Afghanistan Drug Control
Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts Needed Gao ID: GAO-10-291 March 9, 2010The illicit drug trade remains a challenge to the overall U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Afghanistan produces over 90 percent of the world's opium, which competes with the country's licit agriculture industry, provides funds to insurgents, and fuels corruption in Afghanistan. Since 2005, the United States has allotted over $2 billion to stem the production, consumption, and trafficking of illicit drugs while building the Afghan government's capacity to conduct counternarcotics activities on its own. In this report, GAO (1) examines how the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan has changed; (2) assesses progress made and challenges faced within the elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public information, and drug demand reduction program areas; and (3) assesses U.S. agencies' monitoring and evaluation efforts. To address these objectives, GAO obtained pertinent program documents and interviewed relevant U.S. and Afghan officials. GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
The U.S. counternarcotics strategy has changed emphasis across program areas over time to align with the overarching counterinsurgency campaign. The 2005 U.S. counternarcotics strategy focused on five program areas: elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public information, and alternative livelihoods. Since then, U.S. Department of Defense (Defense) policy and rules of engagement were changed to allow greater military involvement in Afghanistan counternarcotics efforts due to the ties between traffickers and insurgents. Furthermore, the U.S. counternarcotics strategy has shifted to align more closely with counterinsurgency efforts by de-emphasizing eradication, focusing more on interdiction efforts, and increasing agricultural assistance. The United States' use of total poppy cultivation as a primary measure of overall counternarcotics success has limitations in that it does not capture all aspects of U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In recognition of this, the administration is attempting to develop measures that better capture overall counternarcotics success. U.S. agencies have reported progress within counternarcotics program areas, but GAO was unable to fully assess the extent of progress due to a lack of performance measures and interim performance targets to measure Afghan capacity, which are a best practice for performance management. For example, although Defense is training Afghan pilots to fly interdiction missions on their own, this program lacks interim performance targets to judge incremental progress. Furthermore, a lack of security, political will, and Afghan government capacity have challenged some counternarcotics efforts. For example, eradication and public information efforts have been constrained by poor security, particularly in insurgency-dominated provinces. In addition, other challenges affect specific program areas. For example, drug abuse and addiction are prevalent among the Afghan National Police. Monitoring and evaluation are key components of effective program management. Monitoring is essential to ensuring that programs are implemented as intended, and routine evaluation helps program managers make judgments, improve effectiveness, and inform decisions about current and future programming. U.S. agencies in all counternarcotics areas have monitored program progress through direct U.S. agency oversight, contractor reporting, and/or third-party verification. For example, eradication figures were routinely reported by U.S. Department of State (State) officials and contractors, and verified by United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime monitors. U.S. agencies also conducted and documented program evaluations to improve effectiveness in the elimination/eradication, interdiction, and public information program areas. However, State has not formally documented evaluations of its justice reform program.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-10-291, Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts Needed
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Report to Congressional Addressees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2010:
Afghanistan Drug Control:
Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but Interim Performance
Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts Needed:
GAO-10-291:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-291, a report to congressional addressees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The illicit drug trade remains a challenge to the overall U.S.
counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan. Afghanistan produces over
90 percent of the world‘s opium, which competes with the country‘s
licit agriculture industry, provides funds to insurgents, and fuels
corruption in Afghanistan. Since 2005, the United States has allotted
over $2 billion to stem the production, consumption, and trafficking
of illicit drugs while building the Afghan government‘s capacity to
conduct counternarcotics activities on its own.
In this report, GAO (1) examines how the U.S. counternarcotics
strategy in Afghanistan has changed; (2) assesses progress made and
challenges faced within the elimination/eradication, interdiction,
justice reform, public information, and drug demand reduction program
areas; and (3) assesses U.S. agencies‘ monitoring and evaluation
efforts. To address these objectives, GAO obtained pertinent program
documents and interviewed relevant U.S. and Afghan officials. GAO has
prepared this report under the Comptroller General‘s authority to
conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
What GAO Found:
The U.S. counternarcotics strategy has changed emphasis across program
areas over time to align with the overarching counterinsurgency
campaign. The 2005 U.S. counternarcotics strategy focused on five
program areas: elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform,
public information, and alternative livelihoods. Since then, U.S.
Department of Defense (Defense) policy and rules of engagement were
changed to allow greater military involvement in Afghanistan
counternarcotics efforts due to the ties between traffickers and
insurgents. Furthermore, the U.S. counternarcotics strategy has
shifted to align more closely with counterinsurgency efforts by de-
emphasizing eradication, focusing more on interdiction efforts, and
increasing agricultural assistance.
The United States‘ use of total poppy cultivation as a primary measure
of overall counternarcotics success has limitations in that it does
not capture all aspects of U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In
recognition of this, the administration is attempting to develop
measures that better capture overall counternarcotics success. U.S.
agencies have reported progress within counternarcotics program areas,
but GAO was unable to fully assess the extent of progress due to a
lack of performance measures and interim performance targets to
measure Afghan capacity, which are a best practice for performance
management. For example, although Defense is training Afghan pilots to
fly interdiction missions on their own, this program lacks interim
performance targets to judge incremental progress. Furthermore, a lack
of security, political will, and Afghan government capacity have
challenged some counternarcotics efforts. For example, eradication and
public information efforts have been constrained by poor security,
particularly in insurgency-dominated provinces. In addition, other
challenges affect specific program areas. For example, drug abuse and
addiction are prevalent among the Afghan National Police.
Monitoring and evaluation are key components of effective program
management. Monitoring is essential to ensuring that programs are
implemented as intended, and routine evaluation helps program managers
make judgments, improve effectiveness, and inform decisions about
current and future programming. U.S. agencies in all counternarcotics
areas have monitored program progress through direct U.S. agency
oversight, contractor reporting, and/or third-party verification. For
example, eradication figures were routinely reported by U.S.
Department of State (State) officials and contractors, and verified by
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime monitors. U.S. agencies also
conducted and documented program evaluations to improve effectiveness
in the elimination/eradication, interdiction, and public information
program areas. However, State has not formally documented evaluations
of its justice reform program.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making several recommendations to State and Defense to improve
performance measurement of U.S. counternarcotics programs and evaluate
justice reform efforts. State and Defense generally concurred with our
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-291] or key
components. For more information, contact Charles Michael Johnson Jr.
at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy Changing Emphasis Across Program Areas
to Support Overarching Counterinsurgency Campaign:
Although Counternarcotics Programs Reported Some Progress, They Remain
Challenged by Lack of Security, Political Will, and Afghan Government
Capacity:
Monitoring and Evaluation of Most U.S. Counternarcotics Programs Under
Way:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: U.S. Funding of Counternarcotics-Related Activities in
Afghanistan:
Table 2: DEA Interdiction Data for Afghanistan Fiscal Year 2005
through Fiscal Year 2009:
Table 3: Capability Milestone Criteria:
Table 4: Monitoring and Evaluation Activities by Program Area:
Figures:
Figure 1: Estimated Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2009:
Figure 2: Allotment of U.S. Funding for Counternarcotics Activities in
Afghanistan by Program Area from Fiscal Year 2005 to Fiscal Year 2009:
Figure 3: U.S. Agency Involvement in Afghanistan Counternarcotics
Activities, as of February 2010:
Figure 4: Time Line of Counternarcotics Strategies in Afghanistan:
Figure 5: Total Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2005-2009:
Figure 6: Central Eradication Performance Targets and Results, 2005-
2009:
Figure 7: Opium Poppy Being Eradicated:
Figure 8: Governor-Led Eradication Performance Targets and Results,
2005-2009:
Figure 9: Counternarcotics Public Information Materials for Schools:
Abbreviations:
CM: Capability milestone:
CNPA: Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan:
CSTC-A: Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
ISAF: International Security and Assistance Force:
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime:
USAID: United States Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 9, 2010:
Congressional Addressees:
The illicit drug trade undermines virtually every aspect of the U.S.
and Afghan governments' efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan
and remains a challenge to the overall U.S. counterinsurgency campaign
in the country. The production of opium competes with the country's
licit agriculture industry, provides funds to insurgents, and fuels
corruption in Afghanistan.
In 2003, the Afghan government adopted a National Drug Control
Strategy with the goal of eliminating the production, consumption, and
trafficking of illicit drugs in Afghanistan. Since 2005, when it
became more involved in the counternarcotics effort and developed its
first counternarcotics strategy, the United States has allotted over
$2 billion to stem the production, consumption, and trafficking of
illicit drugs in Afghanistan through elimination/eradication,
interdiction, justice reform, public information, and drug demand
reduction.[Footnote 1]
In this report, we (1) examine how the U.S. counternarcotics strategy
in Afghanistan has changed over time; (2) assess progress made and
challenges faced within the elimination/eradication, interdiction,
justice reform, public information, and drug demand reduction program
areas; and (3) assess U.S. agencies' monitoring and evaluation of
counternarcotics programs.
To address these objectives, we obtained information from pertinent
planning, funding, and program documents detailing U.S.
counternarcotics efforts and interviewed relevant officials from the
U.S. Departments of State (State), Defense (Defense), and Justice,
including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Washington,
D.C., and Afghanistan. To examine how the U.S. counternarcotics
strategy in Afghanistan has changed, we reviewed U.S. and Afghan
strategy documents and discussed recent strategic shifts with relevant
U.S. officials, including the Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan, and with the Office of National Drug Control Policy. To
assess counternarcotics progress and challenges, we reviewed planning
and reporting documentation and discussed performance measures,
interim performance targets, and ongoing challenges with State,
Defense, Department of Justice, DEA, and contractor officials
implementing U.S. projects in Afghanistan, as well as with officials
from the Afghan Ministries of Counter Narcotics, Interior, and
Justice. To assess U.S. monitoring and evaluation of counternarcotics
programs, we examined contractor reports, agency documentation, and
available evaluations conducted by U.S. government agencies and third
parties such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
Additionally, we discussed these monitoring and evaluation activities
with officials from State, Defense, Department of Justice, and DEA.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to March 2010,
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. (See appendix
I for a more complete description of our scope and methodology.)
Background:
[Side bar: Opium Poppy:
[Photograph of opium poppy: Source: State]
Opium poppy is a hardy, drought-resistant crop that is easily grown
throughout Afghanistan‘s rugged territory. Opium poppy is an annual
crop with a 6 to 7 month planting cycle. It is planted between
September and December and flowers approximately 3 months after
planting. After the flower‘s petals fall away, the opium, an opaque,
milky sap found in the plant‘s seed capsule, is harvested between
April and July. The sap can then be refined into morphine and heroin.
End of Side bar]
Afghanistan produces over 90 percent of the world's opium, which is
refined into heroin in Afghanistan and other countries. According to
UNODC, in 2008, the value of the illicit narcotics industry equaled as
much as one-third of Afghanistan's licit economy--it is a notable
source of funding for the insurgency, competes with licit development,
and undermines governance. Processing and transit points for narcotics
are spread throughout Afghanistan, and finished opiates are smuggled
across Afghanistan's borders and into the global market. Of the
roughly $3 billion dollars generated by the Afghan narcotics trade,
UNODC estimates that $90-$160 million per year is channeled to the
insurgency.
As figure 1 shows, most opium poppy cultivated in 2009 was in
Afghanistan's southern and western regions. These are also the most
insecure areas with active insurgent elements.
Figure 1: Estimated Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of Afghanistan]
Estimated Opium Poppy Cultivation:
Province: Helmand;
Amount: More than 50,000 hectares.
Province: Badghis;
Amount: 1,000-19,999 hectares.
Province: Farah;
Amount: 1,000-19,999 hectares.
Province: Daykondi;
Amount: 1,000-19,999 hectares.
Province: Kandahar;
Amount: 1,000-19,999 hectares.
Province: Oruzgan;
Amount: 1,000-19,999 hectares.
Province: Zabol;
Amount: 1,000-19,999 hectares.
Province: Herat;
Amount: 100-999 hectares.
Province: Nimruz;
Amount: 100-999 hectares.
Province: Kabul;
Amount: 100-999 hectares.
Province: Nangahar;
Amount: 100-999 hectares.
Province: Laghman;
Amount: 100-999 hectares.
Province: Konar;
Amount: 100-999 hectares.
Province: Badakhshan;
Amount: 100-999 hectares.
All other provinces are poppy free.
Source: UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009.
Note: Provinces qualifying as poppy-free are where UNODC estimates
there are 100 or fewer hectares of poppy cultivated. One hectare
equals approximately 2.47 acres.
[End of figure]
Since 2005, the United States has allotted approximately $2.5 billion
for elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice reform, public
information, and drug demand reduction activities in Afghanistan.
These counternarcotics-related activities are funded through State's
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account, the
Global War on Terror supplemental funding account, and Defense's
Counternarcotics account (see table 1).
Table 1: U.S. Funding of Counternarcotics-Related Activities in
Afghanistan:
Allotments: Elimination/eradication[A];
FY 2005: $258.0 million;
FY 2006: $134 million;
FY 2007: $166.7 million;
FY 2008: $196.4 million;
FY 2009: $237.0 million;
Total: $992.2 million.
Allotments: Interdiction;
FY 2005: $213.3 million;
FY 2006: $102.5 million;
FY 2007: $253.2 million;
FY 2008: $204.2 million;
FY 2009: $193.0 million;
Total: $966.3 million.
Allotments: Rule of law/justice[B];
FY 2005: $24.0 million;
FY 2006: $26.5 million;
FY 2007: $55.5 million;
FY 2008: $94.4 million;
FY 2009: $182.0 million;
Total: $382.5 million.
Allotments: Public information[C];
FY 2005: $8.4 million;
FY 2006: $2.0 million;
FY 2007: $6.0 million;
FY 2008: $2.0 million;
FY 2009: $17.0 million;
Total: $35.4 million.
Allotments: Drug demand reduction;
FY 2005: 0.0;
FY 2006: $2.7 million;
FY 2007: $2.0 million;
FY 2008: $2.0 million;
FY 2009: $11.0 million;
Total: $17.6 million.
Allotments: Program development and support;
FY 2005: $12.2 million;
FY 2006: $13.2 million;
FY 2007: $23.9 million;
FY 2008: $21.2 million;
FY 2009: $40.2 million;
Total: $110.9 million.
Allotments: Total[D];
FY 2005: $516.0 million;
FY 2006: $280.9 million;
FY 2007: $507.3 million;
FY 2008: $520.4 million;
FY 2009: $680.3 million;
Total: $2,504.9 million.
Sources: GAO analysis of State and Defense budgetary documents.
Note: This table excludes alternative development and agriculture
programs. Funding allotments for U.S. alternative development and
agriculture programs, which we will report on separately in spring
2010, totaled approximately $1.4 billion from fiscal years 2005
through 2009.
[A] While these figures include the full cost of State's Air Wing
fleet in Afghanistan, these aircraft also support other
counternarcotics programs, as well as other Embassy Kabul activities.
[B] During the course of our review, State was unable to provide a
detailed breakout of counternarcotics-specific activities within the
rule of law/justice reform program area. Therefore, this figure
includes some activities unrelated to counternarcotics programs.
[C] Figures do not include funding for Counternarcotics Advisory
Teams, which are counted under elimination/eradication.
[D] Numbers may not sum to totals due to rounding.
[End of table]
As figure 2 illustrates, excluding the U.S. investment in alternative
development programs, the majority of U.S. counternarcotics-related
funding has been in the elimination/eradication and interdiction
program areas.
Figure 2: Allotment of U.S. Funding for Counternarcotics Activities in
Afghanistan by Program Area from Fiscal Year 2005 to Fiscal Year 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Elimination/eradication: 39.6% ($992 million);
Interdiction: 38.6% ($966 million);
Rule of law/justice: 15.3% ($383 million);
Program development and support: 4.4% ($111 million);
Public information: 1.4% ($35 million);
Drug demand reduction: 0.7% ($18 million).
Sources: GAO analysis of State and Defense budgetary documents.
[End of figure]
Elimination/Eradication:
The United States has allotted approximately $992 million in support
of elimination/eradication programs since fiscal year 2005. These
programs seek to reduce opium poppy cultivation by destroying opium
poppy plants before farmers are able to harvest their illicit crops
(eradication) and by providing rewards to provinces for reductions in
opium poppy cultivation. State has supported an Afghan central
eradication force, a governor-led eradication program, and an
incentive program called the Good Performers Initiative, which rewards
provinces for reductions in poppy cultivation.
Interdiction:
State and Defense have allotted approximately $966 million for
interdiction programs since fiscal year 2005. U.S. interdiction
programs aim to decrease narcotics trafficking and processing by
conducting interdiction operations, which include, among other things,
raiding drug laboratories; destroying storage sites; arresting drug
traffickers; conducting roadblock operations; seizing chemicals and
drugs; and conducting undercover drug purchases. The interdiction
program also seeks to increase the capability of Afghan law
enforcement to disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking organizations.
DEA plays a significant role in the U.S. interdiction effort and is
the lead U.S. agency responsible for conducting interdiction
operations in Afghanistan.[Footnote 2] DEA works with the specialized
units of the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) to conduct
investigations, build cases, and arrest drug traffickers, which we
discuss in detail later in this report. DEA also works to build Afghan
law enforcement capacity by mentoring CNPA specialized units. Defense,
which also conducts interdiction operations in support of its
counterinsurgency mission, supports the training, equipping, and
sustainment of the CNPA specialized units, as well as the construction
of CNPA-related infrastructure projects.[Footnote 3]
Justice Reform:
Since fiscal year 2005, State has allotted approximately $383 million
to support the Afghan government's efforts to establish
counternarcotics-specific criminal justice institutions and increase
the Afghan government's capacity to arrest, prosecute, and punish
traffickers. State supports six Department of Justice attorneys that
train, mentor, and assist prosecutors and investigators on the Afghan
Criminal Justice Task Force (Task Force) and the judges on the Afghan
Central Narcotics Tribunal (Tribunal). These institutions have
exclusive national jurisdiction over the adjudication and prosecution
of mid-and high-level narcotics cases in Afghanistan.
In addition, Defense constructed the State-funded Counternarcotics
Justice Center (Justice Center), which serves as a secure facility for
the Task Force and Tribunal to carry out their adjudication missions.
The Justice Center consists of a detention building and a courthouse;
offices for judges, investigators, and prosecutors; and barracks for
members of the protective Afghan Judicial Security Unit. Additionally,
the Department of Justice's United States Marshals Service trains and
equips the Afghan Judicial Security Unit to provide facility
protection at the Justice Center and to serve as a private security
detail for Afghan judges and high-threat detainees.[Footnote 4]
Public Information:
State and Defense have allotted approximately $35 million to support
the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics in developing and
disseminating counternarcotics messages through nationwide public
information campaigns and through province-based activities of
Counternarcotics Advisory Teams (advisory teams).[Footnote 5] Advisory
teams are staffed with two contract advisors and eight Afghan Ministry
of Counter Narcotics employees that specialize as either public
information, gender affairs, alternative livelihoods, or monitoring
and evaluation officers. Staffed to seven provinces,[Footnote 6]
advisory teams work directly with provincial and local leaders to
implement counternarcotics plans and disseminate counternarcotics
messages. These messages are for the most part developed by State's
other public information contractor, which subcontracts with Afghan
companies to produce and disseminate counternarcotics messages via
radio, television, and print materials in both Dari and Pashto. These
messages are also publicized at community events held by advisory
teams. State officials report that public information enhances other
counternarcotics program areas, and its success is, therefore, tied to
the success of the other program areas.
Drug Demand Reduction:
Since fiscal year 2006, State has allotted approximately $18 million
to address the drug addiction problem in Afghanistan through technical
and training assistance to the Afghan government in creating national
drug abuse treatment, intervention, and prevention programs. State's
program supports rehabilitation clinics, including clinics exclusively
for women and children. The program also supports mosque-based drug
intervention services and trains community and religious leaders on
counseling drug addicts.
Overview and Coordination of U.S. Agency Involvement:
As shown in figure 3, multiple U.S. agencies are involved in U.S.
counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan.
Figure 3: U.S. Agency Involvement in Afghanistan Counternarcotics
Activities, as of February 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table, containing photographs]
Elimination/Eradication:
State:
* Funds and manages program;
* Provided aircraft for operations.
Interdiction:
Justice (DEA):
* Conducts operations and mentors specialized units;
Defense:
* Funds Afghan interdiction aircraft;
* Conducts operations in support of counterinsurgency;
* Builds and maintains facilities;
* Conducts police training;
State:
* Funds operation and maintenance costs of facilities and provides
aircraft for operations.
Justice reform:
Justice:
* Implements program;
* Mentors prosecutors and judges;
State:
* Funds program and operation and maintenance costs of facilities;
Defense:
* Builds facilities.
Public information:
State:
* Funds and manages program.
Drug demand reduction:
State:
* Funds and manages program.
Sources: GAO analysis of State, Defense, and Justice program
documents; (left to right) State, Defense, GAO, State, and State
(photos).
[End of figure]
U.S. officials involved in Afghan counternarcotics stated that
coordination between agency partners has been largely successful.
Agency partners meet regularly through several coordinating bodies in
Kabul, such as the Eradication Working Group and Counternarcotics Sync
Group. Additionally, interdiction operations and intelligence are
coordinated through a variety of mechanisms. The Interagency
Operations Coordination Center coordinates and analyzes intelligence
information in Kabul to produce targets for interdiction operations
and is jointly led by DEA and the United Kingdom's Serious Organized
Crime Agency. The Combined Joint Interagency Task Force-Nexus
established by Defense in Kandahar is intended to provide coordination
support, intelligence, and target packages for DEA interdiction
missions as well as International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)
[Footnote 7] counterinsurgency operations that target insurgents
linked to the drug trade. The Joint Narcotics Analysis Center is an
intelligence center jointly led by the United States and United
Kingdom in London that provides strategic analysis and operational
support to interdiction activities in Afghanistan. Officials involved
in the Interagency Operations Coordination Center and Combined Joint
Interagency Task Force-Nexus reported that they are exploring ways of
formalizing their relationship for enhanced cooperation. Additionally,
State recently created and filled a position for a Coordinating
Director for Development and Economic Affairs at Embassy Kabul that
oversees all U.S. assistance programs, including counternarcotics
activities. State also hosts meetings of the interagency
Counternarcotics Working Group in Washington, D.C. According to State,
the latest revisions to the U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy were
coordinated through these working-level meetings.
U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy Changing Emphasis Across Program Areas
to Support Overarching Counterinsurgency Campaign:
The U.S. counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan has become more
integrated with the broader counterinsurgency effort over time, as
depicted in figure 4.
Figure 4: Time Line of Counternarcotics Strategies in Afghanistan:
[Refer to PDF for image: timeline with background photograph of poppy
field]
2003:
Afghanistan publishes National Drug Control Strategy concentrating on
combating illicit narcotics production, consumption, and trafficking.
2005:
United States assumes larger role in and develops strategy for
counternarcotics in Afghanistan, which introduces
elimination/eradication to overall effort.
2006:
Afghanistan updates its National Drug Control Strategy to include
elimination/eradication and other program areas.
2007:
United States refines strategy to, among other things, coordinate
counternarcotics and counterinsurgency planning and operations.
However, Defense policy at this time prohibited military from directly
participating in drug interdiction missions.
2008:
Defense changes policy and rules of engagement to allow greater
support for interdiction operations.
2009:
United States begins development of new strategy to align with
counterinsurgency efforts. New approach de-emphasizes eradication,
focuses on interdiction, increases assistance to farmers, and
integrates alternative development programs into general agricultural
assistance.
Sources: United States and Afghanistan strategies and planning
documents; State (photo).
[End of figure]
In 2003, Afghanistan adopted a National Drug Control Strategy with the
goal of eliminating production, consumption, and trafficking of
illicit drugs in Afghanistan. In 2005, the United States assumed a
larger role in the counternarcotics effort after several years of
increases in opium poppy cultivation and developed its first
counternarcotics strategy for Afghanistan. This strategy concentrated
on five program areas: elimination/eradication, interdiction, justice
reform, public information, and alternative livelihoods. The 2005 U.S.
strategy introduced elimination/eradication, which had not been a
major focus of previous efforts. The government of Afghanistan added
this and other program areas to its 2006 National Drug Control
Strategy, which it updated and integrated into its National
Development Strategy in 2008.
In August 2007, the United States refined its counternarcotics
strategy, seeking to: (1) increase development assistance to encourage
licit economic development; (2) amplify the scope and intensity of
interdiction and eradication operations; (3) encourage consistent,
sustained political will for the counternarcotics effort among the
Afghan government, coalition partners, and international civilian and
military organizations; and (4) coordinate counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency planning and operations with a particular emphasis
on integrating drug interdiction into the counterinsurgency mission.
At that time, however, Defense policy prohibited the military from
directly participating in drug interdiction missions.
According to Defense and DEA officials, this prohibition of military
involvement in interdiction missions prevented or hampered the ability
of some missions from occurring in insecure areas and made commanders
reluctant to provide support to DEA. However, both Defense and DEA
officials stated that this policy ignored a nexus between the
narcotics trade and the insurgency. For example, DEA drug raids
yielded weapons caches and explosives used by insurgents, as well as
suspects listed on Defense military target lists, and military raids
on insurgent compounds also yielded illicit narcotics and narcotics
processing equipment.
According to Defense, in November 2008 it changed its rules of
engagement to permit the targeting of persons by the military
(including drug traffickers, if appropriate) who provide material
support to insurgent or terrorist groups. Additionally, Defense
clarified its policy, in December 2008, to allow the military to
accompany and provide force protection to U.S. and host nation law
enforcement personnel on counternarcotics field operations, so long as
Defense personnel do not directly participate in arrests. According to
Defense, these changes are also mirrored in North Atlantic Treaty
Organization doctrine, allowing members to participate in interdiction
operations. Defense and DEA officials stated that these changes have
benefited interdiction-related programs in Afghanistan.
In 2009, the U.S. approach shifted again to align more closely with
counterinsurgency efforts. This programmatic shift de-emphasized
eradication by ending support for the Afghan central eradication
force. According to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, eradication unduly punished and alienated farmers for making
a "rational economic decision"[Footnote 8] while ignoring the profits
gleaned by traffickers and insurgents from the sale of processed opium
and heroin. Therefore, based on the reasoning that going after drug
labs and traffickers would more precisely target the drug-insurgency
nexus, the United States is focusing more on interdiction efforts.
According to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
Defense and DEA will continue to lead in the interdiction program
area, with State playing the role of coordinator. In addition, this
strategic shift increased assistance to farmers and integrated
alternative development programs into general agricultural assistance.
According to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
the U.S. counternarcotics strategy will be a subcomponent of the
broader counterinsurgency campaign.
Although Counternarcotics Programs Reported Some Progress, They Remain
Challenged by Lack of Security, Political Will, and Afghan Government
Capacity:
The United States' use of total poppy cultivation as a primary measure
of overall counternarcotics success has limitations in that it does
not capture all aspects of U.S. counternarcotics efforts. In
recognition of this, the administration is attempting to develop
measures that better capture overall counternarcotics success. U.S.
agencies reported some progress within each of the counternarcotics
program areas by collecting information on program-specific
performance measures; however, it is difficult to fully assess
progress in some areas due to a lack of interim performance targets,
which can be used to provide decision makers with an indication of the
incremental progress toward achieving results. In addition,
challenges, such as lack of security, political will, and Afghan
government capacity affect progress in all program areas.
Current Measure of Overall Counternarcotics Success Has Limitations:
Since 2005, the United States has measured overall success through
total hectares under opium poppy cultivation. Each counternarcotics
program area has its own program-specific performance measures--which
we address later in this section. However, opium poppy cultivation
continues to be tracked by the United States and UNODC as an aggregate
measure of counternarcotics success.[Footnote 9] Evidence based on
annual UNODC surveys indicates a peak in production during 2007 with
declines in subsequent years. As opium poppy cultivation has declined
and more provinces have become poppy-free,[Footnote 10] it has become
more concentrated in the largely insecure south and west of
Afghanistan. Changes in poppy cultivation since 2005 are shown in
figure 5.[Footnote 11]
Figure 5: Total Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2005-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Year: 2005;
Hectares: 104,000;
90% Confidence, Upper: 113,000;
90% Confidence, Lower: 95,000.
Year: 2006;
Hectares: 165,000;
90% Confidence, Upper: 180,000;
90% Confidence, Lower: 150,000.
Year: 2007;
Hectares: 193,000;
90% Confidence, Upper: 209,000;
90% Confidence, Lower: 177,000.
Year: 2008;
Hectares: 157,000;
90% Confidence, Upper: 190,000;
90% Confidence, Lower: 130,000.
Year: 2009;
Hectares: 123,000;
90% Confidence, Upper: 137,000;
90% Confidence, Lower: 102,000.
Sources: UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey for 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008,
and 2009.
[End of figure]
However, U.S. officials pointed out that poppy cultivation fails to
capture all aspects of counternarcotics success. For example, although
20 of the 34 Afghan provinces are now poppy-free, some of these
provinces may still contain high levels of drug trafficking or
processing. Additionally, according to the Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the use of opium poppy cultivation as the
primary measure of overall success led to an over-emphasis on
eradication activities, which due to their focus on farmers, could
undermine the larger counterinsurgency campaign. Officials from the
Office of National Drug Control Policy also criticized using total
opium poppy cultivation as the sole measure of success, stating that
measures of success should relate to security, such as public safety
and terrorist attacks. Moreover, previous GAO work on U.S.
counternarcotics efforts in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia indicates that
government control of drug-growing areas and project sites is
essential for counternarcotics success.[Footnote 12]
According to preliminary documents, the administration is attempting
to develop measures that better capture overall counternarcotics
success. Potential measures being considered include interdiction of
drugs, volume and value of narcotics in Afghanistan, and successful
interdiction and prosecution of narcotics traffickers. However, at the
time of our review, no such measures had been finalized.
Elimination/Eradication: Efforts Challenged by Political Will,
Security, and Afghan Capacity:
The goal of elimination/eradication programs is to reduce opium poppy
cultivation through forced eradication and economic incentives. State
assisted the Afghan government in selecting, training, and fielding a
central eradication force[Footnote 13] of Afghan police to destroy
poppy crops and serve as a deterrent to continued poppy cultivation.
The governor-led eradication program reimburses governors that self-
initiate eradication of poppy in their provinces. After the
eradication is verified by UNODC, the U.S. government transfers funds
to the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, which in turn reimburses
governors at the rate of $135 per hectare eradicated.[Footnote 14] As
the elimination component of this program area, the Good Performers
Initiative annually provides political recognition and direct
financial incentives to provinces that reduce or eliminate opium poppy
cultivation.
Central Eradication Force Consistently Hindered by Political Will and
Security Challenges That Limited Effectiveness and Mobility:
State and the Afghan government established annual performance targets
for central eradication by setting a specific amount of hectares to be
eradicated. Central eradication did not meet its specific targets, as
shown in figure 6.
Figure 6: Central Eradication Performance Targets and Results, 2005-
2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Year: 2005-2006;
Actual hectares eradicated: 2,250.
Year: 2006-2007;
Actual hectares eradicated: 3,149;
Target: 7,000-10,000.
Year: 2007-2008;
Actual hectares eradicated: 1,174;
Target: 3,000-7,000.
Year: 2008-2009;
Actual hectares eradicated: 2,663;
Target: 5,000.
Sources: GAO analysis of State and UNODC data.
[End of figure]
State originally intended a central eradication force comprised of
Afghan Counternarcotics Police to be augmented by aerial herbicide
spraying, a method the U.S. government has historically used and
supported in Colombia.[Footnote 15] However, the proposed aerial spray
eradication met heavy Afghan and international political resistance
and was never authorized by the Afghan government. This forced central
eradicators to destroy poppy crops with such equipment as tractors,
all-terrain vehicles, and sticks. In 2005, State aircraft began
supporting the program by transporting personnel and equipment and
providing reconnaissance and protection for the central eradicators.
This force was heavily dependent on large ground convoys for its
deployment. For example, during its last eradication season, the
central eradicators deployed from Kabul to Helmand in an 80 kilometer-
long convoy. According to State officials, the ground convoys were
expensive, made the force vulnerable to attack, and caused central
eradicators to spend more time deploying and less time eradicating.
Maintenance and readiness of vital equipment proved to be a persistent
challenge. Additionally, U.S. agency officials and contractors
reported incidents of equipment sabotage and dismantling for parts.
Opium poppy eradication is illustrated in figure 7.
Figure 7: Opium Poppy Being Eradicated:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: State.
Another factor that hampered central eradicators was the delay in
gaining permission to manually eradicate from Afghan governors.
[Footnote 16] In 2008, the concept for the central eradication force
was changed so that central eradicators could operate without governor
permission in areas where governors either would not or could not
launch eradication efforts themselves. State officials at the time
recognized that this forced eradication mission would require greater
protection for the central eradication force, which faced growing
resistance as poppy growth became more concentrated in less-secure
areas. A counternarcotics infantry unit from the Afghan National Army
deployed with the central eradication force during the 2009 season
and, although more hectares were eradicated than in 2008, State
officials reported that this unit was unable to provide sufficient
force protection.
As a result of these challenges, State officials in Afghanistan said
that the central eradication force was not very effective as a large-
scale crop elimination tool but maintained that it provided a
deterrent against poppy cultivation. However, in 2009, UNODC surveyed
Afghan farmers who had stopped growing poppy, and 1 percent of
respondents cited fear of eradication as a reason for stopping opium
poppy cultivation.[Footnote 17]
Continued Governor-Led Eradication Success Contingent Upon Adequate
Security, Political Will, and Afghan Capacity:
Separate targets were established for governor-led eradication.
Governor-led eradication met its performance target in 2006-2007, but
did not in other years, as shown in figure 8.
Figure 8: Governor-Led Eradication Performance Targets and Results,
2005-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Year: 2005-2006;
Actual hectares eradicated: 13,050.
Year: 2006-2007;
Actual hectares eradicated: 15,898;
Target: 15,000-25,000.
Year: 2007-2008;
Actual hectares eradicated: 4,306;
Target: 15,000-25,000.
Year: 2008-2009;
Actual hectares eradicated: 2,687;
Target: 15,000.
Sources: GAO analysis of State and UNODC data.
[End of figure]
Comparisons of both central and governor-led eradication show that
substantially more hectares of poppy were eradicated through governor-
led efforts in years prior to 2009 (see figs. 6 and 8). However,
according to State, as cultivation becomes more concentrated in areas
of poor security, and more stable provinces become poppy-free, the
opportunities to use governor-led eradication have become more
limited. In particular, U.S. officials note that adequate force
protection is essential for eradication in the south. Some governors
are willing to eradicate, but are constrained by poor security, as in
insurgency-dominated Helmand in 2009. Protection for governor-led
eradicators relies upon agreements made between governors and local
security forces.
In addition, U.S. officials stated that governor-led eradication
efforts were challenged by lack of political will among governors.
Each autumn, U.S. officials and Afghan governors collectively set
targets for the upcoming year's eradication work. Nevertheless, even
after agreement is ostensibly reached with all governors, some
governors do not take action in their provinces. A State official
noted the case of one governor who was unwilling to eradicate even
after receiving 10 tractors for this purpose. The UNODC recently
reported that timely eradication could have caused seven more
provinces to become poppy-free and directly attributed the absence of
eradication in two of these provinces to a lack of planning and will
to eradicate.
A State official also noted that while political will exists in some
cases, many governors do not have the capacity or resources to
initiate eradication. To assist governors with the start-up costs of
eradication (rental of equipment, hiring of labor, provision of fuel),
the United States and United Kingdom provide advanced payments to
governors against future eradication achievements.
Thirty-three of 34 Afghan Provinces Rewarded through Good Performers
Initiative:
Under the Good Performers Initiative,[Footnote 18] provinces
determined by UNODC to be poppy-free receive $1 million in development
assistance. Provinces that reduce poppy cultivation by 10 percent
receive $1,000 per each additional hectare of reduction up to a
maximum reward of $10 million.[Footnote 19] Annual special recognition
awards of $500,000 are also given to provinces that have taken
extraordinary steps to fight narcotics, but which may not qualify
under the previous criteria. Projects--such as the construction of
irrigation systems or provision of tractors--are selected and funded
through a process that includes oversight by both the Afghan Ministry
of Counter Narcotics and State. To date, the U.S. government has
allotted over $80 million[Footnote 20] to 33 provinces through the
Good Performers Initiative, while the United Kingdom has provided
approximately $12 million.[Footnote 21] In 2009, State pledged nearly
$39 million to the initiative. As of September 2009, 7 of 43 projects
initiated through Good Performers Initiative were complete.
Determining the precise effect of this program on poppy cultivation in
any given province is a challenge. A State review of the Good
Performers Initiative found that a combination of variables, including
political will and security, as well as incentives like development
projects, ultimately contribute to poppy cultivation reductions across
provinces. Afghan officials expressed favorable views of the Good
Performers Initiative, for example identifying it as a main factor in
the rising number of poppy-free provinces. According to State, the
efficiency of disbursements has improved with the transfer of the Good
Performers Initiative fund and administrative responsibilities from
the United Nations Development Programme-administered Counternarcotics
Trust Fund to the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Inefficiencies
at the fund frustrated governors with delays in approving and
implementing projects, leading the Afghan government to recommend a
different funding arrangement. Due to the slowness of delivery and the
high administrative costs of funding projects through the trust fund,
the United States created a joint bank account with the Afghan
Ministry of Counter Narcotics to administer program moneys more
rapidly.
Interdiction: United States Conducting More Operations, but Afghan
Capacity Limited:
U.S. interdiction programs aim to decrease narcotics trafficking and
processing by conducting operations, as well as increasing the
capability of Afghan law enforcement to disrupt and dismantle drug
trafficking organizations. DEA is the lead agency for conducting
narcotics interdiction operations in Afghanistan, and its presence
expanded from 13 to 81 permanently assigned agents during fiscal year
2009.[Footnote 22] DEA agents in Kabul and at forward operating bases
in Afghan provinces work with specialized units of the CNPA to conduct
investigations, build cases, and arrest drug traffickers. These
specialized and vetted units include the National Interdiction Unit, a
tactical unit intended to conduct raids and seizures; the Sensitive
Investigative Unit, intended to gather evidence and develop cases for
narcotics investigations;[Footnote 23] the Technical Investigation
Unit, a subunit of the Sensitive Investigative Unit intended to
collect evidence through wiretaps; and the Air Interdiction Unit, a
force of eight MI-17 helicopters used to transport DEA and National
Interdiction Unit personnel on air assault operations. DEA Foreign-
deployed Advisory Support Teams identify, target, and disrupt drug
trafficking organizations, and conduct affiliated counterinsurgency
operations in concert with the Afghan National Interdiction Unit, Air
Interdiction Unit, and the British-trained Afghan Special Narcotics
Force.[Footnote 24] Additionally, State's Air Wing in Afghanistan
supports interdiction activities on an as-needed and as-available
basis.[Footnote 25]
DEA also plays a role in building Afghan law enforcement capacity by
mentoring CNPA specialized units and deploying with specialized unit
platoons at forward operating bases. Defense supports the construction
of these forward operating bases, as well as other infrastructure
projects such as CNPA training and basing facilities in Kabul. State
supports the operation and maintenance costs of some of these Defense-
built infrastructure projects, as well as vetting (through urinalysis
and polygraphs) of Sensitive Investigative Unit and Technical
Investigation Unit officers. Defense trains, equips, and sustains the
CNPA specialized units, including logistics and maintenance support to
the Air Interdiction Unit helicopter fleet intended to establish an
air interdiction capacity for the Ministry of Interior.
U.S. Defense Policy Change Allowing More Interdiction Missions:
As noted earlier, in late 2008, Defense and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization changed their policies to allow the U.S. military and
ISAF forces to participate in interdiction operations in Afghanistan.
DEA and Defense officials stated that these changes have enabled
higher levels of interdiction operations in areas previously
inaccessible due to security problems. DEA conducted 82 interdiction
operations in Afghanistan during fiscal year 2009 (compared with 42 in
fiscal year 2008), often with support from U.S. military and other
coalition forces. These operations include, among other things,
raiding drug laboratories; destroying storage sites; arresting drug
traffickers; conducting roadblock operations; seizing chemicals and
drugs; and conducting undercover drug purchases. The U.S. military and
ISAF are also targeting narcotics trafficking and processing as part
of regular counterinsurgency operations. For example, ISAF Regional
Commands are expected to submit a counternarcotics campaign plan for
2010, and Defense has established a Combined Joint Interagency Task
Force-Nexus in Kandahar intended to provide coordination support,
intelligence, and target packages for DEA interdiction missions as
well as ISAF counterinsurgency operations that target insurgents
linked to the drug trade.[Footnote 26]
One way for U.S. agencies to measure progress in this area is by
tracking and reporting the results of interdiction operations, as
shown in table 2.
Table 2: DEA Interdiction Data for Afghanistan Fiscal Year 2005
through Fiscal Year 2009:
Interdiction operations;
2005[A]: 33;
2006: 48;
2007: 37;
2008: 42;
2009: 82.
Opium seized (metric tons)[B];
2005[A]: 42.9;
2006: 7.5;
2007: 0.892;
2008: 2.442;
2009: 25.
Heroin seized (metric tons);
2005[A]: 5.5;
2006: 1;
2007: 0.124;
2008: 4.083;
2009: 0.593.
Hashish seized (metric tons);
2005[A]: 142.4;
2006: 1.3;
2007: 0.434;
2008: 238.935;
2009: 53.133.
Clandestine conversion labs destroyed;
2005[A]: 247;
2006: 31;
2007: 1;
2008: 13;
2009: 25.
Drug-related arrests;
2005[A]: 32;
2006: 79;
2007: 33;
2008: 48;
2009: 56.
Source: DEA.
[A] According to DEA officials, during 2005 the Foreign-deployed
Advisory Support Teams primarily engaged in search-and-destroy
missions, resulting in extensive narcotics seizures and destruction of
processing labs. Today, the Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Teams
are building evidentiary cases for eventual trial at the Criminal
Justice Task Force.
[B] One metric ton equals 1,000 kilograms or approximately 2,205
pounds.
[End of table]
Agreements between the United States and Afghanistan contain interim
performance targets for interdiction operations. For example, for 2008-
2009, the agreed upon goal was to produce a 10 percent increase from
2008 of drug and precursor chemical seizures or interception of drug
traffickers, with 25 percent of drug seizures resulting in arrests.
However, DEA officials in Afghanistan cautioned that seizure and
arrest figures alone are not sufficient to show that interdiction
operations are having an impact on the Afghan narcotics industry.
Furthermore, measuring the results of drug-control actions is
difficult because data on illegal drug movements are more difficult to
collect than data on most legal commodities. Without knowing how much
was shipped or what got through, the amount of narcotics seized does
not yield a meaningful measure of effectiveness. As a result, DEA also
measures its performance through its investigative and enforcement
efforts against High Value Targets designated by the DEA Kabul Country
Office, as well as significant Afghan drug organizations identified by
the interagency Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force program.
According to DEA, if one of these organizations is disrupted or
dismantled, it is reflected in the yearly evaluation of the region.
Additionally, DEA officials in the field stated that they attempt to
gauge impact of operations on narcotics networks through intelligence
information.
Capacity of Afghan Counternarcotics Police to Carry Out Interdiction
Efforts Limited:
With regard to increasing Afghan law enforcement capacity to disrupt
and dismantle drug trafficking organizations, CSTC-A[Footnote 27] uses
capability milestones (CM), ranging from CM1 (fully capable) to CM4
(not yet capable), as criteria to assess army and police progress in
manning, training, and equipping. According to U.S. officials, these
ratings incorporate input from DEA and Defense mentors working with
the CNPA specialized units. These criteria are summarized in table 3.
Table 3: Capability Milestone Criteria:
Capability milestone: CM1;
Description: Unit is capable of independently planning, executing, and
sustaining counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with no
operational coalition support for organic functions.
Capability milestone: CM2;
Description: Unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining
counterinsurgency operations at the battalion level with coalition
support.
Capability milestone: CM3;
Description: Unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency
operations at the company level with coalition support.
Capability milestone: CM4;
Description: Unit formed but not yet capable of conducting primary
operational missions.
Source: Defense.
[End of table]
As of June 2009, CSTC-A rated the CNPA's specialized units at CM3
(partially capable) with the exception of the Air Interdiction Unit,
which along with the provincial CNPA, was rated at CM4 (not capable).
[Footnote 28] State also reports on the capability levels of the CNPA
specialized units in its yearly International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report but does not report details that would allow a more
accurate assessment of the units' capability. For example, in its
January 2009 report, State reported that the National Interdiction
Unit was capable of conducting its own operations, including
requesting and executing search and arrest warrants, while the
Sensitive Investigative Unit was able to independently initiate and
complete investigative and undercover cases.
Although U.S. agencies did assess the capabilities of the CNPA and its
specialized units, we found that these assessments lacked interim
performance targets, which can enable decision makers to more readily
understand incremental progress made toward program goals. For
example, while Defense officials did provide informal performance
targets for the Air Interdiction Unit, such as Afghan pilots and crews
being able to conduct transport flights, or flying interdiction
missions with mixed Afghan/U.S. crews, these targets were not
formalized in an overall training plan or time line that would allow a
program manager to judge whether training was on, ahead, or behind
schedule. Similarly, while CSTC-A's CM-ratings of the CNPA and its
specialized units provided a snapshot of operational capability, there
were no interim performance targets to assess what this snapshot means
in terms of overall progress. Furthermore, the CM ratings do not
assess the CNPA's institutional capability to provide logistics and
administrative support. A recent interagency evaluation identified
organizational capacity as a critical weakness of the CNPA, and
Defense officials stated that Defense is working to develop subratings
to measure CNPA support functions such as logistics support, financial
management, administration, and training.
U.S. and Afghan officials noted the continued development and
increased operational capacity of the CNPA's specialized units. For
example, DEA officials cited the National Interdiction Unit's ability
to conduct smaller ground-based interdiction operations on its own,
the Sensitive Investigative Unit's ability to conduct simple
counternarcotics investigations, and the execution of 180 wiretaps by
the Technical Investigation Unit between October 2008 and June 2009,
stating that this would not have been possible 2 years ago.
However, a July 2009 interagency evaluation, as well as U.S. and
Afghan officials we interviewed, identified weaknesses in broader CNPA
capacity and its training program, including the following:
* Lack of a comprehensive strategy for CNPA development and no U.S.
agency with clear responsibility for training, leading to "neglect of
the force" beyond the specialized units.
* Lack of structure and integrity of operation in CNPA personnel
system, causing the exact number of current CNPA personnel, their
locations, training and equipping status, and current support to be
unclear.
* No institutional capacity within the CNPA to provide daily
administrative, logistics, finance, and training support to its
various components, leading to dependency of the specialized units on
U.S. support.
* No institutional plan for equipping or recruitment to the CNPA.
* Greater lack of priority and logistics support affecting the
provincial CNPA, along with questions of ownership and authority with
provincial Afghan National Police.
According to Defense officials, Defense is refocusing its efforts to
train and equip the CNPA based on this assessment's findings and
recommendations. Since December 2009, Defense has supported the
deployment of four advisors from the Department of Justice's
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program to
CSTC-A, where they are assessing CNPA training needs, exploring ways
to reform, and seeking to coordinate CNPA training requirements with
the larger police training mission. Defense officials characterized
this as a first step, and the CNPA assessment estimated that it will
take at least 3 years before the CNPA, beyond the specialized units,
is able to conduct targeted and coordinated investigations at the
national level.
Limited Air Assets Force Trade-off between Interdiction Missions and
Training of Afghans:
The objectives of the Air Interdiction Unit[Footnote 29] are to
provide operational airlift for DEA and National Interdiction Unit-led
interdiction missions, as well as to build Afghan capacity to conduct
such missions autonomously. According to DEA officials, airlift
support from the Air Interdiction Unit allows DEA and the National
Interdiction Unit to act swiftly on intelligence information and
perform air assault operations on targets across Afghanistan,
including areas that would otherwise be inaccessible by ground due to
security concerns. According to Defense officials, only contractor
pilots currently fly during actual interdiction operations due to a
lack of proficient Afghan pilots.
One key challenge facing the Air Interdiction Unit, in light of
limited air assets, is meeting the growing demand for interdiction
missions while also training Afghan pilots, flight engineers, and crew
chiefs to conduct such missions themselves. Defense officials training
the Air Interdiction Unit told us that, because interdiction missions
must be flown by contractor pilots, this forces a trade-off between
conducting interdiction missions and training Afghan pilots. According
to Defense and DEA officials, operations should always take priority
over training. Defense is addressing this issue by attempting to
procure six additional helicopters in fiscal year 2010 and utilizing
flight simulators in Kabul and at its training center in the United
States.[Footnote 30] Additionally, the United Kingdom has contributed
four helicopters to the Air Interdiction Unit with plans to contribute
two more.[Footnote 31] Germany has also provided two helicopters for
general Ministry of Interior use.
Defense and DEA officials stated that airlift requirements have grown
beyond what was originally envisaged for the Air Interdiction Unit,
and they also stated they expected these requirements to grow further
as DEA expands into forward operating bases.[Footnote 32] Defense
officials told us that they expected growing interdiction requirements
to continue to compete with efforts to train Afghans over the next
year. To address limited air assets, DEA officials stated that DEA is
attempting to procure medium-lift helicopters in fiscal year 2011.
Justice Reform: While Some Progress Reported, Extent Is Unclear, and
Broader Justice Sector-Related Challenges Impede Efforts:
[Side bar:
2009 Status of Afghan Extradition Law:
International extradition is the formal process by which a person
found in one country is surrendered to another country for trial or
punishment. This process is regulated by treaty between the U.S.
government and the government of a foreign country and has been used
by DEA in countries such as Colombia and Mexico to extradite high-
level drug figures that DEA has determined would be more reliably
prosecuted and incarcerated through the U.S. judicial system. U.S.
Department of Justice attorneys assisted Afghan counterparts in
drafting an extradition law, which, according to Department of Justice
officials, is still pending final decision with the Afghan parliament.
According to Department of Justice officials, when the Afghan
parliament ended session in June 2009, the extradition law remained in
draft form and contained three concerns:(1) a requirement for third
party consent for the extradition of third party nationals–e.g.,
Pakistan would have to consent to the extradition of one of its
citizens from Afghanistan to the United States; (2) the law would not
apply to women; and (3) the law sets up reciprocity in extradition.
End of side bar]
As noted earlier, the goal of the justice reform program area is to
support the Afghan government's efforts to establish counternarcotics-
specific criminal justice institutions and increase the Afghan
government's capacity to arrest, prosecute, and punish traffickers.
According to DEA officials, the absence of a bilateral U.S.-Afghan
extradition agreement that includes narcotics offenses removes a
valuable channel for prosecuting higher profile drug traffickers.
Without a formal extradition option, DEA generally must rely on the
Afghan justice system to prosecute and incarcerate drug violators,
which U.S. officials characterized as "embryonic" and often subject to
political will.[Footnote 33]
State provides funding for Department of Justice-led mentoring
programs with the Afghan investigators and prosecutors on the Criminal
Justice Task Force and Afghan judges on the Central Narcotics
Tribunal, as well as Department of Justice-led advising activities
regarding the development of Afghan laws and procedures.[Footnote 34]
The 32 Afghan prosecutors and 35 investigators on the Task Force and
14 Afghan judges on the Tribunal are working out of the completed
Counternarcotics Justice Center, which opened in May 2009 after a
multiyear delay.[Footnote 35]
While the Task Force and Tribunal are now operating within the Justice
Center, and laws are being developed as previously noted, the extent
of progress in U.S. agency programs cannot be fully assessed due to a
lack of interim performance targets. For example, the fiscal year 2009
work plan does not outline interim performance targets that provide
specific levels of results to be achieved within an explicit time
frame.
In addition, a lack of defined criteria makes it difficult for State
and Department of Justice officials to ensure that the Task Force,
Tribunal, and Justice Center are achieving their intended purposes.
The Task Force and Tribunal are responsible for narcotics and
narcotics-related corruption cases against mid-and high-level drug
traffickers, and the Justice Center was constructed to assist the
Afghan government in prosecuting and detaining significant or mid-to
high-level narcotics offenders. Since 2005, the Task Force and the
Tribunal have tried and convicted approximately 1,550 drug
traffickers. However, both State and Department of Justice officials
acknowledged that the definitions of a low-, mid-, or high-level
trafficker are not based on any clear criteria. Instead, according to
a State official, subjective judgments are made based on the amount of
drugs seized, the extent of a trafficker's political connections, or
whether the trafficker is a government official. Additionally,
according to the Department of Justice, more appropriate measures than
the current low-, mid-, and high-level traffickers may exist.
Provincial-Level Capacity and Corruption Hinder Successful Prosecution
of Counternarcotics Cases:
According to U.S. and Afghan officials, deficiencies in CNPA training
result in inconsistent crime scene investigation, poor evidence
gathering, and weakened cases brought before the Task Force. For
example, a senior Afghan Ministry of Interior official stated that
provincial CNPA personnel often do not correctly follow arrest,
reporting, and transfer procedures for suspects referred to the
Justice Center. Department of Justice officials also noted that the
widespread illiteracy among the CNPA contributes to the poor quality
of case documentation. In addition, U.S. and Afghan officials observed
that CNPA personnel are generally not arresting high-level traffickers.
State has reported that narcotics-related corruption is particularly
pervasive at the provincial and district levels of government, where
officials have been known to facilitate drug activities and benefit
from revenue streams produced by the drug trade. For example, an
Afghan Ministry of Justice official noted that police and prosecutors
are easy targets for bribery because they are reportedly not paid
sufficiently. A recent Defense-led interagency evaluation also found
that CNPA personnel are more susceptible to corruption than regular
Afghan National Police officers due to the lucrative nature of the
narcotics trade. For example, Department of Justice and Afghan
officials noted that, in about one-third of cases from provinces,
provincial CNPA personnel have submitted drugs as evidence to the
Justice Center but did not arrest the criminal suspect or suspects.
Counternarcotics Justice Center Encounters Operational and Security
Challenges:
Operational and security challenges continue to hinder the
effectiveness of the Justice Center, including the following:
* Sustainment of operations and maintenance costs. The Justice Center
is challenged by high operations and maintenance costs of $3 million
per year, which State will fund through May 31, 2011. While State
officials are currently working to develop a transition plan, no
documented transition plan yet exists that addresses how the Justice
Center will be handed over to the Afghan government in 2011. According
to State and Department of Justice officials, the Afghan government
will not be able to pay for these costs after the United States
withdraws its support in May 2011. We have previously noted that
Afghanistan continues to lack the ability to cover its government
expenditure plans without foreign assistance.[Footnote 36]
* Retaining Afghan protective personnel. The Justice Center suffers
from low retention of trained and vetted marshals who provide judicial
security for the Tribunal. According to Department of Justice and
State officials, conditions continue to be extremely unsafe for Afghan
judges; the chief appellate judge was assassinated in September 2008.
We have previously reported that trained Afghan staff often leave
government or other public agencies to work with donors and
contractors who can offer better-paying jobs, and U.S. Marshals
Service officials noted that trained personnel are often recruited to
Afghan agencies that pay more, resulting in a shortage in vetted staff
that can provide protection for prisoners, prosecutors, and judges.
Public Information: Activities Difficult to Measure and Challenged by
Lack of Security and Political Will:
As previously noted, the goals of the U.S. public information program
are to discourage poppy cultivation and build the capacity of the
Afghan government to conduct public information activities on its own.
However, according to State officials, measuring the effectiveness of
public information campaigns is inherently difficult, as it is
impossible to know exactly how much opium poppy was not planted due to
public information efforts. State collects information on the number
and type of public information activities conducted by
Counternarcotics Advisory Teams in the provinces and materials
produced by public information contractors. In 2008, advisory teams
worked with local leaders and provincial authorities to conduct a
total of 413 public information events,[Footnote 37] reaching an
estimated 79,723 people. From January to June 2009, State's contractor
produced more than 80,000 print materials containing counternarcotics
messages, from billboards and posters to children's booklets. These
were augmented by radio and television programs, news stories, and
other products that were broadcast nationwide thousands of times.
Examples of counternarcotics public information materials are shown in
figure 9.
Figure 9: Counternarcotics Public Information Materials for Schools:
[Refer to PDF for image: photographic display of materials]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Despite obtaining information on the number and type of public
information activities, we were unable to assess the full extent of
progress since State did not establish performance targets for its
public information activities. A 2009 Inspector General assessment of
State's counternarcotics program in Afghanistan found a lack of
meaningful performance measures to evaluate public information program
effectiveness. While acknowledging this lack of performance targets,
State officials told us that they make qualitative judgments of the
program based on the number and type of public information events
conducted. They also stated that public information's success is tied
to the success of other counternarcotics program areas. For example,
if governors and the central government cannot present a credible
threat of eradication, previous messages, which warned farmers to
switch to wheat or risk destruction of their opium poppy crops, lose
credibility. Such messaging also loses effectiveness if alternative
crops are not available.
State has established a goal of ensuring that the Afghan government is
able to conduct its own effective public information campaign.
Although public information campaigns are publicized as originating
from the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, a State official stated
that advisory teams and State's contractor actually carry out most
operational activities of the public information campaign. Attempts to
extend advisory teams' regional reach have been limited by both poor
security and the absence of qualified Ministry of Counter Narcotics
officials in the provinces.
We were unable to assess Afghan capacity to conduct its own public
information campaigns due to a lack of capability measures or interim
performance targets. While advisory teams record the number of working
group meetings and training sessions they conduct to build Afghan
capacity, they do not keep records of who attends that would allow
follow-up on the results of this training. Additionally, although
State has established a benchmark for turning advisory teams over to
the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, this benchmark is tied only
to poppy cultivation levels and does not take Afghan capacity to
conduct public information into account.[Footnote 38] It is not clear
how advisory teams intend to phase out as poppy cultivation levels
decrease, or how the Ministry of Counter Narcotics will be able to
sustain public information efforts without advisory team assistance.
Poor security, lack of political will, and significant variances
between provinces challenge efforts to develop and spread appropriate
counternarcotics messages across Afghanistan. Security concerns
largely dictate how often and how far advisory teams can travel
outside their base of operations. For example, in the relatively
secure northern regions, advisory teams are able to travel regularly
to neighboring provinces to conduct public information events and
other outreach. In less secure southern areas, like Kandahar, advisory
teams' movements have been limited, while some other teams have been
compelled to retreat to military bases for protection. The advisory
team in the western Farah province reported its main problem is the
lack of security, which restricts it to daylight operations in the
provincial capital. Any team travel outside the city must be under
heavy armed protection and with advance permission from program
officers in Kabul.
Alongside security, political will has been consistently reported as a
factor challenging the implementation of public information. In
general, State officials maintain that the stronger and more active a
provincial governor is in combating narcotics, the more active the
local advisory team will be. Currently, the advisory teams in Helmand
and Nangarhar are the most active since they receive substantial
backing from their respective governors. State officials further noted
that some governors are indifferent and at times hostile to public
information efforts, making it difficult for advisory teams to
coordinate official events, access audiences, and get buy-in from
other government officials.
According to a State official, public information constitutes its own
program area due to the difficulty of conducting such activities in
Afghanistan. This official describes Afghan culture as very
interpersonal, requiring sustained contact in order for messaging to
be fully effective. Public information has largely become a substitute
for not being physically and continuously present in many areas. To
account for the lack of physical presence, and for some of the
variances in language, security, and levels of involvement in the
narcotics industry, the public information program is tailoring
messages to specific provinces. Advisory teams work with provincial
leaders to create public information messages that will resonate most
in their particular provinces. Messages are translated into
appropriate local languages and are tailored to be geographically and
seasonally appropriate as well. Tailoring counternarcotics messages
has been cited as more effective than blanket messaging throughout the
country, but it is also more costly and time-consuming.
Drug Demand Reduction: United States Increasing Efforts to Address
Drug Addiction:
The United States has funded drug demand reduction efforts since 2006
and, in 2009, State increased its funding from $2 million to $11
million to support 26 drug treatment clinics, further develop
protocols for the treatment of addicts, and train Afghan prevention
providers and counselors. The UNODC and the United Kingdom no longer
fund drug demand reduction programs, and State and Afghan officials
reported that other coalition partners are not supporting such efforts
with funding or personnel.
UNODC recently approached State in an effort to fund community-based
mobile treatment teams that address both drug demand and HIV
prevention, similar to the type of programming that UNODC discontinued
2 years ago. State is exploring the possibility of supporting UNODC's
village-based treatment model for Afghanistan as one of several
modalities of treatment in an effort to support comprehensive
rehabilitation services.
State has indicated that the demand for treatment services is
increasing. A 2005 UNODC survey documented approximately 1 million
drug users in Afghanistan, and the 2010 UNODC National Drug Use Survey
is expected to report 2 million drug users. According to the Afghan
government, drug demand reduction activities encounter several
challenges that impede progress, including the following:
* A dearth of treatment subcenters in the districts and facilities for
district outreach programs.
* A shortage of health professional staff in the treatment centers
with the capacity to practice addictive and behavioral psychotherapy.
* A lack of vocational training courses in the treatment centers and
work opportunities for addicts after the rehabilitation process.
According to State officials, 12 to 41 percent of Afghan police
recruits at Regional Training Centers test positive for drugs,
depending on the province. A State official noted that this percentage
likely understates the number of opium users because opiates leave the
system quickly; many recruits who tested negative for drugs have shown
opium withdrawal symptoms later in their training. A State official
also reported that the drug demand reduction program is considering
the establishment of dedicated rehabilitation clinics at the regional
police training centers; however, because the police recruits leave
once they finish their training, these clinics will not be able to
provide the same long-term inpatient services that exist at the 26
clinics. While State recognizes that police addiction problems are an
issue, a State official said that due to limited State financial
resources, its U.S. drug demand reduction programs do not specifically
target police forces.
Although no U.S. drug demand reduction programs specifically for
Afghan police existed at the time of our field work, after sending a
draft of our report to the agencies for comment in February 2010,
State and Defense informed us of recent efforts by the Afghan
Ministries of Interior and Public Health to establish a drug
rehabilitation center in Kabul for priority use by Afghan National
Police. Additionally, according to CSTC-A, the Ministries of Interior
and Public Health signed a memorandum of agreement in December 2009
that authorizes Afghan National Police access to Ministry of Public
Health drug rehabilitation facilities nationwide.
Monitoring and Evaluation of Most U.S. Counternarcotics Programs Under
Way:
As a component of effective program management, monitoring is
essential to ensuring that U.S. counternarcotics programs are
implemented as intended. In addition, evaluation uses routine data
collection and analysis to provide evidence that can be used to
compare alternative programs, guide program development and decision
making, and reveal effective practices.[Footnote 39] As shown in table
4, U.S. agencies monitored counternarcotics program progress through
direct U.S. agency involvement, contractor reporting, and/or third-
party verification. Program evaluations were completed or under way in
four of the five program areas (elimination/eradication, interdiction,
public information, and drug demand reduction), but not for the
justice reform program.
Table 4: Monitoring and Evaluation Activities by Program Area:
Program area: Elimination/eradication;
Monitoring: State program officers deployed with central eradication
force and performed site visits of Good Performers Initiative projects;
U.S. contractor deployed with central eradication force and routinely
reported on activities to State. UNODC verified number of hectares
eradicated by central and governor-led eradication programs;
Evaluation: State completed Good Performers Initiative program
evaluation in March 2009. No documented evaluations for central and
governor-led eradication programs.
Program area: Interdiction;
Monitoring: Defense conducted oversight of building construction and
monitored development of CNPA and its specialized units through
training program and logistical support. DEA agents monitored CNPA
specialized units through direct mentoring and joint operations;
Evaluation: U.S. government completed interagency evaluation of CNPA
capacity and overall training program in July 2009.
Program area: Justice reform;
Monitoring: Department of Justice attorneys monitored justice sector
activities through direct mentoring of Afghan prosecutors, judges, and
investigators on the Criminal Justice Task Force and also reported
routinely to State;
Evaluation: None documented.
Program area: Public information;
Monitoring: State program officers conducted site visits of
Counternarcotics Advisory Team activities. U.S. contractor worked
directly with Afghans on advisory teams to conduct public information
activities and reported routinely to State;
Evaluation: Contractor conducted and documented results of provincial
focus groups to assess effectiveness of public information messages.
UNODC evaluated various counternarcotics media campaigns in October
2008.
Program area: Drug demand reduction;
Monitoring: State program officers conducted site visits of Afghan
drug treatment clinics. U.S. contractor visited clinics to monitor the
implementation and administration of drug treatment centers and
prevention programs. Contractor also routinely reported on activities
to State;
Evaluation: State conducting an evaluation of drug demand reduction
projects to assess progress and impact.
Sources: GAO analysis of State, Defense, Department of Justice, DEA,
and UNODC program documents.
[End of table]
Defense and DEA directly monitored interdiction program activities
through their training, mentoring, and logistical support efforts for
the CNPA specialized units. For example, Defense monitored the Air
Interdiction Unit's performance by tracking operational readiness
rates and the number of interdiction operations conducted against
missions requested. In addition to State's efforts to directly monitor
its counternarcotics activities through site visits, State also used
contractors to directly monitor counternarcotics activities within the
elimination/eradication, public information, and drug demand reduction
programs. For example, a State official noted that the agency's
relationship with its contractor allows the United States to
effectively monitor and oversee public information campaigns and drug
rehabilitation programs in remote areas. In the justice reform area,
Department of Justice attorneys routinely reported on their mentoring
of Afghan judges and prosecutors to State. Additionally, State program
officers at Embassy Kabul routinely documented State's
counternarcotics activities and those of its contractors. For example,
a June 2009 embassy report detailed a visit by State program officers
to a public event jointly organized by the central eradication force
and a Counternarcotics Advisory Team.
U.S. agencies documented evaluations to improve program effectiveness
in the elimination/eradication, interdiction, and public information:
program areas but not for the justice reform program.[Footnote 40]
Within the elimination/eradication program area, State conducted a
March 2009 evaluation of the Good Performers Initiative that included
short-, medium-, and long-term recommendations to improve program
performance. Additionally, State officials told us that central and
governor-led eradication program performance is evaluated through the
annual UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey. However, while UNODC verifies
and reports the number of hectares eradicated, its surveys do not
evaluate or make recommendations to improve U.S. program performance.
State officials stated that eradication program performance was
continually reviewed and assessed but were unable to provide any
documented evaluations of eradication programs.
Within the interdiction program area, State, Defense, DEA, Department
of Justice, and others completed an interagency evaluation of the CNPA
in July 2009 that contained judgments and recommendations regarding
overall capability and the training and equipping effort. According to
U.S. officials, this evaluation and its recommendations will inform
efforts to refocus the training program onto the broader CNPA beyond
its specialized units. For public information, State officials
reported that evaluating progress in this program area is a persistent
challenge. They stated that normally some idea of public information
effectiveness can be gathered from nationwide polling, but poor
security prevents extensive outreach and the implementation of
accurate polling methodology. In the absence of a nationwide polling
capability, State is relying on provincial focus groups conducted by
its contractor to assess the effectiveness of counternarcotics
messaging. An October 2008 UNODC evaluation also attempted to measure
the effects of public information messaging through provincial focus
groups.
Within the drug demand reduction program area, State is currently
evaluating the long-term impact of the State-funded drug treatment
assistance programs. This 2009-2011 evaluation is designed to measure
long-term impact relating to behavior (e.g., reduction in drug use/
relapse rates, reduction in criminal activity and recidivism rates,
reduction in intravenous drug use, increase in employment, and mental
health). This evaluation will also provide critical information on
treatment success with opium and heroin-addicted women and their
children. According to State, the results of this evaluation will be
used to further improve substance abuse treatment services throughout
Afghanistan.
Within the justice reform program area, neither State nor Department
of Justice was able to provide us with a documented program
evaluation. While a State official noted that program officers
conducted informal evaluations of program activities, they did not
document any of these evaluations. Therefore, we are unable to
validate their completion or determine whether these informal
evaluations informed decisions about current and future justice reform
programming.
Conclusions:
Despite ongoing challenges, including falling short of poppy
eradication goals, the United States has reported some reductions in
poppy cultivation, increases in interdiction operations, the
destruction of drug labs, and the conviction of drug traffickers in
Afghanistan. While these are reasonable output measures, absent
specific performance targets against which to assess them, they do not
sufficiently indicate the success of U.S. efforts to reduce the threat
of illicit drugs to the stability, reconstruction, and governance of
Afghanistan. As we have previously reported, clearly defined
performance targets would enable decision makers to more readily
understand the extent of progress made, as well as which program
elements are effective and which could be improved. In addition, the
development of capable Afghan security forces is essential to the U.S.
counternarcotics effort, as well as the larger counterinsurgency
campaign in Afghanistan. While capability performance goals have been
established, the U.S. government lacks interim performance targets for
the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan. Such performance targets
would better enable program managers to assess whether the U.S. effort
is on track or determine if adjustments need to be made. This is
particularly important given the U.S. ultimate goal is to build Afghan
capacity to independently carry out counternarcotics efforts.
Additionally, best management practices have demonstrated that
documentation of routine evaluations enables program managers to
identify program vulnerabilities and implement lessons learned, which
we found were lacking in some of the U.S. led counternarcotics
programs. These routine evaluations can help program managers
understand program weaknesses and make needed improvements.
As the United States moves forward with implementing its strategy and
measuring success in Afghanistan, we believe the U.S. government has
an opportunity to improve its performance measurement and evaluation
efforts.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the U.S. government's ability to assess progress toward
counternarcotics goals, we are making the following four
recommendations:
* The Secretary of Defense develop performance targets to measure
interim results of efforts to train the CNPA.
* The Secretary of State develop performance measures and interim
targets to assess Afghan capacity to independently conduct public
information activities.
* The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of
DEA and the Attorney General, establish clear definitions for low-,
mid-, and high-level traffickers that would improve the ability of the
U.S. and Afghan governments to track the level of drug traffickers
arrested and convicted.
* The Secretary of State perform an evaluation of the justice reform
program.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Departments of State and Defense provided written comments on a
draft of this report, which are reproduced in appendixes II and III,
respectively. The Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and the
Office of National Drug Control Policy also provided technical
comments and updates that we have incorporated throughout the report
as appropriate.
Defense concurred with our recommendation to develop performance
targets to measure interim results of efforts to train the CNPA and
noted that it is in the process of establishing initial and interim
program performance metrics in accordance with the U.S.
Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan.
State concurred with our recommendation to develop performance
measures and interim targets to assess Afghan capacity to
independently conduct public information activities, and noted that it
is in the process of developing an assessment tool for its
counternarcotics public information campaign.
State deferred to DEA and the Department of Justice concerning our
recommendation that it establish clear definitions for low-, mid-, and
high-level traffickers in consultation with DEA and Justice to enhance
the ability of the U.S. and Afghan governments to track the level of
drug traffickers arrested and convicted. While we acknowledge DEA and
the Department of Justice's expertise in this area, we believe
nonetheless because of State's role in funding and managing the
justice reform program in Afghanistan, State holds the primary
responsibility for ensuring that measures to gauge progress exist.
Therefore, State should remain engaged in the development of more
precise definitions for these measures. If State or the Department of
Justice develops or identifies measures that are determined to be more
appropriate for measuring justice reform progress, then we believe
that these would fulfill the spirit of our recommendation.
State concurred with our recommendation to perform an evaluation of
the justice reform program, and noted that it is an ideal time to
evaluate this program's progress using an outside partner.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice; and the
Office of National Drug Control Policy. The report also is available
at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Charles Michael Johnson Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
List of Congressional Addressees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Flake:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Russ Feingold:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Michael Honda:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To review U.S. counternarcotics activities in Afghanistan, we obtained
information from pertinent planning, funding, and reporting documents
for U.S. counternarcotics programs and interviewed relevant officials
from the Departments of State (State), Defense (Defense), and Justice,
including Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Washington, D.C.,
and Afghanistan. The Federal Bureau of Investigation indicated that it
had no involvement in U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and
is, therefore, not a part of our review. Additionally, this review
focused specifically on the elimination/eradication, interdiction,
justice reform, public information, and drug demand reduction program
areas, leaving alternative development to be addressed by a later
product on broader agricultural assistance to Afghanistan. State and
Defense were unable to provide us with programmatic breakouts of
counternarcotics funding linked to expenditures within our audit time
frames.
To examine how the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan has
changed, we reviewed available U.S. and Afghan strategy and planning
documents, including the August 2007 U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy
for Afghanistan and the July 2009 Counternarcotics Action Plan for
Afghanistan. Although the latest U.S. counternarcotics strategy was
not finalized at the time of our review, we discussed the upcoming
strategic shifts and their programmatic implications with relevant
U.S. officials, including the Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan and officials at the Office of National Drug Control
Policy. Additionally, to understand the resource impact of this
strategic shift, we examined Congressional Notifications from State's
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and U.S.
agencies' fiscal year 2010 funding requests.
To assess counternarcotics progress, we reviewed relevant planning and
reporting documentation to identify program goals, performance
measures, and interim performance targets. We based our analysis of
performance targets on best management practices identified in
previous GAO work, which states that interim performance targets can
be used to provide information on interim results when it may take
years before an agency sees the results of its programs. Such
information can also provide congressional and other decision makers
with an indication of the incremental progress the agency expects to
make in achieving results.[Footnote 41] We also examined Letters of
Agreement between the U.S. and Afghan governments, contractor reports,
agency performance plans and reports, and programmatic documentation.
In addition, we spoke with State, Defense, Department of Justice, DEA,
and contractor officials implementing U.S. projects in Afghanistan, as
well as with officials from the United Kingdom and the Afghan
Ministries of Counter Narcotics, Interior, and Justice to discuss
progress made and ongoing challenges to counternarcotics activities.
This included site visits to the State Air Wing Headquarters, the
National Interdiction Unit/Sensitive Investigative Unit complex, the
Air Interdiction Unit headquarters, the Counternarcotics Training
Academy, and the Counternarcotics Justice Center in Kabul, as well as
the border crossing at Islam Qalah in Herat province. We also reviewed
relevant studies and assessments by the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) and relevant think tanks.
To assess the reliability of UNODC data, we reviewed the statistical
estimation and survey data methods detailed in UNODC's annual
Afghanistan Opium Surveys. Additionally, we did not independently
assess the reliability of the Afghanistan interdiction data provided
by DEA, but we considered these data generally acceptable to provide
an overall indication of the magnitude and nature of interdiction
operations from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2009. We also reviewed
key reports by agency inspector generals and the Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.
To assess U.S. monitoring and evaluation of counternarcotics programs,
we first utilized, as a framework, the Government Performance and
Results Act, which outlines good management practices such as
establishing strategic, long-term goals and planning and reporting
progress toward these goals on an annual basis. We also referenced
good management practices outlined within previous GAO reports and
considered monitoring and evaluation principles established by the
American Evaluation Association.[Footnote 42] We then examined
contractor reports, agency documentation, and available evaluations
conducted by U.S agencies and third parties such as UNODC.
Additionally, we discussed these monitoring and evaluation activities
with officials from State, Defense, Department of Justice, DEA, and
the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
The information on foreign law in this report is not the product of
GAO's original analysis, but it is derived from interviews and
secondary sources.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2009 to March 2010,
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, DC 20520:
March 2, 2010:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
"Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported,
but Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform
Efforts Needed," GAO Job Code 320657.
The enclosed Department of State comments arc provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Sabrina Bahir, Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at (202) 776-8523.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc:
GAO ” Ilvnek Kalkus:
INL ” David Johnson:
State/OIG ” Tracy Burnett:
[End of letter]
Department Of State Comments To GAO Draft Report:
Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but
Interim Performance Targets And Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts
Needed (GAO-10-291, GAO Code 320657):
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled
"Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported,
but Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform
Efforts Needed."
The State Department welcomes the draft GAO report and considers it
thorough and its recommendations generally sound. State agrees with
the statement that monitoring and evaluation are key components of
effective program management, and shares the view that interim
performance targets and benchmarks can assist decision-makers in
understanding the extent of progress made in fulfilling objectives.
State is leading an inter-agency effort to produce implementation
plans (1Ps) keyed to objectives in the 2009-11 Counternarcotics
Strategy that will help to track progress on meeting those objectives.
The IPs include descriptions of desired end-states, measures of
effectiveness, and ” as appropriate ” benchmarks against the 2009-11
calendar.
Recommendation:
The Secretary of State develop performance measures and interim
targets to assess Afghan capacity to independently conduct public
information activities.
State welcomes this recommendation and is in the process of developing
an assessment tool for the Counternarcotics Public Information (CNPI)
campaign, which is administered by the Colombo Plan, an international
organization, in partnership with the Afghan Ministry of Counter
Narcotics (MCN). The Colombo Plan monitors the CNPI campaign in 26
provinces where a regional MCN office is present and engaged, and
provides administrative support and skills training for MCN officials.
Recommendation:
The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of DEA
and the Attorney General, establish clear definitions for low-, mid-,
and high-level traffickers that would improve the ability of the U.S.
and Afghan governments to track the level of drug traffickers arrested
and convicted.
The Department of State defers to the Department of Justice, including
DEA, to establish clear definitions of low-, mid-, and high-level
traffickers.
Recommendation:
The Secretary of State perform an evaluation of the justice reform
program.
State concurs with this recommendation. INL has conducted periodic
reviews of the bureau's programs in Afghanistan, as well as receiving
periodic updates from our implementers in Afghanistan on their
progress towards goals set out in our various statements of work and
inter-agency agreements. This includes a 2008 INL study. However, we
concur that now that all of our programs are mature; it is an ideal
time to evaluate their progress using an outside partner.
INL will shortly seek an organization or institution with significant
prior experience in research, evaluation, and statistical analysis to
evaluate the effectiveness of the Embassy's justice sector programs
and provide recommendations for further changes and modifications to
our office.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at
the end of this appendix.
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict & Interdisciplinary
Capabilities:
2500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2500:
March 3, 2010:
Mr. Charles Johnson Jr.
Director, Director International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Johnson:
The following are Department of Defense (DoD) comments on the GAO
draft report (GAO-10-291), "Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy
Evolving and Progress Reported, but Interim Performance Targets and
Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts Needed," dated January 29, 2010
(GAO Code 320657). DoD comments refer to two recommendations in the
draft report.
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense
develop performance targets to measure interim results of efforts to
train the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). (See page
54/GAO Draft Report.)
DoD Response: DoD concurs with the recommendation that the Department
should develop performance targets to measure interim results of
efforts to train the CNPA. In accordance with the U.S.
Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan and its associated
Implementation Plans, the Department is establishing initial and
interim program performance metrics to enable managers to assess CNPA
training efforts.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, develop a drug
rehabilitation program or other approach to specifically target the
drug addiction problem within the Afghan National Police. (See page
55/GAO Draft Report.) [See comment 1]
DoD Response: DoD concurs because the DoD role is limited to
consultation. Since 2005, DoD has been the lead agency on manning,
training, and equipping the Afghan National Police. In regards to the
ANP, DoD currently works with the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) to
provide mandatory drug awareness courses for all basic recruits,
conduct drug testing, identify drug users, and recommend identified
drug users for treatment. DoD will also continue to work with MOI to
help it enforce its counter-drug policy. DoD's scope of mission does
not include branching into drug rehabilitation programs, nor do we
believe that we have the expertise in DoD to take on such an
additional mission. We believe that if this mission is addressed, it
should be addressed by the Executive Branch departments with the
necessary expertise in drug rehabilitation.
My point of contact is CDR Jennifer Whereatt, (703) 692-4182, or email
jeffifer.whereatt@osd.mil.
Signed by:
Michael Vickers:
The following is GAO's comment on the Department of Defense's comment
letter dated March 3, 2010.
GAO Comments:
1. The draft report we provided the agencies for comment included a
recommendation that State, in consultation with Defense, develop a
drug rehabilitation program or other approach to specifically target
the drug addiction problem within the Afghan National Police. During
the agency comment period, State and Defense informed us of recent
efforts by the Afghan Ministries of Interior and Public Health to
establish a drug rehabilitation center in Kabul for priority use by
Afghan National Police. Additionally, according to CSTC-A, the
Ministries of Interior and Public Health signed a memorandum of
agreement in December 2009 that authorizes Afghan National Police
access to Ministry of Public Health drug rehabilitation facilities
nationwide. We, therefore, dropped this recommendation from our final
report, as these actions fulfilled the spirit of our recommendation.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Charles Michael Johnson Jr., (202) 512-7331, or johnsoncm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Hynek Kalkus, Assistant
Director; David W. Hancock; Steven J. Banovac; Christina Bruff;
Virginia Chanley; Carl Barden; Joseph Carney; and Mark Dowling made
key contributions to this report. Technical assistance was provided by
Jena Sinkfield, Joyce Evans, and Cynthia Taylor.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] We will address alternative development, another significant U.S.
counternarcotics effort, in a subsequent report due out in spring
2010. As part of the recent strategy shift, alternative development
programs are now classified broadly as agriculture programs.
[2] GAO previously reported on DEA's overseas activities in 2009, see
GAO, Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland
Security and an Updated Accountability Framework Can Further Enhance
DEA's Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-63] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 20,
2009).
[3] State funds the operation and maintenance of many of these
infrastructure projects, as well as some training and vetting of the
CNPA specialized units.
[4] State plans to continue funding the Counternarcotics Justice
Center's operation and maintenance costs, estimated at $3 million per
year, until 2011.
[5] Defense was involved in public information activities prior to
State taking the lead in 2006.
[6] Advisory teams are located in Badakhshan, Balkh, Farah, Helmand,
Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Oruzgan provinces.
[7] Since 2001, the United States has worked with international
partners under a United Nations mandate to assist Afghanistan in
creating a safe and secure environment, in part through the ISAF. U.S.
forces in Afghanistan are deployed either as part of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization-led ISAF or Operation Enduring Freedom,
which includes the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
(CSTC-A), in efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan.
[8] Opium poppy generally yields greater profits per hectare than
licit crops such as wheat.
[9] Other high-level indicators tracked by the United States included
provinces reducing cultivation and poppy-free provinces. The United
States also collected program-level performance indicators and targets.
[10] In 2006, 6 provinces were poppy-free. In 2009, 20 provinces were
poppy-free.
[11] The United States uses UNODC data to inform programmatic
decisions, such as determining Good Performers Initiative rewards.
However, the U.S. government also independently estimates total opium
poppy cultivation to inform policy decisions. U.S. government-
estimated totals in hectares are as follows: 107,400 (2005); 172,600
(2006); 202,000 (2007); 157,000 (2008); 131,000 (2009).
[12] GAO, Drug Control: Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating
Illicit Crops in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious
Obstacles, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-291]
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2002).
[13] The central eradication force was known as the Central Poppy
Eradication Force between 2004 and 2005, the Afghan Eradication Force
between 2005 and 2007, and the Poppy Eradication Force between 2007
and 2009.
[14] The United Kingdom also contributes to governor-led eradication
reimbursements.
[15] GAO, Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but
Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for
Reducing Assistance, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-71] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 6,
2008).
[16] Prior to 2008, the central eradicators were dependent on
governors to approve eradication plans and lead them to poppy fields.
[17] Farmers reported the following additional reasons why they
stopped growing poppy in 2009. The most significant reasons cited
included the Afghan government's ban on opium cultivation (33
percent), low sale price of opium (18 percent), and opium cultivation
being against Islam (16 percent). No other reason amounted to greater
than 6 percent of respondents.
[18] The Good Performers Initiative began with the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and other donors channeling funding
for the program through a trust fund administered by the United
Nations Development Programme.
[19] Nangarhar received the maximum $10 million reward in 2008, and
Helmand is projected to receive the maximum reward as a result of its
2009 cultivation reduction.
[20] USAID allocated $10 million to the Good Performers Initiative
prior to State taking over funding of the program in 2008.
[21] Oruzgan province did not receive Good Performers Initiative
funding between 2006 and 2008. It also does not qualify for 2009
funding. Although UNODC reports that poppy cultivation in Oruzgan
dropped 7 percent in 2009, this is below the 10 percent reduction
threshold required by Good Performers Initiative criteria.
[22] As of December 2009, DEA had filled 65 of these 81 positions.
[23] Sensitive Investigative Units are groups of host-nation
investigators that DEA polygraphs, trains, equips, and mentors to
conduct bilateral drug investigations and collect counternarcotics
intelligence.
[24] The Afghan Special Narcotics Force is a British-supported CNPA
paramilitary unit tasked with carrying out raids against high-value
targets and drug infrastructure, e.g., bazaars, and laboratories, with
a view to injecting risk into the illicit drugs trade.
[25] From November 1, 2008, through August 18, 2009, the Air Wing's 10
Huey II helicopters spent about 20 percent of their flight-time
providing overwatch, close air support, and casualty evacuation
support to DEA-led interdiction operations.
[26] At the time of our review, plans called for the Combined Joint
Interagency Task Force-Nexus to include, in addition to military
personnel, representatives from DEA, State, and other government
agencies, including analysts attached to the Interagency Operations
Coordination Center in Kabul.
[27] Defense's CSTC-A, in partnership with State, the government of
Afghanistan, and international partners, trains and equips the Afghan
National Security Forces. CSTC-A works with the international
community to develop a capable Afghan National Army and Afghan
National Police intended to enhance the security and stabilization of
Afghanistan.
[28] CSTC-A rated the overall CNPA at CM3 (partially capable).
[29] The Air Interdiction Unit consists of eight MI-17 helicopters in
Afghanistan and, until recently, was supported by another four MI-17s
used for training pilots, flight engineers, and crew chiefs in the
United States.
[30] Defense sent Afghan pilots, flight engineers, and crew chiefs to
the United States as part of the Air Interdiction Unit's training
program.
[31] With the inclusion of these helicopters, the Air Interdiction
Unit also assumes responsibility for supporting interdiction missions
of the British-trained Afghan Special Narcotics Force.
[32] DEA officials expected future air support needs of the expanded
DEA presence to grow to include medical evacuation services,
logistical lift, and convoy support, all of which they judged would
outstrip the air assets currently available to the Air Interdiction
Unit.
[33] The Afghan constitution permits extradition of individuals if
pursuant to a multilateral convention which allows for extradition,
and to which Afghanistan is a party. Afghanistan is a party to the
U.N. Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances which it has cited to justify a limited number
of extraditions the United States has requested. Nevertheless,
according to State and Department of Justice officials, this process
may not be efficient or reliable.
[34] The arrangement is formalized in an interagency agreement, where
Department of Justice provides State with a work plan that outlines
programmatic goals and objectives, performance measures, and
activities.
[35] Plans to expand the Justice Center have also been delayed because
of insufficient funding and inadequate utilities. Defense's U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers has indicated it would work closely with State to
ensure completion of the Justice Center's expansion.
[36] See GAO, Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-473SP] (Washington,
D.C.: April 2009).
[37] These events included councils with influential community
members, sporting events, and others held for women, youth, and
farmers.
[38] The benchmark states that advisory teams will be phased out as
poppy cultivation levels decrease and will be completely turned over
to the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics when levels reach 25
percent of 2007 levels, or 50,000 hectares.
[39] We utilized as a framework the Government Performance and Results
Act, which outlines good management practices such as establishing
strategic, long-term goals and planning and reporting progress toward
these goals on an annual basis. We also referenced good management
practices outlined in previous GAO reports and guidance and considered
monitoring and evaluation principles established by the American
Evaluation Association. See Appendix I: Scope and Methodology for more
information.
[40] An evaluation of the drug demand reduction program was under way
at the time of our review.
[41] GAO, Agency Performance Plans: Examples of Practices That Can
Improve Usefulness to Decisionmakers, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69] (Washington, D.C.:
February 1999).
[42] For a previous GAO discussion of monitoring and evaluation, see
GAO, International Food Assistance: USAID Is Taking Action to Improve
Monitoring and Evaluation of Nonemergency Food Aid, but Weaknesses in
Planning Could Impede Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-980] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28,
2009). See also An Evaluation Roadmap for a More Effective Government
(Washington, D.C.: February 2009) issued by the American Evaluation
Association's Task Force on Evaluation Policy.
[End of section]
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