Displaced Iraqis
Integrated International Strategy Needed to Reintegrate Iraq's Internally Displaced and Returning Refugees Gao ID: GAO-11-124 December 2, 2010The estimated number of Iraqis who have been internally displaced since February 2006 is about 1.6 million, and numerous Iraqis are in neighboring countries. Tens of thousands of Iraqi families have returned home and the number is slowly increasing. GAO examined (1) conditions in Iraq that pose a challenge to the reintegration of displaced Iraqis, (2) actions the international community is taking to address these conditions and reintegration, and (3) the extent to which the international community has an effective reintegration strategy. GAO analyzed reports and data, met with officials from the U.S. and Iraqi governments and international and nongovernmental organizations, and did fieldwork in Geneva and Baghdad.
Several issues impede the return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis. Although the overall security situation in Iraq has improved since 2006, the actual and perceived threat across governorates and neighborhoods continues to impede Iraqi returns and reintegration. Problems in securing property restitution or compensation and shelter have made it difficult to return and reintegrate. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that 43 percent of the internally displaced that it surveyed did not have access to their homes, primarily because their property was occupied or destroyed. IOM also reported that one-third of the heads of returnee families it assessed were unemployed. Iraq continues to lack adequate access to essential services--that is, food, water, sanitation, electricity, health services, and education. Moreover, insufficient government capacity and commitment cross over each of the problem areas and serve as a deterrent to returns and reintegration. The international community has taken action to address the impediments that displaced Iraqis face, but the extent to which these efforts will result in reintegration of displaced Iraqis is uncertain. International and nongovernmental organizations, supported by U.S. and other donor funding, have initiated projects. However, the extent to which these projects specifically target and affect reintegration is not consistently measured. The Iraqi government has initiated efforts to encourage returns and reintegration. However, progress in this area has been limited due to insufficient commitment and capacity, according to international and U.S. officials. Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international community do not have an integrated international strategy for the reintegration of displaced Iraqis. The international community lacks integrated plans because Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration planning efforts stalled due to limitations of authority, capacity, and broader Iraqi government support, according to U.S. and international officials; the United Nation's (UN) strategy and plans have not specifically focused on reintegration; and an unclassified version of the current U.S. government strategy has not been made publicly available. This situation has hindered efforts to efficiently assess the needs of internally displaced Iraqis and returnees. Moreover, the international community has not yet reached an agreement on goals and expected outcomes for reintegration. Also, the UN has not integrated data on returnee needs from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) into its new Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (IAU), which was established to provide a central point for collecting and assessing data, and UNHCR is not taking advantage of IAU resources and coordination efforts. Furthermore, it is difficult for stakeholders to effectively delineate roles and responsibilities and establish coordination and oversight mechanisms. One area with significant potential for inefficiencies is in the establishment and operation of numerous assistance centers and mobile units across Iraq by various entities to assist returnees, the internally displaced, and other vulnerable Iraqis. GAO recommends that (1) the Secretary of State (State) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator assist Iraq in developing an effective integrated international strategy for reintegrating displaced Iraqis; (2) State and USAID make publicly available an unclassified version of the current U.S. strategy; (3) State encourage UNHCR to share primary data collected and take advantage of the IAU efforts; and (4) State and USAID work with UNHCR and others to inventory and assess the operations of the various assistance centers to determine and achieve an optimal framework. The Department of State and USAID concurred with our recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Joseph A. Christoff Team: Government Accountability Office: International Affairs and Trade Phone: (202) 512-8979GAO-11-124, Displaced Iraqis: Integrated International Strategy Needed to Reintegrate Iraq's Internally Displaced and Returning Refugees
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-11-124
entitled 'Displaced Iraqis: Integrated International Strategy Needed
to Reintegrate Iraq's Internally Displaced and Returning Refugees'
which was released on December 2, 2010.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
December 2010:
Displaced Iraqis:
Integrated International Strategy Needed to Reintegrate Iraq's
Internally Displaced and Returning Refugees:
GAO-11-124:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-124, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The estimated number of Iraqis who have been internally displaced
since February 2006 is about 1.6 million, and numerous Iraqis are in
neighboring countries. Tens of thousands of Iraqi families have
returned home and the number is slowly increasing. GAO examined
(1) conditions in Iraq that pose a challenge to the reintegration of
displaced Iraqis, (2) actions the international community is taking to
address these conditions and reintegration, and (3) the extent to
which the international community has an effective reintegration
strategy. GAO analyzed reports and data, met with officials from the
U.S. and Iraqi governments and international and nongovernmental
organizations, and did fieldwork in Geneva and Baghdad.
What GAO Found:
Several issues impede the return and reintegration of displaced
Iraqis. Although the overall security situation in Iraq has improved
since 2006, the actual and perceived threat across governorates and
neighborhoods continues to impede Iraqi returns and reintegration.
Problems in securing property restitution or compensation and shelter
have made it difficult to return and reintegrate. The International
Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that 43 percent of the
internally displaced that it surveyed did not have access to their
homes, primarily because their property was occupied or destroyed. IOM
also reported that one-third of the heads of returnee families it
assessed were unemployed. Iraq continues to lack adequate access to
essential services-”that is, food, water, sanitation, electricity,
health services, and education. Moreover, insufficient government
capacity and commitment cross over each of the problem areas and serve
as a deterrent to returns and reintegration.
The international community has taken action to address the
impediments that displaced Iraqis face, but the extent to which these
efforts will result in reintegration of displaced Iraqis is uncertain.
International and nongovernmental organizations, supported by U.S. and
other donor funding, have initiated projects. However, the extent to
which these projects specifically target and affect reintegration is
not consistently measured. The Iraqi government has initiated efforts
to encourage returns and reintegration. However, progress in this area
has been limited due to insufficient commitment and capacity,
according to international and U.S. officials.
Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international
community do not have an integrated international strategy for the
reintegration of displaced Iraqis. The international community lacks
integrated plans because Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration
planning efforts stalled due to limitations of authority, capacity,
and broader Iraqi government support, according to U.S. and
international officials; the United Nation‘s (UN) strategy and plans
have not specifically focused on reintegration; and an unclassified
version of the current U.S. government strategy has not been made
publicly available. This situation has hindered efforts to efficiently
assess the needs of internally displaced Iraqis and returnees.
Moreover, the international community has not yet reached an agreement
on goals and expected outcomes for reintegration. Also, the UN has not
integrated data on returnee needs from the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) into its new Inter-Agency Information and Analysis
Unit (IAU), which was established to provide a central point for
collecting and assessing data, and UNHCR is not taking advantage of
IAU resources and coordination efforts. Furthermore, it is difficult
for stakeholders to effectively delineate roles and responsibilities
and establish coordination and oversight mechanisms. One area with
significant potential for inefficiencies is in the establishment and
operation of numerous assistance centers and mobile units across Iraq
by various entities to assist returnees, the internally displaced, and
other vulnerable Iraqis.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that (1) the Secretary of State (State) and U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) Administrator assist Iraq in
developing an effective integrated international strategy for
reintegrating displaced Iraqis; (2) State and USAID make publicly
available an unclassified version of the current U.S. strategy; (3)
State encourage UNHCR to share primary data collected and take
advantage of the IAU efforts; and (4) State and USAID work with UNHCR
and others to inventory and assess the operations of the various
assistance centers to determine and achieve an optimal framework. The
Department of State and USAID concurred with our recommendations.
View GAO-11-124 or key components. For more information, contact
Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Inadequate Security, Property Resolution and Shelter, Income-
Generating Opportunities, Essential Services, and Governance Pose
Challenges to Reintegrating Displaced Iraqis:
International Community Is Addressing Impediments That Iraqis Face;
However, the Extent to Which These Efforts Result in Reintegration Is
Not Measured, and Officials Reported Insufficient Iraqi Government
Commitment and Capacity:
Iraq, the United States, and Other Members of the International
Community Lack an Integrated International Strategy for Reintegrating
Displaced Iraqis:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Roles and Responsibilities of Key U.S. and Iraqi
Government and International Community Entities Addressing Iraqi
Displacement:
Appendix III: U.S. Funds Obligated and Expended for Iraq-Related
Humanitarian Assistance Projects, and Intended Beneficiaries, Fiscal
Years 2003-2009, as of September 30, 2009:
Appendix IV: U.S. Development Assistance Funding, Partners, and
Activities in Iraq, Fiscal Years 2003-2009:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Sample of Programs and Projects Implemented by the
International Community to Address Impediments to Reintegration and
Assist Vulnerable Iraqis:
Table 2: State/PRM-Funded Programs for Humanitarian Assistance to
Iraqi Refugees, Returnees, IDPs, and Vulnerable Persons, Fiscal Year
2009:
Table 3: USAID/OFDA-Funded Programs for Humanitarian Assistance to
Iraqi IDPs, Returnees, and Vulnerable Persons, Fiscal Year 2009:
Table 4: Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM) and Total
Iraqi Government Budget and Expenditures, 2008 to 2010:
Table 5: Summary of the Key Iraqi Government Decree and Orders to
Facilitate Certain Returns and Reintegration of Displaced Iraqis, 2008-
2009:
Table 6: U.S. Development Assistance Funds Obligated and Expended in
Iraq, by Source of Funds, for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2009, as of
September 30, 2009:
Table 7: USAID/Iraq Development Assistance for Implementing Partners'
Activities, as Obligated for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2009, as of
September 30, 2009:
Figures:
Figure 1: Key Movements of Displaced Iraqis, from 2006 to September
2008:
Figure 2: Religious Affiliation of IOM-Assessed IDPs in Iraq, as of
February 2010:
Figure 3: Religious Affiliation of Iraqi Refugees Registered by UNHCR,
at the End of 2008:
Figure 4: U.S. Solider Standing Guard while U.S. Government Officials
Meet with U.N. Representatives and Iraqi Government Officials at the
Kindi IDP Resettlement Center Near Baghdad:
Figure 5: Iraqi Homes Destroyed:
Figure 6: Housing Arrangements of IOM-Assessed IDPs in Iraq, as of
February 2010:
Figure 7: Stagnant Water Near a Residential Area and Poor Quality Tap
Water in an Iraqi School:
Figure 8: Garbage on a Baghdad Street:
Figure 9: Iraqi Schools Damaged by Looting and Conflict:
Figure 10: Looted Iraqi Government Office:
Abbreviations:
DOD: Department of Defense:
IAU: Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit:
ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross:
IDP: internally displaced person:
IMC: International Medical Corps:
IOM: International Organization for Migration:
ME/IR: Middle East Bureau/Office of Iraq Reconstruction:
MODM: Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration:
NGO: nongovernmental organization:
NSC: National Security Council:
OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs:
OFDA: Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance:
PRM: Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration:
UN: United Nations:
UN-HABITAT: United Nations Human Settlements Programme:
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees:
UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund:
USAID: United States Agency for International Development:
USIP: United States Institute of Peace:
WFP: World Food Program:
WHO: World Health Organization:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 2, 2010:
Congressional Committees:
The estimated number of Iraqis who have been internally displaced
since February 2006[Footnote 1] is about 1.6 million, according to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the
International Organization for Migration (IOM).[Footnote 2] In
addition, governments in the region report that about 1.5 to 1.7
million Iraqi refugees are in their countries, although the actual
number is unknown.[Footnote 3] According to IOM, tens of thousands of
Iraqi families have returned and the number of returnees is slowly
increasing; however, UNHCR officials question the sustainability of
these returns. On February 27, 2009, President Obama stated that it is
in the United States' strategic interest--and a moral responsibility--
to help displaced Iraqis. According to the President, the U.S.
government "will work with the Iraqi government over time to resettle
refugees and displaced Iraqis within Iraq--because there are few more
powerful indicators of lasting peace than displaced citizens returning
home."[Footnote 4]
GAO assessed U.S. and international efforts to reintegrate internally
displaced Iraqis and returning Iraqi refugees. The United Nations (UN)
defines reintegration as the achievement of sustainable returns. In
this report, we address (1) the conditions in Iraq that pose a
challenge to the reintegration of displaced Iraqis; (2) the actions
that the United States, Iraq, and other members of the international
community have taken to address these conditions and reintegration;
and (3) the extent to which the United States, Iraq, and other members
of the international community have an effective strategy for
reintegrating displaced Iraqis. This report builds on our prior work
assessing U.S. and international efforts to protect and assist Iraqi
refugees in neighboring countries.[Footnote 5] Because of broad
congressional interest in the U.S. engagement in Iraq, we have
completed this report under the Comptroller General's authority to
conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
To address these objectives, we interviewed officials and reviewed
reports and data from the U.S. government, the Iraqi government, UNHCR
and other UN agencies, IOM, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and
research institutes. To identify conditions that pose a challenge to
reintegrating displaced Iraqis, we reviewed research papers and
assessments; strategies and policy papers; program implementation,
monitoring, and progress reports; and related documents. We assessed
challenges by considering factors such as their significance and the
degree to which they could be generalized, and then grouped them by
category. To identify the actions that the United States, Iraq, and
the international community have taken to address these conditions and
reintegration, we reviewed policy, strategy, planning, and funding
documents; UN appeals; monitoring and progress reports; and related
documents. To determine the extent to which the United States, Iraq,
and the international community have an effective strategy to address
the reintegration of displaced Iraqis, we reviewed policy, strategy,
and planning documents from the U.S. and Iraqi governments, the UN,
UNHCR, and IOM. We interviewed U.S. agency, Iraqi government,
international organization, NGO, and research institution officials
and reviewed their documents to determine known issues and problems.
For each objective, we documented evidence from multiple sources and
validated it with knowledgeable U.S., UN, IOM, and NGO officials to
ensure accuracy. Appendix I contains a more detailed description of
our scope and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2009 to December 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
Several issues impede the return and reintegration of displaced
Iraqis. First, although the overall security situation in Iraq has
improved since 2006, the actual and perceived threat across
governorates and neighborhoods continues to impede Iraqi returns and
reintegration. The Department of Defense (DOD) reported that from
December 2009 to February 2010, approximately 73 percent of the enemy
attacks occurred in 4 of the 18 governorates in Iraq--Baghdad, Diyala,
Ninewa, and Salah al-Din. The first three of these four governorates
account for 89 percent of the displacement occurring after the
February 2006 Samarra Al-Askari mosque bombing, according to the UN.
Second, problems in securing property restitution or compensation and
shelter have made it difficult for Iraqis to return to their places of
origin and reintegrate or integrate elsewhere in Iraq. According to a
2009 IOM report, 43 percent of IDPs surveyed did not have access to
their homes, primarily because their property was occupied or
destroyed. The property resolution process is reportedly complicated,
cumbersome, and has yet to be proven effective, and the problem is
further exacerbated by the reported lack of adequate shelter. The UN
Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) reported in July 2009 that
Iraq had a housing shortage of at least 1.5 million units and demand
was increasing. Third, without employment or other income-generating
opportunities, displaced Iraqis may decide against returning to their
former communities or have difficulty reintegrating. IOM reported in
November 2009 that one-third of the heads of the returnee families it
assessed were unemployed and employment opportunities for internally
displaced persons (IDP) were also limited. Fourth, the lack of
adequate essential services--primarily, food and nonfood items; water,
sanitation, and electricity; health services; and education--further
acts as a barrier to returns and reintegration. Fifth, insufficient
government capacity and commitment cross over each of the problem
areas and serve as deterrents to returns and reintegration.
International and nongovernmental organizations and the U.S. and Iraqi
governments have taken action to address the impediments that
displaced Iraqis face, but the extent to which these efforts will
result in reintegration of displaced Iraqis is uncertain. First,
international and nongovernmental organizations, supported by U.S. and
other donor funding, have initiated many projects to address
impediments to returns, including projects focusing on protection,
property and shelter, income, essential services, and government
support. However, the extent to which these projects specifically
target and impact reintegration is not consistently measured or
reported in the aggregate against international goals for
reintegration. These projects target a mix of vulnerable populations
in Iraq, including IDPs, returning refugees, non-Iraqi refugees, other
conflict victims, and the communities that host them. Second, the U.S.
government implements its objectives regarding displaced Iraqis by
conducting diplomatic efforts and providing assistance through its
implementing partners in conjunction with broader humanitarian and
development assistance efforts. The U.S. goals and outcomes for these
efforts were classified or considered sensitive information and were
not made publicly available. Accordingly, we did not provide an
unclassified assessment of the extent to which U.S. assistance was
achieving its intended goals. Third, the Iraqi government has
initiated steps to encourage returns and reintegration; however,
progress has been limited due to insufficient commitment and capacity
at various levels of the government, according to international
organization and U.S. officials. For example, although the Ministry of
Displacement and Migration (MODM), a relatively new ministry, issued a
National Policy on Displacement, it has lacked the authority and
capacity to lead ministerial efforts, according to officials.
Furthermore, the international and nongovernmental organizations
stated that, bureaucratic challenges, based on the lack of political
commitment and capacity, have prevented many returnees from recovering
their property and receiving stipends allowed under a government
decree and orders issued in 2008 and 2009.
Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international
community do not have an integrated international strategy for the
reintegration of displaced Iraqis. The international community lacks
integrated plans because Iraqi MODM planning efforts stalled due to
limitations of authority, capacity, and broader Iraqi government
support, according to the international community; the UN's strategy
and plans have not specifically focused on reintegration; and the U.S.
government has not made an unclassified version of its current
strategy publicly available. An effective strategy would be integrated
and provide Iraq and its implementing partners with a tool to shape
policies and programs. International community officials agree that to
be effective, the strategy should be Iraqi-led. Without an integrated
strategy, clearly defined and agreed-upon strategic goals and intended
outcomes for reintegration have not been specifically developed. For
example, the international community has not yet reached agreement on
when the displacement it is addressing began or when the displaced are
considered reintegrated. In addition, this situation has hindered
efforts to efficiently and effectively assess the needs of Iraqi IDPs
and returnees. While UN agencies, affiliated organizations, and their
implementing partners have collected and assessed data for their
specialized work in Iraq, data gaps remain. For example, according to
international organizations, no inventory and analysis have been
conducted of financial assistance programs available to IDPs and
returnees to determine gaps, overlap, or impact. Furthermore, the UN
has not fully integrated data from UNHCR into its new Inter-Agency
Information Analysis Unit (IAU), which was established to provide a
central point for collecting and assessing data. UNHCR is not sharing
the "raw" or primary data it collects on IDPs, returnees, and
vulnerable populations and is not taking advantage of IAU resources
and coordination. Finally, without an Iraqi-led integrated strategy,
it is difficult for stakeholders to effectively delineate roles and
responsibilities and establish coordination and oversight mechanisms.
The MODM Minister stated that his ministry's initial role was limited
to that of a coordinating body, leaving no single entity charged with
implementing the necessary tasks. At UN Country Team meetings and UN
Assistance Mission for Iraq activities, officials stated that while
some information is shared, organizations "protect their turf," and
opportunities to build on the efforts of others are lost. One area
with significant potential for overlap is the establishment of
numerous assistance centers and mobile units across Iraq to register
or assist returnees, IDPs, and vulnerable Iraqis. UNHCR, IOM,
International Medical Corps (IMC), and U.S. government officials
expressed concern about the need for multiple centers, possible
inefficiencies, and the extent to which the MODM will be capable of
assuming responsibilities for centers in the future.
In this report, we make several recommendations. First, we recommend
that the Secretary of State and United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) Administrator work with the appropriate
international organizations to assist the Iraqi government in
developing an effective integrated international strategy that
addresses impediments to returns and prepares for and facilitates the
return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis. Second, we recommend
that the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator make publicly
available an unclassified version of the current U.S. strategy and
their implementing plans for assisting and reintegrating displaced
Iraqis, including their goals, performance measures, and progress
assessments. Third, to ensure that the U.S. and Iraqi governments,
other donors, international organizations, and implementing partners
have the best data available regarding the numbers and needs of IDPs,
returnees, and other vulnerable Iraqis, we recommend that the
Secretary of State encourage UNHCR to share its raw (primary) data and
methodology with the IAU and to take advantage of IAU expertise and
coordinated efforts. Fourth, to ensure the effective and efficient use
of resources by its implementing partners, we recommend that the
Secretary of State and USAID Administrator work with UNHCR and its
other implementing partners to take inventory of and assess the
purposes, organization, operations, and results of the various
assistance, return, and registration centers and mobile units in Iraq
to determine the optimal framework for assisting IDPs, returnees, and
other vulnerable Iraqis.
In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of State
(State) and USAID agreed with our recommendations. State and USAID's
written comments and our evaluation of those comments are discussed
later in this report. In addition, DOD commented that it agreed with
the report and supports State and USAID in the execution of their
mission to assist and reintegrate displaced Iraqis. State and DOD
provided technical comments, which were incorporated where appropriate.
Background:
Iraq has had a long history of displacement due to wars and the
policies of the Saddam Hussein regime. That regime instituted
"Arabization" policies to force out many non-Arabs from Kirkuk and the
surrounding areas and replace them with Arab citizens to strengthen
the regime's political control over the areas' oil fields and fertile
lands.[Footnote 6] Displacement occurred during the Iran-Iraq war in
the 1980's; the campaign against the Kurds, which intensified after
the war in 1988; the draining of the marshes in southern Iraq during
the war and again after the first Gulf War in 1991; and the 2003 fall
of the Saddam Hussein regime. UNHCR reported in December 2009 that an
estimated 2.76 million individuals were displaced in Iraq, 1.2 million
of which had been displaced prior to 2006.[Footnote 7] The latest wave
of large-scale displacement occurred after the February 2006 bombing
of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, which triggered a rise in
sectarian violence. According to State and UN reports, insurgents,
death squads, militias, and terrorists increased their attacks against
civilians in 2006.[Footnote 8] According to UNHCR and IOM, there was a
sharp increase in the numbers of Iraqis abandoning their homes for
other locations in Iraq and abroad as a result of the sectarian
intimidation and violence that erupted during this period. IOM
reported that the majority of the Iraqi displacement occurred in 2006
and 2007. According to IOM, as of September 2008, about 90 percent of
the post-2006 IDPs in Iraq originated from Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninewa
governorates (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Key Movements of Displaced Iraqis, from 2006 to September
2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of Iraq]
The map depicts:
IDP movement originating from Diyala governorate;
IDP movement originating from Baghdad governorate;
IDP movement originating from Ninewa governorate;
Refugee movement originating from Iraq to:
Egypt and Lebanon;
Europe;
Gulf States;
Jordan;
Iran;
Turkey.
Sources: GAO analysis of maps from UNHCR and OCHA; IOM (data); Map
Resources (map).
[End of figure]
According to IOM, 4 years after the Al-Askari bombing, displaced
families are returning and new displacement is rare; however, the
number of those displaced who had returned (returnees) remains well
below the estimated number of those who remain displaced. As of the
end of 2009, UNHCR estimated that of those who were displaced before
and after the Al-Askari bombing, 745,630 IDPs and 433,696 refugees had
returned.[Footnote 9] IOM reported in February 2010, that of those who
were displaced after the 2006 Al-Askari bombing, IOM returnee field
monitors had identified an estimated 374,166 returnees.[Footnote 10]
Additionally, the numbers of returnees varies by governorate, with
Baghdad experiencing the largest share of IDP and refugee returns,
according to UNHCR. The majority of those who initially returned were
IDPs rather than refugees, which is a pattern that has been seen in
other displacement situations worldwide, according to IOM and UNHCR
officials. IOM reported in February 2010, that its assessments of an
estimated 1.3 million IDPs identified by its field monitors, showed
that 49 percent of all post-Al-Askari bombing IDPs want to return to
their places of origin, 29 percent want to remain and integrate into
their current places of displacement, 19 percent want to resettle to a
third location, and 3 percent are waiting to make a decision.[Footnote
11]
According to UNHCR officials, displaced Iraqis tend to be educated and
come from urban, middle-class backgrounds, which is in sharp contrast
to displaced communities in other nations. UNHCR also reported that
the displaced Iraqi population comprises Sunnis, Shias, Christians,
and other groups that were forced to relocate to areas where they
constitute the dominant groups.[Footnote 12] According to IOM, 58
percent of the 1.3 million IDPs that they had assessed reported to be
Shia Muslim and 33 percent reported to be Sunni Muslim, as of February
2010 (see figure 2); however, religious affiliations and ethnicity
varied by governorates.[Footnote 13] According to UNHCR, 21 percent of
the Iraqi refugees that were actively registered in neighboring
countries at the end of 2008 identified themselves as Shia Muslims,
and 56 percent identified themselves as Sunni Muslims (see figure 3).
[Footnote 14]
Figure 2: Religious Affiliation of IOM-Assessed IDPs in Iraq, as of
February 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Shia Muslim: 58%;
Sunni Muslim: 33%;
Christian: 5%;
Other/Unknown: 4%.
Source: GAO analysis of IOM data.
Note: The total number of IDPs assessed was about 1.3 million
individuals (221,983 families).
[End of figure]
Figure 3: Religious Affiliation of Iraqi Refugees Registered by UNHCR,
at the End of 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Shia Muslim: 56%;
Sunni Muslim: 21%;
Christian: 14%;
Other/Unknown: 5%;
Unspecified Muslim: 4%.
Source: GAO analysis of IOM data.
Note: The total number of Iraqi refugees actively registered with
UNHCR at the end of 2008 was 311,000. Countries of registration
included the Syrian Arab Republic, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
Lebanon, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Turkey, and the Islamic Republic
of Iran.
[End of figure]
The UN's Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement defines an
internally displaced person as one who has been forced or obliged to
leave his or her home as a result of armed conflict, generalized
violence, violation of human rights, or disaster, but has not crossed
an international border. A refugee, as defined by the 1951 UN
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol,
is a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country."[Footnote 15]
According UNHCR's Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration
Activities, reintegration is a process that should result in the
disappearance of differences in legal rights and duties between
returnees and their compatriots and the equal access of returnees to
services, productive assets, and opportunities. UNHCR's Handbook also
states that such a process assumes that refugees return to societies
that are more or less stable, and, when this is not the case,
returnees and communities in areas of return should benefit equally
from improved access to productive assets and social services.
According to UNHCR, voluntary repatriation and reintegration is the
preferred durable solution for refugees.[Footnote 16]
Iraqi and U.S. government entities, international organizations, and
NGOs play significant roles in addressing Iraqi displacement in Iraq
and the region. For information on the key responsible entities and
their respective roles, see appendix II.
Inadequate Security, Property Resolution and Shelter, Income-
Generating Opportunities, Essential Services, and Governance Pose
Challenges to Reintegrating Displaced Iraqis:
Problems in securing a safe environment, property and shelter, income,
essential services, and government capacity and commitment may impede
large numbers of returns and the reintegration of displaced Iraqis,
according to U.S. government, UNHCR, and IOM officials. UNHCR
considers that the basic conditions necessary to encourage and sustain
large-scale returns to Iraq have not been established. UNHCR had
predicted large-scale returns for 2009 after security conditions had
improved in the latter half of 2007 and in 2008, but they did not
materialize, according to U.S. government, UNHCR, and IOM officials.
UN, IOM, and U.S. government officials agree that the decision to
return and the ability to reintegrate involve a complex set of factors
that may vary by location and individual circumstance. Moreover,
according to the UN, IOM, and NGOs, many of these factors also
negatively affect vulnerable Iraqis in the communities that host IDPs
and Iraqis who did not have the means to flee the conflict or the
ensuing economic hardships.
Uncertain Security Conditions May Impede Iraqi Returns and
Reintegration:
Although the overall security situation in Iraq has improved since
2006, the actual and perceived threat across governorates and
neighborhoods continues to impede Iraqi returns and reintegration,
according to U.S. government, UNHCR, and IOM officials. According to
the UN, voluntary return is the preferred solution, but Iraqis should
not be encouraged to return until the security situation allows for
large-scale return and sufficient monitoring of returns. According to
DOD, overall violence in Iraq, after peaking in 2007, remains at its
lowest level in 5 years. However, the level and nature of violence has
varied by governorate. DOD reported that from December 2009 to
February 2010, about 73 percent of the attacks occurred in 4 out of
the 18 governorates--Baghdad, Diyala, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din.
[Footnote 17] The first three of these governates account for 89
percent of the displacement occurring after the February 2006 Samarra
Al-Askari Mosque bombing, according to the UN. In contrast, the
Kurdistan Region, with its relatively homogenous population and the
presence of the Kurdish security forces, remained relatively safe and
stable, according to DOD.
Many displaced Iraqis may be afraid of returning because of the fear
of violent reprisals from militants and members of opposing sects,
according to USAID and UNHCR officials. IOM reported in 2008 that
returnees were threatened, shot at, or killed after returning home.
[Footnote 18] An MODM official reported that one of the initial
families that had returned to a Baghdad neighborhood was killed as a
warning to others not to return. UNHCR and IOM officials stated that
some displaced Iraqis, particularly those from targeted minority
groups, have no plans to return out of fear of persecution. According
to the UN, although a decrease in violence in Iraq has been observed,
grave and systematic human rights violations persist and remain
largely unreported. The UN also reported that violence against
professionals, women, and members of minority communities occur often
and are rarely punished.[Footnote 19]
Moreover, many displaced Iraqis and returnees have had difficulties in
accessing services, including those provided by humanitarian
organizations, because of obstacles such as curfews, checkpoints, and
areas affected by intense fighting, according to UNHCR, IOM, other UN
agencies, and NGOs. In addition, according to UNHCR, the precarious
security situation is requiring UNHCR to increase investments in the
security of staff and may continue to limit UNHCR's mobility inside
Iraq (see figure 4). The UN, UNHCR, IOM, and International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) cautioned that while access may be improving
overall, the security situation could deteriorate again, which could
limit their access to the population.
Figure 4: U.S. Solider Standing Guard while U.S. Government Officials
Meet with U.N. Representatives and Iraqi Government Officials at the
Kindi IDP Resettlement Center Near Baghdad:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S. Navy, Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Edwin L.
Wriston (photographer).
[End of figure]
Lack of Property Restitution or Compensation and Shelter May Impede
Iraqi Returns and Reintegration:
Problems in securing property restitution or compensation[Footnote 20]
and shelter have made it difficult for displaced Iraqis to return and
reintegrate or integrate elsewhere in Iraq, according to UNHCR and IOM
officials. According to a 2009 United States Institute of Peace (USIP)
report,[Footnote 21] the lack of policies addressing displacement-
related property issues is a major obstacle to returns and may prolong
instability, hinder reconciliation, and nurture grievances along
ethnic or sectarian lines. In November 2009, IOM reported that about
one-third of surveyed returnees found their homes in bad condition.
[Footnote 22] In February 2009, IOM reported that 43 percent of the
post-2006 Samarra bombing IDPs surveyed did not have access to their
homes, primarily because the property was occupied or destroyed (see
figure 5); and that 38 percent did not know the status of their
property, often because they could not safely access it.[Footnote 23]
According to the 2009 USIP report and IOM, hundreds of thousands of
displaced families are estimated to have homes that are occupied or
used by strangers, such as militants, squatters, other displaced
Iraqis, or, in rare cases, Iraqi Army or other government officials,
sometimes resulting in multiple scenarios of competing claims. Many
displaced Iraqis have also lost personal property, business stock,
usage rights for farm land, and farming equipment, according to the
report. Moreover, a number of returnees with leases to apartments have
had difficulties in reclaiming their accommodations because, in some
cases, landlords took advantage of their tenants' absence to re-lease
the properties at higher rents, according to the 2009 USIP report.
Figure 5: Iraqi Homes Destroyed:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Copyright © Integrated Regional Information Networks, Afif
Sarhan (photographer).
[End of figure]
Further complicating property restitution and compensation are the
Iraqi government's policies that distinguish between Iraqis who were
displaced before and after the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003. The
implementation of these policies has yet to be proven effective for
either group. For pre-March 2003 cases, the Commission for the
Resolution of Real Property Disputes was established in 2006 to
address property issues resulting from the Ba'athist regime's policies
of forced displacement, according to the 2009 USIP report.[Footnote
24] According to the report, the commission's "quasi-judicial" system
is not well adapted to the nature and number of cases and thus is
cumbersome and prone to delays. As of January 2009, the commission had
decided about 67,000 cases of the approximately 150,000 cases filed
since March 2004. However, due to appeals and re-reviews, only about
30,000 decisions were deemed final and enforceable and compensation
was paid only in about 1,000 cases. Moreover, USIP reported that data
are not available regarding the number of claimants--with decisions in
their favor--able to reoccupy their houses or land. An Iraqi
government official stated that many IDPs typically require more
assistance than what the government provides to replace lost
properties and rebuild or repair damaged homes.
For post-March 2003 cases, the Iraqi government initially deemed that
property violations were the fault of terrorists and criminals and
thus were a law enforcement problem that could be resolved in the
courts, if needed. According to the 2009 USIP report, the existing
legal framework may have been inadequate to fairly resolve complex
displacement cases and to effectively handle the potentially large
caseload. In 2008, according to the U.S. government and IOM, the Iraqi
government recognized the need to further address property issues and
thus initiated changes to its policies and efforts.
The property restitution and compensation problem is further
exacerbated by the reported lack of adequate shelter. UN-HABITAT
reported in July 2009 that Iraq had a housing shortage of at least 1.5
million units,[Footnote 25] and demand was increasing.[Footnote 26]
According to UN-HABITAT, just over 70 percent of Iraqis lived in urban
areas, and more than 10 percent of the houses in these areas had more
than 10 occupants and more than 35 percent had 3 or more people per
room. According to IOM, displaced families continue to have difficulty
in finding adequate housing in their places of displacement, even
several years after leaving home. IOM reported that IDPs' shelter
arrangements include renting, moving in with friends and relatives,
occupying empty public buildings, establishing collective settlements,
and other arrangements (see figure 6).[Footnote 27] However, these
arrangements may not be sustainable because they pose costs to both
the displaced and their host communities. For example, IOM reported
that the majority of internally displaced Iraqis are living in rental
accommodations, but, as time passes, rent prices increase and their
ability to pay decreases. Friends and relatives, already struggling to
provide for themselves, are additionally burdened by housing the
displaced, according to UN-HABITAT. Moreover, IDPs living in
settlements or public buildings may often be at risk from eviction by
local authorities or private owners. Less than 1 percent of displaced
Iraqis live in tent camps.
Figure 6: Housing Arrangements of IOM-Assessed IDPs in Iraq, as of
February 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Rented housing: 58%;
House of host family or relatives: 12%;
Collective town settlement: 9%;
Public building: 3%;
Other: 18%.
Source: GAO analysis of IOM data.
Note: The total number of IDPs assessed was about 1.3 million
individuals (221,983 families).
[End of figure]
Lack of Income Opportunities May Impede Iraqi Returns and
Reintegration:
According to USAID and international organization officials, without
employment or other income-generating opportunities, displaced Iraqis
may not return to their former communities or may have difficulty in
reintegrating. In November 2009, IOM reported that 34 percent of the
heads of returning households that it had surveyed stated that they
could not find employment, even though they were able to work.
[Footnote 28] IOM also found that employment rates were higher in
certain governorates, such as Baghdad. Employment for IDPs has also
been scarce and varied across the governorates, according to USAID.
According to IOM, 31.7 percent of the IDP families assessed had at
least one employed family member as of December 2009. In general,
employment in Iraq is scarce, according to USAID and UNHCR officials.
The UN reported in January 2009 that the unemployment rate was 18
percent.[Footnote 29] In addition, the UN and IOM estimate that over
50 percent of the active population is unemployed or underemployed,
and that over 55 percent may face difficulties in covering basic
living costs. Underemployment and poverty pose a significant risk to
the reconciliation and stability of the country, according to the UN.
Moreover, IOM officials said that regaining former employment is
difficult for displaced Iraqis. According to an international
organization, the largest employer in Iraq is the government, but,
according to IOM, returnees have difficulty in regaining prior
government employment, either due to discrimination or corruption. In
March 2010, State reported allegations of employment discrimination by
several ministries based on religious, ethnic, and political
affiliations.[Footnote 30] The agricultural sector is the second-
largest contributor to the economy, according to the UN. IOM reported
the need to provide returnees and IDPs in rural areas who want to farm
with the necessary means, such as land, seeds, fertilizers, tools,
poultry, and cattle. In addition, according to IOM officials, many
skilled professionals became displaced, and the longer they are
displaced, the greater the likelihood that their skills will become
outdated. Furthermore, MODM reported that Iraq lacks procedures to
recognize professional certificates and diplomas acquired abroad.
Officials from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and UNHCR are concerned that Iraqi
refugees from professional or middle-class backgrounds may be
reluctant to return for low-skilled and low-paying jobs, which could
potentially affect government capacity and economic growth in Iraq.
Inadequate Access to Essential Services May Impede Iraqi Returns and
Reintegration:
Food and Nonfood Items:
The lack of access to food and nonfood items is a deterrent to returns
and reintegration, according to UNHCR officials. The top three
priority needs identified by returnee families assessed by IOM were
food (over 60 percent), fuel (over 40 percent), and other nonfood
items (over 40 percent), according to a November 2009 IOM report.
[Footnote 31] According to the UN, most Iraqis, including IDPs and
returnees, receive monthly food rations from the Public Distribution
System.[Footnote 32] According to a UN report, although the Public
Distribution System largely shields Iraqis from rising global food
costs, local prices have climbed higher than global prices.[Footnote
33] According to IOM, IDP families have also reported having no or
partial access to the Public Distribution System.[Footnote 34] The
World Food Program (WFP) reported in 2008 that distribution across the
country had been uneven due to the conflict. Many IDP families have
had difficulties in obtaining the proper documents to register for the
Public Distribution System in their new locations, which is required
to obtain rations, according to UNHCR officials. According to USAID
officials, the re-registration of Public Distribution System cards was
improving as of January 2010. Additionally, the rise in fuel prices
and the difficulties of obtaining fuel have placed considerable burden
on many Iraqis, including IDPs and returnees, according to IOM and the
ICRC. IOM further reported that the returnee families it assessed
listed fuel as one of the highest priority needs.
Water, Sanitation, and Electricity:
The UN reported in December 2008, that about 40 percent of Iraqis
continued to suffer from poor water quality and sanitation services
due to dysfunctional systems, network breakdowns, aging
infrastructure, and frequent power supply interruptions (see figure
7).[Footnote 35] According to IOM, access to potable water is a major
concern of IDPs, returnees, and Iraqis in general.[Footnote 36]
Although approximately more than 80 percent of IOM-assessed returnees
in 2009 had access to municipal water networks, the water may not have
been potable, according to IOM. A 2007 survey of Iraqi households also
found that although 81.3 percent of individuals lived in dwellings
connected to public water networks only 12.5 percent of these
individuals had reported that their supply of water was constant.
[Footnote 37]
Figure 7: Stagnant Water Near a Residential Area and Poor Quality Tap
Water in an Iraqi School:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Sources: USAID, Thomas Hartwell (photographer) (left); Copyright ©,
Integrated Regional Information Networks (right).
[End of figure]
According to the UN, sewage is also a common sight in many
neighborhoods, and solid waste management at the family level is a
serious problem (see figure 8). For example, IOM reported in May 2009
that because of blocked sanitation networks, several houses in Baghdad
had been damaged by water and left structurally compromised or had
collapsed. ICRC reported that a number of water treatment plants in
Iraq had either shut down or reduced their operating capacity as a
result of the electricity supply issue.[Footnote 38]
Figure 8: Garbage on a Baghdad Street:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: USAID, Thomas Hartwell (photographer).
[End of figure]
According to DOD, the electricity supply for many Iraqis is still
intermittent and unpredictable, although the gap between demand and
supply has narrowed. UN-HABITAT reported in October 2009 that Iraqis
experienced, on average, 16 hours of power interruption per day.
Health Care:
Displaced and vulnerable Iraqis may also find challenges in obtaining
access to health care. In November 2009, IOM reported that more than
one-third of assessed families reported having no access to health
care, but that this figure was higher for certain governorates (e.g.,
just over one-half of the assessed families in Baghdad).[Footnote 39]
Lack of access is most often due to the distance to the nearest health
care center or lack of equipment and staff. ICRC reported that of the
34,000 doctors registered in 1990, at least 20,000 have left the
country, and 2,200 doctors and nurses have been killed since 2003. In
addition, ICRC reported that hospitals and other health facilities
often lack drugs and other essential items. In 2009, OCHA reported
that mental health issues were also a concern, because many Iraqis had
been affected by conflict and displacement.[Footnote 40] In addition,
IDPs may not have the money to secure transportation to public health
facilities or purchase medication and services that are not available
through the public system. Furthermore, according to the World Health
Organization (WHO) and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
officials, discrimination based on sectarian grounds and fear of
traveling to health facilities could also limit access to health care.
According to WHO officials, there is little data on the health needs
of displaced Iraqis. Although Iraq's public health system does
generate up-to-date information, WHO officials said that they have had
to rely on surveys conducted in 2006/2007 for much of their
information. These officials also said that without sufficient health
data, decision makers will not have the information to identify
vulnerable populations, such as displaced Iraqis, and develop
strategies to meet Iraq's health needs.
Education:
According to IOM, just under 10 percent of the returnee families with
school-age children in Iraq reported having no access to education;
however, this figure varies greatly across the country. For example,
almost two-thirds of returnee families reported having no access to
schooling in the Babylon governorate. According to USAID, schools have
been damaged and looted (see figure 9). According to OCHA, military
interventions, during March and April, 2008, in Baghdad caused the
closing of 22 schools, 11 of which sustained major damages.[Footnote
41] During this period, curfews were imposed and attendance dropped to
30 percent. In addition, IOM reported in April 2009 that many
Christian IDPs from Mosul were unable to enroll in school because they
lacked documentation. Furthermore, according to the UN Children's Fund
(UNICEF), a number of Iraqi schools are overcrowded and lack proper
sanitation facilities, which would make it difficult for these
facilities to absorb returning displaced children. Also, UNICEF
reported in January 2009 that a number of students who were returning
to their homes after being displaced may not have registered with the
government to receive standard school supplies.[Footnote 42]
Figure 9: Iraqi Schools Damaged by Looting and Conflict:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: USAID, Thomas Hartwell (photographer).
[End of figure]
Insufficient Iraqi Government Capacity and Commitment May Impede Iraqi
Returns and Reintegration:
IOM and UNHCR officials said that shortfalls in the Iraqi government's
capacity and commitment have limited the potential for reintegrating
displaced Iraqis. According to U.S. and international assessments and
officials, years of neglect, a highly centralized decision-making
system under the former regime, and looting in 2003 decimated Iraq's
government ministries (see figure 10). In March 2009, GAO reported
that Iraqi ministries had significant shortages of personnel who could
formulate budgets, procure goods and services, and perform other
ministry tasks.[Footnote 43] GAO also reported that violence and
sectarian strife; the exodus of skilled labor from Iraq; and the
weakness in Iraqi procurement, budgeting, and accounting procedures
limited the Iraqi government's ability to spend its capital project
budget.[Footnote 44]
Figure 10: Looted Iraqi Government Office:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: USAID, Debbi Morello (photographer).
[End of figure]
According to U.S. and UNHCR officials, although there has been some
progress, the Iraqi government appears to be noncommittal in
addressing displacement issues. For example, the Iraqi Prime Minister
has appointed a senior official to coordinate IDP and refugee issues,
but the Iraqi government does not appear ready to direct significant
resources to assist refugees. DOD also reported in 2009 that given
other priorities, engaging Syria and Jordan on the return of a largely
Sunni refugee population remained a low priority for the Iraqi
government.[Footnote 45] Furthermore, U.S. and international
organization officials said that the Iraqi government has not given
MODM the authority and capacity to direct or coordinate government
efforts to address displacement issues. In addition, IOM officials
stated that many of the Sunni Iraqi refugees will not return until
they see true national reconciliation in Iraq because they do not
trust the current Iraqi government to protect them.
International Community Is Addressing Impediments That Iraqis Face;
However, the Extent to Which These Efforts Result in Reintegration Is
Not Measured, and Officials Reported Insufficient Iraqi Government
Commitment and Capacity:
Although international and nongovernmental organizations and U.S. and
Iraqi governments have taken action to address the impediments that
Iraqi IDPs and refugees face to return and reintegration, the extent
to which these efforts will result in reintegration (i.e., sustainable
returns) is unknown. The extent to which these projects specifically
target and impact reintegration is not consistently measured or
reported in the aggregate against international goals for
reintegration. U.S. goals and outcomes for these efforts were
classified or considered sensitive and thus an unclassified assessment
and reporting of progress made toward U.S. goals could not be made.
Moreover, the Iraqi government has made limited progress due to the
lack of uniform government support and capacity, according to
international community officials. A March 2010 report stated that the
rates of return of IDPs and refugees had not increased in the last
year.[Footnote 46]
International and Nongovernmental Organizations Have Initiated
Projects Addressing Conditions That Impede Returns and Reintegration,
but the Effect on Reintegration Is Not Consistently Measured:
International and nongovernmental organizations, supported by U.S. and
other donor funding, have initiated many projects to address
impediments to returns and reintegration of displaced Iraqis. However,
according to international organization and U.S. government officials,
the extent to which these projects specifically target and impact
reintegration is not consistently measured or reported in the
aggregate against measurable goals and objectives for reintegration.
According to the UN, international efforts focus on all vulnerable
Iraqis. Thus, these projects target a mix of vulnerable populations in
Iraq, including IDPs, returning refugees, non-Iraqi refugees, other
conflict victims, and the communities that host them (see table 1).
According to international and U.S. government officials, host
communities are often equally vulnerable and including them reduces
the likelihood of resentment toward providing assistance to IDPs and
returning refugees.
Table 1: Sample of Programs and Projects Implemented by the
International Community to Address Impediments to Reintegration and
Assist Vulnerable Iraqis:
Reintegration challenge: Security and protection;
International community actor and program implemented:
* UNHCR: Established 15 Protection and Assistance Centers and 40
associated mobile teams that provide services to displaced, returning,
and vulnerable Iraqis in all governorates, including identification of
protection needs, legal advice and assistance, court representation,
and referrals for services;
* UNHCR: Established 12 Return Integration Community Centers in
Baghdad and several other governorates to provide outreach,
information, and service referrals to displaced and returning Iraqis.
These centers also coordinate with local communities and authorities
to relay information about the needs of displaced and returning Iraqis;
* IMC and UNHCR: Support the operations of the MODM Returnee
Assistance Centers. These centers provide returnees with legal advice
and assistance in replacing missing official documents and accessing
government services and benefits;
* UNICEF: Developing a protection awareness curriculum in Baghdad for
the training of social service providers on early marriage, child
recruitment, and sexual abuse.
Reintegration challenge: Property compensation and shelter;
International community actor and program implemented:
* IMC and UNHCR: Support the operations of the MODM Returnee
Assistance Centers, where returnees can obtain legal advice on
property cases involving compensation, occupation, and evacuation, as
well as the eviction of squatters from occupied properties;
* UNHCR: Rehabilitated and reconstructed 8,501 shelters in 2009 that
benefited 56,238 people, 62 percent of whom were returning IDPs;
* UN-HABITAT: Supplied shelter to 800 IDP and returnee families to
integrate them with their host communities for a "contextually
appropriate duration."
Reintegration challenge: Income generation;
International community actor and program implemented:
* IOM: Provided vocational training for 733 people and agricultural
training for 2,328;
* IOM: Provided 4,494 in-kind grants ranging in value from $400 to
$2,000 (such as fishing equipment, carpentry and welding tools, and
food sales materials, among other materials) to vulnerable Iraqis to
support the formation and expansion of small businesses. Provided 254
returnees with in-kind grants for the same under a pilot program with
MODM;
* ICRC: Established income-generating projects in the Baghdad and
Najaf governorates to help female-headed households.
Reintegration challenge: Essential services;
International community actor and program implemented:
* WFP: Provided food assistance for about 750,000 internally displaced
Iraqis and about 577,000 other vulnerable Iraqis;
* ICRC: Rehabilitated infrastructure to improve access to safe
drinking water and sanitation, upgraded water facilities and developed
water-supply systems that benefited displaced Iraqis living within
host communities, and provided water trucking services and developed
or rehabilitated water supply systems for IDPs living in settlements;
* UNICEF and NGO partners: Rehabilitated water and sanitation
networks, and implemented hygiene awareness campaigns in schools;
* WHO: Supported the Ministry of Health in developing plans to upgrade
the national health information system and train Iraqi health care
professionals;
* UNICEF and WHO: Supported the Ministry of Health's widespread
emergency campaign to vaccinate more than 800,000 children in northern
governorates to prevent the spread of measles;
* NGOs: Set up programs to improve Iraqi children's psychosocial
skills in the classroom and at home, including the training of
education supervisors and teachers in vulnerable districts;
* UNICEF: Assisted with the rehabilitation of 105 schools and
distributed teaching and learning materials to schools.
Reintegration challenge: Capacity development;
International community actor and program implemented:
* IOM: Implemented programs to strengthen MODM's daily operations with
staff training and development of an organizational structure. IOM
worked with Iraqi professionals who have migrated abroad to return to
Iraq for short-term assignments to contribute expertise for
reconstruction and development efforts.
Source: GAO summary based on information from the U.S. government,
international organizations, and NGOs.
[End of table]
Through its 2009 Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region, the UN
coordinated most international organization efforts and funding to
meet humanitarian needs in Iraq and for Iraqi refugees and the
communities that host them in neighboring countries. In June 2009, the
UN revised its consolidated appeal by increasing the amount requested
from $547.3 million to $650.4 million.[Footnote 47] According to OCHA,
the U.S. government contributed about 71 percent of new contributions
to the 2009 appeal and funded at least 56 percent of all reported 2009
assistance to Iraq and the region.[Footnote 48]
The UN did not issue a consolidated appeal for Iraq and the region for
2010. Instead, UN assistance requests are primarily found in three
documents:
* The Iraq 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan, developed by 9 UN agencies,
IOM, and 12 NGOs operating in the country, focuses on overall
humanitarian assistance for Iraq, including efforts that also target
IDPs and returnees, and requests about $193.6 million.
* The UNHCR Global Appeal 2010-2011 for Iraq focuses on IDPs,
returning refugees, other refugees and stateless people inside Iraq
and requests about $264.3 million for 2010, of which about $31.1
million is targeted for reintegration projects that include returnees
and host communities.
* The Regional Response Plan for Iraqi Refugees focuses on Iraqi
refugees and the host communities in 12 neighboring and other
countries and requests about $364.2 million.
U.S. Government Implements Its Objectives by Conducting Diplomatic
Efforts and Providing Assistance through Its Implementing Partners:
In a February 2009 speech, President Obama stated that diplomacy and
assistance were required to help displaced Iraqis. This speech
established a policy that National Security Council (NSC), State,
USAID, and DOD officials follow in finding durable solutions for
displaced Iraqis, including reintegrating voluntary returns within and
to Iraq. While the following information provides examples of U.S.
diplomatic efforts and assistance, we note that overall U.S. goals,
objectives, and outcomes for U.S. efforts were classified or
considered sensitive information during our review.[Footnote 49]
Accordingly, the information in this section is descriptive and can
provide no assessment of the extent to which U.S. assistance is
achieving its intended goals. Subsequent to concluding our field work
and our exit meetings with U.S. agencies and the NSC, the NSC provided
GAO with an unclassified summary, that had not been made public, of a
classified May 2009 U.S. government strategy regarding support for
returning Iraqi refugees and IDPs. The stated U.S. goal was to create
conditions inside key areas of Iraq that will allow the maximum number
of voluntary returns to be sustainable. Objectives were provided for
fiscal years 2009-2011. However, the NSC also noted that the summary
prepared for GAO in July 2010 was based on a "historical document",
should be viewed in that context, and that it had not been updated to
reflect the current situation.
Diplomatic Efforts:
In August 2009, the White House announced that the NSC's Senior
Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights would serve as its
coordinator on Iraqi refugees and IDPs. In November 2009, the Senior
Director and the Assistant Secretary of State for Population,
Refugees, and Migration met with the Iraqi government's refugees and
IDP coordinator and the head of the Iraqi Prime Minister's
Implementation and Follow-up Committee on National Reconciliation to
discuss the challenges related to the return and reintegration of
displaced Iraqis. The officials subsequently issued a joint statement
that described steps agreed upon by both the U.S. and Iraqi
governments to assist Iraq's displaced population and support national
unity. One of the agreed-upon steps was to promote cooperation with
other nations to broaden international support efforts and thereby
make returns more sustainable. In August 2009, the White House also
assigned a senior Foreign Service Officer to take up the post of
Senior Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees and Displaced Persons at the
U.S. embassy.[Footnote 50] The Senior Coordinator is responsible for
coordinating the U.S. government's work in Iraq on refugees and IDPs
and representing the United States on Iraqi displacement issues with
the Iraqi government, the international community, and NGOs.
Humanitarian and Development Assistance:
To provide humanitarian and developmental assistance, the U.S.
government primarily contributes funds to UN appeals and provides
bilateral assistance through its implementing partners. U.S. funding
does not solely target returnees; it supports programs that include
assistance for both returnees and other vulnerable populations. As of
September 30, 2009, State and USAID had obligated about $1.9 billion
and expended about $1.5 billion in fiscal years 2003 through 2009 for
all Iraq-related humanitarian assistance in Iraq and the region. This
total included funds to assist Iraqi refugees and the communities that
host them in neighboring countries (see appendix III for funding and
intended beneficiaries). Table 2 provides State's Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration's (PRM) implementing partners,
activities, country locations, and funding obligated for fiscal year
2009. Of these activities, about $45 million of the $303.4 million
obligated in fiscal year 2009 was allocated to IOM and UNHCR for
projects under State's new "returns program" in Iraq. These two
programs are targeted to benefit returnees and other vulnerable Iraqis.
Table 2: State/PRM-Funded Programs for Humanitarian Assistance to
Iraqi Refugees, Returnees, IDPs, and Vulnerable Persons, Fiscal Year
2009:
Implementing partner: UNHCR;
Activity: Emergency Relief Supplies; Education; Food Assistance;
Health; Protection; Shelter; Cash Assistance for Extremely Vulnerable
Individuals;
Location: Iraq, Jordan, Syria, and other neighboring countries;
Funding obligated: $198,000,000.
Implementing partner: UNICEF;
Activity: Education; Health; Water and Sanitation;
Location: Jordan, Syria, and other neighboring countries;
Funding obligated: $15,000,000.
Implementing partner: IOM;
Activity: Socioeconomic Reintegration for Returnees; Psychosocial,
Legal, Health, and Livelihoods Support for IDP and Returnee Female-
headed Households; Anti-trafficking Programs;
Location: Iraq, Syria, Jordan and other neighboring countries;
Funding obligated: $12,700,000.
Implementing partner: NGOs;
Activity: Health; Education; Emergency Relief Supplies;
Location: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Armenia[A];
Funding obligated: $41,384,670.
Implementing partner: Other International Organizations;
Activity: Protection; Health; Water and Sanitation; Emergency Relief
Supplies; Livelihoods Support;
Location: Iraq, Jordan, and Syria;
Funding obligated: $36,319,631.
Implementing partner: Total;
Funding obligated: $303,404,301.
Source: GAO analysis based on data and information from State.
[A] State provided $400,000 to Save the Children in fiscal year 2009
to support Iraqi and other refugees in Armenia.
[End of table]
USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funds and
oversees a wide range of humanitarian assistance activities that are
implemented by a number of NGO and UN partners who provide programs
for IDPs and other vulnerable Iraqis. Table 3 provides USAID/OFDA's
implementing partners, activities, locations, and funding obligated
for fiscal year 2009. Of the about $83.4 million obligated, $60
million was for programs intended to provide direct assistance to
returning families; support to communities with significant numbers of
current or anticipated returnees; and general assistance to vulnerable
populations, regardless of displacement status. According to USAID/
OFDA, since Iraq is transitioning from an emergency to a development
phase, OFDA plans to conclude its work in Iraq in 2011.
Table 3: USAID/OFDA-Funded Programs for Humanitarian Assistance to
Iraqi IDPs, Returnees, and Vulnerable Persons, Fiscal Year 2009:
Implementing partner: Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development;
Activity: Agriculture and Food Security; Economic Recovery and Market
Systems; Emergency Relief Supplies; Protection; Shelter and
Settlements; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene;
Location in Iraq: Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Erbil, Wasit;
Funding obligated: $2,547,653.
Implementing partner: CHF International;
Activity: Shelter and Settlements;
Location in Iraq: Anbar;
Funding obligated: $3,868,135.
Implementing partner: IMC;
Activity: Economic Recovery and Market Systems; Health;
Humanitarian Coordination and Information Management; Protection;
Shelter and Settlements; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene;
Location in Iraq: Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Basrah, Diyala, Karbala,
Najaf, Ninawa, Qadisiyah, Wasit;
Funding obligated: $18,075,687.
Implementing partner: International Rescue Committee;
Activity: Emergency Relief Supplies; Protection; Shelter and
Settlements;
Location in Iraq: Anbar, Baghdad, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninawa, Sulaymaniyah;
Funding obligated: $4,975,648.
Implementing partner: International Relief and Development;
Activity: Agriculture and Food Security; Emergency Relief Supplies;
Economic Recovery and Market Systems; Health; Protection; Shelter and
Settlements; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene;
Location in Iraq: Anbar, Baghdad, Kirkuk, Ninawa;
Funding obligated: $9,441,496.
Implementing partner: IOM;
Activity: Economic Recovery and Market Systems; Emergency Relief
Supplies; Humanitarian Coordination and Information Management;
Protection; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene;
Location in Iraq: Anbar, Baghdad, Basrah, Dahuk, Diyala, Erbil,
Kirkuk, Muthanna, Ninawa, Qadisiyah, Sulaymaniyah, Wasit;
Countrywide;
Funding obligated: $10,430,249.
Implementing partner: Mercy Corps;
Activity: Economic Recovery and Market Systems; Emergency Relief
Supplies; Humanitarian Studies, Analysis, or Applications; Protection;
Shelter and Settlements; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene;
Location in Iraq: Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah ad Din, Sulaymaniyah;
Countrywide;
Funding obligated: $14,500,000.
Implementing partner: Save the Children/U.S.;
Activity: Protection;
Location in Iraq: Basrah, Dhi Qar, Maysan, Muthanna;
Funding obligated: $3,000,000.
Implementing partner: UNICEF;
Activity: Protection; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene;
Location in Iraq: Countrywide;
Funding obligated: $8,000,000.
Implementing partner: WFP;
Activity: Economic Recovery and Market Systems; Logistics;
Emergency Relief Supplies; Humanitarian Coordination and Information
Management;
Location in Iraq: Countrywide;
Funding obligated: $8,000,000.
Implementing partner: WFP;
Activity: Administrative Support;
Funding obligated: $556,202.
Implementing partner: Total;
Funding obligated: $83,395,070.
Source: GAO analysis based on data and information from USAID.
[End of table]
In addition, USAID's Middle East Bureau/Office of Iraq Reconstruction
(ME/IR) and USAID/Iraq at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad continue to
support programs focusing on development assistance. Although not
directly tied to current reintegration efforts, development assistance
could improve conditions in Iraq that could increase the number of
returns and foster reintegration, according to U.S. and international
organization officials. As of September 30, 2009, USAID had obligated
about $6.4 billion and expended about $5.6 billion in fiscal years
2003 through 2009 for development assistance projects in Iraq (see
appendix IV for funding by source and funding by implementing
partner). For example, USAID's Community Stabilization Program,
completed in October 2009, offered employment activities, vocational
training, small grants, and small infrastructure projects in
communities affected by insurgent violence. USAID's development
assistance also supported programs focusing on building capacity for
all levels of the government and other organizations. For example, in
July 2006, USAID implemented the National Capacity Development
Program, known in Arabic as Tatweer. The aim of this program is to
increase the effectiveness of ministries by reforming internal
operational systems and instituting best practices and international
standards. The program is expected to end in January 2011. Tatweer
works with 10 ministries, including MODM, and 7 executive offices. For
MODM, Tatweer is providing assistance on capacity-building activities,
including improvements to the information technology infrastructure
and the management of relief supplies, according to USAID.
Finally, DOD provides assistance in Iraq through its Commander's
Emergency Response Program. This program enables local commanders to
respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements
within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that
immediately assist the local population.[Footnote 51] According to DOD
officials, although the program is not targeted to returns and
reintegration, in some cases, relief and reconstruction are carried
out in areas heavily populated by IDPs. DOD had obligated about $3.6
billion in fiscal years 2004 through 2009 for projects under the
program in Iraq, including water and sanitation, health care, and
other projects, according to DOD officials.
Iraqi Government Has Initiated Steps to Encourage Returns and
Reintegration; However, Officials Report That Progress Has Been
Limited Due to Insufficient Commitment and Capacity:
The Iraqi government's efforts to encourage returns and reintegration
have been limited by insufficient political commitment and capacity
within the government, according to international organization and
U.S. government officials. The Iraqi government has developed policies
and taken initial steps to assist IDPs and encourage voluntary returns
and reintegration. MODM issued a National Policy on Displacement and
the government issued a decree and orders that allow for financial
stipends and assistance in safely recovering property. However, the
international community has reported that MODM was not able to
implement its policy, and that bureaucratic challenges, based on lack
of capacity[Footnote 52] and political commitment at various levels of
the Iraqi government, have prevented many returnees from recovering
their property and receiving stipends. In June 2009, DOD reported that
"serious efforts" to facilitate the return of refugees by the Iraqi
government have been "all but non-existent."[Footnote 53]
MODM, a relatively new ministry, has lacked the authority and capacity
to lead ministerial efforts regarding returns and reintegration,
according to international organization and U.S. government officials.
In July 2008, MODM issued a National Policy on Displacement, which
recognized displacement as a key challenge facing the government of
Iraq and the international community. The policy set a goal to find
durable solutions for displaced Iraqis, established objectives,
stressed the rights of displaced persons, described the basic needs of
Iraqi IDPs, and recommended activities to address the needs. However,
the policy was not fully implemented because MODM lacked the authority
and capacity to coordinate efforts within the Iraqi government,
according to international organization and U.S. government officials.
According to officials, the more established ministries--such as
Defense, Interior, Health, Education, and others--continued to work
independently of MODM. Furthermore, MODM did not have uniform support
at all levels of the government for the policy or for efforts to
facilitate the return of refugees of all sects, according to
international organization, NGO, and U.S. government officials.
Moreover, MODM received a relatively small budget in 2008 because its
role was originally viewed as primarily a coordinating rather than an
implementing role, according to U.S. government and international
organization officials. For 2009, the total Iraqi budget decreased,
including that of MODM. According to the MODM Minister and U.S.
government and international organization officials, the budgeted
amount for 2009 was insufficient (see table 4), particularly since
MODM began implementing programs and delivering services. However,
according to officials, other ministries may be independently
assisting IDPs and returnees through their own budgets and efforts.
For example, the Ministry of Housing is planning to build shelters,
according to officials. For 2010, the MODM budget was slightly higher
than the amount that it expended in 2008 and more than triple the
amount of its 2009 budget.
Table 4: Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM) and Total
Iraqi Government Budget and Expenditures, 2008 to 2010:
Dollars in millions:
Account: Operating;
2008 budget: $227.6;
2008 expenditures: $183.4;
2009 budget: $49.0;
2009 expenditures (January-November): $58.3;
2010 budget: $181.4.
Account: Compensation;
2008 budget: [Empty];
2008 expenditures: [Empty];
2009 budget: $4.9;
2009 expenditures (January-November): $4.4;
2010 budget: $7.1.
Account: Goods and Services;
2008 budget: [Empty];
2008 expenditures: [Empty];
2009 budget: $3.3;
2009 expenditures (January-November): $1.7;
2010 budget: $3.4.
Account: Social benefits;
2008 budget: [Empty];
2008 expenditures: [Empty];
2009 budget: $40.7;
2009 expenditures (January-November): $52.2;
2010 budget: $170.9.
Account: Investment;
2008 budget: $2.5;
2008 expenditures: $1.9;
2009 budget: $6.7;
2009 expenditures (January-November): $0.5;
2010 budget: $13.7.
Account: Total MODM;
2008 budget: $230.1;
2008 expenditures: $185.2;
2009 budget: $55.7;
2009 expenditures (January-November): $58.8;
2010 budget: $195.2.
Account: Total government of Iraq;
2008 budget: $72,181.4;
2008 expenditures: $56,064.3;
2009 budget: $58,615.1;
2009 expenditures (January-November): $36,882.7;
2010 budget: $72,332.0.
Source: GAO analysis based on Iraqi Ministry of Finance data provided
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Note: The 2008 Iraqi supplemental budget did not disaggregate
operating budget accounts.
[End of table]
The Iraqi government issued a decree and orders to facilitate certain
returns and reintegration for some displaced Iraqis, primarily in
Baghdad and Diyala (see table 5); however, progress has been limited.
Table 5: Summary of the Key Iraqi Government Decree and Orders to
Facilitate Certain Returns and Reintegration of Displaced Iraqis, 2008-
2009:
Decree/order/date: Council of Ministers Decree 262; July 17, 2008;
Summary actions:
* Continues to grant 150,000 Iraqi dinars (about $126) per month, for
3 consecutive months to each IDP family (about 120,000 families) that
was displaced as of January 1, 2008;
* Grants a total of 1 million Iraqi dinars (about $838) per family for
returning IDPs, Iraqi refugees who have stayed in host countries for 8
to 12 months, and returnees from the Kurdish Region (about 35,000
families), provided that they are no longer recorded as displaced;
* Grants rental assistance of 300,000 Iraqi dinars (about $252) per
month for 6 months to displaced families squatting in Baghdad houses
to return these houses to returning displaced families.
Decree/order/date: Cabinet Order 101/S; August 3, 2008;
Summary actions:
* Activates prior Order 83/S that provides that anyone displacing
someone from their home will be punished according to Iraq's Anti-
terrorism Law, and provides that anyone who occupies a house belonging
to a displaced person will be considered as a participant in the
displacement and be held responsible for the property and its
contents, which should be left to the legal owner;
* Provides 1 month, as of August 1, 2008, for squatters occupying
homes of displaced Iraqis to leave them with all their contents to
their legal owners;
* Orders MODM branches to establish centers to receive, register, and
take the necessary information from displaced persons who should show
legal proof of their ownership and legal residence;
* Orders MODM, Ministry of Justice, Reconciliation Committee, Baghdad
governorate, and Baghdad Operation Command to undertake their
responsibilities and nominate representatives in MODM branches,
discussed above, each one according to its jurisdiction;
* Orders Baghdad Operation Command to issue the necessary instructions
to facilitate implementation of this order;
and Governorate Operations Commands to undertake the same mechanism to
facilitate return of IDPs to their original places in each governorate.
Decree/order/date: Cabinet Order 54/S; July 16, 2009;
Summary actions:
Establishes committee in Diyala governorate, under the chairmanship of
the Head of the Implementation and Follow-up Committee for National
Reconciliation, that is responsible for the following:
* Activating Cabinet Order 101/S of 2008 concerning the return of
displaced persons in the Diyala governorate;
* Following up on the implementation of the projects of Basha'ir Al-
Khair Commission for Diyala Reconstruction;
* Following up on the compensation grant for damaged houses in the
Diyala governorate;
* Following up on the issue of water shortages in the governorate and
improving the agricultural situation there;
* Coordinating between the ministries concerned, the service
departments, and the security committee regarding security, services,
and displacement;
* Coordinating with international organizations willing to provide
services to the Diyala governorate within the legal framework.
Source: GAO summary based on U.S. government translations of Iraqi
government documents.
[End of table]
International organizations and NGOs have identified problems
regarding this decree and these orders and their implementation.
According to USIP, Decree 262 and Order 101 cover only a limited
segment of the displaced population, require extensive documentation
that returnees may have lost due to displacement, do not clarify the
roles of the various agencies involved in the process, and do not
dedicate resources for administration and oversight. USIP reported
that by the end of 2008, about 10,000 returnee families had registered
to receive the grant under Decree 262, but only a small number had
received it. In January 2009, the volume of new cases dropped
significantly, which according to UNHCR, IOM, and NGOs, may have been
due to the low rate of payments. According to international
organization and U.S. government officials, the amount of the stipends
under these orders is insufficient to cover expenses and serve as an
incentive for returns. In addition, IMC officials said the Iraqi
government has not been proactive in providing squatters with the 6
months of rental assistance due under Decree 262. Moreover, according
to OCHA and IMC, MODM issued a Ministerial Order on February 12, 2009
that precluded further registration of IDPs for benefits and refocused
efforts on monitoring returnees. According to OCHA, the order sought
to prevent double registrations and forgery; however, it may restrict
legitimate IDPs' access to benefits. OCHA further noted that the
Ministerial Order may restrict unregistered IDPs' ability to register
as returnees and receive benefits under Decree 262 and Order 101,
since they have to be registered as IDPs first to re-register as
returnees.
According to U.S. government officials, a key indicator for Iraqi
government progress will be how the Iraqi government, at the central,
governorate, and local levels, moves forward with its funding for and
implementation of Order 54 regarding returns and reintegration in
Diyala. The Iraqi government has made Diyala the focus of an
initiative, led by the Follow-up Committee for National
Reconciliation, to create conditions for large-scale IDP and refugee
returns. According to State, the Iraqi government has pledged 37
billion dinar (about $30 million) for use by the Diyala Governor to
reconstruct destroyed homes and pledged to provide 6-month contract
jobs for up to 10,000 returnee families and 10,000 nonreturnee
families. DOD reported in April 2010, that the Iraqi Security Forces
continue to make progress in improving security in Diyala by
eliminating insurgent support and thereby setting the conditions for
economic recovery and return of displaced Iraqis. However, the
perception of disproportionate targeting of Sunnis has strained
sectarian relations, allowing Shi'a extremists and criminal elements
much greater freedom of movement.[Footnote 54]
Iraq, the United States, and Other Members of the International
Community Lack an Integrated International Strategy for Reintegrating
Displaced Iraqis:
Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international
community lack an integrated strategy for the reintegration of
displaced Iraqis. An effective strategy would be integrated and
provide Iraq and its implementing partners with a tool to shape
policies and programs so that stakeholders can achieve the desired
results in an accountable and effective manner.[Footnote 55]
International community stakeholders agree that to be effective, the
strategy should be Iraqi-led with the assistance of the international
community. The lack of an integrated strategy for reintegration
resulted in a lack of agreed-upon strategic goals and outcomes, has
hindered efforts to efficiently and effectively assess the needs of
Iraqi IDPs and returnees, and has hindered stakeholder coordination
and efficiency of service delivery.
Iraq, the United States, and the UN Lack Integrated Plans for
Reintegrating Displaced Iraqis:
Iraq, the United States, and other members of the international
community lack an integrated plan for reintegrating displaced Iraqis
because Iraqi MODM planning efforts stalled due to limitations of
authority, capacity, and broader Iraqi government support; the UN's
strategy and plans have primarily focused on assistance to the most
vulnerable Iraqis and have not specifically focused on reintegration;
and the current U.S. government strategy has not been made publicly
available. An effective strategy would be integrated and provide Iraq
and its implementing partners with a tool to shape policies and
programs so that stakeholders can achieve the desired results in an
accountable, efficient, and effective manner.
Iraqi MODM Planning Efforts Stalled Due to Lack of Authority,
Capacity, and Iraqi Government Support:
According to international organization, U.S. government, and NGO
officials, MODM does not have the authority, capacity, or Iraqi
government support to implement its displacement policy and develop an
effective strategy. In July 2008, MODM issued the National Policy on
Displacement. This policy offers a general description of the problem,
identifies basic goals, defines terms, stresses the rights of
displaced persons, describes the basic needs of Iraqi IDPs, and
recommends activities to mitigate some of the problems identified. The
policy also calls for setting up a comprehensive, effective, and
realistic workplan; providing adequate protection and assistance to
displaced persons; specifying coordination structures among all state
institutions; and allocating funds and developing financial procedures
for the implementation of the policy. However, international
organization, U.S. government, and NGO officials noted that MODM
efforts have stalled because the ministry has had little authority or
ability to coordinate efforts within the Iraqi government to implement
the policy and develop an effective strategy. International and
nongovernmental organization officials have expressed concern about
the lack of unified Iraqi support for the policy and development of a
strategy. UNHCR, IOM, and other actors will continue to build on the
National Policy on Displacement as well as relevant legal authorities
that we have described previously, according to the UN. According to
State officials, the extent to which the Iraqi government implements
Order 54, which focuses a range of efforts in Diyala and essentially
makes Diyala a test case, may determine the future development of a
viable strategy.
UN Strategy and Plans Have Primarily Focused on Assistance to the Most
Vulnerable Iraqis and Have Not Specifically Focused on Reintegration:
Overall UN strategic efforts in Iraq have targeted humanitarian
assistance to the most vulnerable Iraqis, which may or may not include
IDPs and returnees, but are not specifically focused on reintegration.
The United Nations 2008-2010 Iraq Assistance Strategy[Footnote 56]
focuses on needs and planned assistance by sector,[Footnote 57] and
although it occasionally mentions the impact of IDPs on sectors and
includes a few broadly stated outputs regarding IDPs, it does not
address reintegration. As part of its strategic approach, the UN
issued its consolidated 2009 funding appeal for assistance efforts in
Iraq and neighboring and other countries hosting refugees.[Footnote
58] The UN noted in its midyear review that, although IDPs were
returning, large numbers of returns had not yet materialized and
should not be encouraged. Thus, the UN continued to address the needs
of vulnerable groups within the entire population and not to limit
efforts to IDPs and returnees. In the UN's 2010 appeal, the UN
interspersed some new efforts intended to facilitate returns and
reintegration while also assisting other vulnerable Iraqis. However,
after making progress in consolidating its 2009 appeal, the UN divided
its 2010 appeal into three planning documents, further fragmenting its
initial planning efforts to address returns and reintegration.
Additionally, although the initial planning efforts may include
outputs, such as that at least 35 mobile teams and 14 Protection and
Assistance Centers provide legal aid and monitor the needs of people
of concern, they do not define reintegration (i.e., what is a
sustainable return) or include specific indicators or outcomes for
reintegration, as would be expected in an effective strategic plan.
Current U.S. Government Strategy Is Not Publicly Available:
According to NSC, State, and USAID officials, the U.S. strategy
regarding the reintegration of Iraqis is delineated in three
classified or sensitive documents that have not been made available in
a public document. Also, an unclassified version of the current U.S.
strategy has not been developed and made public. Administration
officials stated that the classified and sensitive documents were not
drafted with the aim of creating a publicly announced strategy to
persuade Iraqis to return home; rather, they are planning documents
describing how to use U.S. assistance to ensure that Iraqis who choose
to return to Iraq have support systems in place. In the absence of a
publicly available strategy, administration officials stated that the
United States will focus on the three efforts announced by the U.S.
President in February 2009. The President stated that the
administration would provide more assistance and take steps to
generate international support for countries hosting refugees,
cooperate with others to resettle refugees facing great personal risk,
and work with the Iraqi government over time to resettle refugees and
displaced Iraqis within Iraq.[Footnote 59]
Subsequent to concluding our field work and our exit meetings with
U.S. agencies and the NSC, in July 2010 NSC provided GAO with an
unclassified summary of a classified May 2009 U.S. government strategy
regarding support for returning Iraqi refugees and IDPs. While the
summary was made available to GAO, it had not been made public. The
NSC summary included a fiscal year 2010 objective to assist the Iraqi
government, in coordination with international organizations and other
donors, in developing a comprehensive strategy to support the
reintegration of displaced Iraqis. The strategy was to include active
participation of the Iraqi government line ministries. However, such a
strategy was not developed. The NSC noted that the summary prepared
for GAO was based on a "historical document," should be viewed in that
context, and that it had not been updated to reflect the current
situation.
Iraq, the United States, and Other International Community
Stakeholders Have Not Yet Reached Agreement on Defined Goals and
Outcomes, Including Defining the Target Population and Reintegration:
Clearly defined and agreed-upon strategic goals and intended outcomes
for reintegration have not been specifically developed. Strategic
goals explain what results are expected and when they are expected. A
direct alignment between strategic goals and strategies for achieving
those goals is important for assessing an ability to achieve those
goals. In the case of reintegrating displaced Iraqis, key parameters
have not yet been agreed upon, which makes it difficult to establish
measurable goals.
For example, the international community has no agreed-upon
determination of when the displacement it is addressing in Iraq began
or when the displaced are considered reintegrated. MODM's National
Policy on Displacement includes a focus on an estimated 1.2 million
Iraqis who were displaced over the 40 years before the fall of Saddam
Hussein's regime in 2003 and on an estimated more than 1.6 million who
were internally displaced after; while the Iraqi government's 2008 and
2009 orders and decree focus assistance to a limited segment of the
displaced population. The U.S. government and some international
organization programs are more focused on displacement since 2003,
particularly the large displacement occurring after the February 2006
Samarra bombing.
Similarly complex is agreeing upon when the displaced are considered
reintegrated and international assistance is no longer required for
reintegration. Reintegration is defined as "sustainable returns," but
a clear and uniform definition of "sustainable" in the context of Iraq
has not been agreed to by the international community. MODM's National
Policy on Displacement defines durable solutions as based on three
elements--long-term security, restitution of or compensation for lost
property, and an environment that sustains life under normal economic
and social conditions. Under the policy, the displaced may return to
their home or place of habitual residence; integrate locally into the
social, economic, cultural, and political fabric of the community
where they initially found temporary refuge; or resettle in a new
community. However, restitution of or compensation for lost property
may occur long after the displaced return, integrate, or resettle, and
there is little agreement on what constitutes normal economic and
social conditions for Iraq. According to U.S. government officials,
they plan to address the lack of clarity and agreement over
definitions and parameters as they develop their plans to assist the
Iraqi government in reintegration efforts.
Lack of an Integrated Strategy Has Hindered Efforts to Efficiently and
Effectively Assess the Needs of Iraqi IDPs and Returnees:
The lack of an integrated strategy has hindered efforts to efficiently
and effectively assess the needs of Iraqi IDPs and returnees. A
strategy for reintegration must include information on the needs of
displaced Iraqis and be updated on the basis of the assistance
provided and remaining needs. While various UN agencies, affiliated
organizations, and their implementing partners have collected and
assessed data for their specialized work in Iraq, gaps remain. In
addition, the UN has not integrated data from UNHCR into its new Inter-
Agency Information Analysis Unit, which was established to provide a
central point for collecting and assessing needs-based data, according
to a senior IAU official.
Over time, the UN and its partners have individually attempted to
identify and estimate the numbers of vulnerable Iraqis, internally
displaced, returnees, and Iraqi and non-Iraqi refugees; survey
returnees and IDPs on their reasons for leaving, immediate needs, and
priority needs for return; document protection, property, livelihood,
and governance issues; and determine the status of essential services
across the country. However, international organization, NGO, and U.S.
government officials stated that it was often difficult to identify
the best data available because data from different sources did not
always agree, some of the data were incomplete or outdated, or the
methodology used to obtain and assess the reliability of some data was
not clear. According to UNHCR, OCHA should have been coordinating the
data collection and assessments from the beginning, but they did not
initially have a presence in Iraq. As a result, each organization
collected and assessed its own data, according to UNHCR. According to
some officials, the Iraqi population has been over surveyed as a
result of these separate assessments. According to international and
nongovernmental organizations, gaps in information and data remain.
For example:
* In 2009, UNHCR predicted that over 400,000 refugees would return to
Iraq in 2009. The returns did not materialize and no further fact-
based assessments and predictions on the rate of return have been made
to facilitate planning efforts, according to UNHCR and U.S. government
officials.
* According to international organizations, no inventory and analysis
has been conducted of the various financial assistance programs
available to IDPs and returnees to determine gaps, overlap, or impact.
As a result, there is no assurance that resources are allocated in a
rational and fair manner. Some international organizations provide
returnees and vulnerable populations with cash, cash for work, and in-
kind grants for business development. USIP reported that in addition
to grants provided by the central government, ministries, provincial
governments, and municipalities provide other forms of financial
assistance and other specific funds for houses damaged in particular
military operations, and that there are a variety of victims and
martyrs commissions that provide other sorts of compensation.
* Despite efforts to improve outreach and surveys of vulnerable
populations, some areas have not been accessible to international
organizations and NGOs due to security concerns and lack of trained
national staff. To begin to address this problem, in 2009, OCHA
planned to inventory and train national NGOs through three workshops
and subsequently carried out training inside Iraq for 74 Iraqi NGOs on
humanitarian principles, rapid needs assessments, and results based
management. By 2011, UNHCR plans to increase its presence in Iraq by
relocating staff from Jordan and Kuwait; increasing its network of
national NGOs across Iraq; and working through international NGO
partners to provide support, oversight, and a review of the capacity
of national NGOs to access areas, identify vulnerable populations, and
provide assistance, particularly should security deteriorate.
To address data gaps and overlap, in February 2008, the UN established
the IAU in Amman, Jordan, under the direction of OCHA and the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. According to a senior IAU
official, the primary purpose of the IAU is to be a "one-stop shop"
for collecting and providing data on Iraq and to ensure that the best
data are available.[Footnote 60] The IAU is intended to bring together
analysts from UN agencies and NGOs to facilitate and enhance data
collection, sharing, analysis, and joint assessments; provide timely
and accurate information on the situation and needs in the different
areas of Iraq; and increase coordination to reduce project duplication
and maximize the targeting of vulnerable communities.[Footnote 61]
According to the senior IAU official, in the spring of 2010, the UN
Country Team established a new steering committee composed of agency
heads that met for the first time to set priorities and develop a work
plan for the IAU. As of July 2010, the IAU has staff in Jordan and
Iraq, including new governate-based Information Management Offices.
[Footnote 62] According to the senior IAU official, the IAU now
receives data and assessments from most organizations conducting work
in Iraq, have analysts from most of the major contributors as part of
their team,[Footnote 63] and help plan for and coordinate future
surveys. Through an agreement between the UN and the U.S. government,
the IAU will also begin to analyze declassified U.S. databases and
share information.
However, according to the senior IAU official, although UNHCR is a
participating agency of the IAU, is a member of the UN Country Team,
and shares it reports with the IAU, UNHCR is not fully participating
in the IAU. UNHCR is not sharing the raw or primary data it collects
on IDPs, returnees, and vulnerable populations; its methodology and
data limitations; and an analyst to work with the IAU team and is not
taking advantage of IAU resources and coordination. The IAU official
stated that as a result, UNHCR issues are not on the agenda, and other
agencies are unaware of the composition and quality of UNHCR data. The
official added that UNHCR is not taking advantage of IAU staff
expertise and lessons learned on how to implement surveys using NGOs
and how to scrub and assess raw data. For example, UNHCR conducted a
survey of returnees but has not shared its questionnaire and raw data
with the IAU. Moreover, UNHCR is not involved in planning future
surveys, such as a major activity of the IAU this year, which is to
work with the Iraqi government and civil society to develop a
socioeconomic monitoring system for Iraq within the Central
Organization for Statistics and Information Technology and the
Kurdistan Regional Statistic Office, according to the IAU official.
According to UNHCR and IAU officials, UNHCR had initially assigned an
analyst to the IAU, but has not refilled the position since the staff
member left it in 2009. According to the IAU official, UNHCR informed
the IAU that it had abolished the position because it did not have a
qualified staff member to detail to the IAU. UNHCR officials stated
that they found little added value from having a staff person detailed
to the IAU.
Lack of an Integrated Strategy Has Hindered Stakeholder Coordination
and Efficiency:
Without an integrated strategy, it is difficult for stakeholders to
effectively delineate roles and responsibilities and establish
coordination and oversight mechanisms for effective and efficient
implementation. The MODM Minister stated that his ministry's initial
role was limited to that of a coordinating body, leaving no single
entity charged with implementing the necessary tasks. The Minister
added that although the Ministries of Health, Education, Interior, and
Defense are essential to addressing impediments to returns, they do
not have programs specifically focusing on IDPs.
Roles and efforts among international organizations may overlap,
particularly since organizations plan their work independently of each
other and work bilaterally with local leaders, the Iraqi government,
and donor country agencies. According to international and NGO
officials, decreasing international donor community contributions to
these organizations has caused them to compete for funding and trained
national staff. At UN Country Team meetings and UN Assistance Mission
for Iraq activities, officials at one agency stated that while some
information is shared, organizations "protect their turf," and
opportunities to build on the efforts of others are lost. According to
IOM and UNHCR, although organizations try to avoid conflicts by
focusing their efforts in different sectors--such as UNHCR focusing
its projects on shelter and property issues, IOM focusing on
livelihood projects, and WFP focusing on delivery of food--efforts may
overlap. For example, WFP is expanding its focus in Iraq to include
livelihood projects. According to IMC, coordinating committees are
prolific in Iraq but they are not always effective. For example,
according to IMC, IMC and USAID/OFDA were working on shelter
rehabilitation in one area, only to find out from field staff that
UNHCR was doing similar work. According to IMC officials, they have
been involved in the UN sector outcome teams, but the meetings were
generally held in Amman without an Iraqi government presence, thereby
limiting effective coordination.
One area with significant potential for overlap is the establishment
of numerous assistance centers and mobile units across Iraq to
register or assist returnees, IDPs, and vulnerable Iraqis.
International and U.S. government officials expressed concerns about
the need for multiple centers, possible inefficiencies, and extent to
which the MODM will be capable of assuming responsibilities for
centers in the future. Although each center initially had its own
purpose, some of the activities at these centers now overlap, and all
require oversight and administrative support, according to
international organization officials. A number of these centers are
funded by State and USAID and managed or supported by MODM, UNHCR,
IMC, and IOM. A sample of these centers includes the following:
* MODM Return and Assistance Centers: According to UNHCR, as of July
2010, MODM had established three main Return and Assistance Centers--
two in Baghdad (Karkh and Resafa) and one in Diyala--to register and
assist displaced Iraqis who want to return to their original homes. In
addition, each of the 14 MODM branches outside of Baghdad and Diyala
has a Registration Department where the same functions are performed.
The centers register new arrivals, streamline returnee access to
assistance, offer returning Iraqis legal aid and advice, assist in
resolving property disputes, help replace lost documents, and help
with access to MODM and government benefits. IMC supports the Karkh
and Diyala centers with funding from USAID and strategic guidance from
UNHCR. According to an IMC official, IMC is essentially co-managing
the centers at MODM's request because MODM lacks trained staff. IMC
also supports some of the MODM Registration Departments. UNHCR, with
State's PRM funding, supports operations of the Resafa center,
including its mobile teams, and supports two of the Karkh center
mobile teams. According to UNHCR, although it is not ideal to have a
medical NGO co-operating the centers, IMC was one of the few UNHCR
partners and international NGOs positioned in Iraq when the centers
were established.
* UNHCR Protection and Assistance Centers: As of March 2010, UNHCR had
established and continued to operate 15 Protection and Assistance
Centers and 40 associated mobile teams that provide services to
displaced, returning, and vulnerable Iraqis and others in all 18
governorates in Iraq. As of May 2010, the centers included a total of
125 staff, including lawyers, social workers, monitors, and public
information and database officers. The centers conduct protection
monitoring assessments to identify needs, gather information, and
identify opportune interventions regarding basic human rights and
physical security; provide legal assistance addressing a broad
spectrum of needs, including legal counseling and interventions and
access to services, documentation, and compensation; provide
assistance and referrals to services and other stakeholders, such as
authorities, NGOs, UNHCR, or other Protection and Assistance Centers;
and provide briefings and information sessions to raise awareness of
protection needs.
* UNHCR Return Integration Community Centers: In mid-2009, UNHCR
established and began operating 12 Return Integration Community
Centers to expand its capacity to reach out to return communities. The
centers coordinate with and relay information to local communities;
conduct needs assessments; and address the social, assistance, and
information needs of displaced and returning IDPs and refugees. Six of
the centers are based in Baghdad and the others are based in Anbar,
Basrah, Diyala, Kirkuk, Missan, and Ninewa. UNHCR plans to increase
the number of these centers to at least 16 in 2010. As of May 2010,
these centers included a total of 159 staff.
* IOM Community Outreach and Women Centers: IOM and its partners are
establishing four Women Centers with funding from State. The centers
will provide legal aid, psychosocial support, health counseling, and
livelihood support to the most vulnerable IDP and returnee female-
headed households in Baghdad, Diyala, and Missan.
After our fieldwork discussions with UNHCR and U.S. government
officials, UNHCR informed us in June 2010 that it was taking action to
address the multiple assistance centers and potential for duplication
and lost efficiencies. First, UNHCR informed us that it had agreed to
merge all Protection and Assistance Centers and Return Integration
Community Centers in 2011 to reduce administrative costs. Second,
UNHCR, in discussions with the U.S. Embassy, suggested that all MODM
Return and Assistance Center activities be placed under one management
umbrella. According to UNHCR, doing so would enable them to have a
more harmonized approach that would avoid potential confusion and
duplication. UNHCR also stated that this approach will provide it with
the opportunity to harmonize staff payments and incentives.
Conclusions:
It is in the U.S. government's interest to work with Iraq and
international community stakeholders to develop an integrated
international strategy for reintegrating displaced Iraqis that
transitions efforts and costs over time to the Iraqi government.
First, Iraq is a sovereign nation that should lead efforts to address
impediments to the return and reintegration of all displaced Iraqis.
Second, in MODM's National Policy on Displacement, the Iraqi
government states that it cannot address this issue without the help
of the international community. Third, in fiscal year 2009, the United
States funded more than one-half of the humanitarian assistance
provided to Iraq, and the lack of an international strategy may result
in lost efficiencies and wasted funds. One possible example of this
may be the administration of many assistance centers and mobile units
across Iraq. Furthermore, President Obama stated in his February 2009
speech on responsibly ending the war in Iraq that the United States
will pursue a transition to Iraq and that the United States has a
moral responsibility to help displaced Iraqis. We recognize that
strategies themselves are not end points, but starting points, and
that implementation is the key. However, an integrated strategy--along
with transparent goals and shared, accurate data on the conditions and
effectiveness of projects--is useful in suggesting ways to enhance the
value of plans, filling in gaps, speeding implementation, guiding
resource allocations, and providing oversight opportunities.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To enhance the ability of the Iraqi and U.S. governments,
international organizations, and NGOs to effectively plan and
integrate their efforts to assist and reintegrate displaced Iraqis, we
recommend that the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator work
with the appropriate international organizations to assist the Iraqi
government in developing an international strategy that addresses
impediments to return and prepares for and facilitates the return and
reintegration of displaced Iraqis.
To ensure that the U.S. goals and plans are fully integrated with
those of Iraq and other international community stakeholders and that
progress toward meeting those goals is transparent, we recommend that
the Secretary of State and USAID Administrator make public an
unclassified version of the current U.S. strategy and their
implementing plans for assisting and reintegrating displaced Iraqis,
including their goals, performance measures, and progress assessments.
To ensure that the U.S. and Iraqi governments, other donors,
international organizations, and implementing partners have the best
data available regarding the numbers and needs of IDPs, returnees, and
other vulnerable Iraqis, in the most efficient manner, we recommend
that the Secretary of State encourage UNHCR to share its raw data and
methodology with the IAU and take advantage of IAU expertise and
coordinated efforts.
To ensure the effective and efficient use of resources by its
implementing partners, we recommend that the Secretary of State and
USAID Administrator work with UNHCR and its other implementing
partners to take inventory of and assess the purposes, organization,
operations, and results of the various assistance, return, and
registration centers and mobile units in Iraq to determine and achieve
an optimal framework for assisting IDPs, returnees, and other
vulnerable Iraqis.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and
Defense and USAID. State and USAID provided written comments, which
are reprinted in appendixes V and VI. DOD provided oral comments which
are summarized below. State and DOD also provided technical comments,
which we incorporated where appropriate.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State and USAID agreed with
our recommendations regarding the need to assist the Iraqi government
in developing an international strategy for reintegrating displaced
Iraqis and to make public an unclassified version of the current U.S.
strategy and their implementing plans. State and USAID also agreed
with our recommendation regarding the need to work with UNHCR and
other implementing partners to take inventory of and assess the
various assistance, return, and registration centers and mobile units
to determine and achieve an optimal framework. USAID and State noted
that efforts to address this recommendation have begun. According to
State, UNHCR has begun to consolidate services and plan the merger of
centers. State also agreed with our recommendation regarding the need
to encourage UNHCR to share its raw data and methodology with the IAU
and take advantage of IAU expertise and coordinated efforts. In
addition, DOD commented that it agreed with the report and supports
State and USAID in the execution of their mission to assist and
reintegrate displaced Iraqis.
We will send copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, and
the Secretary of Defense. In addition, this report will be available
at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8979 or http://www.gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions
to this report are listed in appendix VII.
Signed by:
Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
List of Congressional Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Patrick Leahy:
Chairman:
The Honorable Judd Gregg:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Edolphus Towns:
Chairman:
The Honorable Darrel Issa:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Flake:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Chairwoman:
The Honorable Kay Granger:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
To examine efforts to reintegrate displaced Iraqis, we reviewed (1)
the conditions in Iraq that pose a challenge to their reintegration;
(2) the actions that the United States, Iraq, and other members of the
international community have taken to address these conditions and
reintegration; and (3) the extent to which the United States, Iraq,
and other members of the international community have an effective
strategy for reintegrating displaced Iraqis. When reintegration
challenges and efforts were intertwined with efforts to assist
internally displaced and vulnerable Iraqis, we included both in our
scope. We conducted fieldwork in Washington, D.C.; New York City
(United Nations (UN) agencies); Geneva, Switzerland (United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for
Migration (IOM), and other international organization headquarters);
and Iraq. We also conducted telephone interviews with UN officials in
Amman, Jordan, that were responsible for work in Iraq.
* Within the U.S. government, we reviewed documents and interviewed
officials of the National Security Council's (NSC) Office of
Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights; Department of State's (State)
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs; Department of Defense's Office of the Secretary of
Defense and Joint Staff; the U.S. Agency for International
Development's (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and
Middle East/Iraq Reconstruction Office; the Central Intelligence
Agency; the U.S. missions in New York and Geneva; the U.S. embassy and
USAID mission in Baghdad, Iraq; and the Multi-National Force-Iraq
representative to the U.S. Embassy's IDP Working Group.
* Within the Iraq government, we interviewed the Iraqi Minister of
Displacement and Migration and reviewed Iraqi government and
ministerial documents, including publicly available reported numbers
of IDPs and returnees. We toured the facilities and interviewed Iraqi
and nongovernmental organization (NGO) officials at the Karkh Return
and Assistance Center in Baghdad, Iraq.
* We interviewed officials and reviewed documents from international
organizations, including the UNHCR, IOM, UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, International Committee of the
Red Cross, UN Department of Political Affairs, UN Development
Programme, World Heath Organization, World Food Program, and UN
Children's Fund (UNICEF). We also reviewed documents from the UN Human
Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT).
* With the assistance of Interaction in the United States and the
International Council of Voluntary Agencies in Geneva, Switzerland, we
held discussion groups with international NGOs that had, have, or plan
to have a presence in Iraq to discuss challenges to reintegration,
actions taken and planned, and gaps remaining to be addressed.
* We interviewed and reviewed studies and papers from research
institutes and advocacy groups, such as the Brookings Institute's
Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, the Norwegian Refugee
Council's Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Refugees
International, Human Rights First, and the U.S. Institute of Peace.
To identify conditions that pose a challenge to reintegrating
displaced Iraqis, we reviewed research papers and assessments;
strategies and policy papers; program implementation, monitoring, and
progress reports; and related documents and interviewed officials from
the U.S. and Iraqi governments, international organizations, NGOs, and
research institutes. We filtered challenges by considering factors,
such as their significance and the degree to which they could be
generalized, and then grouped them by category. We documented evidence
from multiple sources and validated it with knowledgeable U.S., UN,
IOM, and NGO officials to ensure accuracy. In addition, we also
considered data compiled by IOM through the assessments and surveys
that it has conducted of Iraqi IDPs and returnees since 2006. To
determine the reliability of IOM data on conditions in Iraq, we
interviewed officials from IOM, USAID, PRM, the U.S. Embassy in
Baghdad, and the Brookings Institution and reviewed IOM's data
collection methodology and reports. The 2009 assessments of internally
displaced persons (IDP) covered more than 80 percent of the estimated
total of about 270,000 IDP families; however, it cannot be generalized
to the population of all IDPs. The 2009 survey of identified returnee
families was based on a sample of 4,061 of the 58,110 returnee
families. The survey cannot be generalized to all returnee families
because it relied on a mixture of random and judgmental sampling
methods and had a low response rate. These two data sources cannot be
directly compared because of their different populations, data
collection methods, and sample sizes. We determined that in
conjunction with testimonial and documentary evidence, the IOM data
are sufficiently reliable to describe the conditions that impede
reintegration for those surveyed, but that the data cannot be used to
make inferences to the larger IDP and returnee populations in Iraq.
To identify the actions that the United States, Iraq, and the
international community have taken to address these conditions, we
reviewed policy, strategy, planning, and funding documents; UN funding
appeals; monitoring and progress reports; and related documents and
interviewed officials from the U.S. and Iraqi governments,
international organizations, NGOs, and research institutes. We
reviewed U.S. agency-reported amounts obligated, and expended for
fiscal years 2003 through 2009, as of September 30, 2009, for
humanitarian assistance[Footnote 64] and development assistance. State
provided us with funding data from its Abacus database and Global
Financial Management System. USAID provided data from its Phoenix
database. We checked data provided against the source database
printouts and discussed data reliability with agency officials. To
verify our summarization of the funding and associated data, we sent
out draft tables to agency contributors, resolved discrepancies, and
made supported changes. We found the funding data from State and USAID
to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. The Army
Budget Office provided the amounts obligated for fiscal years 2003
through 2009, as of September 30, 2009, for the Commander's Emergency
Response Program from the Iraq Reconstruction Management System. Based
on prior work and data reliability assessments, we found the Army's
funding data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report.
To determine the extent to which the United States, Iraq, and other
members of the international community have an effective
strategy[Footnote 65] to address the reintegration of displaced
Iraqis, we reviewed policy, strategy, and planning documents from the
U.S. and Iraqi governments, the UN, and IOM. We interviewed U.S.
agency, Iraqi government, international organization, NGO, and
research institution officials and reviewed their documents to
determine issues and problems resulting from the lack of a strategy.
We documented evidence from multiple sources and validated it with
knowledgeable U.S., UN, IOM, and NGO officials to ensure accuracy.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2009 to December 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Roles and Responsibilities of Key U.S. and Iraqi
Government and International Community Entities Addressing Iraqi
Displacement:
U.S. government:
Key entity: National Security Council (NSC);
Roles and responsibilities: The NSC's Senior Director for Multilateral
Affairs and Human Rights serves as the coordinator for U.S. government
efforts addressing assistance, repatriation and reintegration, and
resettlement for displaced Iraqis. This position was first filled in
August 2009.
Key entity: Senior Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees and Internally
Displaced Persons;
Roles and responsibilities: The Senior Coordinator, a senior Foreign
Service officer stationed at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, is
responsible for coordinating U.S. government efforts in Iraq that
address Iraqi displacement. The Senior Coordinator is also responsible
for representing the United States in its dealings with the Iraqi
government, the international community, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGO) on displacement issues. This position was
established by Public Law 110-181 § 1245 (2008) and first filled in
July 2008.
Key entity: Department of State's (State) Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration (PRM);
Roles and responsibilities: PRM is responsible for coordinating
protection, humanitarian assistance, and resettlement for refugees and
conflict victims; is the lead U.S. agency interface with international
organizations and NGOs on refugee issues; funds implementing
international organization and NGO partners, such as the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), for assistance to
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP); and formulates U.S.
foreign policy on population issues and international migration. To
protect and assist Iraqi refugees and returnees, PRM works with the
NSC, United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
regional bureaus, and U.S. missions to provide guidance to its
international organization and NGO implementing partners and to engage
with donor countries and countries hosting Iraqi refugees.
Key entity: Department of State's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs;
Roles and responsibilities: The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs advises
on and develops policy for the assistance and reintegration of
displaced Iraqis. The bureau participates in the NSC's interagency
planning committees.
Key entity: U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of U.S.
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA);
Roles and responsibilities: OFDA funds and oversees a wide range of
humanitarian assistance activities that are implemented by a number of
NGO and United Nations (UN) partners who provide humanitarian
assistance programs for IDPs and other vulnerable Iraqis. OFDA
coordinates these relief efforts with other USAID offices, State, and
governmental and nongovernmental organizations and agencies in Iraq.
Key entity: U.S. Agency for International Development's Middle East
Bureau/Office of Iraq Reconstruction (ME/IR);
Roles and responsibilities: ME/IR funds and oversees implementing
partners--primarily, private contractors, NGOs, and international
organizations--that implement programs focusing on economic
development and capacity building at all levels of the Iraqi
government. The USAID Iraq Mission, located in Baghdad, works closely
with coalition forces and other U.S. government agencies;
international institutions, such as the UN and World Bank; Iraq's
national, provincial, and local governments; and a network of partners
that include NGOs, local community groups, and Iraqi citizens to
implement USAID's development programs.
Key entity: Department of Defense (DOD)/Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-
I)/U.S. Forces-Iraq;
Roles and responsibilities: MNF-I worked to improve security
conditions and maintain stability for all Iraqis and provided security
for U.S. and UN officials that enabled them to safely assist Iraqis.
U.S. Forces-Iraq (replacing MNF-I on Jan. 1, 2010) negotiates with
tribal leaders, trains Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and assists
Provincial Reconstruction Teams as they build essential services for
the Iraqi people, including IDPs. DOD personnel have provided support,
such as information sharing, to USAID, State, and international
organizations to address displacement. DOD participates in the
National Security Council's interagency planning committees.
Iraqi government:
Key entity: Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced
Persons;
Roles and responsibilities: A political advisor to the Prime Minister
of Iraq was appointed by the Prime Minister to also serve as the Iraqi
government's coordinator for Iraqi refugee and IDP issues in September
2009.
Key entity: Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM)[A];
Roles and responsibilities: MODM was established as a coordinating
body within the Iraqi government ministries on displacement issues. As
of 2008, MODM was empowered to provide additional grants and establish
centers to receive and register displaced and returning Iraqis.
Key entity: The Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for National
Reconciliation;
Roles and responsibilities: The Implementation and Follow-up Committee
plays a lead role in promoting reconciliation between Sunnis (in
particular, those that were associated with the Saddam regime) and
Iraq's Shiite majority and chairs efforts for reconciliation and
reintegration in Diyala.
Key entity: Iraqi Security Forces;
Roles and responsibilities: The Iraqi Security Forces, in addition to
providing general security, are also responsible for enforcing laws
and government orders designed to assist displaced Iraqis, such as
evicting squatters from homes owned by displaced Iraqis.
International community[B]:
Key entity: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
Roles and responsibilities: UNHCR has a global mandate to lead and
coordinate international action for the protection of refugees and
stateless people and to find lasting solutions to their plight. UNHCR
coordinates efforts with the Iraqi government and works to reintegrate
displaced Iraqis. UNHCR chairs the UN Country Team addressing
protection and co-chairs the team addressing shelter in Iraq. UNHCR
provides protection, shelter, and emergency assistance to IDPs,
refugees, and returnees.
Key entity: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA);
Roles and responsibilities: OCHA, on behalf of the UN Humanitarian
Coordinator for Iraq, mobilizes and coordinates humanitarian action in
Iraq. OCHA is responsible for information management and analysis,
advocacy and public information, resource mobilization and management,
disaster preparedness and response, and protection. OCHA works in
partnership with UN agencies, international organizations, and NGOs.
The consolidated appeal process for Iraq was led by OCHA. Through the
Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (IAU), OCHA collates and
analyzes data on the humanitarian situation to create and disseminate
information products, such as maps, charts and graphs, reports and
assessments, and contact information, and maintains the OCHA and IAU
Web sites to share these products.
Key entity: The International Organization for Migration (IOM);
Roles and responsibilities: IOM is an intergovernmental organization
that works on migration issues worldwide. IOM, in partnership with
other international organizations and the Iraqi government, conducts a
wide range of activities in Iraq, such as building capacity in certain
Iraqi ministries, monitoring and providing emergency assistance to
IDPs and other vulnerable groups, and assisting efforts to redress
property rights. IOM is also a member of the UN Country Team.
Key entity: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC);
Roles and responsibilities: ICRC is an international organization that
works to ensure humanitarian protection and assistance to victims of
war and other situations of violence worldwide. ICRC has a permanent
mandate founded under international law to take impartial action for
persons affected by conflict. ICRC provides relief assistance to IDPs
and other vulnerable groups inside Iraq. It also has assessed the
detention and treatment conditions of detainees, provided medical
supplies to hospitals, and rehabilitated existing water and sanitation
infrastructure, among other things.
Key entity: Nongovernmental organizations;
Roles and responsibilities: International and national NGOs conduct
significant efforts in Iraq for the benefit of IDPs, returnees, and
all vulnerable Iraqis.
Sources: National Security Council, Departments of State and Defense,
U.S. Agency for International Development, Iraqi government, United
Nations organizations, International Organization for Migration, and
the International Committee of the Red Cross.
[A] A number of Iraqi government ministries are relevant to MODM's
efforts, such as the Ministries of Finance, Planning and Development
Cooperation, Trade, Health, Education, Interior, and Defense, among
others.
[B] The UN Country Team, which includes UNHCR, OCHA, and IOM, works to
coordinate UN efforts and to provide assistance in myriad areas in
Iraq that may directly or indirectly address Iraqi displacement. Other
UN Country Team members include the Economic and Social Commission for
Western Asia; Food and Agriculture Organization; International Labour
Organization; Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; UN
Development Programme; UN Environment Programme; UN Education, Science
and Cultural Organization; UN Population Fund; UN Centre for Human
Settlements; UN Children's Fund; UN Industrial Development
Organization; UN Fund for Advancement of Women; UN Office for Project
Services; the World Food Program; and the World Health Organization.
IOM and the World Bank are affiliated bodies of the UN Country Team,
not UN organizations.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: U.S. Funds Obligated and Expended for Iraq-Related
Humanitarian Assistance Projects, and Intended Beneficiaries, Fiscal
Years 2003-2009, as of September 30, 2009:
Dollars in millions:
Source of funds: 2003 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF
1)/P.L. 108-11;
2004 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2)/P.L. 108-106;
Agency/Office: State/Population, Refugees, and Migration Bureau (PRM);
Funding: Total obligations: $159.9;
Expended balance: $159.2;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: Internally displaced persons
(IDP) and vulnerable populations[A]; In region: Iraqi and other
refugees and host country populations[B].
Source of funds: 2003 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF
1)/P.L. 108-11;
Agency/Office: USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA);
Funding: Total obligations: $128.4;
Expended balance: $126.7;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: None.
Source of funds: Food for Peace/P.L. 480 Title II;
108-7, P.L. 108-447, P.L. 110-5, P.L. 110-161;
Agency/Office: USAID/Office of Food for Peace;
Funding: Total obligations: $218.2;
Expended balance: $218.2;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs; In region: Iraqi
refugees and host country populations.
Source of funds: Food for Peace/P.L. 108-7[C];
Agency/Office: USAID/Office of Food for Peace;
Funding: Total obligations: $191.1;
Expended balance: $191.1;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: Iraqi population; In region:
None.
Source of funds: International Disaster and Famine Assistance &
International Disaster Assistance/P.L. 108-7, P.L. 107-115, P.L. 108-
447, P.L. 109-102, P.L. 110-28, P.L. 110-161, P.L. 110-252, P.L. 111-
32;
Agency/Office: USAID/OFDA;
Funding: Total obligations: $209.2;
Expended balance: $126.6;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: None.
Source of funds: Migration and Refugee Assistance/P.L. 108-7, P.L. 109-
102, P.L. 110-5, P.L. 110-161, P.L. 110-28, P.L. 110-252, P.L. 111-32,
P.L. 111-8;
Agency/Office: State/PRM;
Funding: Total obligations: $591.8;
Expended balance: $421.5;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: Iraqi and other refugees and host country
populations.
Source of funds: Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance[D]/
Presidential Determination (P.D.) 2003-17, P.D. 2003-13, P.D. 2001-22,
P.D. 2007-31;
Agency/Office: State/PRM;
Funding: Total obligations: $50.9;
Expended balance: $50.5;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: Iraqi and other refugees and host country
populations.
Source of funds: 2003 Economic Support Fund/P.L. 108-7;
Agency/Office: USAID/OFDA;
Funding: Total obligations: $11.6;
Expended balance: $11.6;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: None.
Source of funds: 2006 Economic Support Fund/P.L. 109-234;
Agency/Office: State/PRM;
Funding: Total obligations: $50.0;
Expended balance: $46.5;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: None; In region: Iraqi and
other refugees and host country populations in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon,
and Egypt.
Source of funds: 2007 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund/P.L. 110-
28;
Agency/Office: USAID/Office of Middle Eastern Affairs;
Funding: Total obligations: $10.3;
Expended balance: $7.3;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: None; In region: Government
of Jordan to meet the needs of Iraqi refugees and host country
population.
Source of funds: 2008 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund/P.L. 110-
252;
Agency/Office: State/PRM;
Funding: Total obligations: $45.0;
Expended balance: $39.2;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: None;
In region: Iraqi refugees in Jordan and host country population.
Source of funds: 2008 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund/P.L. 110-
252;
Agency/Office: USAID/Office of Middle Eastern Affairs;
Funding: Total obligations: $155.0;
Expended balance: $116.5;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: None; In region: Government
of Jordan to meet the needs of Iraqi refugees and host country
population.
Source of funds: Development Assistance/P.L. 108-7;
Agency/Office: USAID/OFDA;
Funding: Total obligations: $26.5;
Expended balance: $26.3;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs and vulnerable
populations; In region: None.
Source of funds: Child Survival and Health/P.L. 108-7;
Agency/Office: USAID/OFDA;
Funding: Total obligations: $5.7;
Expended balance: $5.7;
Intended program beneficiaries: In Iraq: IDPs; In region: None.
Source of funds: Total;
Funding: Total obligations: $1,853.6;
Expended balance: $1,546.9.
Source: GAO analysis based on funding data and information from the
Department of State and USAID.
[A] Vulnerable populations in Iraq may include other Iraqis at risk;
Iraqis who have returned from other countries; refugees in Iraq from
other countries, such as Palestinians; and other conflict victims.
[B] U.S. refugee programs benefit the host country population because
countries hosting Iraqi refugees in the region do not allow donors to
provide assistance solely to Iraqi refugees. In some cases, a portion
of the funds was contributed to international organizations that may
have spent the funds in one or a number of the countries hosting
Iraqis in the region. Host countries receiving assistance include
Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, and Iran.
[C] According to USAID, in 2003, USAID's Food for Peace Program
received $191.1 million, which was reallocated from funds originally
appropriated in P.L. 108-7 to Development Assistance, Economic Support
Fund, Child Survival and Health, and International Disaster and Famine
Assistance accounts.
[D] The U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance fund is drawn
upon by the President to meet unexpected urgent refugee and migration
needs whenever the President determines that it is in the U.S.
national interest to do so. Funds are appropriated annually to this
fund and remain available until expended.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: U.S. Development Assistance Funding, Partners, and
Activities in Iraq, Fiscal Years 2003-2009:
In fiscal years 2003 through 2009, the U.S. government, through
USAID's Middle East Bureau's Office of Iraq Reconstruction (ME/IR),
obligated about $6.4 billion and expended about $5.6 billion for
development assistance projects in Iraq (see table 6). The USAID Iraq
Mission, located in Baghdad, worked with USAID's partners to implement
these projects (see table 7). The intended beneficiaries of these
activities included local Iraqi NGOs, local and regional government
entities, provincial directorates, local courts, universities, local
media outlets, the Independent Higher Electoral Commission, community
action groups, victims of coalition operations, and ministries at the
national and provincial levels.
Table 6: U.S. Development Assistance Funds Obligated and Expended in
Iraq, by Source of Funds, for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2009, as of
September 30, 2009:
Dollars in millions:
Source of funds[A]: 2003 Child Survival-Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
Fund (P.L. 108-11);
Funding:
Total obligations: $31.06;
Expended balance: $31.06.
Source of funds[A]: 2003 Development Assistance-Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund (P.L. 108-11);
Funding:
Total obligations: $13.19;
Expended balance: $13.19.
Source of funds[A]: 2003 Economic Support-Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Fund (P.L. 108-11);
Funding:
Total obligations: $44.99;
Expended balance: $40.00.
Source of funds[A]: 2003 International Disaster Assistance-Iraq Relief
and Reconstruction Fund (P.L. 108-11);
Funding:
Total obligations: $38.14;
Expended balance: $37.95.
Source of funds[A]: 2003 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (P.L. 108-
11);
Funding: Total obligations: $1,489.12;
Expended balance: $1,489.12.
Source of funds[A]: 2004 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (P.L. 108-
106);
Funding:
Total obligations: $2,473.33;
Expended balance: $2,412.73.
Source of funds[A]: 2006 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund (P.L.
109-234);
Funding: Total obligations: $429.34;
Expended balance: $424.82.
Source of funds[A]: 2007 Democracy Fund (P.L. 110-28);
Funding:
Total obligations: $60.00;
Expended balance: $19.06.
Source of funds[A]: 2007 Continuing Resolution for Economic Support
Fund (P.L. 110-5);
Funding:
Total obligations: $99.65;
Expended balance: $98.02.
Source of funds[A]: 2007 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund (P.L.
110-28);
Funding:
Total obligations: $1,002.56;
Expended balance: $926.44.
Source of funds[A]: 2008 Economic Support Fund (P.L. 110-61);
Funding:
Total obligations: $12.96;
Expended balance: $4.96.
Source of funds[A]: 2008 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund (P.L.
110-252);
Funding:
Total obligations: $371.00;
Expended balance: $136.23.
Source of funds[A]: 2009 Supplemental for Economic Support Fund (P.L.
111-32);
Funding:
Total obligations: $212.10;
Expended balance: $0.00.
Source of funds[A]: 2009 Bridge Supplemental for Economic Support Fund
(P.L. 110-252);
Funding:
Total obligations: $102.33;
Expended balance: $1.19.
Source of funds[A]: Gifts and donations[B];
Funding:
Total obligations: $0.01;
Expended balance: $0.01.
Source of funds[A]: Total;
Funding:
Total obligations: $6,379.78;
Expended balance: $5,634.78.
Source: GAO analysis based on data and information from USAID.
[A] According to USAID officials, USAID had 2 years to obligate the
appropriations for the Democracy and Economic Support funds, but had 5
years to expend them so not all obligated funds had been expended by
September 30, 2009.
[B] Gifts and donations were from private citizens supporting USAID's
efforts in Iraq.
[End of table]
Table 7: USAID/Iraq Development Assistance for Implementing Partners'
Activities, as Obligated for Fiscal Years 2003 through 2009, as of
September 30, 2009:
Dollars in millions:
Implementing partner: Abt Associates, Inc;
Activity: Implemented a program to support Iraqi-led initiatives to
ensure the rapid provisioning of health services in Iraq, while
strengthening the country's overall health system;
Obligated: $23.03.
Implementing partner: AECOM International Development, Inc;
Activity: Worked with Iraq's Council of Representatives to organize
training and build capacity to better oversee government operations,
legislate, and represent their constituents;
Obligated: $31.20.
Implementing partner: Agricultural Cooperative Development
International/Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance;
Activity: Worked with community groups to identify, prioritize, and
address local needs through projects under the Community Action
Program;
Obligated: $99.28.
Implementing partner: Air Force Contract Augmentation Program;
Activity: Provided goods and services in support of preparedness and
worldwide rehabilitative operations in Iraq;
Obligated: $79.30.
Implementing partner: America's Development Foundation;
Activity: Supported the development of civil society and the media in
Iraq;
Obligated: $57.10.
Implementing partner: Bearing Point, Inc;
Activity: Assisted the Iraqi government with the aim of creating an
economic environment that encourages investment and fuels a market-
based economy;
Obligated: $302.88.
Implementing partner: Bechtel Corporation;
Activity: Supported the rehabilitation of Iraq's infrastructure, such
as power, water and waste treatment plants, telecommunications, roads,
bridges, airports, and seaports;
Obligated: $2,189.50.
Implementing partner: Cardno Emerging Markets Group, Ltd;
Activity: Worked to build the capacity of the Ministry of Health to
design, implement, and evaluate effective behavior change and
communication programs;
Obligated: $5.00.
Implementing partner: Consortium for Elections and Political Process
Strengthening;
Activity: Provided support to increase the capacity of the Independent
High Electoral Commission;
Obligated: $216.89.
Implementing partner: Cooperative Housing Foundation International;
Activity: Worked with community groups to identify, prioritize, and
address local needs through projects through the Community Action
Program;
Obligated: $262.69.
Implementing partner: Creative Associates International, Inc;
Activity: Provided technical assistance to facilitate school
enrollment and student retention, and assisted in providing capacity
building to the Ministry of Education;
Obligated: $108.09.
Implementing partner: Development Alternatives, Inc;
Activity: Through the Iraq Rapid Assistance Program, Development
Alternatives provided grants, via the provincial reconstruction teams,
to support activities in economic, social development, and civil
society efforts to mitigate conflict. Development Alternatives also
assisted the marshland dwellers, in restoration of the marshlands, and
to expand agriculture productivity;
Obligated: $278.31.
Implementing partner: Futures Group International;
Activity: Provided field-level programming policy development and
implementation in health issues;
Obligated: $0.03.
Implementing partner: International Business and Technical Consultants;
Activity: Provided monitoring and evaluation services to assess the
impact and effectiveness of the USAID/Iraq's Community Stabilization
Program as a nonlethal tool for counterinsurgency;
Obligated: $1.93.
Implementing partner: International Relief and Development;
Activity: Through the Community Action Program, worked with community
groups to identify, prioritize, and address local needs through
projects. Through the Community Stabilization Program, worked to
achieve economic and social stability in urban communities through
programs that focus on training and employment;
Obligated: $782.24.
Implementing partner: International Resources Group Lt;
Activity: Implemented emergency relief and short-term rehabilitation
response efforts in support of the Near East Regional Program;
Obligated: $25.79.
Implementing partner: Kroll Associates, Inc;
Activity: Provided services as a private security subcontractor;
Obligated: $8.68.
Implementing partner: Logenix International, L.L.C;
Activity: Warehoused and stored Primary Health Care Kits, and
coordinated with the Ministry of Health central and governorate-level
offices to facilitate delivery to centers;
Obligated: $0.11.
Implementing partner: Louis Berger International, Inc;
Activity: Provided training, technical assistance, and loan capital
through microfinance institutions to promote economic and job growth;
promoted the development of agricultural businesses and markets;
conducted a comprehensive assessment of the Basrah Children's Hospital
Project; and rehabilitated, opened, and operated vocational training
and employment services;
Obligated: $391.37.
Implementing partner: Macro International, Inc;
Activity: Provided support to the Ministries of Health and Planning to
plan and implement national demographic and health survey;
Obligated: $0.69.
Implementing partner: Management Systems International, Inc;
Activity: Through USAID's National Capacity Development program,
worked to build the capacity of key Iraqi ministries to develop public
administration and management skills and provided monitoring and
evaluation services to assess program performance;
Obligated: $344.35.
Implementing partner: Mercy Corps;
Activity: Worked with community groups to identify, prioritize, and
address local needs through projects through the Community Action
Program;
Obligated: $93.38.
Implementing partner: Other;
Activity: Provided administrative assistance for the Community
Stabilization Program;
Obligated: $0.12.
Implementing partner: QED Group, L.L.C;
Activity: Provided performance evaluation and reporting services as
well as short-term support for USAID's programmatic objectives in Iraq;
Obligated: $14.23.
Implementing partner: Relief International;
Activity: Provided support for a program entitled the Iraqi Community-
based Conflict Mitigation Program;
Obligated: $16.44.
Implementing partner: Research Triangle Institute;
Activity: Promoted diverse and representative citizen participation in
provincial, municipal, and local councils;
built capacity of provincial councils for governance;
and assisted the Ministry of Health in training of primary health care
center staff;
Obligated: $811.52.
Implementing partner: Save the Children;
Activity: Worked with community groups to identify, prioritize, and
address local needs through projects under the Community Action
Program;
Obligated: $43.09.
Implementing partner: SkyLink Air and Logistic Support, Inc;
Activity: Provided USAID with a capability to improve airport
management and operations;
trained local Iraqi staff in management;
and provided technical assistance, supplies, food, and materials for
reconstruction;
Obligated: $26.82.
Implementing partner: Stevedoring Services of America;
Activity: Provided seaport assessments and management expertise to
ensure that materials and supplies flow efficiently and safely through
seaports in Iraq;
Obligated: $14.32.
Implementing partner: The Partnership for Child Healthcare;
Activity: Provided support to maternal and child health to increase
coverage and/or quality of maternal and child health care;
Obligated: $2.00.
Implementing partner: UN Children's Fund;
Activity: Provided basic health, water supply, and sanitation services
for Iraq;
Obligated: $56.27.
Implementing partner: UN Development Program;
Activity: Received Iraq Trust fund contribution;
Obligated: $5.00.
Implementing partner: UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization;
Activity: Provided support to basic education in Iraq through the
printing and distribution of math and science textbooks;
Obligated: $9.78.
Implementing partner: University Partners;
Activity: Provided support for higher education development in the
following areas: infrastructure (University of Hawaii); teacher
training (University of Oklahoma); economic growth (DePaul
University), culture (University of New York, Stony Brook), and public
health (Jackson State University);
Obligated: $20.42.
Implementing partner: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
Activity: Provided architecture and engineering technical services for
USAID's Iraq reconstruction contract;
Obligated: $24.68.
Implementing partner: U.S. Department of the Treasury;
Activity: Provided personnel support;
Obligated: $0.30.
Implementing partner: Voice of America;
Activity: Conducted small media-based outreach to Iraq's oral
communicators;
Obligated: $1.00.
Implementing partner: Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance;
Activity: Supported the expansion of a private, competitive, and
efficient private sector in Iraq;
Obligated: $12.09.
Implementing partner: World Bank;
Activity: Received Iraq Trust Fund contribution;
Obligated: $5.00.
Implementing partner: World Health Organization;
Activity: Provided support for the provision of basic health services,
emergency immunization campaign for measles, and other disease-control
efforts;
Obligated: $14.80.
Implementing partner: Yankee Group;
Activity: Provided telecommunications planning;
Obligated: $0.06.
Implementing partner: Total;
Obligated: $6,379.78.
Source: GAO analysis based on data and information from USAID.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
November 10, 2010:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Displaced
Iraqis: Integrated International Strategy Needed to Reintegrate Iraq's
Internally displaced and Returning Refugees," GAO Job Code 320654.
The enclosed Department of State continents are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Elizabeth Hopkins, Director, Bureau of Population, Refugees and
Migration at (202) 453-9271.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc: GAO ” Joseph Christoff:
PRM ” Eric Schwartz:
State/OIG ” Evelyn Klemstine:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on Draft GAO Report:
Displaced Iraqis: Integrated International Strategy Needed to
Reintegrate Iraq's Internally Displaced and Returning Refugees
(GA0-11-124, GAO Code 320654):
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report. The
Department of State appreciates that the GAO report acknowledges the
challenges to sustainable return and reintegration of displaced
Iraqis. As the report describes, the United States Government (USG)
and other international actors are actively engaged in supporting
voluntary, sustainable return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis,
but many factors remain beyond our control. We also note that just as
security conditions impact return decisions, they also constrain USG
staff and partners' mobility inside Iraq, which compounds the
challenges to program implementation and monitoring. Finally, as
detailed below, we emphasize that the U.S. Government does not
proactively encourage returns at this time, but aims to support
voluntary, sustainable returns and reintegration for those who choose
it.
The Department of State agrees with the GAO's recommendation that the
Secretary of State and USAID Administrator work with the appropriate
international organizations to assist the Iraqi government in
developing an international strategy that addresses impediments to
return and prepares for and facilitates the return and reintegration
of displaced Iraqis. We note that it is the Iraqi government that must
lead the implementation of such a strategy; the USG role will continue
to be one of advocacy and support. In Washington and Baghdad, we seek
a stronger partnership with Iraqi officials and international
organizations, and consistently urge increased Iraqi planning and
execution on displacement issues. Senior U.S. officials routinely
raise displacement with Iraqi officials during visits to Iraq and in
high-level U.S.-based meetings. We work in close coordination with the
United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) to include the needs of the
displaced in development and humanitarian programming.
The United States and the international community encourage and
support viable Iraqi government initiatives. As noted in the report,
Prime Minister Order 54 put the Prime Minister's Implementation and
Follow-Up Committee for National Reconciliation (IFCNR) in charge of
coordinating national and international efforts to promote refugee and
IDP returns in Diyala governorate and authorized significant spending
to benefit displaced Diyalans. The United States, other donors, and
international organizations work closely with IFCNR, and coordinate
programming to provide integrated support in Diyala. We are also
working closely with Iraqi government officials to find durable
solutions for displaced Iraqis, including a potential land allocation
system.
It is important to emphasize that preparing for, and facilitating the
voluntary return and reintegration of displaced Iraqis is different
than promotion of returns. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) determines when to promote voluntary repatriation, and
currently judges security conditions in central Iraq not stable enough
to actively promote facilitated repatriation. The USG goal is not for
Iraqis to return before they are ready; rather, the goal is to create
conditions that will allow for sustainable returns. As noted in the
GAO report, documents on a reintegration strategy were not developed
to create a publicly announced effort to persuade Iraqis to return
home; they were planning tools describing how to best target our
assistance to ensure Iraqis who choose to return to Iraq have
necessary support systems in place Finally, we note that internally
displaced Iraqis are increasingly indicating that they would prefer to
integrate locally in their sites of displacement. Making local
integration a viable option will be an important component of our
updated strategy, referenced below.
The State Department concurs with the GAO's recommendation to make
public an unclassified version of the U.S. Strategy and Implementation
Plan. An updated, unclassified USG Support for Returning Iraqi
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Strategy Document is
in the final stages of development and will be made publicly
available. Unlike the 2009 planning document described in further
detail below, this Strategy Document is designed as an overview of key
USG objectives over the next three years and indicators we will use to
measure progress. As noted throughout the GAO report, many external
variables affect return and reintegration decisions, including
security conditions, political dynamics, the state of the Iraqi
economy, availability of housing, access to basic services and
infrastructure, and the psychology of the displaced. While the
Strategy creates a coherent U.S. approach and useful guideposts as we
move forward, we expect that Strategy implementation and design will
evolve as does the situation in Iraq.
The 2009 USG Support for Returning Iraqi Refugees and Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) Strategy Document was drafted as part of an
internal USG planning process to ensure the USG had a coordinated and
complementary response in supporting returning Iraqi refugees and
IDPs. Unlike press releases or other general information that we post
on our website, we do not routinely share internal planning documents
with the public. In this case, the Strategy Document contained
sensitive information, including internal deliberations and comments
on our bilateral relationship with the Government of Iraq, which if
shared publicly could be harmful to U.S. interests, and potentially
harm the interests of displaced Iraqis. For that reason, select
sections of the document were not approved for release. However, as
noted in the GAO Report, there is an unclassified summary of the
Strategy Document which the National Security Council provided to GAO
in July. The core concepts of the Strategy Document were freely shared
with our partners, including other donors, I0s, NGOs and the GOI in
many discussions focused on USG policy, programs, and plans vis-à-vis
Iraqi refugees, IDPs, and potential returns.
The Department of State concurs with the GAO's recommendation to
encourage UNHCR to share its raw data and methodology with the Inter-
Agency Information and Analysis Unit (IAU) and take advantage of IAU
expertise and coordinated efforts. The Department of State encourages
coordination among all its partners. We will continue to encourage
UNHCR to work with the IAU to coordinate information and data in a
manner that maximizes efficiency and effectiveness in delivery of
humanitarian assistance and support for returns and reintegration.
The State Department concurs with the GAO's recommendation to work
with UNHCR and its implementing partners to assess assistance, return
and registration centers and mobile units to determine and achieve an
optimal framework. We have already begun this process. UNHCR has
consolidated the services of its Protection Assistance Centers (PACs)
and Return, Integration and Community Centers (RICCs) in Ninewa,
Kirkuk, Diyala and Missan, creating a single point of service in each
of these governorates. In Anbar and Salaheddin, existing PACs and
RICCs are slated for merger in early 2011. PACs and RICCs in Thi-Qar
and Basra should be consolidated by spring 2011. UNHCR plans to
maintain both PACs and RICCs with complementary services in Baghdad
because the demand for services there is so high. The two Returns
Assistance Centers in Baghdad and one in Diyala will be maintained.
UNHCR will support NGOs to provide legal services at the RICCs and
RACs, manage return processes at the RACs, and manage operations at
the RICCs.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID:
From The American People:
Joseph A. Christoff:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Christoff:
I am pleased to provide U.S. Agency for International Development's
(USAID) formal response to the GAO draft report entitled Displaced
Iraqis: Integrated International Strategy Needed to Reintegrate Iraq's
Internally Displaced and Returning Refugees (GA0-11-124).
The enclosed USAID comments are provided for incorporation with this
letter as an appendix to the final report.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this audit
review.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Angelique M. Crumbly:
Deputy Assistant Administrator:
Bureau for Management:
Enclosure: a/s:
[End of letter]
USAID Comments on GAO Report entitled Displaced Iraqis: Integrated
International Strategy Needed to Reintegrate Iraq's Internally
Displaced and Returning Refugees (GAO-11-124):
Recommendation 1: We recommend that the Secretary of State and U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator work with
the appropriate international organizations to assist the Iraqi
government in developing an international strategy that addresses
impediments to return and prepares for and facilitates the return and
reintegration of displaced Iraqis.
Response: USAID agrees with the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) recommendation and will support the development of an
international strategy that addresses impediments to returns and
facilitates the voluntary return, reintegration, and settlement of
displaced Iraqis into local communities. In addition, an international
strategy will need to be coordinated with and implemented in
partnership with the Government of Iraq.
Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Secretary of State, USAID
Administrator, and the Secretary of Defense make public an
unclassified version of the U.S. strategy and their implementing plans
for assisting and reintegrating displaced Iraqis, including their
goals, performance measures, and progress assessments.
Response: USAID agrees with the GAO recommendation and has worked with
the Secretary of State/Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
(PRM), and others in Washington and in Baghdad on an unclassified
version of the U.S. strategy. An unclassified strategy supporting
implementing plans for assisting and reintegrating displaced Iraqis
has already been approved and was shared with the GAO in July 2010.
USAID is currently working with the Secretary of State/PRM and other
U.S. Government agencies in the creation of an updated Internally
Displaced Person (IDP)/Refugee assistance unclassified strategy.
Recommendation 3: We recommend that the Secretary of State and USAID
Administrator work with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNCHR) and its other implementing partners to take inventory of and
assess the purposes, organization, operations, and results of the
various assistance, return, and registration centers and mobile units
in Iraq to determine and achieve an optimal framework for assisting
IDPs, returnees, and other vulnerable Iraqis.
Response: USAID agrees with the GAO recommendation. The process of
assessing the purpose, organization, operations, and results of the
various assistance, return, and registration centers and mobile units
in Iraq is already underway. Furthermore, USAID will work with the
Secretary of State/PRM to determine an optimal framework for assisting
IDPs, returnees, and other vulnerable Iraqis through the continued use
of these centers.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Joseph A. Christoff, (202) 512-8979 or christoffJ@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition, Audrey Solis, Assistant Director; Martin De Alteriis;
Farhanaz Kermalli; Gilbert Kim; Heather Latta; Kathleen Monahan; and
Mary Moutsos made key contributions to this report. Additional
assistance was provided by Todd Anderson, Gergana Danailova-Trainor,
Karen Deans, Timothy DiNapoli, Walker Fullerton, Cheron Green, Emily
Gupta, Bruce Kutnick, Charlotte Moore, Christopher Mulkins, Diahanna
Post, and Gwyneth Woolwine.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] According to IOM, the bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra
in February 2006 triggered sectarian violence that significantly
increased the number of displaced Iraqis.
[2] Data are from the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration for
the 15 central and southern governorates and from the Kurdistan
Regional Government for the 3 northern governorates.
[3] According to UNHCR, at the beginning of 2009 about 310,413 Iraqi
refugees were actively registered with UNHCR in Egypt, Iran, Jordan,
Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.
[4] Remarks of President Barack Obama--Responsibly Ending the War in
Iraq (Camp Lejeune, N.C.: Feb. 27, 2009).
[5] GAO, Iraqi Refugee Assistance: Improvements Needed in Measuring
Progress, Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an
International Strategic Plan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-120] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21,
2009).
[6] Deborah Isser and Peter Van der Auweraert, United States Institute
of Peace Special Report, Land, Property, and the Challenge of Return
for Iraq's Displaced (Washington, D.C.: April 2009).
[7] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Iraq
Operation; Monthly Statistical Update on Return-December 2009.
[8] GAO, Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Progress Report:
Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-837] (Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2008).
[9] No data were available on how many returnees had been successfully
reintegrated or had been displaced again.
[10] The number of returnees identified includes those from which the
IOM field monitors were able to reach and collect data as of the
reporting date. It does not include displacement in Dahuk, Erbil, and
Sulaymaniyah.
[11] International Organization for Migration, IOM Emergency Needs
Assessments Four Years of Post-Samarra Displacement in Iraq (February
2010).
[12] Jeff Crisp, Jane Janz, Jose Riera, and Shahira Samy, United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Policy Development and
Evaluation Service, Surviving in the City: A Review of UNHCR's
Operation for Iraqi Refugees in Urban areas of Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria (Geneva, Switzerland: July 2009).
[13] IOM data cannot be used to make inferences on the larger IDP and
returnee populations in Iraq and only describe the information of
those families interviewed by IOM that had been displaced post-
February 2006.
[14] Figures were derived from UNHCR's review of the registration data
of active caseloads at the end of 2008. In a previous review, GAO
reported that registration numbers may not be a true proxy of the
number of Iraqi refugees because an unknown number of refugees do not
register or seek assistance. For more information, see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-120].
[15] 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
[16] If voluntary repatriation is not feasible, then other durable
solutions may include integration in the host country or resettlement
in a third-party country.
[17] Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq:
March 2010 Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of
Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law
110-252) (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2010).
[18] International Organization for Migration, IOM Monitoring and
Needs Assessments: Assessment of Iraqi Return, March 2008.
[19] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, Iraq 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan (Geneva, Switzerland and
New York, N.Y.: Dec. 24, 2009).
[20] According to the Handbook on Housing and Property Restitution for
Refugees and Displaced Persons: Implementing the "Pinheiro
Principles", all displaced persons, including refugees, have the right
to have restored to them any housing, land, or property taken
arbitrarily or unlawfully, or if restitution is not possible, to be
compensated instead. See the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization, Norwegian Refugee Council, United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN-HABITAT, and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Housing and Property
Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons; Implementing the
'Pinheiro Principles' (New York, N.Y.: March 2007).
[21] See Deborah Isser and Peter Van der Auweraert, United States
Institute of Peace Special Report, Land, Property, and the Challenge
of Return for Iraq's Displaced (Washington, D.C.: April 2009). The
2009 USIP report states that it was based on the extensive efforts of
both USIP and IOM to assist the Iraqi government in the design of
displacement-related land and property policies, including a July 2008
conference in Amman sponsored by USIP and the World Bank and a
November 2008 conference in Baghdad sponsored by USIP, IOM, and UNHCR.
[22] International Organization for Migration, Assessment of Return to
Iraq (Nov. 3, 2009). This survey was based on a sample of 4,061
returnee families identified by IOM and is not generalizeable to all
returnee families.
[23] International Organization for Migration, IOM Emergency Needs
Assessments, February 22, 2009: Three Years of Post-Samarra
Displacement in Iraq.
[24] The Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes,
established by the Iraqi Transitional National Assembly, replaced the
Coalition Provisional Authority's Iraq Property Claims Commission
established in 2004, according to USIP. The commission's mandate is
limited to claims that resulted from the confiscation, expropriation,
forced sale, or other actions by Saddam Hussein's regime from July 17,
1968, to April 9, 2003. The commission does not consider claims for
loss of personal property, such as a car, or damage and destruction of
property in cases where it was not taken.
[25] UN-HABITAT, Iraq: Country Program Document 2009-2011 (Nairobi,
Kenya: July 27, 2009).
[26] According to UN-HABITAT, overcrowding will increase as Iraq's
population--estimated at 29.7 million in July 2010, according to the
CIA World Fact Book--continues to expand to an estimated 50 million by
2030. Also, see UN-HABITAT, Fact Sheet: Housing and Shelter in Iraq-
World Habitat Day (Oct. 5, 2009).
[27] IOM data cannot be used to make inferences on the larger IDP and
returnee populations in Iraq and only describe the information of
those interviewed by IOM. USAID and State consider IOM's data
sufficiently reliable for their use, though they also acknowledge that
the data have limitations. We determined that these data are
sufficiently reliable to generally describe conditions that impede
integration for those surveyed.
[28] International Organization for Migration, Assessment of Return to
Iraq (Nov. 3, 2009). This survey was based on a sample of 4,061
returnee families identified by IOM and is not generalizeable to all
returnee families.
[29] United Nations Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, Iraq
Labor Force Analysis 2003-2008 (January 2009).
[30] Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
2009 Human Rights Report: Iraq (March 2010).
[31] International Organization for Migration, Assessment of Return to
Iraq (Nov. 3, 2009). This survey was based on a sample of 4,061
returnee families identified by IOM and is not generalizeable to all
returnee families.
[32] The Public Distribution System, managed by the Iraqi Ministry of
Trade, makes available a monthly "food basket" that may consist of
items such as wheat; flour; rice; sugar; tea; vegetable oil; pulses;
milk; infant formula; and nonfood items, such as soap and detergent.
[33] Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, Iraq Food Prices
Analysis (Aug. 31, 2009).
[34] International Organization for Migration, IOM Emergency Needs
Assessments, February 22, 2009: Three Years of Post-Samarra
Displacement in Iraq.
[35] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, Iraq and the Region, 2009 Consolidated Appeal, (New York and
Geneva, November 2008).
[36] International Organization for Migration, Assessment of Return to
Iraq (Nov. 3, 3009). This survey was based on a sample of 4,061
returnee families identified by IOM and is not generalizeable to all
returnee families.
[37] Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology of
Iraq, the Kurdistan Region Statistics Organization, and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank,
Iraq Household Socio-Economic Survey-2007: Tabulation Report (2008).
[38] International Committee of the Red Cross, Iraq: No Let-Up In the
Humanitarian Crisis (March 2008).
[39] International Organization for Migration, Assessment of Return to
Iraq (Nov. 3, 2009). This survey was based on a sample of 4,061
returnee families identified by IOM and is not generalizeable to all
returnee families.
[40] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, Iraq 2010 Humanitarian Action Plan (Geneva, Switzerland and
New York, N.Y.: Dec. 24, 2009).
[41] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs, Iraq and the Region, 2009 Consolidated Appeal, (New York and
Geneva, November, 2008).
[42] UNICEF, Humanitarian Action Update: Iraq (Jan. 19, 2009).
[43] GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance
Challenges to Stability Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-476T] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009).
[44] For more information, see GAO, Iraq Reconstruction: Better Data
Needed to Assess Iraq's Budget Execution, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-153] (Washington, D.C.: Jan.15,
2008).
[45] Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq:
June 2009 Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of
Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law
110-252) (Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2009).
[46] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Norwegian Refugee
Council, Iraq: Little New Displacement but around 2.8 Million Iraqis
Remain Internally Displaced (Geneva, Switzerland: Mar. 4, 2010).
[47] United Nations, Iraq and the Region, Mid-Year Review, 2009
Consolidated Appeal (June 2009).
[48] Donors also provide bilateral funding to fill perceived gaps in
the UN appeals and to organizations that do not participate in the UN
appeals, such as the ICRC, which is a key partner in Iraq.
[49] In our previous review on Iraqi refugee assistance, State
provided its U.S. goals for use in our unclassified report, and we
found that improvements were needed in measuring progress. See GAO-09-
120.
[50] The Senior Coordinator Post was first filled in July 2008.
[51] GAO has previously assessed the use of the Commander's Emergency
Response Program in Iraq. See Military Operations: Actions Needed to
Better Guide Project Selection for Commander's Emergency Response
Program and Improve Oversight in Iraq, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-736R] (Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2008).
[52] According to the United Nations Development Programme, capacity
includes processes by which individuals, organizations, institutions,
and societies have the abilities (individually and collectively) to
perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives.
[53] Department of Defense, Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq,
June 2009 Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of
Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008, (Section 9204, Public
Law 110-252) (July 23, 2009).
[54] Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq:
March 2010 Report to Congress in Accordance with the Department of
Defense Supplemental Appropriations Act 2008 (Section 9204, Public Law
110-252) (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2010).
[55] For criteria for an effective strategy, see GAO, Combating
Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National
Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004); Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting
Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture
Restructuring, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-852]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2006); Rebuilding Iraq: More
comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2006); and Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and
Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in
U.S. Strategies, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-476T]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009).
[56] United Nations, United Nations 2008-2010 Iraq Assistance Strategy
(May 2008).
[57] Sectors include education, water and sanitation, health and
nutrition, housing and shelter, food security, protection, governance,
and economic reform and diversification.
[58] The 2009 Consolidated Appeal for Iraq and the Region was composed
of two pillars: Pillar I was coordinated by the UN's Office for
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and reflected needs within Iraq,
and Pillar II was coordinated by UNHCR and addressed protection and
assistance for Iraqi refugees in the region.
[59] Remarks of President Barack Obama--Responsibly Ending the War in
Iraq (Camp Lejeune, North Carolina: Feb, 27, 2009).
[60] According to the IAU, its key audience includes the Iraqi
government, civil society, private sector, donors, the UN, NGOs,
implementing partners, media, and research institutions.
[61] IAU participating agencies and NGOs include the UN Assistance
Mission for Iraq, OCHA, UN Development Programme, UNICEF, UN
Population Fund, Food and Agriculture Organization, WHO, UN-HABITAT,
UNHCR, WFP, International Labour Organization, IOM, Mercy Corps,
International Medical Corps, and Information Management and Mine
Action Programs.
[62] According to an IAU official, although OCHA is phasing out its
presence in Iraq, the IAU will continue under the direction and
funding of the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary
General for Humanitarian Coordination, United Nations Assistance
Mission for Iraq.
[63] The terms of reference for the IAU stated that participating
agencies and partners are committed to allocate a significant
proportion of their analyst's time for the first 6 months and that
activities would involve a combination of group and individual work.
[64] For U.S. Appropriation Funds Apportioned to Iraq-Related
Humanitarian Assistance, as of September 30, 2008, see GAO, Iraqi
Refugee Assistance: Improvements Needed in Measuring Progress,
Assessing Needs, Tracking Funds, and Developing an International
Strategic Plan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-120]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009).
[65] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004); Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting
Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD's Global Posture
Restructuring, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-852]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2006); Rebuilding Iraq: More
comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-788] (Washington, D.C.:
July 11, 2006); and Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and
Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in
U.S. Strategies, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-476T]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009).
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
