U.S. Public Diplomacy
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight
Gao ID: GAO-09-679SP May 27, 2009
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has spent at least $10 billion on communication efforts designed to advance the strategic interests of the United States. However, foreign public opinion polling data shows that negative views towards the United States persist despite the collective efforts to counteract them by the State Department (State), Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of Defense (DOD), and other U.S. government agencies. Based on the significant role U.S. strategic communication and public diplomacy efforts can play in promoting U.S. national security objectives, such as countering ideological support for violent extremism, we highlighted these efforts as an urgent issue for the new administration and Congress.
(1) Strategic and operational planning--The United States' current national communication strategy lacks a number of desirable characteristics identified by GAO, such as a clear definition of the problem, desired results, and a delineation of agency roles and responsibilities. We believe the inclusion of these and other key elements could have helped address several of the challenges and issues discussed below. Prior GAO reports have discussed the need for agency-specific and country-level plans that support national-level planning efforts. We found that such supporting plans have generally not been developed. In the absence of an improved strategy and supporting plans, it remains doubtful that agency programs are strategically designed and executed in support of common goals. (2) Performance measurement--While agencies have made some progress in developing performance measurement systems, limited data exist on the ultimate effect of U.S. outreach efforts relative to the top-level goals outlined in the national communication strategy. (3) Coordination of U.S. communications efforts--Although several mechanisms have been established to coordinate U.S. strategic communication policy and programs, concerns remain regarding the roles and responsibilities of State and DOD; the extent of outreach to the private sector; and whether new leadership mechanisms or organizational structures are needed. (4) State's public diplomacy workforce--State faces a number of human capital challenges that influence the effectiveness of its public diplomacy operations. Specific challenges include staffing shortages, a shortage of experienced public diplomacy officers to fill mid-career positions, administrative burdens and staffing policies that limit the time public diplomacy officers can devote to outreach efforts, and ongoing foreign language proficiency shortfalls. Collectively, these challenges and concerns raise the risk that U.S. interests are not being adequately addressed. (5) Outreach efforts in high-threat posts--Security concerns around the world have led to building practices and personnel policies that have limited the ability of local populations to interact with Americans inside and outside the embassy. For the past several years, State has experimented with alternative outreach mechanisms such as American Corners to alleviate this forced isolation. These efforts raise significant policy, funding, and operational questions, which remain to be fully addressed. (6) Interagency efforts to adopt a new approach to public diplomacy-- Dynamic shifts in how target audiences obtain and use information have led many public diplomacy practitioners to conclude that the United States must more fully engage emerging social networks and technologies (such as Facebook and Twitter) in order to remain relevant. Referred to as "Public Diplomacy 2.0," this new approach to strategic communications is exploring ways to operate in this evolving information environment. However, substantial questions exist regarding the challenges associated with this new approach.
GAO-09-679SP, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2009:
U.S. Public Diplomacy:
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight:
GAO-09-679SP:
Contents:
Letter:
Enclosure I: Background:
Enclosure II: Strategic and Operational Planning:
Enclosure III: Performance Measurement:
Enclosure IV: Coordination of U.S. Communications Efforts:
Enclosure V: State's Public Diplomacy Workforce:
Enclosure VI: Outreach Efforts in High-Threat Posts:
Enclosure VII: Interagency Efforts to Adopt a New Approach to Public
Diplomacy:
Appendix I: Extent to Which the June 2007 National Strategy Addresses
GAO's Desirable Characteristics:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: June 2007 National Strategy's Conformance with GAO's Desirable
Characteristics:
Table 2: State Department's Linked Performance Indicators:
Table 3: Summary of Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National
Strategy:
Figures:
Figure 1: Key Uses of U.S. Strategic Communication Budget Resources for
the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal
Year 2008:
Figure 2: Key Elements of the Campaign-Style Approach:
Figure 3: Extent to Which the June 2007 National Strategy for Public
Diplomacy and Strategic Communication Addresses the 27 Elements of the
Desirable Characteristics of a National Strategy:
Abbreviations:
BBG: Broadcasting Board of Governors:
CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies:
DOD: Department of Defense:
ECA: Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs:
PCC: Policy Coordinating Committee:
State: Department of State:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
VOA: Voice of America:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 27, 2009:
Congressional Committees:
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government
has spent at least $10 billion on communication efforts designed to
advance the strategic interests of the United States. However, foreign
public opinion polling data shows that negative views towards the
United States persist despite the collective efforts to counteract them
by the State Department (State), Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG),
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of
Defense (DOD), and other U.S. government agencies. Based on the
significant role U.S. strategic communication and public diplomacy
[Footnote 1] efforts can play in promoting U.S. national security
objectives, such as countering ideological support for violent
extremism, we highlighted these efforts as an urgent issue for the new
administration and Congress.[Footnote 2] To assist Congress with its
oversight agenda, we have enclosed a series of issue papers that
discuss long-standing and emerging public diplomacy challenges
identified by GAO and others.[Footnote 3]
While the prior administration issued a national communication strategy
in June 2007, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009 requires that the President issue a new comprehensive strategy by
December 2009 to guide interagency efforts. The issues discussed in the
enclosures to this report should be considered in the development of
the new strategic plan, related agency and country-level plans, and
other areas such as State's human capital and security policies. Key
issues include the following:
* Strategic and operational planning--The United States' current
national communication strategy lacks a number of desirable
characteristics identified by GAO, such as a clear definition of the
problem, desired results, and a delineation of agency roles and
responsibilities. We believe the inclusion of these and other key
elements could have helped address several of the challenges and issues
discussed below. Prior GAO reports have discussed the need for agency-
specific and country-level plans that support national-level planning
efforts. We found that such supporting plans have generally not been
developed. In the absence of an improved strategy and supporting plans,
it remains doubtful that agency programs are strategically designed and
executed in support of common goals.
* Performance measurement--While agencies have made some progress in
developing performance measurement systems, limited data exist on the
ultimate effect of U.S. outreach efforts relative to the top-level
goals outlined in the national communication strategy.
* Coordination of U.S. communications efforts--Although several
mechanisms have been established to coordinate U.S. strategic
communication policy and programs, concerns remain regarding the roles
and responsibilities of State and DOD; the extent of outreach to the
private sector; and whether new leadership mechanisms or organizational
structures are needed.
* State's public diplomacy workforce--State faces a number of human
capital challenges that influence the effectiveness of its public
diplomacy operations. Specific challenges include staffing shortages, a
shortage of experienced public diplomacy officers to fill mid-career
positions, administrative burdens and staffing policies that limit the
time public diplomacy officers can devote to outreach efforts, and
ongoing foreign language proficiency shortfalls. Collectively, these
challenges and concerns raise the risk that U.S. interests are not
being adequately addressed.
* Outreach efforts in high-threat posts--Security concerns around the
world have led to building practices and personnel policies that have
limited the ability of local populations to interact with Americans
inside and outside the embassy. For the past several years, State has
experimented with alternative outreach mechanisms such as American
Corners to alleviate this forced isolation. These efforts raise
significant policy, funding, and operational questions, which remain to
be fully addressed.
* Interagency efforts to adopt a new approach to public diplomacy--
Dynamic shifts in how target audiences obtain and use information have
led many public diplomacy practitioners to conclude that the United
States must more fully engage emerging social networks and technologies
(such as Facebook and Twitter) in order to remain relevant. Referred to
as "Public Diplomacy 2.0," this new approach to strategic
communications is exploring ways to operate in this evolving
information environment. However, substantial questions exist regarding
the challenges associated with this new approach.
We reviewed current agency documents related to the issues discussed in
the attached enclosures. We discussed these issues with State, BBG,
USAID, and DOD officials in Washington, D.C. We reviewed reports
related to public diplomacy by various research institutions. We also
applied national planning criteria developed by GAO to the United
States' current national communication strategy to highlight
deficiencies that we believe should be addressed in the President's new
interagency strategy. Further information on the scope and methodology
for this particular analysis can be found in appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2008 through May 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions.
We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to State,
BBG, USAID, and DOD. Each agency declined to provide formal comments.
State, BBG, and USAID provided technical comments, which we
incorporated in the report, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees. In addition, we are sending copies of this report to the
National Security Council and executive branch agencies. The report
also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov]. If you have any questions, please contact Jess T.
Ford at (202) 512-4128 or FordJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last
page of this report. For press inquiries, please contact Chuck Young at
(202) 512-4800. Key contributors to this report are included in
appendix II.
Signed by:
Gene L. Dodaro:
Acting Comptroller General of the United States:
Enclosures:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chair:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chair:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chair:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Chair:
The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chair:
The Honorable John M. McHugh:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chair:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Kay Granger:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John Tierney:
Chair:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Background:
The overall goal of U.S. strategic communication efforts is to
understand, engage, inform, and influence the attitudes and behaviors
of global audiences in support of U.S. strategic interests. U.S.
strategic communication efforts are distributed across several
entities, including State, BBG, USAID, and DOD, and function under the
broad guidance of the White House and National Security Council. Within
the U.S. government, State's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and
Public Affairs has the lead for U.S. strategic communication efforts.
Agency Programs:
State's public diplomacy efforts are managed by the Under Secretary for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, who oversees the Bureaus of
Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), International Information
Programs, and Public Affairs. ECA aims to foster mutual understanding
between the United States and other countries through International
Visitor, Fulbright, and other academic and professional exchange
programs. The Bureau of International Information Programs communicates
with foreign publics about U.S. policy, society, and values through
speaker programs, print and electronic publications, and Internet
outreach. The Bureau of Public Affairs informs audiences about U.S.
foreign policy through activities such as media outreach and news
management. State's workforce of over 1,000 public diplomacy officers
is divided between Washington and overseas posts, where public
diplomacy staff report through the ambassador to their respective
regional bureaus in Washington. State embassy officers engage in
information dissemination, media relations, cultural affairs, and other
efforts.
The BBG, as the overseer of U.S. international broadcasting efforts,
aims to support U.S. strategic communication objectives by broadcasting
fair and accurate information, while maintaining its journalistic
independence as a news organization. The BBG operates 75 language
services divided among its five broadcast entities--Voice of America
(VOA), the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting.
USAID's communication mission is to inform host country audiences about
U.S. assistance. To fulfill this role, USAID maintains a public affairs
office in Washington, D.C., and a network of 111 communication
specialists at USAID missions worldwide. The communications
specialists' outreach functions include responding to inquiries about
USAID programs, collaborating with the embassy public affairs office,
speech writing for the USAID mission director and others, preparing
press releases, and coordinating Web site updates.
DOD's Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Joint
Communication is responsible for overseeing DOD activities directed at
shaping departmentwide communications doctrine, organization, and
training for the joint force; but this office has not issued formal
policy regarding its strategic communication operations. Among other
efforts, DOD has developed a predoctrinal document called the
"Commander's Handbook," which provides strategic communications
principles, techniques, and procedures, and has launched some strategic
communication education and training initiatives to help
institutionalize strategic communication. DOD's strategic communication
operations are divided among public affairs activities, information
operations (which includes psychological operations), and defense
support to public diplomacy offices.
Agency Funding:
As shown in figure 1, State and the BBG shared a total strategic
communication budget of about $1.6 billion in fiscal year 2008, with
$501 million going to State's exchange and cultural affairs programs,
$378 million going to State's nonexchange programs, and the balance of
$682 million going to the BBG to support its global broadcasting
efforts.
Figure 1: Key Uses of U.S. Strategic Communication Budget Resources for
the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal
Year 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
State Department: $879 million total:
* Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs exchange programs: $501
million;
* Public diplomacy activities in State's regional bureaus: $181
million;
* Domestic and overseas public diplomacy American salaries: $125
million;
* Public diplomacy activities in State's functional bureaus: $28
million;
* Bureau of International Information Programs: $23 million;
* Related appropriations: $20 million.
Broadcasting Board of Governors: $682 million total:
* BBG management, engineering, capital improvement, and other costs:
$252 million;
* Voice of America: $188 million;
* Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: $83 million;
* Radio Free Asia: $34 million;
* Office of Cuba Broadcasting: $33 million.
Source: State Department and BBG.
Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
[End of figure]
USAID funds all domestic and some foreign audience communications out
of limited agency operating expenses. There is no stand-alone budget
for agency communications other than the operational budget amount
allotted to USAID's headquarters public affairs bureau through the
annual budget process.[Footnote 4] USAID's main resource for
communicating to foreign audiences is its worldwide network of
communications specialists, most of whom are Foreign Service Nationals.
USAID missions usually establish a program budget for mission or
country communications based on amounts left over within the mission
budget or through use of hard-to-utilize local currency accounts
maintained by the embassy or mission, or both.
DOD does not have a separate budget covering its strategic
communication activities. DOD officials said that they consider
strategic communication to be a process instead of a discrete set of
programs, and as a result, cannot identify DOD's spending on its
strategic communication efforts. Nonetheless, DOD officials acknowledge
the department spends hundreds of millions of dollars each year to
support its outreach efforts, and DOD has identified strategic
communication as a critical capability it intends to develop and
support with related policy and doctrinal guidance, training, and staff
and program resources.
[End of section]
Enclosure II: Strategic and Operational Planning:
Issue:
A national strategy is a critical planning tool that provides
policymakers and implementing agencies with direction and guidance on
goals, resource allocations, program implementation, and evaluation and
ensures effective oversight and accountability. Beginning in 2003, we
reported on the importance of a national communication strategy to
ensure agency efforts are properly coordinated, convey consistent
messages to target audiences, focus on achieving concrete and
measurable objectives, and lead to mutually reinforcing benefits
overseas.[Footnote 5] In 2005, we specifically recommended such a
strategy be developed.[Footnote 6] In June 2007, the previous
administration released a national communication strategy, which
established three objectives: (1) offer a positive vision of hope and
opportunity, (2) nurture common interests and values, and (3) help
isolate and marginalize violent extremists. The strategy also provided
guidance on such topics as target audiences, public diplomacy
priorities, and interagency coordination, and outlined implementation
plans for each communication objective. However, the strategy failed to
include a clear definition of the problem, desired results, and a
delineation of agency roles and responsibilities. Moreover, the
strategy is not adequately supported by agency-specific plans and
country-level plans modeled on private-sector best practices that could
help increase the coordination and effectiveness of U.S. communication
efforts that are distributed across four major agencies, dozens of
discrete programs, a diverse range of communication objectives, and
assorted target audiences around the world. The National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 requires that the President
issue a new comprehensive strategy by December 2009 to guide
interagency strategic communication efforts.[Footnote 7] It is
important that the President and Congress, in devising this new
strategy, incorporate the need to (1) address key planning elements
such as a desired end-state with clear outcome and subordinate goals,
and (2) develop plans and policies regarding the need for supporting
department and country-level planning efforts that incorporate private-
sector best practices. Absent the development of such a detailed
strategy, the U.S. government runs the risk that its communication
efforts will lack coordination and focus, and fail to achieve strategic
objectives.
Key Findings:
2007 National Strategy Only Partially Addressed Key Planning Elements:
In 2004, GAO identified a set of desirable characteristics to aid in
the development and implementation of national strategies, enhance
their usefulness as tools to help make policy and program decisions,
guide resource allocations, and assure better accountability for
results.[Footnote 8] However, the June 2007 communication strategy did
not address or only partially addressed such key characteristics as
defining the purpose of the document, describing the nature and scope
of the problem, developing a hierarchy of strategic goals and
performance objectives, describing future costs and needed resources,
and delineating U.S. government roles and responsibilities. Table 1
lists all six characteristics identified by GAO and our assessment of
whether the June 2007 strategy generally addresses, partially
addresses, or does not address the key elements that support each
characteristic.
Table 1: June 2007 National Strategy's Conformance with GAO's Desirable
Characteristics:
Characteristics: Clear purpose, scope, and methodology;
Extent of conformance: Partially addresses;
Examples of missing or incomplete elements:
* Purpose;
* Methodology.
Characteristics: Detailed discussion of problems, risks, and threats;
Extent of conformance: Does not address;
Examples of missing or incomplete elements:
* Problem definition;
* Risk assessment.
Characteristics: Desired goals, objectives, activities, and outcome-
related performance measures;
Extent of conformance: Partially addresses;
Examples of missing or incomplete elements:
* Overall desired results, or "end-state";
* Hierarchy of strategic goals and subordinate objectives;
* Milestones and outcome-related performance measures.
Characteristics: Resources, investments, and risk management;
Extent of conformance: Does not address;
Examples of missing or incomplete elements:
* Resources and investments associated with the strategy;
* Sources of resources;
* Risk management principles.
Characteristics: Delineation of U.S. government roles,
responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms;
Extent of conformance: Partially addresses;
Examples of missing or incomplete elements:
* Lead, support, and partner roles and responsibilities of specific
federal agencies, departments, or offices;
* Discussion of how conflicts will be resolved.
Characteristics: Description of strategy's integration among and with
other entities;
Extent of conformance: Partially addresses;
Examples of missing or incomplete elements:
* Addresses integration with relevant documents from other agencies and
subordinate levels.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
The new administration needs to fully consider these characteristics in
drafting the new strategy called for by the National Defense
Authorization Act to ensure the strategy more extensively guides key
planning, decision-making, and oversight processes in line with
strategic communication objectives.
Supporting Agency Plans Have Generally Not Been Developed:
Beginning in 2003, GAO recommended that State develop an agency-level
plan to integrate its diverse public diplomacy activities and direct
them towards common objectives. We noted that the absence of a strategy
may hinder the department's ability to guide its programs towards the
achievement of concrete and measurable results. State responded to this
recommendation with improvements to its strategic planning process;
however, the department still lacks an agency-level plan that
specifically supports the current national strategy. Significantly, the
June 2007 national communication strategy calls for the development of
such agency-level plans. The strategy indicates agency plans should
identify key programs and policies that support the national strategy's
objectives, identify key audiences, assign agency responsibility,
outline specific implementation plans, and develop criteria to evaluate
effectiveness. Among the four nonintelligence agencies (State, USAID,
BBG, and DOD) involved in U.S. strategic communication efforts, only
DOD responded to this call for an agency-specific plan. However, DOD's
plan only lists programs and policies that support the national
strategy's objectives, while omitting any details on target audiences,
DOD's role in relation to other agencies, implementation plans, and
performance measures. In the absence of supporting agency plans, no
clear link can be established between national communication
objectives, agency programs, and results, raising doubts about whether
agency programs have been strategically designed to support a common
purpose in the most efficient and effective manner possible. The new
administration should require the development of supporting agency
plans as it drafts the new strategy called for by the National Defense
Authorization Act.
State Department Lacks Country-Level Plans:
We have recommended that State develop detailed country-level plans
that incorporate strategic communication best practices--which we refer
to as the "campaign-style approach."[Footnote 9] As shown in figure 2,
the campaign-style approach includes defining a core message,
identifying target audiences, developing detailed communication
strategies and tactics, and using research and evaluation to inform and
redirect efforts as needed.
Figure 2: Key Elements of the Campaign-Style Approach:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Research and evaluation:
1) Define core messages and themes based on program objectives;
2) Define target audiences;
3) Develop detail strategies and tactics to reach your target audiences
with your intended messages and themes;
4) Develop and implement a detailed communication plan that
incorporates your program objectives,messages/themes, target audiences,
strategies/tactics, and in-depth research and evaluation results;
5) Monitor progress, adjust strategies and tactics, and report results;
6) Return to step 4, refine as necessary.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Though we have reported that both USAID and DOD have sought to develop
country-level communication plans that generally adhere to the campaign-
style approach, State has not yet developed such plans. Our 2006 review
of public diplomacy operations in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt found
that this approach and corresponding communication plans were absent,
and that in-country public diplomacy planning efforts represented top-
level statements of intent with little detailed planning to support
post communication goals. In 2007, we reported that State's attempt to
improve country-level planning through a pilot effort at 18 posts
served as a useful exercise, but the country plans lacked key elements
of the campaign-style approach. State officials told us a new
initiative will be launched this year requiring embassies to develop
"public diplomacy implementation plans" that address post outreach
efforts. State intends to pilot test these plans in 12 countries. It
remains to be determined whether these new plans will fully incorporate
the campaign-style approach to strategic communication.
The new administration should require the development of supporting
country-level plans as part of its new strategy. In the absence of such
plans, program officials will likely fail to effectively harness
available resources towards explicit communication goals and
objectives.
Oversight Questions:
1. What is the status of current agency efforts to meet the December
2009 deadline for a new national communication strategy?
2. To what extent will the President's new communication strategy
incorporate key planning elements such as a clear definition of the
problem, desired results, and a delineation of agency roles and
responsibilities?
3. What is the status of developing agency-level plans that support the
national strategy's communication goals and objectives?
4. To what extent does State plan to develop country-level
communication plans that adhere to the campaign-style approach
recommended by GAO?
[End of section]
Enclosure III: Performance Measurement:
Issue:
It is critical that agencies comprehensively measure the performance of
their strategic communication efforts to understand which efforts are
most effective and, in turn, determine how to make most efficient use
of limited resources. However, U.S. agencies have not fully
demonstrated the effect of their strategic communication efforts on the
national communication goals, such as countering ideological support
for violent extremism. Since 2003, GAO and other organizations have
called on agencies to fully embrace a "culture of measurement" for
their strategic communication efforts, beginning with a comprehensive
communication strategy that would better enable agencies to direct
their multifaceted efforts towards concrete and measurable progress.
While agencies have made some progress in this area, including
evaluating some programs, such as exchanges, the United States still
lacks a national strategy that includes desired results, performance
objectives, and outcome-related indicators.
Key Findings:
Limitations of Prior National-Level Performance Planning:
The 2007 national communication strategy identifies three key strategic
goals--(1) offer a positive vision of hope and opportunity, rooted in
the most basic values of the American people; (2) nurture common
interests and values; and (3) marginalize extremism. However, this
strategy does not identify target "end-states," which are the desired
results of such efforts, nor are the strategic goals supported by
subordinate performance objectives and indicators that would allow
agencies and others to gauge progress. In addition, agencies have
adopted varying performance management systems that do not link back to
the national communication strategy.
* BBG's performance measurement system is not explicitly linked to the
national strategy. According to BBG officials, the board's statutory
mandate of broadcasting accurate and objective news and information
sets it apart from other strategic communication efforts. BBG officials
told us BBG supports the national strategic communications goals when
they are consistent with BBG's mandate and strategic plan. BBG has a
standard set of performance indicators it uses to measure progress
towards its overarching strategic goal to "deliver accurate news and
information to significant audiences in support of U.S. strategic
interests."
* USAID has not established a standard set of performance indicators
for measuring progress towards the national strategic communications
goals. USAID officials noted that their strategic communications do not
constitute a separate program or budget line item; thus these efforts
are generally not monitored or evaluated separately. However, USAID's
field-based communications specialists are expected to develop
communication strategies that include goals and objectives as well as
performance monitoring plans for their outreach activities.
* While DOD strategic communication has a substantial role in
marginalizing extremism, DOD has not established standard performance
indicators to assess its effectiveness in contributing to this key
strategic goal. DOD officials said this is because the department
considers strategic communications to be a process instead of a
discrete program, thus they are not separately monitored. However, DOD
has measured the effectiveness of its communications at the project
level.
* In contrast to the other three agencies, State's performance
measurement system provides a set of outcome-oriented performance
indicators linked to the national strategy's goals as shown in table 2.
However, State has not established subordinate objectives in support of
the national goals that could better illustrate the linkages between
the broad strategic goals and its performance indicators.
Table 2: State Department's Linked Performance Indicators:
National strategic goals: Offer a positive vision of hope and
opportunity, rooted in the most basic values of the American people;
State's outcome-oriented performance indicators: Increased
understanding of U.S. policy, society, and values.
National strategic goals: Nurture common interests and values;
State's outcome-oriented performance indicators: Percentage of exchange
program participants who increased or changed their understanding of
the United States immediately following their program.
National strategic goals: Marginalize extremism;
State's outcome-oriented performance indicators: Reduction in the level
of anti-American sentiment among participants of State information
programs.
Source: State's Fiscal Year 2008 Performance Report.
[End of table]
Agencies' Ability to Measure Results Limited by Inherent Challenges and
Varying Use of Research:
Agencies cite three inherent challenges in measuring the effectiveness
of their strategic communication efforts. First, strategic
communications may only produce long-term, rather than immediate,
effect. Second, it is difficult to isolate the effect of strategic
communications from other influences, such as policy. Third, strategic
communications often target audiences' perceptions, which are
intangible and complex and thus difficult to measure. GAO and others
have identified some potential best practices for assessing strategic
communications programs that address some of the inherent difficulties
in measuring these programs' effect on attitudes and behaviors. For
example, in 2007, we reported that in-depth actionable research at
every step of the communications process is critical to monitoring and
evaluating progress.[Footnote 10] Common private-sector measurement
techniques that are used to measure results include the use of surveys
and polling to develop baseline data, immediate follow-up research, and
additional tracking polls to identify long-term changes over time.
In addition, agencies' funding and use of research to measure
performance varies. We reported in 2007 that State has generally not
adopted a research-focused approach to evaluate the effect of its
thematic communications efforts. State conducts and contracts for
audience research, including broad public opinion polling and focus
groups, in over 50 countries each year through its Office of Research,
which has an annual research budget of about $5.5 million. However,
such generic research is not used to evaluate the effectiveness of
public diplomacy programs. By contrast, BBG uses research to help its
broadcast services plan and evaluate their programs. BBG has a research
budget of about $10 million per year, which funds audience surveys,
focus groups, in-depth interviews, and listener and monitor panels to
support its broadcasting activities throughout the world. In our prior
work, we identified shortcomings with BBG's audience research
methodology. In our August 2006 report on the Middle East Broadcasting
Networks, we recommended that several steps be taken to correct
methodological concerns that could affect the accuracy of its research
data regarding Alhurra's viewing rates and Radio Sawa's listening
rates.[Footnote 11] BBG has since taken steps to address some of these
methodological concerns, including identifying significant
methodological limitations. While USAID does not have a central
research office that conducts audience research, staff at some missions
contract for polling and focus groups to support specific, targeted
public awareness campaigns. Finally, some of DOD's combatant commands
have recently initiated their own polling and focus group efforts.
Limited Evaluation of State Public Diplomacy Programs:
State has evaluated its public diplomacy programs to varying degrees.
The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) has its own
staffed and resourced internal evaluation unit and has been a leader in
performance measurement and evaluation for several years. While this
bureau has extensively evaluated its programs using its annual
evaluation budget of $1.8 million, State has sponsored limited
evaluation of the rest of its public diplomacy programs. For example,
the Bureau of International Information Programs' Speakers Program,
which it describes as its "largest and single most powerful instrument
for engaging foreign publics on a person-to-person basis," has not yet
been evaluated, although State is planning an evaluation of the program
later in 2009. Further, embassy public affairs officers generally do
not conduct systematic program evaluations and receive only limited
audience polling data to help measure progress. The lack of a
comprehensive system for evaluating public diplomacy performance
hinders State's ability to correct its course of action or direct
resources toward activities that offer a greater likelihood of success.
In order to bring measurement and evaluation for the rest of public
diplomacy up to the ECA bureau's high standard, State recently
established an Evaluation and Measurement Unit within State's Office of
Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
The unit is charged with developing performance measurement instruments
and conducting independent evaluations of the effectiveness of all
State public diplomacy programs. This unit has established a core set
of public diplomacy performance indicators and launched a global public
diplomacy tracking system as well as a pilot study to attempt to
quantify the aggregate effect of public diplomacy programs and
products.
State Department Country-Level Reporting on Results Is Inconsistent:
State has inconsistent reporting requirements for its public diplomacy
activities undertaken at the country-level and therefore does not
ensure these efforts are measured by comparable standards, or at all.
State mission performance planning guidance allows public diplomacy
staff in the field to focus on public diplomacy as a stand-alone
strategic goal aimed at promoting mutual understanding, to integrate
public diplomacy into another strategic goal, such as counterterrorism,
or do both. When treated as a stand-alone goal, posts are expected to
generate related performance indicators and targets. When public
diplomacy efforts are integrated with other strategic goals, posts are
not required to develop related performance targets and indicators. In
2003, we administered a survey to the heads of public affairs sections
at U.S. embassies worldwide covering a range of issues.[Footnote 12]
Survey results indicated that about 87 percent of respondents
integrated public diplomacy into the missions' other strategic goals,
which means that the majority of missions were not required to measure
the performance of their public diplomacy programs.
Oversight Questions:
1. How do agencies track their contributions towards common
communication goals such as marginalizing extremism?
2. To what extent have agencies incorporated in-depth, actionable
research into their performance evaluation efforts?
3. To what extent do available resources meet agency needs for in-
depth, actionable research?
4. What effect do embassy communications efforts have beyond supporting
the traditional goal of promoting mutual understanding, and how is this
measured?
[End of section]
Enclosure IV: Coordination of U.S. Communications Efforts:
Issue:
When agencies conduct communications programs in a fragmented,
uncoordinated way, it can result in a patchwork of programs that can
waste funds, lead to inconsistent messaging, and limit the overall
effectiveness of the effort. Interagency coordination of U.S. strategic
communication efforts is limited by several challenges, including
unclear agency roles and responsibilities, a lack of sustained
leadership to direct agencies' efforts, minimal interagency sharing of
research, and the lack of a strategy to engage the private sector. Due,
in part, to concerns about the lack of effective interagency
coordination, several reports have questioned whether new leadership
mechanisms and organizational structures are needed to improve U.S.
strategic communication efforts. Several reports have proposed creating
an independent or semi-independent organization to support the
government in achieving its communications goals, while other reports
propose establishing a new government agency to consolidate U.S.
government communications.
Key Findings:
Roles and Responsibilities Have Not Been Defined:
The national communications strategy identifies the principal mechanism
for the coordination of U.S. government strategic communication
activities, namely the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Public
Diplomacy and Strategic Communication led by State's Under Secretary
for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, but does not address which
agencies, departments, and offices will implement the strategy and
their roles and responsibilities. The lack of guidance on DOD's and
State's respective roles and responsibilities is of particular concern.
Both departments have made marginalizing extremism--one of the three
national communication goals--their top communications priority and are
undertaking activities in this area. While State has been formally
designated as the lead for all U.S. government strategic
communications, DOD has more resources than State to apply to the
strategic communications goal of marginalizing extremism. In 2006, DOD
established the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Support to Public Diplomacy to support and coordinate public diplomacy
efforts, and serve as the lead for developing policy within DOD on
countering ideological support for terrorism. DOD officials said this
office was disbanded in early 2009 and it is unclear what existing or
new mechanisms, if any, will conduct its functions. Further, despite
internal planning initiatives that began in 2006, DOD has not defined
the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of its internal military
capabilities that support strategic communications, such as public
affairs, information operations, and defense support for public
diplomacy.
Lack of Leadership:
We reported in 2005 that a lack of leadership has contributed to
agencies independently defining and coordinating strategic
communications programs.[Footnote 13] Some reports note that a unifying
vision of strategic communications starts with sustained senior
leadership from the White House focusing exclusively on global
communication. In January 2003, the then-President established an
Office of Global Communications to facilitate the strategic direction
and coordination of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. However, this office
was ineffectual in fulfilling its intended role and no longer exists.
In addition, State officials told us the lack of sustained leadership
at the under secretary level has also hindered interagency
coordination. These officials estimate the position of the Under
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has been vacant about
40 percent of the time since 2001, and said the PCC did not meet when
the position was vacant. A recent report on this issue notes that
neither a lead organization nor lead individual has the authority to
command independent departments or agencies, and the PCC structure is
incapable of fostering coordination and strategic planning.[Footnote
14] The report recommends alternative options to integrate government
efforts, such as the creation of decentralized interagency teams made
up of a small full-time staff to formulate and implement policy and
support collaboration.
Minimal Interagency Sharing of Research:
Several U.S. agencies conduct and sponsor audience research and media
monitoring; however, they have not yet developed interagency protocols
or a central clearinghouse for sharing such research as recommended by
GAO in 2007.[Footnote 15] Agency officials told us that barriers to
sharing research include classification of documents and concerns about
the release of sensitive and proprietary information. A PCC
subcommittee on "Metrics and Polling," the main interagency forum for
research staff to discuss issues of concern, has recently taken steps
to encourage greater sharing of research information, particularly
through conducting two applied research seminars in which various U.S.
government agencies shared and analyzed audience, market, and opinion
data with the aim of informing communication strategies for Afghanistan
and Pakistan. The BBG has also recently provided other U.S. agencies
with access to its audience research.
Lack of a Comprehensive Strategy to Engage the Private Sector:
In 2003 and 2005, we recommended the Secretary of State develop a
strategy to engage with the private sector in pursuit of common public
diplomacy objectives to help ensure private-sector resources, talents,
and ideas are effectively utilized in support of U.S. strategic
communications. In 2005 we reported that State had engaged the private
sector in the area of international exchange programs, but other
efforts led by State's Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy and
Public Affairs had not yielded significant results. Since then, a
former under secretary established an Office of Private Sector Outreach
for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, which has partnered with the
private sector on various projects, hosted a Private Sector Summit on
Public Diplomacy in January 2007, invited private-sector experts to
assist U.S. government officials in marketing public diplomacy
programs, and identified action steps the private sector can take to
support and improve U.S. public diplomacy. However, the office has not
worked with the private sector to implement those additional action
steps. While State's efforts thus far have merit, their effect may be
limited if not backed by the type of comprehensive strategy to engage
the private sector we have recommended.[Footnote 16]
Oversight Questions:
1. What is the appropriate role of DOD in relation to State in
strategic communication? What are DOD's and State's respective
authorities, comparative advantages, and capabilities in conducting
strategic communication?
2. Given the disbanding of DOD's Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy, what mechanisms,
if any, will be instituted to carry out its functions?
3. When will DOD issue policy guidance regarding its internal strategic
communication structure?
4. What are State's plans for future engagement with the private
sector? When will State develop a strategy for engagement as
recommended by GAO?
5. What criteria can be used to evaluate the advantages and
disadvantages of creating new organizational structures for conducting
strategic communication?
[End of section]
Enclosure V: State's Public Diplomacy Workforce:
Issue:
Having the right people, with the right skills, in the right place is
essential to the effective management of any government program.
Beginning in 2003, GAO has reported that State's public diplomacy
operations have been hampered by insufficient numbers and types of
staff, administrative burdens and time constraints, and language
proficiency shortfalls. These problems have compromised State's ability
to fully execute its public diplomacy mission, led to minimal coverage
at certain posts, placed a strain on more-junior staff filling
positions above their pay grade, and diminished effectiveness where
target language proficiency levels have not been met. The department
has sought to respond to these challenges by instituting a number of
initiatives including a requested increase of 2,400 in American and
Foreign Service National staff over the next 2 years, various financial
incentives to attract and motivate staff, and increased training
opportunities. It remains to be determined whether these assorted
initiatives will fully address the human capital challenges identified
by GAO; a failure to do so by State will compromise the effectiveness
of its public diplomacy operations for the foreseeable future.
Key Findings:
Staffing Shortages and Lack of Mid-Level Officers Hinder U.S. Outreach
Efforts:
State has experienced a shortage of public diplomacy staff since 1999
when the United States Information Agency was merged into the
department. In 2003, GAO reported that State experienced a 13 percent
vacancy rate in its public diplomacy positions. Similar findings were
reported by GAO in May 2006, and data from November 2007 show a vacancy
rate of over 13 percent. In our 2003 report, we noted that more than 50
percent of those responding to our survey of public diplomacy officers
felt the number of Foreign Service officers available to perform public
diplomacy duties was inadequate. Our May 2006 report noted that while
several recent reports on public diplomacy had recommended increased
spending on U.S. public diplomacy programs, several embassy officials
told us that, given current staffing levels, they lacked the capacity
to effectively utilize increased funds.
In August 2006, we reported that State's consular and public diplomacy
positions were the hardest to fill, with 91 percent of the vacancies in
these two tracks at the mid-level. We noted this staffing gap placed
pressure on State to appoint junior officers to so-called "stretch
positions"--whereby they serve in a position above their pay grade--to
fill as many of these vacancies as possible. For example, at the time
of our visit in 2006 the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria--which had the
third largest mission in Africa with nearly 800 employees--told us the
embassy had only three senior officers, and public affairs were handled
entirely by first-tour junior officers. Ambassadors at posts GAO
visited stated that junior officers, while generally highly qualified
when entering the Foreign Service, lack sufficient training to handle
some of the high-stress situations they encounter and therefore often
end up making mistakes. A January 2008 analysis by State's Human
Resources Bureau indicates that mid-level shortages continue. The
report notes the public diplomacy cone has the highest mid-level
deficit among the five generalist cones, and public diplomacy officers
are being promoted through the mid-levels at higher rates than other
cones. State officials expect it will take several years before the mid-
level deficit is erased. One senior State official noted accelerated
rates of promotion have led to concern that some public diplomacy
officers may not have the requisite experience and expertise to perform
effectively at their current levels.
Administrative Burden and Lack of Time Cited as Limiting Factors:
In 2003, we reported public diplomacy officers at posts were burdened
with administrative tasks, and thus had less time to conduct public
diplomacy outreach activities than they did when the United States
Information Agency was responsible for U.S. public diplomacy efforts.
More than 40 percent of the 118 public affairs officers responding to
our survey reported the amount of time they had to devote exclusively
to executing public diplomacy tasks was insufficient. During our
overseas fieldwork, officers told us that, while they managed to attend
U.S. and other foreign embassy receptions and functions within their
host country capitals, it was particularly difficult to find time or
staff resources to travel outside the capitals to interact with
ordinary citizens. In May 2006, we noted one senior State official
overseas told us administrative duties, such as budget, personnel, and
internal reporting, compete with officers' public diplomacy
responsibilities. Another official in Egypt told us she rarely had
enough time to strategize, plan, or evaluate programs.
This challenge is compounded at posts with short tours of duty,
including many posts of strategic importance in the Muslim world, as
officials stated it is difficult to establish the type of close working
relationships essential to effective public diplomacy when in the
country for only a short time. In May 2006, we reported the average
length of tour at posts with significant Muslim populations was 2.1
years, compared with 2.7 years in the non-Muslim world. Noting the
prevalence of 1-year tours at such posts, a senior official at State
said public affairs officers who have shorter tours tend to produce
less effective work than officers with longer tours.
Language Proficiency Shortfalls Remain:
Beginning in July 2003, GAO reported that 21 percent of officers in
public diplomacy language-designated positions did not meet the
language requirements for their position. We reported similar findings
in May 2006, and as of October 2008 this figure stood at 25 percent.
Our May 2006 report noted this problem was particularly acute at posts
where Arabic--classified as a "superhard" language by State--
predominates. In countries with significant Muslim populations, we
reported 30 percent of language-designated public diplomacy positions
were filled by officers without the requisite proficiency in those
languages, compared with 24 percent elsewhere. In Arabic language
posts, about 36 percent of language-designated public diplomacy
positions were filled by staff unable to speak Arabic at the designated
level. In addition, State officials said there are even fewer officers
willing or able to speak on television or engage in public debate in
Arabic. The information officer in Cairo stated his office does not
have enough Arabic speakers to engage the Egyptian media effectively.
Effect of Several Recent Initiatives Remains to Be Determined:
State is seeking to increase its total staffing by over 2,400
individuals over the next 2 years to, in part, create the "personnel
float" needed to allow staff to take language and other forms of
training, fill vacant positions, and ease the burden on existing staff.
State has also repositioned several public diplomacy officers as part
of its transformational diplomacy initiative, and is increasing its
overall amount of language training and providing supplemental training
for more difficult languages at overseas locations. The department has
also increased its language proficiency and hardship-post service
incentives and requirements. However, it remains to be determined
whether these efforts will collectively resolve State's long-standing
human capital challenges.
Other groups have reported that additional human capital challenges
help to explain State's long-standing difficulties filling open public
diplomacy positions with fully qualified staff. For example, the United
States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy issued a report on the
status of State's human capital operations since the integration of the
United States Information Agency into the department in 1999.[Footnote
17] This report addresses a range of topics that the commission
believes have significantly contributed to State's human capital
problems. Discussed topics include hiring, training, promotion
practices, and the degree to which the 1999 merger of the United States
Information Agency into State has resulted in better integration of the
public diplomacy function into the work of State--in particular as
measured by the presence of public diplomacy officers in the
department's decision-making ranks.
Oversight Questions:
1. What is State's strategy to obtain a sufficient number of staff to
create the desired training float needed to fill vacant public
diplomacy positions and meet all required language training needs?
2. What is State's strategy to address the deficit in mid-level
management expertise?
3. Are public affairs officers at posts overburdened with
administrative duties? If so, what can be done to alleviate this
situation?
[End of section]
Enclosure VI: Outreach Efforts in High-Threat Posts:
Issue:
Conditions in high-threat posts have led to security precautions that
limit public access to U.S. embassies and reduce the number of external
facilities open to local populations--thereby limiting the
effectiveness of U.S. outreach efforts. Beginning in the late 1990s,
security concerns led to the fortification of preexisting and new
embassies, which in many cases entailed increased physical barriers
around the embassies, as well as the location of embassy complexes to
more remote locations. These measures have had the ancillary effect of
making the United States seem unapproachable and distrustful, according
to State officials, leading to increased anti-American sentiments
amongst local populations. Compounding this problem, security and
budgetary considerations brought about the closure of publicly
accessible facilities outside the embassy compound, such as American
Centers and Libraries. While little has been done to change the
forbidding presence associated with many embassies, State has responded
to the lack of external facilities by exploring a variety of outreach
mechanisms such as American Corners, which are centers that provide
information about the United States, hosted in local institutions and
staffed by local employees. It is important that State determine the
relative effectiveness of these alternative outreach mechanisms and, in
turn, find the right balance between security and mission concerns.
Key Findings:
Enhanced Security Measures and the Closure of Public Facilities Have
Limited Outreach Efforts:
Since the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,
Congress has provided State hundreds of millions of dollars annually
for embassy construction to secure facilities around the world. Among
the many embassy security-related construction requirements is that
facilities be further offset from the street, leading to the building
of many new embassies several miles from urban centers. Such sites tend
to be in remote areas poorly served by public transportation, and these
relocations have diminished the ability of local citizens and U.S.
embassy personnel to interact. As we reported in May 2006, the new
security architecture has created heavily-protected structures that
make embassies seem less welcoming to local citizens. Congress has also
mandated that sites selected for new U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad
meet a colocation requirement designed to ensure all U.S. government
agencies, except those under the command of a United States area
military commander, be located on the same compound, complicating
attempts to establish diplomatic venues outside the compound.
In addition, due to security concerns and other factors, State closed
or eliminated funding for many publicly accessible facilities that
provided an opportunity for local populations to interact directly with
Americans with the goal of promoting mutual understanding.[Footnote 18]
Beginning in the late 1990s, the United States began to close its
worldwide network of American Cultural Centers operated in downtown
locations in capital cities around the world, which offered reading
rooms; group lectures; film, music, and art series; and English
language instruction.[Footnote 19] With the closure of these
facilities, their operations were transferred to Information Resource
Centers located within heavily fortified embassy compounds, many of
which are now open by appointment only or have hours of operation and
security policies limiting public access. In May 2006, we reported
that, in Pakistan, for example, all American Centers closed for
security reasons and selected operations moved to the embassy's
Information Resource Center.[Footnote 20] Our report noted that
concrete barriers and armed escorts outside the embassy compounds
contribute to a perception that visitors are not welcome, as do
requirements restricting visitors' use of cell phones and pagers within
the embassy. According to one official in Pakistan, the number of
visitors to the embassy's Information Resource Center has declined to
as few as one per day because many visitors feel humiliated by the
embassy's rigorous security procedures. We also reported the
Information Resource Center in Abuja, Nigeria, is open only to students
and other specific demographic groups, and access is granted by
appointment only. The head of the center in Abuja said accessibility
was one of his primary challenges.
State Has Responded to Security Concerns and Actions by Establishing a
Range of Alternate Outreach Mechanisms:
Over the past two decades, State has experimented with a number of
alternative outreach mechanisms designed to offset the increasingly
isolated nature of U.S. diplomatic operations. These alternative
mechanisms generally consist of small outposts with no or few U.S.
staff, or virtual, internet-based efforts supported by in-person travel
to a city or region. Specific alternate outreach mechanisms include the
following:
* American Presence Posts: Headed by an American officer, these posts
provide citizen, commercial, and public diplomacy outreach services to
a major city or region. There are currently nine such posts worldwide.
While plans to create additional posts are on hold for budgetary and
other reasons, State would like to add more American Presence Posts
over the next few years.
* American Corners: These provide the United States with a physical
public diplomacy outpost, which includes internet access, a small
reference collection, and a discussion forum. Sponsored by a host
country's municipal or national government, the U.S. government is only
required to fund the equipment and materials used. Staff are provided
by the host institution. There are approximately 410 American Corners
throughout the world, and State plans to develop up to 30 more corners
over the next 2 years.
* American Discovery Centers: These are small kiosks that provide
information on America. The prime example of the use of these kiosks is
Pakistan. In May 2006, we reported there were over 180 such kiosks,
primarily in schools. State is considering the expanded use of such
kiosks.
* Virtual Presence Posts: Virtual Presence Posts are generally designed
to combine virtual presence through an embassy-hosted Web site with
coordinated outreach, programming, and travel targeted at a particular
city or region.
* Other outreach mechanisms: In our May 2006 report on outreach to the
Muslim world, we noted that in Nigeria several embassy staff, including
the Ambassador, often travel together to cities lacking a permanent
American presence; according to embassy officials, these "embassy on
the road" tours typically last 3 or 4 days and can involve dozens of
individuals. A variation on this theme are embassy "circuit riders,"
who are staff who travel from the embassy on a scheduled basis to cover
an assigned city or territory.
To date, only American Corners have been formally evaluated by State.
State's evaluation was generally favorable; however, in May 2006, we
reported that, while one State official told us American Corners are
the best solution given the current security environment, others have
described them as public diplomacy "on the cheap." The American Corner
we visited in Nigeria was confined to a single small room housing a
limited reference library and a small selection of donated books. At a
meeting with a focus group of Nigerians in Abuja who had participated
in U.S.-sponsored exchanges, no one present was familiar with the
American Corner. Other posts we visited have had difficulty finding
hosts for American Corners, as local institutions fear becoming
terrorist targets.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has
recommended that State systematically determine and coordinate how and
where to locate alternative outreach mechanisms on a country by country
basis.[Footnote 21] According to CSIS, each country mission should
conduct this assessment, in coordination with the relevant State
regional bureau, and integrate it into the post's strategic planning
process. To support the effective development of these country-level
strategies, CSIS recommended that State establish a federally-funded
research center to assist with a number of related data analysis tasks.
Oversight Questions:
1. To what extent has State evaluated the effectiveness of alternative
outreach mechanisms such as American Corners, American Presence Posts,
and Virtual Presence Posts?
2. What process guides post decisions on the need to establish outreach
mechanisms and how are decisions made regarding the mix, number, and
placement of these facilities? How is this process linked to post
efforts to reach specific target audiences?
3. How would reestablishing American Centers contribute to fulfilling
U.S. strategic communication goals?
[End of section]
Enclosure VII: Interagency Efforts to Adopt a New Approach to Public
Diplomacy:
Issue:
The United States needs to consider new approaches to conducting its
strategic communication efforts in response to dynamic changes in the
ways people around the world receive and use information. In
particular, the rise of social networking, namely through Internet
sites such as Facebook and Twitter, has transformed the nature of
communications globally. State's prior Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs recently endorsed a new public diplomacy
approach, referred to as Public Diplomacy 2.0, that could more fully
engage these new and evolving communication trends. Key issues that
remain to be addressed include the level of resources the United States
should devote to this new approach, how agency operations will be
guided when there is limited knowledge or agreement on how to operate
in this new information environment, and how results will be measured
when message control is partly or completely ceded to other groups that
can distribute information through hundreds or thousands of diverse
communication channels. These and other considerations should be
incorporated in the President's new communication strategy, which could
provide the best means for outlining a vision for Public Diplomacy 2.0
efforts. While GAO has not previously assessed this issue, current
information suggests a failure to adapt in this dynamic communications
environment could significantly raise the risk that U.S. public
diplomacy efforts could become increasingly irrelevant, particularly
among younger audiences that represent a key focus of U.S. strategic
communication efforts.
Key Findings:
Public Diplomacy 2.0 Initiatives Are Underway:
The most recent Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
noted in December 2008 that the United States should place a greater
reliance on dialogue and collaboration, enabled by emerging social
networks, in addition to the traditional model of public diplomacy that
has focused on building a positive image of the United States, mainly
through long-term programs like cultural and educational exchanges and
efforts to tell America's story.[Footnote 22] State, the BBG, and DOD
have begun to respond to this and earlier calls for change. State has
been most active in this new approach, and the BBG's international
broadcasting has the potential to help form social networks of like-
minded people who listen to services such as the Voice of America (VOA)
and Radio Free Asia and then pass along this information through word
of mouth, blogs, Internet sites, and other means. DOD has chosen to
engage in this new approach to a certain degree; however, DOD officials
said it would represent a "sea change" in the department's culture to
allow its staff to fully engage in Public Diplomacy 2.0-style
activities.
Specific examples of agency Public Diplomacy 2.0 initiatives include
the following:
* In December 2008, State joined with major new media companies and the
Columbia University School of Law to bring together a number of youth
movements from around the world to New York City to launch an Internet-
based global network to mobilize people against violence and
oppression. (See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-679sp]
for an independently produced, State-endorsed video clip of the
event that was edited by GAO.)
* State has also held blogger-only press conferences, started its own
blog, established a page on Facebook and a social networking site
called Exchanges Connect, created a digital outreach team to
participate in blogs and Web chat rooms with the goal of countering
ideological support for terrorism, and hosted YouTube video contests on
such topics as "what is democracy."
* VOA maintains pages on YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter in multiple
languages. According to BBG officials, there have been 4 million views
of VOA-produced videos in the past year. VOA also distributes its
content through podcasts, syndicated feeds to users' desktops, and
mobile phones. For example, VOA has an agreement with Nokia to
distribute English language content on mobile phones sold in China.
* VOA created a special U.S. election Web site in 2008 that attracted
traffic from more than 200 countries and resulted in thousands of users
joining an online VOA community, where they were able to share photos,
ask questions, and comment about the U.S. electoral process.
* DOD plans to hold a conference on emerging Web technologies in July
2009 to gain a better awareness and understanding of these tools,
identify barriers to their adoption (such as restrictions due to
policy, organizational culture, and other factors), and determine
implementation strategies. Many DOD commands now have their own
official blog sites and use tools such as Twitter and Facebook. The
U.S. Army has also had success using online games and a variety of
mechanisms to reach out to younger audiences.
Challenges and Practical Considerations:
Agencies seeking to implement this new approach to public diplomacy
face several key challenges. First, there is a general lack of adequate
research and understanding of how government entities can and should
operate in a social network environment. Second, agencies will
generally lose control over content since participants in a dialogue or
collaborative project are free to voice their own opinions and
distribute information as they choose. As noted by one senior State
official, however, a difference in opinions is one of the core
strengths of the approach and the underlying basis for its
effectiveness. Third, views expressed by U.S. officials on, for
example, social networking sites or blogs, become part of the permanent
discussion record, which raises practical questions about how best to
mitigate potential instances of miscommunication. Fourth, the level of
available resources is small compared to the magnitude of the global
communications environment. For example, State's Digital Outreach team
consists of eight individuals seeking to provide a U.S. point of view
into a communication environment consisting of millions of personal
blogs and discussion forums on thousands of Web sites. Finally, this
approach is likely to pose technical challenges, as agency efforts to
plan, coordinate, fund, implement, and evaluate their Public Diplomacy
2.0 efforts could strain systems and capabilities that have had
difficulty operating smoothly in the less complex environment of
traditional public diplomacy efforts.
Oversight Questions:
1. To what extent will the Public Diplomacy 2.0 approach be included in
the President's December 2009 national communication strategy?
2. What criteria should be used to guide strategic investment decisions
regarding this new approach to public diplomacy?
3. How do agencies intend to address the challenges identified by GAO
such as the lack of in-depth research on social networking and resource
constraint issues?
4. Are there other challenges and practical considerations that should
be considered in adopting this new approach?
[End of section]
Appendix I: Extent to Which the June 2007 National Strategy Addresses
GAO's Desirable Characteristics:
In a 2004 GAO testimony, we identified six desirable characteristics of
an effective national strategy that would enable its implementers to
effectively shape policies, programs, priorities, resource allocations,
and standards that would enable federal departments and other
stakeholders to achieve the identified results.[Footnote 23] We further
determined in that testimony that national strategies with the six
characteristics can provide policymakers and implementing agencies with
a planning tool that can help ensure accountability and more effective
results. To develop these six desirable characteristics of an effective
national strategy, we reviewed several sources of information. First,
we gathered statutory requirements pertaining to national strategies,
as well as legislative and executive branch guidance. We also consulted
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, general literature
on strategic planning and performance, and guidance from the Office of
Management and Budget on the President's Management Agenda. In
addition, among other things, we studied past reports and testimonies
for findings and recommendations pertaining to the desirable elements
of a national strategy. Furthermore, we consulted widely within GAO to
obtain updated information on strategic planning, integration across
and between the government and its partners, implementation, and other
related subjects. We developed these six desirable characteristics
based on their underlying support in legislative or executive guidance
and the frequency with which they were cited in other sources. We then
grouped similar items together in a logical sequence, from conception
to implementation. Table 3 provides these desirable characteristics and
examples of their elements.
Table 3: Summary of Desirable Characteristics of an Effective National
Strategy:
Desirable characteristic: Purpose, scope, and methodology;
Brief description: Addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope
of its coverage, and the process by which it was developed.
Desirable characteristic: Problems, risks, and threats;
Brief description: Addresses the particular national problems and
threats the strategy is directed toward.
Desirable characteristic: Desired goals, objectives, activities, and
performance measures;
Brief description: Addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve;
steps to achieve those results; as well as the priorities, milestones,
and performance measures to gauge results.
Desirable characteristic: Resources, investments, and risk management;
Brief description: Addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources
and types of resources and investments needed, and where resources and
investments should be targeted by balancing risk reductions and costs.
Desirable characteristic: U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and
coordination mechanism;
Brief description: Addresses who will be implementing the strategy,
what their roles will be compared to those of others, and mechanisms
for them to coordinate their efforts.
Desirable characteristic: Integration among and with other entities;
Brief description: Addresses how a national strategy relates to other
strategies' goals, objectives, and activities--and to subordinate
levels of government and their plans to implement the strategy.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To assess U.S. strategic communication planning efforts, we examined
the June 2007 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic
Communication. To determine whether this national strategy contains all
six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that we
developed and used in our prior work, we first developed a checklist of
these characteristics, along with their 27 component elements. Two GAO
staff members then independently assessed the national strategy for its
inclusion of the 27 elements, recorded their findings on separate
checklists, and met to reconcile any differences in their assessments.
Once these assessments were reconciled, one additional GAO staff member
reviewed this analysis for completeness and accuracy. To determine the
extent to which the national strategy addressed GAO's six
characteristics of an effective national strategy, we developed the
following three categories: the strategy (1) generally addresses a
characteristic when it explicitly cites all elements related to that
characteristic; (2) partially addresses a characteristic when it
explicitly cites at least one, but not all, of the elements related to
that characteristic; and (3) does not address a characteristic when it
does not explicitly cite any of the elements related to that
characteristic. By applying these categories to our checklists of the
27 elements, we developed a consolidated summary of the extent to which
the strategy addressed the six characteristics of an effective national
strategy. Figure 3 shows the results of our assessment of the national
communication strategy.
Figure 3: Extent to Which the June 2007 National Strategy for Public
Diplomacy and Strategic Communication Addresses the 27 Elements of the
Desirable Characteristics of a National Strategy:
[Refer to PDF for image: table]
1. Clear purpose, scope, and methodology: Partially addresses.
Purpose: 1a. Identifies the impetus that led to the strategy being
written, such as a statutory requirement, mandate, or key event: Does
not address.
Purpose: 1b. Discusses the strategy‘s purpose: Does not address.
Scope: 1c. Defines or discusses key terms, major functions, mission
areas, or activities the strategy covers: Generally addresses.
Methodology: 1d. Discusses the process that produced the strategy
(e.g., what organizations or offices drafted the document, whether it
was the result of a working group, or which parties were consulted in
its development): Does not address.
Methodology: 1e. Discusses assumptions or the principles and theories
that guided the strategy‘s development: Partially addresses.
2. Detailed discussion of problems, risks, and threats: Does not
address.
Problem definition: 2a. Includes a detailed discussion or definition of
the problems the strategy intends to address: Does not address.
Problem definition: 2b. Includes a detailed discussion of the causes of
the problems: Does not address.
Problem definition: 2c. Includes a detailed discussion of the operating
environment: Does not address.
Risk assessment: 2d. Addresses a detailed discussion of the threats at
which the strategy is directed: Does not address.
Risk assessment: 2e. Discusses the quality of data available (e.g.,
constraints, deficiencies, and "unknowns"): Partially addresses.
3. Desired goals, objectives, activities, and outcome-related
performance measures: Partially addresses.
Goals and subordinate objectives: 3a. Addresses the overall results
desired (i.e., an ’end state“): Does not address.
Goals and subordinate objectives: 3b. Identifies strategic goals and
subordinate objectives: Partially addresses.
Activities: 3c. Identifies specific activities to achieve results:
Generally addresses.
Performance measures: 3d. Addresses priorities, milestones, and outcome-
related performance measures: Partially addresses.
Performance measures: 3e. Identifies process to monitor and report on
progress: Generally addresses.
Performance measures: 3f. Identifies limitations on progress
indicators: Generally addresses.
4. Resources, investments, and risk management: Does not address.
Resources and investments: 4a. Identifies what the strategy will cost:
Does not address.
Resources and investments: 4b. Identifies the sources (e.g., federal,
international, and private, and types of resources or investments
needed, e.g., budgetary, human capital,information technology, research
and development, and contracts): Partially addresses.
Risk management: 4c. Addresses where resources or investments should be
targeted to balance risks and costs: Does not address.
Risk management: 4d. Addresses resource allocation mechanisms: Does not
address.
Risk management: 4e. Identifies risk management principles and how they
help implementing parties prioritize and allocate resources: Does not
address.
5. Delineation of U.S. government roles, responsibilities, and
coordination mechanism: Partially addresses.
Organizational roles and responsibilities: 5a. Addresses who will
implement the strategy: Partially addresses.
Organizational roles and responsibilities: 5b. Addresses lead, support,
and partner roles and responsibilities of specific federal agencies,
departments, or offices (e.g., who is in charge during all phases of
the strategy‘s implementation): Does not address.
Coordination: 5c. Addresses mechanisms or processes for parties to
coordinate efforts within agencies and with other agencies: Generally
addresses.
Coordination: 5d. Identifies process for resolving conflicts: Does not
address.
6. Description of strategy's integration among and with other entities:
Partially addresses.
6a. Addresses how the strategy relates to the strategies of other
institutions and organizations and their goals, objectives, and
activities (horizontal): Generally addresses.
6b. Addresses integration with relevant documents from other agencies
and subordinate levels (vertical): Partially addresses.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128 or FordJ@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Audrey Solis (Assistant
Director), Michael ten Kate, and Emily Gupta made key contributions to
this report. Technical assistance was provided by Robert Alarapon,
Martin de Alteriis, Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott, Joseph Carney, Marcus Corbin,
and Leah DeWolf.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Broadcasting to Cuba: Actions Are Needed to Improve Strategy and
Operations. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-127].
Washington, D.C.: January 22, 2009.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and
Coordination of Research. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-904. Washington, D.C.: July
18, 2007.
Foreign Assistance: Actions Needed to Better Assess the Impact of
Agencies' Marking and Publicizing Efforts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-277. Washington, D.C.:
March 12, 2007.
U.S. International Broadcasting: Management of Middle East Broadcasting
Services Could Be Improved. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-762. Washington, D.C.: August 4,
2006.
Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist
Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-894. Washington, D.C.: August 4,
2006.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim
Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant
Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-535.
Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the
Lack of a National Communication Strategy. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-323. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2005.
U.S. International Broadcasting: Enhanced Measure of Local Media
Conditions Would Facilitate Decisions to Terminate Language Services.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-374. Washington, D.C.:
February 26, 2004.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces
Significant Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-951. Washington, D.C.: September 4,
2003.
U.S. International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach Focuses on
Reaching Large Audiences but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-772. Washington,
D.C.: July 15, 2003.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] We use the terms "public diplomacy," "outreach," and "strategic
communication" interchangeably in this report.
[2] This report expands on issues discussed on GAO's transition Web
site, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-679sp2].
[3] These papers are based on the continuing work of GAO, the 10
related reports we have issued since July 2003 (see list of related GAO
products), and select studies conducted by outside groups.
[4] In 2008, this amounted to $1.7 million.
[5] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but
Faces Significant Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-951] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4,
2003).
[6] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts
Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-323] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4,
2005).
[7] Pub. L. No. 110-417, Sec. 1055(a).
[8] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in
National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004).
[9] GAO has also discussed the use of a "program logic model" to
further improve planning efforts at the interagency, department, and
country level. A logic model systematically outlines program
activities, inputs, outputs, outcomes, and program effect in a direct
relational path.
[10] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic
Use and Coordination of Research, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-904] (Washington, D.C.: July 18,
2007).
[11] GAO, U.S. International Broadcasting: Management of Middle East
Broadcasting Services Could Be Improved, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-762] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 4,
2006).
[12] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but
Faces Significant Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-951] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4,
2003).
[13] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts
Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-323] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4,
2005).
[14] Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield
(Arlington, Va., Nov. 26, 2008).
[15] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Actions Needed to Improve Strategic
Use and Coordination of Research, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-904] (Washington, D.C.: July 18,
2007).
[16] GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but
Faces Significant Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-951] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4,
2003); and GAO-05-323.
[17] United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Getting the
People Part Right: A Report on the Human Resources Dimension of U.S.
Public Diplomacy (Washington, D.C., June 25, 2008).
[18] According to State, only about 30 American Cultural Centers remain
open today. U.S. funding for binational outreach centers in Latin
America was also eliminated; however, about 110 centers remain open
with other revenue sources. Congress is now considering the option of
reopening American Cultural Centers where security conditions permit
and resuming some level of funding for binational centers where
appropriate. See Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
U.S. Public Diplomacy--Time to Get Back in the Game, 2009.
[19] As we noted in our May 2006 report, in 1990 the majority of posts
had such publicly accessible facilities; now, however, few do.
[20] We reported in May 2006, that State's Bureau of International
Information Programs operates more than 170 such centers worldwide.
[21] Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Embassy of the
Future (Washington, D.C., Oct. 15, 2007).
[22] In articulating his support for Public Diplomacy 2.0, State's most
recent Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
highlighted the example of a social movement directed against rebel
forces in Colombia, which illustrates the power of the collaborative,
social networking approach in action. In this instance, according to
the Under Secretary, an unemployed computer technician in Colombia
started a Facebook page that grew quickly to more than 400,000 members.
The group, called One Million Voices against the FARC, was able to
mobilize 12 million people to engage in street protests on a single day
in 190 cities around the world, just 2 months after it was set up.
[23] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004).
[End of section]
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