Firearms Trafficking
U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges Gao ID: GAO-09-709 June 18, 2009In recent years, violence along the U.S.-Mexico border has escalated dramatically, due largely to the Mexican government's efforts to disrupt Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTO). U.S. officials note the violence associated with Mexican DTOs poses a serious challenge for U.S. law enforcement, threatening citizens on both sides of the border, and U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials generally agree many of the firearms used to perpetrate crimes in Mexico are illicitly trafficked from the United States across the Southwest border. GAO was asked to examine (1) data on the types, sources, and users of these firearms; (2) key challenges confronting U.S. government efforts to combat illicit sales of firearms in the United States and stem the flow of them into Mexico; (3) challenges faced by U.S. agencies collaborating with Mexican authorities to combat the problem of illicit arms; and (4) the U.S. government's strategy for addressing the issue. GAO analyzed program information and firearms data and met with U.S. and Mexican officials on both sides of the border.
Available evidence indicates many of the firearms fueling Mexican drug violence originated in the United States, including a growing number of increasingly lethal weapons. While it is impossible to know how many firearms are illegally smuggled into Mexico in a given year, about 87 percent of firearms seized by Mexican authorities and traced in the last 5 years originated in the United States, according to data from Department of Justice's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). According to U.S. and Mexican government officials, these firearms have been increasingly more powerful and lethal in recent years. Many of these firearms come from gun shops and gun shows in Southwest border states. U.S. and Mexican government and law enforcement officials stated most firearms are intended to support operations of Mexican DTOs, which are also responsible for trafficking arms to Mexico. The U.S. government faces several significant challenges in combating illicit sales of firearms in the United States and stemming their flow into Mexico. In particular, certain provisions of some federal firearms laws present challenges to U.S. efforts, according to ATF officials. Specifically, officials identified key challenges related to restrictions on collecting and reporting information on firearms purchases, a lack of required background checks for private firearms sales, and limitations on reporting requirements for multiple sales. GAO also found ATF and Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the primary agencies implementing efforts to address the issue, do not effectively coordinate their efforts, in part because the agencies lack clear roles and responsibilities and have been operating under an outdated interagency agreement. Additionally, agencies generally have not systematically gathered, analyzed, and reported data that could be useful to help plan and assess results of their efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico. U.S. law enforcement agencies have provided some assistance to Mexican counterparts in combating arms trafficking, but these efforts face several challenges. U.S. law enforcement assistance to Mexico does not target arms trafficking needs, limiting U.S. agencies' ability to provide technical or operational assistance. In addition, U.S. assistance has been limited due to Mexican officials' incomplete use of ATF's electronic firearms tracing system, an important tool for U.S. arms trafficking investigations. Another significant challenge facing U.S. efforts to assist Mexico is corruption among some Mexican government entities. Mexican federal authorities are implementing anticorruption measures, but government officials acknowledge fully implementing these reforms will take considerable time, and may take years to affect comprehensive change. The administration's recently released National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy includes, for the first time, a chapter on combating illicit arms trafficking to Mexico. Prior to the new strategy, the U.S. government lacked a strategy to address arms trafficking to Mexico, and various efforts undertaken by individual U.S. agencies were not part of a comprehensive U.S. governmentwide strategy for addressing the problem. At this point, it's not clear whether ONDCP's "implementation plan" for the strategy, which has not been finalized, will include performance indicators and other accountability mechanisms to overcome shortcomings raised in our report.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-709, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2009:
Firearms Trafficking:
U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and
Coordination Challenges:
GAO-09-709:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-709, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In recent years, violence along the U.S.-Mexico border has escalated
dramatically, due largely to the Mexican government‘s efforts to
disrupt Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTO). U.S. officials
note the violence associated with Mexican DTOs poses a serious
challenge for U.S. law enforcement, threatening citizens on both sides
of the border, and U.S. and Mexican law enforcement officials generally
agree many of the firearms used to perpetrate crimes in Mexico are
illicitly trafficked from the United States across the Southwest
border.
GAO was asked to examine (1) data on the types, sources, and users of
these firearms; (2) key challenges confronting U.S. government efforts
to combat illicit sales of firearms in the United States and stem the
flow of them into Mexico; (3) challenges faced by U.S. agencies
collaborating with Mexican authorities to combat the problem of illicit
arms; and (4) the U.S. government‘s strategy for addressing the issue.
GAO analyzed program information and firearms data and met with U.S.
and Mexican officials on both sides of the border.
What GAO Found:
Available evidence indicates many of the firearms fueling Mexican drug
violence originated in the United States, including a growing number of
increasingly lethal weapons. While it is impossible to know how many
firearms are illegally smuggled into Mexico in a given year, about 87
percent of firearms seized by Mexican authorities and traced in the
last 5 years originated in the United States, according to data from
Department of Justice‘s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF). According to U.S. and Mexican government officials,
these firearms have been increasingly more powerful and lethal in
recent years. Many of these firearms come from gun shops and gun shows
in Southwest border states. U.S. and Mexican government and law
enforcement officials stated most firearms are intended to support
operations of Mexican DTOs, which are also responsible for trafficking
arms to Mexico.
The U.S. government faces several significant challenges in combating
illicit sales of firearms in the United States and stemming their flow
into Mexico. In particular, certain provisions of some federal firearms
laws present challenges to U.S. efforts, according to ATF officials.
Specifically, officials identified key challenges related to
restrictions on collecting and reporting information on firearms
purchases, a lack of required background checks for private firearms
sales, and limitations on reporting requirements for multiple sales.
GAO also found ATF and Department of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the primary agencies implementing
efforts to address the issue, do not effectively coordinate their
efforts, in part because the agencies lack clear roles and
responsibilities and have been operating under an outdated interagency
agreement. Additionally, agencies generally have not systematically
gathered, analyzed, and reported data that could be useful to help plan
and assess results of their efforts to address arms trafficking to
Mexico.
U.S. law enforcement agencies have provided some assistance to Mexican
counterparts in combating arms trafficking, but these efforts face
several challenges. U.S. law enforcement assistance to Mexico does not
target arms trafficking needs, limiting U.S. agencies‘ ability to
provide technical or operational assistance. In addition, U.S.
assistance has been limited due to Mexican officials‘ incomplete use of
ATF‘s electronic firearms tracing system, an important tool for U.S.
arms trafficking investigations. Another significant challenge facing
U.S. efforts to assist Mexico is corruption among some Mexican
government entities. Mexican federal authorities are implementing
anticorruption measures, but government officials acknowledge fully
implementing these reforms will take considerable time, and may take
years to affect comprehensive change.
The administration‘s recently released National Southwest Border
Counternarcotics Strategy includes, for the first time, a chapter on
combating illicit arms trafficking to Mexico. Prior to the new
strategy, the U.S. government lacked a strategy to address arms
trafficking to Mexico, and various efforts undertaken by individual
U.S. agencies were not part of a comprehensive U.S. governmentwide
strategy for addressing the problem. At this point, it‘s not clear
whether ONDCP‘s ’implementation plan“ for the strategy, which has not
been finalized, will include performance indicators and other
accountability mechanisms to overcome shortcomings raised in our
report.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations to several departments, including the
Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice, to improve
interagency coordination, data gathering and analysis, and strategic
planning. State and DHS agreed with our recommendations. Justice did
not comment on our recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-709] or key
components. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202)512-4128
or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Available Evidence Suggests Most Firearms Recovered in Mexico Come from
U.S. Gun Dealers, and Many Support DTOs:
U.S. Efforts to Combat Illicit Sales of Firearms and to Stem the Flow
of These Arms across the Southwest Border Face Key Challenges:
U.S. Assistance Limited by a Lack of Targeting Resources at Needs and
Concerns over Corruption among Some Mexican Government Officials:
United States Lacks a Comprehensive Strategy to Combat Arms Trafficking
to Mexico:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Geographic Distribution of Firearms Seized and Traced:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Key ATF and ICE Efforts and Resources to Combat Arms
Trafficking to Mexico:
Table 2: Ten Firearms Types Most Frequently Recovered in Mexico and
Traced, Fiscal Years 2004 to 2008:
Figures:
Figure 1: Drug-War Related Murders in Mexico:
Figure 2: U.S. Cities Reporting the Presence of Mexican DTOs, January
1, 2006, through April 8, 2008:
Figure 3: Percentages of Firearms Seized in Mexico and Traced in Fiscal
Years 2004-2008 That Originated in the United States:
Figure 4: High-Powered Firearms Seized by the Government of Mexico in a
Single Confrontation with Criminal Organizations in November 2008:
Figure 5: Top Source States for Firearms Seized in Mexico and Traced
Over the Last 5 Years (Fiscal Years 2004-2008):
Figure 6: Map of Primary Trafficking Routes from the United States into
Mexico:
Figure 7: Southbound Operation Being Conducted at San Ysidro Border
Crossing Between San Diego, California, and Tijuana, Mexico:
Figure 8: Firearms Seized in Mexican States in 2008 and Illicit
Firearms Traced to Mexican States (Fiscal Year 2008):
Figure 9: Correlation Between the Number of Firearms Seized in Mexico
and the Number of Firearms Traced by ATF, by Mexican Federal Entity:
Abbreviations:
ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives:
BEST: Border Enforcement Security Task Force:
BVIC: Border Violence Intelligence Cell:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
CENAPI: Centro Nacional de Planeación, Análisis e Información para el
Combate a la Delincuencia (Government of Mexico's Planning, Analysis
and Information Center for Combating Crime):
CRS: Congressional Research Service:
DDTC: Directorate of Defense Trade Controls:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
DTO: drug trafficking organization:
EPIC: El Paso Intelligence Center:
EOUSA: Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys:
FFL: federal firearms licensee:
IBIS: Integrated Ballistics Identification System:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs:
IRS: intelligence research specialist:
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding:
NAS: Narcotics Affairs Section:
NTC: National Tracing Center:
OFAC: Office of Foreign Assets Control:
ONDCP: Office of National Drug Control Policy:
PGR: Procuraduría General de República (Government of Mexico's Office
of Attorney General):
State: Department of State:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 18, 2009:
The Honorable Eliot L. Engel:
Chairman:
The Honorable Connie Mack, IV:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Dan Burton:
The Honorable William Delahunt:
The Honorable Gabrielle Giffords:
The Honorable Gene Green:
The Honorable Albio Sires:
House of Representatives:
In recent years, violence along the U.S.-Mexico border has escalated
dramatically as the administration of President Felipe Calderon has
sought to combat the growing power of Mexican drug trafficking
organizations (DTO) and curb their ability to operate with impunity in
certain areas of Mexico. The Mexican government's efforts to disrupt
DTO operations has put pressure on criminal organizations fighting to
maintain control over lucrative routes they depend on to funnel drugs
to the United States, and arms and cash from the United States into
Mexico. In 2008, the number of individuals killed in violent incidents
in Mexico exceeded 6,200, more than twice as many as in 2007, with
around 1,500 killed in the first 3 months of 2009 alone.
As illicitly trafficked firearms have fueled the drug trafficking
violence,[Footnote 1] Mexican officials have come to regard illicit
firearms as the number one crime problem affecting the country's
security, and U.S. officials note the violence associated with Mexican
DTOs poses a serious challenge for U.S. law enforcement, threatening
the safety of citizens on both sides of the border, particularly given
the increased level of criminal activity in the southwestern United
States and concerns that it could grow. According to the Department of
Justice's (DOJ) 2009 National Drug Threat Assessment, Mexican DTOs
represent the greatest organized crime threat to the United States,
controlling drug distribution in at least 230 U.S. cities, and gaining
strength in markets they do not yet control. In response to this
growing threat, in March 2009, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) announced it planned to increase resources on the U.S.-Mexico
border, including more personnel and greater use of available
technologies, among other elements.
In response to your request that we review U.S. efforts to stem the
flow of arms trafficking into Mexico, we examined (1) what data are
available on the types, sources, and users of these arms; (2) key
challenges that confront U.S. government efforts to combat illicit
sales of firearms in the United States and to stem the flow of these
arms across the Southwest border into Mexico; (3) challenges faced by
U.S. agencies collaborating with Mexican authorities to combat the
problem of illicit arms; and (4) the U.S. government's strategy for
addressing the issue.
To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed program and
project status reports, and related information. To obtain a better
understanding of the scope and progress of various U.S. agencies'
programs related to arms trafficking, we met with cognizant officials
from DOJ's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF);
DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border
Protection (CBP); the Department of State (State); and other agency
officials supporting U.S. efforts to combat arms trafficking, including
the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), and the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP). We visited and met with officials from three major Southwest
border cities--San Diego, California, and El Paso and Laredo, Texas--
and their Mexican counterpart cities to explore the challenges faced by
law enforcement officials to stem the flow of arms smuggling across the
border. We also traveled to Mexico City and Monterrey, Mexico, to meet
with U.S. embassy and consulate officials responsible for implementing
programs to combat arms trafficking and Mexican government officials
responsible for related activities. We did not review Mexican firearms
laws, and to the extent that we comment on these in this report, we
relied on secondary sources. We also reviewed ATF, ICE, and CBP data on
seizures of southbound firearms and cases involving arms trafficking to
Mexico. We determined the data provided to us by various U.S. agencies
on these topics were sufficiently reliable to provide an overall
indication of the magnitude and nature of the illicit firearms trade.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to June 2009, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains
additional details about our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
Available evidence indicates a large proportion of the firearms fueling
Mexican drug violence originated in the United States, including a
growing number of increasingly lethal weapons. While it is impossible
to know how many firearms are illegally trafficked into Mexico in a
given year, around 87 percent of firearms seized by Mexican authorities
and traced over the past 5 years originated in the United States,
according to data from ATF. Around 68 percent of these firearms were
manufactured in the United States, and around 19 percent were
manufactured in third countries and imported into the United States
before being trafficked into Mexico. According to U.S. and Mexican
government officials, these firearms have been increasingly more
powerful and lethal in recent years. For example, many of these
firearms are high-caliber and high-powered, such as AK and AR-15 type
semiautomatic rifles. Many of these firearms come from gun shops and
gun shows in Southwest border states, such as Texas, California, and
Arizona, according to ATF officials and trace data. U.S. and Mexican
government and law enforcement officials stated most guns trafficked to
Mexico are intended to support operations of Mexican DTOs, which are
also responsible for trafficking arms to Mexico.
The U.S. government faces several significant challenges to its efforts
to combat illicit sales of firearms in the United States and to stem
the flow of these arms across the Southwest border into Mexico. First,
certain provisions of some federal firearms laws present challenges to
U.S. efforts, according to ATF officials. Specifically, officials
identified key challenges related to (1) restrictions on collecting and
reporting information on firearms purchases, (2) a lack of required
background checks for private firearms sales, and (3) limitations on
reporting requirements for multiple sales. Another challenge we found
is ATF and ICE, the primary agencies implementing efforts to address
this issue, do not consistently and effectively coordinate their
efforts, in part because the agencies lack clear roles and
responsibilities and have been operating under an outdated interagency
agreement. This has resulted in some instances of duplicate initiatives
and confusion during operations. Additionally, we found agencies lack
systematic analysis and reporting of aggregate data related to arms
trafficking, and they were also unable to provide complete information
to us on the results of their efforts to seize firearms destined for
Mexico and to investigate and prosecute cases. This type of information
could be useful to better understand the nature of the problem, to help
plan ways to address it, and to assess progress made.
U.S. law enforcement agencies and State have provided some assistance
to Mexican counterparts in combating arms trafficking, but these
efforts face several key challenges. U.S. law enforcement agencies have
built working relationships with Mexican federal, state, and local law
enforcement, as well as the Mexican military, which has given the
United States the opportunity to provide Mexican government
counterparts with some technical and operational assistance on firearms
trafficking. However, U.S. assistance has been hampered by a number of
factors. In particular, U.S. law enforcement assistance has been
limited and, furthermore, it has not targeted arms trafficking needs.
For example, although the Merida Initiative--a U.S. interagency
response to transborder crime and security issues affecting the United
States, Mexico, and Central America--provides general law enforcement
and counternarcotics assistance to Mexico, it does not provide
dedicated funding to address the issue of arms trafficking. A number of
efforts officials told us could be helpful in combating arms
trafficking--such as establishing and supporting a bilateral,
multiagency arms trafficking task force--have not been undertaken. In
addition, U.S. assistance has been limited due to Mexican government
officials' incomplete use to date of ATF's electronic firearms tracing
system, known as eTrace, which is an important tool for U.S. arms
trafficking investigations in the United States. The ability of Mexican
officials to input data into eTrace has been hampered partly because a
Spanish language version of eTrace under development for months has
still not been deployed across Mexico. Another significant challenge
facing U.S. efforts to assist Mexico is concern about corruption among
some Mexican government entities. According to Mexican and U.S.
government officials, extensive corruption at the federal, state, and
local levels of Mexican law enforcement impedes U.S. efforts to develop
effective and dependable partnerships with Mexican government entities
in combating arms trafficking. Mexican federal authorities are
implementing anticorruption measures--including polygraph and
psychological testing, background checks, and salary increases--but
government officials acknowledge fully implementing these reforms will
take considerable time, and may take years to affect comprehensive
change.
On June 5, 2009, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)
released its 2009 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy,
which, for the first time, includes a chapter on combating illicit arms
trafficking to Mexico. Prior to the new strategy, the U.S. government
did not have a strategy that explicitly addressed arms trafficking to
Mexico. In the absence of a strategy, individual U.S. agencies have
undertaken a variety of activities and projects to combat arms
trafficking to Mexico. While these individual agency efforts may serve
to combat arms trafficking to Mexico to some degree, they were not part
of a comprehensive U.S. governmentwide strategy for addressing the
problem. GAO has identified several key elements that should be a part
of any strategy, including identifying objectives and funding targeted
to meet these objectives; clear roles and responsibilities; and
mechanisms to ensure coordination and assess results. We reviewed a
copy of the new National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy,
which ONDCP officials told us will serve as the basic framework, with
an "implementation plan" to follow in late summer of 2009. ONDCP
officials told us that this implementation plan will provide detailed
guidance to the responsible agencies and have some performance measures
for each objective. At this point, it is not clear whether the
implementation plan will include performance indicators and other
accountability mechanisms to overcome shortcomings raised in our
report. In addition, in March 2009, the Secretary of Homeland Security
announced a new DHS Southwest border security effort to significantly
increase DHS presence and efforts along the Southwest border, including
conducting more southbound inspections at ports of entry, among other
efforts. However, it is unclear whether the new resources that the
administration has recently devoted to the Southwest border will be
tied to the new strategy and implementation plan.
To ensure that relevant agencies are better focused on combating
illicit arms trafficking to Mexico, we are making recommendations to
the ONDCP and three executive departments.
We are recommending that the U.S. Attorney General prepare a report to
Congress on approaches to address the challenges law enforcement
officials raised in this report regarding constraints on the collection
of data that inhibit their ability to conduct timely investigations.
Additionally, we recommend that the U.S. Attorney General and the
Secretary of Homeland Security finalize the Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) between ATF and ICE and develop processes for periodically
monitoring its implementation.
We have several recommendations to improve data gathering and reporting
to help identify where efforts should be targeted to combat illicit
arms trafficking to Mexico, including that: (1) the U.S. Attorney
General direct ATF to regularly update its reporting on aggregate
firearms trafficking data and trends; (2) the U.S. Attorney General and
the Secretary of Homeland Security direct ATF and ICE to ensure they
share comprehensive data and leverage each other's expertise and
analysis on future assessments relevant to southbound weapons smuggling
trends; and (3) the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security ensure the systematic data gathering and reporting on the
results of these efforts, including firearms seizures, investigations,
and prosecutions.
We also recommend that the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of
State work with the Government of Mexico to expedite the dissemination
of eTrace in Spanish to relevant Government of Mexico officials,
provide these officials proper training on the use of eTrace, and
ensure more complete input of information on seized arms into eTrace.
Finally, we recommend that the Office of National Drug Control Policy
ensure its implementation plan for the arms trafficking chapter of the
2009 National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy (1) identifies
needs and defines objectives for addressing those needs; (2) identifies
roles and responsibilities for meeting objectives that leverage the
existing expertise of relevant agencies; (3) ensures agencies have
guidance for setting funding priorities and providing resources to
address those needs; (4) establishes mechanisms to facilitate
coordination across agencies; and (5) employs monitoring mechanisms to
determine and report on progress and identify needed improvements.
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland
Security, Justice, and State and to the Office of National Drug Control
Policy. DHS and State provided written comments, which are reproduced
in appendixes III and IV.
DHS agreed with our recommendations; however, DHS raised questions
regarding our interpretations of certain data and the relationship
between ICE and ATF. We disagree that our presentation of the data is
misleading, and the evidence in the report clearly demonstrates
coordination problems between ICE and ATF.
State agreed with our recommendation that the U.S. Attorney General and
the Secretary of State work with the Government of Mexico to expedite
the dissemination of eTrace in Spanish across Mexico to the relevant
Government of Mexico officials, provide these officials the proper
training on the use of eTrace, and ensure more complete input of
information on seized arms into eTrace. In addition, State added that
the agency is funding a $5 million Forensics Laboratories project with
the Government of Mexico's Office of the Attorney General (PGR) for the
successful investigation and prosecution of criminal cases.
We also received technical comments from DHS, DOJ, State, and ONDCP,
which we have incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.
Background:
Since his inauguration in December 2006, President Felipe Calderon has
mobilized the Mexican military and law enforcement in a series of large
scale counternarcotics operations throughout the country. These efforts
have targeted areas, particularly along the U.S.-Mexican border, where
DTOs have exerted most influence. By pursuing and detaining the leaders
of these criminal organizations, Mexican authorities have disrupted
DTOs' internal power structures and territorial control. The DTOs have
countered government pressure with increased violence against law
enforcement entities. The government's efforts to disrupt drug
trafficking operations also appear to have intensified conflicts among
DTOs over access to lucrative trafficking routes to the United States.
The result has been an escalation of drug-related assassinations,
kidnappings, and other violent crimes. While the majority of the
casualties have been individuals involved in the drug trade in some
way, victims also include law enforcement officers, journalists, and
innocent bystanders. Gun violence in Mexico has increased dramatically
in the last 2 years, with the number of drug-related murders more than
doubling from around 2,700 in 2007 to over 6,200 in 2008. The drug-
related murder rates for the first quarter of 2009 remain high and thus
the yearly total for 2009 will likely be close to the 2008 level. See
figure 1.
Figure 1: Drug-War Related Murders in Mexico:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Year: 2007;
Number of murders: 2,712.
Year: 2008;
Number of murders: 6,262.
Year: 2009 through March 26;
Number of murders: 1,680.
Year: 2009 (Projected through December);
Number of murders: 7,214.
Source: Mexican Federal Government‘s Planning, Analysis and Information
Center for Combating Crime (CENAPI).
[End of figure]
Growing criminal activity in Mexico, particularly in communities across
the Southwest border, has raised concerns that the violence might spill
over to the United States. Since 2006, DOJ's annual National Drug
Threat Assessment has reported Mexican DTOs and criminal groups are the
most influential drug traffickers and the greatest organizational
threat to the United States. Law enforcement reporting indicates
Mexican DTOs maintain drug distribution networks or supply drugs to
distributors in at least 230 U.S. cities. See figure 2. Mexican DTOs
control most of the U.S. drug market and are gaining strength in
markets they do not yet control. President Obama has expressed concern
about the increased level of violence along the border, particularly in
Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana, and has called for continued monitoring of
the situation to guard against spillover into the United States.
Figure 2: U.S. Cities Reporting the Presence of Mexican DTOs, January
1, 2006, through April 8, 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: map of the United States]
Represented by a dot, the map depicts U.S. cities reporting the presence
of Mexican DTOs.
Sources: GAO analysis of DOJ‘s National Drug Threat Assessment 2009;
Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Since the 1970s, the United States has collaborated with Mexican
authorities and provided assistance to Mexico to combat transnational
crimes associated with drug trafficking, including illicit firearms
smuggling. However, counterarms trafficking efforts have been a modest
component of broader bilateral law enforcement cooperation. U.S. and
Mexican officials also told us that, in the past, the Mexican
government considered illicit arms trafficking a problem that
originated in the United States and thus needed to be dealt with by
U.S. authorities. However, the Mexican government has taken on a
greater focus in combating arms trafficking in recent years. For
example, Mexico's Secretary of Public Security noted, "the arms issue —
is a subject that was not considered when discussing drug trafficking,
however today it is part of the dialogue we have with our colleagues
from the United States." Moreover, Mexican officials told us they now
regard illicit firearms as the number one crime problem affecting the
country's security, and they are intent on working with their U.S.
counterparts to address the threat posed by weapons smuggling.
DOJ's ATF and DHS's ICE are the two primary agencies combating illicit
sales and trafficking of firearms across the Southwest border. For over
40 years, ATF has implemented efforts to combat arms trafficking within
the United States and from the United States to other countries as part
of its mission under the Gun Control Act,[Footnote 2] and it is the
only entity within the U.S. government able to trace firearms recovered
in crime in Mexico.[Footnote 3] ATF also conducts inspections of FFL
gun dealers to ensure they comply with applicable federal firearms laws
and regulations.[Footnote 4] Through Project Gunrunner--ATF's key
effort to address arms trafficking to Mexico--the agency has conducted
investigations to identify and prosecute individuals involved in arms
trafficking schemes and has provided training to Mexican law
enforcement officials on firearms identification and tracing
techniques, among other efforts.[Footnote 5] According to ICE, for over
30 years, ICE--and previously the U.S. Customs Service--has implemented
efforts to enforce U.S. export laws, and ICE agents and other staff
address a range of issues, including combating the illicit smuggling of
money, people, drugs, and firearms.[Footnote 6] Examples of ICE's arms
trafficking-related activities include its efforts to raise public
awareness through the dissemination of posters and brochures to educate
FFLs and firearms purchasers about U.S. laws related to firearms and
smuggling, as well as ICE's more recent effort to expand seizures of
firearms destined for Mexico on the U.S. side of the border.[Footnote
7] ICE enhanced its efforts on arms trafficking to Mexico through
Operation Armas Cruzadas, announced in 2008. Table 1 provides more
information on ATF and ICE efforts to combat arms trafficking.[Footnote
8]
Table 1: Key ATF and ICE Efforts and Resources to Combat Arms
Trafficking to Mexico:
Agency: ATF;
Key activities:
* Through Project Gunrunner, which was initiated following discussions
between ATF and the Mexican government in 2005, ATF conducts
investigations, develops intelligence, and provides training related to
arms trafficking to Mexico in partnership with the Mexican government
and other U.S. government agencies;
* ATF has said the cornerstone of this initiative is tracing firearms
recovered in crime in Mexico, which provides intelligence and
investigative leads;
Estimated funding expenditures (between fiscal years 2004-2008): $76.6
million;
* Funding included Southwest border-related efforts at EPIC, funding
for staff in Mexico, and funding that was earmarked for Southwest
Border Initiative in the four Southwest border states;
* According to ATF, funding does not fully reflect costs for the
agency's domestic efforts to investigate cases;
Personnel (fiscal year 2008)[A]:
* 550 agents and industry operations investigators in the four
Southwest border states[B];
* 6 agents and intelligence and other staff assigned to the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC);
* 3 agents assigned to the U.S. Embassy and a consulate in Mexico.
Agency: ICE;
Key activities:
* In 2008, ICE announced Operation Armas Cruzadas as a bilateral law
enforcement and intelligence sharing operation to reduce arms
trafficking to Mexico. As part of the operation, in the first few
months of 2009 ICE increased efforts to seize firearms destined for
Mexico on U.S. side of border, as well as to develop intelligence and
investigative leads;
* ICE also has 10 Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) teams
in the four Southwest border states to investigate and prevent illicit
smuggling of goods and people out of the United States, including
firearms;
Estimated funding expenditures (between fiscal years 2004-2008): $15.2
million;
* According to ICE, this amount included ICE efforts to investigate
arms trafficking on the U.S. side of the border, including trafficking
to Mexico, as well as other locations, such as Central America. It also
included efforts by staff in Mexico in support of arms trafficking
investigations and other Southwest border BEST efforts;
* ICE officials stated the above estimate does not fully reflect ICE's
efforts to address the issue due to the way ICE tracks funding
expenditures. They noted ICE spent about $1.06 billion for Southwest
border activities overall between fiscal years 2004 and 2008, including
efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico;
Personnel (fiscal year 2008)[A]:
* 1,934 agents assigned to Southwest border offices;
* 52 intelligence officers and analysts assigned to Southwest border
offices, including nine at EPIC;
* 8 agents assigned to the U.S. Embassy and four consulates in Mexico.
Sources: GAO analysis of testimonial and documentary evidence from ATF
and ICE.
[A] ATF officials stated that, although ATF personnel focus on firearms
issues, which would include arms trafficking to Mexico,
responsibilities also include issues such as arson or gangs. ICE
officials stated that ICE personnel who address arms trafficking to
Mexico are also responsible for a range of other issues, such as the
smuggling of drugs, money, or people.
[B] Officials from ATF and ICE stated the focus of U.S. government
efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico has been in the four
Southwest border states, though staff in other states may also
undertake efforts to address the issue.
[End of table]
Several other U.S. agencies also play a role in stemming the flow of
illicit firearms across the Southwest border into Mexico, including the
following:
* DHS's CBP is charged with managing, securing, and controlling the
nation's borders with a priority mission of keeping terrorists and
their weapons out of the United States. It also has a responsibility
for securing and facilitating trade and travel while enforcing hundreds
of U.S. regulations, including immigration and drug laws; as such, CBP
is involved in intercepting contraband firearms to Mexico.[Footnote 9]
* DOJ's U.S. Attorneys serve as the nation's principal litigators under
the direction of the U.S. Attorney General. U.S. Attorneys handle
criminal prosecutions and civil suits in which the United States has an
interest, including cases against individuals who violate federal
criminal laws related to firearms trafficking. Since each U.S. Attorney
exercises wide discretion in the use of resources to further the
priorities of local jurisdictions, the caseload distribution related to
firearms trafficking varies between districts.
* DOJ's DEA is responsible for the enforcement of U.S. controlled
substances laws and regulations and bringing to justice key individuals
and organizations involved in the production or distribution of
controlled substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffic in
the United States. In carrying out its mission, the DEA also
coordinates and cooperates with U.S. and Mexican law enforcement
officials in efforts to combat criminal violence and thus shares
intelligence on DTO activities, including weapons violations.
* State's INL advises the President, Secretary of State, and other U.S.
government agencies on policies and programs to combat international
narcotics and crime. INL programs support State's strategic goals to
reduce the entry of illegal drugs into the United States and to
minimize the impact of international crime on the United States and its
citizens. INL oversees funding provided to assist Mexico in its fight
against organized crime under the Merida Initiative. Merida is a U.S.
interagency response to transborder crime and security issues affecting
the United States, Mexico, and Central America. The Initiative seeks to
strengthen partner countries' capacities to combat organized criminal
activities that threaten the security of the region, including arms
trafficking.
* DOJ's Criminal Division attorneys serve as DOJ's primary legal
experts on firearms related issues and contribute to the nation's
prosecutorial efforts from the headquarters level. Criminal Division
prosecutors are charged with developing and implementing strategies to
attack firearms trafficking networks operating in the United States and
abroad. These prosecutors prosecute important firearms related cases,
formulate policy, assist and coordinate with local U.S. Attorneys
Offices on legal issues and multidistrict cases, and work with numerous
domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies to construct effective
and coordinated enforcement strategies.
* ONDCP, whose principal purpose is to establish policies, priorities,
and objectives for the nation's drug control program, produces a number
of publications including a National Southwest Border Counternarcotics
Strategy, which this year includes a component on combating arms
trafficking.
Available Evidence Suggests Most Firearms Recovered in Mexico Come from
U.S. Gun Dealers, and Many Support DTOs:
Available evidence indicates many of the firearms fueling Mexican drug
violence have come from the United States, including a growing number
of increasingly lethal weapons. Many of these firearms came from gun
shops and gun shows in Southwest border states, such as Texas,
California, and Arizona, according to ATF officials and trace data.
U.S. and Mexican government officials stated most guns trafficked into
Mexico are facilitated by and support operations of Mexican drug
trafficking organizations.
Available Information Suggests Most Firearms Recovered in Mexico Come
from the United States and Are Increasingly More Powerful and Lethal:
According to U.S. and Mexican government and law enforcement officials
and data from ATF on firearms seized in Mexico and traced from fiscal
year 2004 to fiscal year 2008, a large portion of the firearms fueling
the Mexican drug trade originated in the United States, including a
growing number of increasingly lethal weapons. As is inherently the
case with various types of illegal trafficking, such as drug
trafficking, the extent of firearms trafficking to Mexico is unknown;
[Footnote 10] however, according to ATF, a large number of guns are
seized from criminals by the military and law enforcement in Mexico,
and information on many of these guns is submitted to ATF for the
purposes of tracing their origins and uncovering how the guns arrived
in Mexico.[Footnote 11] ATF maintains data on the firearms that are
seized in Mexico and submitted for a trace, and, from these firearms
trace requests, ATF officials told us, they are often able to detect
suspicious patterns and trends that can help identify and disrupt arms
trafficking networks on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border.
Using ATF's eTrace data, which currently serves as the best data we
found available for analyzing the source and nature of firearms
trafficked and seized in Mexico, we determined over 20,000, or 87
percent, of firearms seized by Mexican authorities and traced from
fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008 originated in the United States.
Figure 3 shows the percentages of firearms seized in Mexico and traced
from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008 that originated in the United
States. Over 90 percent of the firearms seized in Mexico and traced
over the last 3 years have come from the United States.
Figure 3: Percentages of Firearms Seized in Mexico and Traced in Fiscal
Years 2004-2008 That Originated in the United States:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Year: 2004;
Percentages of Firearms Seized that Originated in the United States:
72%;
Estimated number of guns traced to the United States: 3,090.
Year: 2005;
Percentages of Firearms Seized that Originated in the United States:
82%;
Estimated number of guns traced to the United States: 5,260.
Year: 2006;
Percentages of Firearms Seized that Originated in the United States:
95%;
Estimated number of guns traced to the United States: 1,950.
Year: 2007;
Percentages of Firearms Seized that Originated in the United States:
95%;
Estimated number of guns traced to the United States: 3,060.
Year: 2008;
Percentages of Firearms Seized that Originated in the United States:
93%;
Estimated number of guns traced to the United States: 6,700.
Source: GAO analysis of ATF data.
[End of figure]
Around 68 percent of these firearms were manufactured in the United
States, while around 19 percent were manufactured in third countries
and imported into the United States before being trafficked into
Mexico. ATF could not determine whether the remaining 13 percent
foreign sourced arms had been trafficked into Mexico through the United
States, due to incomplete information.
While the eTrace data only represents data from gun trace requests
submitted from seizures in Mexico and not all the guns seized, it is
currently the only systematic data available, and the conclusions from
its use that the majority of firearms seized and traced originated in
the United States were consistent with conclusions reached by U.S. and
Mexican government and law enforcement officials involved personally in
combating arms trafficking to Mexico. In 2008, of the almost 30,000
firearms that the Mexican Attorney General's office said were seized,
only around 7,200, or approximately a quarter, were submitted to ATF
for tracing. U.S. and Mexican government and law enforcement officials
indicated Mexican government officials had not submitted all of the
firearms tracing information due to bureaucratic obstacles between the
Mexican military and the Mexican Attorney General's Office and lack of
a sufficient number of trained staff to use eTrace. For instance, at
one point, State officials told us, the Government of Mexico had only
one staff person collecting gun information and entering it into
eTrace.[Footnote 12] Further, as ATF pointed out, not all guns seized
in the United States are submitted by U.S. entities to ATF for tracing
either, due to some of the same type of bureaucratic and resource
challenges faced in Mexico. Consistent with the results of eTrace data,
U.S. law enforcement officials who had worked on arms trafficking in
Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexican border told us their experience and
observations corroborated that most of the firearms in Mexico had
originated in the United States. Furthermore, U.S. and Mexican
government and law enforcement officials also stated this scenario
seemed most likely, given the ease of acquiring firearms in the United
States; specifically, they told us they saw no reason why the drug
cartels would go through the difficulty of acquiring a gun somewhere
else in the world and transporting it to Mexico when it is so easy for
them to do so from the United States.
Firearms Seized in Mexico Are Increasingly More Powerful and Lethal:
While existing data does not allow for an analysis of trends of all
firearms seized in Mexico, according to U.S. and Mexican government
officials, the firearms seized in Mexico have been increasingly more
powerful and lethal in recent years.[Footnote 13] For example, around
25 percent of the firearms seized in Mexico and traced in fiscal year
2008 are high-caliber and high-powered such as AK and AR-15 type
semiautomatic rifles, which fire ammunition that can pierce armor often
used by Mexican police (see table 2).
Table 2: Ten Firearms Types Most Frequently Recovered in Mexico and
Traced, Fiscal Years 2004 to 2008:
* 9 mm pistol:
* .38 caliber revolver:
* .22 caliber pistol:
* .380 caliber pistol:
* 7.62 mm AK-type semiautomatic rifle:
* .22 caliber rifle:
* .223 caliber AR-15 type semiautomatic rifle:
* .45 caliber pistol:
* .38 caliber pistol:
* 12 gauge shotgun.
Source: GAO analysis of ATF data.
[End of table]
Moreover, U.S. and Mexican government officials told us they have
encountered an increasing number of the higher caliber, high-powered
weapons, particularly in the past 2 years in seizures resulting from
operations against drug cartels. A video clip of the types of firearms
recovered near the Southwest border and in Mexico is available at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-709]. In addition,
U.S. government officials told us there had been a decrease in some of
the smaller, lower-powered guns, such as the .22 caliber pistol and
rifle. Mexican and U.S. government officials told us that the guns used
by the drug cartels often overpower Mexican police and rival that of
the military. See figure 4.[Footnote 14]
Figure 4: High-Powered Firearms Seized by the Government of Mexico in a
Single Confrontation with Criminal Organizations in November 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: CENAPI.
[End of figure]
In addition, there have been some examples of military grade firearms
recovered in Mexico. Some of these recovered firearms, ATF officials
noted, were guns commercially available in the United States that were
altered to make them more lethal. For instance, AK-type and AR-15 type
semiautomatic rifles have been altered to make them fully automatic,
like machine guns used by the U.S. and Mexican militaries. Seventy
machine guns were submitted for tracing to ATF between fiscal year 2004
and fiscal year 2008, which represents a small percentage, 0.30
percent, of the total number of 23,159.
A small number of the firearms[Footnote 15] seized in Mexico have been
traced back to legal sales of weapons from the United States to Mexico
or a third country, according to ATF.[Footnote 16] For instance,
firearms traced back to the Government of Mexico, from 2004 to 2008,
constituted 1.74 percent, or 403 firearms, of the total number of trace
requests made during that time. This included 70 .223 caliber AR-15-
type semiautomatic rifles and one machine gun. In addition, 39 guns
were recovered in 2008 that had been sold legally by the United States
to a third party country, including 6 guns each from Germany, Belize,
and Guatemala and 1 from El Salvador. These 39 guns included 21
semiautomatic pistols, and nothing larger or more powerful than the
Colt 45. According to U.S. law enforcement officials we met with, there
have not been any indications of significant trafficking of firearms
from U.S. military personnel or U.S. military arsenals. According to
ATF data for fiscal years 2004-2008, of the 23,159 guns seized in
Mexico and traced, 160 firearms, or 0.70 percent, were found to be U.S.
military arms.
Many Firearms Trafficked into Mexico Come from Gun Shops and Gun Shows
in Southwest Border States:
From fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008, most of the firearms seized
in Mexico and traced came from U.S. Southwest border states. In
particular, about 70 percent of these firearms came from Texas,
California, and Arizona. Figure 5 provides data on the top source
states for firearms trafficked to Mexico and traced from fiscal year
2004 to fiscal year 2008.
Figure 5: Top Source States for Firearms Seized in Mexico and Traced
Over the Last 5 Years (Fiscal Years 2004-2008):
[Refer to PDF for image: map and pie-chart]
Texas: 39%;
California: 20%;
Arizona: 10%;
Colorado: about 2%;
Florida: about 2%;
Illinois: about 2%;
New Mexico: about 2%;
Nevada: about 2%;
Oklahoma: about 2%;
Washington: about 2%;
Other states: less than 2% each.
Sources: GAO analysis of ATF trace data; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Most of the firearms seized in Mexico and successfully traced come from
gun shops and pawn shops, according to ATF gun trace data. According to
ATF, there are around 6,700 retail gun dealers--gun shops and pawn
shops--along the Southwest border of the United States. This represents
around 12 percent of the approximately 55,000 retail gun dealers
nationwide. These gun dealers, or FFLs,[Footnote 17] can operate in gun
shops, pawn shops, their own homes,[Footnote 18] or out of gun shows.
From fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008, of those firearms ATF was
able to trace back to a retail dealer, around 95 percent were traced
back to gun shops and pawn shops--around 71 to 79 percent from gun
shops and 15 to 19 percent from pawn shops, according to ATF. In
addition to these firearms that are successfully traced back to a
retail dealer, some ATF officials told us, based on information from
their operations and investigations, many seized guns also come from
private sales at gun shows, though it is impossible to know this exact
number due to the lack of records kept for such purchases, which is
discussed further below.
The illicit purchase of firearms in the United States happens in
various ways depending upon where the purchase takes place.
* Gun shops and pawn shops. Firearms purchased at gun shops and pawn
shops for trafficking to Mexico are usually made by "straw purchasers,"
according to law enforcement officials. These straw purchasers are
individuals with clean records who can be expected to pass the required
background check and who are paid by drug cartel representatives or
middlemen to purchase certain guns from gun shops. Because the straw
purchasers are legitimately qualified to purchase the guns, they can be
difficult to identify by gun shop owners and clerks, absent obvious
clues that would signify that a straw purchase is happening. For
instance, ATF officials were tipped off to straw purchases when older
women purchased multiple AK-type semiautomatic rifles, or individuals
who seemed to know little about guns made purchases off of a written
shopping list. In far fewer cases, ATF officials stated, corrupt gun
shop owners or staff facilitate these illicit purchases. ATF officials
told us they have not estimated what percentage of firearms trafficked
to Mexico result from such illegal actions on the part of the gun shop
owners or staff, but ATF has identified gun shop personnel who sold
guns they knew would be trafficked to Mexico, as well as instances
where gun shop personnel have altered their records to mask the
disappearance of guns from their inventory after being sold illegally.
[Footnote 19]
* Gun shows. According to ATF officials, individuals can use straw
purchasers as they would at gun shops to acquire guns from gun shops
with booths at gun shows. In addition, individuals can also purchase
guns at gun shows from other individuals making sales from their
private collections. These private sales require no background checks
of the purchaser and require no record be made or kept of the sale. ATF
officials told us this prevents their knowing what percentage of the
problem of arms trafficking to Mexico comes from these private sales at
gun shows.
Most Guns Trafficked to Mexico Support DTOs, According to U.S. and
Mexican Government Officials:
U.S. and Mexican government officials stated most guns trafficked into
Mexico are facilitated by and support operations of Mexican DTOs.
[Footnote 20] According to ATF officials, once the gun is acquired in
the United States, typically a middleman or someone representing the
drug cartel will transport or pay another individual to transport the
firearm or firearms into Mexico. Firearms are generally trafficked
along major U.S. highways and interstates and through border crossings
into Mexico. The firearms are normally transported across the border by
personal or commercial vehicle because, according to U.S. and Mexican
government officials, the drug cartels have found these methods to have
a high likelihood of success. (We will discuss the challenges to
seizing illicit southbound firearms at the border in the second
objective of this report.) Once in Mexico, the firearms are generally
deposited in border towns or trafficked along major highways to their
destinations. The transporter drops off the firearm or firearms at a
set location for pick up and use by members of a drug cartel. Figure 6
displays the primary trafficking routes from the United States into
Mexico.
Figure 6: Map of Primary Trafficking Routes from the United States into
Mexico:
[Refer to PDF for image: map]
The map depicts primary trafficking routes from the U.S. into Mexico
going through the following border cities:
El Paso, Texas;
Laredo, Texas;
McAllen, Texas;
Nogales, Arizona;
San Diego, California.
Sources: ATF - adapted by GAO; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
ATF and Mexican government officials told us they have found in Mexican
arms trafficking investigations that a small number of firearms
illicitly trafficked into Mexico from the United States are for
hunters, off-duty police officers, and citizens seeking personal
protection. Officials from ATF, ICE, and the Government of Mexico told
us most of the guns seized and traced come from seizures Mexican
military or law enforcement make in their war with the drug cartels.
Government of Mexico data showed almost 30,000 firearms were seized in
Mexico in 2008. Government of Mexico officials told us almost all of
them were seized in operations against the drug cartels.
U.S. Efforts to Combat Illicit Sales of Firearms and to Stem the Flow
of These Arms across the Southwest Border Face Key Challenges:
U.S. efforts to combat illicit sales of firearms in the United States
and to prevent the trafficking of these arms across the Southwest
border into Mexico confront several key challenges. First, relevant law
enforcement officials we met with noted certain provisions of some
federal firearms laws present challenges to their efforts to address
arms trafficking. Second, we found poor coordination and a lack of
information sharing have hampered the effectiveness of the two key
agencies--ATF and ICE--that implement various efforts to address arms
trafficking to Mexico. Third, a variety of factors, such as
infrastructure limitations and surveillance by drug traffickers at the
border, hinder U.S. efforts to detect and seize southbound firearms at
U.S.-Mexico border crossings. Finally, agencies lack systematic
gathering and recent analyses of firearms trafficking data and trends
that could be used to more fully assess the problem and plan efforts,
and they were unable to provide complete information to us on the
results of their efforts to seize firearms destined for Mexico and to
investigate and prosecute cases.
Some Federal Firearms Laws Present Challenges to U.S. Efforts to Combat
Arms Trafficking to Mexico, according to Law Enforcement Officials:
U.S. agencies implement efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico
within current applicable federal firearms laws.[Footnote 21] In
enacting federal firearms laws such as the Gun Control Act of 1968,
Congress has sought to keep firearms out of the hands of those not
legally entitled to possess them and to assist law enforcement in
efforts to reduce crime and violence, without placing an unnecessary
burden on law-abiding citizens who may acquire, possess, or use
firearms for lawful activity.[Footnote 22] Furthermore, Congress stated
that in enacting the Gun Control Act of 1968 that the law was not
intended to discourage or eliminate the private ownership or use of
firearms by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.[Footnote 23]
However, ATF officials stated certain provisions of some federal
firearms laws present challenges to their efforts to combat arms
trafficking to Mexico. For example, they identified key challenges
related to (1) restrictions on collecting and reporting information on
firearms purchases, (2) a lack of required background checks for
private firearms sales, and (3) limitations on reporting requirements
for multiple sales.
* Restrictions on collecting and reporting information on firearms
purchases. FFLs are required by federal law to maintain records of
firearm transactions and to provide information on the first retail
purchaser of a firearm to ATF in response to a trace request within 24
hours.[Footnote 24] ATF has stated that information obtained through
the firearms trace process is critical to its efforts to identify
individuals involved in firearms trafficking schemes and to detect
trafficking patterns. In addition, ATF documents and officials noted
the trace of a firearm recovered in crime in Mexico often leads to the
initiation of an arms trafficking investigation or provides agents with
information to assist with an investigation. However, the U.S.
government is prohibited by law from maintaining a national registry of
firearms.[Footnote 25] As a result, ATF must take a number of steps to
trace a crime gun, including, as applicable, contacting the importer,
manufacturer, and wholesaler of the firearm in order to identify the
FFL retailer who sold the firearm to the first retail purchaser. Key
law enforcement officials stated restrictions on establishing a federal
firearms registry lengthen the time and resources required by ATF to
complete a crime gun trace and can limit the success of some traces.
ATF officials added that information ATF is able to maintain on certain
firearms purchases, such as information on some multiple firearms
purchases, enables ATF to more quickly trace those firearms if they
turn up in crime because the information is already entered into a
searchable database.
According to ATF, from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008, it took
the agency an average of about 14 days to complete a trace of a firearm
recovered in Mexico to the first retail purchaser. However, officials
stated investigative leads obtained from trace results are most useful
within the first few days following a firearm seizure, in part because
the sort of conspiracies often associated with firearms trafficking
tend to change personnel frequently and, as a result, an individual
found to be responsible for the purchase of a particular firearm may no
longer have ties to the principal gun trafficker directing the
scheme.[Footnote 26]
DOJ documents and ATF officials also noted secondary firearms--firearms
resold following the first retail purchase from an FFL, or "used guns"--
are commonly trafficked to Mexico. Federal law permits the private
transfer of certain firearms from one unlicensed individual to another
in places such as at gun shows, without requiring any record of the
transaction be maintained by the unlicensed individuals, an FFL, or
other law enforcement authority.[Footnote 27] Secondhand firearms may
also be sold to and purchased from FFL pawnshops.[Footnote 28] Although
pawnshops maintain records of any secondhand firearm transfers,
[Footnote 29] ATF cannot directly trace the firearm from the first
retail sale at an FFL to the pawnshop. Through the firearms trace
process, ATF can follow the records of a firearm from the manufacturer
or importer to the first retail sale at an FFL; however, if the firearm
was resold from one individual to another or through a pawnshop, there
is a break in the chain of records, and ATF must then consult with the
last recorded purchaser of the firearm to determine the continuing
disposition of the firearm. As a result, ATF officials stated that,
while ATF may be able to trace a firearm to the first retail purchaser,
it generally has no knowledge of any secondhand firearms purchases from
gun shows or pawnshops--where many traffickers buy guns--without
conducting further investigation, which may require significant
additional resources and time.
* Lack of required background checks for private firearms sales.
Federal firearms law prohibits certain persons from possessing or
receiving firearms.[Footnote 30] A 1993 amendment to the Gun Control
Act (the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act) required background
checks be completed for all nonlicensed persons seeking to obtain
firearms from FFLs, subject to certain exceptions.[Footnote 31] These
background checks provide an automated search of criminal and
noncriminal records to determine a person's eligibility to purchase a
firearm. However, private sales of firearms from one individual to
another, including private sales at gun shows, are not subject to the
background checks requirement and, therefore, do not require the seller
to determine whether the purchaser is a felon or other prohibited
person, such as an illegal or unlawful alien.[Footnote 32] DOJ
documents and ATF officials stated that, as a result, many firearms
trafficked to Mexico may be purchased through these types of
transactions by individuals who may want to avoid background checks and
records of their firearms purchases.[Footnote 33]
* Limitations on reporting requirements for multiple sales. Under the
federal multiple sale reporting requirement, an FFL that sells two or
more handguns within 5 business days to an individual must report
information on the transaction to ATF.[Footnote 34] The federal
reporting requirement was established to cover multiple sales of
handguns, following studies showing that handguns sold in multiple
sales to the same individual purchaser were frequently used in crime.
ATF has identified multiple sales or purchases of firearms by a
nonlicensee as a "significant indicator" of firearms trafficking, and
officials noted the federal multiple sale reporting requirement helps
expedite the time required by ATF to complete a crime gun trace. ATF
officials added that information ATF received from FFLs on multiple
sales has provided critical leads for some investigations of arms
trafficking to Mexico. However, the requirement does not apply to
purchases of long guns.[Footnote 35] As a result, although according to
ATF data about 27 percent of firearms recovered in Mexico and traced
from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008 were long guns, ATF does not
have information in its multiple sales database on any long guns
recovered in crime in Mexico that may have been purchased through a
multiple sale. In addition, law enforcement officials noted traffickers
are aware of how to avoid the federal reporting requirement by
spreading out purchases of handguns at different FFLs. For example,
traffickers can effectively purchase two or more guns within 5 business
days without having such purchases reported as long as they purchase no
more than one gun at any individual FFL.
Lack of Coordination Hampers ATF and ICE Efforts to Combat Arms
Trafficking to Mexico:
Some officials we met with from ATF and ICE--the two primary agencies
combating arms trafficking to Mexico--noted the agencies have worked
well together on various efforts to address the issue; however, we
found ATF and ICE have not consistently coordinated their efforts to
combat arms trafficking. ATF has stated it aims to address arms
trafficking to Mexico in collaboration with domestic and Mexican law
enforcement partners, including Mexican government entities, as well as
U.S. agencies such as ICE and DEA. Specifically, a 2007 ATF document
outlining its plan for Project Gunrunner stated ATF would incorporate
ICE, CBP, and other participating agencies in joint initiatives, to
expand information sharing and coordinated operations. According to
ICE, its BEST initiative was largely developed to facilitate
cooperation and bring together resources of ICE, CBP, and other U.S.
and Mexican law enforcement entities to take a comprehensive approach
to address border violence and vulnerabilities. However, an outdated
interagency agreement and jurisdictional conflicts have led to
instances of poor coordination between the two agencies. Officials from
both agencies in Washington and in the field cited examples of
inadequate communication on investigations, unwillingness to share
information, and dysfunctional operations. As a consequence, it is
unclear whether ATF and ICE are optimizing the use of U.S. government
resources and minimizing duplication of efforts to address the issue.
ATF and ICE officials we interviewed had differing views of their
respective roles and responsibilities for addressing arms trafficking
to Mexico. ATF officials stated ATF's relative experience on firearms
issues and broad range of relevant authorities under which it operates--
including its role in tracing crime guns and regulating the firearms
industry--make it the logical U.S. agency to lead efforts to combat
arms trafficking to Mexico. For example, ATF enforces provisions of
federal firearms laws[Footnote 36] related to:
* prohibited persons in possession of a firearm,[Footnote 37]
* knowingly giving or selling a firearm to a prohibited person,
[Footnote 38]
* a lawful purchaser acquiring a firearm on behalf of an unlawful
purchaser (known as a "straw purchase"),[Footnote 39]
* dealing in firearms without a license, [Footnote 40] and:
* the unlawful interstate transfer of firearms in certain
instances.[Footnote 41]
Although ICE officials acknowledged ATF had more years of experience on
firearms issues, they told us they viewed ATF's role as focused on
firearms trafficking on the U.S. side of the border, while ICE has the
primary role in cases involving firearms smuggled across the U.S.
border into Mexico. ICE enforces provisions related to the illegal
export or smuggling of goods, including firearms and ammunition, from
the United States into Mexico in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976
[Footnote 42] and its implementing regulations, the International
Trafficking in Arms Regulations[Footnote 43]; the USA Patriot
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005[Footnote 44]; and the
Export Administration Act[Footnote 45] and its implementing
regulations, Export Administration Regulations;[Footnote 46] among
other authorities.[Footnote 47]
In the locations we visited during our audit work, officials cited
examples of how unclear roles and responsibilities have hindered
communication and cooperation during some operations. Examples are as
follows:
* Several officials told us they felt the agencies were not taking
sufficient advantage of each other's expertise to more effectively
carry out operations, such as ATF's expertise in firearms
identification and procedures for conducting surveillance at gun shows,
and ICE's experience dealing with export violations and combating money
laundering and alien smuggling, which ICE officials noted also may be
relevant to cases of arms trafficking.
* Information on intelligence related to arms trafficking to Mexico was
not being shared by the agencies at the El Paso Intelligence Center
(EPIC), which was established to facilitate coordinated intelligence
gathering and dissemination among member agencies related to Southwest
border efforts to address drug, alien, and weapons smuggling. The 9/11
Commission Report asserted intelligence sharing is critical to combat
threats to the United States and that intelligence analysts should
utilize all relevant information sources. According to ATF, its "gun
desk" at EPIC was established as a conduit or clearinghouse for weapons-
related intelligence from federal, state, local, and international law
enforcement entities, including weapons seizure information from ICE,
CBP, and Mexican authorities. ICE stated its Border Violence
Intelligence Cell (BVIC) was established at EPIC to coordinate weapons
smuggling investigations and other related efforts with partner
agencies and facilitate timely information sharing and analysis.
However, ATF officials we met with at EPIC told us that, although they
thought it was important for the two agencies' efforts to be integrated
at EPIC, they had minimal interaction with BVIC staff. Additionally,
senior ICE officials at headquarters told us that, in the past, ATF has
taken information shared by ICE and used it to lead its own
investigations; as a result, ICE has subsequently been reluctant to
share information with ATF at EPIC. Although CBP had a representative
assigned to the gun desk during our site visit in January 2009, the ATF
official in charge of the gun desk stated ICE did not have a
representative at the gun desk as of May 1, 2009. After reviewing a
draft of this report, ATF and ICE officials at headquarters noted ICE
had requested permission from ATF to assign a representative to the gun
desk in the past 6 months, and ATF permitted the assignment at the end
of May; they stated an ICE analyst had been assigned to the gun desk as
of June 1, 2009, which may contribute to improved coordination between
the two agencies at EPIC in the future.
* The agencies have not coordinated and collaborated on some covert
operations, potentially compromising the effectiveness of these
efforts. For example, ATF officials stated that, in some cases, ICE did
not follow standard procedures ATF has established for conducting
operations at gun shows. ATF officials told us of one case in which ICE
did not coordinate with ATF on an operation at a gun show, which led to
an ICE agent unknowingly conducting surveillance on an ATF agent who
was pursuing a suspect trafficker. ICE officials stated that, in
another case, ATF had conducted "controlled delivery" covert operations
in an attempt to identify organizations receiving illicit weapons in
Mexico, without coordinating with ICE. The ICE officials said ATF did
not notify them of their operations, including preclearing the
controlled export of the weapons, which could have put ATF's operation
in conflict with ICE, CBP, or Mexican government law enforcement and
raised the risk that weapons smuggled to Mexico as part of the
operations would end up in the wrong hands and be used in crime.
* In some cases, ATF and ICE refused to provide required documentation
to assist each other in arms trafficking investigations, according to
ICE officials. ICE officials stated, in some cases, ATF officials would
not provide necessary statements for cases ICE was investigating that
involved interstate firearms violations. As a result, the officials
said they would not provide a required immigration certificate to ATF
for arms trafficking cases ATF was investigating that involved an
immigration violation.
* Although ICE established BEST teams to facilitate interagency
coordination and an integrated approach to address border issues, ATF
and ICE officials indicated ATF has had minimal participation on the
BEST teams. ICE officials stated that, as of May 2009, ATF was working
with 4 of the 10 Southwest border BEST teams. ATF stated in February
2009 it had not permanently assigned any agents to BEST teams, but some
ATF agents had been available on an as-needed or part-time basis to
assist with BEST efforts to stop the illegal export of weapons from the
U.S. A senior ATF official subsequently told us resource constraints
prevented ATF from fully participating in the Southwest border BEST
teams, but the official said ATF recently agreed to assign one ATF
agent to each of the Southwest border BEST teams that are located where
ATF also has a field office.
* ATF, ICE, State, and other relevant officials we met with at the U.S.
Embassy in Mexico City agreed on the potential usefulness of creating
an interagency, bilateral operational arms trafficking task force to
conduct joint operations and investigations including both U.S. and
Mexican government officials. However, ATF and ICE could not agree on
who would take the lead, or whether they would co-lead, the effort.
Senior ICE officials told us ICE preferred not to co-lead an
interagency task force with ATF unless ATF could provide an equivalent
level of resources, and ATF had relatively fewer resources in Mexico.
The officials also said ICE wanted to minimize coordination meetings
that would be required with an interagency task force. While a senior
ATF official stated ATF and ICE agreed at an April conference in Mexico
to create an interagency task force including both agencies that would
be led by the Mexican government, senior ICE officials said the
interagency task force would be led by ICE, and ICE is also moving
forward with its own plans to create several bilateral taskforces
comprising relevant ICE and Mexican officials at key locations in
Mexico, without ATF involvement.
ATF and ICE officials acknowledged the need to better coordinate their
efforts to leverage their expertise and resources, and to ensure their
strategies are mutually reinforcing, particularly given the recent
expanded level of effort to address arms trafficking. In our past work,
we have found that in an interagency effort where interagency
collaboration is essential, it is important that agencies have clear
roles and responsibilities and that there be mechanisms to coordinate
across agencies.[Footnote 48] Officials from both agencies stated ATF
and ICE are in the process of updating a 1978 MOU that existed between
ATF and Customs (before the 2003 creation of ICE), and the agencies are
working to improve coordination and cooperation.[Footnote 49] ATF
officials said the new MOU will more clearly define the agencies'
statutory jurisdictions and reflect changes in some laws since the
previous MOU was created. A draft copy of the MOU we obtained also
included some guidelines for coordinating investigations and resolving
interagency conflicts. A senior ATF official suggested that, in the
future, it would be helpful if ICE and ATF officials in charge of field
offices could develop more detailed standard operations procedures for
their respective locations, based on the MOU. However, ATF and ICE have
not reached formal agreement on the MOU to date, and officials said
they have not established other formal coordination mechanisms to
facilitate high-level information sharing and integrate strategies for
addressing arms trafficking to Mexico.
Various Factors Limit the Potential to Detect and Seize Southbound
Weapons at U.S. Mexican Border:
We conducted site visits to three locations along the U.S.-Mexico
border (Laredo/Nuevo Laredo, San Diego/Tijuana, and El Paso/Juarez) and
to Monterrey and Mexico City, Mexico, between September 2008 and
January 2009. In March 2009, the Secretary of Homeland Security
announced a new Southwest border security initiative that will expand
screening technology and add personnel and canine teams that can detect
weapons and currency for southbound inspections at ports of entry,
among other efforts.[Footnote 50] Although we have not reviewed these
new plans, our review of operations found various factors limit the
potential for southbound inspections to reduce the flow of arms at the
Southwest border.
While ATF and ICE play important roles in investigating cases of arms
trafficking to Mexico, CBP is responsible for the ports of entry at the
U.S.-Mexico border, and its efforts include intercepting southbound
illicit firearms at the border.[Footnote 51] Although CBP reported that
from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2008 some weapons were seized as a
result of southbound inspections along the U.S.-Mexico border, in
general, such inspections have yielded relatively few seizures.
According to agency officials we met with, in general, southbound
inspections of vehicles and persons have not been a high priority for
the U.S. government and have resulted in relatively few weapons
seizures. [Footnote 52] For example, in fiscal year 2008, CBP reported
35 southbound weapons seizures occurred at 10 of the 25 land ports of
entry along the Southwest border, involving a total of 70 weapons.
[Footnote 53] The other 15 ports of entry did not report any southbound
weapons seizures.[Footnote 54]
Efforts to increase southbound weapons seizures at the Southwest border
are limited by several factors, including resource and infrastructure
limitations, drug traffickers' surveillance capabilities, and the
limitations of Mexican government efforts.
* Resource and infrastructure limitations. Although CBP officials
stated CBP does not track the overall number of southbound inspections
conducted at Southwest border crossings, officials stated such
inspections have generally been periodic and ad hoc, depending on
available resources and local intelligence. For example, at one border
crossing we visited, CBP officials stated law enforcement agencies
typically conducted about one to two southbound operations per month.
Officials noted southbound border crossings generally lack the
infrastructure available at northbound crossings for screening vehicles
and persons, such as overhead canopies, inspection booths, X-ray units,
and other technologies. CBP officials we met with at the San Ysidro
border crossing from San Diego to Tijuana, Mexico, noted there are 24
northbound lanes at that crossing, with inspection booths and screening
technologies that enable them to process about 110,000 vehicles and
pedestrians crossing from Mexico into the United States every day with
an average 1-1.5 hour wait per vehicle.[Footnote 55] However, the
officials said there are only 6 southbound lanes, none of which have
the inspections infrastructure northbound lanes have, and the majority
of vehicles cross into Mexico without stopping on either side of the
border. Because of the lack of southbound infrastructure at this border
crossing, officials said they use orange cones and concrete barriers to
designate inspection areas during southbound operations (see figure 7).
Figure 7: Southbound Operation Being Conducted at San Ysidro Border
Crossing Between San Diego, California, and Tijuana, Mexico:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
To increase southbound inspections, law enforcement officials told us
significant additional resources for personnel, equipment, and
infrastructure along the Southwest border would be required beyond what
is already spent conducting northbound screenings. For example, as of
March 2009, Laredo, Texas, was the only CBP location along the
Southwest border with a permanent team of individuals available to
conduct southbound inspections at local border crossings.[Footnote 56]
CBP noted that, under the new security initiative, it plans to conduct
more regular southbound operations, in collaboration with other law
enforcement entities. However, officials stated some border crossings
lack the additional space that would be required to expand southbound
infrastructure in order to accommodate primary and secondary screening
areas while limiting the impact on traffic. For example, we visited one
border crossing in El Paso, Texas, that is adjacent to park land not
owned by CBP, which CBP officials said would preclude any efforts to
expand southbound infrastructure at that crossing. Officials added that
the new Southwest border security initiative will include efforts to
survey existing southbound infrastructure to assess needs for
functionality and worker safety, but they said any efforts to expand
southbound infrastructure under the new security initiative would be
long-term, since projects generally take 7-10 years.
* Drug traffickers' surveillance capabilities. Law enforcement
officials stated they typically only have about 45 minutes to an hour
to conduct a southbound inspections operation before drug traffickers
conducting surveillance at the border detect the operation and tell
potential traffickers to wait for the operation to end before
attempting to cross. As a result, officials said inspections are
typically conducted during random brief intervals over a certain time
period, such as 2 to 3 days.
* Limited Mexican southbound operations. Although Mexican customs aims
to inspect 10 percent of vehicles crossing into Mexico on the Mexican
side of the border, they have generally inspected much less than that
to date. U.S. and Mexican officials noted, Mexican customs typically
has focused more on inspections of commercial vehicles for illicit
goods, which result in the payment of a fine, than on inspections for
illicit weapons. Officials said this variance was due to several
factors, including Mexico's general lack of capacity for detecting
illicit weapons, as well as concerns about corruption and the risks
faced by Mexican officials involved in a seizure of illicit firearms.
However, the Mexican government is taking some steps to improve
inspections, such as enhancing background checks and vetting staff
involved in inspections, and putting in place new processes, equipment,
and infrastructure to improve the security, efficiency, and
effectiveness of inspections.
DHS's new Southwest border security initiative has the potential to
mitigate some of the limitations we found with existing border
operations. We did not review efforts under the new initiative, and it
is too early to tell whether and to what extent these recent efforts
may effectively stem the flow of illicit weapons at the U.S.-Mexico
border. Additionally, even if southbound operations were significantly
expanded along the Southwest border, they might still result in a
relatively small percentage of the weapons intended for Mexico being
seized. For example, in comparison, even with the level of screening
that is currently conducted on vehicles and persons coming into the
United States from Mexico, the U.S. interagency counternarcotics
community has noted only a portion of illicit drugs crossing into the
United States from Mexico are seized at the border.[Footnote 57]
Agencies Lack Complete Data to Help Plan and Assess Results of Efforts
to Address Arms Trafficking to Mexico:
With the exception of information maintained by ATF on traces of
firearms seized in Mexico, in general, U.S. agencies were not able to
provide comprehensive data to us related to their efforts to address
arms trafficking to Mexico. We found agencies lack recent systematic
analysis and reporting of aggregate data related to arms trafficking,
which could be used to better understand the nature of the problem and
to help plan and assess ways to address it. Additionally, while
agencies provided some information on efforts to seize firearms, and
initiate and prosecute cases of arms trafficking to Mexico, they were
not able to provide complete and accurate information related to
results of their efforts to address trafficking to Mexico specifically.
[Footnote 58]
As mentioned previously, ATF maintains some data on firearms that are
seized in Mexico and submitted for a trace, which can be used to help
characterize arms trafficking patterns and trends.[Footnote 59] For
example, ATF has used this information to identify primary trafficking
routes from the United States to Mexico and to identify types of
firearms frequently recovered in crime in Mexico. ATF also provided
data we requested on the number of traces that were linked to a
multiple handgun sale and on firearms that had been reported lost or
stolen.[Footnote 60] However, ATF was unable to provide data to us on
the number of arms trafficking to Mexico cases involving straw
purchasers or unlicensed sellers because the agency does not
systematically track this information. ATF was also unable to provide
information we requested on the number of traces completed for firearms
recovered in Mexico that were linked to FFL gun dealer sales at gun
shows from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008, although the agency
began a new effort to track this information in its firearms tracing
system in June 2008. Multiple sales, straw purchasers, trafficking by
unlicensed sellers, and gun shows have been cited in prior ATF reports
and by ATF officials as sources or indicators for firearms trafficking
in general and to Mexico in particular.
For example, in 1999 and 2000, the Department of the Treasury and ATF
released three reports that included analyses of firearms trafficking
trends based on ATF investigations.[Footnote 61] The reports included
information such as primary reasons for initiating firearms trafficking
investigations, sources of illegal firearms, types of traffickers
identified in investigations, and trafficking violations commonly
associated with investigations. Law enforcement agencies and the
National Academy of Sciences have stated the type of information
related to arms trafficking included in the reports can be used by
Congress and implementing agencies to more accurately assess the
problem and to help target and prioritize efforts. [Footnote 62] One of
the three reports, released in February 2000, stated it was to be the
first in an annual series. However, it has not been updated, and
similar analyses and reporting have not been completed since the three
reports were released. Senior ATF officials stated ATF had not recently
compiled reports including an analysis of aggregate data on firearms
trafficking due to a provision in their appropriation that was in place
from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2007[Footnote 63] that restricted
the sharing of this type of information. The officials stated an update
would be useful and, since the appropriations restrictions were relaxed
in 2008, ATF was considering such an update in the future, though no
funding was requested for this activity in ATF's fiscal year 2010
budget.
ICE officials also acknowledged the importance of compiling this type
of information, and they noted that, for the first time in March 2009,
ICE, CBP, and DHS intelligence staff had compiled an assessment
providing an overview of southbound weapons smuggling trends, such as
primary smuggling routes and destination states for firearms in Mexico.
[Footnote 64] The assessment included an analysis of 212 southbound
weapons seized by CBP and ICE in the Southwest border states in fiscal
year 2007 and fiscal year 2008, as well as data from the Mexican
government on firearms seizures in Mexico between 2006 and 2008 and
data from ATF on a portion of traces ATF completed for firearms
recovered in Mexico in 2007 and 2008. However, the assessment notes
that it "does not provide an all inclusive picture of—firearms
smuggling" from the United States to Mexico. ICE stated it worked
closely with ATF intelligence staff in developing the assessment.
Nevertheless, the senior ATF intelligence official cited by ICE as its
primary ATF contact for the assessment told us while ATF answered
specific questions from ICE, such as regarding ATF's firearms trace
process, ATF was not asked to provide comprehensive data and analysis
or significant input into the assessment's overall findings and
conclusions. In addition, although ICE officials stated that the
assessment had been completed in March 2009, senior ATF officials we
met with in April, including the Chief of ATF's National Tracing
Center, had just received a copy for the first time. We found the
assessment only includes a subset of trace statistics we were able to
obtain from ATF on firearms recovered in crime in Mexico and traced
over the last 5 years. The senior ATF intelligence official told us
that it would make sense for future assessments to be developed
jointly, in order to leverage more comprehensive data and analysis
available from both agencies; however, he noted that until both
agencies improve their interagency coordination, developing a joint
assessment was unlikely.
Law enforcement agencies also reported tracking some information
related to results of their efforts to address arms trafficking to
Mexico to date, such as data on firearms seizures and cases initiated,
but they lack complete data on results of their efforts to combat arms
trafficking to Mexico specifically and have not systematically reported
information on results of their efforts.[Footnote 65] Examples follow:
* Firearms seizures. Law enforcement agencies could not provide
complete data on the number of firearms seizures they made involving
arms trafficking to Mexico. ATF reported to us it acquired 8,328
firearms in the four Southwest border states (Arizona, California, New
Mexico, and Texas) in fiscal year 2008 as evidence in support of
criminal investigations (through abandonment, purchase, or seizure),
related to its Southwest border enforcement efforts.[Footnote 66]
However, a senior ATF official stated the agency is not able to readily
retrieve data on whether a firearm was headed north or south, or, for
example, whether an agent determined a firearm was being trafficked to
Mexico or was seized for some other reason.[Footnote 67] In addition,
seizures of firearms in other states that may relate to arms
trafficking to Mexico are not reflected in the above number.[Footnote
68] Similarly, ICE reported to us it seized a total of 1,767 firearms
in those same states in support of criminal investigations related to
its Southwest border enforcement efforts in fiscal year 2008, including
152 firearms designated as having transited through or being destined
for Mexico.[Footnote 69] ICE officials said agents have not
consistently indicated in ICE's data tracking system when a seizure
relates to Mexico, so the latter number is likely less than the actual
number of firearms seized related to Mexico. They added that seizures
of firearms in other states that may relate to arms trafficking to
Mexico also would not be reflected in the data. Additionally, while CBP
reported to us it seized a total of 70 southbound firearms at official
land ports of entry along the Southwest border in fiscal year 2008, it
noted not all southbound weapons seizures necessarily relate to arms
trafficking, such as in instances when an individual is arrested at the
border due to an outstanding warrant and the individual also had a
weapon.[Footnote 70]
* Cases initiated. Law enforcement agencies could not provide complete
data on cases they initiated involving arms trafficking to Mexico. ATF
reported to us it initiated 280 cases nationwide related to arms
trafficking to Mexico in fiscal year 2008. However, a senior ATF
official stated some cases involving weapons that were exported to
another country, such as Guatemala, and were later recovered in crime
in Mexico would not be included in the above number, because the
intermediate location would be recorded as the destination country in
ATF's data tracking systems; therefore, the number provided is likely
fewer than the actual number of cases. The official also noted ATF's
data systems do not capture information on reasons for initiating
cases, such as whether a case was initiated based on information
provided from a confidential informant or based on findings from an FFL
inspection.[Footnote 71] ICE reported to us it initiated 103 cases
involving Mexico-related weapons smuggling in fiscal year 2008.
However, ICE officials stated some cases that do relate to arms
trafficking to Mexico are not included in the data since ICE agents
have not consistently indicated whether a case is related to Mexico in
ICE's data tracking system.[Footnote 72] They also noted their data
systems do not capture information on specific reasons for initiating
cases, such as whether a case was initiated following a highway
interdiction on the U.S. side of the border or based on information
provided from a confidential informant. However, ICE was able to
provide a breakdown to us of cases by referring agency. For example,
ICE reported 15 of the cases involving weapons smuggled to Mexico were
initiated following a weapons seizure by CBP at an official port of
entry, and 16 were initiated following a referral from ATF.
* Prosecutions. Agencies were also unable to provide complete data on
prosecutions of cases involving arms trafficking to Mexico. Officials
from DOJ's Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) stated their
national database for tracking criminal cases does not have a category
specific to Mexico arms trafficking cases. They said there is not a
simple way to determine which cases involve arms trafficking to Mexico
since cases may involve various defendants and charges, and no charges
are specific to arms trafficking to Mexico. They added that, to date,
most of the cases U.S. Attorneys Offices have prosecuted relating to
arms trafficking to Mexico have been referred to U.S. Attorneys by ATF.
[Footnote 73] ATF reported to us it referred 73 cases involving arms
trafficking to Mexico for prosecution in fiscal year 2008.[Footnote 74]
ATF officials stated although their data systems track the outcome of
all cases, including firearms trafficking cases in general, or, as
another example, for cases related to Southwest border violence (which
may involve arms trafficking as well as other related offenses) they do
not readily track the outcome of arms trafficking to Mexico cases
specifically. However, based upon further review and analysis, ATF was
able to generate some information for us on the outcome of the 73
cases: specifically, as of September 30, 2008, 22 cases were pending a
prosecutorial decision, 46 had been accepted for prosecution, and 5 had
not been accepted for prosecution. In addition, ATF reported 47 of the
cases had been indicted, and 33 had resulted in convictions. While ICE
was not able to provide data on the number of cases involving arms
trafficking to Mexico that it referred for prosecution, it reported 66
cases involving Mexico-related weapons smuggling had been indicted, and
47 had resulted in convictions in fiscal year 2008. ICE officials noted
some narcotics, money laundering, or human trafficking cases may also
result in charges related to weapons smuggling that are not reflected
in this data. They said compiling more complete and precise data
related to prosecutions of cases involving arms trafficking to Mexico
would require extensive documentary review and analysis.
U.S. Assistance Limited by a Lack of Targeting Resources at Needs and
Concerns over Corruption among Some Mexican Government Officials:
U.S. law enforcement agencies have provided some technical and
operational assistance to Mexican counterparts to combat arms
trafficking to Mexico. However, these efforts have been limited in
scope and hampered by the incomplete use of ATF's eTrace system and a
lack of targeting resources at needs. In addition, concerns about
corruption among some Mexican government officials limit the United
States' ability to establish a full partnership with Mexican government
entities in combating illicit arms trafficking to Mexico.
Agencies Provide Some Assistance to Mexican Counterparts in Combating
Arms Trafficking, but Overall Efforts Are Limited and Not Targeted to
Needs:
U.S. law enforcement agencies have provided some assistance to Mexican
counterparts in combating arms trafficking. As noted previously in this
report, U.S. law enforcement agencies conduct their work in Mexico in
cooperation with Government of Mexico counterparts under the Treaty on
Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States for Mutual Legal Assistance.[Footnote 75] ATF agents in
Monterrey, for instance, have built working relationships with federal,
state, and local law enforcement, as well as the Mexican military, in
the Monterrey area. This type of outreach has given the United States
the opportunity to provide Mexican government counterparts some
technical and operational assistance on firearms trafficking.[Footnote
76]
* Technical assistance. ATF has provided training sessions on firearms
identification, developing arms trafficking investigations, and the use
of eTrace. For instance,[Footnote 77] according to ATF, from fiscal
years 2007 through 2008, ATF trained 375 law enforcement officials on
the use of eTrace, at a cost of just under $10,000. Government of
Mexico officials told us the training was extremely helpful in
improving the skills of the officers who received it. However, only a
small percentage of officers received the training, and more training
is needed, Government of Mexico officials told us. In addition, ATF has
provided some equipment to Mexican government counterparts, such as
providing forensics equipment to the State Crime Lab of Nuevo Leon in
Monterrey, Mexico.[Footnote 78]
* Operational assistance. ATF currently has 3 agents in Mexico, and ICE
has 12, though ICE agents are required to work on a wide variety of
issues and, at the time of our field work in Mexico, none was
exclusively dedicated to arms trafficking issues. In May 2009, ICE
officials told us that one ICE agent in Mexico would now be dedicated
to arms trafficking. Where they can, these ATF and ICE agents work with
their Mexican counterparts to assist at crime scenes and to gain access
to firearms information necessary to conduct gun traces. As part of
this, ATF has worked with Mexican law enforcement to collect gun data
for submission to eTrace. Once they have received the data on the guns
through eTrace, ATF's National Tracing Center in West Virginia conducts
the gun traces and returns information on their findings to the
submitting party. In addition, ATF uses that trace information to
launch new investigations or inform existing ones. ATF officials told
us these investigations are the means by which ATF shuts down arms
trafficking networks.
However, despite these efforts, overall ATF and ICE assistance has been
limited, according to Mexican and U.S. government officials. For
example, due to ATF's resource limitations, it has provided only a
portion of the training ATF officials told us is needed to federal,
state, and local law enforcement and to the Mexican military. In
addition, though ATF and ICE have provided operational assistance in
investigations, and though ATF has assisted in the collection of
firearms information for submission to ATF's eTrace when Mexican law
enforcement and military seize firearms, ATF and ICE have been
significantly limited in what assistance they can provide. For
instance, there are several firearms seizures in Mexico every week, but
in a country as large as Mexico, neither ATF nor ICE have enough staff
in multiple locations to assist with the vast majority of gun seizures
that take place.
Also, U.S. assistance has been limited due to the incomplete use to
date of eTrace by Mexican government officials.[Footnote 79] The
inputting of firearms information into eTrace provides an important
tool for U.S. law enforcement to launch new, or to further existing,
arms trafficking investigations in the United States, which can lead to
the disruption of networks that traffic arms into Mexico, according to
ATF officials. In addition, the data inputted into eTrace currently
serves as the best data we found available for analyzing the source and
nature of the firearms that are being trafficked and seized in Mexico.
However, because Mexican government officials have only entered a
portion of the information on firearms seized, the eTrace data only
represents data from these gun trace requests, not from all the guns
seized. U.S. and Mexican government and law enforcement officials told
us Mexican government officials' failure to submit all of the firearms
tracing information could be attributed to several factors, including
the following:
* Mexican officials only recently began to fully appreciate the long-
term value to Mexico of providing gun trace information to ATF;
* the Mexican military serves as the central repository for all seized
guns in Mexico, while the Mexican Attorney General's office is
responsible for maintaining information on seized firearms, and
coordinating access to the guns in order to collect necessary
information has presented some challenges, according Mexican government
officials;
* the Mexican Attorney General's office is understaffed and has not had
sufficient resources to clear the eTrace backlog, according to U.S. and
Mexican government officials;
* only some of the Mexican Attorney General's office staff had received
ATF-provided training on identification of firearms and on using the
eTrace system; and:
* eTrace has been provided only in an English language version.
Recent trends in submissions of trace requests to ATF's National
Tracing Center indicate Mexican government officials have begun to
input more information using eTrace. ATF officials attribute this
increased use of eTrace by Mexican government officials to the training
and outreach the agency has provided over that period of time, and they
hope this number will continue to grow as Mexican government officials
become more aware of the long-term benefits to Mexico of submitting
firearms trace requests, participate in ATF firearms identification and
eTrace training, and devote more resources to gathering the firearms
information and entering it into eTrace.[Footnote 80]
Nonetheless, the ability of Mexican officials to input data into eTrace
has been hampered because a Spanish language version of eTrace has
still not been deployed across Mexico. In September 2008, ATF and State
officials told us eTrace would soon be deployed across Mexico.[Footnote
81] However, ATF officials told us that to date the eTrace system is
still being adapted to include all planned changes--such as the ability
to enter more than one last name for a suspect or other party and to
enter addresses that are differently configured from those in the
United States--and that they were not sure when Spanish eTrace would be
deployed across Mexico. U.S. and Government of Mexico officials told us
it was important to complete the development of Spanish eTrace and
immediately deploy it across Mexico because providing it and the
necessary training for it to all relevant parties in Mexico would
likely improve Mexican government officials' use of the system.
In addition, according to U.S. law enforcement and embassy officials,
no needs assessments regarding arms trafficking were conducted in
advance of Merida Initiative funding and, as a result, some needs that
have been identified have not been addressed. The United States has
recently provided significant funding for assistance to the Government
of Mexico under the Merida Initiative; however, the Initiative
currently provides general law enforcement and counternarcotics
assistance to Mexico but has not focused on arms trafficking. State
told us that the initial allocation of assistance was more general in
order to enable it to be provided to get the money out for use in
Mexico more quickly. Going forward, State told us that with additional
time they could potentially develop and seek funding for more specific
programs or efforts to assist Mexico in combating arms trafficking.
State's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in Mexico City administers
Merida Initiative funding for Mexico and had been able to use some of
the Initiative's monies in support of ad hoc arms trafficking
initiatives conducted by U.S. law enforcement agencies and other U.S.
entities at the embassy. However, there were specific needs identified
by Mexican and U.S. government officials that were not being met,
including the following:
* Mexican government officials we met with consistently stated their
agencies needed training from U.S. law enforcement on firearms
trafficking. They said ATF had provided some training that was very
useful to their agencies, including training on identifying firearms,
discovering trafficking trends, or developing firearms trafficking
cases and that their agencies did not have their own courses on the
issue. However, there had only been a few training sessions and only a
small percentage of Mexican government officials to date had received
the training. ATF, ICE, and embassy officials agreed more training was
needed but said they had minimal resources to devote to address the
problem. NAS officials at the embassy told us they were able to take
some of the Merida Initiative money for building general capacity and
use it to support some training with an arms trafficking application.
However, these amounts were small, and the money was not designated in
such a way that an arms trafficking curriculum or training program
could be developed on a large scale and funded through Merida
Initiative monies. Both U.S. and Mexican government officials told us
designing and providing a comprehensive training program could be very
helpful in boosting Mexican law enforcement capacity to combat arms
trafficking.
* Mexican government officials, as well as U.S. law enforcement and
embassy officials, told us another currently unmet need was the
development of a bilateral, interagency investigative task force for
arms trafficking. While the embassy uses a law enforcement working
group to share general, nonoperational information on a whole range of
law enforcement issues in Mexico, there was no group of U.S. and
Mexican law enforcement officials working jointly at an operational and
investigative level on combating arms trafficking. Mexican and U.S.
government and embassy officials told us that such a task force would
include a group of vetted Mexican law enforcement and government
officials working jointly with U.S. counterparts in relevant law
enforcement agencies, such as ATF, ICE, and others, on identifying,
disrupting, and investigating arms trafficking on both the Mexican and
U.S. sides of the border.[Footnote 82] Such types of vetted units,
called Special Investigative Units, work with DEA on counternarcotics
operations in Mexico. DEA officials we met with told us that these
units are time, energy, and resource intensive, but that they are
essential for success in their efforts.[Footnote 83] However, there is
no dedicated money that can be used for establishing and maintaining
such a group for combating arms trafficking. NAS officials we met with
in Mexico City who were administering funds for the Merida Initiative
told us they had been able to provide some funding for various projects
that had an arms trafficking application. However, funding a standing
bilateral, interagency task force would require significant money that
would need to be consistently available year to year. As such, these
officials told us that, to date, they had not been able to use Merida
Initiative funding to develop and maintain such an arms trafficking
task force. In addition, NAS officials said that when the embassy had
supported the possibility of creating such a task force, ATF and ICE
each insisted on leading such an effort and refused to work under the
other's leadership, preferring instead to run their own agency units
with the Mexican government. Embassy officials told us they were unsure
whether any such units would be created in the future without
significant dedicated funding and agreement.
Concerns about Corruption among Some Mexican Officials Have Hampered
U.S. Efforts to Provide Assistance:
Since taking office in December 2006, President Calderon has recognized
the need to address the problem of organized crime and the corruption
it creates throughout Mexican government and society. Calderon's
administration has reached out to the United States for cooperation and
U.S. assistance in an unprecedented way. However, U.S. assistance to
Mexico has been limited due to concerns about corruption among Mexican
government entities, according to Mexican and U.S. government
officials.
According to Mexican government officials, corruption pervades all
levels of Mexican law enforcement--federal, state, and local. For
example, some high ranking members of federal law enforcement have been
implicated in corruption investigations, and some high publicity
kidnapping and murder cases have involved corrupt federal law
enforcement officials. Furthermore, corruption is more of a problem at
the state and local levels than federal, according to U.S. and Mexican
government officials. The Mexican military, however, is generally
considered to be less vulnerable to corruption than law enforcement,
according to U.S. and Mexican government officials. As a result, the
Calderon administration has used the military extensively to disrupt
drug cartel operations and seize illicit firearms and to assist or
replace local law enforcement when they are overwhelmed or deemed
corrupt. For example, in late 2008, President Calderon's administration
terminated around 500 officers on Tijuana's police force and brought in
the military to fill the gap until new officers who had been
sufficiently vetted could be hired and trained.
U.S. government and law enforcement officials told us that corruption
inhibits their efforts to ensure a capable and reliable partnership
with Mexican government entities in combating arms trafficking. For
instance, U.S. law enforcement officials we met with along the
Southwest border and in Mexico told us they attempt to work with
Mexican counterparts in law enforcement, the military, and Attorney
General's Office whenever possible. However, incidents of corruption
among Mexican officials compel them to be selective about the
information they share and with whom they share it. For example, in
2006, the Government of Mexico reported that it had dismissed 945
federal employees and suspended an additional 953, following aggressive
investigations into public corruption.
Similarly, CBP officials told us that, on the border, collaboration
between Mexican and U.S. counterparts has been limited due to concerns
about corruption among Government of Mexico customs officers. In fact,
in one major border crossing location, CBP officers told us they had
not been in contact with their Mexican customs counterparts and would
not know who they could trust if they were. The Mexican military has
been brought in to work along the border, due to the corruption within
Mexican customs, according to Mexican and U.S. government officials.
The Government of Mexico is implementing anticorruption measures,
including polygraph and psychological testing, background checks, and
salary increases for federal law enforcement and customs officers, and
has implemented reforms to provide some vetting for state and local
officers as well. However, these efforts are in the early stages and
may take years to affect comprehensive change, according to Mexican and
U.S. government officials.
United States Lacks a Comprehensive Strategy to Combat Arms Trafficking
to Mexico:
While U.S. law enforcement agencies have developed initiatives to
address arms trafficking to Mexico, none have been guided by a
comprehensive, governmentwide strategy. Strategic plans for ATF and ICE
raise the issue of arms trafficking generally or overall smuggling to
Mexico, but neither focuses on arms trafficking to Mexico or lays out a
comprehensive plan for addressing the problem. In our past work, we
have identified key elements that constitute an effective strategy,
including identifying needs and objectives and the resources necessary
to meet them, as well as establishing mechanisms to monitor progress
toward objectives. In June 2009, the administration released its 2009
National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, which, for the
first time, contains a chapter on arms trafficking to Mexico. We
reviewed the strategy, and it contains some key elements of a strategy,
such as setting objectives, but lacks others, such as performance
measures for monitoring progress toward objectives. ONDCP officials
said an appendix with an "implementation plan" for the strategy will be
added in late summer of 2009 that will have some performance measures
for its objectives. However, at this point, it is not clear whether the
implementation plan will include performance indicators and other
accountability mechanisms to overcome shortcomings raised in our
report. In addition, in March 2009, the Secretary of Homeland Security
announced a new DHS Southwest border security effort to significantly
increase DHS presence and efforts along the Southwest border, including
conducting more southbound inspections at ports of entry, among other
efforts. However, it is unclear how the new resources that the
administration has recently devoted to the Southwest border will be
tied to the new strategy and implementation plan.
Strategic Plans for Agencies Are Not Focused on Arms Trafficking to
Mexico:
Strategic plans for ATF and ICE raise the issues of arms trafficking in
general and overall smuggling to Mexico, but neither plan focuses on
arms trafficking to Mexico or lays out a comprehensive plan for how the
agencies would address the problem. In addition, the Merida Initiative
does not include provisions that would constitute a strategy to combat
arms trafficking.
ATF:
ATF's current strategic plan for fiscal years 2004-2009 does not
mention arms trafficking to Mexico. The strategic plan lays out the
strategic goal to "enforce Federal firearms laws in order to remove
violent offenders from our communities and keep firearms out of the
hands of those who are prohibited by law from possessing them." As part
of this objective, the plan identifies one tactic to "partner with law
enforcement agencies and prosecutors at all levels to develop focused
strategies that lead to the investigation, arrest, and prosecution of—
domestic and international firearms traffickers—and others who attempt
to illegally acquire or misuse firearms." However, the strategic plan
neither lays out how ATF will go about implementing the tactic or
achieving the goal, nor does it include any performance metrics to
measure performance and monitor progress. ATF officials told us that
they are currently developing their new fiscal year 2010 strategic
plan, which will include more information relevant to arms trafficking
to Mexico; however, as ATF's fiscal year 2010 strategic plan was in
draft form and subject to change, we could not determine whether the
final version will contain key elements, such as needs assessments,
clear definition of roles and responsibilities, or metrics to measure
progress.
In June 2007, ATF released a document announcing Project Gunrunner, as
part of DOJ's Southwest Border Initiative. This document does provide
some strategic goals, outcomes, and action items for combating arms
trafficking and violence in Mexico and the United States. For example,
ATF's strategy regarding DOJ's Southwest Border Initiative is
summarized as follows:
"Working with its domestic and international law-enforcement partners,
ATF will deny the "tools of the trade" to the firearms-trafficking
infrastructure of the criminal organizations operating in Mexico
through proactive enforcement of its jurisdictional areas in the
affected border States in the domestic front, as well as through
assistance and cooperative interaction with the Mexican authorities in
their fight to effectively deal with the increase in violent crime."
ATF included certain action items, which provided some specific tasks
for ATF to accomplish its strategic goals under Project Gunrunner. Some
examples of action items include the following:
* The United States and Mexico establishing a point of contact for each
ATF border field division who will meet regularly with the Mexican
Attorney General's Office's representative to coordinate investigative
and firearms-trafficking issues.
* ATF and other DOJ components, such as DEA, U.S. Marshals Service, and
FBI; and DHS components, such as ICE, operating along the border
implementing investigative strategies and for developing intelligence
relating to trafficking into Mexico.
* The United States and Mexico forming a consultative group of
attorneys and law enforcement officials from both countries to address
legal issues and policies involving firearms trafficking and
enforcement strategies.
* The United States exploring the availability of funding to provide
technology and equipment to assist the government of Mexico in
upgrading its firearms forensics analysis and tracing capabilities.
While this ATF Project Gunrunner document does contain useful strategic
goals and specific action items to achieve those goals, key elements
are missing, such as mechanisms that could measure and ensure progress
toward these goals.
ICE:
Similarly, in ICE's interim strategic plan, dated July 2005, there are
no specific arms trafficking to Mexico goals or action items, nor are
there mechanisms for measuring progress in their efforts. ICE released
a fact sheet on its new effort to combat illicit arms trafficking to
Mexico--Armas Cruzadas--which did include mission goals:
"The mission of Armas Cruzadas is for U.S. and Mexican government
agencies to synchronize bi-lateral law enforcement and intelligence-
sharing operations in order to comprehensively identify, disrupt, and
dismantle trans-border weapons smuggling networks. The goals include
(1) establishing a bilateral program to stop weapons smuggling; (2)
coordinating operations; (3) developing intelligence about arms
trafficking networks; (4) strengthening interagency cooperation; (5)
promoting intelligence information exchange; and (6) implementing
points of contact for information exchange."
To meet these goals, ICE detailed some action items, which included:
* training stakeholders;
* creating a border violence intelligence cell;
* developing a vetted arms trafficking group;
* implementing a weapons virtual task force;
* reinvigorating the ICE Border Liaison Program; and:
* leveraging investigation, interdiction, and intelligence.
While ICE's fact sheet does contain relevant strategic goals and
specific action items to achieve those goals, key elements of a
strategy are missing as well, such as mechanisms to ensure progress
toward the strategic goals.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
In CBP's current strategic plan, there are no goals specific to arms
trafficking to Mexico. The primary focus of CBP's plan is on preventing
dangerous people and goods from getting into the United States, and the
issue of preventing arms from going across the border into Mexico is
not addressed.
In other reports and publications, CBP mentions items it has seized on
the border, including drugs, illicit currency, and even prohibited
plant materials and animal products, but the agency does not mention
illicit firearms. However, CBP officials told us they have an important
role to play in combating arms trafficking to Mexico and will continue
to increase their efforts to combat arms trafficking with new
initiatives, including some in coordination with and support of
operations involving ICE and other U.S. law enforcement agencies.
The Merida Initiative:
The Merida Initiative does not include provisions that would constitute
a strategy to combat arms trafficking. While a bill in Congress to
authorize the Merida Initiative included a "sense of Congress" that an
"effective strategy to combat...illegal arms flows is a critical part
of a United States — anti-narcotics strategy,"[Footnote 84] a
subsequent appropriations act, which makes reference to Merida,
included no details on which agency or agencies should be responsible
for developing and implementing such a strategy.[Footnote 85] And, as
mentioned previously in the report, State has not dedicated funding for
the Merida Initiative that targets illicit arms trafficking.
The U.S. Embassy in Mexico, where the Merida Initiative funding is
administered, also maintains a Mission Performance Plan to guide its
efforts each fiscal year. This plan lays out goals of working with
Government of Mexico partners on law enforcement issues including
transborder issues, such as smuggling of arms. However, there are
neither detailed performance measures, nor are there mechanisms to
ensure collaboration across agencies on the issue of combating arms
trafficking to Mexico.
Several Key Elements Are Essential to an Effective Strategy:
We have previously identified several key elements of an effective
strategy. These elements include:
* identifying clear objectives:
* defining roles and responsibilities for each party to meet those
objectives:
* ensuring sufficient funding and resources necessary to accomplish
objectives:
* implementing mechanisms to facilitate coordination across agencies;
and:
* monitoring progress toward objectives and identifying needed
improvements.
We have found that having a strategy with elements such as these has
the potential for greatly enhancing agency performance. For example,
managers can use performance information to identify problems in
existing programs, to try to identify the causes of problems, and to
develop corrective actions.
New National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy Includes
Chapter on Arms Trafficking, but It Does Not Contain Some Key Elements
of an Effective Strategy:
In June 2009, the administration released its 2009 National Southwest
Border Counternarcotics Strategy, which, for the first time, contains a
chapter on arms trafficking to Mexico. By law,[Footnote 86] the Office
of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is required to issue a new
strategy every 2 years. The previous version of this document, from
2007, did not include any strategy to combat illicit arms trafficking
to Mexico. According to ONDCP officials, initially, this new version
did not include arms trafficking either, but in February, a working
group, co-led by ATF and ICE, began working on an arms trafficking
piece.
We reviewed the strategy's chapter on arms trafficking and found that
the chapter does contain some key elements of a strategy. For instance,
in that chapter, there are some broad objectives and under those, there
are several supporting actions on topics such as improving information
sharing. Under each supporting action, there is a description of an
issue item to be addressed and how, in general, the relevant agencies
should resolve the issue. For example, an issue item under "Facilitate
U.S. Government interagency intelligence sharing" states:
"U.S. law enforcement organizations and intelligence agencies operate a
variety of intelligence collection and analysis programs which are
directly or indirectly related to weapons smuggling. The Department of
Defense provides analytical support to some of these programs with
regard to captured military weapons and ordnance. In order to provide
better operational access and utility to law enforcement agencies, the
U.S. Government will capitalize upon the existing law enforcement
interagency intelligence center, EPIC, to reinforce rapid information
sharing methods for intelligence derived from Federal, State, local and
Government of Mexico illicit weapons seizures. Absent statutory
limitations, plans should be made to move to a real-time data sharing
methodology."
While the arms trafficking chapter of the strategy contains some key
elements of a strategy, such as setting objectives, it lacks others,
such as providing detailed roles and responsibilities for relevant
agencies or performance measures for monitoring progress toward
objectives. However, ONDCP officials said an appendix with an
"implementation plan" for the strategy will be added in late summer of
2009 that will have more detailed actions for each agency to take, as
well as some performance measures for each item under the objectives.
Furthermore, ONDCP officials said there will be annual reporting that
addresses performance towards the plan's goals within the National Drug
Control Strategy's annual reporting to Congress. However, at this
point, it is not clear whether the implementation plan will include
performance indicators and other accountability mechanisms to overcome
shortcomings raised in our report. In addition, in March 2009, the
Secretary of Homeland Security announced a new DHS Southwest border
security effort to significantly increase DHS presence and efforts
along the Southwest border, including conducting more southbound
inspections at ports of entry, among other efforts. However, it is
unclear how the new resources that the administration has recently
devoted to the Southwest border will be tied to the new strategy and
implementation plan.
Conclusions:
Combating arms trafficking has become an increasing concern to U.S. and
Mexican government and law enforcement officials, as violence in Mexico
has soared to historic levels, and U.S. officials have become concerned
about the potential for increased violence brought about by Mexican
DTOs on the U.S. side of the border. However, while this violence has
raised concern, there has not been a coordinated U.S. government effort
to combat the illicit arms trafficking to Mexico that U.S. and Mexican
government officials agree is fueling much of the drug-related
violence. Agencies such as ATF and ICE have made some efforts to combat
illicit arms trafficking, but these efforts are hampered by a number of
factors, including the constraints of the legal framework in which law
enforcement agencies operate, according to agency officials, and poor
coordination among agencies. In addition, agencies have not
systematically and consistently gathered and reported certain types of
data on firearms trafficking that would be useful to the administration
and Congress to better target resources to combat arms trafficking to
Mexico. Gaps in this data hamper the investigative capacity of law
enforcement agencies. Further, a Spanish language version of ATF's
eTrace has been in development for months but has yet to be finalized;
the lack of this new version of eTrace has impeded the use of eTrace by
Mexican law enforcement officials, which limits data that could be used
in investigations on both sides of the border and results in incomplete
information on the nature of firearms trafficked and seized in Mexico.
Quick deployment of eTrace across Mexico and training of the relevant
officials in its use could increase the number of guns submitted to ATF
for tracing each year, improving the data on the types and sources of
firearms trafficked into Mexico and increasing the information that law
enforcement officials have to investigate and build cases.
U.S. and Mexican government officials in locations we visited told us
that, while they have undertaken some efforts to combat illicit arms
trafficking, they are concerned that without a targeted, comprehensive,
and coordinated U.S. government effort, their efforts could fall short.
In June 2009, the administration released its 2009 National Southwest
Border Counternarcotics Strategy, containing a chapter on arms
trafficking to Mexico. We reviewed the strategy's chapter on arms
trafficking and found that the chapter does contain some key elements
of a strategy, such as setting objectives, but it lacks others, such as
providing detailed roles and responsibilities for relevant agencies or
performance measures for monitoring progress toward objectives. ONDCP
officials said they will develop an implementation plan for the
strategy in late summer of 2009 that will have more detailed actions
for each agency to take, as well as some performance measures for each
item under the objectives. However, at this point, it is not clear
whether the implementation plan will include performance indicators and
other accountability mechanisms to overcome shortcomings raised in our
report. Furthermore, in March 2009, the administration announced more
resources for the Southwest border, including more personnel and
equipment for conducting southbound inspections. However, it is unclear
how the new resources that the administration has recently devoted to
the Southwest border will be tied to the new strategy and
implementation plan.
The current level of cooperation on law enforcement issues between the
United States and Mexico under President Calderon's administration
presents a unique opportunity to work jointly to combat illicit arms
trafficking. Taking advantage of this opportunity will require a
unified, U.S. government approach that brings to bear all the necessary
assets to combat illicit arms trafficking.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the U.S. Attorney General prepare a report to
Congress on approaches to address the challenges law enforcement
officials raised in this report regarding the constraints on the
collection of data that inhibit the ability of law enforcement to
conduct timely investigations.
To further enhance interagency collaboration in combating arms
trafficking to Mexico and to help ensure integrated policy and program
direction, we recommend the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of
Homeland Security finalize the Memorandum of Understanding between ATF
and ICE and develop processes for periodically monitoring its
implementation and making any needed adjustments.
To help identify where efforts should be targeted to combat illicit
arms trafficking to Mexico, we have several recommendations to improve
the gathering and reporting of data related to such efforts, including
that:
* the U.S. Attorney General direct the ATF Director to regularly update
ATF's reporting on aggregate firearms trafficking data and trends;
* the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
light of DHS's recent efforts to assess southbound weapons smuggling
trends, direct ATF and ICE to ensure they share comprehensive data and
leverage each other's expertise and analysis on future assessments
relevant to the issue; and:
* the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security
ensure the systematic gathering and reporting of data related to
results of these efforts, including firearms seizures, investigations,
and prosecutions.
To improve the scope and completeness of data on firearms trafficked to
Mexico and to facilitate investigations to disrupt illicit arms
trafficking networks, we recommend that the U.S. Attorney General and
the Secretary of State work with the Government of Mexico to expedite
the dissemination of eTrace in Spanish across Mexico to the relevant
Government of Mexico officials, provide these officials the proper
training on the use of eTrace, and ensure more complete input of
information on seized arms into eTrace.
To support the 2009 Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, we
recommend the ONDCP Director ensure that the implementation plan for
the arms trafficking chapter of this strategy (1) identifies needs and
clearly defines objectives for addressing those needs, (2) identifies
roles and responsibilities for meeting objectives that leverage the
existing expertise of each relevant agency, (3) ensures agencies are
provided guidance on setting funding priorities and providing resources
to address those needs, (4) establishes mechanisms to facilitate
coordination across agencies, and (5) employs monitoring mechanisms to
determine and report on progress toward objectives and identifies
needed improvements.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland
Security, Justice, and State and to the Office of National Drug Control
Policy. DHS and State provided written comments, which are reproduced
in appendixes III and IV.
DHS generally agreed with our recommendations; however, DHS raised
questions regarding our interpretation of certain data and the
relationship between ICE and ATF. We disagree that our presentation of
the data is misleading, and the evidence in the report clearly
demonstrates coordination problems between ICE and ATF.
State agreed with our recommendation that the U.S. Attorney General and
the Secretary of State work with the Government of Mexico to expedite
the dissemination of eTrace in Spanish across Mexico to the relevant
Government of Mexico officials, provide these officials the proper
training on the use of eTrace, and ensure more complete input of
information on seized arms into eTrace. In addition, State added that
the agency is funding a $5 million Forensics Laboratories project with
the Government of Mexico's Office of the Attorney General (PGR) for the
successful investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. This
funding, State said, will be used to provide state-of-the-art equipment
and training, which directly support DOJ and DHS efforts in the
disruption of firearms.
DOJ provided no formal departmental comment on the draft of this
report. However, ATF and DEA provided technical comments, which we
incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.
DHS and ONDCP also provided technical comments on our report, which we
incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and to the Attorney General, the Secretaries of Homeland
Security and State, and the Director of the Office of National Drug
Control Policy. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO
Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Other GAO contacts and staff
acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To identify data available on types of firearms trafficked to Mexico
and the sources of these arms, we consulted U.S. and Mexican government
databases, as well as research prepared by nongovernmental entities. We
relied primarily on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (ATF) data compiled by its National Tracing Center (NTC)
since it contained the most detailed information on the types of
illicit firearms seized in Mexico and where they had originated. NTC
data on firearms seized in Mexico, however, is not comprehensive. The
data is based chiefly on trace information submitted through ATF's
eTrace system. As mentioned earlier in this report, over the last 5
years, about one-quarter to one-third of the illicit firearms seized in
Mexico had information submitted through eTrace, and not all of these
were successfully traced. Notwithstanding its limitations, NTC data was
sufficiently reliable to permit an analysis of where the firearms
seized in Mexico that could be traced had been manufactured and whether
they had been imported into the United States before arriving in
Mexico. For those arms that were traced to a retail dealer in the
United States before being trafficked to Mexico, NTC data also
contained information on the states where they had originated. Based on
the trace data and discussions with ATF and other law enforcement
officials, we were able to develop an analysis of the type of retail
transactions involved in the initial marketing of the firearms in the
United States before they were trafficked to Mexico.
NTC trace data also contained information allowing identification of
the types of firearms (e.g., caliber and model) that were most commonly
seized in Mexico and subsequently traced. We corroborated this
information in extensive discussions with U.S. and Mexican law
enforcement officials. However, as noted earlier in the report, because
firearms seized in Mexico are not always submitted for tracing within
the same year they were seized, it was not possible for us to develop
data to track trends on the types of firearms trafficked or seized.
Similarly, we were unable to obtain quantitative data from U.S. or
Mexican government sources on the users of illicit firearms in Mexico.
However, there was consensus among U.S. and Mexican law enforcement
officials that most illicit firearms seized in Mexico had been in the
possession of organized criminal organizations linked to the drug
trade. The involvement of criminal organizations involved in drug
trafficking in the trafficking of illicit firearms into Mexico was
confirmed by law enforcement intelligence sources.
To learn more about trends in illicit firearms seizures in Mexico, we
obtained data from the Mexican Federal Government's Planning, Analysis
and Information Center for Combating Crime--Centro Nacional de
Planeación, Análisis e Información para el Combate a la Delincuencia--
(CENAPI) on seizures from 2004 to the first quarter of 2009. To
determine the geographical distribution of firearms seized in Mexico,
we obtained data from CENAPI on seizures by Mexican federal entity--31
states and the Federal District of Mexico City. We did not assess the
reliability of data provided by CENAPI, but we considered this data
generally acceptable to provide an overall indication of the magnitude
and nature of the trends in arms seizures since 2004.
To identify key challenges confronting U.S. government efforts to
combat illicit sales of firearms in the United States and to stem the
flow of these arms across the Southwest border into Mexico, we
interviewed cognizant officials from the Department of Justice's (DOJ)
ATF, Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA), and the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP); and the Department of State (State)
regarding their relevant efforts.
We reviewed and analyzed DOJ and DHS documents relevant to U.S.
government efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico, including
funding data provided to us by ATF, CBP, and ICE; the 1978 Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) between CBP and ATF and a draft version of a
revised MOU between ATF and ICE; data from ATF, CBP, and ICE on
firearms seizures; data from ATF and ICE on efforts to investigate and
prosecute cases involving arms trafficking to Mexico; and agency
reports and assessments related to the issue. We also reviewed relevant
prior GAO reports, Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports and
memorandums, and reports from DOJ's Office of Inspector General related
to ATF's efforts to enforce federal firearms laws. We reviewed
provisions of federal firearms laws that agency officials identified as
relevant to U.S. government efforts to address arms trafficking to
Mexico, including the Gun Control Act of 1968, the National Firearms
Act of 1934, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. We did not review
Mexican firearms laws and to the extent that we comment on these in
this report, we relied on secondary sources.
To explore challenges faced by U.S. agencies collaborating with Mexican
authorities to combat illicit arms trafficking, we visited U.S.-Mexico
border crossings at Laredo and El Paso, Texas, and San Diego,
California. In these locations, we interviewed ATF, CBP, DEA, and ICE
officials responsible for overseeing and implementing efforts to stem
the flow of illicit arms trafficking to Mexico and related law
enforcement initiatives. We observed U.S. government efforts to develop
and share intelligence related to arms trafficking to Mexico at the El
Paso Intelligence Center. We also conducted fieldwork in Mexico City,
Monterrey, Nuevo Laredo, and Tijuana, Mexico. In Mexico, we met with
ATF, CBP, DEA, ICE, and State officials working on law enforcement
issues at the U.S. embassy and consulates. We interviewed Mexican
government officials engaged in efforts to combat arms trafficking from
the Attorney General's Office (Procuraduría General de la República),
including CENAPI; the Ministry of Public Safety (Secretaria de
Seguridad Pública); the Ministry of Defense (Secretaría de la Defensa
Nacional); and Customs (Servicio de Administración Tributaria). Since
we did not conduct fieldwork in a generalizeable sample of locations
along the Southwest border and in the interior of Mexico, our
observations in these locations are illustrative but may not be
representative of all efforts to address the issue.
To assess the U.S. government's strategy for addressing the issue of
arms trafficking to Mexico we reviewed strategic planning, internal
guidance, policy, and procedures documents for relevant agencies and
departments. Following the March 2009 decision to include a chapter on
arms trafficking in the Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, we
met with Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) officials to
discuss development of this document, and obtained a general overview.
ONDCP officials also arranged for one of our team members to review the
draft document.
Finally, to assess the reliability of data provided by ATF, CBP, and
ICE on funding for efforts to address arms trafficking to Mexico,
seizures of southbound firearms, and cases involving arms trafficking
to Mexico, we reviewed and discussed the sources of the data with
agency officials. We determined the program and project information
provided to us were sufficiently reliable to provide an overall
indication of the magnitude and nature of the illicit firearms trade
and of the completeness of data agencies have related to their efforts
to address the issue. Any financial data we reported were for
background purposes only.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Geographic Distribution of Firearms Seized and Traced:
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee staff requested that we compare data on
firearms seizures in Mexico and ATF firearms trace data to determine if
ATF's trace data reflected the geographic distribution of firearms
seizures in that country. Our analysis indicates that there is a strong
positive correlation between the data we obtained from CENAPI on
seizures by Mexican federal entity--that is, 31 states and the Federal
District of Mexico City[Footnote 87]--for calendar year 2008, and ATF's
firearms trace data linked to specific Mexican federal entities for
fiscal year 2008. Eight of the top 10 Mexican federal entities for
firearms seizures in 2008, according to CENAPI data--Baja California,
Chihuaha, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, Oxaca, Tamaulipas, and the
Federal District of Mexico City--also showed up among the top 10
Mexican federal entities where firearms traced by ATF were seized.
Figure 8 shows that the Mexican federal entities where most firearms
are seized are very similar to those submitting the most firearms trace
requests.
Figure 8: Firearms Seized in Mexican States in 2008 and Illicit
Firearms Traced to Mexican States (Fiscal Year 2008):
[Refer to PDF for image: maps]
This figure contains two maps of Mexico, with states noted in
categories as follows:
Illegal firearms seized in Mexican States (2008):
Less than 250 firearms seized;
Greater than 250 firearms seized;
Greater than 1,000 firearms seized.
Source: GAO analysis based on CENAPI data.
Illegal firearms traced to Mexican States (fiscal year 2008):
Less than 100 firearms;
Greater than 100 firearms;
Greater than 250 firearms.
Source: GAO analysis based on ATF data.
[End of figure]
Methodology:
In order to determine the geographic distribution of firearms seized in
Mexico, we obtained data from CENAPI on seizures, by Mexican federal
entity. According to CENAPI data, a total of 29,824 firearms were
seized in Mexico in 2008. In order to ascertain the geographic
distribution of firearms seized in Mexico that were traced by ATF, we
obtained data from ATF linking firearms traced to the Mexican federal
entities where they were seized. In fiscal year 2008, ATF traced 7,198
firearms seized in Mexico. Of these, 6,854 were linked to specific
states or the Federal District. However, 344 firearms were traced in
fiscal year 2008 that could not be linked to a specific state where
they may have been seized. We excluded these from our analysis.
We ranked the Mexican states and Federal District by the number of
firearms seized according to the data provided by CENAPI, and we ranked
them a second time according to the trace data provided by ATF. We then
compared the two sets of data using a correlation analysis. See figure
9 below. The correlation coefficient for the data was 0.85, indicating
a strong positive correlation. We also performed a correlation analysis
for the raw data--that is, the number of firearms seized in Mexico, and
the number of firearms traced by ATF, by Mexican federal entity. The
correlation coefficient for those two sets of data was 0.79. We also
examined the ratio of arms seized to arms traced and this ranged from
.03 to 1.78. Figure 9 shows a strong positive correlation between the
number of firearms seized in Mexico and the number of firearms traced
by ATF, by Mexican federal entity.
Figure 9: Correlation Between the Number of Firearms Seized in Mexico
and the Number of Firearms Traced by ATF, by Mexican Federal Entity:
[Refer to PDF for image: line and plotted point graph]
Mexican Federal Entity: Michoacan;
Rank based on ATF data: 1;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 1.
Mexican Federal Entity: Tamaulipas;
Rank based on ATF data: 2;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 2.
Mexican Federal Entity: Jalisco;
Rank based on ATF data: 5;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 3.
Mexican Federal Entity: Chihuahua;
Rank based on ATF data: 6;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 4.
Mexican Federal Entity: Sinaloa;
Rank based on ATF data: 11;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 5.
Mexican Federal Entity: Mexico, Distrito Federal;
Rank based on ATF data: 3;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 6.
Mexican Federal Entity: Baja California;
Rank based on ATF data: 8;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 7.
Mexican Federal Entity: Guerrero;
Rank based on ATF data: 12;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 8.
Mexican Federal Entity: Guanajuato;
Rank based on ATF data: 9;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 9.
Mexican Federal Entity: Oaxaca;
Rank based on ATF data: 10;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 10.
Mexican Federal Entity: Sonora;
Rank based on ATF data: 4;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 11.
Mexican Federal Entity: Nuevo Leon;
Rank based on ATF data: 7;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 12.
Mexican Federal Entity: Veracruz;
Rank based on ATF data: 13;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 13.
Mexican Federal Entity: Durango;
Rank based on ATF data: 16;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 14.
Mexican Federal Entity: Chiapas;
Rank based on ATF data: 18;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 15.
Mexican Federal Entity: Hidaldo;
Rank based on ATF data: 20;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 16.
Mexican Federal Entity: Nayarit;
Rank based on ATF data: 32;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 17.
Mexican Federal Entity: San Luis Potosi;
Rank based on ATF data: 17;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 18.
Mexican Federal Entity: Estado de Mexico;
Rank based on ATF data: 14;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 19.
Mexican Federal Entity: Coahuila;
Rank based on ATF data: 19;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 20.
Mexican Federal Entity: Tabasco;
Rank based on ATF data: 21;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 21.
Mexican Federal Entity: Zacatecas;
Rank based on ATF data: 28;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 22.
Mexican Federal Entity: Aguascalientes;
Rank based on ATF data: 23;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 23.
Mexican Federal Entity: Puebla;
Rank based on ATF data: 24;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 24.
Mexican Federal Entity: Morelos;
Rank based on ATF data: 22;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 25.
Mexican Federal Entity: Tlaxcala;
Rank based on ATF data: 30;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 26.
Mexican Federal Entity: Queretaro;
Rank based on ATF data: 31;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 27.
Mexican Federal Entity: Colima;
Rank based on ATF data: 25;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 28.
Mexican Federal Entity: Baja California Sur;
Rank based on ATF data: 26;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 29.
Mexican Federal Entity: Yucatan;
Rank based on ATF data: 27;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 30.
Mexican Federal Entity: Campeche;
Rank based on ATF data: 29;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 31.
Mexican Federal Entity: Quintana Roo;
Rank based on ATF data: 15;
Rank based on CENAPI data: 32.
Sources: GAO analysis based on data provided by CENAPI and ATF.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov]
June 9, 2009:
Mr. Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
RE: Draft Report GAO-09-709, Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to
Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination
Challenges (GAO Job Code 320599):
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to review and comment on the U.S. Government Accountability Office's
(GAO's) draft report referenced above. The GAO made three
recommendations to DHS. The Department agrees with them although
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials question some of
GAO's assertions.
DHS officials separately question the statistic involving the
origination of weapons as currently presented by GAO. GAO asserts that,
"Available evidence suggests most firearms recovered in Mexico come
from U.S. gun dealers, and many support Drug Trafficking Organizations"
and fuel Mexican drug violence. Using the Department of Justice's
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) eTrace data,
GAO determined that about 87 percent of firearms seized by Mexican
authorities and traced from fiscal years 2004 to 2008 originated in the
United States. DHS officials believe that the 87 percent statistic is
misleading as the reference should include the number of weapons that
could not be traced (i.e., out of approximately 30,000 weapons seized
in Mexico, approximately 4,000 could be traced and 87 percent of
those - 3,480 - originated in the United States.) Numerous problems
with the data collection and sample population render this assertion as
unreliable. [See comment 1]
Recommendations:
To further enhance interagency collaboration in combating arms
trafficking to Mexico and help ensure integrated policy and program
direction, GAO recommends that the U.S. Attorney General and the
Secretary of Homeland Security finalize the Memorandum of Understanding
between ATF and ICE, and develop processes for periodically monitoring
its implementation and making any needed adjustments.
The DHS, in particular ICE, agrees with the recommendation. In April
2009, ATF and ICE officials met to finalize a draft version of the
proposed Memorandum of Understanding (MOLT). The draft is awaiting
approval and signature by ICE and ATF officials. A revised MOU will
update the formal partnership between ATF and ICE relative to each
entities investigative efforts and jurisdiction. The proposed MOU
articulates the procedures to be followed by each entity in accordance
with the authorities vested in each entity by Congress. The mutual goal
is to keep the public safe by using those tools given to each entity,
either through statute or regulation, which are vital to the effective
control of the domestic and international trafficking of munitions.
ICE is committed to working with ATF to more effectively utilize
Federal investigative resources and enforce statutes and regulations
within each entity's jurisdiction. In situations where respective
mission efforts coincide, the MOU will serve to coordinate how each
entity will pursue their respective investigations to optimize the use
of resources and minimize duplication of efforts.
To help identify where efforts should be targeted to combat illicit
arms trafficking to Mexico, GAO made two recommendations to DHS
designed to improve the gathering and reporting of data related to
these efforts: (1) the U.S. Attorney and the Secretary of Homeland
Security, in light of DHS's recent efforts to assess southbound weapons
smuggling trends, direct ATF and ICE to coordinate any future
assessments relevant to the issue; and (2) the U.S. Attorney and the
Secretary of Homeland Security ensure the systematic gathering and
reporting of data related to results of these efforts, including
firearms seizures, investigations, and prosecutions.
ICE agrees with the fast recommendation immediately above and will
continue to coordinate with ATF on any future assessments, as ICE did
most recently in, the assessment completed in March 2009. ICE also
agrees with the second recommendation to improve the gathering and
reporting of specific data. ICE's law enforcement database enables the
agency to capture, track, and provide statistical information on all
ICE investigations, as well as associate seizures and enforcement
actions against individuals linked to criminal behavior. ICE will
continue to enhance law enforcement systems and data management
activities in furtherance of executive reporting capabilities. [See
comments 2 and 3]
ICE and CBP Comments on the Draft Report Narrative:
ICE officials question some of GAO's conclusions regarding ICE's
efforts to combat arms trafficking to Mexico and do not believe GAO has
sufficient facts to reach certain conclusions.
GAO concludes that ICE and ATF "do not effectively coordinate their
efforts, in part because the agencies lack clear roles and
responsibilities ... additionally, agencies generally have not
systematically gathered, analyzed, and reported data that could be
useful to help plan and assess results of their efforts to address arms
trafficking to Mexico." While GAO finds a few isolated instances in
which ICE and ATF have not adequately coordinated investigative
activities, coordination actually occurs frequently.
ICE presented considerable evidence to the GAO audit team of joint
coordination between ICE and ATF and can share this information with
the Congressional requesters. Of note, the two entities share
actionable information daily through a variety of venues: the gun desk
at the El Paso Intelligence Center, the Border Enforcement Security
Task Forces, and in field offices.
The conclusion that the agencies/entities "lack clear roles and
responsibilities" is not supported by the excellent working
relationship ICE and ATF enjoy. ICE officials believe ATF personnel
recognize ICE's statutory authority to enforce anti-smuggling and
export control laws long used to prevent the illegal cross-border
movement of firearms and other contraband to and from Mexico.
Similarly, ICE personnel recognize ATF's role in investigating the
illegal smuggling of weapons into the United States and enforcing the
Gun Control Act. [See comment 4]
GAO opines in the draft report that ICE "lacks systematic gathering and
recent analyses of firearms trafficking data and trends that could be
used to more fully assess the problem and plan efforts." GAO however
does not identify a single instance in which ICE personnel were unable
to pursue an investigation because they were unsure of their ability to
enforce the law. [See comment 5]
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials had comments on GAO
statements related to the DHS component. GAO found that while
individual agency efforts may serve to combat arms trafficking to
Mexico to some degree, they are not part of a comprehensive U.S.
government-wide strategy for addressing the problem. GAO identified
several key elements that should be a part of any strategy, including
needs assessments, objectives and funding targeted to meet these
objectives, clear roles and responsibilities, and mechanisms to ensure
coordination and assess results. Specific to CBP, GAO states that CBP's
current strategic plan has no goals specific to arms trafficking to
Mexico.
CBP's Strategic Plan is a high level document and as such, does not get
into the specifics of which type of contraband nor which country to
focus on. The Strategic Plan states that "At the ports of entry, CBP's
Office of Field Operations secures the flow of people and goods into
and out of the country, while facilitating legitimate travel and
trade." The strategic plan was not meant to get into specifics. This
section of the draft report is misleading the reader to believe that
because a high level document does not mention Mexico or firearms, CBP
will not address the threat of firearms exports to Mexico or any other
country. [See comment 6]
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Homeland
Security's letter dated June 9, 2009.
GAO Comments:
1. We disagree that our use of the 87 percent statistic is misleading.
Our report clearly states that the number of firearms traced by ATF
represents a percentage of the overall firearms seized in Mexico. More
importantly, ATF trace data for each year since 2004 identified that
most of the firearms seized in Mexico and traced came from the United
States. Our recommendation to the U.S. Attorney General and the
Secretary of State to expedite further enhancement of eTrace and work
with the Government of Mexico to expand its use is designed to shed
further light on the origin of guns seized in Mexico.
2. We have added additional information to the text of the report to
clarify ATF's role in DHS's recent assessment. While ICE stated it
worked closely with ATF intelligence staff in developing the
assessment, the senior ATF intelligence official ICE cited as its
primary ATF contact for the assessment told us that ATF provided some
information to ICE for its assessment, but ATF was not asked to provide
comprehensive data and analysis or significant input into the
assessment's overall findings and conclusions. We found the assessment
only includes a subset of trace statistics we were able to obtain from
ATF on firearms recovered in crime in Mexico and traced over the last 5
years. The senior ATF intelligence official told us that it would make
sense for future assessments to be developed jointly, in order to
leverage more comprehensive data and analysis available from both
agencies; however, he noted that until both agencies improve their
interagency coordination, developing a joint assessment was unlikely.
3. We did not comment in the report on whether any of ICE's databases
enable the agency to capture, track, and provide statistical
information on all ICE investigations, as well as associate seizures
and enforcement actions against individuals linked to criminal
behavior. However, as we noted in the report, ICE was unable to provide
comprehensive statistical information specifically on cases involving
arms trafficking to Mexico.
4. Contrary to DHS's assertion that ICE and ATF enjoy an excellent
working relationship in their efforts to combat arms trafficking to
Mexico, ATF, ICE, and State officials we met with along the Southwest
border, in Mexico, and at headquarters cited problems with ATF and ICE
working well together. These officials included senior officials at
ICE's Office of International Affairs in Washington, from ICE's Attaché
office in Mexico City, and from ICE's office at the U.S. Consulate in
Tijuana, Mexico.
5. It was not within the scope of our audit to review specific ICE
investigations or their disposition, and we did not comment on this in
our report. Our report noted that, in general, ICE was not able to
provide comprehensive data to us related to its efforts to address arms
trafficking to Mexico. For instance, ICE was not able to provide
complete data on the seizure of firearms destined for Mexico, the
number of cases it initiated related to arms trafficking to Mexico, or
the disposition of cases ICE submitted for prosecution. Also, DHS's
recent assessment of southbound weapons smuggling trends, which could
be used to better understand the nature of the problem and to help plan
and assess ways to address it, notes that it "does not provide an all
inclusive picture of—firearms smuggling" from the United States to
Mexico. In addition, as we noted in comment 2, it only contains a
subset of the data we were able to obtain from ATF relevant to the
issue.
6. As noted in the report, GAO has found that one of the key elements
that should be part of any strategy is clearly identifying an agency's
objectives and establishing mechanisms for determining progress toward
those objectives. Neither CBP's strategic plan, nor other CBP reports
and publications, make mention of illicit firearms, focusing instead on
other CBP efforts screening people and goods entering the United
States. However, our report noted that CBP is involved in new Southwest
border initiatives announced by DHS to significantly increase DHS
presence along the border, including conducting more southbound
inspections at ports of entry, among other efforts.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the
end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
June 5, 2009:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Firearms
Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face
Planning and Coordination Challenges," GAO Job Code 320599.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Ernesto Hernandez, Military Advisor, Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs at (202) 647-0198.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc:
GAO - Addison Ricks:
INL - William McGlynn:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on Draft GAO Report:
Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico
Face Planning and Coordination Challenges (GAO-09-709, GAO Code
320599):
Thank you for allowing the Department of State the opportunity to
comment on the draft report, "Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to
Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face Planning and Coordination
Challenges."
Recommendation for the Secretary of State:
To improve the scope and completeness of data on firearms trafficked to
Mexico and to facilitate investigations to disrupt illicit arms
trafficking networks, GAO recommends that the U.S. Attorney General and
the Secretary of State work with the Government of Mexico to expedite
the dissemination of eTrace in Spanish across Mexico to the relevant
Government of Mexico officials, provide these officials the proper
training on the use of eTrace, and ensure more complete input of
information on seized arms into eTrace.
Response:
The Department of State concurs with GAO's recommendation. The
Department is supporting the Department of Justice Alcohol Tobacco and
Firearms' (ATF) efforts to develop a Spanish-language version of the
Internet-based Firearms Tracing and Analysis (eTrace), and will work
with them to help make sure it is quickly disseminated throughout not
only Mexico, but also throughout the Spanish-speaking countries.
Additionally, the Department is funding a $5 million Forensics
Laboratories project with the Office of the Attorney General (PGR) for
the successful investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. This
funding will be used to provide state-of-the-art equipment and training
in such areas as collection and preservation of evidence,
chemical/biological analysis, computer forensics, and an Integrated
Ballistics Identification System (IBIS) which directly supports
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
efforts in the disruption of firearms. IBIS will complement the ATF's
eTrace by tracing the origin of U.S source firearms recovered from
Mexican criminal investigations. [See comment 1]
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's letter
dated June 5, 2009.
GAO Comments:
1. State agreed with our recommendation that the U.S. Attorney General
and the Secretary of State work with the Government of Mexico to
expedite the dissemination of eTrace in Spanish across Mexico to the
relevant Government of Mexico officials, provide these officials the
proper training on the use of eTrace, and ensure more complete input of
information on seized arms into eTrace. In addition, State added that
the department is funding a $5 million Forensics Laboratories project
with the Government of Mexico's Office of the Attorney General (PGR)
for the successful investigation and prosecution of criminal cases, and
we incorporated this information into the report.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Juan Gobel, Assistant
Director; Joe Carney; Virginia Chanley; Matt Harris; Elisabeth Helmer;
Grace Lui; and J. Addison Ricks provided key contributions to this
report. Technical assistance was provided by Joyce Evans, Theresa
Perkins, Jena Sinkfield, and Cynthia Taylor.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] According to U.S. and Mexican government officials, including the
Government of Mexico Attorney General's Office, Mexican law prohibits
the commercial sale or purchase of a firearm; all firearm sales must go
through the Government of Mexico. Officials told us that the
application and sales process takes a long time and that the types of
firearms that Mexican citizens are allowed to possess are limited to
smaller caliber pistols and rifles.
[2] Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213.
[3] ATF is responsible for investigating criminal and regulatory
violations of federal firearms laws, among other responsibilities. In
carrying out its responsibilities, ATF licenses and regulates federal
firearms licensees (FFL) to ensure they comply with applicable laws or
regulations. ATF also traces U.S. and foreign manufactured firearms for
international, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, to
link a suspect to a firearm in a criminal investigation or identify a
potential trafficker. Firearms tracing is the systematic tracking of
the movement of a firearm recovered by law enforcement officials from
its first sale by the manufacturer or importer through the distribution
chain (wholesaler/retailer) to identify the first retail purchaser. ATF
has a paperless firearm trace submission system (eTrace) that is
accessible through the Internet, through which users can submit,
retrieve, query, and store firearms trace information, as applicable.
[4] According to ATF, as part of the FFL inspection process, when ATF
Industry Operations Investigators review FFL records and other
information, they check to see that firearms are properly accounted
for, and look for firearms trafficking indicators to identify any
suspicious purchases, which are referred to ATF criminal investigators
for potential investigation.
[5] In April 2009, ATF announced plans to temporarily assign Gunrunner
Impact Teams made up of additional personnel and resources to the
Southwest border as part of Project Gunrunner, in order to increase
investigative leads and intelligence to combat arms trafficking to
Mexico.
[6] ICE officials stated ICE's efforts include enforcing laws related
to the export of military items and dual-use goods.
[7] According to ICE, other related activities include its efforts to
support the State Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) in
increasing the number of end use verification checks for firearms
lawfully exported to Mexican government entities to ensure intended
recipients of U.S. munitions are actually in control of those items
lawfully exported. As discussed later in this report, a small number of
firearms recovered in crime in Mexico to date have been traced back to
lawful exports.
[8] U.S. law enforcement agencies conduct their work in Mexico in
cooperation with Government of Mexico counterparts under the Treaty on
Cooperation Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States for Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.-Mexico, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 100-13 (1988).
[9] Although CBP has a role in intercepting southbound illicit firearms
at the border, southbound inspections of vehicles and persons traveling
from the United States to Mexico have generally not been a focus of
CBP's efforts. See pages 34-39 in this report for a discussion of CBP's
efforts to seize illicit firearms at the Southwest border.
[10] While there is no data on the total number of firearms trafficked
to Mexico, the Government of Mexico maintains data on the number of
firearms seized in Mexico. Information, such as serial numbers, on many
of these seized firearms is submitted to ATF's National Tracing Center
for tracing. ATF's National Tracing Center attempts to trace the
firearms using the information submitted. Between fiscal years 2004-
2008, around 52 percent of trace requests from Mexico that were
submitted to ATF's National Tracing Center identified the first retail
dealer. Furthermore, according to ATF, the identification of the
country of manufacturing origin of a firearm does not depend on
identifying the first retail dealer but rather on the initial
description of the firearm.
[11] As noted earlier, U.S. law enforcement agencies conduct their work
in Mexico in cooperation with Government of Mexico counterparts under
the Treaty on Cooperation Between the United States of America and the
United Mexican States for Mutual Legal Assistance.
[12] ATF and Government of Mexico officials told us they have worked to
address some of these obstacles, have already increased Mexico's use of
eTrace between fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2008, and plan to make
more extensive use of eTrace by Government of Mexico entities.
[13] While we reviewed data on firearms seized in Mexico and traced
from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008, we could not determine from
the data trends on increases in caliber or size of guns, because the
year the firearm was traced was not necessarily the year it was seized,
the year it was trafficked into Mexico, or the year it was purchased.
[14] ATF has analyzed firearms seizures in Mexico from fiscal year 2005
to fiscal year 2007 and identified the following weapons commonly used
by drug traffickers: 9 mm pistols; .38 super pistols; 5.7 mm pistols;
.45 caliber pistols; AR-15 type rifles; and AK-type rifles.
[15] In addition to firearms, some grenades and rocket launchers have
been seized by Mexican government agencies that, according to ATF
officials, generally had come from stocks in Central American countries
that had obtained the weapons from the United States in the 1980s or,
since then, through the foreign military sales process.
[16] The Department of Defense (DOD) provides analytical support to ATF
regarding captured weapons that there is reason to suspect may
originally have been provided by the U.S. government to another country
and then leaked out. Therefore, information provided by ATF would
include such DOD analytical support as a subset of that information.
[17] 18 U.S.C. § 923(a) requires that a person file for and obtain a
license from the U.S. Attorney General before he or she can engage in
the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms.
[18] Under regulation, some part of a private dwelling must be open to
the public in order to constitute a business premise as required to
obtain federal firearms license. 27 C.F.R. § 481.11.
[19] A June 2000 Department of the Treasury and ATF report found that
FFL traffickers were involved in under 10 percent of ATF trafficking
investigations, although FFL traffickers were associated with greater
mean numbers of illegally trafficked firearms per investigation (see
Following the Gun: Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Traffickers
(Washington, D.C.)). ATF has not assessed the extent to which cases of
arms trafficking to Mexico involve FFL traffickers.
[20] According to ATF's Project Gunrunner Fact Sheet from September
2008, "Most of the firearms violence in Mexico is perpetrated by drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs) who are vying for control of drug
trafficking routes to the United States and engaging in turf battles
for disputed distribution territories—. DTOs operating in Mexico rely
on firearms suppliers to enforce and maintain their illicit narcotics
operations. Intelligence indicates these criminal organizations have
tasked their money laundering, distribution and transportation
infrastructures reaching into the United States to acquire firearms and
ammunition. These Mexican DTO infrastructures have become the leading
gun trafficking organizations operating in the southwest United
States."
[21] Two major federal statutes regulate the commerce in, and
possession of, firearms: National Firearms Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1236,
codified, as amended, at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 and the Gun Control Act
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, codified, as amended, at 18
U.S.C. §§ 921-931.
[22] Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 101 and Huddleston v. U.S., 415 U.S. 814,
824 (1974) (interpreting the legislative history of the Gun Control Act
of 1968 and reiterating that the principal purpose of the Gun Control
Act was to curb crime by keeping firearms out of the hands of those not
legally entitled to possess them).
[23] Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 101.
[24] 18 U.S.C. §§ 923(g)(1)(A) and (g)(7). FFLs are required by federal
law to maintain records of firearm transactions for a period of 20
years. 27 C.F.R. § 478.129.
[25] The Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, §106, 100
Stat. 449 (1986) prohibited the establishment of a federal registry of
firearms, firearms owners, and firearms transactions and dispositions.
[26] According to ATF, the primary goal of a straw purchasing
conspiracy investigation is to identify the principal firearms
trafficker. If the principal trafficker is not caught, that individual
can continue to enlist new straw purchasers.
[27] Only individuals who are engaged in the business of importing,
manufacturing, or dealing in firearms--those whose principal objectives
are livelihood and profit--need to obtain a license (18 U.S.C. §§
921(21) and 923(a).) In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A) only
requires licensed importers, licensed manufacturers, and licensed
dealers to maintain records of importation, shipment, receipt, sale, or
other disposition of firearms at his or her place of business.
[28] 18 U.S.C. § 921(11) defines a "dealer," in part, as a person who
is a pawnbroker. Consequently, the recording requirements of 18 U.S.C.
§ 923(g)(1)(A) and associated regulations, which apply to licensed
firearms dealers, apply to pawnbrokers as well.
[29] As an FFL, a pawnshop is subject to the same records maintenance
and reporting requirements as all other FFLs. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(11)
(dealer is defined by law as encompassing a person who is a
pawnbroker); 18 U.S.C. § 923(a) (requiring dealers to obtain a license
to deal in firearms); and 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(A) (requiring licensed
dealers to maintain records).
[30] 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and (n).
[31] Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 103(i), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(t). The
Brady Act established the National Instant Criminal Background Check
System. In passing the Brady Act, Congress took into consideration the
privacy interests of private individuals and specifically required the
Attorney General to pass regulations to ensure the privacy and security
of the information in the System. Section 922(t)(3) lists exemptions
from the background check requirement.
[32] 18 U.S.C. § 922(t) prohibits only a licensee from transferring a
firearm to a nonlicensee before contacting the national criminal
background check system and does not apply to transfers by
nonlicensees. According to a 1999 report by the Department of the
Treasury and DOJ, this is known as the "gun show loophole." The Gun
Control Act requires all persons manufacturing, importing, or selling
firearms as a business to be federally licensed, but private
transactions between persons "not engaged in the business" are not
covered by the Gun Control Act. Nonlicensees are prohibited from
transferring firearms to any person who they have reasonable cause to
believe is not a resident of the state in which the transaction occurs
and from knowingly transferring a firearm to prohibited persons.
However, the Brady Act does not apply to private firearm transfers. See
Department of the Treasury, DOJ, and ATF, Gun Shows: Brady Checks and
Crime Gun Traces (Washington, D.C.: January 1999).
[33] The 1999 report by the Department of the Treasury and DOJ provided
recommendations to the President to close the "gun show loophole;"
however, resulting legislation subsequently proposed in Congress did
not become law.
[34] Since 1975, FFLs have been required by regulation (27 C.F.R. §
478.126a), and subsequently by law (18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(3)(A)), to
report all transactions in which an unlicensed person has acquired two
or more handguns at one time or during any 5 consecutive business days
(called a multiple sale). 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(3)(A) specifies that a
licensee must prepare a report of multiple sales, during 5 consecutive
business days, of two or more pistols, or revolvers, or any combination
of the two totaling two or more, to an unlicensed individual. According
to ATF, the purpose of the requirement was to enable ATF to monitor and
deter illegal commerce in handguns by unlicensed persons.
[35] Long guns include shotguns and rifles, the latter of which include
firearms such as AK and AR-15 type semiautomatic rifles.
[36] As noted previously, two major federal statutes regulate the
commerce in, and possession of, firearms: National Firearms Act of
1934, 48 Stat. 1236, codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872 and
the Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213,
codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-931.
[37] 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); 27 C.F.R. § 478.32.
[38] 18 U.S.C. § 922(d); 27 C.F.R. § 478.32.
[39] While straw purchasing is not in itself illegal, it is illegal to
intentionally provide false information in connection with the
acquisition of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). See also U.S. v.
Moore, 109 F.3d 1456, 1460-63 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining the straw man
doctrine and applying it to a factual case).
[40] 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1), 923(a).
[41] 18 U.S.C § 922.
[42] Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320, as amended.
[43] 22 C.F.R. parts 120-130.
[44] Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006).
[45] 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420. The Export Administration Act is not
permanent legislation. Authority granted under the act lapsed in August
2001. However, Executive Order 13222, Continuation of Export Control
Regulations, which was issued in August 2001 and extended most recently
by Presidential Notice on July 23, 2008, under the authority provided
by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. §§1701 et
seq.), continues the controls established under the act and the
implementing EAR. See 73 Fed. Reg. 43603 (July 25, 2008).
[46] 15 C.F.R. subchapter C.
[47] ATF and ICE officials noted that they may support each other's
efforts to address arms trafficking in areas in which one agency may
have primary jurisdiction.
[48] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives
to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute
Terrorists, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-697]
(Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2007); GAO, Results-Oriented Government:
Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal
Agencies, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); and GAO, Managing for Results:
Enhancing Agency Use of Performance Information for Management Decision
Making, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-927]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005).
[49] According to the 1978 MOU, the agreement was developed to
facilitate more effective use of federal investigative resources and
"an open exchange of intelligence and joint enforcement efforts on dual
jurisdiction investigations, i.e., investigations in which there are,
or may be, violations of statutes within the primary investigative
jurisdiction" of each agency.
[50] In addition, law enforcement officials stated that they have used,
and are planning to expand, license plate reader technology along the
Southwest border to combat arms trafficking. CBP has also begun
screening 100 percent of outbound railcars at eight rail crossings
along the U.S.-Mexico border, although officials noted that most
southbound weapons seizures have occurred following inspections of
personally owned (noncommercial) vehicles at the official ports of
entry and rail screenings have resulted in no weapons seizures to date.
[51] CBP and ICE officials noted that they often work together in
efforts to intercept firearms at the border.
[52] Law enforcement officials noted that southbound operations are
focused on illicit goods in general, including money, guns, drugs, and
people.
[53] CBP noted not all southbound weapons seizures necessarily relate
to arms trafficking, such as in instances when an individual is
arrested at the border due to an outstanding warrant, and the
individual also had a weapon.
[54] Officials also told us few weapons have been seized in between the
official ports of entry, although CBP does not maintain data on
southbound weapons seized in between the ports of entry.
[55] The officials noted about 80 percent of border-crossers are
"frequent crossers," meaning that they cross the border in both
directions 10 times per month or more.
[56] CBP officials stated that since March 2009, under the new
Southwest border security initiative, CBP has been in the process of
reassigning staff in order to have at least one dedicated team
available for southbound inspections at each field office along the
Southwest border.
[57] The U.S. interagency counternarcotics community includes the
Central Intelligence Agency's Crime and Narcotics Center; the Defense
Intelligence Agency's Counternarcotics Trafficking Office, Defense's
Joint Staff, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics; DHS's ICE, CBP, U.S. Coast Guard, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, Office of Counternarcotics and Enforcement,
and the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator; Justice's DEA, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, National Drug
Intelligence Center, and the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task
Force; the National Security Agency; ONDCP; State/INL; and the
Department of the Treasury's Internal Revenue Service and Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
[58] We have identified standards for appropriate and effective
internal control in government, which can help agencies improve
operational processes and identify and address major performance and
management challenges, such as the need to comprehensively identify
internal and external risks and to monitor activities to compare actual
performance to planned or intended results. See GAO, Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.:
November 1999).
[59] Pages 14-24 of this report provide information on types and
sources of firearms trafficked from the United States to Mexico, based
on analyses of traces of firearms recovered in crime in Mexico.
[60] In fiscal year 2008, 145 of 7,206 (about 2 percent) firearm trace
requests submitted by Mexico were linked to a multiple sale. Ten trace
requests were submitted for firearms that were found to have been
reported lost or stolen from an FFL or an interstate carrier.
[61] Department of the Treasury, Department of Justice, and Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Gun Shows: Brady Checks and Crime Gun
Traces (Washington, D.C.: January 1999); Department of the Treasury and
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Commerce in Firearms in the
United States (Washington, D.C.: February 2000); and Department of the
Treasury and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Following the
Gun: Enforcing Federal Laws Against Firearms Traffickers (Washington,
D.C.: June 2000).
[62] A 2004 report by the National Academy of Sciences highlighted the
general lack of data related to firearms and violence and the
effectiveness or impact of various gun control policies. The report
noted the importance of this type of information to aid policymakers in
assessing problems, such as illegal commerce in firearms, and to help
determine ways to effectively address firearms-related issues. See
National Academy of Sciences, Firearms and Violence: A Critical Review,
ISBN 978-0-309-09124-4 (2004).
[63] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, Div.
B, 118 Stat. 3, 53; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No.
118-447, Div. B, 118 Stat. 2809, 2859-60 (2004); Science, State,
Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290, 2295-96 (2005); Continuing
Appropriations Resolution, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-289, Div. B, 120 Stat.
1311 (2006), as amended.
[64] The assessment was labeled for official use only and has not been
released to the public.
[65] Law enforcement officials stated data on firearms seizures, cases
initiated, and prosecutions provided by one agency are not necessarily
mutually exclusive of data provided by another agency since multiple
agencies may track information on the same seizure event or trafficking
case.
[66] This figure does not include all firearms acquired by ATF in the
above mentioned states in fiscal year 2008; it only includes those
firearms identified by ATF as related to its Southwest border
enforcement efforts. ATF reported that, of the 8,328 firearms, 559 were
abandoned (voluntarily turned over to ATF by the owner for appropriate
disposition. According to ATF, an abandonment must be unconditional;
the person abandoning the property is not absolving themselves of
potential criminal charges in connection with the property); 336 were
purchased (generally in undercover scenarios, for evidentiary
purposes); 4,040 were seized administratively (administrative
forfeiture is a process by which property may be forfeited to the
United States by ATF without any judicial action); 307 were seized
judicially (judicial forfeiture is an action included as part of a
criminal prosecution or an action in a U.S. district court ); 1,448
were seized for evidence (property that is not subject to forfeiture
may be seized as evidence where there is probable cause to believe that
the evidence will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction);
1,638 were seized as evidence and held in the custody of a cooperating
law enforcement agency in a joint investigation with ATF where there
was probable cause to believe the evidence would aid in a particular
apprehension or conviction (this property, though held by another law
enforcement agency, is part of the case in chief being recommended for
prosecution by ATF).
[67] ATF stated an accurate determination of the reason(s) for the
acquisition of firearms as evidence can only be obtained by reviewing
the investigative reports underlying the acquisition of each individual
firearm.
[68] Law enforcement officials stated a majority of firearms trafficked
from the United States to Mexico are sourced to the Southwest border
states.
[69] An ICE official noted data on ICE firearms seizures include
seizures by ICE on the U.S. side of the border, as well as seizures by
CBP that were referred to ICE.
[70] CBP Border Patrol also noted that while Border Patrol maintains
data on weapons seizures in between the official ports of entry, they
are not able to determine from the data whether a weapon was headed
north or south or was related to arms trafficking to Mexico without
conducting further investigation. Officials noted anecdotal evidence
suggests that few weapons intended for Mexico have been seized in
between the ports of entry.
[71] A 2004 report by the DOJ Office of the Inspector General found
that ATF's FFL inspection program was not fully effective for ensuring
that FFLs comply with federal firearms laws because inspections were
infrequent and of inconsistent quality, and follow-up inspections and
adverse actions had been sporadic (see Report Number I-2004-005,
Inspections of Firearms Dealers by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (Washington, D.C). However, ATF has not
assessed the extent to which cases of arms trafficking to Mexico
involve FFL traffickers.
[72] For example, ICE officials said narcotics, money laundering, or
human trafficking cases that also involved arms smuggling may not be
reflected in data provided on the initiation and prosecution of cases.
[73] EOUSA officials noted that, for the first time, in 2009, EOUSA is
planning to provide training for relevant U.S. officials on
prosecutions of southbound weapons smuggling cases.
[74] ATF reported that, of the 73 cases, DHS participated in some way
in 39 of the investigations (for example, an agent, analyst, or
attorney from ICE, CBP, Border Patrol, BEST, or another DHS component
was a participant or source of information for the investigation). A
senior ATF official stated arms trafficking to Mexico cases are not
necessarily referred for prosecution in the same year they are
initiated. A case may be referred to a U.S. Attorney's Office or in
some cases to a state or local prosecutor for prosecution.
[75] Treaty on Cooperation Between the United States of America and the
United Mexican States for Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.-
Mexico, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-13 (1988).
[76] According to DOD, ATF has asked DOD to utilize ongoing military-
to-military discussion channels to facilitate ATF conversations with
the Mexican military. Should such prospective discussions take place,
DOD would be in a supporting and facilitating role, and any results
would properly be reported by ATF.
[77] From fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2008, ATF provided 12
training sessions on the use of eTrace in Mexico City, Monterrey,
Hermosillo, Guadalajara, Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Nogales, Matamoros,
Nuevo Laredo, and Merida, Mexico.
[78] According to State, it will fund a $5 million Forensics
Laboratories project with the Mexican Attorney General's Office for the
successful investigation and prosecution of criminal cases. This
funding will be used to provide state-of-the-art equipment and training
in such areas as collection and preservation of evidence, chemical/
biological analysis, computer forensics, and an Integrated Ballistics
Identification System (IBIS), which will directly support DOJ and DHS
efforts in the disruption of firearms trafficking. IBIS will complement
ATF's eTrace by tracing the origin of U.S. sourced firearms recovered
from Mexican criminal investigations.
[79] Between fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2008, the Government of
Mexico submitted more weapons to be traced--from 0 to 1067--with the
remaining requests generally entered by ATF agents operating in Mexico.
[80] In addition to incomplete submissions of firearms information into
eTrace, ATF officials told us that the time between when a firearm is
seized in Mexico and when ATF receives a trace request varies. While
ATF receives some requests within a day or so of a firearms seizure,
over the last few years, ATF has received other requests to trace
"batches" of firearms that were seized over an 18-month period. ATF is
working with the Mexican government to improve the trace process,
including shortening average time between when a firearm is seized and
ATF receives a trace request.
[81] According to State, money from the Department of the Treasury's
Asset Forfeiture Funds, not money from State's Merida funding, will be
used to develop and deploy the Spanish language version of eTrace.
[82] We found in our past work that in a large-scale, interagency
effort, mechanisms to ensure interagency collaboration are essential,
and we have identified key elements of collaboration, including
defining and articulating common outcomes; agreeing on roles and
responsibilities; and establishing compatible policies and procedures.
See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[83] Direct, operational funding for DEA's vetted units in Mexico
totals approximately $2 million per year, excluding the salaries and
expenses for the DEA Special Agents who work with the units.
[84] H.R. 6028, 110th Cong. (2008).
[85] Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-252, §
1406, 122 Stat. 2323, 2339 (tying funding for assistance for Mexico to
a requirement for a report by the Secretary of State that the
Government of Mexico is establishing a mechanism for regular
consultations to make recommendations concerning implementation of the
Merida Initiative).
[86] Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-469, § 1110, 120 Stat. 3502, 3544
[87] Mexico City, the capital of Mexico, is not a "state," but rather a
unique jurisdiction within the Republic of Mexico known as the "Federal
District." It is comparable to the District of Columbia in the United
States.
[End of section]
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