Military and Dual-Use Technology
Covert Testing Shows Continuing Vulnerabilities of Domestic Sales for Illegal Export Gao ID: GAO-09-725T June 4, 2009Terrorists and foreign governments regularly attempt to obtain sensitive dual-use and military technology from manufacturers and distributors within the United States. Although the Department of State (State) or Department of Commerce (Commerce), or both, must grant approval to export sensitive military and dual-use items, publicly reported criminal cases show that individuals can bypass this requirement and illegally export restricted items such as night-vision goggles. In the wrong hands, this technology poses a risk to U.S. security, including the threat that it will be reverse engineered or used directly against U.S. soldiers. Given the threat, the subcommittee asked GAO to conduct undercover tests to attempt to (1) purchase sensitive dual-use and military items from manufacturers and distributors in the United States; and (2) export purchased items without detection by domestic law-enforcement officials. To perform this work, GAO used fictitious individuals, a bogus front company, and domestic mailboxes to pose as a buyer for sensitive items. GAO, in coordination with foreign law-enforcement officials, also covertly attempted to export dummy versions of items. GAO interviewed relevant agencies to gain an understanding of which items were in demand by terrorists and foreign governments. GAO actions were not designed to test controls of other countries. Relevant agencies were also briefed on the results of this work.
GAO foundthat sensitive dual-use and military technology can be easily and legally purchased from manufacturers and distributors within the United States and illegally exported without detection. Using a bogus front company and fictitious identities, GAO purchased sensitive items including night-vision scopes currently used by U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan to identify targets, triggered spark gaps used to detonate nuclear weapons, electronic sensors used in improvised explosive devices, and gyro chips used in guided missiles and military aircraft. Interviews with cognizant officials at State and Commerce and a review of laws governing the sale of the types of items GAO purchased showed there are few restrictions on domestic sales of these items. GAO was also able to export a number of dummy versions of these items using the mail to a country that is a known transshipment point for terrorist organizations and foreign governments attempting to acquire sensitive technology. Due to the large volume of packages being shipped overseas, and large volume of people traveling overseas, enforcement officials within the United States said it is impossible to search every package and person leaving the United States to ensure sensitive technologies are not being exported illegally. As a result, terrorists and foreign governments that are able to complete domestic purchases of sensitive military and dual-use technologies face few obstacles and risks when exporting these items. The table below provides details on several of the items GAO was able to purchase and, in two cases, illegally export without detection.
GAO-09-725T, Military and Dual-Use Technology: Covert Testing Shows Continuing Vulnerabilities of Domestic Sales for Illegal Export
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-725T
entitled 'Military And Dual-Use Technology: Covert Testing Shows
Continuing Vulnerabilities of Domestic Sales for Illegal Export' which
was released on June 4, 2009.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, June 4, 2009:
Military And Dual-Use Technology:
Covert Testing Shows Continuing Vulnerabilities of Domestic Sales for
Illegal Export:
Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director:
Forensic Audits and Special Investigations:
GAO-09-725T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-725T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House
of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Terrorists and foreign governments regularly attempt to obtain
sensitive dual-use and military technology from manufacturers and
distributors within the United States. Although the Department of State
(State) or Department of Commerce (Commerce), or both, must grant
approval to export sensitive military and dual-use items, publicly
reported criminal cases show that individuals can bypass this
requirement and illegally export restricted items such as night-vision
goggles. In the wrong hands, this technology poses a risk to U.S.
security, including the threat that it will be reverse engineered or
used directly against U.S. soldiers.
Given the threat, the subcommittee asked GAO to conduct undercover
tests to attempt to (1) purchase sensitive dual-use and military items
from manufacturers and distributors in the United States; and (2)
export purchased items without detection by domestic law-enforcement
officials.
To perform this work, GAO used fictitious individuals, a bogus front
company, and domestic mailboxes to pose as a buyer for sensitive items.
GAO, in coordination with foreign law-enforcement officials, also
covertly attempted to export dummy versions of items. GAO interviewed
relevant agencies to gain an understanding of which items were in
demand by terrorists and foreign governments. GAO actions were not
designed to test controls of other countries. Relevant agencies were
also briefed on the results of this work.
What GAO Found:
GAO found that sensitive dual-use and military technology can be easily
and legally purchased from manufacturers and distributors within the
United States and illegally exported without detection. Using a bogus
front company and fictitious identities, GAO purchased sensitive items
including night-vision scopes currently used by U.S. soldiers in Iraq
and Afghanistan to identify targets, triggered spark gaps used to
detonate nuclear weapons, electronic sensors used in improvised
explosive devices, and gyro chips used in guided missiles and military
aircraft. Interviews with cognizant officials at State and Commerce and
a review of laws governing the sale of the types of items GAO purchased
showed there are few restrictions on domestic sales of these items.
GAO was also able to export a number of dummy versions of these items
using the mail to a country that is a known transshipment point for
terrorist organizations and foreign governments attempting to acquire
sensitive technology. Due to the large volume of packages being shipped
overseas, and large volume of people traveling overseas, enforcement
officials within the United States said it is impossible to search
every package and person leaving the United States to ensure sensitive
technologies are not being exported illegally. As a result, terrorists
and foreign governments that are able to complete domestic purchases of
sensitive military and dual-use technologies face few obstacles and
risks when exporting these items. The table below provides details on
several of the items GAO was able to purchase and, in two cases,
illegally export without detection.
Table: Sensitive Items Purchased by GAO Using Fictitious Identities:
Item: Gyro chip;
Use: Dual-use – Used in advanced aircraft, missile, space and
commercial systems for stabilization, control, guidance, and
navigation;
Notes:
* In 2006, company paid a $15 million civil penalty for the export of
civil aircraft containing a gyro chip to China;
* The gyro chip is fully self contained, lightweight, and has a
virtually unlimited life;
* GAO exported without detection.
Item: Night-vision monocular;
Use: Military – Used by U.S. troops to identify targets in nighttime
operations;
Notes:
* In 2006, criminal convictions for two people involved in export of
night-vision devices to the terrorist group Hezbollah;
* GAO‘s bogus company became a certified distributor for the item,
gaining access to an unrestricted quantity; & Contains an image
intensifier tube made to military specifications.
Item: Accelerometer;
Use: Dual use – Accelerometers are suitable for use in ’smart“ bombs
and for measuring motions generated by nuclear and chemical explosives;
Notes:
* Item is in high demand by foreign countries and was the subject of a
2007 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement investigation;
* In 2007, an individual was sentenced for conspiracy to smuggle
military-grade accelerometers from the United States to China;
* GAO exported without detection.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-725T] or key
components. For more information, contact Gregory Kutz at (202) 512-
6722 or kutzg@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Terrorists and foreign governments regularly attempt to obtain
sensitive dual-use[Footnote 1] and military technology from
manufacturers and distributors within the United States. Recently the
Department of Justice (DOJ) reported that, on a daily basis, foreign
states as well as criminal and terrorist groups seek arms, technology,
and other material to advance their technological capacity. With the
United States producing advanced technology, it has become a primary
target of these illegal technology-attainment efforts. For fiscal year
2008, DOJ publicly reported more than 145 defendants faced criminal
charges for violations of export-control laws. Roughly 43 percent of
the defendants charged in these cases were attempting to illegally
transfer items to Iran or China. For example, a 2007 undercover
investigation by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
agency revealed that an individual in Connecticut attempted to purchase
and illegally export an accelerometer to China. According to the
indictment, this accelerometer is suitable for use in smart bombs and
for measuring motions generated by nuclear and chemical explosives. In
another example, in 2008, various individuals and companies were
indicted on federal charges for purchasing items capable of being used
to construct Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), including
inclinometers, and exporting these items to multiple transshipment
points, with Iran being the final destination. These types of items
have been, and may continue to be, used against U.S. soldiers in Iraq
and Afghanistan. In addition, we have identified weaknesses in the
effectiveness and efficiency of government programs designed to protect
critical technologies while advancing U.S. interests. Since 2007, we
have included ensuring the effective protection of technologies
critical to U.S. national security interest as a high-risk area.
[Footnote 2]
While the U.S. State Department (State) and Commerce Department
(Commerce) each have jurisdiction over the export of certain items to
countries outside the United States, many of these same items can be
purchased legally within the United States. In a testimony before
another congressional committee in 2008, we described how our
undercover agents were able to purchase sensitive items such as F-14
Tomcat aircraft parts, night-vision goggles currently being used by
U.S. forces, and current-issue military body armor on commercial
internet sites such as eBay and Craigslist.[Footnote 3] Given the ease
at which we were able to buy those items, and the continued attempts by
foreign governments and terrorist groups to obtain sensitive
technologies from within the United States, the committee asked us to
conduct proactive testing to attempt to (1) purchase sensitive dual-use
and military items from manufacturers and distributors in the United
States; and (2) export purchased items without detection by domestic
law-enforcement officials.
To perform this investigation, we spoke with relevant agencies to gain
an understanding of which dual-use and military items were in demand by
terrorists and foreign governments. Furthermore, we identified publicly
disclosed enforcement cases regarding the sale and illegal export of
sensitive dual-use and military items. We searched for dual-use and
military technology being sold on manufacturers' and distributors' Web
sites. We then made domestic purchases of dual-use and military items
either through e-mail or the seller's Web site. We did not purchase
items from individual persons or commercial auction sites such as eBay
or craigslist. We used a bogus front company and fictitious identities
when purchasing these items, meaning that we conducted our work with
fictitious names and contact information that could not be traced back
to GAO. We also established a Web site related to our bogus company and
rented domestic commercial mailboxes used to receive purchased items.
In some cases, no information other than a name and credit card were
used when purchasing a sensitive item. When possible, we obtained
written price quotes from manufacturers and distributors for purchases
of additional quantities of items we successfully purchased. After
purchasing these items in an undercover capacity, we contacted the
distributors and manufacturers of the items and informed them of our
operation. We then interviewed company officials and performed
additional follow-up investigative work. In addition, we coordinated
with foreign government officials to covertly export a number of dummy
versions of the items we purchased. We discussed the results of our
work with officials at State and Commerce, as well as law-enforcement
officials within the Department of Defense, DOJ, and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).
We conducted our investigation from May 2008 through June 2009 in
accordance with quality standards for investigations as set forth by
the Council for Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE).
Background:
Commerce and State are principally responsible for regulating the
export of sensitive dual-use and military items, respectively. Under
the authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979,[Footnote 4]
Commerce is responsible for regulating the export of dual-use items
that are included in the Commerce Control List (CCL).[Footnote 5]
Specifically, Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is
responsible for regulating the export and reexport of most commercial
items. The commercial items BIS regulates are referred to as dual-use
items that have both commercial and military or proliferation
applications. BIS's export enforcement activities target the most
significant threats facing the United States such as the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems, terrorism
and state sponsors of terror, and diversions of dual-use goods to
unauthorized military end uses.
Under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976,[Footnote 6]
State regulates the export of military items, which are included in the
U.S. Munitions List.[Footnote 7] Generally, items regulated by State
require an export license, while items regulated by Commerce do not
necessarily require an export license. Whether an export license is
required depends on multiple factors including the item being exported,
country of ultimate destination, individual parties involved in the
export, parties' involvement in proliferation activities, and the
technical characteristics and planned end use of the item. Any person
or company in the United States that engages in manufacturing,
exporting, or importing U.S. Munitions List items must register with
State.[Footnote 8]
Commerce and State require exporters to identify items that are on the
CCL and U.S. Munitions list and, if required, obtain license
authorization from the appropriate department to export these items
unless an exemption applies. Exporters are responsible for complying
with export-controls laws and regulations. When shipping a sensitive
dual-use or military item that requires a license, exporters are
required to electronically notify DHS's Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) officials at the port where the item will be exported, including
information on the quantity and value of the shipment, the issued
export license number, or an indication that the item is exempt from
licensing requirements. Export enforcement agencies including CBP, ICE,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Commerce's Office of Export
Enforcement (OEE), U.S. Attorney's Office and the Defense Criminal
Investigative Service, are involved with inspecting items to be
shipped, investigating potential violations of export-control laws, and
punishing export-control violators.
U.S. regulations are designed to keep specific military and dual-use
items from being diverted to improper end users. However, current
regulations focus on the export of these items and do not address the
domestic sales of these items. The seller of a U.S. Munitions List item
or a CCL item may legally sell the item within the United States, and
is under no legal duty to perform any type of due diligence on a buyer.
However, if the seller of an item knows or has reason to know that the
buyer is representing a foreign government or intends to export the
item, then the seller may be liable.[Footnote 9]
Sensitive Dual-Use and Military Items Can Be Easily Purchased within
the United States Using a Bogus Front Company and Fictitious
Identities:
We found that sensitive dual-use and military technology can be easily
purchased from manufacturers and distributors within the United States.
Using a bogus front company and fictitious identities, we purchased
[Footnote 10] sensitive dual-use and military items from the sellers of
the items. Based on our legal analysis of the applicable laws and
regulations over the domestic sale of sensitive dual-use and military
technology, we determined that companies are allowed to make domestic
sales of sensitive items with little or no restrictions. Some of the
manufacturers and distributors of items we purchased stated that they
independently instituted procedures to document the sales of sensitive
items, such as requiring buyers to fill out end-user agreements.
[Footnote 11] However, the sellers were not legally required to conduct
any research to validate the authenticity of the identification used or
the final use of the item. In addition, many of the distributors and
manufacturers have received warning letters from Commerce for exporting
sensitive items without the required export license.
Items obtained by our fictitious individuals included a night-vision
monocular, electronic components used in IEDs, and secure military-
grade radios used by U.S. Special Operations personnel. Items we
obtained were not only sensitive in nature, but were also in demand by
foreign governments and terrorist organizations. Specifically, seven of
the sensitive dual-use and military items we obtained during our
investigation have been the center of criminal indictments and
convictions for violations of export control laws. All items, except
the F-16 engine computer, were new and unused. The F-16 engine computer
was purchased from a distributor who had obtained the item from the
Department of Defense. Table 1 below summarizes the sensitive items we
obtained during our investigation, followed by detailed case-study
narratives.[Footnote 12]
Table 1: Sensitive Dual-Use and Military Items:
Dual-use items:
Case: 1;
Item: Triggered spark gap;
Dual-use: [Check];
Military: [Empty];
Nuclear: [Check];
IED: [Empty].
Case: 2;
Item: Oscilloscope;
Dual-use: [Check];
Military: [Empty];
Nuclear: [Check];
IED: [Empty].
Case: 3;
Item: Accelerometer;
Dual-use: [Check];
Military: [Check];
Nuclear: [Check];
IED: [Empty].
Case: 4;
Item: Quadruple differential line receiver;
Dual-use: [Check];
Military: [Check];
Nuclear: [Empty];
IED: [Check].
Case: 5;
Item: Inclinometer;
Dual-use: [Check];
Military: [Check];
Nuclear: [Empty];
IED: [Check].
Case: 6;
Item: Gyro chip;
Dual-use: [Check];
Military: [Check];
Nuclear: [Empty];
IED: [Empty].
Case: 7;
Item: Ka-band power amplifier;
Dual-use: [Check];
Military: [Check];
Nuclear: [Empty];
IED: [Empty].
Military items:
Case: 8;
Item: Infra-red flag;
Dual-use: [Empty];
Military: [Check];
Nuclear: [Empty];
IED: [Empty].
Case: 9;
Item: Modular tactical vest (MTV)/enhanced small arms protective
inserts (ESAPI);
Dual-use: [Empty];
Military: [Check];
Nuclear: [Empty];
IED: [Empty].
Case: 10;
Item: Night-vision monocular/Night-vision goggles (NVG);
Dual-use: [Empty];
Military: [Check];
Nuclear: [Empty];
IED: [Empty].
Case: 11;
Item: Secure personal radio;
Dual-use: [Empty];
Military: [Check];
Nuclear: [Empty];
IED: [Empty].
Case: 12;
Item: F-16 engine computer;
Dual-use: [Empty];
Military: [Check];
Nuclear: [Empty];
IED: [Empty].
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Sensitive Dual-Use Items:
Using a bogus front company, fictitious identities, and a domestic
mailbox we rented, we were able to purchase sensitive dual-use items
from distributors and manufacturers. Items that we purchased have
commercial applications, but can also be used for other purposes such
as in the development of nuclear weapons, guided missiles, and IEDs.
The items listed below are subject to export restrictions under either
the CCL or State's U.S. Munitions List. Many of the items we purchased
have also been the center of previously identified unlawful exports to
foreign nations.
Sensitive Dual-Use Items with Nuclear Applications:
* Case 1: Triggered Spark Gap. Triggered spark gaps are versatile high-
voltage switches used for medical applications that can also be used as
nuclear weapons detonators. Triggered spark gaps have been the center
of unlawful exports to Pakistan and India. However, they are completely
legal to buy and sell within the United States.
Figure 1: Triggered Spark Gap:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph of Triggered Spark Gap]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In January 2009, using a bogus company and a domestic mailbox as a
business address, we purchased, via e-mail, a triggered spark gap for
the amount[Footnote 13] of $735 from a manufacturer that is registered
in the federal Central Contractor Registration (CCR) database, an
approved government supplier via the General Services Administration
(GSA) schedule, and a previous target for attempted purchases by
foreign nationals. After obtaining the triggered spark gap, we notified
the manufacturer of our undercover purchase. During our interview with
the manufacturer, company personnel stated they believed that they had
sufficient protocols in place to document the sale of their items. The
manufacturer requires new customers to complete a certification form
where the customer provides their name and the end use of the product
they are purchasing. However, because sales of this item are legal
domestically, we were able to purchase it with a fictitious name and
bogus company, and by providing a valid credit card. With no
requirement to do so, the manufacturer did not question our fictitious
identity or bogus company and did not inquire further about the end use
for our product. While purchasing the triggered spark gap, we also
obtained a price quote for up to 100 additional triggered spark gaps.
In addition, in 2005, an individual was sentenced to 3 years in prison
for conspiring to violate and violating U.S. export restrictions after
exporting, using an air freight company, items including triggered
spark gaps. Another individual was indicted for conspiring to violate
and violating U.S. export restrictions. The two individuals arranged to
purchase, and export to Pakistan, several U.S.-origin triggered spark
gaps. In order to obtain the triggered spark gaps the individuals
falsely indicated that the items were intended for medical use.
* Case 2: Oscilloscope. Oscilloscopes are used for displaying the
timing, voltages, frequency, and other attributes of electrical
signals. In addition, certain oscilloscope versions are capable of
being utilized in weapon of mass destruction development and are also
export-controlled for antiterrorism reasons. However, oscilloscopes are
legal to buy and sell within the United States. During our
investigation, we determined that CCL versions of oscilloscopes can be
purchased on the Internet from a distributor that is registered in CCR
through an online purchase with a credit card. Because this item cost
over $7,500, we chose not to purchase it. However, we confirmed with
the distributor that we would have been able to purchase an
oscilloscope domestically without any verification. In addition, a
model of oscilloscope similar to the version we could have purchased
was also illegally shipped overseas by the same seller in 2005.
Specifically, this seller pled guilty to one felony count of violating
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act by exporting an
oscilloscope to Israel without a license. This distributor was
sentenced to pay a criminal fine in the amount of $50,000, placed on 3
years' probation and ordered to serve 250 hours of community service.
In recent years, the oscilloscope manufacturer has received several
warning letters from Commerce for exporting oscilloscopes to Pakistan
and India without the required license.
* Case 3: Accelerometer. Accelerometers are sensors and instruments
used for measuring, displaying, and analyzing acceleration and
vibration. They can be used on a stand-alone basis, or in conjunction
with a data-acquisition system. The version of the accelerometer we
purchased is suitable for use in "smart" bombs and for measuring
motions generated by nuclear and chemical explosives and, although
legal for domestic sale, is export-controlled under CCL restrictions.
In January 2009, we purchased an accelerometer from a manufacturer for
the amount of $2,766. The manufacturer is registered in CCR and is an
approved government supplier through the GSA Schedule. We accomplished
the purchase using a fictitious name, bogus company, and domestic
mailbox as a business address. We also provided an end-user
certification stating that we would use the item for research and
development purposes and would not export the item. We met with the
manufacturer after our purchase to discuss what we had done and to
discuss whether the company implemented any voluntary restrictions over
the domestic sales of sensitive items. The manufacturer of the item did
not implement controls that are not required by law, and believed that
documentation of the sale was appropriate. This type of item is in high
demand by foreign countries. For example, a 2007 undercover
investigation by ICE revealed that an individual attempted to purchase
and illegally export the same type of accelerometer we purchased to
China. Specifically, ICE used an undercover company to capture the
individual. The individual was sentenced 12 months in prison for his
role in conspiring to export the accelerometer.
Dual-Use Items with IED applications:
* Case 4: Quadruple Differential Line Receiver. The quadruple
differential line receiver is used for balanced or unbalanced digital
data transmission. The product supports defense, aerospace, and medical
applications. In addition, certain versions of quadruple differential
receivers have military applications. This item may be legally bought
and sold within the United States. In April 2009, we purchased 10
military-grade quadruple differential line receivers from a distributor
for the amount of $248. The transaction was accomplished through the
company's Internet Web site using a bogus company, fictitious identity,
and domestic mailbox as a business address. Because the law did not
mandate it, no verification of our identity or description of the use
of the product was required. After the purchase we notified the
distributor of our undercover purchase. As a result of our undercover
purchase, the distributor stated it will consider implementing
voluntary controls for the online transactions, but did not provide
details on what additional controls it would implement. In addition to
our purchase, other individuals have attempted to export a similar item
to Iran. Specifically, in 2008, various individuals and companies were
indicted on federal charges for purchasing items for IEDs including
items similar to a quadruple differential line receiver. The
individuals allegedly arranged to export items to multiple
transshipment points, with Iran being the final destination. In
addition, we spoke with a Department of Defense official who confirmed
similar U.S.-made technology is being found in IEDs. The official
stated that terrorist groups are using more advanced IEDs with easy
access to this type of technology.
* Case 5: Inclinometer. An inclinometer is an instrument used for
measuring angles of slope and inclination of an object with respect to
its center of gravity. Inclinometers, which are export-controlled but
legal to buy and sell within the United States, are suitable for use in
the military, medical, optical, range-finder, and robotics fields, and
have applications in IEDs. In February 2009, we purchased an
inclinometer from a manufacturer for the amount of $548. The
manufacturer is registered in CCR and has recently been the target for
purchases by individuals shipping inclinometers to Iran. Because it was
a domestic purchase, the manufacturer was not required to request an
end-user agreement, or question our identity, company, or that our
business address was a mailbox. While purchasing the inclinometer, we
also obtained a price quote for up to 40 additional inclinometers. In
addition, after the purchase we notified the manufacturer of our
undercover purchase. When interviewed, the manufacturer correctly
stated that he did not identify any Commerce-identified red flags from
the undercover transaction.[Footnote 14] In addition, in 2008, various
individuals and companies were indicted on federal charges for
purchasing items for IEDs and exporting inclinometers to Iran.
Specifically, in 2007, the individuals allegedly purchased
inclinometers from the same manufacturer we purchased inclinometers
from, and shipped them to multiple transshipment points, with Iran
being the final destination.
Other Dual-Use Items:
* Case 6: Gyro Chip. Gyro chips are sensitive dual-use items used in
advanced aircraft, missile, space, and commercial systems for
stabilization, control, guidance, and navigation. The gyro chip's
original intent was for commercial use; however, this same item is also
used to stabilize and steer guided missiles. For this reason, the item
is export-controlled, but may be legally bought and sold within the
United States without restriction. The device is fully self-contained,
extremely small, lightweight, and has virtually unlimited life.
Figure 2: Gyro Chip:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph of Gyro Chip]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In February 2009, we purchased a gyro chip from a manufacturer that is
registered in CCR for the amount of $3,146. During the purchase process
the manufacturer made it clear that the item is subject to ITAR, and if
exported would be subject to export restrictions. During the undercover
purchase we provided our bogus company's Web site address, listed a
domestic mailbox as a business address, and completed a falsified end-
user agreement. While purchasing the gyro chip, we also obtained a
price quote for an additional 10 gyro chips. In addition, after the
purchase we notified the manufacturer of our undercover purchase. We
then interviewed the manufacturer, which stated that it conducts
extensive training of its personnel on export regulations of items it
sells, attends export-regulation conferences, hires export consultants,
and conducts internal training to sales representatives on specific
procedures to follow while quoting or selling products. However, no
validation procedures are required when a domestic sale is made, and
therefore the manufacturer did not identify our fictitious identity and
company. In addition, in a previous case, State charged a different
company with shipping 85 commercial jets overseas many of which went to
countries including China with a gyro chip embedded in the flight
control systems. In April 2006, the company agreed to pay $15 million
to settle the allegations.[Footnote 15]
* Case 7: Ka-Band Power Amplifier. Ka-band power amplifiers are suited
for military radar systems, ground terminals for Ka-band satellite
communications systems, and point-to-point communication systems. Ka-
band power amplifiers are export-controlled for national security
reasons, but legal to buy and sell within the United States. In March
2009, we purchased two Ka-band power amplifiers from a distributor for
the amount of $227. The distributor is registered in CCR and was a
previous target for purchases by individuals shipping amplifiers to
China. Our purchase was made via e-mail and the Internet using a
fictitious identity, bogus company, and domestic mailbox as a business
address, and by providing an end-user agreement. We completed the
agreement using bogus information and stating we would not export the
item without obtaining an export license. Because there are no
restrictions on the domestic sale of this item, no additional
documentation procedures or validation was performed by the distributor
prior to our purchase. While purchasing the Ka-band power amplifiers,
we also obtained a price quote for up to 99 additional amplifiers. In
addition, after the purchase we notified the distributor of our
undercover purchase. When we interviewed distributor personnel, they
stated their documentation procedures require the customer to complete
an end-user agreement; however, they correctly stated they are not
required to do this for domestic sales. In 2009, an individual was
indicted for exporting several controlled items including this Ka-band
power amplifier to China without an export license. Specifically, on
three occasions the individual allegedly had someone in the United
States ship several controlled items to China, and in one occasion the
individual hand-carried the items when flying from the United States to
China. In recent years, Commerce issued warning letters to the
manufacturer for exporting electronics to China, failure to comply with
a license condition, and exporting amplifiers to Germany for sale to
China without the required export license.
Sensitive Military Items:
Using a bogus front company, fictitious identities, and a domestic
mailbox as our business address, we were able to purchase or otherwise
obtain sensitive military items from distributors and manufacturers
without detection. Some of the items we obtained are subject to State's
U.S. Munitions List and have been at the center of unlawful export
plots by foreigners. After purchasing and receiving the sensitive
military items, we interviewed the sellers regarding the controls they
have in place for the sales of their respective items.
* Case 8: Infra-Red (IR) Flag. IR flags[Footnote 16] are currently in
use by U.S. military forces to help identify friendly soldiers during
nighttime operations. Several of the IR flags we purchased appear as a
black material with no identifying markers. However, with the use of
U.S. military night-vision technology (such as the monocular we
purchased in case 10 below), the patches reveal a U.S. flag, and are
the same IR flags used on U.S. military combat uniforms. An enemy
fighter wearing these IR flags could potentially pass as a friendly
service member during a night combat situation, putting U.S. troops at
risk. Nevertheless, these items are completely legal to buy and sell
within the United States.
Figure 3: IR Flags:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph of IR Flags]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In September 2008, we purchased various U.S. IR flags from a
distributor for the amount of $78. The company's Internet storefront
states it specializes in designing modified battle dress uniforms and
other military uniform accessories used by modern-day warriors.
Specifically, the company's Web site states that Special Forces in Iraq
and Afghanistan currently use many of their products. Although there is
no legal requirement to do so, the distributor's Internet site stated
that the company checks for military identification; however, the
seller failed to request identification from our undercover
investigator. In the end, our fictitious buyer was only required to
provide a name, credit card, and domestic address for shipment to
purchase these items. After purchasing and receiving the IR flags, we
also obtained a price quote for an additional 400 IR flags. In
addition, after the purchase we notified the distributor of our
undercover purchase. When interviewed, the distributor of the IR flags
stated that it always requests for a copy of a military ID as part of
his own voluntary policy and has minimal voluntary controls in place
over the sale of the IR tabs. However, the distributor did not request
a copy of a military ID as part of our purchase. In addition, we
interviewed the distributor's supplier (manufacturer); the manufacturer
stated that the distributor is required by their distributorship
agreement to ask for a military ID. As a result of this lapse, the
manufacturer stated that the distributor will no longer be authorized
to sell the IR flags.
* Case 9: Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) and Enhanced Small Arms
Protective Inserts (ESAPI). The MTV we purchased is a type currently
being used by U.S. military personnel and have been tested to National
Institute of Justice[Footnote 17] Level IIIA[Footnote 18] 9mm velocity.
Enemies of the United States could use the vest during attacks against
American and coalition forces, and they could also be used by criminals
within the United States and on the United States-Mexico border.
However, the item is completely legal to sell, buy, or possess within
the United States, except by certain violent felons. ESAPIs are ceramic
plates that are thicker than the normal SAPIs and increase the
protection. These types of ESAPIs are suited for use in the MTV we
purchased. The combination of these items could give terrorists or
criminals an advantage and protection in combat situations. In
September 2008, we purchased an MTV of the type currently in use by the
U.S. Marine Corps in Iraq and Afghanistan from a distributor for the
amount of $2,417. The distributor is an approved government supplier
through the GSA schedule. We purchased the MTV from the distributor's
Internet Web site. Although legally not required to do so, the
distributor's Web site states that it requires a military ID and
completes a verification process before the sale of the equipment.
However, we were able to bypass their voluntary requirements using a
fictitious military ID. After purchasing and receiving the MTV, we also
obtained a price quote for an additional 20 MTVs. In addition, we found
that we could have purchased new ESAPI plates, from the same
distributor through the same process, which fit into the MTV we
purchased. The addition of the e-SAPI plates would have increased the
effectiveness of our vest. We chose not to purchase the ESAPI plates
because we had purchased similar plates in our prior work.[Footnote 19]
After the purchase, we notified the distributor of our undercover
purchase. The distributor stated that it has several voluntary controls
in place. Specifically, for our transaction it noticed that the
shipping address and billing address were different; therefore, it
called the credit card company to verify that the credit card was
valid, thinking that would be sufficient to verify that the undercover
customer was not bogus. In the past, this distributor has received a
warning letter from Commerce for exporting police equipment without the
required export license. In addition, the MTV manufacturer was fined
$65,000 for the export of military items to Kuwait, Chile, Oman,
Trinidad and Tobago, and Saudi Arabia without the required export
license.
* Case 10: Night-Vision Monocular and Night-Vision Goggles (NVG). The
night-vision monocular is a lightweight, self-contained, image-
intensification system capable of being either hand-held, mounted to a
small arms weapon mounting rail, or mounted to a head mount or helmet
mount. Night-vision monoculars are used in nighttime operations by U.S.
forces to provide a tactical advantage on the battlefield. They are
legal to buy and sell within the United States.
Figure 4: Night-Vision Monocular:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph of Night-Vision Monocular]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
In November 2008, we purchased a night-vision monocular of a type that
is currently in use by the U.S. military from a distributor that is
registered in CCR, for $3,600. The purchase was made using a fictitious
identity, bogus company, and domestic mailbox as a business address.
During our undercover purchase, the seller certified our bogus company
to be a distributor of the item by signing a dealer/reseller agreement.
This allowed us to circumvent the seller's voluntary restrictions on
only selling the items to military and law-enforcement agencies. As a
result, we could have obtained a substantial number of night vision
monoculars as part of this agreement. In addition, we also found that
we could have purchased new military-specification NVGs, from the same
distributor through the same process. We chose not to purchase the NVG
because we had purchased a similar NVG in our prior work.[Footnote 20]
After the purchase we notified the distributor of our undercover
purchase. When we interviewed distributor personnel, they stated that
they have controls in place that are required for the sale of night-
vision technology as a part of the distributor agreement. The
distributor correctly stated that it is the reseller/dealer's
responsibility, if exporting an item, to request and obtain export
licenses for the subject items and to ensure that the requirements of
all applicable export laws and regulations are met. Night-vision
technology has been in demand by entities in countries like China,
Singapore, Indonesia, Iran, and Hong Kong. For example, on November 14,
2006, BIS issued a Section 11(h) Denial Order against two individuals
in connection with their criminal convictions for conspiring to export
Commerce-and State-controlled night-vision devices to the terrorist
group Hezbollah in Lebanon.
* Case 11: Secure Personal Radio (SPR). According to the SPR
distributor, the SPR model we obtained, which is being used by U.S.
Special Forces personnel, is the latest model with enhanced digitally
encrypted capability that has a low probability of detection without
the aid of high-tech military radio-interception equipment. The SPR
provides secure communications between battlefield personnel with an
encryption feature that makes communicating with the radio virtually
undetectable. Nevertheless, the item is legal to buy and sell within
the United States. In November 2008, we obtained two SPRs with headsets
and accessories along with one microphone headset on a loan from a
distributor. Specifically, the company loaned, at no cost, our bogus
company the two radios for demonstration purposes with the possibility
for the undercover company to become a distributor of the SPR radios.
The company also offered our undercover investigator a job selling the
equipment on a commission basis. Because there are no domestic
restrictions on these radios, the company only asked for a copy of a
driver's license prior to loaning the radios. After the transaction, we
made the distributor aware of the fictitious identity. The distributor
acknowledged that it should have shown more voluntary due diligence
prior to loaning the radios to our undercover investigator. The
distributor stated that it requires an end-user agreement and a copy of
identification for documentation purposes, but it performs no other
voluntary verification checks. The distributor stated it often receives
inquiries from foreign individuals and estimated as much as 30 percent
of individuals that register on its Web site are foreign. The
distributor told us that it informs these individuals it only sells
domestically to military and law-enforcement entities.
* Case 12: F-16 Engine-Monitoring System Computer (EMSC). F-16 EMSC
processes digital engine-performance signals from the digital
electronic-control module. This EMSC is used in more than 75 percent of
the USAF's single-engine F-16 Block 50/52 aircraft. Furthermore, the
engine that uses this monitoring system is also qualified for use on
the F-15 Strike Eagle aircraft and was recently chosen by South Korea
to power its new F-15K fighters. This item is export-controlled under
ITAR, but is legal to buy and sell within the United States. In April
2009, using a fictitious identity and bogus company, we purchased,
through e-mail, a used F-16 EMSC from an online distributor for the
total amount of $570. The distributor had obtained this item from DOD.
During the purchase process, we provided a bogus company name, a
domestic mailbox as a business address, a copy of our fictitious
person's driver license, and a falsified end-user agreement. After
obtaining the F-16 EMSC, we notified the seller of our undercover
purchase. During our interview with the seller, the official correctly
stated that the seller is not required to have any controls in place
for the domestic sale of this item; however, for its own voluntary due
diligence the seller ran a public-records check on our fictitious
person, but did not identify the purchase as suspicious. In recent
years, several individuals and companies have been sentenced to
probation and received fines in connection with illegal exports of
aircraft components to Iran and Libya. In addition to the United States
and its allies' fleets of F-16 aircraft, Venezuela's military also has
a fleet of F-16s and has recently issued public statements suggesting
the country may want to sell its fleet of F-16s to Iran.
Sensitive Dual-Use and Military Items Can Be Easily Exported:
We were able to export, without detection by U.S. enforcement
officials, a number of dummy versions of sensitive dual-use and
military items to a country that is a known transshipment point for
terrorist organizations and foreign governments attempting to acquire
sensitive technology. Due to the large volume of packages being shipped
overseas, large volume of people traveling overseas, and various
agencies[Footnote 21] involved in enforcing export controls, U.S.
enforcement officials stated it is impossible to search every package
and person leaving the United States to ensure sensitive dual-use and
military items are not being exported illegally. The combined effect of
the lack of restrictions over domestic sales and the ease of illegal
export of these items is that sensitive dual-use and military items can
be easily purchased and exported by terrorists or foreign governments
without detection.
In order to export our items, we first obtained nonfunctional "dummy"
versions of the items through cooperation with the manufacturers. Next,
in cooperation with foreign law-enforcement officials, we shipped the
items, using commercial mail, in nondescript boxes that did not
disclose the true contents of the items contained within the package.
The boxes passed through U.S. customs controls without being inspected.
The location we shipped the items to was a known transshipment point
for items being sent to terrorist organizations and other foreign
governments. After receiving the unopened packages, the foreign law-
enforcement officials shipped the items back to the United States.
When we discussed our covert shipments with State, Commerce, and
various law-enforcement agencies responsible for monitoring packages,
vehicles, and persons exiting the United States, they were not
surprised by our success. Officials from several agencies stated that
there is no practical way to ensure that otherwise unsuspicious people,
vehicles, or packages leaving the United States that carry or contain
export-controlled items can be identified and searched consistently.
Officials from Commerce stated that they were aware of similar schemes
used by real individuals attempting to illegally export controlled
items. In addition, officials from State stated they have programs in
place, working in coordination with other government agencies such as
ICE, designed to educate manufacturers and distributors about laws and
common risks associated with sales of sensitive technology. However,
State agreed that it is difficult to prevent items from leaving the
country after they are legally sold to an individual within the United
States.
Conclusions:
A comprehensive network of controls and enforcement is necessary to
ensure sensitive technology does not make it into the hands of
unauthorized individuals. However, the lack of legal restrictions over
domestic sales of these items, combined with the difficulties
associated with inspecting packages and individuals leaving the United
States, results in a weak control environment that does not effectively
prevent terrorists and agents of foreign governments from obtaining
these sensitive items. The key to preventing the illegal export of
these sensitive items used in nuclear, IED, and military applications
is to stop the attempts to obtain the items at the source, because once
sensitive items make it into the hands of terrorists or foreign
government agents, the shipment and transport out of the United States
is unlikely to be detected.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other Members of the subcommittee may
have at this time.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To perform the undercover test of purchasing sensitive dual-use and
military items from manufacturers and distributors in the United States
we spoke with relevant agencies and used publicly disclosed enforcement
cases regarding the sales and illegal exports of sensitive dual-use and
military items. GAO used the information obtained from these sources to
determine which sensitive items were in demand by terrorists and
foreign governments. We also reviewed the export regulations to
determine that manufacturers and distributors are not required to have
controls for the domestic sales of sensitive items. We searched for
dual-use and military technology being sold on manufacturers' and
distributors' Web sites. We then made domestic purchases of dual-use
and military items either through e-mail, personal contact, or the
seller's Web site. We used a bogus front company, fictitious
identities, and domestic mailboxes as our business address when
purchasing these items, meaning that we conducted our work with
fictitious names and contact information that could not be traced back
to GAO. We also established a Web site related to our bogus company and
rented domestic commercial mailboxes used to receive purchased items.
The bogus company used was incorporated to add more credibility. In
some cases, during the purchase process, no information other than a
name and credit card were used to purchase a sensitive item. In other
cases, we submitted falsified end-user agreements stating the end use
of the product and agreeing not to export the sensitive item. On one
occasion, we provided a local military unit as the end use of the item
and a fictitious military ID we created using commercial computer
software. After we purchased the sensitive items, when possible, we
obtained written price quotes from manufacturers and distributors for
purchases of additional quantities of items we successfully purchased.
After successfully purchasing these items in an undercover capacity, we
contacted the distributors and manufacturers of the items and informed
them of our operation. We did not attempt to purchase items from
individual persons or commercial auction sites such as eBay or
craigslist. Of the sensitive items disclosed we did not purchase the
oscilloscope, enhanced small arms protective inserts, and the night-
vision goggles. For these items we obtained written price quotes in
lieu of purchasing the items due to their costs or due to the fact we
had purchased the item in previous work. After obtaining the prices
quotes, we confirmed with the seller of the items that our purchases
would have been successful once we had made payment arrangement for the
items.
To attempt to export purchased items without detection by domestic law-
enforcement officials, we coordinated with foreign government officials
to covertly export items out of the United States. We shipped the items
to a destination known to be a transshipment point for terrorist
organizations and other foreign governments. We were able to export a
number of items. The export process consisted of mailing the dummy
versions of items from the United States through commercial package
shipment. We falsified the shipment documents provided with the
package. When the foreign government officials received the shipment
they received specific instructions on how to inspect the shipment to
verify that the package was sealed and was not opened or inspected by
any U.S. officials. The foreign government officials also received
special instructions on how to mail the package to GAO. GAO
successfully received all items back from foreign law enforcement
officials. We briefed officials at the Departments of State and
Commerce, as well as law-enforcement officials within the Departments
of Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice on the results of our work
and incorporated their comments concerning controls over exported
items.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Dual-use items refer to items that have commercial uses as well as
military or nuclear proliferation uses.
[2] See GAO, High-Risk: Series an Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington, D.C.: Jan, 22,
2009).
[3] See GAO, Internet Sales: Undercover Purchases on eBay and
Craigslist Reveal a Market for Sensitive and Stolen U.S. Military
Items, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-644T]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2008).
[4] Pub. L. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2401-2420. The Act has lapsed and been reauthorized by statute and
Executive Order several times. Currently, the Act is in force pursuant
to Executive Order 13,222, 66 Fed. Reg. 44,025 (Aug. 22, 2001), which
extended the application of the Act under the authority of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. 95-223,
Title II 91 Stat. 1626, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707.
IEEPA provisions are renewed yearly through a presidential
determination, the most recent occurring on July 25, 2008 (73 Fed. Reg.
43,603).
[5] The CCL is contained in Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 of the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. § 774.1.
[6] Pub. L. 94-329, Title II, § 212(a)(1), 90 Stat. 744, codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2778.
[7] The U.S. Munitions List is contained in Part 121 of the
International Traffic In Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. §§ 121.1-
.16.
[8] Export often involves the actual shipment of goods or technology
out of the United States. Under ITAR, transfers of Munitions List
"technical data" to foreign persons within the United States is also
considered to be an export. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(4). Under EAR,
release of CCL "technology" to foreign nationals within the United
States is considered to be an export to the home country of the foreign
national and thus may require an export license. 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b).
[9] An otherwise legal transaction is prohibited if the seller knows an
export violation will occur, pursuant to 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(1) for
CCL items and 22 C.F.R. § 127.1(2) for U.S. Munitions List items.
Criminal liability may attach under 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410, 50 U.S.C. §
1705, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c), or general statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 371.
[10] For several items, we obtained written price quotes in lieu of
purchasing the items due to their costs. After obtaining the price
quotes, we confirmed with the sellers of the items that our attempted
purchases would have been successful once we had made payment
arrangements for the items.
[11] End-user agreements refer to documents submitted by the buyer in
which the buyer self-certifies the proposed use for the item being
purchased, whether the buyer plans to export the item, and whether the
buyer plans to resell the item.
[12] For item 2 (Oscilloscope) we obtained a written price quote in
lieu of purchasing the item due to its cost. For the NVG in item 10, we
found we could have purchased this same item from the same seller of
the Night Vision Monocular. However, since we had purchased this item
on previous work, we choose not to purchase this same item again. For
item 9 (ESAPI) we found we could have purchased this item from the same
seller as the MTV however, since we had purchased this item in previous
work we choose not to purchase this same item again. After obtaining
the price quotes, we confirmed with the sellers of the items that our
attempted purchases would have been successful once we had made payment
arrangements for the items.
[13] Total amounts may include taxes, shipping and handling fees, and
service fees.
[14] Commerce's BIS publishes a list of "Red Flag Indicators" that may
indicate a transaction could lead to a violation of the Export
Administration Regulations. A seller who finds a red flag is encouraged
to report it to Commerce. Examples of red flags include situations
where the item purchased does not fit with the buyer's line of
business, the buyer is willing to pay cash for an expensive item where
financing is the norm, or the buyer has little or no business
background. The full list is available at [hyperlink,
http://www.bis.doc.gov/enforcement/redflags.htm].
[15] Specific gyro chips are subject to the export licensing
jurisdiction of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, unless
these specific gyro chips are integrated into and included as an
integral part of a commercial primary or standby instrument system. If
included as an integral part of a commercial primary or standby
instrument system, these specific gyro chips are subject to the CCL.
[16] The IR flags are also known as IFF (identification of friend or
foe) IR U.S. flags.
[17] The U.S. Justice Department has created standards of body armor
known as the N.I.J. (National Institute of Justice) Standard 0101.06.
[18] Level IIIA is usually the highest threat level in soft body armor.
It is usually worn as overt-style armor because of the weight and
thickness of the ballistic panels.
[19] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-644T].
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-644T].
[21] See GAO, Export Controls: Challenges Exist in Enforcement of an
Inherently Complex System, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-265] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20,
2006).
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
