Department of State
Additional Steps Needed to Address Continuing Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts Gao ID: GAO-09-874 September 17, 2009The Department of State (State) has designated about two-thirds of its 268 overseas posts as hardship posts. Staff working at such posts often encounter harsh conditions, including inadequate medical facilities and high crime. Many of these posts are vital to U.S. foreign policy objectives and need a full complement of staff with the right skills to carry out the department's priorities. As such, State offers staff at these posts a hardship differential--an additional adjustment to basic pay--to compensate officers for the conditions they encounter and as a recruitment and retention incentive. GAO was asked to assess (1) State's progress in addressing staffing gaps at hardship posts since 2006 and the effect of any remaining gaps, and (2) the extent to which State has used incentives to address staffing gaps at hardship posts. GAO analyzed State data; reviewed relevant documents; met with officials in Washington, D.C.; and conducted fieldwork in five hardship posts.
Despite some progress in addressing staffing shortfalls since 2006, State's diplomatic readiness remains at risk due to persistent staffing and experience gaps at key hardship posts. Several factors contribute to these gaps. First, State continues to have fewer officers than positions, a shortage compounded by the personnel demands of Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, while State has reduced its mid-level experience gap, the department does not anticipate eliminating this gap until 2012 and continues to face difficulties attracting experienced applicants to hardship posts--especially posts of greatest hardship. Third, although State's assignment system has prioritized the staffing of hardship posts, it does not explicitly address the continuing experience gap at such posts, many of which are strategically important, yet are often staffed with less experienced officers. Staffing and experience gaps can diminish diplomatic readiness in several ways, according to State officials. For example, gaps can lead to decreased reporting coverage, loss of institutional knowledge, and increased supervisory requirements for senior staff, detracting from other critical diplomatic responsibilities. State uses a range of incentives to staff hardship posts, but their effectiveness remains unclear due to a lack of evaluation. Incentives to serve in hardship posts range from monetary benefits to changes in service and bidding requirements, such as reduced tour lengths at posts where dangerous conditions prevent some family members from accompanying officers. In a 2006 report on staffing gaps, GAO recommended that State evaluate the effectiveness of its incentive programs for hardship post assignments. In response, State added a question about hardship incentives to a recent employee survey. However, the survey does not fully meet GAO's recommendation for several reasons, including that State did not include several incentives in the survey. State also did not comply with a legal requirement to assess the effectiveness of increasing danger and hardship pay in filling certain posts. Recent legislation increasing Foreign Service Officers' basic pay will increase the cost of existing incentives, thereby heightening the importance that State evaluate its incentives for hardship post assignments to ensure resources are effectively targeted and not wasted.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-874, Department of State: Additional Steps Needed to Address Continuing Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts
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Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2009:
Department Of State:
Additional Steps Needed to Address Continuing Staffing and Experience
Gaps at Hardship Posts:
GAO-09-874:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-874, a report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of
Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of State (State) has designated about two-thirds of its
268 overseas posts as hardship posts. Staff working at such posts often
encounter harsh conditions, including inadequate medical facilities and
high crime. Many of these posts are vital to U.S. foreign policy
objectives and need a full complement of staff with the right skills to
carry out the department‘s priorities. As such, State offers staff at
these posts a hardship differential”an additional adjustment to basic
pay”to compensate officers for the conditions they encounter and as a
recruitment and retention incentive.
GAO was asked to assess (1) State‘s progress in addressing staffing
gaps at hardship posts since 2006 and the effect of any remaining gaps,
and (2) the extent to which State has used incentives to address
staffing gaps at hardship posts. GAO analyzed State data; reviewed
relevant documents; met with officials in Washington, D.C.; and
conducted fieldwork in five hardship posts.
What GAO Found:
Despite some progress in addressing staffing shortfalls since 2006,
State‘s diplomatic readiness remains at risk due to persistent staffing
and experience gaps at key hardship posts. Several factors contribute
to these gaps. First, State continues to have fewer officers than
positions, a shortage compounded by the personnel demands of Iraq and
Afghanistan. Second, while State has reduced its mid-level experience
gap, the department does not anticipate eliminating this gap until 2012
and continues to face difficulties attracting experienced applicants to
hardship posts”especially posts of greatest hardship. Third, although
State‘s assignment system has prioritized the staffing of hardship
posts, it does not explicitly address the continuing experience gap at
such posts, many of which are strategically important, yet are often
staffed with less experienced officers. Staffing and experience gaps
can diminish diplomatic readiness in several ways, according to State
officials. For example, gaps can lead to decreased reporting coverage,
loss of institutional knowledge, and increased supervisory requirements
for senior staff, detracting from other critical diplomatic
responsibilities.
Table: Examples of Overseas Posts with Various Hardship Differentials,
as of September 2008:
Posts: Buenos Aires, Osaka, Paris; Hardship differential (percentage of
base pay): 0;
Hardship: [Empty];
Greatest hardship: [Empty].
Posts: Amman, Bogotá, Windhoek;
Hardship differential (percentage of base pay): 5;
Hardship: [Empty];
Greatest hardship: [Empty].
Posts: Istanbul, Kuala Lumpur, Sao Paulo;
Hardship differential (percentage of base pay): 10;
Hardship: [Empty];
Greatest hardship: [Empty].
Posts: Lima, Mexico City, Moscow;
Hardship differential (percentage of base pay): 15;
Hardship: [Check];
Greatest hardship: [Empty].
Posts: Jeddah, Manila, Sofia;
Hardship differential (percentage of base pay): 20;
Hardship: [Check];
Greatest hardship: [Empty].
Posts: Beirut, Kathmandu, Lagos;
Hardship differential (percentage of base pay): 25;
Hardship: [Check];
Greatest hardship: [Check].
Posts: Monrovia, Nairobi, Shenyang;
Hardship differential (percentage of base pay): 30;
Hardship: [Check];
Greatest hardship: [Check].
Posts: Baghdad, Dushanbe, Kabul;
Hardship differential (percentage of base pay): 35;
Hardship: [Check];
Greatest hardship: [Check].
Source: State.
[End of table]
State uses a range of incentives to staff hardship posts, but their
effectiveness remains unclear due to a lack of evaluation. Incentives
to serve in hardship posts range from monetary benefits to changes in
service and bidding requirements, such as reduced tour lengths at posts
where dangerous conditions prevent some family members from
accompanying officers. In a 2006 report on staffing gaps, GAO
recommended that State evaluate the effectiveness of its incentive
programs for hardship post assignments. In response, State added a
question about hardship incentives to a recent employee survey.
However, the survey does not fully meet GAO‘s recommendation for
several reasons, including that State did not include several
incentives in the survey. State also did not comply with a legal
requirement to assess the effectiveness of increasing danger and
hardship pay in filling certain posts. Recent legislation increasing
Foreign Service Officers‘ basic pay will increase the cost of existing
incentives, thereby heightening the importance that State evaluate its
incentives for hardship post assignments to ensure resources are
effectively targeted and not wasted.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends the Secretary of State (1) take steps to minimize the
experience gap at hardship posts by making the assignment of
experienced officers to such posts an explicit priority consideration,
and (2) develop and implement a plan to evaluate incentives for
hardship post assignments. State generally agreed with our findings and
recommendations.
View GAO-09-874 or key components. For more information, contact Jess
T. Ford at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Persistent Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts Can
Compromise Diplomatic Readiness:
State Has Wide Range of Measures and Incentives to Staff Hardship Posts
but Their Effectiveness is Unclear Due to Lack of Evaluation:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Department of State Generalist Staffing Surplus/Deficit by
Career Track:
Appendix III: 2009 Historically Difficult to Staff and Service Need
Differential Posts:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Number and Percentage of Mid-Level Generalist Positions Filled
by Officers Working above Grade, as of September 30, 2008:
Table 2: Foreign Service Mid-Level Generalists' Surplus/(Deficit)
across Career Tracks, as of December 31, 2008:
Table 3: Financial and Nonfinancial Incentives and Requirements for
Service at Hardship Posts:
Table 4: Foreign Service Generalists' Surplus/(Deficit) across Career
Tracks, as of December 31, 2008:
Table 5: Historically Difficult to Staff and SND Posts for 2009 Summer
Assignments Cycle:
Figures:
Figure 1: Distribution of Overseas Foreign Service Posts and Positions
by Hardship Differential, as of September 30, 2008:
Figure 2: Average Number of Bids per Position by Hardship Differential
for Grades 2, 3, and 4 for 2008:
Figure 3: Average Bids per Generalist Career Track by Hardship
Differential for 2008:
Abbreviations:
DRI: Diplomatic Readiness Initiative:
FSO: Foreign Service Officer:
GEMS: Global Employee Management System:
HR/CDA: Office of Career Development and Assignments:
MC: minister counselor:
OC: counselor:
OIG: Office of Inspector General:
OPM: Office of Personnel Management:
SND: Service Need Differential:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 17, 2009:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Department of State (State) has designated roughly two-thirds of
its 268 overseas posts as hardship posts.[Footnote 1] Staff working in
such locations often encounter harsh environmental and living
conditions that can include inadequate medical facilities, limited
opportunities for spousal employment, poor schools, high levels of
crime, and severe climate. In addition to the high number of hardship
posts State must staff, the number of positions in locations too
dangerous for some family members to accompany an officer has grown
considerably in recent years, from more than 700 in 2006 to over 900 at
the end of fiscal year 2008. Many hardship posts are of critical
importance to U.S. foreign policy objectives and necessitate a full
complement of staff with the right skills to carry out the department's
priorities.
In recent years we have reported on a number of human capital issues
facing State, including staffing deficits at hardship posts that
negatively impact diplomatic readiness.[Footnote 2] We reported in 2002
that State's staffing shortfalls and ineffective assignment system
compromised diplomatic readiness at hardship posts.[Footnote 3]
Subsequently, we reported in 2006 that State had made progress in
addressing overall staffing shortfalls since implementing its
Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI), which enabled the department to
hire and train more than 1,000 employees above attrition from 2002 to
2004; however, the initiative did not fully meet its goals and mid-
level vacancies remained a problem at critical posts.[Footnote 4]
Furthermore, the department faces the continuing challenge of staffing
embassy compounds in the conflict zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. To
help meet these challenges, the Congress authorized additional
positions for State in 2008--the first new positions outside the
department's consular and worldwide security upgrade programs since
2004, according to State. Moreover, State has requested over 700
additional Foreign Service Officer (FSO) staff in its fiscal year 2010
budget request.
In response to your request, this report discusses (1) State's progress
in addressing staffing gaps at hardship posts since 2006 and the effect
of any remaining gaps, and (2) the extent to which State has used
incentives to address staffing gaps at hardship posts.
To address these objectives, we reviewed GAO and State Office of
Inspector General (OIG) reports and analyzed staffing, bidding, and
position data. We also examined surveys conducted by State, analyzed
State documents that outline incentives for hardship service, and
collected data on participation in and funds expended on hardship
incentive programs. Additionally, we met with officials in State's
Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Bureau of
Administration, six regional bureaus, and the American Foreign Service
Association. To assess the impact of staffing gaps and State's use of
hardship incentives firsthand, we conducted fieldwork in Lagos and
Abuja, Nigeria; Shenyang, China; and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
We selected these posts for their level of hardship, their strategic
importance to the United States, and the low number of staff applying
for each position. Specifically, the locations in Nigeria and Shenyang
are posts of greatest hardship and the locations in Saudi Arabia are
hardship posts which, at the time of our visit, had 1-year tours. In
addition to our fieldwork, we conducted telephone interviews with
senior officials in several additional hardship locations, including
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Liberia, and Tajikistan. We also convened an
expert roundtable of several retired senior State officials, all of
whom previously served as ambassadors to hardship posts.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through September
2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
State is the lead agency responsible for implementing American foreign
policy and representing the United States abroad. It staffs
approximately 268 embassies, consulates, and other posts with over
8,000 Foreign Service positions overseas.[Footnote 5] Roughly two-
thirds of these posts are in locations that qualify for a special
salary differential[Footnote 6] to compensate officers for the harsh
living conditions experienced there. The differential ranges from 5 to
35 percent of basic pay and is determined by a number of factors
including extraordinarily difficult living conditions, excessive
physical hardship, or notably unhealthy conditions affecting at least a
majority of employees stationed at such a post.[Footnote 7] Figure 1
shows the distribution of overseas posts and positions by hardship
differential. In general, tours of duty are two years in the United
States and at 20 percent and 25 percent hardship posts. Tours at other
posts are generally three years, although a number of posts in
locations too dangerous for some family members to accompany an officer
carry 1-year tours.
Figure 1: Distribution of Overseas Foreign Service Posts and Positions
by Hardship Differential, as of September 30, 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Hardship differential percentage: 0-10%;
Posts with no or low hardship differential: 149 (52%);
Positions: 3,843 (48%);
Hardship differential percentage: 15-20%;
Hardship posts: 50 (19%);
Positions: 2,008 (25%).
Hardship differential percentage: 25-35%;
Posts of greatest hardship: 79 (29%);
Positions: 2,233 (28%).
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.
[End of figure]
FSOs serving abroad fall into two broad categories: generalists and
specialists. FSO generalists help formulate and implement the foreign
policy of the United States and are grouped into five career tracks:
management, consular, economic, political, and public diplomacy. FSO
specialists provide support services at overseas posts worldwide or in
Washington, D.C., and are grouped into seven major categories:
administration, construction engineering, information technology,
international information and English language programs, medical and
health, office management, and security. State requires its FSOs to be
available for service anywhere in the world, and reserves the ability
to direct officers to any of its posts overseas or to its Washington
headquarters. However, directed assignments are rare. The process of
assigning FSOs to their positions typically begins when the staff
receive a list of upcoming vacancies for which they may compete. Staff
then submit a list of positions for which they want to be considered,
or "bids," to the Office of Career Development and Assignments (HR/CDA)
and consult with their career development officer. The process varies
depending on an officer's grade and functional specialty:
* Entry-level officers' assignments are directed by the Entry Level
Division of HR/CDA with little input from the posts or bureaus.
* Mid-level officers consult with bureaus and overseas posts to market
themselves for their desired positions. Subsequently, HR/CDA convenes
panels to finalize the assignments.[Footnote 8]
* Senior-level officers are selected for their positions by the
Director General,[Footnote 9] following approval of policy-level
positions by a special committee. As with mid-level officers, HR/CDA
convenes a panel to finalize the assignments.
In recent years, State has taken a series of measures to address gaps
and reallocate staff to emerging priority nations. In 2002, State
implemented the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) to address
staffing and training gaps that, according to the department,
endangered U.S. diplomatic readiness. Through the DRI--a 3-year, $197
million program--State hired 1,069 new foreign and civil service
employees above attrition. However, as we previously reported, most of
this increase was absorbed by the demand for personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan. In 2006, State introduced the Global Repositioning
Program, which reallocated existing positions to emerging high-priority
countries in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. The primary focus of
this program was to move political, economic, and public diplomacy
officers from places like Washington and Europe to countries of
increasing strategic importance such as China and India.
Persistent Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts Can
Compromise Diplomatic Readiness:
Despite some progress since we last reported in 2006, State has
continued to face staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts that
may compromise its diplomatic readiness. Several factors contribute to
gaps at hardship posts, including State's overall staff shortage, which
is compounded by the significant personnel demands of Iraq and
Afghanistan, and a mid-level staffing deficit that has been reduced,
but not eliminated. Moreover, State continues to experience difficulty
in attracting officers to hardship posts and its assignment system does
not explicitly address the experience gap at these posts. Staffing and
experience gaps at hardship posts can diminish diplomatic readiness in
a variety of ways, according to current and former State officials,
including by reducing reporting coverage, weakening institutional
knowledge, and increasing the supervisory burden on senior staff.
Staffing and Experience Gaps Remain at Key Hardship Posts:
State continues to face staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts,
including many of significant strategic importance to the United
States. First, State has faced difficulty in filling critical positions
at hardship posts. In its FY 2007 Annual Performance Report, State
identified staffing of critical positions--designated positions at the
posts of greatest hardship (those with hardship differentials of at
least 25 percent)--as a key priority, noting that such positions are
often on the forefront of U.S. policy interests. As such, State
established a target for fiscal year 2007 of filling 90 percent of such
critical positions with qualified bidders by the end of the assignments
cycle.[Footnote 10] However, State reported filling 75 percent of its
critical positions, thereby missing its target. State further noted
that it would be unable to fill more than 75 percent of critical
positions until its resource needs were met. Subsequently, the
department lowered its target to 75 percent for fiscal year 2008, which
it reported it met.
In addition to staffing gaps specific to critical positions, State
faces its highest rate of vacancies at the posts of greatest hardship.
[Footnote 11] As of September 2008, State had a 17 percent average
vacancy rate at the posts of greatest hardship--nearly double the
average rate of 9 percent at posts with no hardship
differentials.[Footnote 12] Vacancies at posts we visited during our
review included a mid-level public affairs position in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia,[Footnote 13] that was vacant as of September 2008 and, at the
time of our March 2009 visit, was not expected to be filled until June
2009. Similarly, a section chief in Lagos, Nigeria,[Footnote 14] stated
that prior to his arrival at post in August 2008, his position had been
vacant for nearly a year. Although there were few vacancies in
Shenyang, China,[Footnote 15] at the time of our visit, nearly one-
quarter of the staffed positions had been vacant for 4 months or more
before their current incumbents arrived.
Beyond higher position vacancy rates, posts of greatest hardship face
experience gaps due to a higher rate of staff filling positions above
their own grades (see table 1).[Footnote 16] As of September 2008,
about 34 percent of mid-level generalist positions at posts of greatest
hardship were filled by officers in upstretch assignments[Footnote 17]--
15 percentage points higher than the upstretch rate for comparable
positions at posts with no or low differentials. Furthermore, as of the
same date, 25 of 34 (over 70 percent) of all overseas generalists
working two grades above their rank were located at hardship posts.
[Footnote 18]
Table 1: Number and Percentage of Mid-Level Generalist Positions Filled
by Officers Working above Grade, as of September 30, 2008:
Posts with no or low differentials: 210 of 1,093 (19 percent);
Hardship posts: 328 of 1,053 (31 percent);
Posts of greatest hardship: 189 of 551 (34 percent).
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[End of table]
At posts we visited during our review, we observed numerous officers
working in positions above their rank. For example, in Abuja, Nigeria,
[Footnote 19] more than 4 in every 10 positions were staffed by
officers in upstretch assignments, including several employees working
in positions two grades above their own. We also found multiple
officers in upstretch assignments in Shenyang, including one mid-level
consular position that officials stated has never been filled at grade.
Several Factors Contribute to Gaps at Hardship Posts:
A number of factors lead to gaps at hardship posts, including:
* State's overall staff shortage, which is compounded by the
significant personnel demands of Iraq and Afghanistan;
* a persistent mid-level staffing deficit exacerbated by continued low
bidding on hardship posts; and:
* an assignment system that does not explicitly address the continuing
experience gap at hardship posts.
Overall Foreign Service Staffing Shortage Compounded by Personnel Needs
of Iraq and Afghanistan:
As of April 2009, State had about 1,650 vacant Foreign Service
positions in total. Approximately 270 of these vacancies were due to
State not having enough employees to fill all of its positions--a
shortfall that has grown since our last report.[Footnote 20] Officers
attending training or rotating from post to post without replacements
to fill their positions accounted for most of the remaining 1,380
vacancies.[Footnote 21] As we reported in 2006, State implemented DRI
with the intention of hiring enough new employees above attrition to
allow staff time for critical job training--also referred to as a
"training float"--and to respond to emerging crises. However, as we
previously reported, this goal became quickly outdated largely due to
staffing demands for Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, due to the
overall shortage of FSOs and the high priority of meeting Iraq and
Afghanistan's staffing needs, bureaus have had to identify nearly 670
positions to leave unfilled, or "frozen," since 2005. As a result,
State has generally been able to find candidates to fill positions in
Iraq and Afghanistan[Footnote 22]--its top priority posts--but doing so
has created gaps elsewhere, including at other hardship posts. For
instance, positions that bureaus decided not to fill in the 2009
assignments cycle included several positions at hardship posts, such as
an economic officer in Lagos, a management officer in Shenyang, and
three or more positions each in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; Mexico City,
Mexico; and Moscow, Russia.
State officials also noted that the pressing need to staff Iraq and
Afghanistan has led officers serving elsewhere to interrupt or cancel
their current tours and volunteer for service in those two countries,
thereby leaving other posts with unexpected gaps. For example, a senior
official stated that a key political/military officer position in
Russia was vacant due to the incumbent volunteering for a year of
service in Afghanistan. The senior official further stated that he
anticipated it would be difficult to find a temporary replacement for
the unexpected vacancy. Similarly, officials in the Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs told us an officer who received nearly a year
of language training in Vietnamese canceled her tour in Vietnam to
serve in Iraq.
Although State recently received a significant increase in resources
and has requested more, the extent to which this influx will allow the
department to eliminate vacancies is unclear. State received funding
for about 140 additional Foreign Service positions in fiscal year 2008.
Subsequently, in fiscal year 2009, State received about 720 additional
Foreign Service positions that, according to the department, largely
allowed it to fill vacancies created by personnel serving in Iraq and
Afghanistan and increases in language training.[Footnote 23] The
department has requested nearly 740 additional Foreign Service
positions for fiscal year 2010 that, according to State's 2010
Congressional Budget Justification, will allow it to begin expanding
its presence according to strategic priorities. However, given that
about 1,650 positions were vacant as of April 2009, it is unclear if
the approximately 1,600 positions received or requested will enable
State to both eliminate vacancies and expand its operations as stated.
[Footnote 24]
Despite Some Progress, Mid-Level Experience Gap Remains:
While new resources may enable State to partially address vacancies and
the department has reduced its mid-level deficit since 2006, the
remaining shortage of mid-level officers represents a continuing
experience gap. As of December 2008, State had 85 fewer mid-level
generalist officers than positions (see table 2)--an improvement on the
deficit of 316 that we previously reported. However, as of the same
date, State faced a 28 percent greater deficit at the FS-02 level than
it did in 2006, with mid-level positions in the public diplomacy and
consular cones continuing to experience the largest shortages of staff
overall.
Table 2: Foreign Service Mid-Level Generalists' Surplus/(Deficit)
across Career Tracks, as of December 31, 2008:
Grade level: Mid level 1;
Management: (37);
Consular: 17;
Economic: 44;
Political: 57;
Public diplomacy: (67);
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty];
Total Surplus/(Deficit): 14.
Grade level: Mid level 2;
Management: (84);
Consular: 51;
Economic: 36;
Political: 16;
Public diplomacy:
Grade level: (223);
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty];
Total Surplus/(Deficit): (204).
Grade level: Mid level 3;
Management: 87;
Consular: (129);
Economic: 19;
Political: 8;
Public diplomacy: 120;
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty];
Total Surplus/(Deficit): 105.
Grade level: Total;
Management: (34);
Consular: (61);
Economic: 99;
Political: 81;
Public diplomacy: (170);
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: (85);
Total Surplus/(Deficit): [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[End of table]
According to a senior State official, the department will continue to
face a deficit at the FS-02 level until 2012. The official told us that
the department plans to manage this experience gap by assigning
officers in the FS-03 grade to stretch positions. However, as we
discuss later in this report, positions filled by officers in upstretch
assignments can compromise diplomatic readiness. State has also
accelerated promotions of FS-03 officers to address the experience gap.
For instance, State's Five-Year Workforce Plan for Fiscal Years 2008
through 2012 projects that it will take about 8 years for officers
hired in 2008 to be promoted to the FS-02 level. By contrast, officers
promoted to the FS-02 level in 2003 had an average time-in-service of
10.7 years. However, according to State, additional acceleration of
promotions is unlikely given the potential risks associated with
promoting officers with insufficient experience.
Despite Improvements, Low Bidding on Hardship Posts Continues to
Exacerbate Mid-Level and Other Staffing Deficits:
Although hardship posts have experienced an increase in bidding since
we last reported, they continue to have difficulty attracting bids from
experienced officers. Figure 2 shows the average number of bids on FS-
02, FS-03, and FS-04 positions at overseas posts by differential rate
for the 2008 summer assignments cycle.[Footnote 25]
Figure 2: Average Number of Bids per Position by Hardship Differential
for Grades 2, 3, and 4 for 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Uncollected AD/CV Duties
Difference Between Estimated and Final AD/CV Duty Rate (Percentage
Points)
Hardship differential percentage: 0;
Bids/Positions: Median, 2008: 18.3;
Bids/Positions: Median, 2005: 22.0;
Bids/Positions:
Muscat: 2.5;
Matamoros: 4;
Rabat: 7.3;
Berlin: 8.6;
Prague: 9.5;
Helsinki: 11;
Osaka-Kobe: 12;
Bridgetown: 12.8;
Paris: 13.7;
Gaborone: 14.8;
Montevideo: 19;
Wellington: 20;
Santiago: 21;
Nagoya: 22;
Toulouse: 24;
Buenos Aires: 25.2;
Singapore: 28.7;
Perth: 30;
Barcelona: 31;
Belfast: 32;
Toronto: 34.5;
Nicosia: 36;
Sydney: 39.
Hardship differential percentage: 5%;
Bids/Positions: Median, 2008: 11.8;
Bids/Positions: Median, 2005: 13.3;
Bids/Positions:
Amman: 5.1;
Hermosillo; 8;
Johannesburg: 9.4;
Bogota: 13;
Reykjavik: 15;
Port Louis: 17.5;
Windhoek: 20.3.
Hardship differential percentage: 10%;
Bids/Positions: Median, 2008: 12.4;
Bids/Positions: Median, 2005: 12.4;
Bids/Positions:
Nuevo Laredo: 2;
Adana: 4;
Brasilia: 6.8;
Kuwait: 8.2;
Durban: 9.3;
Sao Paulo: 14.3;
Riga: 16.6;
Bangkok: 18.2;
Kuala Lumpur: 21.1;
Istanbul: 26.4;
Chiang Mai: 37.
Hardship differential percentage: 15%;
Bids/Positions: Median, 2008: 10.0;
Bids/Positions: Median, 2005: 9.7;
Bids/Positions:
Kingston: 4.5;
Ciudad Juarez: 6.4;
Moscow: 7.8;
Beijing: 10.7;
Mexico City: 12.9;
Belgrade: 14.7;
Lima: 15.9;
Bucharest: 17;
Bandar Seri Begewan: 19.5;
Suva: 26.
Hardship differential percentage: 20%;
Bids/Positions: Median, 2008: 7.9;
Bids/Positions: Median, 2005: 6.0;
Bids/Positions:
Kolonia: 2;
Abidjan: 3.3;
Riyadh: 6.2;
Jeddah: 6.4;
Podgorica: 8.7;
Dhahran: 9.8;
Minsk: 10.9;
Lusaka: 12;
Manila: 13.7;
Sofia: 16.3;
Belmopan: 20.
Hardship differential percentage: 25+%;
Bids/Positions: Median, 2008: 4.5;
Bids/Positions: Median, 2005: 3.2;
Bids/Positions:
Juba: 0;
Shenyang: 1.5;
Lagos: 2.6;
Abuja: 3;
Monrovia: 3.8;
Georgetown: 4.4;
Dushanbe: 5.3;
Dili: 6;
Beirut: 7.9;
Baku: 8.8;
Nairobe: 9.8;
Phonm Penh: 11.6;
Kathmandu: 12.8.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: The lines in the graph show the median of the average number of
bids for each differential rate. Selected posts are named as examples
of locations at each hardship differential.
[End of figure]
Since our 2006 report, the median average[Footnote 26] of all bids on
hardship posts has increased by about 20 percent (from 5 to 6).
[Footnote 27] The increase has been more pronounced for posts of
greatest hardship, which received a median average of 4.5 bids per post
in 2008--about 40 percent higher than the median average of 3.2 bids we
previously reported. However, hardship posts continue to have
difficulty attracting bids from experienced officers. Specifically,
positions at hardship posts received a median average of 4 bids from at-
grade officers, including a median average of 2.7 at-grade bids for
positions at the posts of greatest hardship. By contrast, posts with no
or low hardship differentials received a median average of over 9 at-
grade bids. Furthermore, as of September 2008, hardship posts comprised
over 90 percent (62 of 67) of posts that State classified as
historically difficult to staff[Footnote 28] for 2009.
Low bidding on hardship posts exacerbates State's staffing deficits--
particularly its shortage of mid-level consular and public diplomacy
officers. Figure 3 shows the average number of bids per generalist
career track for each hardship differential in the summer 2008
assignments cycle. While all generalist career tracks received about 3
to 4 times fewer bids at the posts of greatest hardship than at posts
with no differentials in 2008, consular and public diplomacy positions
received among the fewest bids on average--3.6 and 4.3, respectively.
Given that State faces its largest staff shortages in mid-level
consular and public diplomacy positions, low bidding for such positions
at hardship posts increases the difficulty of filling them.
Figure 3: Average Bids per Generalist Career Track by Hardship
Differential for 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Hardship differential percentage: 0%;
Consular: 14.1;
Economic: 17.8;
Management: 19.7;
Political: 15.5;
Public diplomacy: 12.5.
Hardship differential percentage: 5%;
Consular: 7.6;
Economic: 18.5;
Management: 13;
Political: 10.8;
Public diplomacy: 6.3.
Hardship differential percentage: 10%;
Consular: 11.2;
Economic: 12.6;
Management: 14.8;
Political: 15.2;
Public diplomacy: 8.3.
Hardship differential percentage: 15%;
Consular: 6.4
Economic: 14.5
Management: 4
Political: 8
Public diplomacy: 7.8
Hardship differential percentage: 20%;
Consular: 4.5;
Economic: 11.6;
Management: 11.2;
Political: 7;
Public diplomacy: 10.1.
Hardship differential percentage: 25+%;
Consular: 3.6;
Economic: 6.2;
Management: 6.1;
Political: 5.7;
Public diplomacy: 4.1.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[End of figure]
State's Assignment System Prioritizes Staffing of Key Hardship Posts,
but Does Not Explicitly Address Continuing Experience Gap:
State has taken steps in recent years to prioritize staffing of
hardship posts. For example, in the 2007 assignments cycle, State
assigned staff to hardship positions it considered critical--including
in Iraq and Afghanistan--prior to assigning staff to positions
elsewhere. Similarly, in the 2008 assignments cycle, State assigned
staff to the posts of greatest hardship before assigning staff
elsewhere. However, as we noted earlier in this report, hardship posts
face a higher rate of upstretch assignments than posts with no or low
differentials--an experience gap that State's assignment system does
not explicitly address. For example, while State's instructions to
bidders for the 2007 and 2008 assignments cycles did emphasize the
staffing of hardship positions, the instructions did not differentiate
between filling the positions with at-grade officers and filling them
with officers below the positions' grades. Although State's
instructions to bidders clearly state that employees bidding on stretch
assignments compete against at-grade bidders, the low number of at-
grade bids on hardship positions limits the likelihood that such
positions will be filled by at-grade officers. Furthermore, in the
assignments cycles for 2007 through 2009, State consistently permitted
upstretch assignments to hardship posts 1 to 3 months prior to
permitting upstretch assignments to posts with low or no hardship
differentials, which may have encouraged officers with less experience
to bid on hardship posts. According to State, upstretch assignments can
be career-enhancing in some cases; however, the experience gap they
represent--particularly at the mid-levels--can compromise diplomatic
readiness.
Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts Can Compromise
Diplomatic Readiness:
Current and former State officials, including recently retired
ambassadors and former directors general who participated in a GAO
expert roundtable, staff currently posted overseas, and officials in
Washington told us that staffing gaps at hardship posts diminish
diplomatic readiness in a variety of ways. According to these
officials, gaps can lead to decreased reporting coverage, loss of
institutional knowledge, and increased supervisory requirements for
senior staff, which take time away from other critical diplomatic
responsibilities.
Senior management at selected posts had concerns that vacant positions
caused an increased workload on officers at posts, which may detract
from important functions. For example, the economic officer position in
Lagos, whose responsibility is solely focused on energy, oil, and
natural gas, was not filled in the 2009 cycle. The incumbent explained
that, following his departure, his reporting responsibilities will be
split up between officers in Abuja and Lagos. He said this division of
responsibilities would diminish the position's focus on the oil
industry and potentially lead to the loss of important contacts within
both the government ministries and the oil industry. A 2008 Office of
Inspector General (OIG) inspection of Freetown, Sierra Leone, noted
concern over the effect of a sudden vacancy when the embassy's sole
political/economic officer cut his tour short to serve in Iraq.
[Footnote 29] This vacancy deprived the embassy of its only reporting
officer and the resulting transition period caused officials in
Washington to be dissatisfied with economic reporting on issues such as
the diamond industry and its impact on political instability, money
laundering, drug smuggling, and, perhaps, terrorism. Similarly, an
official told us that a political/military officer position in Russia
was vacant because of the departure of the incumbent for a tour in
Afghanistan, and the position's portfolio of responsibilities was
divided among other officers in the embassy. According to the official,
this vacancy slowed negotiation of an agreement with Russia regarding
military transit to Afghanistan.
Another potentially adverse effect of staffing gaps is that important
post-level duties, such as reporting and staff development, may suffer
from inexperience when entry-level officers are staffed to mid-level
positions. While officials at post said that some officers in stretch
positions perform well, others told us that the inexperience of entry-
level officers serving in mid-level capacities can have a negative
impact. For example, the economic section chief at one post we visited
stated that reporting produced by an entry-level officer in a mid-level
position lacked the necessary analytical rigor. The political section
chief at the same post noted that a mid-level position responsible for
reporting on terrorism was staffed by an officer serving two grades
above his current grade level with no previous reporting experience. A
2008 OIG inspection of N'Djamena, Chad, found that difficulties
attracting staff with the requisite skills and experience contributed
to deviations from standard operating procedures.[Footnote 30]
Another consequence of staffing gaps is that senior-level staff at
posts with no experienced mid-level officers are diverted from key
responsibilities by the need to supervise inexperienced entry-level
staff. In 2006, we found that senior staff at several posts spent more
time on operational matters and less time on overall planning, policy,
and coordination than should be the case. On our recent visits, we
found that there are still inexperienced officers taking on mid-level
responsibilities and that these officers require more supervision and
guidance from senior post leadership than more experienced mid-level
officers would require; as a result, the senior officers have less time
to perform high-level planning and policy implementation. According to
officials we met with, inexperienced officers sometimes perform
essential tasks such as adjudicating visas, identifying political
trends, and assisting American citizens abroad; therefore, they often
require guidance on how to carry out such activities. When senior-level
officials must serve as the only source of guidance, post officials
explained, they have less ability to plan and coordinate policy. For
example, the ambassador to Nigeria told us spending time helping
officers in stretch positions is a burden and interferes with policy
planning and implementation. The consular chief in Shenyang told us he
spends too much time helping entry-level officers adjudicate visas and,
therefore, less time managing the section. A 2008 OIG inspection of
N'Djamena, Chad, reported that the entire front office was involved in
mentoring entry-level officers and that this was an unfair burden on
the ambassador and deputy chief of mission, given the challenging
nature of the post.[Footnote 31]
In addition to gaps in established positions, some State officials at
overseas posts told us that there are not enough authorized positions
to manage the heavy workload at some posts. These officials stated that
even if the department had an adequate number of people to fill all
current positions, there would still be a need for additional positions
and officers to fill them because the current workload outweighs the
workforce. For example, a senior official at one post told us that her
embassy did not have enough authorized management positions to support
the rapid increase in staff for all government agencies located there.
As a result, the ambassador placed a moratorium on the addition of any
new staff from any agency until the embassy received more management
officer positions. The official explained that the moratorium has
prevented some agencies from adding staff to implement important
programs related to health, education, and counternarcotics efforts.
During the GAO expert roundtable of former ambassadors to hardship
posts, a former director general said that one of his former posts had
so many visitors that four officers had to deal primarily with visits
and not their other responsibilities. In addition, according to the
ambassador to Liberia, the embassy in Monrovia lacks adequate staff
positions to meet its goals. She said it is not uncommon for one
section to work twenty hours of overtime in one week. The ambassador
listed four new positions that she believes should be authorized but,
according to her, will not likely be added in the next few years. The
State OIG also commented on the need for reasonable growth in Monrovia
in a 2008 mission inspection.[Footnote 32] A 2009 OIG inspection of
Nouakchott, Mauritania, noted concern that without another political
officer in the embassy, the post would not have the depth needed to
adequately cover the rapidly evolving political situation and achieve
department goals in the country.[Footnote 33] Similarly, officials in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, noted that the creation and filling of a
political/economic section chief position, as they have requested in
their Mission Strategic Plan, would alleviate the current need for
entry-level officers to report directly to the consul general.
State Has Wide Range of Measures and Incentives to Staff Hardship Posts
but Their Effectiveness is Unclear Due to Lack of Evaluation:
State uses a range of incentives to staff hardship posts, but their
effectiveness remains unclear due to a lack of evaluation. Incentives
to serve in hardship posts range from monetary benefits to changes in
service and bidding requirements. In 2006, we recommended that State
evaluate the effectiveness of its incentive programs for hardship post
assignments, but the department has not yet done so systematically.
Further, recent legislation will increase the cost of existing
incentives, thereby increasing the need for State to fully evaluate its
incentives to ensure resources are effectively targeted and not wasted.
State Has a Wide Range of Measures and Other Incentives to Staff
Hardship Posts:
State has created a wide range of measures and financial and
nonfinancial incentives to encourage mid-level officers to seek
assignments to--and remain at--hardship posts around the world. These
have included some measures designed for all hardship posts, as well as
others tailored specifically to fill positions in Iraq and Afghanistan,
posts State has declared to be the highest priority.
In addition to hardship and danger pay, incentives to bid on--and
remain in--hardship posts, particularly those considered historically
difficult to staff, include:
* The opportunity to include upstretch jobs on core bid list. Mid-level
officers may include bids for upstretch positions in their "core bid"
list, provided that the position is at a hardship post or the officer
is serving at a hardship post when the bid list is due.[Footnote 34]
State generally requires employees to maintain a list of six "core
bids" on positions at their grade level. State often offers upstretch
assignments as a reward for strong performance and as a career-
enhancing opportunity.
* Eligibility to receive student loan repayments. Officers who accept
assignments to posts with at least a 20 percent hardship differential
or any danger pay allowance may be offered student loan repayments as a
recruitment or retention incentive.
* Extra pay to extend tour in certain posts. Employees who accept a 3-
year assignment at certain historically difficult to staff posts
qualifying for the Service Need Differential (SND) program are eligible
to receive an additional hardship differential over and above existing
hardship differentials, equal to 15 percent of the employee's basic
compensation.[Footnote 35]
* One year of service at unaccompanied or certain difficult to staff
posts. State has established a 1-year tour of duty at posts considered
too dangerous for some family members to accompany an officer, in
recognition of the difficulty of serving at such posts. Additionally,
employees may negotiate shorter tours to historically difficult to
staff posts, provided it is in the interest of the service.
* Consideration for promotion. State instructs the selection boards who
recommend employees for promotion to "...weigh positively creditable
and exemplary performance at hardship and danger posts..." However, the
instructions only identify Iraq and Afghanistan by name.
State has taken special measures to fill positions in Iraq and
Afghanistan, including assigning officers to these two posts before
assigning them to other posts. Incentives for officers to serve in Iraq
and Afghanistan include:
* Priority consideration for onward assignments. State has instituted a
program whereby a Foreign Service employee may be selected for his/her
assignment for 2010 at the same time as he/she is selected for a 2009
Iraq assignment.
* The option to serve in Iraq or Afghanistan on detail and extend
current assignment. State allows officers to serve in Iraq or
Afghanistan on detail from Washington or their current post of
assignment, which provides financial and other benefits. For example,
officers serving on detail from Washington, D.C., retain locality
pay.[Footnote 36] Moreover, according to State officials, officers who
leave their families at their current post of assignment to serve on
detail avoid the disruption of moving their families and may extend
their tour at their current post of assignment from 3 years to 4 years,
which may be particularly attractive for officers with school age
children as it enables more educational continuity.[Footnote 37]
* Favorable consideration for promotion. State's selection boards that
recommend employees for promotion are expected to look favorably on
service in Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, State instructs the
boards to "particularly credit performance in Provincial Reconstruction
Teams and other regional operations in Iraq, which the President and
Secretary of State have determined to be of the highest priority."
In addition to incentives, State has rules requiring certain employees
to bid on positions at hardship posts. These Fair Share rules require
designated FSOs to bid on a minimum of three posts with a 15 percent or
higher differential pay incentive in two geographic areas.[Footnote 38]
Table 3 lists the various incentives and requirements across posts,
based on hardship differential.
Table 3: Financial and Nonfinancial Incentives and Requirements for
Service at Hardship Posts:
Category: Financial;
5% & 10%:
Hardship differential;
15%:
Hardship differential;
Danger pay;
SND;
Student loan repayment program[A];
20%:
Hardship differential;
Danger pay;
SND;
Student loan repayment program;
25% to 35%:
Hardship differential;
Danger pay;
SND;
Student loan repayment program;
Combat Zones:
Hardship differential;
Danger pay;
Student loan repayment program;
Retain DC locality pay;
Family stays at post if sent on 1-year TDY OR can elect separate
maintenance allowance;
Special differential (20% for FS-01, FS-02, FS-03, and FS-04 levels if
serve more than 180 days).
Category: Nonfinancial;
5% & 10%:
Negotiated tours[B];
Favorable consideration in promotion boards.
15%:
Meets Fair Share requirements;
Staff eligible to bid for a position one grade higher than their
current grade level;
Negotiated tours;
Favorable consideration in promotion boards.
20%:
Meets Fair Share requirements;
Staff eligible to bid for a position one grade higher than their
current grade level;
Negotiated tours;
Favorable consideration in promotion boards.
25% to 35%:
Meets Fair Share requirements;
Staff eligible to bid for a position one grade higher than their
current grade level;
Negotiated tours;
Favorable consideration in promotion boards.
Combat Zones:
Meets Fair Share requirements (after 6 months in Iraq, 10 months in
Afghanistan);
Staff eligible to bid for a position one grade higher than their
current grade level;
Onward assignments;
Favorable consideration in promotion boards;
Extension of previous assignment.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[A] Officers who accept assignments to posts with at least a 20 percent
hardship differential or any danger pay allowance are eligible for
student loan repayments.
[B] Nonstandard tours of duty may be negotiated if a post is
historically difficult to staff and the tour length is in the interest
of the service.
[End of table]
Although State offers a range of incentives, it does not routinely
track or report on their total cost. In response to our request for
cost information, State queried its payroll system and estimated that
it spent about $83 million on hardship pay, $30 million on danger pay,
and about $3 million on SND in fiscal year 2008. The cost information
indicates that the amount spent on financial incentives has increased
in recent years. According to the State OIG, in fiscal year 2005, the
department spent about $65 million on hardship pay, $16 million on
danger pay, and $3 million on SND.[Footnote 39] Separately, State
reports the amount spent on student loan repayments to the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) as part of that office's statutory
requirement to report annually to the Congress on agencies' use of
student loan repayments.[Footnote 40] According to our analysis of data
from OPM's report for 2007, State repaid about $2.5 million of student
loans to FSOs in that year.
Although not all incentives cost money, they may present other
tradeoffs. First, State officials report that the 1-year tour of duty
to Iraq has been a useful recruitment tool.[Footnote 41] However, these
and other officials told us that the 1-year tour length makes it
difficult for FSOs to form the relationships with their counterparts in
other governments necessary for the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. For
example, a State official told us of a recent instance where the U.S.
government needed information on a Middle Eastern country's
relationship with another nation in the region. However, none of the
four political officers at the U.S. embassy in the country had
sufficient contacts with the host government to obtain the information
required. Consequently, the U.S. embassy needed to ask State
headquarters to obtain the information from the host government by way
of that country's embassy in the United States, resulting in delayed
reporting of the information. A former Director General told us that 1-
year tours result in a loss of institutional knowledge and program
continuity. Second, the opportunity to bid on stretch assignments is an
incentive because such assignments may be career-enhancing. However, as
noted earlier in this report, senior officials may need to supervise
and guide officers in stretch positions more than officers in positions
at their current grade levels.
State Has Not Systematically Evaluated Effectiveness of Incentive
Programs for Hardship Post Assignments:
State has not systematically evaluated the effectiveness of its
incentive programs, despite recommendations to do so. Agency officials
cited the difficulty of evaluating the impact of any single incentive
because of the numerous factors involved, but State has not taken
advantage of available tools to evaluate incentive programs. State has
not generated sufficient data to evaluate the impact of the favorable
consideration for promotion and the SND program in attracting employees
to bid on, or remain in, hardship post assignments. State also did not
comply with a congressional mandate to evaluate recent increases in
hardship and danger pay.
State's Effort to Evaluate Effectiveness of Incentive Programs for
Hardship Posts is Insufficient:
State's efforts to evaluate hardship incentives remain insufficient. We
previously reported that State created a number of incentives to
address the growing number of vacancies at hardship posts to achieve
its goal of having the right people in the right place with the right
skills.[Footnote 42] However, in 2006, we reported State had not
measured the effectiveness of hardship incentives, and recommended
State systematically evaluate the effectiveness of such measures,
establishing specific indicators of progress and adjusting the use of
the incentives based on this analysis. State responded to this
recommendation by including a question on the impact of incentives to
its biennial employee quality of life survey, but this step does not
fully respond to our recommendation for three reasons.
First, the survey's incentive question is not specific enough. State
included the question "How important was each of the following in your
decision to bid on overseas positions during the last assignment cycle
in which you submitted bids?" in its most recent Quality of Life at
Work survey. The question then listed 11 items, some of which are
incentives (e.g., hardship pay) and others are generic aspects of
overseas assignments (e.g., security). While the survey provides some
limited information, the survey question does not ask about the
influence of the incentives on officers' willingness to bid on--and
remain in--hardship post assignments. Further, by mixing incentives and
other aspects of hardship post assignments, the question dilutes the
focus on the incentives. Moreover, the list of incentives included is
incomplete. For example, it does not ask employees about the extent to
which the opportunity to include upstretch jobs on their core bid list
or the favorable promotion consideration by selection boards impact
their decisions to bid on hardship post assignments. Excluding some
incentives from the survey hampers State's ability to evaluate the
effectiveness of programs for hardship post assignments individually
and collectively.
Second, the overall survey design has limitations preventing State
officials from segregating responses by post and also does not collect
key demographic information. For example, the survey data do not allow
State officials to determine which responses came from posts with no
hardship differential, such as London, United Kingdom, and which came
from posts of greatest hardship, such as Lagos, Nigeria. The survey
also does not ask respondents for key demographic information, such as
age and family status. The absence of this information makes it
difficult to assess the effectiveness of the incentives as they apply
to posts differently. Further, the appeal of one incentive relative to
another incentive may differ based upon an officer's personal
circumstances.
Third, State did not establish specific indicators of progress against
which to measure the survey responses over time. As previously noted,
State tracks the percentage of critical positions filled with qualified
bidders by the end of the assignments cycle. However, State has not
attempted to link this information to the survey results, as suggested
by government management standards.[Footnote 43] Since the survey
incentive question is so vague, tracking it over time would not provide
a useful indicator of progress to assess the outcomes of its programs
for hardship post assignments.
While State Cites External Constraints for Evaluating Incentives,
Proper Evaluation Design and Execution May Help Meet This Challenge:
State has not taken advantage of available tools to evaluate incentive
programs for hardship post assignments. State officials maintain that
external constraints make it challenging to evaluate the department's
incentive programs. They reported that, in their view, it is not
possible to isolate the effectiveness of a single incentive because of
the large number of factors staff consider when bidding on assignments.
Specifically, the department cited the difficulties of capturing the
personal and family preferences and values that influence bid decisions
in a database.[Footnote 44] While acknowledging the challenges of this
type of analysis, there are statistical methods and procedures to help
determine the extent of association between the key variables of
interest, while controlling for the effect of other measurable factors
that could influence outcomes. Further, cost-effectiveness analysis--
which attempts to systematically quantify the costs of alternatives and
assumes that each alternative results in achieving the same benefits--
can be an appropriate evaluation tool when dollar values cannot be
ascribed to the benefits of a particular program.
State Has Not Generated Data to Measure Key Incentives:
While State has taken steps to improve its data collection effort, it
does not collect sufficient information to determine whether the SND
program or the instructions to selection boards to weigh service at
hardship posts positively are having an impact on bidding on hardship
posts. State has increased the amount of data it collects on the SND
program since we last reported in 2006, but more information is needed
to evaluate the program's effectiveness. In 2006, we reported State was
able to provide information on the number of officers who actually
enrolled in the program, but was not able to provide information on the
number of eligible officers who did not. Since we last reported on this
issue, State has begun collecting data on which officers decline SND.
However, State has not gathered the additional information necessary to
measure the effectiveness of the program. According to a department
official, State has considered the calculation of the worldwide rate at
which officers extend their tours of duty to be a lower priority than
other human resources initiatives. The State official said that it is
not possible to evaluate the program's effectiveness without this
information.
The manner in which State tracks employees serving in Iraq and
Afghanistan makes it difficult to analyze the impact of the promotion
consideration outlined in the instructions to selection boards. As
previously noted, officers may serve in Iraq and Afghanistan on detail
from Washington or another post of assignment; however, while they are
on detail, State's personnel database continues to reflect the
officer's current post of assignment. Furthermore, we reported in June
2009[Footnote 45] that State does not have a mechanism for identifying
and tracking its employees deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan and
recommended the department establish policies and procedures to do so.
[Footnote 46] The lack of readily available data on FSOs deployed to
Iraq and Afghanistan may make it difficult to comply with a June 2009
congressional direction to State that it report on the promotion
process at the department as it relates to any preferential
consideration given for service in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, as
compared to other hardship posts.[Footnote 47] According to officials,
State has not yet attempted to analyze the impact of the instructions
to the selection boards on promotions.
State Did Not Undertake Congressionally Mandated Report to Assess
Impact of Increased Hardship and Danger Pay on Staffing Shortfalls:
State has not complied with a congressional mandate to assess the
effectiveness of increasing hardship and danger pay ceilings to recruit
experienced officers to certain posts, hampering oversight of State's
use of the authority to increase such differentials. In December 2005,
Congress passed legislation authorizing State to raise the hardship
differentials and danger pay allowances from 25 percent to 35 percent
as a recruitment and retention incentive.[Footnote 48] The law required
the department to (1) notify several congressional committees of the
criteria to be used in adjusting the hardship and danger differentials
and (2) study and report by 2007 on the effect of the increases in
hardship differential and danger pay allowance ceilings in filling
"hard to fill" positions.[Footnote 49] In response, State notified
Congress in March 2006 that it would increase the threshold for posts
to qualify for the 30 and 35 percent differentials and allowances under
the present criteria it uses to calculate its hardship and danger pay
differential calculations, rather than add new criteria.[Footnote 50]
However, State officials confirmed that the department did not study
the effect of these increased differentials and allowances on filling
"hard to fill" positions and did not provide the required report to
Congress. A State official said that, as of July 2009, the department
had begun an effort to comply with the congressional mandate. According
to State's comments on this report, the department expects to fulfill
the mandate by October 2009.
Despite the hardship and danger pay increases, these high-priority
posts continue to have difficulties attracting bidders. Specifically,
17 of the 26 posts with either danger or hardship pay differentials
above 25 percent were designated historically difficult to staff as of
May 2008. The lack of an assessment of the effectiveness of the danger
and hardship pay increases in filling positions at these posts, coupled
with the continuing staffing challenges in these locations, makes it
difficult to determine whether these resources are properly targeted.
Legislative Changes May Result in Increased Expenditures on Incentives
for Hardship Post Assignments:
Several measures passed by Congress this year may raise the cost of
hardship post incentives already in place and provide additional
incentives. Legislation enacted in 2009 authorized locality pay
adjustments for fiscal year 2009 for members of the Foreign Service
stationed overseas comparable to that if such member's official duty
station were in the District of Columbia, and appropriated $41 million
for this purpose.[Footnote 51] According to a State official, the
legislative change will result in an approximately 8 percent increase
in basic pay for FSOs, beginning in August 2009. Locality pay is not
itself an incentive for hardship post assignments. However, the
resulting increase in basic pay will lead to an increase in hardship
pay, danger pay, and SND, all of which are calculated as percentages of
basic pay. Officials we interviewed, both at hardship posts and in
Washington, D.C., cited the lack of locality pay as a deterrent to bid
on overseas positions. We have reported in the past that differences in
the statutes governing domestic locality pay and differential pay for
overseas service created a gap in compensation, which State officials,
the American Foreign Service Association, and many officers have
reported effectively penalizes overseas employees compared to employees
based in Washington, D.C.[Footnote 52]
Congress also recently enacted legislation authorizing State to pay
recruitment, relocation, and retention bonuses to all FSOs other than
ambassadors and chiefs of mission who are on official duty in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan.[Footnote 53] Previously, Foreign Service
generalists were not entitled to receive recruitment, relocation, and
retention bonuses.[Footnote 54] As of the end of fiscal year 2008,
there were about 340 Foreign Service generalist positions in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Further, State also plans to increase the
number of FSOs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The large--and growing--
number of FSOs serving at these posts represents a potentially
significant increase in recruitment, relocation, and retention bonus
payments.[Footnote 55]
Conclusions:
The conduct of U.S. diplomacy compels State to assign staff to hardship
posts where conditions are difficult and sometimes dangerous, but that
nonetheless are at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy priorities.
State has made progress since 2006 in reducing its deficit of mid-level
officers and increasing the average number of bids at hardship posts.
Despite these advances, State continues to face persistent staffing and
experience gaps at such posts--especially at the mid-level--which can
compromise its diplomatic readiness. The department has generally been
able to fill its top priority posts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but key
positions at other hardship posts remain vacant or are filled by
officers who may lack the necessary experience to effectively perform
their duties, potentially compromising State's ability to advance U.S.
international interests. Although State plans to address staffing gaps
by hiring more officers, the department acknowledges it will take years
for these new employees to gain the experience they need to be
effective mid-level officers. The department plans to manage this
experience gap in the near term by continuing to assign officers to
positions above their current grade level. However, the frequent
assignment of officers to stretch positions in hardship posts brings
some risks, which will likely persist since State's assignment system
does not explicitly address the continuing experience gap at hardship
posts as a priority consideration in making assignments. Furthermore,
despite State's continued difficulty attracting qualified staff to
hardship posts, the department has not systematically evaluated the
effectiveness of its incentives for hardship service. These incentives
cost the department millions of dollars annually--an investment that
will grow given recent legislative initiatives that raise FSO basic pay
and expand the use of bonuses for recruitment, relocation, and
retention. Without a full evaluation of State's hardship incentives,
the department cannot obtain valuable insights that could help guide
resource decisions to ensure it is most efficiently and effectively
addressing gaps at these important posts.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that hardship posts are staffed commensurate with their
stated level of strategic importance and resources are properly
targeted, we recommend the Secretary of State take the following two
actions:
* Take steps to minimize the experience gap at hardship posts by making
the assignment of at-grade, mid-level officers to such posts an
explicit priority consideration.
* Develop and implement a plan to evaluate incentives for hardship post
assignments. Such a plan could include an analysis of how the hardship
assignment incentive programs work individually and collectively to
address the department's difficulty in recruiting staff to accept--and
remain in--positions at hardship posts.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
State provided written comments on a draft of this report. The comments
are reprinted in Appendix IV. State generally agreed with the report's
findings, conclusions, and recommendations. For example, the department
acknowledged that many hardship posts may face experience gaps. State
also provided us with a draft analysis of the impact of increased
hardship and danger pay on staffing shortfalls and indicated that it
plans to continue tracking employee attitudes toward hardship
incentives through future surveys. While these are positive steps, they
do not fully respond to our recommendation to implement a plan to
evaluate hardship incentives. In addition, State provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretary of State and interested congressional committees. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on our Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To assess the Department of State's (State) progress in addressing
staffing gaps at hardship posts since 2006 and the effect of any
remaining gaps, we:
* reviewed GAO and State Office of Inspector General reports (OIG), as
well as applicable legislation and budget documents;
* analyzed staffing, bidding, and position data; and:
* interviewed officials in State's Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of
Consular Affairs, and six regional bureaus regarding staffing issues.
To determine State staff surplus/deficit figures, we analyzed State
staffing data and compared the number of positions in each career track
with the number of Foreign Service Officers (FSO) in each track. For
example, if the total number of employees in the consular career track
is 1,055 and the total number of consular positions is 1,866, the
deficit in officers would be 811.
We analyzed bid data from the 2008 summer assignments cycle to
determine the average number of bids per post, the median number of
bids for each differential rate, and the average number of bids per
generalist career track for each differential rate. In order to compare
2008 data with the 2005 data from our previous report and remain
consistent, we used FS-04, FS-03, and FS-02 bid data. The bid data
include the number of positions to be filled at each post and the
number of bids received for each position. We used the bid data for the
summer assignments cycle because, according to State officials, most
employees are transferred during this cycle, compared to the winter
cycle. Because State staffed Iraq through a separate assignments cycle
in 2008 that involved a different bidding process than the regular
summer assignments cycle, we did not include Iraq positions in our
analysis.
We used the following methodology to obtain our results:
* To obtain the average number of bids per post, we took the total
number of bids received on all positions at each post and divided it by
the total number of positions to be filled at the post. For example, in
the 2008 summer assignments cycle, Lagos had 9 positions to be filled
and received a total of 23 bids, resulting in an average of 2.6 bids
for this post.
* To obtain the median number of bids at each differential rate, we
arranged in ascending order the average number of bids for each post at
the corresponding differential rate and used the middle average. For
example, assuming there are 5 posts at the 25 percent differential rate
and their average bids are 3, 5, 7, 9, and 16, the median of the
average bids is 7.
* To obtain the average number of bids per generalist career track at
each differential rate, we took the total number of bids received on
all positions in each career track per differential and divided it by
the total number of positions to be filled in the career track per
differential. For example, assuming there are 3 management positions at
the 15 percent differential rate receiving a total of 12 bids, the
average number of bids for management positions at 15 percent
differential posts is 4.
We also analyzed data on all State Foreign Service positions as of the
end of fiscal year 2008 to determine the vacancy rate for each post,
the average vacancy rate for each differential rate, and the proportion
of mid-level generalist positions filled by officers working above
their grades for each differential rate. The position data include the
number of positions at each post, the career track and grade of each
position and, for positions that are staffed, the career track and
grade of the incumbent. We used position data as of the end of the
fiscal year because, according to State officials, most employees
moving on to their next assignments have arrived at their new posts by
that time. Due to limitations in the position data for Iraq, we did not
include Iraq positions in our analysis.
We used the following methodology to obtain our results:
* To obtain the vacancy rate for each post, we took the total number of
vacant positions at each post and divided it by the total number of
positions to be filled at the post. For example, assuming there are 10
total positions at a given post and 2 vacancies, the vacancy rate is 20
percent.
* To obtain the average vacancy rate for each differential rate, we
took the sum of all vacancy rates for posts with a given differential
and divided it by the total number of posts with that differential. For
example, assuming there are 5 posts at the 25 percent differential rate
and their vacancy rates are 10 percent, 12 percent, 15 percent, 17
percent, and 20 percent, the average vacancy rate is 14.8 percent.
* To obtain the proportion of mid-level generalist positions filled by
officers working above their grades for each differential rate, we took
the total number of generalist positions at the FS-03, FS-02, and FS-01
levels filled with officers in upstretch assignments for each
differential and divided it by the total number of generalist positions
at those levels with that differential. For example, assuming there are
only 7 mid-level generalist positions at posts with a 20 percent
differential and 2 are filled by officers in upstretches, the upstretch
rate is 29 percent.
To assess the extent to which State has used incentives to address
staffing gaps at hardship posts, we:
* reviewed GAO and State OIG reports, as well as applicable legislative
documents and guidance from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
and the Office of Management and Budget;
* examined surveys conducted by State;
* analyzed State documents that outline incentives for hardship
service, including those available to officers serving in Iraq and
Afghanistan;
* collected data on participation in and funds expended on hardship
incentive programs; and:
* interviewed officials in State's Bureau of Human Resources, Bureau of
Administration, and six regional bureaus regarding State's use of
incentives.
We obtained bidding data from State's FSBID database and staffing and
position data from State's Global Employee Management System (GEMS)
database. Since we have previously checked the reliability of both
these databases, we inquired if State had made any major changes to the
databases since our 2006 report. State indicated that it had not made
major changes to either. We also tested the data for completeness and
interviewed knowledgeable officials from the Office of Resource
Management and Organizational Analysis and the Office of Career
Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) concerning the reliability of the
data. Based on our analysis of the data and discussions with the
officials, we determined the bidding and staffing data to be
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also determined that the
position data for all posts but Iraq were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this engagement. Given the limitations associated with Iraq
positions in the position data, we obtained a separate set of Iraq-
specific position data from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) to
use to analyze staffing in Iraq. To assess the reliability of the Iraq
position data provided by NEA, we asked State how the data are
collected, entered, and checked. State indicated that the data are
collected and maintained manually by authorized assignment personnel
and constantly updated through coordination between NEA and human
resources officials in Iraq, among others. Based on this assessment and
our analysis of the data, we determined NEA's Iraq position data to be
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement.
We conducted fieldwork in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria; Shenyang, China;
and Riyadh and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to study the impact of staffing
gaps at selected hardship posts and State's use of incentives for
hardship service. In deciding where to conduct our fieldwork, we
considered factors such as the historic difficulty of staffing a given
post; the mix of incentives available; strategic importance; and
recommendations from cognizant State officials. We selected the posts
in Nigeria because of their historically low bidding, their 25 percent
hardship differentials, and because each offers Service Need
Differential (SND). We selected Shenyang because of the post's 30
percent hardship differential, historically low bidding, and SND. We
selected the posts in Saudi Arabia because, in addition to their
historically low bidding and 20 percent hardship differentials, both
were unaccompanied 1-year posts at the time of our review. In addition
to our fieldwork, we conducted telephone interviews with senior
officials in several additional hardship posts, including Bangladesh,
Cambodia, Liberia, and Tajikistan. We also convened an expert
roundtable of several retired senior State officials. The participants
in the roundtable had all served as ambassadors to hardship posts in
the last 10 years. Two participants were also former directors general.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2008 through September
2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Department of State Generalist Staffing Surplus/Deficit by
Career Track:
Table 4 shows staffing surpluses and deficits by career track for
foreign service generalists as of December 31, 2008.
Table 4: Foreign Service Generalists' Surplus/(Deficit) across Career
Tracks, as of December 31, 2008:
Grade level: Senior level; MC;
Management: (8);
Consular: 13;
Economic: [Empty];
Political: 7;
Public diplomacy: (4);
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty];
Total Surplus/(Deficit): 8.
Grade level: Senior level; OC;
Management: (34);
Consular: (14);
Economic: 31;
Political: 40;
Public diplomacy: (29);
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty];
Total Surplus/(Deficit): (6).
Grade level: Senior level; Subtotal;
Management: (42);
Consular: (1);
Economic: 31;
Political: 47;
Public diplomacy: (33);
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: 2;
Total Surplus/(Deficit): [Empty].
Grade level: Mid level; 1;
Management: (37);
Consular: 17;
Economic: 44;
Political: 57;
Public diplomacy: (67);
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty];
Total Surplus/(Deficit): 14.
Grade level: Mid level; 2;
Management: (84); Consular: 51;
Economic: 36;
Political: 16;
Public diplomacy: (223);
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty];
Total Surplus/(Deficit): (204).
Grade level: Mid level; 3;
Management: 87;
Consular: (129);
Economic: 19;
Political: 8;
Public diplomacy: 120;
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: [Empty];
Total Surplus/(Deficit): 105.
Grade level: Mid level; Subtotal;
Management: (34);
Consular: (61);
Economic: 99;
Political: 81;
Public diplomacy: (170);
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: (85);
Total Surplus/(Deficit): [Empty].
Grade level: Jr. level; 4;
Management: 165;
Consular: (595)[A];
Economic: 108;
Political: 152;
Public diplomacy: 199;
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: 29;
Total Surplus/(Deficit): 29.
Grade level: Total;
Management: 89;
Consular: (657);
Economic: 238;
Political: 280;
Public diplomacy: (4);
Surplus/(Deficit) by grade level: (54);
Total Surplus/(Deficit): (54)[B].
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
Note: Senior Foreign Service grades include minister counselor (MC) and
counselor (OC).
[A] Although there is a deficit of 595 entry-level officers in the
consular cone, State does not consider this a true deficit because
nearly all entry-level generalists serve in consular positions during
their first or second assignment, regardless of cone.
[B] The total deficit decreases from 54 to 42 when junior grades 05 and
06 are included. We omitted these positions from the table to remain
consistent with our 2006 report, in which we noted that we did not
include these grades because we were told that they were training
positions that are not counted against the deficit.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: 2009 Historically Difficult to Staff and Service Need
Differential Posts:
[End of section]
Table 5 lists posts that State designated as historically difficult to
staff or eligible for Service Need Differential (SND) for the 2009
summer assignments cycle.
Table 5: Historically Difficult to Staff and SND Posts for 2009 Summer
Assignments Cycle:
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Angola;
Post: Luanda;
Historically difficult to staff [Check]: [Check];
SND [Check]: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Benin;
Post: Cotonou;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Burkina Faso;
Post: Ouagadougou;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Burundi;
Post: Bujumbura;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Cameroon;
Post: Douala;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Cameroon;
Post: Yaounde;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Cape Verde;
Post: Praia;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Central African
Republic;
Post: Bangui;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Chad;
Post: N'Djamena;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Congo, Democratic
Republic of the;
Post: Kinshasa;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Congo, Republic of;
Post: Brazzaville;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Cote d'Ivoire;
Post: Abidjan;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Djibouti;
Post: Djibouti;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Equatorial Guinea;
Post: Malabo;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Eritrea;
Post: Asmara;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Gabon;
Post: Libreville;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Gambia, The;
Post: Banjul;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Guinea;
Post: Conakry;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Liberia;
Post: Monrovia;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Malawi;
Post: Lilongwe;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Mali;
Post: Bamako;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Mauritania;
Post: Nouakchott;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Niger;
Post: Niamey;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Nigeria;
Post: Abuja;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Nigeria;
Post: Lagos;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Rwanda;
Post: Kigali;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Sierra Leone;
Post: Freetown;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Sudan;
Post: Khartoum;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of African Affairs: Togo;
Post: Blome;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs:
Brunei;
Post: Bandar Seri Begawan;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs:
China; Post: Guangzhou;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs:
Post: Shenyang;
Historically difficult to staff:
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs:
Indonesia;
Post: Medan;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs:
Japan;
Post: Naha;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs:
Marshall Islands;
Post: Majuro;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs:
Micronesia;
Post: Kolonia;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs:
Papua New Guinea;
Post: Port Moresby;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs:
Timor-Leste;
Post: Dili;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs:
Armenia;
Post: Yerevan;
Historically difficult to staff:[Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs:
Belarus;
Post: Minsk;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs:
Bosnia and Herzegovina;
Post: Banja Luka;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs:
Kosovo;
Post: Pristina;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs:
Moldova;
Post: Chisinau;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs:
Montenegro;
Post: Podgorica;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs:
Russia;
Post: Vladivostok;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs:
Russia;
Post: Yekaterinburg;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: Iraq;
Post: Baghdad;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: Israel;
Post: Jerusalem;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: Jordan;
Post: Amman;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: Saudi Arabia;
Post: Jeddah;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: Saudi Arabia;
Post: Riyadh;
Historically difficult to staff:
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs: Yemen;
Post: Sanaa;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs:
Afghanistan;
Post: Kabul;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs:
Bangladesh;
Post: Dhaka;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs:
India;
Post: Calcutta;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs:
Kazakhstan;
Post: Astana;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs:
Pakistan;
Post: Islamabad;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs:
Pakistan;
Post: Lahore;
Historically difficult to staff:
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs:
Tajikistan;
Post: Dushanbe;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs:
Turkmenistan;
Post: Ashgabat;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: Guyana;
Post: Georgetown;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: Haiti;
Post: Port-au-Prince;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: Jamaica;
Post: Kingston;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: Mexico;
Post: Ciudad Juarez;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: Mexico;
Post: Hermosillo;
Historically difficult to staff:
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: Mexico;
Post: Nogales;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Empty].
Regional bureau/country: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs:
Suriname;
Post: Paramaribo;
Historically difficult to staff: [Check];
SND: [Check].
Source: State.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State:
Note: GAO's comment supplementing those in the report text appears at
the end of this appendix.
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
September 2, 2009:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Department
Of State: Additional Steps Needed To Address Continued Staffing and
Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts," GAO Job Code 320585.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Bert
Curtis, HR Specialist, Bureau of Human Resources at (202) 647-2655.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sid Kaplan (Acting):
cc:
GAO - Goodwin Agbara:
DGHR - Nancy Powell:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Additional Steps Needed to Address Continued Staffing and Experience
Gaps at Hardship Posts (GAO-09-874, GAO Code 320585):
The Department thanks GAO for its evaluation of the Department's
challenges regarding staffing and experience gaps at hardship posts. As
GAO has reported, we have continuously strived throughout much of this
decade to ensure that hardship posts are filled as effectively as
possible. Our tools have included aggressive recruitment, assignment
rule adjustments, and a varied menu of programs including monetary,
professional and even (for the most difficult to fill positions) family-
oriented incentives.
As GAO acknowledges, we have been successful in staffing our highest
priority posts at or near 100%. As GAO also recognizes, and we would
like to emphasize, the underlying causes of staffing shortages, i.e.,
the growth of our mission without a commensurate growth in resources,
must be addressed to ensure diplomatic readiness.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to respond to the GAO
recommendations and looks forward to continued engagement.
GAO Recommendations for Executive Action & DOS Response
To ensure that hardship posts are staffed commensurate with their
stated level of strategic importance and resources are properly
targeted, we recommend the Secretary of State take the following two
actions:
1. Take steps to minimize the experience gap at hardship posts by
making the assignment of at-grade, mid-level officers to such posts an
explicit priority consideration.
We concur with this recommendation and would like to assure GAO that
the staffing of hardship posts is a priority for the Department.
However, as GAO continues to note (as in a related 2006 study), we have
more positions than available officers. The overall shortage of Foreign
Service officers and specialists contributes to the difficulty in
staffing our missions and presents the Department with difficult
choices. When there are overall service deficits at the mid-levels,
many positions will go unfilled and/or training may be sacrificed.
While we acknowledge that this may result in an experience gap at many
hardship posts, we would point out that not all hardship posts are top
policy priorities. Conversely, not all non-hardship posts are low
policy priorities. Until staffing levels meet our needs, we will have
to prioritize both positions and posts.
In recent years, the Department has frozen positions around the world
to ensure that our highest priority jobs were indeed filled globally.
As those hired under Diplomacy 3.0 begin to enter the workforce, many
of these positions will be filled, albeit with entry-level officers.
Diplomacy 3.0 is our first infusion of additional positions in several
years and the beginning of the Secretary's efforts to build the size of
the Foreign Service by 25%.
2. Develop and implement a plan to evaluate incentives for hardship
post assignments. Such a plan could include an analysis of how the
hardship assignment incentive programs work individually and
collectively to address the department's difficulty in recruiting staff
to accept - and remain in - positions at hardship posts.
We concur with this recommendation and agree with GAO and the Congress
that the question of effectiveness of incentives to staff hardship
posts is important. In response to Public Law 109-140 Section 4(e), the
Department has been collecting and analyzing data on differential and
danger pay increases. This study will be completed by early October
2009, and we have provided GAO with a preliminary draft. [See comment]
We had expected to continue to track employee attitudes toward these
incentives through future surveys. While we traditionally have not been
able to add questions to OPM's biennial Human Capital Survey, we have
done so to the similar survey we conducted in the odd-numbered years.
OPM has advised, however, that it expects to conduct its survey
annually, thus complicating our ability to collect needed data. We have
expressed this concern to OPM and understand it is considering our
request to include customized questions, at least every other year,
within the OPM-administered Federal Human Capital survey.
On a related matter, we found GAO statements regarding overseas pay
comparability misleading and would like to clarify some of the basic
facts. Comparability pay is not a function of, nor is it offered as,
compensation for hardship posts. Rather, it applies regardless of
overseas location to certain categories of members of the Foreign
Service. Its purpose is to eliminate the loss in basic pay that certain
Foreign Service members incur while serving abroad. That gap was
created by the introduction of locality pay in 1994 and has undermined
the value of our hardship incentives, even eliminating that value at
certain hardship posts. We would also note that comparability pay has
not been permanently authorized by Congress.
The following is GAO's comment to the Department of State's letter
dated September 2, 2009.
GAO Comment:
While State's analysis of hardship differential and danger pay
increases and its request to OPM to include customized questions about
hardship incentives in future surveys are positive steps, they do not
fully respond to our recommendation to implement a plan to evaluate
hardship incentives. State expects to fulfill the mandate to study and
report on the effect of the increases in hardship differential and
danger pay ceilings in filling "hard to fill" positions in October
2009. However, as noted earlier, State offers other incentives which it
has not evaluated. Furthermore, we also note that State's last survey
had several limitations. For example, the survey lacked the requisite
specificity, included an incomplete list of incentives, and did not
collect key demographic information. Unless State addresses these
issues, the survey's utility as an evaluation tool will remain limited.
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Key contributors to this report include Anthony Moran, Assistant
Director; Richard Gifford Howland; Aniruddha Dasgupta; Brian Hackney;
Joseph Carney; Martin de Alteriis; Grace Lui; Michael Courts; Zina
Merritt; Gloria Hernandez-Saunders; and John Brummet. Technical
assistance was provided by Robert Alarapon, Gena Evans, and Thomas
Zingale.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S.
government provides differential pay incentives--an additional 5 to 35
percent of basic salary, depending on the severity or difficulty of the
conditions--to encourage employees to bid on assignments to these posts
and to compensate them for the hardships they encounter. For the
purposes of this report, we refer to these differential pay incentives
as hardship differentials. We define hardship posts as those posts
where the hardship differential is at least 15 percent. We define posts
of greatest hardship as those where the hardship differential is at
least 25 percent. We define posts with low differentials as those where
the hardship differential is 5 or 10 percent. We define posts with no
differentials as those where the hardship differential is 0 percent.
[2] State defines diplomatic readiness as its "ability to get the right
people in the right place at the right time with the right skills to
carry out America's foreign policy."
[3] GAO, State Department: Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective
Assignment System Compromise Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-626] (Washington, D.C.:
June 18, 2002).
[4] GAO, Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls
Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-894] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 4,
2006).
[5] State's overseas workforce also includes locally employed staff.
This report focuses on the Foreign Service.
[6] A post differential may be granted on the basis of conditions of
environment which differ substantially from conditions of environment
in the continental United States and warrant additional pay as a
recruitment and retention incentive. 5 U.S.C. § 5925. For the purposes
of this report, we refer to State's post differential as hardship
differential.
[7] State pays an additional 15 percent to 35 percent of salary for
danger pay at designated posts. The danger pay allowance is designed to
provide additional compensation above basic compensation to all U.S.
government civilian employees, including chiefs of mission, for service
in foreign areas where there exist conditions--such as civil
insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or war--that threaten physical harm
or imminent danger to employees.
[8] In terms of the Foreign Service grade structure, mid-level
positions include FS-03, FS-02, and FS-01 and are equivalent to the
civil service GS-13, GS-14, and GS-15, respectively.
[9] The Director General is the official who heads State's Bureau of
Human Resources.
[10] According to State, the assignments cycle for a given year
includes both the summer and winter assignments cycles.
[11] We used data from State's Global Employee Management System (GEMS)
database to calculate vacancy rates. Due to limitations in the GEMS
data on positions in Iraq, we do not include Iraq in our vacancy rate
calculations or figures.
[12] As of the same date, the average vacancy rate for all hardship
posts was 15 percent, as compared to an average rate of 10 percent for
all posts with no or low differentials.
[13] At the time of our visit, Jeddah had a 20 percent hardship
differential and a 25 percent danger pay allowance.
[14] At the time of our visit, Lagos had a 25 percent hardship
differential.
[15] At the time of our visit, Shenyang had a 30 percent hardship
differential.
[16] We used data from State's GEMS database to calculate rates of
staff filling positions above their own grades. Due to limitations in
the GEMS data on positions in Iraq, we do not include Iraq in these
calculations of staff filling positions above their own grades or in
table 1.
[17] An upstretch assignment is an assignment to a position above one's
current grade.
[18] By comparison, slightly fewer than half of all overseas generalist
positions are located at hardship posts.
[19] At the time of our visit, Abuja had a 25 percent hardship
differential.
[20] In August 2006, we reported an overall staffing shortage of about
200 employees, based on State data from September 2005. According to a
senior State official, the current shortfall of about 270 will decline
over the course of 2009 as several cadres of new hires are brought on
board.
[21] Of the approximately 1,380 additional vacant positions, about
1,020 were due to officers serving in training or rotating from post to
post without replacements to fill their vacated positions. The
approximately 360 remaining vacancies were due to officers on medical
leave, temporary duty, or short tours.
[22] To fill positions in Iraq and Afghanistan, State has frequently
assigned officers to positions above their grade. As of September 2008,
over 40 percent of officers in Iraq and Afghanistan were serving in
upstretch assignments.
[23] A forthcoming GAO report discusses challenges State faces in
meeting its foreign language proficiency requirements in further
detail. See GAO, Department of State: Comprehensive Plan Needed to
Address Persistent Foreign Language Shortfalls, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-955] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17,
2009).
[24] State has attempted to temporarily address vacancies through its
Expanded Professional Associates Program. According to State, 105
positions, equivalent to entry-level officer positions, were
established through this program in 2009 and filled by eligible Foreign
Service family members.
[25] We analyzed bidding for these positions to remain consistent with
our 2006 report, which included our analysis of bids on FS-02, FS-03,
and FS-04 positions in the 2005 summer assignments cycle. Because State
staffed Iraq through a special assignments cycle in 2008 separate from
the regular summer assignments cycle, we did not include Iraq in our
analysis of bidding.
[26] We use the term median average to refer to the midpoint of the
average number of bids per post for each differential rate. For
example, if there are three posts with a hardship differential of 25
percent and their average bids are 4, 5, and 7, the median average is
5.
[27] This calculation includes bids on all posts with hardship
differentials of at least 15 percent.
[28] The list of historically difficult to staff posts for a given year
is created the prior year. A post is considered historically difficult
to staff if it is designated most difficult to staff for 3 out of the
last 4 years. Most difficult to staff means that over half of the jobs
available for that post in a given bidding cycle are designated hard to
fill. A position is considered hard to fill if it attracts fewer than 3
at-grade, in-cone bids in a given assignments cycle.
[29] Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Embassy Freetown,
Sierra Leone, ISP-I-08-18A (Washington, D.C., March 2008). As of March
2008, Freetown had a 30 percent hardship differential.
[30] Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Embassy N'Djamena,
Chad, ISP-I-09-02A (Washington, D.C., December 2008). As of December
2008, N'Djamena had a 30 percent hardship differential.
[31] ISP-I-09-02A.
[32] Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Embassy Monrovia,
Liberia, ISP-I-08-20A (Washington, D.C., March 2008). As of March 2008,
Monrovia had a 30 percent hardship differential.
[33] Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Embassy
Nouakchott, Mauritania, ISP-I-09-23A (Washington, D.C., March 2009). As
of March 2009, Nouakchott had a 25 percent hardship differential.
[34] A core bid is one on a position in an employee's cone/skill code
and grade for which the employee has either the required language
proficiency, or time to acquire it, between his or her transfer
eligibility date and that of the incumbent.
[35] State regulations say that in order to qualify for SND, an
employee must be assigned to a post that has at least a 15 percent
differential and the combined SND and danger pay allowance do not
exceed 35 percent.
[36] Locality pay is a salary comparability benefit, typically
available to domestic federal employees only to attract workers in the
continental United States to the federal government versus the private
sector. Historically, FSOs posted overseas have not received locality
pay. Current locality pay for Washington, D.C., is 23.1 percent.
[37] The standard tour of duty at posts with no differentials is three
years.
[38] An employee is considered Fair Share if he or she has not served
at least (1) 20 months at a post with a combined hardship and danger
pay differential of 15 percent or greater, or (2) 10 months at a post
with a 1-year standard tour of duty during the 8 years prior to the
employee's upcoming transfer eligibility date.
[39] Department of State, OIG, Report of Inspection: Bureau of
Administration, Office of Allowances, ISP-I-06-51 (Washington, D.C.,
September 2006).
[40] 5 U.S.C. § 5379.
[41] One year is also the standard tour of duty in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
[42] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-894] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-626].
[43] In conjunction with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and
GAO, OPM issued a strategic human capital framework--called the Human
Capital Assessment and Accountability Framework--to provide a
consistent, comprehensive representation of human capital management to
guide federal agencies. OPM's framework provides six standards, along
with associated indicators, or practices, for achieving success. One of
the effectiveness indicators under the Talent Management standard is
the reporting of appropriate metrics to senior managers and human
resource executives to assess the outcomes from retention strategies.
[44] At posts we visited in 2008 and 2009, we heard concerns similar to
those we reported on in 2006, when we found that family considerations-
-child-related and spousal employment concerns, in particular--were a
significant obstacle to attracting mid-level officers to hardship
posts.
[45] GAO, Human Capital: Actions Needed to Better Track and Provide
Timely and Accurate Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed
Federal Civilians, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-562]
(Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2009). State officials compiled their list
of civilian employees who had been deployed to and returned from Iraq
or Afghanistan between January 1, 2006, and April 30, 2008 by querying
GEMS. According to a responsible State official, GEMS is a human
resources system designed to document a personnel action from its
initial request until it is completely processed.
[46] In response to our recommendation, State committed to consulting
and coordinating with the Department of Defense and other executive
agencies to determine the best way to establish policies and procedures
to accurately identify and track standardized information on deployed
civilians.
[47] H.R. Rept. No. 111-151, at 123 (2009) (Conf. Rept.).
[48] To provide certain authorities for the Department of State, and
for other purposes, Pub. L. No. 109-140, § 4, 119 Stat. 2650, 2651
(2005).
[49] Id.
[50] State uses a point system to determine the appropriate
differential and danger pay rates for posts. State informed Congress
that posts would need to reach higher thresholds to qualify for the 30
and 35 percent levels.
[51] See Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 1113; Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 4, 123 Stat. 524, 525 and Explanatory Statement,
submitted by Mr. Obey, Chairman of the House Committee on
Appropriations, Regarding H.R. 1105, Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009,
155 Cong. Rec. H 1653, 2404 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 2009).
[52] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-894] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-626].
[53] See Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 1115(d).
[54] State has had the authority to offer recruitment, retention, and
relocation bonuses to Foreign Service specialists and civil service
employees.
[55] According to OPM, in calendar year 2007, State paid approximately
$6 million in retention bonuses to 594 informational technology
specialists, unrelated to FSO staffing in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan.
[End of section]
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