Combating Terrorism
U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed Gao ID: GAO-09-883 September 24, 2009The U.S. government considers the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a vital partner in combating terrorism. The strong diplomatic relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, founded more than 70 years ago, was strained by the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, that were carried out in large part by Saudi nationals and killed thousands of U.S. citizens. GAO was asked to report on (1) the U.S. government strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism financing, and (2) U.S. government agencies' assessment of and the Saudi government's views on progress toward the goals of this strategy. GAO analyzed relevant U.S. and Saudi strategy, planning, and evaluation documents related to efforts since 2005, and discussed these efforts with subject matter experts and U.S. and Saudi officials in Washington, D.C., and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. GAO submitted a copy of this report to intelligence agencies, the National Security Council, and the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury for their review and comment.
The U.S. government strategy to collaborate with Saudi Arabia on counterterrorism utilizes existing diplomatic and security-related efforts to create an active antiterrorism coalition by enhancing the Saudi government's ability to combat terrorists and prevent financial support to extremists. These objectives are contained in Department of State's (State) Mission Strategic Plans (MSP) for Saudi Arabia for fiscal years 2006 through 2009, and also reflected in a January 2008 report from State to the Congress on its strategy for Saudi Arabia. The MSPs include performance targets to measure progress on efforts to combat terrorism and its financing, such as providing security training to the Saudi government, strengthening Saudi financial institutions, and implementation of relevant Saudi regulations. U.S. and Saudi officials report progress on countering terrorism and its financing within Saudi Arabia, but noted challenges, particularly in preventing alleged funding for terrorism and violent extremism outside of Saudi Arabia. In April 2009, State assessed progress related to its goal of building an active U.S.-Saudi antiterrorist coalition as "on target." U.S. and Saudi officials report progress in enhancing the Saudi government's ability to combat terrorists, and note the Saudi government's efforts have disrupted Al Qaeda's terrorist network within Saudi Arabia. However, these officials noted Saudi Arabia's neighbor, Yemen, is emerging as a base from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch attacks against U.S. and Saudi interests. U.S. and Saudi officials also report progress on efforts to prevent financial support to extremists, citing, for example, the Saudi government's regulations on sending charitable contributions overseas, and the arrest and prosecution of individuals providing support for terrorism. However, U.S. officials remain concerned about the ability of Saudi individuals and charitable organizations to support terrorism outside of Saudi Arabia, and noted limited Saudi enforcement capacity and terrorists' use of cash couriers as challenges. Despite these concerns, some performance targets related to countering terrorism financing were removed from State's current MSP. According to State officials, these changes were made either because a specific target was no longer considered feasible or because progress was made toward the target.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-883, Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2009:
Combating Terrorism:
U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in
Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing
Efforts Needed:
GAO-09-883:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-883, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The U.S. government considers the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a vital
partner in combating terrorism. The strong diplomatic relationship
between the United States and Saudi Arabia, founded more than 70 years
ago, was strained by the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, that
were carried out in large part by Saudi nationals and killed thousands
of U.S. citizens.
GAO was asked to report on (1) the U.S. government strategy to
collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter
terrorism and terrorism financing, and (2) U.S. government agencies‘
assessment of and the Saudi government‘s views on progress toward the
goals of this strategy. GAO analyzed relevant U.S. and Saudi strategy,
planning, and evaluation documents related to efforts since 2005, and
discussed these efforts with subject matter experts and U.S. and Saudi
officials in Washington, D.C., and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
GAO submitted a copy of this report to intelligence agencies, the
National Security Council, and the Departments of Defense, Energy,
Homeland Security, Justice, State, and Treasury for their review and
comment.
What GAO Found:
The U.S. government strategy to collaborate with Saudi Arabia on
counterterrorism utilizes existing diplomatic and security-related
efforts to create an active antiterrorism coalition by enhancing the
Saudi government‘s ability to combat terrorists and prevent financial
support to extremists. These objectives are contained in Department of
State‘s (State) Mission Strategic Plans (MSP) for Saudi Arabia for
fiscal years 2006 through 2009, and also reflected in a January 2008
report from State to the Congress on its strategy for Saudi Arabia. The
MSPs include performance targets to measure progress on efforts to
combat terrorism and its financing, such as providing security training
to the Saudi government, strengthening Saudi financial institutions,
and implementation of relevant Saudi regulations.
U.S. and Saudi officials report progress on countering terrorism and
its financing within Saudi Arabia, but noted challenges, particularly
in preventing alleged funding for terrorism and violent extremism
outside of Saudi Arabia. In April 2009, State assessed progress related
to its goal of building an active U.S.-Saudi antiterrorist coalition
as ’on target.“ U.S. and Saudi officials report progress in enhancing
the Saudi government‘s ability to combat terrorists, and note the Saudi
government‘s efforts have disrupted Al Qaeda‘s terrorist network within
Saudi Arabia. However, these officials noted Saudi Arabia‘s neighbor,
Yemen, is emerging as a base from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch
attacks against U.S. and Saudi interests. U.S. and Saudi officials also
report progress on efforts to prevent financial support to extremists,
citing, for example, the Saudi government‘s regulations on sending
charitable contributions overseas, and the arrest and prosecution of
individuals providing support for terrorism. However, U.S. officials
remain concerned about the ability of Saudi individuals and charitable
organizations to support terrorism outside of Saudi Arabia, and noted
limited Saudi enforcement capacity and terrorists‘ use of cash couriers
as challenges. Despite these concerns, some performance targets related
to countering terrorism financing were removed from State‘s current
MSP. According to State officials, these changes were made either
because a specific target was no longer considered feasible or because
progress was made toward the target.
Figure: Goal, Objectives, Assessment, and Challenges of U.S.
Collaboration with Saudi Arabia on Counterterrorism:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Goal: Build an active antiterrorist coalition;
Objectives: Enhance the Saudi government‘s ability to combat
terrorists;
U.S. Agencies‘ Assessment:
* Saudi government‘s efforts have disrupted Al Qaeda‘s terrorist
network within Saudi Arabia;
Challenges:
* Yemen is emerging as a base for Al Qaeda to plan attacks against U.S.
and Saudi interests;
Goal: Build an active antiterrorist coalition;
Objectives: Prevent financial support to extremists;
U.S. Agencies‘ Assessment:
* Progress made in preventing financial support to extremists, but
concerns remain about the ability of Saudi individuals and charitable
organizations to support terrorism outside Saudi Arabia;
Challenges:
* Limited capacity of Saudi government, the use of cash couriers by
terrorist financiers, and circumvention of cash declarations laws pose
challenges to combating terrorism financing.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. agency information.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends the Secretary of State direct the U.S. mission in Saudi
Arabia to reinstate certain targets related to preventing financing of
terrorism outside of Saudi Arabia. State agreed with this
recommendation.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-883] or key
components. For more information, contact Zina D. Merritt at (202) 512-
5257 or merrittz@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
U.S. Government Strategy Is to Create an Active Antiterrorism Coalition
with Saudi Arabia, but Some Targets to Measure Progress toward This
Goal Have Been Removed:
U.S. Agencies and Saudi Officials Report Progress in Combating
Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Challenges Persist,
Particularly in Preventing Alleged Funding for Terrorism and Violent
Extremism outside of Saudi Arabia:
Conclusion:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agencies Comments, Third-Party Views, and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Time Line of Key Events in U.S. and Saudi Relations, 1750-
2004:
Appendix III: Saudi Ministries and Agencies that Have Functions Related
to Countering Terrorism and Terrorism Financing:
Appendix IV: U.S. Agencies Providing Training and Technical Assistance
to Saudi Arabia, 2005-2008:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Table:
Table 1: Selected Legislation and Associated Reporting Requirements on
Efforts to Counter Terrorism and Terrorism Financing, Including Efforts
Related to Saudi Arabia:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:
Figure 2: Interactive Time Line of Key Events in U.S. and Saudi
Relations, 1750-2004:
Figure 3: Objectives and Performance Targets of Mission Strategic Plan
for Saudi Arabia, Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
Figure 4: U.S. Agencies' Assessment of Progress as of August 2009 on
Mission Strategic Plan Performance Targets Related to Combating
Terrorists, Fiscal Years 2006-2008:
Figure 5: Saudi Arabia's National Campaign against Extremism and
Terrorism, Examples of Public Outreach:
Figure 6: Sample of Saudi Literature (with Translated Titles) Designed
to Combat Extremist Ideology:
Figure 7: U.S. Agencies' Assessment of Progress as of August 2009 on
Mission Strategic Plan Performance Targets Related to Preventing
Financial Support to Extremists, Fiscal Years 2006-2008:
Figure 8: Official Saudi Customs Declaration Form:
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOE: Department of Energy:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FAA: Foreign Assistance Act:
FATF: Financial Action Task Force:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FIU: Financial Intelligence Unit:
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
IIRO: International Islamic Relief Organization:
INCSR: International Narcotics Control Strategy Report:
MOI: Ministry of Interior:
MSP: Mission Strategic Plan:
NSC: National Security Council:
OPM-MOI: Office of Program Management-Ministry of Interior:
SAMA: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency:
UN: United Nations:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 24, 2009:
The Honorable Harry Reid:
Majority Leader:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The U.S. government considers the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia a vital
partner in combating terrorism and advancing other U.S. foreign policy
priorities, such as achieving security in Iraq, advancing the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process, and ensuring stability in world oil markets.
The strong diplomatic relationship between the United States and Saudi
Arabia, founded more than 70 years ago, was strained by the Al Qaeda
attacks of September 11, 2001, that were carried out in large part by
Saudi nationals and killed thousands of U.S. citizens. Nevertheless,
the United States and Saudi Arabia currently have an ongoing dialogue
on a range of counterterrorism issues, which include high-level
discussions and working-level collaboration.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
(9/11 Commission) was established in 2002 to prepare a full account of
the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, including alleged Saudi links to the attacks.[Footnote 1] The
9/11 Commission's 2004 report found no evidence that the Saudi
government funded Al Qaeda, but noted that terrorist groups like Al
Qaeda raised funds from Saudi individuals and charitable organizations
headquartered in Saudi Arabia. In addition, media reports continue to
contain allegations that some Saudi individuals and charitable
organizations support terrorism and violent extremism outside of Saudi
Arabia. In 2003 and 2004, a series of terrorist attacks against both
Saudi and U.S. interests were launched in Saudi Arabia, prompting the
Saudi government to intensify its efforts to combat terrorism,
including targeting sources of violent extremism within the country.
In 2004, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States openly
engage the government of Saudi Arabia to build a cooperative
counterterrorism relationship. In August 2007, the President signed the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, which
required that the President of the United States report on a long-term
strategy to work with the Saudi government to, among other things,
combat terrorism through such measures as preventing the financing of
terrorists by Saudi institutions and citizens.[Footnote 2]
Additionally, it required that the report provide an assessment of
Saudi Arabia's progress in these areas since 2001. Also, at the request
of the Congress, in 2005, we reported on allegations that Saudi private
entities and individuals had financed or supported violent extremism.
[Footnote 3] In our report, we noted that the threat of global
propagation of violent extremism was emerging not only from Saudi
sources, but also from sources in other countries, such as Iran,
Kuwait, and Syria, as well as from indigenous groups within some
countries. In 2005, we also reported on U.S. government efforts to
combat terrorist financing abroad that included standards setting and
training and technical assistance in areas such as preventing cash
couriers, which refers to criminals' cross-border movements of cash.
[Footnote 4]
This report provides information on U.S. and Saudi efforts to address
alleged terrorism and terrorism financing since 2005. Specifically, we
report on (1) the U.S. government strategy to collaborate with and
assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism
financing, and (2) U.S. government agencies' assessment of and Saudi
government views on progress toward the goals of the U.S. strategy to
collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed relevant U.S.
strategy, planning, and evaluation documents related to U.S.-Saudi
efforts to counter terrorism and terrorism financing efforts since
2005. While we did not assess the key elements of a strategy as
identified by GAO for the U.S. counterterrorism strategy related to
Saudi Arabia as stated in the Mission Strategic Plans (MSP), we used
the performance targets stated in these documents as criteria against
which we assessed progress. Further, we obtained and examined
documentation from Saudi officials regarding their domestic activities
to counter terrorism and its financing. We discussed U.S.-Saudi
counterterrorism efforts with U.S. officials from the Departments of
State (State), Treasury (Treasury), Homeland Security (DHS), Defense
(DOD), Justice (DOJ), Energy (DOE), National Security Council (NSC),
and the intelligence community; Saudi officials from the Royal Embassy
of Saudi Arabia in Washington, D.C.; and subject matter experts from a
variety of academic institutions and nongovernmental organizations.
Additionally, we traveled to Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where we
visited the Prince Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Advisory and Care in
Riyadh--a counseling program designed to reeducate violent extremists--
and met with U.S. officials from State, Treasury, DOJ, DOD, and DHS;
Saudi officials from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), and the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Islamic Affairs; and
representatives from the Saudi charitable organization the World
Assembly of Muslim Youth. (See appendix I for a complete description of
our scope and methodology.)
We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 through September
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
In this report we recommend that the Secretary of State direct the U.S.
mission in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to reinstate, in consultation
with relevant U.S. agencies, performance measures related to preventing
the flow of alleged financial support, through mechanisms such as cash
couriers, to terrorists and extremists outside Saudi Arabia.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State concurred with our
recommendation, and committed to reinstating performance indicators
relating to Saudi enforcement of cash courier regulations in its
Mission Strategic Plan for Saudi Arabia. DOD stated that it concurs
with our report. We also received technical comments from DOD, DOE,
NSC, State, Treasury, and the intelligence community. Additionally,
consistent with our protocols, we provided a copy of the draft report
to Saudi officials, who described the report as a fair and detailed
review of U.S. and Saudi efforts and offered technical comments. We
incorporated technical comments as appropriate.
Background:
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:
Saudi Arabia is known as the birthplace of Islam and is the site of
Islam's two holiest shrines located in Mecca and Medina. (See figure 1
for a map of Saudi Arabia.) Millions of Muslims from all over the world
visit Mecca to undertake the pilgrimages of hajj and umrah.[Footnote 5]
Like hajj, charitable giving, or zakat, is one of the five pillars or
duties of Islam.[Footnote 6] Zakat, a form of tithe or charity payable
for those in need, is an annual flat rate of 2.5 percent of a Muslim's
assessable capital. Zakat is broader and more pervasive than Western
ideas of charity, functioning as a form of income tax, educational
assistance, and foreign aid.
Figure 1: Map of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:
[Refer to PDF for image: map]
The following locations are depicted on the map:
Riyadh;
Medina;
Mecca;
Jeddah.
Population: 29,000,000[A];
GDP per capita: $21,000[B].
Source: CIA world factbook, adapted by GAO.
[A] 2009 (estimate).
[B] 2008 (estimate).
[End of figure]
Islam is a source of political legitimacy and guidance for the Saudi
government, and the country is governed on the basis of Islamic law or
Sharia. As far back as the mid-eighteenth century, the founder of the
Saudi ruling dynasty, Muhammad bin Saud, allied himself with the
conservative Muslim scholar, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. The teachings
of Abdul Wahhab, which called for a strict interpretation of Islam,
form the basis of Islam as practiced by the majority of people in Saudi
Arabia.[Footnote 7]
The Saudi government is a monarchy headed by the king of Saudi Arabia,
who also serves as the Prime Minister and the Custodian of the Two Holy
Mosques in Mecca and Medina. The current king is King Abdullah bin
Abdulaziz Al-Saud. The king is expected to retain consensus of
important elements in Saudi society, such as the Saudi royal family and
religious leaders. The Saudi royal family consists of thousands of
members, some of whom head government ministries.
In the mid-1940s, Saudi Arabia started large scale oil production, and
by the 1970s an increase in oil prices led to a rapid increase in Saudi
Arabia's per capita income, making it comparable to that of developed
countries during this time period.[Footnote 8] In part, this
prosperity, combined with the Islamic religious obligation toward
charitable giving or zakat, led to the establishment of charitable
organizations headquartered in Saudi Arabia, known as multilateral
charitable organizations. These organizations--which include the Muslim
World League and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth--were established
in the 1960s and 1970s by Saudi royal decree to spread Islam and
provide humanitarian assistance around the world, and received funds
from the Saudi government and citizens.
U.S.-Saudi Relations:
Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia have a long
historical context. Since the establishment of the modern Saudi state
in 1932, and throughout the Cold War, the governments of the United
States and Saudi Arabia developed a relationship based on shared
interests, including energy production and combating communism.
[Footnote 9] For instance, both Saudi Arabia and the United States
became major supporters of the Afghan mujahideen's struggle against the
Soviet invasion in 1979.[Footnote 10] However, U.S. foreign policies
related to the Middle East, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
have at times tested U.S.-Saudi government relations and fueled a
growing anti-American sentiment among some segments of the Saudi
population, as well as in many countries with predominantly Muslim
populations. (See figure 2 for more information on the historical
development of U.S.-Saudi relations.) As we have reported previously,
[Footnote 11] this negative perception of U.S. foreign policy, as well
as other factors such as economic stagnation, a disproportionate youth
and young adult population,[Footnote 12] and repressive and corrupt
governments in certain Middle Eastern countries, have contributed to
the global spread of an extremist ideology promoting hatred,
intolerance, and violence that threatens U.S. national security
interests.
Figure 2: Interactive Time Line of Key Events in U.S. and Saudi
Relations, 1750-2004:
[Refer to PDF for image: timeline. Instructions: Roll your mouse over
the date to see more information. To print expanded information, see
Appendix II.]
1750: Mid-18th Century:
Alliance between Muhammad bin Saud and a conservative Muslim leader.
1902 to 1926:
Saudi power and influence expands.
1932:
Modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia established.
1933:
U.S.-Saudi diplomatic relations established.
1940s:
Saudi Arabia starts large scale oil production.
1945:
Saudi King meets with President Roosevelt.
1948:
State of Israel established.
1950s:
Saudi Arabia allies with the United States in fighting communism.
1953:
First U.S. military training mission organized under the terms of the
U.S. and Saudi mutual defense assistance agreement.
1960s:
First multilateral charitable organization founded in Saudi Arabia.
1970s:
Oil production creates great wealth in Saudi Arabia.
1979:
* Iran is established as an Islamic state;
* Soviets invade Afghanistan;
* Extremists attack Grand Mosque in Mecca.
1980s:
Saudi Arabia and United States aid the mujahideen against the Soviets in
Afghanistan.
1991:
United States establishes military installations in Saudi Arabia.
1993:
Bombing of the World Trade Center kills 6.
1994:
* Saudi government strips Osama bin Laden of citizenship;
* Islamists arrested in Saudi Arabia.
1995:
Terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia kills 5 Americans.
1996:
Bombings in Saudi Arabia kill 19 Americans.
1997:
Saudi Arabia recognizes the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
1999:
UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1267.
2000:
* Start of the Palestinian uprising strains U.S.-Saudi relations;
* Attack on USS Cole.
2001:
* Al Qaeda attacks United States;
* Saudi Arabia condemns September 11th attacks on the United States;
* U.S. and allied forces attack the Taliban and Al Qaeda in
Afghanistan.
2003:
* United States begins military operations in Iraq;
* Major terrorist incidents in Saudi Arabia.
2003 to present:
Iraqi insurgency attracts foreign fighters, including Saudis.
2004:
Escalation in terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia and Saudi government
retaliation.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
According to the U.S. government and experts, some Saudi individuals
and charitable organizations have knowingly or unknowingly provided
financial assistance for terrorism and violent extremism. For example,
according to a report by the 9/11 Commission, some charitable
organizations, such as the Saudi-based Al Haramain Islamic Foundation,
had been exploited by extremists as funding mechanisms to further their
goal of violence against non-Muslims. U.S. government and other expert
reports have linked some Saudi donations to the global propagation of
religious intolerance and support to terrorist activities. For example,
Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda have Saudi roots and accumulated millions
of dollars using legitimate charities, nongovernmental organizations,
and mosques, as well as businesses such as banks and other financial
institutions, to help raise and move their funds. However, experts
agree that it is difficult to determine the extent to which donors are
aware of the ultimate disposition of the funds provided.[Footnote 13]
Saudi Government Efforts to Combat Terrorism and Terrorism Financing,
2003-2005:
Although the Saudi government took actions to combat terrorists
following the September 11, 2001, attacks, Al Qaeda's attacks against
Saudi and U.S. citizens in Saudi Arabia in 2003 and 2004 marked a
turning point in the Saudi government's efforts to combat terrorism and
terrorism financing, as the Saudi government came to see Al Qaeda as a
threat to the Saudi regime. Between 2003 and 2005, the Saudi government
reported that it took a number of actions to combat terrorism and
terrorism financing within the Kingdom, some with U.S. assistance, such
as increasing the size, training, and professionalism of Saudi security
forces. The Saudi and U.S. governments also undertook joint
designations of several branches of the Al Haramain Foundation as
financiers of terrorism under UN Security Council Resolution 1267.
[Footnote 14] (See appendix III for key Saudi agencies involved in
efforts to combat terrorism and terrorism financing within Saudi
Arabia.)
U.S. Assistance to Saudi Arabia to Combat Terrorism and Terrorism
Financing:
Since 2005, several U.S. agencies have conducted training and provided
technical assistance to improve the capacity of the Saudi government to
combat terrorism and its financing. These efforts have included
enhancing the investigative capability of Saudi ministries and
assessing the security of Saudi oil installations, among others. U.S.
agencies involved in these efforts include DOD, DOE, DHS, DOJ, State,
and Treasury, as well as the intelligence community.[Footnote 15] (See
appendix IV for U.S. agencies providing training and technical
assistance to Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism
financing.)
Legislative Reporting Requirements:
The Congress has enacted several laws that require U.S. agencies to
report on terrorism and terrorism financing issues, including those
related to U.S. collaboration with Saudi Arabia. (See table 1 for the
selected legislation and its requirements.)
Table 1: Selected Legislation and Associated Reporting Requirements on
Efforts to Counter Terrorism and Terrorism Financing, Including Efforts
Related to Saudi Arabia:
Legislation: Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 Section 489, as
amended (22 U.S.C. Section 2291);
Reporting requirements: A report on the extent to which each country or
entity that received assistance under Chapter 8 of Part I of the
Foreign Assistance Act in the past two fiscal years[A] has "met the
goals and objectives of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances" (the "1988 UN
Drug Convention") Section 489(a)(1)(A). In addition, the Congress also
mandated the report to identify major money laundering countries (FAA
section 489(a)(3)(C)) and findings on each country's adoption of laws
and regulations to prevent narcotics-related money laundering (FAA
section 489(a)(7)(C));
Lead agency: State;
Agency response: The Money Laundering and Financial Crimes section of
the Department of State's annual International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (INCSR), which includes reporting on Saudi Arabia. The
2009 INCSR is the 26th such report.
Legislation: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(P.L. 108-458) Section 7120(3);
Reporting requirements: A description of the strategy of the United
States for expanding collaboration with the Government of Saudi Arabia
on subjects of mutual interest and importance, including intelligence
and security cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia in
the fight against extremism;
Lead agency: State;
Agency response: Country Reports on Terrorism Starting in 2004, this
annual report replaced the previously published Patterns of Global
Terrorism.
Legislation: Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53) Section 2043(c);
Reporting requirements: A one-time description of the long-term
strategy of the United States to engage the Government of Saudi Arabia
on combating terrorism and provide an assessment of Saudi Arabia's
progress in this area since 2001;
Lead agency: State;
Agency response: U.S. Strategy Toward Saudi Arabia.
Source: GAO:
AIn fiscal years 2007 and 2008, State reports providing Saudi Arabia
approximately $400,000 in foreign assistance funding ($300,000 in
fiscal year 2007 and $99,000 in fiscal year 2008) through its
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
account.
[End of table]
U.S. Government Strategy Is to Create an Active Antiterrorism Coalition
with Saudi Arabia, but Some Targets to Measure Progress toward This
Goal Have Been Removed:
In January 2008, in response to the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007, State submitted to the Congress a report
on the U.S. strategy to collaborate with and assist Saudi Arabia in
areas including countering terrorism and terrorism financing.[Footnote
16] The goals and objectives contained in the January 2008 document
coincide with the plans for collaboration with Saudi Arabia contained
in State's Mission Strategic Plans (MSP) for Saudi Arabia for fiscal
years 2006 to 2009. To measure progress toward the goal of building an
active antiterrorist coalition, the MSPs contain a number of
performance targets; however, some of the targets relating to
countering terrorism financing were removed, even though U.S. agencies
continue to work on those issues in collaboration with the Saudi
government.
U.S. Government Strategy Is to Create an Active Antiterrorism Coalition
with Saudi Arabia:
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. mission
in Saudi Arabia reported expanding its ongoing efforts to collaborate
with the government of Saudi Arabia to combat terrorism. State's MSPs,
previously called Mission Performance Plans, for fiscal years 2006 to
2009 contain goals related to expanding the Saudi government's ability
to counter terrorism and preventing financial support to extremists.
According to State documents, the MSP is developed each year by the
overseas missions to facilitate long-term diplomatic and assistance
planning and provide a strategic plan to set country-level U.S. foreign
policy goals, resource requests, and performance targets. State reports
that its Washington-based bureaus draw on MSPs to gauge the
effectiveness of policies and programs in the field and formulate
requests for resources.
In January 2008, State submitted to the Congress a report on U.S.
strategy for collaborating with Saudi Arabia on countering terrorism
and terrorism financing in response to the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.[Footnote 17] According to this
document, the goal of strengthening the U.S. government's
counterterrorism partnership with Saudi Arabia is to be achieved
through bilateral cooperation to enhance the Saudi government's ability
to combat terrorists and to prevent financial support to extremists.
[Footnote 18] The goals and objectives contained in the January 2008
document coincide with the plans for collaboration with Saudi Arabia
contained in MSPs for Saudi Arabia. According to State officials, DOD
and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence[Footnote 19]
approved the 2008 document. Moreover, officials from various agencies
we met with--including Treasury, DOJ, and DHS--noted they are active
participants in interagency strategic discussions on collaboration with
Saudi Arabia regarding countering terrorism and terrorism financing.
According to Saudi officials, the Saudi government agrees with U.S.
goals to counter terrorism and terrorism financing in Saudi Arabia.
Additionally, Saudi officials told us that generally there has been
strong collaboration between U.S. and Saudi agencies, highlighting
areas such as information sharing and training of security forces.
However, Saudi officials noted some concerns related to U.S.
implementation of certain efforts to counter terrorism financing. For
example, Saudi officials expressed concern about some designations of
individuals and organizations as supporters of terrorism, specifically
suggesting that these designations may violate the right to a fair
legal process. Additionally, Saudi officials noted concerns regarding
past public statements by senior Treasury officials, such as those in
April 2008, that individuals based in Saudi Arabia are a top source of
funding for Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. However,
according to Saudi officials, since Treasury placed a deputy attaché in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in December 2008, there has been a significant
increase in information sharing and decrease in issues of concern.
In addition, the Saudi government has developed its own strategy to
combat terrorism, which Saudi officials characterized as focusing on
three areas or pillars: "men, money, and mindset." The "men" pillar of
the strategy focuses on arresting or killing terrorists. The "money"
pillar of the strategy focuses on measures to counter terrorism
financing, such as tightening controls on financial transactions and
cash couriers, as well as imposing restrictions on Saudi-based
charities. Finally, the "mindset" pillar of the strategy focuses on
preventing extremism by addressing the ideology that is used to recruit
and indoctrinate potential terrorists. Saudi officials stated that the
"mindset" pillar is the most challenging aspect of its counterterrorism
strategy and will be a long-term challenge. Nonetheless, Saudi
officials told us the Saudi government is committed to combating
extremist ideology through programs such as public information
campaigns and terrorist rehabilitation programs.
The U.S. Mission Has Established Targets to Measure the Effectiveness
of Efforts to Combat Terrorism and Its Financing; Some Performance
Targets Related to Terrorism Financing Were Removed from the MSP:
The MSP for Saudi Arabia contains goals, performance indicators, and
performance targets for counterterrorism efforts in Saudi Arabia. While
the MSP is a State document, officials from DOD, DHS, DOJ, and Treasury
told us they were aware of relevant portions of the document. According
to the fiscal year 2009 MSP for Saudi Arabia, the highest priority U.S.
goal is to strengthen its antiterrorist coalition with Saudi Arabia.
Performance of this goal is measured by the indicator "Saudi
effectiveness on measures to combat terrorism and terrorism financing
activities." To build an active antiterrorist coalition with the
government of Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Mission to Saudi Arabia focuses on
objectives related to (a) enhancing the Saudi government's ability to
combat terrorists, and (b) preventing financial support to extremists.
To measure progress toward the goal of building an active antiterrorist
coalition, the MSP contains a number of performance targets each fiscal
year. (See figure 3 for MSP objectives and targets for fiscal years
2006 to 2009.)
Figure 3: Objectives and Performance Targets of Mission Strategic Plan
for Saudi Arabia, Fiscal Years 2006-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Goal: Build an active antiterrorist coalition;
Objectives: Enhance the Saudi government‘s ability to combat
terrorists;
FY 2006 Target:
* Provide security-related training to Saudi government;
* Saudi authorities arrest ’most wanted“ terrorist suspects;
* Strategic Dialogue working group improves cooperation;
FY 2007 Target:
* Provide security-related training to Saudi government;
* Saudi authorities continue publishing ’most wanted“ list;
* U.S.-Saudi cooperation on critical infrastructure protection;
FY 2008 Target:
* No successful terrorist strikes in Saudi Arabia;
* U.S.-Saudi cooperation on critical infrastructure protection;
* Saudi opinion leaders condemn terrorism.
FY 2009 Target:
* No successful terrorist strikes in Saudi Arabia;
* Increased sharing of nonintelligence law enforcement data and other
information;
* Trials of at least 250 terrorism suspects to begin and 50 to
conclude;
* U.S. training for critical infrastructure security;
* Saudi and Yemeni government cooperation to capture and repatriate
extremists.
Goal: Build an active antiterrorist coalition;
Objectives: Prevent financial support to extremists;
FY 2006 Target:
* Saudi financial intelligence unit (FIU) exchanges information with
regional counterparts;
* The Saudi government cosponsors the designation of at least one
individual or organization under United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1267 related to Al Qaeda and the Taliban (UN 1267), details
seized assets, and prosecutes the group or individual;
* Saudi Charities Commission begins operations;
* Cash courier regulations implemented.
FY 2007 Target:
* United States provides training to Saudi FIU;
* Saudi government implements actions under UN 1267, such as providing
detailed accounting of assets seized from designees, and takes legal
action against individuals or groups that support terrorism;
* Saudi Charities Commission begins operations;
* Cash courier regulations implemented and enforced.
FY 2008 Target:
* Additional U.S. training to Saudi FIU;
* Saudi government implements actions under UN 1267, such as providing
accounting of assets seized from designees, and takes legal action
against individuals or groups that support terrorism;
* Saudi Charities Commission begins operations;
FY 2009 Target:
* Saudi FIU joins the Egmont of financial intelligence units), shares
data with law enforcement, and receives reports from customs;
* Saudi government implements actions against UN 1267 designees, such
as providing an accounting of frozen assets and obstructing the travel
of designees, and takes legal actions against Saudi entities supporting
terrorism.
Source: GAO summary of U.S. agency information.
[End of figure]
On an annual basis, the U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia releases an
updated MSP, which may contain revised performance targets related to
building an active antiterrorist coalition with Saudi Arabia. State
officials told us that MSP performance targets are periodically revised
to ensure each fiscal year's targets are most relevant to assessing
progress toward U.S.-Saudi efforts to counter terrorism and terrorism
financing. Specifically, between fiscal years 2006 and 2009, certain
performance targets were added, removed, or updated to reflect the
change in conditions in Saudi Arabia. For instance, new performance
targets were added for fiscal year 2009 that did not exist in previous
years, including enhancing Saudi-Yemeni cooperation and conducting
trials for terror suspects. In addition, the fiscal year 2008 target
related to the public condemnation of terrorism by the Saudi government
and religious leaders was omitted in fiscal year 2009 because,
according to State officials, it had been met.
However, some targets related to preventing financial support to
extremists were removed from the MSP, even though U.S. agencies
reported that efforts to address these issues are important and
ongoing. Specifically, a performance target related to the
establishment of a Saudi Charities Commission existed in the MSP from
fiscal years 2006 to 2008, but was removed for fiscal year 2009.
According to State officials, the performance target related to the
Charities Commission was dropped because State determined that other
strategies to regulate charitable organizations in Saudi Arabia might
be more effective than a commission. Likewise, a target related to
implementation of cash courier regulations was part of the MSP in
fiscal years 2006 and 2007, but was removed in fiscal years 2008 and
2009. According to State, the performance target related to cash
courier regulations was dropped because the Saudi government had made
progress instituting and enforcing these regulations. However,
according to officials from DHS--which takes the lead on issues such as
cash couriers--they were not consulted on the decision to remove the
target related to cash couriers and stated that this target should be
reinstated in the MSP. As a result, the MSP lacks targets against which
U.S. agencies can monitor and assess performance in certain areas of
U.S. concern related to countering terrorism financing. According to
State and Treasury officials, even though targets related to these
activities were removed from MSPs, enforcement of regulations to
prevent terrorism financing are still important U.S. goals, which U.S.
agencies pursue through diplomatic or training activities.
U.S. Agencies and Saudi Officials Report Progress in Combating
Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Challenges Persist,
Particularly in Preventing Alleged Funding for Terrorism and Violent
Extremism outside of Saudi Arabia:
U.S. agencies and Saudi officials report progress countering terrorism
and terrorism financing within Saudi Arabia, but noted challenges,
particularly those related to preventing the flow of alleged financial
support to extremists outside Saudi Arabia. In April 2009, the U.S.
embassy assessed progress towards its goal of building an active
antiterrorist coalition with Saudi Arabia as "on target."[Footnote 20]
With regard to counterterrorism efforts, U.S. and Saudi officials
report progress enhancing the Saudi government's ability to combat
terrorists, and assess that these efforts have disrupted Al Qaeda's
terrorist network within Saudi Arabia. While citing progress, U.S. and
Saudi officials noted Saudi Arabia's neighbor, Yemen, is emerging as a
base from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch attacks against U.S. and
Saudi interests. With regard to preventing financial support to
extremists, U.S. and Saudi officials also report progress, citing,
among other examples, the Saudi government's implementation of cash
courier regulations, ban on the transfer of charitable funds outside
the Kingdom without government approval, and arrest and prosecution of
individuals providing ideological or financial support to terrorism.
Despite these gains, U.S. officials remain concerned about the ability
of Saudi individuals and multilateral charitable organizations, as well
as other individuals visiting Saudi Arabia, to support[Footnote 21]
terrorism and violent extremism outside Saudi Arabia. Moreover, both
Saudi and U.S. officials cited limited Saudi enforcement capacity and
terrorist financiers' use of cash couriers as challenges to Saudi
efforts to prevent financial support to extremists.
U.S. and Saudi Officials Report Progress Combating Terrorists in Saudi
Arabia:
U.S. and Saudi officials report progress enhancing the Saudi
government's ability to combat terrorists and assess that Saudi efforts
have disrupted Al Qaeda's terrorist network within Saudi Arabia. The
U.S. embassy's MSP for fiscal year 2008 lists three performance targets
related to enhancing the Saudi government's ability to combat
terrorists. These targets specifically pertain to (1) prevention of
successful terrorist strikes in Saudi Arabia, (2) improved U.S.-Saudi
cooperation on critical infrastructure protection, and (3) public
condemnation of terrorist activities by Saudi government and religious
leaders. U.S. officials report progress on these performance targets in
fiscal year 2008, as well as the completion of related targets in
fiscal years 2006 and 2007. While citing progress, U.S. and Saudi
officials noted Saudi Arabia's neighbor, Yemen, is emerging as a base
from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch attacks, which could
challenge gains made in combating terrorists in Saudi Arabia. (See
figure 4 for a summary of reported progress related to MSP performance
targets.)
Figure 4: U.S. Agencies' Assessment of Progress as of August 2009 on
Mission Strategic Plan Performance Targets Related to Combating
Terrorists, Fiscal Years 2006-2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: table]
FY 2006 Target: Provide security-related training to Saudi government;
FY 2007 Target: Provide security-related training to Saudi government;
FY 2008 Target: No successful terrorist strikes in Saudi Arabia;
Status of Activities Related to Targets:
* No successful terrorist strikes in Saudi Arabia reported since 2007;
* Saudi government participates in U.S. training on case management and
infrastructure protection;
* Saudi government publishes three most wanted lists.
FY 2006 Target: Saudi authorities arrest ’most wanted“ terrorist
suspects;
FY 2007 Target: Saudi authorities continue publishing ’most wanted“
list;
FY 2008 Target: No successful terrorist strikes in Saudi Arabia;
Status of Activities Related to Targets:
* No successful terrorist strikes in Saudi Arabia reported since 2007;
* Saudi government participates in U.S. training on case management and
infrastructure protection;
* Saudi government publishes three most wanted lists.
FY 2007 Target: U.S.-Saudi cooperation on critical infrastructure
protection;
FY 2008 Target: U.S.-Saudi cooperation on critical infrastructure
protection;
Status of Activities Related to Targets:
* In May 2008, U.S. and Saudi governments sign a cooperation agreement
on critical infrastructure protection;
* U.S. and Saudi governments establish a joint organization to
implement the cooperative agreement.
FY 2006 Target: Strategic Dialogue working group improves cooperation;
Status of Activities Related to Targets:
* In fiscal year 2006, Strategic Dialogue working group meets.
FY 2008 Target: Saudi opinion leaders condemn terrorism;
Status of Activities Related to Targets:
* Saudi leaders, including the King, senior government officials, and
religious leaders, publicly condemn terrorism;
* Saudi government adopts a number of domestic programs designed to
combat extremism in Saudi Arabia.
U.S. Agencies‘ Assessment of Overall Progress:
U.S. officials report progress enhancing the Saudi government‘s ability
to combat terrorists, and assess these efforts have disrupted Al
Qaeda‘s terrorist network within Saudi Arabia.
Concern remains that Saudi Arabia‘s neighbor Yemen is emerging as a
base from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch attacks against U.S. and
Saudi interests.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. agency information.
[End of figure]
No Successful Terrorist Strikes Reported in Saudi Arabia Since 2007:
Officials from State report that there have been no successful
terrorist strikes in Saudi Arabia since February 2007. Officials
attributed this outcome, in part, to Saudi law enforcement actions.
Experts we interviewed also cited decreased popular support for Al
Qaeda, due to Muslim casualties caused by the organization, as a factor
in the declining number of attacks. Both U.S. and Saudi officials cited
strong intelligence and security cooperation between the U.S. and Saudi
governments related to counterterrorism. Moreover, experts with whom we
spoke generally agreed that the Saudi government is serious about
combating terrorism.
State officials report that, while there was a major terrorist incident
in Saudi Arabia in August 2009, there have been no attacks on energy
infrastructure since 2006 and no successful terrorist strikes in Saudi
Arabia since February 2007. On August 27, 2009, a suicide bomber
attempted to assassinate Saudi Arabia's Assistant Minister of Interior
for Security Affairs, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who is also the head
of Saudi Arabia's counterterrorism efforts. While the bomber, a Saudi
national who was on the Saudi government's "most wanted" list, was
killed during the attack, no one else suffered serious injuries.
According to the Saudi embassy, the attacker was from a region
bordering Yemen and had offered to coordinate the return of Saudi
fugitives in Yemen. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed
responsibility for the attack. Officials from State and the Saudi
embassy told us that, while a major attack, the strike was not
successful, as the Prince was not seriously harmed.[Footnote 22]
Similarly, a White House press release described the attack as
unsuccessful. DOD noted, however, that Saudi authorities did not
disrupt this plot. The White House press release also stated that the
attack underscores the continued threat posed by Al Qaeda and the
importance of strong counterterrorism cooperation between the United
States and Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Arabia has also undertaken law enforcement activities, including
arresting and prosecuting terror suspects. According to State
reporting, since May 2003, the Saudi government has killed or captured
Al Qaeda's operational Saudi-based senior leadership, as well as most
of the network's key operatives and many of the Kingdom's most wanted
individuals. Between 2003 and 2008, U.S. and Saudi officials report the
Saudi government arrested or killed thousands of terrorism suspects,
including those suspected of planning attacks on Saudi oil fields and
other vital installations. Further, the Saudi government has published
three "most wanted" lists, and U.S. and Saudi sources report Saudi
Arabia has captured or killed a number of suspects on these lists. In
2008, the Saudi government announced terrorism trials for approximately
1,000 individuals indicted on various terrorism-related charges. In
July 2009, the Saudi government announced that 330 suspects had court
trials, of whom seven were acquitted and the rest received jail terms
ranging from a few months to 30 years.[Footnote 23] Saudi officials
noted that the convictions can be appealed in the Saudi supreme court.
U.S. and Saudi officials told us, and State reports, that such trials
could help combat terrorist ideologies.
Moreover, the U.S. and Saudi governments have implemented joint
activities to strengthen Saudi law enforcement capabilities, such as
State-led training to strengthen the Saudi government's antiterrorism
investigative management and VIP protection capability. Apart from
joint training courses, U.S. officials told us they have close working-
level relationships with their Saudi counterparts and noted that Saudi
security cooperation is significant.[Footnote 24] State, Treasury, FBI,
DOD, and DHS officials told us that U.S. law enforcement and
intelligence agencies have benefited and continue to benefit from Saudi
information on individuals and organizations. The former U.S.
ambassador to Saudi Arabia described U.S.-Saudi counterterrorism
cooperation as among the most productive in the world.
U.S. and Saudi Governments Report Extensive Cooperation on Critical
Infrastructure Protection:
U.S. and Saudi officials report progress in cooperation on protecting
critical infrastructure targets, such as oil installations, in Saudi
Arabia. Officials cited the signing of a technical cooperation
agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia in May 2008, as
well as activities to implement the agreement, as evidence of deeper
cooperation.
U.S. officials told us that the protection of critical Saudi
infrastructure, particularly energy production facilities, has been a
priority since 2006, following an unsuccessful terrorist attack at the
Abqaiq oil facility,[Footnote 25] one of the world's largest oil
processing facilities located in Saudi Arabia. According to State
reporting, critical infrastructure protection is a vital national
interest, as a successful terrorist attack that disrupts Saudi oil
production would have a devastating impact on the U.S. and global
economies.[Footnote 25]
In May 2008, the U.S. Secretary of State and the Saudi Arabian Minister
of Interior signed a technical cooperation agreement to provide U.S.
technical assistance to Saudi Arabia in the area of critical
infrastructure protection. A joint operational entity called the Office
of Program Management-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI) was established to
implement the agreement, consisting of representatives from State, DOD,
DOE, and the Saudi Arabian government. The Saudi Arabian government
agreed to fully fund the agreement's implementation, including all
expenses incurred by U.S. agencies for services and contractor costs.
OPM-MOI is assisting the Saudi government in identifying critical
infrastructure vulnerabilities; developing security strategies to
protect critical infrastructure; and recruiting and training a new MOI
force, the Facilities Security Force, to protect its critical
infrastructure. State is the lead agency for the implementation of the
agreement, DOE is contributing expertise in conducting facility
assessments and developing security strategies for Saudi energy
production facilities, and DOD will contribute expertise in training
and equipping the Facilities Security Force, which is intended to have
more than 35,000 personnel when fully developed. According to U.S.
officials, the current focus of OPM-MOI is protecting critical
infrastructure related to oil production. However, officials told us
OPM-MOI could expand to cooperate with the Saudi government in a number
of other areas, including border security, maritime security, and cyber
security. Other U.S. agencies, such as DHS and the Coast Guard, are
expected to participate in OPM-MOI as the critical infrastructure
mission expands.
Saudi Leaders Have Publicly Condemned Terrorist Activities and
Implemented Programs to Combat Extremism:
Saudi government and religious leaders have publicly condemned
terrorism and terrorism financing. Several high-ranking Saudi
government leaders have spoken out against terrorism and extremism. In
his remarks at the UN's Culture of Peace conference in November 2008,
[Footnote 27] King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz noted that "terrorism and
criminality are the enemies of every religion and every culture." In
July 2008, the King made similar remarks at the World Conference on
Dialogue in Madrid. Many other members of the Saudi government,
including the Ministers of Islamic Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and
Interior, have issued statements against terrorism and extremism since
2001.
Moreover, religious leaders, such as the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia,
[Footnote 28] have issued a number of statements critical of terrorism.
In the spring of 2008, the Grand Mufti issued a statement on the evils
of terrorism and warned Saudi citizens not to listen to those who use
religion to promote terrorism. In October 2007, he delivered a sermon
cautioning young Saudis not to travel abroad to participate in jihad.
In the same speech, he urged Saudi citizens not to finance terrorism
and to be mindful of how their charitable contributions are
distributed. Later that same year, the Grand Mufti stated that
terrorists should be subject to severe punishment in accordance with
Islamic law. According to State, other Saudi Islamic scholars and
officials also voiced support for the Grand Mufti's statement.
Further, in May 2009, the Second Deputy Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia
organized the first national conference on "intellectual security,"
which was to address the "intellectual abnormality" that, according to
the Saudi government, is "the main reason for terrorism." The
conference resulted in a communiqué stressing the importance of
moderation, tolerance, cross-cultural dialogue, nonviolence, and the
establishment of national strategies for promoting those values. The
declaration pointed out the moderate nature of Islam and warned against
the dangers of embracing deviant ideologies. The Deputy Prime Minister
also expressed hope that the small number of Saudis participating in
deviant groups abroad would renounce their beliefs and return home,
noting, Saudi Arabia "is ready to welcome its citizens if they decide
to opt for the correct path."
Saudi Activities to Combat Extremism:
In addition to public statements by Saudi government and religious
figures, the Saudi government has implemented a number of domestic
activities designed to undermine extremist ideology within the Kingdom.
These activities include the following:
* Initiating a media campaign: According to U.S. and Saudi officials,
the Saudi government has implemented an extensive media campaign
against extremist thought. State reports this campaign includes the use
of advertisements, billboards, text messages and the Internet. (Figure
5 shows examples of Saudi Arabia's public outreach campaign.)
Figure 5: Saudi Arabia's National Campaign against Extremism and
Terrorism, Examples of Public Outreach:
[Refer to PDF for image: three photographs]
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:
National Campaign Against Extremism and Terrorism:
Examples of Public Outreach:
Photograph: "May the hand of evil-doers be paralyzed."
Photograph: "The Saudi National Unity Campaign Against Terrorism."
Photograph: "The General Presidency for Youth Welfare and its regional
offices, The Saudi Arabian Olympic Committee, Saudi Football
Federation, sports federations, clubs and youth hostels, join in the
National Unity Campaign Against Terrorism."
Source: Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia.
[End of figure]
See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-883/] for a video
of a Saudi government-sponsored TV advertisement designed to counter
terrorism.
* Distributing publications and other materials: Officials from the
Saudi Ministries of Islamic Affairs and Interior told us Saudi Arabia
had produced a variety of books and pamphlets designed to combat
extremist ideology. Saudi officials estimate that approximately 1.8
million books have been prepared as part of this effort. (Figure 6
shows a sample of Saudi literature to combat extremism provided to GAO
by Saudi officials.)[Footnote 29] Additionally, according to Saudi
officials, the Saudi government distributes, via mosques and schools,
CDs and cassette tapes with lectures and seminars addressing the issues
of terrorism and extremism.
Figure 6: Sample of Saudi Literature (with Translated Titles) Designed
to Combat Extremist Ideology:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrations]
Seditious (rebellion against authority) Bombings and Assassinations:
Causes, Impacts, and Remedy.
Reflections on the Riyadh Bombings.
The Guidance of Quran and Sunna[A] on Maintaining Security and
Protecting Lives: The Prohibition Against Hijacking Airplanes.
The Position of Senior Ulema (religious scholars) on Extremism and
Terrorism.
Source: Materials provided by the government of Saudi Arabia;
translations by GAO.
[A] The Quran and Sunna (which refers to the customs of Prophet
Muhammad) form the basis of Islamic jurisprudence.
[End of figure]
* Monitoring religious leaders: According to State reporting and Saudi
officials, the Saudi government continues to monitor the preaching and
writings of religious leaders, and to reeducate those who advocate
extremist messages. Saudi officials from the Ministry of Islamic
Affairs told us their monitoring has covered approximately 20,000 of
Saudi Arabia's estimated 70,000 mosques, including all of the large
mosques that hold Friday prayers.[Footnote 30] Additionally, Saudi
officials told us they have held hundreds of seminars and lectures in
mosques to help ensure that religious leaders preach a moderate message
to the public.
* Monitoring school teachers: According to officials from the Saudi
Ministry of Islamic Affairs, the Saudi government monitors for school
teachers who teach extremism. Once identified, such teachers are put
through reeducation programs.
* Monitoring Internet sites: According to Ministry of Interior
officials, Saudi authorities are monitoring Internet chat rooms that
could be sources of militant recruitment. In September 2008, Saudi
authorities reported the arrest of three Saudi citizens and two
expatriates for promoting militant activities on Internet forums,
engaging online users in dialogue, spreading misleading information,
and recruiting youth to travel abroad for inappropriate purposes.
According to Saudi reports, the Ministry of Interior called on all
Saudis to be vigilant and urged them not to listen to those who promote
corruption and sedition. In addition, the Ministry published the online
usernames utilized by the suspects.
* Encouraging dialogue: The Saudi government reports that it supports
the activities of the Sakinah (or Tranquility) Campaign, which is an
independent nongovernmental organization that engages in dialogue, via
the Internet, with Internet users who have visited extremist Web sites.
Additionally, in 2008, the King of Saudi Arabia also initiated a series
of conferences to promote interfaith dialogues. The first conference
was hosted by the Muslim World League in Mecca in June 2008 and
consisted of 500 Muslim scholars from around the world. The second
conference was held in Madrid, Spain, in July 2008 and included 300
delegates representing different faiths, including Islam, Buddhism,
Christianity, Hinduism, and Judaism. Finally, the King of Saudi Arabia
was joined by other heads of states at a Special Session of the UN
General Assembly on interfaith dialogue in November 2008.
Saudi Rehabilitation Programs:
The Saudi government operates rehabilitation programs to reeducate
those arrested for supporting terrorism or extremism, as well as those
returning from the U.S. detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, to
reintegrate them into society. Rehabilitation programs take place both
in Saudi prisons and in halfway houses outside of prisons, known as
aftercare centers.[Footnote 31] In March 2009, we visited the aftercare
center-- called the Mohammed bin Nayef Center for Advisory and Care--in
Riyadh and spoke with staff members as well as participants of the
program, including those arrested for terrorism and violent extremism
in Saudi Arabia and those formerly detained at Guantanamo Bay. Staff
members told us the rehabilitation center seeks to "reeducate" its
participants by engaging them in religious debates and providing
psychological counseling. The program generally consists of one-on-one
and group sessions between an offender and religious scholars,
psychiatrists, and psychologists about their beliefs. Program officials
attempt to persuade the offenders that their religious justification
for their actions is based upon a corrupted understanding of Islam.
Psychological counseling includes traditional methods as well as
activities such as art therapy. Staff members told us the program draws
heavily on participants' family and tribal relations. Family members
can visit and telephone the rehabilitation center, and rehabilitation
participants are allowed leave to attend family events such as weddings
and funerals. For instance, when we visited the center, we spoke with
family members visiting their relatives. Those who complete the
program, and are deemed eligible for release, are provided social
support to assist with their reintegration into society, such as
counseling, job opportunities, and stipends. Moreover, these social
services are extended to the family and tribal members of released
participants, as a way to involve participants' larger social network
in their rehabilitation. Saudi officials told us that individuals
generally participate in the program for 6 to 8 months.
Saudi officials report such rehabilitation programs, including those in
prisons and an aftercare center, have treated 4,300 individuals
overall. Specifically, Saudi officials told us that, as of March 2009,
the aftercare center had served approximately 250 individuals, with a
recidivism rate of about 20 percent. Experts with whom we spoke
generally praised the Saudi rehabilitation program, but offered some
caution on the methodology used to measure its results.[Footnote 32]
State reports it is monitoring these rates closely. Saudi officials
told us that former Guantanamo detainees account for most of the
individuals who have recidivated from the aftercare center.[Footnote
33] For example, in January 2009, two former participants at the center
appeared in an Al Qaeda recruiting video filmed in Yemen. One of the
individuals in the video has since turned himself in to Saudi
authorities. Saudi officials acknowledge such cases illustrate the
difficulties associated with assessing which participants should be
released from the rehabilitation center, but told us they are working
to refine their assessment criteria. U.S. and Saudi officials with whom
we spoke told us that, despite the challenges associated with
recidivism, Saudi rehabilitation programs have demonstrated some
positive results. Moreover, U.S. officials told us these activities,
among others, demonstrate the Saudi government's commitment to
undermining extremist ideology within the Kingdom. (See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/media/video/gao-09-883/] for a video of GAO's visit
to a Saudi government operated rehabilitation center.)
Despite Significant Gains in Combating Terrorists in Saudi Arabia,
Instability in Yemen Is a Concern:
While U.S. and Saudi officials told us that Saudi Arabia had made
progress in enhancing its ability to combat terrorists, they assessed
that political instability in Yemen,[Footnote 34] Saudi Arabia's
neighbor, could create challenges to counterterrorism efforts. U.S. and
Saudi officials expressed concern that Yemen, due in part to lack of
government control and proximity to Saudi Arabia, is emerging as a base
from which Al Qaeda terrorists can launch attacks against Saudi and
U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia. For example, as noted previously, in
August 2009, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula--which is based in
Yemen--claimed responsibility for the failed assassination attempt
against Saudi Arabia's Assistant Minister of Interior for Security
Affairs. State has listed Yemen as a terrorist safe haven in its
Country Reports on Terrorism since 2005. In April 2009, in its Country
Reports on Terrorism, State reported that, despite some successes
against Al Qaeda, the response of the government of Yemen to the
terrorist threat was intermittent due to its focus on internal security
concerns. Moreover, State noted that border security between Saudi
Arabia and Yemen remained a problem. Saudi officials also cited
political instability in Yemen, as well as the porous border between
Yemen and Saudi Arabia, as challenges to their counterterrorism
efforts. To address this issue, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi
Arabia told us that the Saudi government is providing Yemen assistance
in a number of areas, including counterterrorism, education, and
health. Saudi officials also stated that Saudi Arabia is building an
electronic fence on the Saudi-Yemen border.[Footnote 35]
U.S. and Saudi Officials Report Progress in Preventing Financial
Support to Extremists, but Concerns Remain about Individuals' and
Multilateral Charitable Organizations' Ability to Support Terrorism and
Violent Extremism outside of Saudi Arabia:
U.S. and Saudi officials report progress in preventing financial
support to extremists, citing improved Saudi regulation and enforcement
capacity. Between fiscal years 2006 and 2008, the U.S. embassy's MSP
listed a number of performance targets related to preventing financial
support to extremists, which include (1) the United States providing
additional training and Saudi banks increasing reporting to the Saudi
Financial Investigation Unit, (2) the Saudi government providing
accounting of assets seized from individuals and organizations
designated as terrorists by the United Nations (UN) 1267 Committee and
taking legal action against nationals and groups providing financial or
ideological support to terrorists, (3) the Saudi Charities Commission
naming senior staff and beginning operations, and (4) the Saudi
government implementing and enforcing cash courier regulations. U.S.
officials report progress on several of these performance targets.
However, U.S. officials remain concerned about the ability of Saudi
individuals and multilateral charitable organizations, as well as other
individuals visiting Saudi Arabia, to support terrorism and violent
extremism outside of Saudi Arabia. U.S. officials also noted that
limited Saudi enforcement capacity and terrorist financiers' use of
cash couriers pose challenges to Saudi efforts to prevent financial
support to extremists. (For a summary of reported progress related to
MSP performance targets from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2008, see
figure 7.)
Figure 7: U.S. Agencies' Assessment of Progress as of August 2009 on
Mission Strategic Plan Performance Targets Related to Preventing
Financial Support to Extremists, Fiscal Years 2006-2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
FY 2006 Target: Saudi financial intelligence unit (FIU) exchanges
information with regional counterparts;
FY 2007 Target: United States provides training to Saudi FIU;
FY 2008 Target: Additional U.S. training to Saudi FIU;
Status of Activities Related to Targets:
* U.S. Treasury and FBI provide training on financial investigative
skills;
* State reports increased reporting by banks;
* Saudi FIU joins the international body of financial intelligence
units.
FY 2006 Target: The Saudi government cosponsors the designation of at
least one individual or organization under United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1267 related to Al Qaeda and the Taliban (UN 1267),
details seized assets, and prosecutes the group or individual.
FY 2007 Target: Saudi government implements actions under UN 1267, such
as providing accounting of assets seized from designees, and takes
legal action against individuals or groups that support terrorism;
FY 2008 Target: Saudi government implements actions under UN 1267, such
as providing detailed accounting of assets seized from designees, and
takes legal action against individuals or groups that support
terrorism;
Status of Activities Related to Targets:
* Saudi government arrests a number of terrorist financiers;
* State reports Saudi government appears cooperative on efforts to
freeze assets of designated individuals and entities;
* State officials note that the Saudi government‘s enforcement of the UN
1267 travel ban provision has not been consistent.
FY 2006 Target: Saudi Charities Commission begins operations;
FY 2007 Target: Saudi Charities Commission begins operations;
FY 2008 Target: Saudi Charities Commission begins operations;
Status of Activities Related to Targets:
* Saudi Charities Commission is not operational;
* In its place, the Saudi government has adopted regulations barring
charitable organizations from sending contributions overseas absent the
approval of the Saudi government;
* State and Treasury have expressed concerns that certain charitable
organizations in Saudi Arabia are not covered by Saudi regulations.
Saudi government officials contend all organizations are covered by
their regulations.
FY 2006 Target: Cash courier regulations implemented;
FY 2007 Target: Cash courier regulations implemented and enforced;
Status of Activities Related to Targets:
* Cash courier regulations enacted by the Saudi government;
* State has reported that the effectiveness of these regulations
remains in question;
* DHS noted that they do not have information”such as the number of
seizures”to assess progress on implementation of cash courier
regulations.
U.S. Agencies‘ Assessment of Overall Progress:
U.S. officials report progress in preventing financial support to
extremists, but concerns remain about the ability of Saudi individuals
and multilateral charitable organizations to provide financial support
for terrorism outside of Saudi Arabia.
Limited capacity, particularly in key Saudi ministries that enforce
financial regulations, the use of cash couriers by terrorist financiers,
circumvention of cash declaration laws, and pervasive use of cash in
Saudi society are cited as challenges to combating the financing of
terrorism.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. agency information.
[End of figure]
The United States Provided Training to the Saudi Financial
Investigation Unit:
In 2005, the government of Saudi Arabia established the Saudi Financial
Investigation Unit, which acts as Saudi Arabia's financial intelligence
unit (FIU). Located in the Ministry of Interior, the Saudi FIU receives
and analyzes suspicious transaction reports and other information from
a variety of sources, such as banking institutions, insurance
companies, and government departments.
Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, which is the FIU for
the United States, and the FBI have provided training to the Saudi FIU
since its establishment in 2005. According to Treasury officials, these
training activities were designed to build the capacity of the Saudi
FIU and assist it in meeting international standards, with the ultimate
goal of having the Saudi FIU attain membership in the Egmont Group, an
international body of financial intelligence units. Saudi officials
told us that the capacity of the Saudi FIU has increased since 2005.
For instance, they noted the number of suspicious transaction reports
they analyze grew from approximately 38 per month in 2006 to 110 per
month in 2008,[Footnote 36] while the staff of the FIU has grown from
approximately 80 individuals in 2006 to 130 individuals in March 2009.
Moreover, since 2005, Saudi officials told us the Saudi FIU had
conducted information exchanges with FIUs in the United States and a
number of countries in the region, and said they expected these
exchanges to increase once the Saudi FIU becomes a member of the Egmont
Group.[Footnote 37] Similarly, Treasury officials told us Saudi
Arabia's membership in the Egmont Group would assist in preventing
financial support to extremists by facilitating information exchanges
between the Saudi FIU and its counterparts. In May 2009, the Saudi FIU
met the requirements for membership and became an official member of
the Egmont Group.[Footnote 38]
The Saudi Government Has Initiated Legal Action against Terrorist
Financiers, but the United States Has Reported the Need for Further
Action:
According to U.S. officials and State reporting in 2007 and 2008, the
Saudi government has taken legal action against terrorist financiers,
based on its laws and regulations related to combating terrorist
financing. In 2003, the Saudi Arabian government enacted an anti-money
laundering law, which provided a statutory basis for considering money
laundering and terrorism financing as criminal offenses. That same
year, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) issued updated anti-
money laundering and counterterrorist financing guidelines for the
Saudi banking and nonbank financial system.[Footnote 39] The guidelines
contain a number of provisions, such as requiring that banks (1) have
mechanisms to monitor all types of "Specially Designated Nationals" as
listed by SAMA, (2) strictly adhere to SAMA guidance on opening
accounts and dealing with charity and donation collection, and (3) use
software to monitor customers to detect unusual transaction patterns.
Additionally, SAMA has also issued "know your customer" guidelines,
requiring banks to freeze accounts of customers who do not provide
updated account information. In July 2004, members of the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) and the Gulf Cooperation Council assessed
Saudi Arabia's legal and regulatory practices with respect to
countering terrorism financing.[Footnote 40] They found Saudi Arabia to
be compliant or largely compliant with most FATF benchmarks--a set of
internationally recognized legal and regulatory benchmarks on money
laundering and terrorism financing.[Footnote 41]
Since 2007, U.S. and Saudi officials report that the government of
Saudi Arabia has arrested and prosecuted a number of individuals
suspected of financing terrorism. For instance, State reports that the
Saudi government arrested 56 suspected terrorist financiers in 2008 and
prosecuted 20 of them. According to Saudi embassy reports, over 40
people were arrested in 2007 for providing financial support to
terrorists. As noted earlier in this report, in July 2009, the Saudi
government announced the convictions of 330 terrorism suspects who were
charged with crime, including affiliation with terrorist organizations
as well as facilitating and financing terrorism. U.S. officials we
spoke with cited these arrests, as well as those against terrorist
cells more generally, as having a disruptive effect on financing
networks. Despite these gains, State notes in its most recent Country
Report on Terrorism that the United States continues to "urge the
government of Saudi Arabia to pursue and prosecute terrorist financiers
more vigorously."
Moreover, State's 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR) cited the Saudi government as "partially compliant" on
obligations related to UN Security Council resolutions on terrorism
financing. UN 1267 requires its signatories to impose certain
restrictions on individual or entities associated with Al Qaeda and the
Taliban, such as freezing their assets and preventing their entry or
transit through signatories' territories (travel ban). In April 2009,
State reported that the Saudi government had taken action against
individuals designated by the UN 1267 Committee by freezing their
accounts and seizing their assets. Moreover, State reports that SAMA
provides the names of suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations
designated by the UN 1267 Committee to all financial institutions under
its supervision. Related to the UN 1267 travel ban provision, State
officials told us that the Saudi government's enforcement of this
provision had not been consistent, particularly during hajj. According
to Saudi officials, the Saudi government's policy is to allow all
Muslims to visit the Kingdom during hajj[Footnote 42] to fulfill their
religious obligations and to not arrest individuals during their
pilgrimage. However, Saudi officials noted they would share information
with the United States about certain individuals, such as those
designated under UN 1267, visiting the Kingdom for religious
obligation.
The Saudi Charities Commission Is Not Yet Operational, but the Saudi
Government Has Issued New Regulations Targeting Saudi Charities and
Multilateral Charitable Organizations:
State and Treasury have reported that some Saudi charitable
organizations have been a major source of financing to extremist and
terrorist groups. In 2002, the Saudi government announced its intention
to establish a National Commission for Relief and Charitable Work
Abroad, commonly known as the Charities Commission, to oversee all
private Saudi charitable activities abroad. U.S. officials told us, and
Saudi officials confirmed, that the Saudi Charities Commission is not
operational. Although the Charities Commission is not operational, the
Saudi government has established regulations barring Saudi charitable
organizations from sending contributions abroad via banks and other
formal financial channels without first receiving the approval of the
Saudi government. Saudi officials told us these regulations are
preferable to a Charities Commission, as they more effectively prevent
the flow of funds outside of Saudi Arabia. Similarly, some U.S.
officials and experts with whom we spoke stated that the current ban
might be preferable to a Saudi Charities Commission, as a ban may be
more effective in preventing financial support from reaching extremist
groups. Other U.S. officials noted that while more effective oversight
of charitable organizations is needed, it is not necessary that such
oversight take the form of a Charities Commission.
Rules related to the banking activities of charitable organization in
Saudi Arabia were first adopted in 2003, and updated in 2008. However,
there is some disagreement over whether these rules apply to all Saudi
charitable organizations. According to U.S. officials, and State
reporting, charitable organizations in Saudi Arabia include
organizations termed "charities"--which tend to operate within the
Kingdom--and organizations dubbed "multilateral" charitable
organizations--which are based in Saudi Arabia but have branches in
other parts of the world. Multilateral charitable organizations based
in Saudi Arabia include the Muslim World League, the International
Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), and the World Assembly of Muslim
Youth. The 2003 rules applied to charitable organizations and
prohibited them from making cash disbursements and transferring money
outside of Saudi Arabia.[Footnote 43] U.S. officials have testified
that the 2003 regulations did not apply to multilateral organizations.
While State reported in the 2006, 2007, and 2008 INCSRs that the
government of Saudi Arabia stated the 2003 regulations applied to
international charities,[Footnote 44] each report also contained
language recommending the Saudi government enhance its oversight of
charities with overseas operations.
Despite the ban on charities transferring money outside of Saudi Arabia
enacted in 2003, a number of charitable organizations with links to
Saudi Arabia have been designated by Treasury since 2005 as financing
terrorist activities. In August 2006, Treasury designated branches of
the IIRO in Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as a Saudi national
employed as the Executive Director of the Eastern Province Branch of
IIRO, for facilitating fundraising for Al Qaeda and affiliated
terrorist groups. Further, from 2002 to 2004,[Footnote 45] the United
States designated 13 branches of the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (Al
Haramain), including several branches that were designated by both the
U.S. and Saudi governments.[Footnote 46] In 2004, the Saudi government
announced that Al Haramain was being dissolved. In June 2008, Treasury
noted that despite Saudi government efforts, which had largely
prevented Al Haramain from operating in its own name, the
organization's leadership had attempted to reconstitute itself and
parts of Al Haramain continued to operate. Thus, in June 2008, Treasury
designated all branches of Al Haramain, including its headquarters in
Saudi Arabia, for having provided support to Al Qaeda as well as other
terrorists and terrorist organizations.
After these designations, in rules dated December 2008, the government
of Saudi Arabia updated its banking regulations to include specific
language related to multilateral organizations, including Muslim World
League, IIRO, and World Assembly of Muslim Youth. The rules state that
transfers from the accounts of these multilateral organizations to any
party outside of the Kingdom shall not be allowed without approval from
SAMA, and that any contributions approved for transfer may only be used
in ways as specified by SAMA. Saudi officials from SAMA and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs with whom we spoke told us that no
charitable contributions, including those from multilateral charitable
organizations, can be sent abroad through bank accounts without the
approval of the Saudi government. Moreover, Saudi officials told us
that, as of July 2009, the Saudi government had not approved any
transfer of funds from charities and multilateral charitable
organizations to support charitable activities outside of Saudi Arabia.
While the Saudi government has not approved the transfer of funds, they
have approved overseas transfers of in-kind humanitarian assistance,
such as medical supplies or blankets, through the Saudi Red Crescent
Society. State reporting acknowledges the Saudi government tightened
controls on charitable giving in September 2008. Officials from World
Assembly of Muslim Youth confirmed that the ban on charitable
contributions leaving Saudi Arabia through a formal financial network
applies to their activities, and that contributions to their
organization have declined as a result. While the Saudi government has
regulations related to the transfer of charitable contributions through
the formal financial system, World Assembly of Muslim Youth officials
stated they have moved money out of Saudi Arabia by providing cash to
individuals or contractors to implement charitable projects outside the
Kingdom.[Footnote 47] State and Treasury officials noted that, despite
the tightened regulations on the formal financial system, they are
still concerned about the ability of multilateral charitable
organizations to move money out of the country, and in the 2009 INSCR,
State reports that multilateral organizations operate "largely outside
of the strict Saudi restrictions covering domestic charities."
According to U.S. officials and State reporting, a proposal for the
Charities Commission is still under review by Saudi officials. However,
the most recent MSP for Saudi Arabia no longer contains a performance
target related to the operation of a Saudi Charities Commission. U.S.
officials told us that, even in the absence of this target, the
regulation of charitable organizations is still a priority that U.S.
agencies pursue through diplomatic and information-sharing activities
with the Saudi government.
Saudi Arabia Has Issued Cash Courier Regulations, but Concerns Remain
about Implementation of These Regulations:
In late 2005, the Saudi government enacted stricter customs declaration
laws that regulate the cross-border movement of cash, jewels, and
precious metals. The regulations state that money and gold in excess of
60,000 Saudi riyals (equivalent to $16,000 U.S. dollars) must be
declared upon entry and exit from Saudi Arabia using official customs
forms.[Footnote 48]
That same year, representatives from DHS's Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) conducted training for 46 Saudi officials on topics
related to bulk cash smuggling. ICE officials told us the goal of this
training was to introduce Saudi officials to interdiction and
investigative techniques designed to support enforcement of the Saudi
customs regulations.
In 2007, State reported concerns related to the enforcement of Saudi
Arabia's customs declaration laws. For example, Saudi customs had not
issued the necessary declaration forms. State officials with whom we
spoke told us that the Saudi government had improved its enforcement of
the laws, including distributing declaration forms and posting signs,
which we observed during our visit to the Kingdom (see figure 8).
Additionally, State has reported that the Saudi government's new cash
courier regulations have resulted in the investigations of several
individuals.
Figure 8: Official Saudi Customs Declaration Form:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Source: Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia.
[End of figure]
According to ICE officials, although they have tried to persuade the
Saudi government to conduct operational training related to preventing
bulk cash smuggling, the Saudi government did not express interest in
undertaking such an exercise until 2008. ICE officials noted that, in
addition to classroom training, it considers operational training
necessary to ensure proper enforcement of customs declaration laws
designed to prevent bulk cash smuggling. Moreover, ICE officials said
that they do not have information--such as the number of seizures and
prosecutions--that would allow them to assess progress with regard to
the Saudi government's efforts to prevent bulk cash smuggling. In its
2009 INCSR, State reported that the Saudi government has adopted
stricter regulations; however, information collected by Saudi customs
on cash declarations and smuggling is not shared with other
governments, and the implementation and effectiveness of the customs
regulations remain in question.
Despite concerns about the Saudi government's enforcement of customs
declaration laws that include cash courier regulations, the MSP
performance target related to cash couriers was removed from the MSP
after fiscal year 2007. U.S. officials told us that, despite the
omission of the target from the MSP, Saudi implementation and
enforcement of cash courier regulations are important U.S. objectives
that U.S. agencies pursue through training and diplomatic activities
with the Saudi government.
Further, in the 2008 and 2009 INCSRs, State reported that, in addition
to bulk cash, some instances of terrorist financing in Saudi Arabia
have allegedly involved informal mechanisms, such as hawala.[Footnote
49] U.S. and Saudi officials told us, and State reports, that hawala
and money services businesses apart from banks and licensed money
changers are illegal in Saudi Arabia. In 2005, State reported that SAMA
consolidated the eight largest money changers into a single bank.
Further, State notes that Saudi banks have created fund transfer
systems that have attracted customers accustomed to using hawala.
According to State, this creates an advantage for Saudi authorities in
combating terrorism financing, as senders and recipients of fund
transfers through this formal financial sector are required to clearly
identify themselves.
Despite Progress, U.S. Officials Remain Concerned about the Ability of
Saudi Individuals and Multilateral Charitable Organizations to Support
Terrorism and Violent Extremism Outside of Saudi Arabia:
Despite reporting progress in Saudi Arabia's efforts to combat
terrorism financing, U.S. officials expressed concern regarding the
ability of Saudi individuals and multilateral charitable organizations,
as well as other individuals visiting Saudi Arabia, to support
terrorism and violent extremism outside Saudi Arabia. Officials
stressed this funding allegedly comes from individuals or multilateral
charitable organizations, not from the Saudi government, and that the
government of Saudi Arabia is pursuing terrorism financiers and
cooperating with the United States to counter terrorism financing.
Further, experts we spoke with agreed that there is no indication that
the Saudi government is providing funding for terrorism.
Officials from State, Treasury, and DHS stated that alleged support
from some Saudi individuals and multilateral charitable organizations
for terrorism and violent extremism outside of Saudi Arabia remains a
cause for concern. According to the 2009 INCSR, Saudi individuals and
Saudi-based charitable organizations continue to be a significant
source of financing for terrorism and extremism outside of Saudi
Arabia. For example, Treasury officials have noted that Saudi-based
individuals are a top source of funding for Al Qaeda and associated
terror groups, such as the Taliban.[Footnote 50] Moreover, there have
been concerns that during hajj--when an estimated 2 to 3 million
Muslims visit Saudi Arabia--non-Saudi individuals associated with
extremists groups could exchange funds to support terrorism and violent
extremism outside of Saudi Arabia. Saudi government officials
acknowledged that Saudi individuals could potentially fund terrorism,
but, according to these officials, such individuals do so in violation
of Saudi laws and regulations. Related to charitable contributions,
Saudi officials told us that no funds have been approved for overseas
transfer. Saudi officials also told us that if a Saudi-affiliated
multilateral charitable organization raises funds abroad, it is the
host country government's responsibility to ensure such funds are used
appropriately, and stated that they have directed their embassies
abroad to cooperate with host country governments in this effort.
U.S. and Saudi officials cited challenges associated with efforts to
prevent financial support to extremists, including limited Saudi
enforcement capacity and the use of cash couriers by terrorist
financiers. First, U.S. and Saudi officials noted enforcement capacity
presents a challenge to U.S.-Saudi efforts to prevent financial support
to extremists. While noting progress, U.S. and Saudi officials told us
that key Saudi enforcement agencies, particularly those agencies that
enforce financial regulations, could benefit from increased training
and technical assistance to build their capacity. For instance, U.S.
and Saudi officials stated that, while the Saudi FIU has expanded its
capacity since its creation in 2005, more training in financial
analysis could be beneficial to the organization.
Second, U.S. and Saudi officials told us that preventing financial
support to extremists is made more challenging by terrorist financiers'
use of cash couriers. According to U.S. and Saudi officials, some
individuals and multilateral charitable organizations have allegedly
increased their use of more informal financial transaction methods,
such as couriering cash across borders, in response to Saudi Arabia's
adoption of regulations making transactions in the formal financial
sector more challenging. Though Saudi Arabia has implemented cash
courier regulations, Saudi officials noted that motivated individuals
can circumvent such regulations by moving amounts of cash that are
below legal declaration limits. U.S. officials concurred, noting
circumvention of regulations as an inherent challenge in regulating the
use of cash couriers in any country. U.S. and Saudi officials also
cited the prevalent use of cash for transactions as a challenge,
particularly in Saudi Arabia. According to these officials, because
large numbers of people in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region use cash,
an individual traveling with or declaring large amounts of cash may not
raise suspicion. Moreover, challenges associated with preventing the
circumvention of cash courier regulations increase during hajj, which,
despite efforts by the Saudi government, presents logistical
enforcement challenges because of the large number of people involved.
Dealing with the challenges inherently associated with the use of cash,
according to Saudi officials, requires using intelligence to target
specific individuals who may be using cash to fund terrorism or violent
extremism and educating the public not to give cash to individuals they
do not know, even for allegedly worthy causes.
Conclusion:
According to State, goals and performance targets in country-specific
Mission Strategic Plans (MSP) are used to assess effectiveness of U.S.
policies and programs in the field and to formulate requests for
resources. According to U.S. officials, since 2005, several targets to
assess progress of the U.S. government's counterterrorism and
antiterrorism financing collaboration with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
have been met. However, some performance targets, specifically those
related to combating financing of terrorism, were removed from the MSP
for Saudi Arabia even though U.S. agencies remain concerned about the
ability of Saudi individuals and multilateral charitable organizations
to fund terrorist organizations in other countries. U.S. agencies
stated that, despite the omission of these targets, they continue to
engage with the government of Saudi Arabia on efforts to prevent
financial support to extremists. Given that State uses MSP targets to
assess progress in countering terrorism and terrorism financing in
Saudi Arabia, it is important that the U.S. mission include targets
related to key areas of concern to more effectively prioritize U.S.
efforts and to formulate resource requests for these activities.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of State direct the U.S. mission in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to reinstate, in consultation with relevant
U.S. agencies, performance measures related to preventing the flow of
alleged financial support, through mechanisms such as cash couriers, to
terrorists and extremists outside Saudi Arabia.
Agencies Comments, Third-Party Views, and Our Evaluation:
State and DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report,
which are reproduced in appendices V and VI, respectively. State
concurred with our recommendation and committed to instructing the U.S.
Embassy, Riyadh, in consultation with key interagency partners, to
ensure that the Mission Strategic Plan reflect the continued importance
of cooperation to combat terrorism financing, including by reinstating
performance indicators related to Saudi enforcement of cash courier
regulations. DOD also concurred with the report. In addition, we
received technical comments from DOD, DOE, NSC, State, Treasury, and
the intelligence community. Additionally, consistent with our
protocols, we provided a copy of the draft report to Saudi officials,
who described the report as a fair and detailed review of U.S. and
Saudi efforts and also offered technical comments. We incorporated
technical comments as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 5 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security,
Justice, the intelligence community, and the National Security Council.
In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-5257, or merrittz@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions
to this report are listed in appendix VII.
Signed by:
Zina D. Merritt, Acting Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology:
In this report, we were asked to report on (1) the U.S. government
strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to
counter terrorism and terrorism financing, and (2) U.S. government
agencies‘ assessment of and the Saudi government‘s views on progress
toward the goals of the U.S. strategy to collaborate with and assist
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Our work focused on the efforts of the intelligence agencies; the
Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Homeland Security (DHS),
Justice (DOJ), State (State), and the Treasury (Treasury); and the
National Security Council (NSC) to collaborate with Saudi Arabia to
combat terrorism and terrorism financing since 2005. Within these
agencies and executive offices, we met with officials from several
relevant components that are monitoring or working with the Saudi
government on efforts to combat terrorism and its financing, including
DHS‘s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); DOJ‘s Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI); State‘s bureaus of Coordinator of
Counterterrorism; Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs; International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; and Near Eastern Affairs; and
Treasury‘s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network, and the Internal Revenue Service. We
focused on these agencies and components as a result of previous work
undertaken by GAO regarding efforts to address violent extremism, our
review of information since GAO‘s previous work indicating which
agencies were involved in efforts to collaborate with Saudi Arabia, and
discussions with U.S. agency officials regarding the agencies with
which they collaborate.
To examine the U.S. government strategy to collaborate with and assist
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to counter terrorism and terrorism
financing, we reviewed relevant U.S. strategic documents, including the
U.S. Strategy Toward Saudi Arabia, Report Pursuant to Section 2043(c) of
the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act,
and Mission Strategic Plans (MSP) for Saudi Arabia (previously called
Mission Performance Plans) for fiscal years 2005 to 2011. While we did
not assess these documents for key elements of a strategy as identified
by GAO, we used the performance targets stated in these documents as
criteria against which we assessed progress. In addition to documents
from U.S. agencies, we obtained documents detailing the Saudi
government‘s approach to combating terrorism and terrorism financing
from Saudi officials, and reviewed public information available on the
embassy Web site. We discussed the U.S. government strategy to
collaborate with and assist Saudi Arabia with officials from DOD, DHS,
DOJ, State, and Treasury, as well as representatives from the Saudi
embassy, including the Saudi Ambassador to the United States.
Furthermore, while in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, we discussed the U.S.
strategy to collaborate with Saudi Arabia with officials from the U.S.
embassy, including the then ambassador, as well as representatives from
the Saudi government, including representatives from the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Islamic Affairs. We met with Saudi
officials from these ministries as they are involved in efforts to
combat terrorism and extremism.
To report U.S. government agencies‘ assessment of progress toward the
goals of the U.S. strategy to collaborate with and assist the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, we reviewed relevant U.S. planning and evaluation
documents, including MSPs for Saudi Arabia, Country Reports on
Terrorism, and International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume
II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, among others. Additionally,
we developed and administered a data collection instrument to agencies
providing training and technical assistance to the Saudi government”
including State, Treasury, DOJ, DHS, DOD, and DOE”to obtain information
on programs and activities, including goals, description, indicators,
assessments, and associated funding. We corroborated information
reported to us in the data collection instrument with information
obtained during interviews with agency officials and reported in agency
evaluation documents. Further, we obtained and examined documentation
from Saudi officials regarding their domestic efforts to counter
terrorism and terrorism financing, including Rules Governing the
Opening of Bank Accounts and General Operational Guidelines in Saudi
Arabia, Third Update, December 2008, and reviewed public information
available on the embassy Web site. Although we report on Saudi efforts
to combat extremism, we did not independently verify all of these
activities. In Washington, D.C., we discussed progress on U.S.-Saudi
counterterrorism efforts with U.S. officials from DOD, DOE, DHS, DOJ,
State, Treasury, and the intelligence community; as well as with Saudi
officials from the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. We also interviewed
subject matter experts from a variety of academic institutions and
nongovernmental organizations to obtain their assessments of progress.
We selected experts who met at least one of the following criteria: (1)
produced research focusing on Saudi Arabia; (2) traveled to Saudi
Arabia; and, (3) were recognized as experts in the professional
community, as determined by the recommendation of other experts. State
concurred with our list of experts. Additionally, we traveled to Riyadh
and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, where we visited the Prince Mohammed bin
Nayef Center for Advisory and Care”a counseling program designed to
reeducate violent extremists”in Riyadh, and met with U.S. officials
from DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and Treasury; Saudi officials from the Saudi
Arabian Monetary Agency and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs,
Interior, and Islamic Affairs; and representatives from World Assembly
of Muslim Youth. The information on foreign laws in this report is not
a product of our original analysis, but is based on interviews and
secondary sources.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 through September
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis
for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We
believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Time Line of Key Events in U.S. and Saudi Relations, 1750-
2004:
Summary: Alliance between Muhammad bin Saud and a conservative Muslim
leader;
Date: Mid-18th century;
Description: Muhammad bin Saud, founder
of the precursor to the modern Saudi state, strikes an alliance with
the conservative Muslim leader, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. This marks
the start of the close association between Saudi political and
religious establishment.
Summary: Saudi power and influence expands;
Date: 1902 to 1926;
Description: Abdul Aziz Al Saud expands Saudi power to other regions of
the Arabian Peninsula, including Riyadh and the holy Muslim city of
Mecca.
Summary: Modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia established;
Date: 1932;
Description: The modern Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is formally established
under the reign of King Abdul Aziz Al Saud with a system of government
based on Islamic law.
Summary: U.S.-Saudi diplomatic relations established;
Date: 1933;
Description: United States and Saudi Arabia establish diplomatic
relations.
Summary: Saudi Arabia starts large scale oil production;
Date: 1940s;
Description: Saudi Arabia starts large scale oil production after World
War II.
Summary: Saudi King meets with President Roosevelt;
Date: 1945;
Description: The meeting between King Abdul Aziz and President Franklin
D. Roosevelt to discuss oil and security is considered the start of
more robust U.S.-Saudi relations.
Summary: State of Israel established;
Date: 1948; Description: In 1948,
Israel is established with support from the United States and
overwhelming Arab opposition.
Summary: Saudi Arabia allies with the United States in fighting
communism;
Date: 1950s;
Description: U.S. and Saudi governments pursue
some common national security objectives, including combating the
global spread of communism. U.S. administrations consider the Saudi
monarchy as an ally against nationalist and socialist governments in
the Middle East.
Summary: First U.S. military training mission organized under the terms
of the U.S. and Saudi mutual defense assistance agreement;
Date: 1953;
Description: United States provides military training assistance to
Saudi Arabia under the terms of the Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and
the Mutual Security Act of 1951.
Summary: First multilateral charitable organization founded in Saudi
Arabia;
Date: 1960s;
Description: The Muslim World League, one of
several multilateral charitable organizations, is established with
headquarters in Saudi Arabia to promote Islam and extend economic aid
to Muslim nations.
Summary: Oil production creates great wealth in Saudi Arabia;
Date: 1970s;
Description: Oil production in the 1970s makes Saudi Arabian per
capita income comparable to that of other developed countries. As the
price of oil rises, Saudi Arabia's wealth and political influence
increase.
Summary: Iran is established as an Islamic state; Soviets invade
Afghanistan; Extremists attack Grand Mosque in Mecca;
Date: 1979;
Description: The Islamic Republic of Iran is established after the
ouster of the Shah, signaling the rise of political Islam as a
challenge to existing regimes in the region. The Soviet army invades
Afghanistan in December, prompting opposition from some Arab
governments as well as from the United States and its allies.
Religious extremists seize the Grand Mosque of Mecca; the Saudi
government regains control and executes the perpetrators.
Summary: Saudi Arabia and United States aid the mujahideen against the
Soviets in Afghanistan;
Date: 1980s;
Description: Volunteers from some Muslim countries, including Saudi
Arabia, join the Afghan mujahideen (the name given to Afghan resistance
fighters) in their fight against the Soviets. The United States and
Saudi Arabia play a leading role in supporting the mujahideen.
Summary: United States establishes military installations in Saudi
Arabia;
Date: 1991;
Description: The United States establishes military installations in
Saudi Arabia during the U.S.-led and Saudi-supported ouster of the
Iraqi army from Kuwait. The bases draw intense opposition from Al
Qaeda, which was founded 3 years earlier.
Summary: Bombing of the World Trade Center kills 6;
Date: 1993;
Description: Terrorists, some with links to Al Qaeda, use a car bomb to
attack the World Trade Center in New York City killing 6 people and
injuring 1,042.
Summary: Saudi government strips Osama bin Laden of citizenship;
Islamists arrested in Saudi Arabia;
Date: 1994;
Description: Citing his support of extremist movements, Saudi Arabia
strips Osama bin Laden of Saudi citizenship. Saudi authorities arrest
hundreds of Islamists who have been openly critical of the Saudi
government.
Summary: Terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia kills 5 Americans;
Date: 1995;
Description: Saudi terrorists use a truck bomb to attack the Riyadh
headquarters of the U.S.-operated training center of the Saudi
National Guard resulting in the death of 5 Americans, among others.
Summary: Bombings in Saudi Arabia kill 19 Americans;
Date: 1996;
Description: Terrorist bombings at U.S. military complex in Khobar,
eastern Saudi Arabia, kill 19 Americans and wound many others. The
attack is conducted by Saudi Hizaballah.
Summary: Saudi Arabia recognizes the Taliban regime in Afghanistan;
Date: 1997;
Description: The Taliban rise to power in Afghanistan in
1996, imposing a strict interpretation of Islamic law on Afghan
society. In 1997, Saudi Arabia becomes one of three countries to
recognize the Taliban regime.
Summary: UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1267;
Date: 1999;
Description: The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 1267
imposing financial and other sanctions applying to individuals and
entities associated with Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and/or the
Taliban.
Summary: Start of the Palestinian uprising strains U.S.-Saudi
relations; Attack on USS Cole;
Date: 2000; Description: Dissatisfaction in Saudi Arabia and many parts
of the Arab world with U.S. policies related to the second Palestinian
intifada (or uprising). Frustrated by a lack of U.S. response to
Israeli-Palestinian violence, in a letter to President Bush in 2001,
Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah warns of a serious rift between the two
governments. Al Qaeda attack on the USS Cole harbored in Yemen kills 17
American soldiers.
Summary: Al Qaeda attacks United States; Saudi Arabia condemns
September 11th attacks on the United States; U.S. and allied forces
attack the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan;
Date: 2001;
Description: On September 11th, the World Trade Center in New York and
the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. are the targets of terrorist attacks,
and a hijacked plane crashes in Pennsylvania. The attacks are carried
out by 19 Al Qaeda hijackers, including 15 Saudi nationals. Saudi
Arabia condemns the attack and withdraws its official recognition of
the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which is an ally of Al Qaeda.
U.S. forces, along with those of several allies and Afghanistan's
Northern Alliance, topple the Taliban regime and remove the safe haven
for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Some Al Qaeda survivors return to their
countries of origin, including Saudi Arabia.
Summary: United States begins military operations in Iraq; Major
terrorist incidents in Saudi Arabia;
Date: 2003; Description: The United States and its coalition of allies
begin military operations in Iraq in March. Saudi Arabia publicly
opposes the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, but reportedly allows the U.S.-
led forces the use of military facilities in the Kingdom in support of
operations in Iraq. However, virtually all U.S. troops are withdrawn
from the Kingdom by August. Several terrorist incidents in Saudi
Arabia, including attacks in May and November on residential compounds,
kill dozens of people.
Summary: Iraqi insurgency attracts foreign fighters, including Saudis;
Date: 2003 to present;
Description: Iraqi insurgency attracts foreign fighters, including
Saudi nationals.
Summary: Escalation in terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia and Saudi
government retaliation;
Date: 2004;
Description: A series of terrorist attacks throughout Saudi Arabia
results in dozens of victims. The targets include Saudi Arabia's oil
infrastructure and the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah. Saudi security forces
intensify their antiterrorist campaign, with casualties on both sides,
including Abdulaziz al-Mughrin, the head of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Saudi Ministries and Agencies that Have Functions Related
to Countering Terrorism and Terrorism Financing:
Saudi ministries and agencies: Ministry of Interior;
Description:
Primary ministry responsible for efforts to combat terrorism and
terrorism financing. It has issued "most wanted" list of terrorists and
its security forces have killed or arrested terrorist suspects. The
ministry also includes investigative units and oversees the Saudi
rehabilitation program for terrorism suspects. The ministry oversees
public security, coast guards, civil defense, fire stations, border
police, and special security and investigative functions, including
criminal investigation.
Saudi ministries and agencies: Saudi Arabian Financial Investigation
Unit;
Description: This unit, which is within in the Ministry of
Interior, was created in 2005 and tasked with handling money laundering
and terror finance cases. All banks are required to file suspicious
transaction reports with this unit. It collects and analyzes these
reports and other available information and makes referrals to relevant
Saudi agencies, including the Mabahith for further investigation and
prosecution.
Saudi ministries and agencies: Mabahith;
Description: Also referred to as the General Investigation Directorate,
it investigates cases related to terrorism, among other activities.
Saudi ministries and agencies: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency;
Description: Serves as the central bank of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
It plays a central role in overseeing all anti-money laundering and
combating financing of terrorism programs and supervises all banking,
securities, and insurance activities in the country.
Saudi ministries and agencies: Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
Description: Oversees political, cultural, and financial international
relations; monitors diplomatic relations. Signs bilateral agreements,
including those related to counterterrorism, and coordinates efforts
with other governments.
Saudi ministries and agencies: Ministry of Finance;
Description: Oversees government finance, including budgeting and
expenditure of all ministries and agencies; controls national economic
growth, zakat, income tax, and customs.
Saudi ministries and agencies: Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments,
Call and Guidance;
Description: Oversees all Islamic affairs, including maintenance of
mosques and monitoring of clerics. The ministry is reported to have
dismissed a large number of extremist clerics and sent them to be
reeducated.
Saudi ministries and agencies: Ministry of Education;
Description: Oversees all schools, including physical infrastructure
and curriculum. One of its priorities is to increase awareness and
religious tolerance among teachers.
Source: GAO summary of Saudi government information.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: U.S. Agencies Providing Training and Technical Assistance
to Saudi Arabia, 2005-2008:
U.S. agency: Department of Defense (DOD);
Associated activities:
* Along with State and DOE, assists the Saudi government with the
protection of critical infrastructure assets, such as oil
installations, through the Office of Program Management-Ministry of
Interior (OPM-MOI)--a U.S.-Saudi joint organization.
U.S. agency: Department of Energy (DOE);
Associated activities:
* Along with DOD and State, assists the Saudi government with the
protection of critical infrastructure assets, such as oil
installations, through OPM-MOI. DOE has provided training to Saudi
officials on conducting facilities assessments, as well as performed
joint assessments of key facilities.
U.S. agency: Department of Homeland Security;
Associated activities:
* Provided training to Saudi Customs officials on interdiction and
investigation related to bulk cash smuggling.
U.S. agency: Department of Justice;
Associated activities:
* Provided training to Saudi officials, through the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, on financial investigation techniques.
U.S. agency: Department of State (State);
Associated activities:
* Leads the U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia;
* Provided training to Saudi government officials related to building
investigative capability and consulted on oil installation security;
* Along with DOD and DOE, assists the Saudi government with the
protection of critical infrastructure assets, such as oil
installations, through OPM-MOI.
U.S. agency: Department of the Treasury;
Associated activities:
* Through the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, provided training
to, and conducted assessments of, the Saudi Arabian Financial
Investigation Unit;
* Through Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigations, provided
training to Saudi officials on financial investigation techniques.
U.S. agency: Intelligence community;
Associated activities:
* Engages in information sharing with Saudi ministries.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. agency information.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
September 14, 2009:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Combating
Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its
Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism
Financing Efforts Needed," GAO Job Code 320592.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Josh
Harris, Desk Officer, Near Eastern Affairs at (202) 647-7750.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc:
GAO - Mona Sehgal:
NEA - Jeffrey Feltman:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism
and its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter
Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed (GAO-09-883, GAO Code 320592):
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on GAO's
draft report entitled Combating Terrorism: US. Agencies Report Progress
Countering Terrorism and its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued
Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed.
The GAO report recommends the following to the Secretary of State:
Recommendation: We recommend that the Secretary of State direct the
U.S. mission in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to reinstate, in
consultation with relevant U.S. agencies, performance measures related
to preventing the flow of alleged financial support, through mechanisms
such as cash couriers, to terrorists and extremists outside Saudi
Arabia.
Response: The Department concurs that, although Saudi Arabia has made
considerable progress in the fight against terrorism and violent
extremism, more work remains to be done in the critical area of terror
financing. To that end, the Department continues to support close
cooperation with the Saudi authorities to prevent the flow of funds
from private donors inside Saudi Arabia to extremist groups outside the
Kingdom. The Department agrees with the recommendation and will
instruct U.S. Embassy Riyadh, in consultation with key interagency
partners, to ensure that the Mission Strategic Plan reflect the
continued importance of cooperation to combat terror financing,
including by reinstating performance indicators relating to Saudi
enforcement of cash courier regulations.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Special Operations, Low-Intensity Conflict, and Interdependent
Capabilities:
2500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2500:
September 10, 2009:
Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. St. Laurent:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report GAO-09-883, `Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress
Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued
Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed,' dated August 28,
2009, (GAO Code 320592). The Department has reviewed and concurs with
the GAO report.
SO/LIC&IC recognizes the tremendous scope of the GAO engagement subject
and applauds the effort of the GAO study team to highlight the
terrorism threats our Nation faces. DoD appreciates the opportunity to
comment on the GAO draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Garry P. Reid:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations:
Combating Terrorism:
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Zina D. Merritt, (202) 512-5257 or merrittz@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Jason Bair (Assistant Director),
Ashley Alley, Alexandra Bloom, Joe Carney, Tom Costa, Martin de
Alteriis, Mark Dowling, Jonathan Fremont, Etana Finkler, Phillip Farah,
Joel Grossman, Julia Jebo, Charles M. Johnson, Jr., Bruce Kutnick,
Elizabeth Repko, Mona Sehgal, and James Strus made key contributions to
this report. Elizabeth Curda, Davi D'Agostino, Muriel Forster, Barbara
Keller, Eileen Larence, Armetha Liles, Sarah McGrath, and Theresa
Perkins also provided technical assistance.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-860]. Washington, D.C.:
July 31, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to
Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622]. Washington, D.C.:
April 17, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: State Department's Antiterrorism Program Needs
Improved Guidance and More Systematic Assessments of Outcomes.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-336]. Washington, D.C.:
February 29, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist
Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-697]. Washington, D.C.:
May 25, 2007.
Terrorist Financing: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Deliver Counter-
Terrorism-Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-632T]. Washington, D.C.:
April 6, 2006.
Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate U.S
Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical
Assistance Abroad. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-19].
Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2005.
International Affairs: Information on U.S. Agencies' Efforts to Address
Islamic Extremism. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-852].
Washington, D.C.: September 16, 2005.
Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from
Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-859]. Washington, D.C.: September
13, 2005.
Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department
of Homeland Security's Visa Security Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-801[. Washington, D.C.: July 29,
2005.
Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess
Terrorists' Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-163]. Washington, D.C.: November 14,
2003.
Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to
Address the Overseas Threat. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-165]. Washington, D.C.: May 23,
2003.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
is an independent bipartisan entity created by the Congress.
[2] Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
August 3, 2007 (Pub. L. No. 110–53, Sec. 2043).
[3] GAO, International Affairs: Information on U.S. Agencies‘ Efforts
to Address Islamic Extremism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-852] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16,
2005).
[4] GAO, Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to
Coordinate U.S. Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training
and Technical Assistance Abroad, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-19] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24,
2005).
[5] The annual pilgrimage of hajj is one of the five pillars of Islam
and required to be undertaken by all Muslims who are physically and
financially able to do so at least once in their lifetime. Another
pilgrimage to Mecca is called the umrah, which, unlike the hajj, can
be undertaken at any time of the year and is not considered compulsory.
[6] Islam has five pillars or duties required of all observant Muslims.
These duties are: (1) shahada (profession of monotheistic faith), (2)
salat (praying five times a day), (3) zakat (charitable giving), (4)
sawm (fasting annually as a religious observance), and (5) hajj
(pilgrimage to Mecca).
[7] Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab called for a return to the fundamentals
of Islam as embodied in the Quran, Islam‘s holy book, and life of the
Prophet Mohammad.
[8] In contrast, according to World Bank reporting, from 1980 to 1992
Saudi Arabia‘s gross national product per capita declined on average by
3.3 percent annually.
[9] For more information on U.S.-Saudi relations, also see
Congressional Research Service, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S.
Relations, August 13, 2009.
[10] Muslims from many countries, including Saudi Arabia, joined the
Afghan mujahideen as an expression of their religious solidarity as
well as to fight communism.
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-852].
[12] Saudi officials and counterterrorism experts told us that those
attracted to extremism tend to be young adult males.
[13] For more information on Saudi Arabia-related terrorism financing
issues, see Congressional Research Service, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist
Financing Issues, June 11, 2008.
[14] United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 1267 (Oct. 15,
1999) led to the establishment of a committee that created a list of
individuals and entities designated for their association with Al
Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and/or the Taliban.
[15] In this report, we focus on U.S. agency efforts to collaborate
with Saudi Arabia between 2005 and 2009. GAO previously reported (GAO-
05-852) on U.S. agencies‘ assistance to Saudi Arabia in 2005.
[16] U.S. Department of State, U.S. Strategy Toward Saudi Arabia,
Report Pursuant to Section 2043(c) of the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act, P.L. 110-53, January 30, 2008, p. 1.
[17] Pub. L. No. 110–53, Sec. 2043(c).
[18] In this report we did not review the other aspects of the
strategy, such as broader political, social, and economic reforms in
Saudi Arabia and U.S. efforts related to the visa lookout system. For
more information on the processing of visas in Saudi Arabia, see GAO,
Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from
Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-859] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13,
2005).
[19] The Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the
intelligence community and acts as the principal advisor to the
President, the National Security Council, and the Homeland Security
Council for intelligence matters related to national security.
[20] U.S. officials provided us their assessment of progress related to
performance targets from fiscal years 2006 to 2008. Since activities
for fiscal year 2009 were still being implemented at the time of this
review, U.S. officials provided us an assessment of progress through
August 2009.
[21] For the purposes of this report, we define ’support“ as financial
assistance or nonfinancial assistance, which may include individuals,
such as those who go abroad as foreign fighters, and materials, such as
weapons. For a detailed description of ’support“ see 18 U.S.C.
2339A(b).
[22] State told us that the success of an attack is measured by whether
or not it meets its objective. In this case, the Prince was not killed,
which presumably was the objective of the attack.
[23] According to a Saudi government press release, the 330 suspects
tried in courts included 41 non-Saudis. Of the 323 people who were
convicted, 13 were sentenced to prison terms of over 20 years.
[24] In November 2005, the U.S. and Saudi governments instituted the
Strategic Dialogues, including a working group on counterterrorism.
According to State, the Strategic Dialogues constitute a high-level and
institutionalized forum for coordination of U.S.-Saudi interests. State
officials told us that the Strategic Dialogues have not met since 2006.
In place of these meetings, U.S. and Saudi officials told us several
high-level U.S. officials visited Saudi Arabia, such as the Assistant
to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and the
Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. Moreover,
U.S. officials told us that, even though meetings of the Strategic
Dialogues have not occurred, cooperation and coordination between the
U.S. and Saudi governments has expanded significantly since 2006,
especially in the area of counterterrorism.
[25] State documents describe the Abqaiq oil facility as the most
important oil processing facility in Saudi Arabia.
[26] According to the DOE, in 2008 Saudi Arabia produced about 9.3
million barrels of oil per day, making it the world‘s second largest
oil producer.
[27] The 2-day Culture of Peace conference was sponsored by Saudi
Arabia and held at the UN headquarters in New York City.
[28] State has reported that while the Grand Mufti is not part of the
Saudi government, he is the most senior religious scholar in Saudi
Arabia and is influential in shaping Saudi public opinion.
[29] Although we were provided literature produced by the Saudi
government to combat extremism, we did not verify the extent of its use
and distribution within the Kingdom.
[30] Saudi officials estimated the number of large mosques holding
Friday prayers to be 14,000.
[31] The rehabilitation programs in Saudi prisons started in 2004,
while the first aftercare center started in 2007. Other aftercare
centers are under construction.
[32] These experts stated that while initial results after the first 2
years look promising, recidivism rates for criminology programs are
generally measured for a 5-year period to accurately assess the success
of a program.
[33] The rehabilitation programs have yet to receive the final Saudi
detainees from Guantanamo. According to Saudi officials, as of July
2009, 11 Saudi men remain in Guantanamo. Saudi officials told us these
men have been in Guantanamo for nearly 8 years and represent the most
difficult cases for rehabilitation.
[34] Over the past few years, in addition to increased terror attacks
by Al Qaeda, the government of Yemen has faced a growing insurgency in
the north and civil unrest in the south.
[35] In addition, the embassy‘s MSP contains a performance target for
fiscal year 2009 related to Saudi-Yemeni cooperation on capturing and
repatriating extremists.
[36] After it analyzes reports, the Saudi FIU refers money laundering
cases to the Saudi Bureau of Investigation and Prosecution and
terrorism financing cases to the Mabahith (or the General Investigation
Directorate), as necessary. Saudi officials estimated that
approximately 5 percent of the suspicious transaction reports they
receive pertain to terrorism financing.
[37] A core goal of the Egmont Group is to facilitate information
sharing between member FIUs, and its members are given access to a
secure private Web site on which to share information.
[38] The United States was a sponsor of Saudi Arabia for Egmont
membership.
[39] The Saudi guidelines were issued in accordance with the Financial
Action Task Force‘s (FATF) 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering and 9
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.
[40] Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Annual Report
2003-2004, Annex C, ’Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Executive Summary - FATF
Recommendations for Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing
of Terrorism.“
[41] The assessment found that Saudi Arabia was not compliant with the
FATF benchmarks in three areas, and noted (1) a clear definition of
terrorism financing is required to ensure that it is an offense if the
funds are intended for terrorist use, or derived from a legal source;
(2) information requests must currently be routed via SAMA, which may
cause delays; and (3) there is a need to strengthen customer
identification measures for nonbank financial institutions. In 2009,
members of the FATF and the Middle East North African FATF Style
Regional Body conducted another assessment of Saudi Arabia‘s financial
system. U.S. officials told us the results of this assessment would not
be available until 2010.
[42] In 2009, State updated its fiscal year 2009 MSP target related to
UN 1267 to include specific language regarding Saudi enforcement of UN
1267 travel ban provisions.
[43] Additionally, according to State, for over 20 years, the Saudi
government has had regulations requiring all charities to be licensed,
registered, and audited by the Saudi Ministry of Social Affairs.
[44] In the INCSR, it is not clear to which organizations the term
’international charities“ applies.
[45] Between 2002 and 2004, the United States designated branches in
Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Comoros
Islands, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, Netherlands, Pakistan, Somalia,
Tanzania, and the United States.
[46] The UN 1267 Committee has designated some, but not all, branches
of Al Haramain Foundation.
[47] Officials from World Assembly of Muslim Youth stated they would
prefer a regulatory system that would allow them to more easily
transfer money to their affiliates abroad, instead of a complete ban on
the transfer of charitable contributions outside of Saudi Arabia via
the formal financial system. The officials noted that having to pay
cash couriers and local contractors results in less funds being
available for projects.
[48] By comparison, each individual arriving into the United States is
required to declare monetary instruments, such as cash, traveler‘s
checks, or money orders, valued at $10,000 or more.
[49] Hawalas are informal banking systems that allow the transfer of
funds, both domestically and internationally, without the use of the
formal financial institutions.
[50] Treasury officials did not cite an estimated amount of funding
from Saudi-based individuals to Al Qaeda and associated terror groups.
[End of section]
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