primarily on
information collected during the registration of Iraqi refugees and
through other outreach mechanisms. The UN's Consolidated Appeals
Process (CAP) also provides a coordinated overview of Iraqi needs based
on input from UN agencies, other international organizations, and NGOs.
NGOs routinely conduct smaller-scale needs assessments when the
organizations are designing project proposals to compete for PRM or
other donor funding. During program implementation, international
organizations and NGOs assess their activities to ensure that project
activities meet the needs of Iraqi refugees, measure the impact of the
services provided and identify unmet needs. Taken collectively, these
assessments provide insight into the needs of Iraqi refugees across
sectors and geographic locations. Finally, PRM identifies gaps in the
humanitarian assistance provided by multilateral organizations and
responds by selecting and funding NGO projects to clearly respond to
these identified needs and gaps.
Comprehensive International Strategy:
The Department of State concurs with this recommendation. As the GAO
report notes on page one, the U.S. government has taken the lead in
efforts to mitigate the humanitarian crisis facing displaced Iraqis.
The Department of State continues to work in coordination with relevant
U.S. agencies, UNHCR, other donor governments, and the Governments of
Iraq, Jordan and Syria, to develop a strategy to provide needed
protection and assistance to displaced Iraqis. Efforts to build a
comprehensive strategy are hampered by the lack of comprehensive needs
and numbers assessments of displaced Iraqis and the lack of agreement
within the international community on the relative vulnerability of
this displaced population in comparison to other refugee crises
worldwide when donors apportion limited international humanitarian
assistance funds.
The Department continues to lead the way in international fora, urging
international organizations to develop accurate needs-based budgets to
assist displaced Iraqis. PRM continues to meet with other partners to
discuss changing circumstances facing displaced Iraqis. For example, in
mid-March 2009, PRM and USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA) jointly hosted a meeting in Jordan to discuss ways
the international community could support the return of Iraqi refugees
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) and prepare for future, large-
scale returns. PRM and OFDA met with UN agencies, other international
organizations and NGOs active inside Iraq and identified sectors that
need support. The group determined that the international community
needed to support community based programs and development activities
to enable Iraq to absorb its returning citizens. As follow up to the
conference, PRM and OFDA are working together to coordinate U.S.
government support for programs assisting current returns and to build
the capacity of the Government of Iraq to be ready to meet the needs of
Iraqi citizens when they start returning home in large numbers.
President Obama made it clear in his February 27 speech on Iraq that
the U.S. has a strategic interest and moral responsibility to assist
displaced Iraqis. PRM is an active participant in the interagency
discussions that are informing the development of a comprehensive Iraq
strategy for the new administration. The U.S. recognizes that continued
provision of protection and assistance to displaced Iraqis and the
simultaneous development of programs to support sustainable returns are
critical components of this much larger, interrelated policy strategy.
Additional Comments on Text:
PRM Engagement:
Throughout the report, the GAO frequently refers to two primary ways
PRM works to assist displaced Iraqis: PRM contributes funding to
international organizations like UNHCR, other UN agencies and NGOs, and
monitors the implementation of partners' program activities. [See, for
example, page I0, "To implement its goals and objectives for Iraqi
refugees, State's PRM bureau primarily funds and monitors the
activities of its implementing partners."] However the GAO does not
mention other important components of our work, particularly that of
providing guidance to international organization and NGO partners and
strong diplomatic engagement with host and donor governments on issues
relating to protection and assistance for Iraqis. In these efforts, PRM
works closely with Department colleagues in regional bureaus, U.S.
Embassies, and U.S. Missions in New York, Brussels, and Geneva. [See
comment 1]
We are an active participant in UNHCR's Executive Committee (ExCom)
which meets four times per year (once in the spring, once in the
summer, and twice in the fall) to provide guidance on UNHCR operations,
program standards, and policies. At ExCom meetings, the U.S. government
joins other donor governments in reviewing and approving all UNHCR
programs and budgets, giving the USG a significant voice in UNHCR's
operations. Outside the Executive Committee meetings, PRM staff discuss
the needs of displaced Iraqis and various program activities with a
wide variety of UNHCR officials at minimum on a weekly basis. Our
interlocutors range from the High Commissioner, Deputy High
Commissioner, and the Middle East Regional Director to UNHCR Country
Representatives in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq and other program
staff within these country operations.
With regard to NGO programs, PRM and its NGO partners establish the
agreed upon parameters for the assistance programs NGOs are committing
to undertake with PRM funding. PRM and NGOs agree on targets for
program activities and ways to measure the organization's progress
towards meeting those targets. PRM selects NGO programs to fill gaps
the Bureau has identified in the assistance provided by international
organizations.
Monitoring:
The Department agrees with monitoring challenges identified by the GAO
in the report. We remain very concerned, however, that the data used on
page 2I to validate this finding are largely drawn from a single
element of an assessment PRM conducted in April 2008 to help the Bureau
identify program performance areas within UNHCR's operations in Jordan
that needed improvement. GAO quotes PRM's assessment that, at that
time, UNHCR was able to effectively monitor approximately 40-59% of its
implementing partners. The report misrepresents this percentage -
taking it out of context in the full assessment - and represents it as
a conclusion valid for the entire time period of the report. It is
therefore misleading and understates the highly professional and
systematic monitoring that is actually undertaken by UNHCR and PRM.
[See comment 2]
Specifically, at the time of the assessment, UNHCR's implementing
partners conducted program activities at more than 200 program sites
across Jordan. The monitoring statistic given in the PRM assessment
primarily reflects the percentage of the sites UNHCR could physically
visit as part of its monitoring plan. While site visits, including
unannounced site visits, are an important component of monitoring,
effective and complete monitoring includes many other components:
review of progress and final program reports, review of financial
reports, follow-up with program managers and other personnel, and
consultations with other donors and humanitarian organizations active
in the same geographic areas or sectors. Indeed, the GAO report fails
to mention that, in the same element of the April 2008 assessment, PRM
notes that UNHCR monitors the finances of its implementing partners on
a quarterly basis and all implementing partners undergo a comprehensive
audit. Finally, we note that the 200 sites mentioned in the GAO report
are activity sites, not distinct implementing partner programs. We have
full confidence in UNHCR's effective monitoring of its implementing
partners during 2008. We continue to regularly discuss with UNHCR its
program implementation and ongoing monitoring efforts in Iraq and the
region in its efforts to assist displaced Iraqis.
Individuals eligible for Special Immigrant Visas and the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program:
On page 48, the report asserts that the State Department recommends
that individuals not pursue the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program if
they have a refugee interview date already scheduled under the U.S.
Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) because refugee processing is
quicker than SIV processing. In actuality, processing under the SIV
program is significantly faster than the in-country refugee program
under USRAP. The SIV process requires one interview in contrast to the
USRAP, which requires one interview with IOM and a second one with DHS.
The State Department encourages otherwise qualified applicants to apply
for the SIV program. [See comment 3]
Chief of Mission approval process for SIV applicants:
As the report states on page 50, the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
program, established under section I244 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2008, provides 5,000 SIVs for certain
Iraqis who have been U.S. government employees, contractors,
subcontractors or their dependents. The report makes no mention of the
I244 program's new requirement for Chief of Mission Approval (COM). The
SIV COM approval process, as mandated in the legislation, has the Chief
of Mission or the COM's designee at Embassy Baghdad review application
requests, conduct verification of U.S. government employment and a risk
assessment. The COM has delegated this responsibility to the Senior
Coordinator for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). SIV
applicants send their documents via email to refugee office staff for
processing and then final review and approval by the Senior
Coordinator. In an effort to reduce staffing and life-support needs in
Baghdad, in April 2009 the majority of the SIV COM processing will be
moved from Baghdad offices to the National Visa Center, which is part
of the Bureau of Consular Affairs at the Department of State. [See
comment 4]
The following are GAO's comments to the Department of State's letter
dated March 31, 2009:
GAO Comments:
1. We added text in the background to describe other components of
PRM's work.
2. As stated in the draft of this report, in April 2008, State reported
that UNHCR "effectively monitors 40 to 59 percent of its partners." In
State's written and technical comments, the department notes that the
statement in its document should have read "implementing partners'
program activity sites." We have revised this report to correct State's
reporting error. Further, despite our requests for an updated
evaluation, State did not provide updated percentages of site visits.
UNHCR, in its technical comments on the draft, provided evidence on the
steps it has taken in 2009 to mitigate this challenge. We incorporated
this information, as appropriate.
3. This statement was deleted from the text.
4. We added a footnote to provide information on the 1244 program's
requirement for Chief of Mission approval and the approval process.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID: From The American People:
U.S. Agency for International Development:
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW:
Washington, DC 20532:
[hyperlink, http://www.usaid.gov]
April 1, 2009:
Joseph A. Christoff, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Christoff:
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's
(USAID) formal response on the draft GAO report entitled "Iraqi Refugee
Assistance: Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress, Assessing Needs,
Tracking Funds, and Developing an International Strategic Plan" (GAO-09-
120).
Thank you for your recommendation to USAID regarding the tracking of
funding for refugee assistance programs. In Iraq, USAID provides
assistance for Internally Displaced People (IDP) through our office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). While refugee programs are overseen
primarily by the State Department's bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration (PRM): USAID also does provide some assistance to Jordan to
assist their efforts in supporting Iraqi refugees.
While early on in our Iraq assistance we did provide limited refugee
assistance, we no longer fund these types of activities under our
humanitarian assistance program. The tracking of refugee assistance is
no longer a concern for USAID's humanitarian assistance program. In
addition, we have an established system of tracking and monitoring for
our assistance in Jordan. Therefore, we feel this issue has been
resolved.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this
review.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Drew W. Luten:
Acting Assistant Administrator:
Bureau for Management:
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition, Audrey Solis, Assistant Director; Minty Abraham; Lynn
Cothern; David Dornisch; Timothy Fairbanks; Kathleen Monahan; Mary
Moutsos; Andrew Stavisky; and Heather Whitehead made key contributions
to this report. Technical assistance was provided by Shirley Brothwell,
Elizabeth Curda, Aniruddha Dasgupta, Etana Finkler, David Hancock, and
Jeremy Sebest.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] As part of our methodology, we limited our fieldwork to Syria and
Jordan, which reported hosting significantly more refugees than other
neighboring countries, such as Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and the
Gulf States.
[2] According to State officials, its international organization
partners include UNHCR, the World Health Organization, the World Food
Program, IOM, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, and the United Nations Children's Fund. For fiscal
years 2007 and 2008, State officials said that they had 9 and 11 NGO
partners implementing their program, respectively.
[3] State's 2008 goal was to maintain basic humanitarian assistance and
protection for Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Its
regional objectives were to meet the assistance and protection needs of
refugees and other conflict victims through expanded engagement and
funding of international and NGO partners; contribute to regional
stability by channeling humanitarian assistance through primary
international organization partners; promote UNHCR to achieve solutions
for Iraqi and non-Iraqi refugees; and ensure greater burden sharing
among donors, including the Iraqi government.
[4] Iraq-related humanitarian assistance funding includes that for
Iraqi refugees and vulnerable populations of neighboring countries
hosting them; internally displaced Iraqis; vulnerable populations in
Iraq; refugees in Iraq, such as Palestinians; and other conflict
victims.
[5] A strategic plan should contain strategic or long-term goals that
cover a period of not less than 5 years from the year it is submitted
and should be updated and revised at least every 3 years.
[6] IOM, Iraq Displacement & Return; 2008 Mid-year Review.
[7] According to the UN, Syria has no domestic legislative framework
securing the rights of Iraqi refugees and most Iraqis are issued 1-to 3-
month residence permits, with a minority being granted 1-to 2-year
resident permits or permits covering a school year. According to the
UN, in Jordan all Iraqis and others that are permitted to enter are
allowed to stay for 3 months in accordance with the Law on the
Residence of Foreigners. In May 2008, Jordan announced that all Iraqis
must obtain a visa prior to arrival.
[8] UNHCR, Protecting Refugees & the Role of UNHCR, 2007-2008 (Geneva).
[9] According to State officials, its international organization
partners include UNHCR, the World Health Organization, the World Food
Program, IOM, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, and the United Nations Children's Fund. For fiscal
years 2007 and 2008, State officials stated that they had 9 and 11 NGO
partners implementing their program, respectively.
[10] Government Performance and Results Act principles include setting
strategic goals, measuring performance, and reporting on the degree to
which goals were met. See GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively
Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[11] In addition to its goal to maintain humanitarian assistance and
protection for Iraqi refugees, State's PRM established two goals for
its efforts within Iraq to (1) support assistance and protection
programs for non-Iraqi refugees while pursuing opportunities to
resettle or temporarily relocate these refugees to safe havens where
they can be processed for resettlement or repatriation and (2) support
UNHCR and International Committee of the Red Cross programs to assist
and protect returning refugees, IDPs, and conflict victims and develop
policy and assistance frameworks for refugee and IDP returns. PRM's
objectives apply to all three goals.
[12] The Fiscal Year 2009 Policy and Program Review Committee paper
outlines State's goals and objectives for fiscal year 2009 and provides
a review of performance in fiscal year 2008.
[13] Sectors include humanitarian assistance, protection, education,
water and sanitation, and health, among others.
[14] According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, "non-
refoulement" is the principle protecting refugees from nonvoluntary
repatriation to places where their lives or freedom would be threatened
because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
[15] Wasting is a measure of acute malnutrition.
[16] For international organizations, State officials noted that they
provide input on objectives and performance measures through
participation in board meetings, donor trips, and country operation
planning meetings. Regarding NGOs, State officials noted that they work
with each NGO partner to establish specific objectives and performance
measures for projects in each country; these measures are documented in
the partner agreements.
[17] See GAO, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118].
[18] State Department, Policy and Program Review Committee (PPRC):
Policy and Implementation Paper for Iraq Refugees and IDPs for FY 2008,
Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2008. The 2009 paper is sensitive but
unclassified.
[19] We also reviewed 13 interim program evaluation reports prepared by
State for 13 projects implemented by 8 NGO partners, the 13 final NGO
reports available, and international organization partners' progress
reports. We also interviewed State officials on their monitoring and
evaluation efforts. (State Department officials prepare interim program
evaluations for each NGO project from the information obtained from NGO
reporting. These evaluations assess progress made and are used to make
management decisions about an NGO's performance and future funding for
Iraqi refugee programs.) We did not assess the reliability of the data
in these reports.
[20] For programs that were funded in fiscal year 2007, State officials
stated that they required monitoring reports at 4 and 12 months, and
for programs funded in fiscal year 2008, State required quarterly
reports.
[21] The 2007 Guidelines for Proposal Submissions for NGO Protection
and Assistance Programs Benefiting Iraqis in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon
was issued as a part of the March 13, 2007, request for proposals.
[22] We did not assess the reliability of the data provided in these
reports.
[23] As of the end of our fieldwork, the State Department had made
available 13 of the 16 final NGO reports for our review. For one NGO
for which State did not provide a final report, State reported that it
did not meet the 50 percent requirement.
[24] State considers the 2009 goals and objectives sensitive and not
for public release.
[25] Framework for Cooperation between the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees and the Bureau of Population, Refugees,
and Migration, U.S. Department of State, for the Year 2008 (Nov. 29,
2007).
[26] Framework for Cooperation between the IOM Administration and the
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of
State, for the Year 2007 (Apr. 18, 2007).
[27] Department of State, The Annual Review of UNHCR Country
Achievements and Future Planning, April 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
17, 2008). According to State, it determined these percentages based on
discussions with UNHCR in Jordan regarding current and past
programming. State reported that site visits are determined by several
criteria, including policy priorities, performance history, funding
level, and security conditions. However, State did not provide any
specifics on the percentage of partners' program activity sites that
should be monitored.
[28] According to UNHCR, in 2009, UNHCR monitoring of implementing
partners and their respective programs has expanded beyond a financial
audit into an evaluative mode with the extensive use of multifunctional
teams visiting project sites, undertaking home visits, and conducting
focus group sessions with Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR, over the
past quarter a Project Control Officer and Senior Oversight Officer
have arrived in Jordan and physical verification of projects is now a
requirement. UNHCR has also decided to reduce its intended
decentralization of services from 18 to 16 locations.
[29] According to the UN, government estimates largely rely on cross-
border movements, which may result in counting persons more than once.
See UN, Iraq and the Region, 2009 Consolidated Appeal, Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York and Geneva).
[30] According to the UN, Iraqi refugees may not register with UNHCR
for a variety of reasons, including fear of being identified and
deported, inability to reach a registration center, lack of
understanding of the benefits of UNHCR registration, and lack of need
for UNHCR protection or assistance.
[31] According to UNHCR, the Iraqi embassy in Syria estimates that the
total number of Iraqis in Syria is between 800,000 and 1,000,000.
[32] According to State, in its interim program evaluations for NGOs,
NGOs in Jordan set targets for numbers of Iraqi beneficiaries too high
because they based them on faulty estimates of the total number of
Iraqi refugees.
[33] According to Fafo, it supplies decision makers and organizations,
nationally and internationally, with research on working life and
social policy.
[34] Fafo, Iraqis in Jordan 2007: Their Number and Characteristics
(Norway, 2007). We assessed Fafo's methodology and found that the
number of 161,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan as of May 2007 is reliable,
but we were unable to establish the reliability of the numbers beyond
the initial 161,000.
[35] United Nations Development Program, Macroeconomic Impact of Iraqi
Refugees on the Syrian Economy (January 2008).
[36] Center for Strategic Studies, The Iraq War's Impact on Growth and
Inflation in Jordan, University of Jordan, 2007.
[37] According to UNHCR, as of March 2009, UNHCR and its partners now
have approximately 200 Iraqi outreach workers in the region.
[38] The IDP Working Group members include UNHCR, IOM, other UN
agencies, and NGOs. Its reporting is based on surveillance data
gathered by IDP Working Group members and on information provided by
the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration, the Kurdistan
Regional Government, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and
other NGOs.
[39] See UN, Iraq and the Region, 2009 Consolidated Appeal, Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (New York and Geneva: Dec.
2008); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Iraq Situation
Update-August 2008 (Geneva: Aug. 2008); and IDP Working Group,
Internally Displaced Persons in Iraq-Update June 2008 (Amman: 2008).
[40] UNHCR reported in August 2008 that among the main dangers and
concerns for returnees are detention and kidnappings, reported from all
over the country but most frequently in Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk,
Muthanna, Ninewa, Salah al Din, and Wassit governates.
[41] See GAO, Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity
Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide
Efforts and Manage Risk, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-117] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2007).
[42] As of July 2008, Jordan, with a total population estimated at 6.2
million, hosted an estimated 1.8 million Palestinian refugees, and
Syria, with a population of an estimated 19.7 million, hosted an
estimated 522,100 Palestinian refugees (Central Intelligence Agency,
World Fact Book, Aug. 21, 2008).
[43] This report does not include information on the outcome of asylum
procedures or the admission of refugees outside of resettlement
programs.
[44] The regional refugee coordinator was based in Cairo until the
summer of 2008, when the new position was established in Amman. A
refugee coordinator in Baghdad is responsible for in-country processing
and embassy referrals from Iraq.
[45] According to the U.S. government, the vast majority of submissions
are UNHCR referrals.
[46] With the passage of a provision in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, certain
refugees of special humanitarian concern could apply directly to the
U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. Such refugees include Iraqis who were
or are employed by the U.S. government, a U.S. contractor, or a U.S.-
based media organization or NGO, and their family members.
[47] The Departments of State and Homeland Security have recently
initiated in-country processing of Iraqis employed by the U.S.
government. According to State, IOM provides rotational coverage in
Baghdad using a mobile office from Amman.
[48] Under Section 101 (a) (42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
as amended, [8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42)] the term refugee includes "any
person who is outside any country of such person's nationality—and who
is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." Under this section, the term refugee also includes,
in such special circumstances as the President after appropriate
consultation [as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (e)] may specify, any
person who is within the country of such person's nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which
such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
[49] According to the State Department, on average about 70 percent of
UNHCR referrals in the region receive U.S. refugee status.
[50] The Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors,
Office of Inspector General, Middle East Regional Office, Status of
U.S. Refugee Resettlement Processing for Iraqi Nationals, MERO-IQO-08-
02 (May 2008).
[51] State officials noted that about 53 percent of the Iraqi refugees
who were approved for resettlement but have not left for the United
States have not done so because State is awaiting completion of
security clearances, known as security advisory opinions, from the
Central Intelligence Agency. According to State, the lack of personnel
resources at the Central Intelligence Agency has become a significant
issue for all immigrant and refugee applicants needing security
advisory opinions, not just Iraqis.
[52] GAO has found that three practices appear to be critical for
effective strategic planning. Organizations must (1) involve their
stakeholders; (2) assess their internal and external environments; and
(3) align their activities, core processes, and resources to support
mission-related outcomes. See GAO, Agencies' Strategic Plans Under
GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.16] (Washington, D.C.: May
1997, Version 1).
[53] Government Performance and Results Act, Section 3 (a) and (b).
[54] See UNHCR, Strategy for the Iraq Situation (Geneva: revised Jan.
1, 2007); and UNHCR, Iraq Situation Response Supplementary Appeal
(Geneva: Jan. 2007).
[55] Strategic Framework for Humanitarian Action in Iraq, United
Nations and Partners, April 2007.
[56] NGO Statement on Regional Consequences of the Humanitarian Crisis
in Iraq; International Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Needs
of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons inside Iraq and in
Neighboring Countries (Geneva: Apr.17-18, 2007).
[57] UNHCR develops annual country operations plans that address its
plans and performance measures for the refugee situation in each
country. Country operations plans or summaries of plans for Syria and
Jordan were made public from 2004 through 2006. Plans from 2007 through
2009 were not made public until UNHCR responded to a draft of this
report. Moreover, recent plans now cover a period of 2 years.
[58] UNHCR, Estimating the Immediate Needs of Iraqi Refugees in the
Middle East, February 2008.
[59] Fafo, Iraqis in Jordan 2007; Their Number and Characteristics
(Norway: 2007).
[60] Pillar II's mission is to "ensure host countries maintain
welcoming environments in which Iraqi refugees can live their lives in
safety and dignity while awaiting return or resettlement." It also
notes that ultimately the 2009 UN Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the
Region must be measured by its impact on the lives of the Iraqi
refugees.
[61] Pillar II objectives within the UN's 2009 Consolidated Appeal for
Iraq and the Region are to (1) ensure that Iraqis are able to seek
asylum and continue to receive protection; (2) ensure that Iraqi
refugees' basic needs are met, with special attention to the most
vulnerable; (3) support targeted resettlement for vulnerable Iraqis;
and (4) undertake contingency measures for potential voluntary returns.
[62] In commenting on a draft of this report, UNHCR noted that it has
appointed a senior regional coordinator that will be based in Amman
beginning in mid-April 2009 to address coordination issues in the
region.
[63] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-163, Section 1059.
[64] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-181, Section 1244.
[65] After December 26, 2007, Iraqis and Afghans who receive special
immigrant status are eligible for a period up to 6 months for
resettlement assistance, entitlement programs, and other benefits
available to refugees admitted under section 207 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Pub. L.
No.110-161).
[66] Under these programs, Iraqi nationals who worked for the U.S.
government, as defined in each program's authorizing legislation, and
met other conditions are eligible to receive special immigrant visas.
[67] Congressional Budget Office, Contractors' Support of U.S.
Operations in Iraq, August 2008 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2008).
[68] In fiscal year 2009, however, the authorized number of SIVs for
this program will revert to 50 annually. See An Act to Increase the
Number of Iraqi and Afghani Translators and Interpreters Who May Be
Admitted to the United States as Special Immigrants, and For Other
Purposes, Pub. L. No. 110-36, June 15, 2007.
[69] Under the 1244 program, the Chief of Mission or his or her
designee is required to conduct a risk assessment of the principal
applicant and an independent review of records maintained by the U.S.
government or hiring organization to confirm employment and faithful
and valuable service to the U.S. government prior to approval of a
petition. According to State, the Chief of Mission has delegated this
responsibility to the Senior Coordinator for Refugees and Internally
Displaced Persons.
[70] Pub. L. No. 110-181, as passed in January 2008, did not allow
processing to begin until fiscal year 2009. However, Pub. L. No. 110-
242, passed on June 3, 2008, amended the legislation to allow
processing to begin in fiscal year 2008 and continue through 2012, and
if any unused amounts remained, into 2013.
[71] U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors
Office of Inspector General, Middle East Regional Office, Status of
Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa Programs (May 2008).
[72] We did not assess the reliability of the data in these reports.
[End of section]
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