Combating Terrorism
Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development Assistance in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Need to Be Improved Gao ID: GAO-10-289 April 15, 2010Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has been a recognized safe haven for al Qaeda leadership and a base for the Taliban to launch cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. The United States, in an effort to assist Pakistan in addressing this threat, pledged $750 million between 2007 and 2011 to support development activities in the FATA region. This report focuses on (1) the extent U.S. development objectives align with U.S. national security goals and Pakistan's objectives, (2) U.S. efforts to track the pledge, (3) U.S. efforts to measure program performance in the FATA, and (4) efforts to monitor assistance in the FATA. GAO reviewed U.S. and Pakistani documents and interviewed U.S. and Pakistani officials in Washington, D.C., and Pakistan. GAO has prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
U.S. national security goals call for development assistance to aid the Pakistani government in addressing terrorist threats emanating from the FATA. GAO found that U.S. development objectives in the FATA are generally aligned with U.S. national security goals and Pakistan's FATA development plans. In September 2007, USAID and Pakistan signed an agreement regarding development activities in the FATA including the creation of joint strategic implementation plans for the seven FATA geographic areas. We found, however, that the U.S. and Pakistan have not yet completed such plans. The U.S. government has implemented two efforts to track its $750 million pledge in accordance with good management practices. State is tallying allocations of U.S. programs in Pakistan's western frontier region (which includes the FATA), and the USAID controller in Islamabad has undertaken an effort to track most, but not all, U.S. development-related obligations and expenditures in the FATA. As of the end of fiscal year 2009, the U.S. government has reportedly allocated over $728 million toward the pledge. USAID and State collect reports on the performance of their FATA-specific programs. However, key elements, such as identification of evaluation efforts and a timeline for reviewing implementing partner reports required by USAID's regulations are missing in its performance management plan for the FATA. Also, State did not collect all the required project performance documentation. Long-term development programs for which performance could be measured against annual targets generally did not achieve targets. Although hampered by security challenges that prevent direct monitoring called for in its guidance, USAID has taken steps to apply a set of indirect monitoring procedures. This includes collecting information from implementing partners and locally employed staff, and the use of a geographic information system. While USAID officials told GAO they use these methods, GAO found that USAID did not always document the use of these monitoring procedures. GAO also found that State has several monitoring procedures, but had not fully documented their use of these procedures.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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Report to Congressional Addressees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2010:
Combating Terrorism:
Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development Assistance in
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Need to Be Improved:
GAO-10-289:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-289, a report to congressional addressees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has been a
recognized safe haven for al Qaeda leadership and a base for the
Taliban to launch cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. The United
States, in an effort to assist Pakistan in addressing this threat,
pledged $750 million between 2007 and 2011 to support development
activities in the FATA region.
This report focuses on (1) the extent U.S. development objectives
align with U.S. national security goals and Pakistan‘s objectives, (2)
U.S. efforts to track the pledge, (3) U.S. efforts to measure program
performance in the FATA, and (4) efforts to monitor assistance in the
FATA. GAO reviewed U.S. and Pakistani documents and interviewed U.S.
and Pakistani officials in Washington, D.C., and Pakistan. GAO has
prepared this report under the Comptroller General‘s authority to
conduct evaluations on his own initiative.
What GAO Found:
U.S. national security goals call for development assistance to aid
the Pakistani government in addressing terrorist threats emanating
from the FATA. GAO found that U.S. development objectives in the FATA
are generally aligned with U.S. national security goals and Pakistan‘s
FATA development plans. In September 2007, USAID and Pakistan signed
an agreement regarding development activities in the FATA including
the creation of joint strategic implementation plans for the seven
FATA geographic areas. We found, however, that the U.S. and Pakistan
have not yet completed such plans.
The U.S. government has implemented two efforts to track its $750
million pledge in accordance with good management practices. State is
tallying allocations of U.S. programs in Pakistan‘s western frontier
region (which includes the FATA), and the USAID controller in
Islamabad has undertaken an effort to track most, but not all, U.S.
development-related obligations and expenditures in the FATA. As of
the end of fiscal year 2009, the U.S. government has reportedly
allocated over $728 million toward the pledge.
USAID and State collect reports on the performance of their FATA-
specific programs. However, key elements, such as identification of
evaluation efforts and a timeline for reviewing implementing partner
reports required by USAID‘s regulations are missing in its performance
management plan for the FATA. Also, State did not collect all the
required project performance documentation. Long-term development
programs for which performance could be measured against annual
targets generally did not achieve targets.
[Figure: stacked horizontal bar graph; refer to PDF for image]
Lower FATA Livelihood Development Program:
Percentage of indicators that met 51%-99% of target: 33.3%; Percentage
of indicators that met 1%-50% of target: 66.7%.
Upper FATA Livelihood Development Program:
Percentage of indicators that met or exceeded target: 13.3%;
Percentage of indicators that met 51%-99% of target: 13.3%;
Percentage of indicators that met 1%-50% of target: 26.7%;
Percentage of indicators that met none of their targets: 46.7%.
Pakistan Maternal and Newborn Health Program:
Percentage of indicators that met or exceeded target: 21.7%;
Percentage of indicators that met 51%-99% of target: 34.8%;
Percentage of indicators that met 1%-50% of target: 4.3%;
Percentage of indicators that met none of their targets: 39.1%.
Improved Child Health in FATA:
Percentage of indicators that met or exceeded target: 38.2%;
Percentage of indicators that met 51%-99% of target: 32.4%;
Percentage of indicators that met 1%-50% of target: 26.5%;
Percentage of indicators that met none of their targets: 2.9%.
Pakistan HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project:
Percentage of indicators that met or exceeded target: 77.8%;
Percentage of indicators that met 51%-99% of target: 22%.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[End of figure]
Although hampered by security challenges that prevent direct
monitoring called for in its guidance, USAID has taken steps to apply
a set of indirect monitoring procedures. This includes collecting
information from implementing partners and locally employed staff, and
the use of a geographic information system. While USAID officials told
GAO they use these methods, GAO found that USAID did not always
document the use of these monitoring procedures. GAO also found that
State has several monitoring procedures, but had not fully documented
their use of these procedures.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the USAID Administrator (1) work with the
Government of Pakistan to develop joint strategic implementation
plans, (2) include all FATA-related programs in its tracking report,
and (3) address gaps in its performance management plan. GAO also
recommends that the Secretary of State improve the collection of
performance documentation and that both improve documentation of
monitoring of FATA-related programs and activities. USAID and State
concurred with all but one of these recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-289] or key
components. For more information, contact Charles Michael Johnson Jr.
at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
U.S. Development Efforts in the FATA Are Generally Aligned with U.S.
National Security and Pakistan's Development Goals, but Joint U.S.-
Pakistan Implementation Plans Are Lacking:
The United States Has Two Efforts Under Way to Track the Pledge:
U.S. Efforts to Measure and Report the Performance of Development
Programs in the FATA Are Lacking:
Procedures Developed to Monitor Assistance Programs in the FATA, but
Their Use Has Not Been Fully Documented:
Conclusion:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Descriptions of FATA Development Programs:
Appendix III: Detailed Performance Results for FATA-Specific USAID
Programs:
Appendix IV: Details of INL Documentation of Monitoring for a Sample
of 42 Activities:
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Development Assistance-Related Role of USAID and State in
Pakistan's FATA and Western Frontier Region:
Table 2: Extent USAID's Performance Management Plan Includes Required
Elements:
Table 3: United States Agency for International Development Long-Term
Programs:
Table 4: United States Agency for International Development's Office
of Transition Initiatives (Quick-Impact Activities):
Table 5: Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs:
Table 6: Lower FATA Development Program, Year 1 Results:
Table 7: Upper FATA Development Program, Year 1 Results:
Table 8: Links to Learning: Education Support to Pakistan: Year 2
Results:
Table 9: Pakistan Maternal and Newborn Health Program: Year 1 Results:
Table 10: Improved Child Health in FATA: Year 3 Results:
Table 11: Polio Eradication Initiative in FATA: Year 1 Results:
Table 12: Pakistan HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project: Year 1
Results:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of Pakistan's FATA:
Figure 2: U.S. Funds Allocated, Obligated, and Disbursed in Pakistan's
Western Frontier Region (Fiscal Years 2007-2009):
Figure 3: Alignment of U.S. National Security Goal with FATA
Development Program:
Figure 4: Alignment of U.S. FATA Development Program Objectives with
Pakistan's FATA Sustainable Development Plan Objectives:
Figure 5: Activities That the F Bureau Identified As Part of the
Pledge:
Figure 6: USAID Implementing Partners' Performance Planning and
Reporting for FATA Development Programs:
Figure 7: INL's Performance Planning and Reporting Documentation:
Figure 8: Percentages of Performance Indicators Meeting Targets: Five
Long-Term Programs:
Figure 9: Percentages of Performance Indicators Meeting Targets: A
Sample of USAID's OTI Quick-Impact Activities:
Figure 10: USAID Documentation of Monitoring for Long-Term Programs:
Figure 11: USAID Documentation of Monitoring for OTI Quick-Impact
Activities:
Figure 12: INL Documentation of FATA Project Monitoring:
Figure 13: INL Documentation of FATA Project Monitoring:
Abbreviations:
ADS: Automated Directives System:
F Bureau: Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance:
FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas:
INL: Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs:
OTI: Office of Transition Initiatives:
State: Department of State:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 15, 2010:
Pakistan is a key U.S. ally in the fight against terrorism and violent
extremism. Taliban, al Qaeda, and other terrorists have exploited
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas' (FATA) loosely
governed and impoverished environment to plan and launch attacks on
Afghan, U.S., and NATO security forces in Afghanistan, as well as on
Pakistani citizens and security forces in Pakistan. We previously
reported in 2008 and 2009 that the United States had not met its
national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close the
safe haven in Pakistan's FATA.[Footnote 1] We also reported that the
United States lacked a comprehensive plan to meet these goals that
included all elements of national power--diplomatic, military,
intelligence, economic, law enforcement support, and development
assistance.
Since that time, the United States has increased its focus on the use
of nonmilitary efforts in Pakistan. In addition to the U.S. pledge to
provide $750 million between 2007 and 2011 toward sustainable
development efforts in Pakistan, the U.S. passed the Enhanced
Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (Pub. L. 111-73) in October
2009, with the goal of providing $7.5 billion in new nonmilitary
assistance to Pakistan over the next 5 years (2010 to 2014). As the
United States considers how it will go forward with efforts to assist
Pakistan in securing, stabilizing, and developing the FATA and western
frontier region, it is vital that continued oversight and
accountability over funds used for these efforts are in place.
This report examines the status of efforts to fulfill the U.S. $750
million pledge for development assistance in the FATA. Specifically,
it examines (1) the extent to which U.S. development objectives align
with U.S. national security goals and Pakistan's objectives, (2) U.S.
efforts to track the fulfillment of the U.S. development assistance
pledge, (3) efforts to measure and report the performance of
development programs, and (4) efforts to monitor development
assistance in the FATA. GAO has been mandated under P.L. 111-73 to
complete a review of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report submitted
to the Congress by the Secretary of State, and to complete an
independent analysis of the President of the United States'
certification that 1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to
cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier
networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related
materials and 2) the Government of Pakistan, during the preceding
fiscal year, has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making
significant efforts toward combating terrorist groups. We plan to
report separately on these two issues over the next year. In the
interim, we believe this report provides useful insight on the U.S.
ability to plan for, implement, monitor, and evaluate additional
development assistance efforts.
To address our objectives, we reviewed strategic, planning, and
program-related documentation from the Department of State (State) and
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and discussed
these issues with relevant department officials in Washington, D.C. In
addition, we conducted field work in Pakistan, where we met with
officials from the U.S. embassy, Pakistan's FATA Secretariat,
implementing partners working in the FATA, and others. We determined
the amount of U.S. funding to FATA by analyzing State and USAID budget
documents covering the period from fiscal years 2007 through 2009 and
by verifying the amounts used for the FATA and the western frontier
region through discussions with agency officials. We analyzed the U.S.
efforts to measure and report results of development assistance
programs and monitor and verify activities by reviewing USAID and
implementing partner planning documents, assistance instruments, and
reports.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2009 through April
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our review objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our review objectives. A
detailed discussion of our scope and methodology appears in appendix I.
Background:
Located in northwestern Pakistan, the FATA is situated along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The mountainous, rugged terrain of the
FATA covers approximately 10,500 square miles, roughly the same size
as the state of Maryland. As figure 1 shows, the FATA is comprised of
seven political agencies--Bajaur, Khyber, Kurrum, Mohmand, Orakzai,
North Waziristan, and South Waziristan--along with six frontier
regions--Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Peshawar, and
Tank.
Figure 1: Map of Pakistan's FATA:
[Refer to PDF for image: map]
FATA includes:
Bajaur Agency;
Mohmand Agency;
Khyber Agency;
Orakzal Agency;
Kurrum Agency;
North Waziristan Agency;
South Waziristan Agency;
F.R. Peshawar;
F.R. Kohat;
F.R. Bannu;
F.R. Lakki Marwat;
F.R. Tank;
F.R. D.I. Khan.
The boundaries and names used on this map do not imply official
endorsement or acceptance by the U.S. Government.
Sources: GAO, USAID, and Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
The culture and socioeconomic status of most FATA inhabitants is
distinct from the Pakistani majority. Pakistan's population is
estimated at about 176 million, and while current FATA data are
unavailable, FATA residents comprised 2 percent of the Pakistani
population in the 1998 census. The FATA is the poorest and least
developed region of Pakistan, with about 60 percent of households
living beneath the poverty line and an annual per capita income of
roughly $250--half the national average. The overall literacy rate in
FATA is 17 percent, while the national average is 44 percent.
Furthermore, there are few opportunities for employment. Most families
take part in pastoral or subsistence agricultural activities. Besides
limiting educational and economic options, the FATA's forbidding
terrain isolates tribal communities from markets, health services, and
outside influences.
Militant activity and internal conflict have compounded political and
economic challenges, contributing to an unstable security situation in
the FATA. With porous borders, difficult terrain, and weak rule of
law, the FATA is recognized as a safe haven for international
terrorists and militants. Al Qaeda, militant factions of the Taliban,
and related extremist groups operate throughout the FATA, parts of the
North West Frontier Province, and Balochistan. Internal displacement
of households has become an increasingly pressing issue as Pakistani
forces mount attacks on terrorist groups and tribal militia clash with
extremist militants. As of February 2010, USAID reported that
according to government of Pakistan figures, there were over 400,000
displaced households within Pakistan.
The FATA is a semi-autonomous region with a code of laws and
administrative structure that distinguish it from other Pakistani
territories and provinces. The British governed the FATA using the
Frontier Crimes Regulations, which was codified in 1901. It
established administrative and judicial systems that allowed tribes
control over internal affairs. This arrangement continued after the
formation of Pakistan, and the FATA is governed distinctly from the
rest of Pakistan. The FATA is administered by the governor of the
North West Frontier Province as an agent of the president, and
political agents serve as intermediaries between the local people of
each FATA agency and the government of Pakistan.
The FATA Secretariat, which was originally formed by the government of
Pakistan in 2002, helps administer Pakistani government programs and
provide services to citizens of the FATA. The FATA Secretariat is
divided into 11 line departments, including health, education, and
agriculture, which work with the political agents to implement
development and public works projects in the FATA. The FATA
Development Authority, which focuses on the creation of public-private
partnerships to bolster economic and social development, was created
as a result of a Pakistani task force convened by the President of
Pakistan after 9/11. The task force recommended a creative, community-
based approach to fighting poverty in the FATA.
In an effort to address the basic needs of the people in the FATA, the
government of Pakistan issued the FATA Sustainable Development Plan in
2006. This 9-year, $2 billion plan states that people in the FATA, in
the absence of sustainable development, were vulnerable to the
influence of extremist factions inhabiting parts of the region.
Implementation of the plan is being coordinated by the government of
Pakistan's FATA Secretariat with assistance from their FATA
Development Authority, USAID, and other international partners. The
plan lays out broad goals in 17 different sectors, including
education, health, water supply and sanitation, and roads.
Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf publicly supported
increasing development efforts in the FATA and, in 2006, met with
President George W. Bush to discuss these efforts. Afterwards, the
U.S. government began to plan to increase U.S. aid for development
activities in the FATA in an effort to combat terrorist influences. In
2007, the U.S. government publicized a $750 million pledge in support
of the FATA Sustainable Development Plan over the 5-year period from
2007 to 2011. To fulfill this pledge, the U.S. government created the
FATA Development Program, which aims to "support the Government of
Pakistan's development efforts to integrate FATA into the mainstream
of Pakistan."
In support of this pledge, State reports that the U.S. government has
allocated $728 million in nonmilitary assistance in Pakistan's western
frontier region, including the FATA.[Footnote 2] Based on our analysis
of data provided by State and USAID, the U.S. has an unliquidated
obligation balance of $93 million as of the end of fiscal year 2009
and has disbursed $109 million. (See figure 2.)
Figure 2: U.S. Funds Allocated, Obligated, and Disbursed in Pakistan's
Western Frontier Region (Fiscal Years 2007-2009):
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Assistance pledged by the United States: $750 million; Allocations:
$728 million;
Unliquidated obligations balance: $ 93 million;
Disbursements: $109 million.
Source: GAO analysis of State and USAID data. Allocations data from
State. Unliquidated obligation balance and disbursements data from
USAID.
[End of figure]
USAID and State manage the U.S. program of assistance for FATA. USAID
sponsors work to, among other things, improve health, education, and
livelihoods in the FATA.[Footnote 3] State's Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) sponsors work to build
roads and bridges, and develop small water resources in support of
border security, law enforcement, and counternarcotics objectives.
State's Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (F Bureau) tracks
the funds toward the pledge. (See table 1 for a description of U.S.
departments, agencies, bureaus, and offices involved in FATA-related
assistance.)
Table 1: Development Assistance-Related Role of USAID and State in
Pakistan's FATA and Western Frontier Region:
U.S. agency: USAID;
Description of roles and responsibilities: USAID is the principal U.S.
agency responsible for extending development assistance. USAID works
around the world to further America's foreign policy interests in
expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the
citizens of the developing world by supporting economic growth,
agriculture and trade; global health; and democracy, conflict
prevention and humanitarian assistance.
In Pakistan's FATA, USAID is focused on strengthening government
institutions to improve service delivery; expanding economic
opportunities, creating jobs, and increasing productivity; improving
maternal and child health; improving teaching standards, upgrading
teacher training institutions, and providing essential equipment and
supplies to raise overall quality of education; and addressing the
needs of displaced people affected by conflict and military
operations, as well as rapidly responding to natural disasters. In
this report we refer to these USAID programs as long-term programs.
The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) is part of USAID's Bureau
for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance and aims to pave
the way for sustainable development projects in crisis areas. OTI
oversees the "quick-impact" part of the FATA Development Program.
Throughout this report, OTI's development work in FATA is referred to
as quick-impact activities or projects.
U.S. agency: State Department;
Description of roles and responsibilities: Overall responsibility for
U.S. international narcotics control efforts rests with the Secretary
of State. The department's responsibilities, carried out by its Bureau
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), include
policy development and program management, diplomatic initiatives,
assistance for crop control, interdiction, and related enforcement
activities. The bureau is represented in Islamabad by the Narcotics
Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy under the direction of the U.S.
Ambassador.
INL oversees the Border Security Program, Law Enforcement program, and
Counternarcotics program, which operate across the western frontier
region. The Border Security Program includes FATA Development Program
activities such as building a Levy training center and constructing
roads and infrastructure.
The Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F Bureau) is
tasked with ensuring the strategic and effective use of foreign
assistance resources.
Source: GAO analysis of State and USAID documents.
[End of table]
U.S. Development Efforts in the FATA Are Generally Aligned with U.S.
National Security and Pakistan's Development Goals, but Joint U.S.-
Pakistan Implementation Plans Are Lacking:
The U.S. development objectives in the FATA are generally in alignment
with U.S. national security goals and the government of Pakistan's
development objectives. The U.S. development objectives in the FATA
support the U.S. core goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda
and its safe havens in Pakistan. U.S. development objectives are also
in line with the government of Pakistan's development objectives, as
described in Pakistan's FATA Sustainable Development Plan, which aims
to address the basic needs of the people in the FATA. However the
governments of the U.S. and Pakistan have not developed joint
strategic implementation plans for each of the seven FATA agencies--
geographic locations in the FATA--as called for in the Program
Assistance Agreement with Pakistan. (See figure 1 in the Background
section for the location of the seven FATA agencies.)
U.S. Development Objectives in the FATA Are Generally Aligned with
U.S. National Security Goals:
The core national security goal, as established by the Obama
administration in March 2009, is to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al
Qaeda, its allies and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent
their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan." To achieve this goal, the
U.S. strategy recommended (1) increasing and broadening assistance in
Pakistan--including job creation, education, and infrastructure--and
(2) strengthening the government of Pakistan's capacity, particularly
in the FATA. The U.S. FATA Development Program, which is the primary
mechanism for implementing the U.S. pledge, directly addresses both of
these recommendations. One of the ways the program addresses the first
recommendation is through vocational or on-the-job training. One of
the ways the program addresses the second recommendation is through
improving the core functions--such as financial management--of the
government of Pakistan's organizations. (See figure 3.)
Figure 3: Alignment of U.S. National Security Goal with FATA
Development Program:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
U.S. Core National Security Goal:
To disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its safe heavens in
Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.
Relevant elements of the recommended strategy for achieving core
national security goal:
* Increasing and broadening assistance in Pakistan–-including, job
creation, education, and infrastructure.
* Strengthening Pakistani government capacity, particularly in the
FATA.
U.S. FATA Development Program role in addressing the U.S. goal:
Support for development in Pakistan‘s FATA is critical to meeting U.S.
objectives in the fight against al Qaeda and related terrorist
organizations in Pakistan.
FATA Development Program role in implementing recommended strategy:
* Focus on employment generation and skills development, basic
education, primary healthcare, infrastructure, agriculture, and media
and public outreach.
* Enhance the Government of Pakistan‘s capacity to deliver essential
services in the FATA.
Source: GAO analysis of White House, State, and USAID documents.
[End of figure]
In addition to the FATA Development Program, various other State and
USAID programs are aligned with the core national security goal to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan.[Footnote 4]
U.S. Development Objectives in the FATA Are Generally Aligned with
Pakistan's Development Objectives:
The U.S. FATA Development Program was designed to target three
development objectives for assistance in the FATA. The United States
seeks to:
1. improve economic and social conditions in the FATA,
2. extend the legitimacy of the government of Pakistan in the FATA,
and:
3. support permanent, sustainable change in the FATA.
As figure 4 shows, the U.S. FATA Development Program is generally
aligned with Pakistan's FATA Sustainable Development Plan, which has
five primary objectives. These are:
1. address basic social needs underlying causes of prevailing
disparity within the FATA,
2. explore and diversify available opportunities to make a positive
contribution toward the economic uplift of the area,
3. monitor and evaluate multisectoral progress to support, assess and
strengthen sustainable development,
4. improve institutional and financial capacities to allow a scaling-
up of development initiatives already being undertaken, and:
5. manage and maintain ecological and subsistence-support systems to
increase livelihood security for ordinary people.
Figure 4: Alignment of U.S. FATA Development Program Objectives with
Pakistan's FATA Sustainable Development Plan Objectives:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
U.S. FATA Development Program:
First objective: Improve economic and social conditions in the FATA;
Examples of activities:
Essential services delivery [aligns with (1)];
Employment generation [aligns with (2)].
Second objective:
Extend the legitimacy of the government of Pakistan in the FATA;
Examples of activities:
Monitoring and evaluation assistance [aligns with (3)];
Financial management training [aligns with (4)].
Third objective:
Support permanent sustainable change in the FATA;
Examples of activities:
Support in strengthening the legal and regulatory environment in the
FATA [aligns with (4)];
Support in creating laws and policies related to sustainability
[aligns with (5)].
Pakistan‘s FATA Sustainable Development Plan Objectives:
(1) Address basic social needs underlying causes of prevailing
disparity within the FATA.
(2) Explore and diversify available opportunities to make a positive
contribution towards the economic uplift of the area.
(3) Monitor and evaluate multisectoral progress to support, assess and
strengthen sustainable development.
(4) Improve institutional and financial capacities to allow a scaling-
up of development initiatives already being undertaken.
(5) Manage and maintain ecological and subsistence-support systems to
increase livelihood security for ordinary people.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID and government of Pakistan documents.
[End of figure]
Improving Economic and Social Conditions in the FATA:
The first U.S. objective--to improve economic and social conditions in
the FATA--is aligned with the government of Pakistan's objectives
regarding social needs and economic opportunities. One way the United
States is addressing this objective is through assisting in the
delivery of essential services, such as primary education and basic
health care. The United States also plans to focus on employment
generation and skill development, which addresses the government of
Pakistan's objective to explore and diversify available economic
opportunities.
Extending the Legitimacy of the Government of Pakistan:
The second U.S. objective--to extend the legitimacy of the government
of Pakistan--is aligned with Pakistan's objectives to build capacity
and assess and strengthen the development efforts. The U.S. plan calls
for providing training to officials in the FATA Secretariat in core
operational functions, including financial management, which addresses
the government of Pakistan's objective to improve institutional and
financial capacities. It also calls for assisting the FATA Secretariat
to develop the ability to conduct monitoring and evaluation, which
addresses the government of Pakistan's objective to monitor and
evaluate multisectoral progress.
Supporting Permanent, Sustainable Change:
The third U.S. objective--to support permanent, sustainable change--is
aligned with the government of Pakistan's objectives to build capacity
and maintain ecological and subsistence-support systems. The United
States is seeking to support the government of Pakistan in
establishing an appropriate legal and regulatory environment for
commercial law and taxation, which supports Pakistan's objective to
improve institutional and financial capacities. The United States also
planned to support the government of Pakistan in creating laws and
policies that ensure the sustainability of vital forest, water, and
mineral resources; this aligns with Pakistan's objective to manage and
maintain ecological and subsistence-support systems.
Efforts Have Been Undertaken to Coordinate Development Assistance:
To help keep U.S. efforts in line with Pakistan's objectives, USAID
and State officials routinely engage with various entities of the
government of Pakistan. USAID and State officials work with FATA
political agents during the planning, implementation, and evaluation
stages of their projects. For example, State officials attend review
meetings with government of Pakistan officials to approve potential
projects and to review the progress of ongoing projects. The political
agents work with U.S. officials to identify potential projects. USAID
officials told us they work side by side with the government of
Pakistan both to build trust between the two countries and to assist
in building the capacity of the government of Pakistan in the FATA.
For example, USAID consults with the political agent and other
government of Pakistan officials to identify guiding principles and
priorities for each quarter. USAID also noted that annual work plans
are developed for some of its programs in consultation with the FATA
Secretariat.
USAID and the Government of Pakistan Have Not Developed Joint
Strategic Implementation Plans for Each FATA Agency As Called for in
Their Agreement:
In September 2007, USAID and the government of Pakistan signed an
agreement regarding development activities in the FATA that included a
requirement to develop joint strategic implementation plans for each
of the seven FATA agencies. Despite efforts that have been undertaken
to coordinate the alignment of U.S. and Pakistani objectives, joint
strategic implementation plans have not been developed. The joint
implementation plans were to be developed by the FATA Secretariat, in
collaboration with USAID, for the purpose of putting the government of
Pakistan's development plan into action in each FATA agency.
According to the agreement, the FATA Secretariat and USAID were to use
the FATA Sustainable Development Plan as a foundation to create
individual implementation plans that would guide development projects
in each FATA agency. For example, the implementation plans were to
prioritize geographic locations and villages that should be
particularly targeted. The implementation plans were also intended to
lay out responsibilities such as stipulating funds control and
monitoring responsibilities. In addition, the implementation plans
were to be designed to assist with tracking performance by laying out
objectives, results, and indicators. According to the agreement, these
plans were to include input from the political agent responsible for
the particular FATA agency (e.g., Bajaur), as well as local officials,
religious leaders, and community leaders from the location.
Additionally, these plans would provide an opportunity for the
government of Pakistan to update and reaffirm their objectives in each
FATA agency over time. The implementation plans were designed to be
reviewed every 6 months to determine progress on annual work plans. A
senior USAID official in Pakistan involved in these efforts said that
as of February 2010, the plans do not exist and did not provide a
reason for the delay. In commenting on this report, USAID noted that
developing FATA level strategies was no longer a relevant and
worthwhile activity.
The United States Has Two Efforts Under Way to Track the Pledge:
In accordance with good management practices, the U.S. government has
implemented two efforts to track the $750 million pledge. State's
Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F Bureau), which is
tasked with ensuring the strategic and effective use of foreign
assistance resources, assumed responsibility for tracking allocations
of U.S. funds toward the U.S. pledge in Pakistan's western frontier
region, which includes the FATA. In addition, the USAID controller in
Islamabad has undertaken an effort to track the funding of FATA-
specific development programs intended to address the pledge. During
the course of our review, USAID and State undertook steps based on our
review to include missing data from State's INL Bureau. However, gaps
in the data remain that prevent a more complete picture of U.S.
funding of development efforts in the FATA and fulfillment of its
pledge.
State's F Bureau Tracks Allocation of U.S. Funds Toward the $750
Million Pledge:
State's F Bureau identifies allotments that are counted toward the
$750 million pledge by collecting data from U.S. government agencies
on their programs and activities in Pakistan's western frontier
region. As previously discussed, providing assistance to this region
is a primary goal of the United States, so it is appropriate for State
and USAID to track resources allocated to achieve this goal. While the
original announcement of the pledge only mentioned development
assistance to the FATA, the pledge has been expanded to cover the
entire western frontier region and to include other assistance, such
as law enforcement. As such, the F Bureau counts all nonmilitary
allocations in Pakistan's western frontier region toward the pledge.
Using these criteria, the F Bureau identified $728 million in
allocations from fiscal years 2007 through 2009 toward meeting the
$750 million pledge.
The F Bureau categorizes the assistance it counts toward the pledge
into three general areas: development assistance, governance
assistance, and security assistance. Under development assistance, the
F Bureau identified $461 million in allocations as of December 2009
toward the pledge, which includes activities such as education,
health, and livelihoods. INL noted that USAID transfers to INL for
road assistance are also included in the development category. Under
governance assistance, the F Bureau identified $117 million in
allocations as of December 2009 toward the pledge, which includes
activities such as USAID's FATA Capacity Building Project, FATA
Transition Initiative, and support of national assemblies in
Balochistan. Under security assistance, the F Bureau identified $150
million in allocations as of December 2009 toward the pledge, which
includes activities such as the construction of a Levy training
center, support to the government of Pakistan's aviation wing in
Balochistan, and law enforcement and antiterrorism training for
civilian police and security forces in the North West Frontier
Province and Balochistan.[Footnote 5] INL noted that other INL
infrastructure assistance under the Border Security Program and
counternarcotics also fall under the security category. (See figure 5.)
Figure 5: Activities That the F Bureau Identified As Part of the
Pledge:
[Refer to PDF for image: table]
Development ($461 million):
* Education;
* Health;
* Livelihoods;
* Private Sector Development;
* Internally Displaced Persons[A].
Governance ($117 million):
* NWFP and FATA Capacity Building;
* Transition Initiatives;
* National/Provincial Assemblies.
Security ($150 million):
* Border Security;
* Counter-Narcotics;
* Counter-Terrorism Training;
* Law Enforcement.
Source: GAO analysis of State and USAID data.
[A] The F Bureau counts allocations from the Economic Support Fund for
assisting internally displaced persons toward the pledge. Allocations
from the Migration and Refugee Assistance Fund or the International
Disaster Assistance Fund are excluded.
[End of figure]
The USAID Controller in Islamabad Has Undertaken an Effort to Track
Development Assistance in the FATA, However, Gaps Remain That Prevent
a More Complete Picture:
In accordance with good management and financial practices, the USAID
controller in Islamabad has undertaken an effort to track the funding
of FATA-specific development programs. As discussed earlier, the FATA
Development Program is the primary mechanism for implementing the
pledge. It consists of 10 programs run by USAID and 3 accounts managed
by State's INL.[Footnote 6] At the time of our review, the USAID
controller in Islamabad had sought to generate quarterly pipeline
reports on the FATA Development Program. USAID's FATA pipeline report
tracks agreement amounts (the full value of the agreement over the
full term subject to the availability of funds), obligations, and
expenditure data for USAID activities, as well as allocations,
obligations, and liquidations for INL activities.
According to the USAID FATA pipeline report, USAID has obligated $161
million in FATA Development Program projects and has expended $104
million of those funds. During the course of our review, we observed
that the USAID controller in Islamabad was experiencing difficulties
obtaining INL's input for inclusion in the FATA pipeline report and
suggested that USAID and INL work together to provide a more complete
report. Action was taken subsequent to our exit meetings with State
and USAID officials in Washington, D.C., to incorporate State data
into the FATA pipeline report. Between fiscal years 2007 through 2009
INL obligated $6 million toward projects in the FATA Development
Program and has expended $145 thousand of those funds.[Footnote 7]
Despite this enhancement, the FATA pipeline report still does not
capture all U.S. activities in the FATA, nor does it report all
activities that the F Bureau counts toward the presidential pledge and
thus remains an incomplete reporting tool for development assistance
in the FATA. For example, in addition to the FATA Development Program,
USAID oversees a number of bilateral assistance programs that operate
across Pakistan that also include some activities in the FATA.
Although included in the F Bureau tracking of the U.S. pledge, they
are not tracked on the USAID FATA pipeline report. USAID officials
said that although it accounts for the nationwide program funds on
other financial reports, it had not been routinely tracking the
portion of funds obligated or expended that were specifically
attributed to activities in the FATA. USAID estimated it had obligated
about $2 million and expended about $1.4 million of these nationwide
program funds for activities in the FATA during fiscal years 2007
through 2009.
U.S. Efforts to Measure and Report the Performance of Development
Programs in the FATA Are Lacking:
USAID and State collect reports on the performance of their FATA-
specific programs, as required by federal regulations and agreements
with implementing partners. USAID, however, has not produced a
complete performance management plan for its development activities in
the FATA, as specified in internal regulations. USAID generally
collects required performance planning and reporting documents from
implementing partners. INL did not collect all of the required
documentation of how it tracks project performance. Development
programs for which performance could be measured against annual
targets generally did not achieve those targets. One of the factors
that may have affected the programs is the dangerous security
environment in the FATA.
USAID Has Not Produced a Complete Performance Management Plan for Its
Development Activities in the FATA:
USAID's Automated Directives System (ADS)[Footnote 8] requires USAID
officials to produce complete performance management plans for each
U.S. assistance objective, but USAID has not produced a complete plan
that includes all key elements for its development assistance efforts
in the FATA, as shown in table 2. The plan should be comprised of 10
elements, including a full set of performance indicators with baseline
and target values, that facilitate the management and reporting of
program performance. These performance indicators are reported to the
F Bureau for inclusion in Pakistan's Mission Performance Plan and
Report, which is discussed later. We found that USAID was in
compliance with 1 of the criteria, not in compliance with 4 criteria,
and we were unable to determine compliance with 5 criteria.
Specifically, as table 2 shows, while USAID identified a set of
performance indicators, USAID did not provide a baseline and target,
as required, for each indicator. Neither did the USAID performance
management plan describe the known data limitations for all of the 41
performance indicators as also required by the ADS. Additionally,
USAID's performance management plan does not identify possible
evaluation efforts and does not include a timeline for duties such as
assessing the quality of data obtained and reviewing implementing
partners' reports.[Footnote 9] Appropriate baseline information and
plans for periodically reviewing program performance allow managers to
make timely assessments and adjust programs to improve performance.
Table 2: Extent USAID's Performance Management Plan Includes Required
Elements:
Criteria for which USAID is in compliance:
Required Elements for a Performance Management Plan:
1. State the full set of performance indicators that the USAID will
use to assess progress;
USAID's Compliance: USAID identified a total of 41 indicators for
their performance management plan.
Criteria for which USAID is not in compliance:
Required Elements for a Performance Management Plan:
2. Provide baseline values and targeted values for each performance
indicator included in the performance management plan;
USAID's Compliance: Targets and baselines have been established for
only 28 indicators.
Required Elements for a Performance Management Plan:
3. Describe known data limitations of each performance indicator;
USAID's Compliance: Data limitations have been described for only 18
indicators.
Required Elements for a Performance Management Plan:
4. Identify possible evaluation efforts;
USAID's Compliance: No evaluation efforts were identified in the
performance management plan.
Required Elements for a Performance Management Plan:
5. Include a calendar of performance management tasks;
USAID's Compliance: A calendar of performance management tasks was not
included in the performance management plan.
Criteria for which USAID's compliance could not be determined[A]:
Required Elements for a Performance Management Plan:
6. Disaggregate performance indicators by gender wherever possible;
USAID's Compliance: USAID disaggregated 17 indicators by gender.
Required Elements for a Performance Management Plan:
7. Specify the source of the data and the method for data collection
that will be used to verify and validate the measured values of actual
performance;
USAID's Compliance: Source and method for data collection were
specified for 15 indicators.
Required Elements for a Performance Management Plan:
8. Specify the schedule for data collection;
USAID's Compliance: A schedule for data collection was specified for
21 indicators.
Required Elements for a Performance Management Plan:
9. Estimate the costs of collecting, analyzing, and reporting
performance data, and plan how these will be financed;
USAID's Compliance: Costs were estimated for one indicator as "travel
and per diem costs" and for 23 indicators as "minimal".
Required Elements for a Performance Management Plan:
10. Describe the data quality assessment procedures;
USAID's Compliance: Data quality assessment procedures were described
for 27 indicators.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID documents and ADS Chapter 203.3.3
Performance Management Plans.
[A] For our review we examined the information provided for the 41
stated indicators. Gathering the underlying information necessary to
determine compliance for these criteria was beyond the scope of our
review.
[End of table]
USAID Collects Required Planning and Reporting Documents from
Implementing Partners:
USAID implementing partners are generally complying with federal and
contractual planning and reporting requirements. In addition to the
ADS requirement that USAID produce a complete performance management
plan for its development activities in the FATA, the code of federal
regulations[Footnote 10] requires USAID to collect performance reports
from implementers at least once per year. However, the specific
requirements for each program vary according to the terms established
in their grants, cooperative agreements or contracts. Figure 6 shows
that of the ten FATA-specific USAID programs, the nine long-term
programs had implementer-developed and USAID-approved performance
management plans. The program managed by USAID's OTI, which is focused
on the delivery of quick-impact activities, produced substitute
documentation. Based on our analysis of USAID data, implementing
partners began tracking performance within 5 months of program start
dates and all have regularly produced quarterly or monthly performance
reports.
Figure 6: USAID Implementing Partners' Performance Planning and
Reporting for FATA Development Programs:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
USAID Programs: Long-Term Programs:
Program name: Lower FATA Livelihood Development Program: Documentation
provided to USAID;
Implementer‘s Performance Management Plan:
Interval Between Program Start Date and First Performance Report[A]: 5
months;
Consistent Periodic Performance Reports: Documentation provided to
USAID.
Program name: Upper FATA Livelihood Development Program: Documentation
provided to USAID;
Implementer‘s Performance Management Plan:
Interval Between Program Start Date and First Performance Report[A]: 5
months;
Consistent Periodic Performance Reports: Documentation provided to
USAID.
Program name: Links to Learning: Education Support Pakistan:
Documentation provided to USAID;
Implementer‘s Performance Management Plan:
Interval Between Program Start Date and First Performance Report[A]: 2
months;
Consistent Periodic Performance Reports: Documentation provided to
USAI.
Program name: FATA Capacity Building Development Program:
Documentation provided to USAID;
Implementer‘s Performance Management Plan:
Interval Between Program Start Date and First Performance Report[A]: 3
months;
Consistent Periodic Performance Reports: Documentation provided to
USAID.
Program name: Pakistan Maternal and Newborn Health Program:
Implementer‘s Performance Management Plan: Documentation provided to
USAID;
Interval Between Program Start Date and First Performance Report[A]: 4
months;
Consistent Periodic Performance Reports: Documentation provided to
USAID.
Program name: Improved Child Health in FATA:
Implementer‘s Performance Management Plan: Documentation provided to
USAID;
Interval Between Program Start Date and First Performance Report[A]: 3
months;
Consistent Periodic Performance Reports: Documentation provided to
USAID.
Program name: Polio Eradication Initiative in FATA:
Implementer‘s Performance Management Plan: Documentation provided to
USAID;
Interval Between Program Start Date and First Performance Report[A]: 4
months;
Consistent Periodic Performance Reports: Documentation provided to
USAID.
Program name: Pakistan HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project:
Implementer‘s Performance Management Plan: Documentation provided to
USAID;
Interval Between Program Start Date and First Performance Report[A]: 3
months;
Consistent Periodic Performance Reports: Documentation provided to
USAID.
Program name: Pakistan Safe Drinking Water and Hygiene Promotion
Project:
Implementer‘s Performance Management Plan: Documentation provided to
USAID;
Interval Between Program Start Date and First Performance Report[A]: 3
months;
Consistent Periodic Performance Reports: Documentation provided to
USAID.
USAID Programs: Quick-Impact Program:
Program name: OTI‘s FATA Transition Initiative[B]:
Implementer‘s Performance Management Plan: Documentation provided to
USAID[C];
Interval Between Program Start Date and First Performance Report[A]: 5
months;
Consistent Periodic Performance Reports: Documentation provided to
USAID.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID documentation.
[A] This interval refers to the number of months that passed between
the date the agreement between USAID and the implementing partner was
signed and the end of the first reporting period.
[B] Although the FATA Transition Initiative is implemented by two
separate partners, we were informed by USAID that the program is
treated as one for management purposes.
[C] Rather than produce a program-wide performance management plan,
USAID's OTI programs formulate quarterly strategic plans for each FATA
agency and plans with performance indicators are devised for each
activity.
[End of figure]
State's Documentation of Program Performance Was Incomplete:
State's INL agreements with the government of Pakistan transfer the
responsibility for project implementation to various Pakistani
entities and require periodic reviews of performance. However, as
figure 7 shows, INL did not have complete documentation of periodic
reviews. The various agreements with the government of Pakistan
outline different ways for INL to track performance. For example, the
agreement to build the Border Security Roads calls for monthly review
meetings while the agreement to construct the Border Security Bridges
calls for monthly performance reports.[Footnote 11] We reviewed our
sample of INL activities to determine the completeness of their
planning and reporting documentation.[Footnote 12] INL had records of
eight monthly review meetings over a 2-year period between U.S. and
Pakistani officials for its Border Security Roads project and one
monthly performance report for the Border Security Bridge project. The
Levy Outposts and Frontier Corps Outposts agreements called for
monthly review meetings, while the Frontier Constabulary Outposts
agreement called for monthly periodic reports. INL did not have any
documentation on performance for these projects. The Levy Training
Center agreement and the Counter-narcotics Roads and Small Schemes
agreement did not require periodic performance reports or review
meetings. However, INL had minutes from several review meetings and
one monthly performance report for counternarcotics activities.
Figure 7: INL's Performance Planning and Reporting Documentation:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Project: Border Security Roads:
Agreement with Government of Pakistan: State had all required
documentation;
Contract Approvals: State had none of the required documentation;
Project Review Meeting: State had some but not all of the required
documentation[B];
Periodic Progress Report: State had some but not all of the required
documentation[B].
Project: Border Security Small Schemes:
Agreement with Government of Pakistan: State had all required
documentation;
Contract Approvals: State had none of the required documentation;
Project Review Meeting: State had some but not all of the required
documentation[B];
Periodic Progress Report: Documentation not required.
Project: Border Security Bridges:
Agreement with Government of Pakistan: State had all required
documentation;
Contract Approvals: State had none of the required documentation;
Project Review Meeting: Documentation not required;
Periodic Progress Report: State had some but not all of the required
documentation[B].
Project: Counter-narcotics Roads:
Agreement with Government of Pakistan: State had all required
documentation;
Contract Approvals: State had all required documentation;
Project Review Meeting: State had some but not all of the required
documentation[B];
Periodic Progress Report: Documentation not required.
Project: Counter-narcotics Small Schemes:
Agreement with Government of Pakistan: State had all required
documentation;
Contract Approvals: State had none of the required documentation;
Project Review Meeting: State had some but not all of the required
documentation[B];
Periodic Progress Report: State had some but not all of the required
documentation[B].
Project: Frontier Constabulary Outposts:
Agreement with Government of Pakistan: State had all required
documentation;
Contract Approvals: State had all required documentation[A];
Project Review Meeting: Documentation not required;
Periodic Progress Report: State had none of the required documentation.
Project: Frontier Corps Outposts:
Agreement with Government of Pakistan: State had all required
documentation;
Contract Approvals: State had none of the required documentation;
Project Review Meeting: State had none of the required documentation;
Periodic Progress Report: Documentation not required.
Project: Levy Outposts:
Agreement with Government of Pakistan: State had all required
documentation;
Contract Approvals: State had none of the required documentation;
Project Review Meeting: State had none of the required documentation;
Periodic Progress Report: Documentation not required.
Project: Levy Training Center:
Agreement with Government of Pakistan: State had all required
documentation;
Contract Approvals:
Project Review Meeting: Documentation not required[A];
Periodic Progress Report: Documentation not required.
Source: GAO analysis of INL documentation.
[A] State only provided us with a portion of the contract.
[B] The designated projects were required to produce quarterly or
monthly progress reports or documentation of review meetings. Those
that had one or more of the required documents for the period of
review, but did not have documentation for every month or quarter were
determined to have "some" documentation.
[End of figure]
State's F Bureau Reports on Performance of Foreign Assistance Programs
in Pakistan:
Based on information provided by USAID and State's INL, the F Bureau
produces the Pakistan Mission Performance Plan and Report to report on
achievements of U.S. foreign assistance programs and provide
information on accomplishments and challenges of U.S. government
entities operating in Pakistan. State's INL and USAID contribute both
narrative and quantitative performance information to these reports.
These reports compile and report on indicators at a nationwide level,
and while they include some reference to the FATA, they are not
intended to include a complete overview of the U.S. programs'
performance against targets specifically in the FATA.[Footnote 13] The
2007 and 2008 performance plans provided summary narrative of U.S.
activities, including the construction of outposts, roads, and
schools; the provision of clean drinking water and microfinance loans;
and training for health workers.
Several of the Programs with Data on Performance Indicators Did Not
Achieve Their Targets:
Performance of USAID's Programs in the FATA: Performance could not be
measured against targets for all ten USAID assistance programs in the
FATA because they did not all include sufficient data on performance
indicators in their most recent annual reporting instruments.
Specifically, two of the nine long-term USAID programs primarily set
long-term targets that coincide with the end of the programs, making
assessments of current performance against targets difficult. Two
other long-term USAID programs did not provide any data on performance
indicators in their most recent annual reporting instrument.[Footnote
14] As such, success in meeting annual performance targets could only
be determined for five of nine long-term USAID programs and USAID's
OTI-led quick-impact program that reported performance primarily
against annual targets. As figure 8 shows, the HIV/AIDS Prevention and
Care project reported that over three quarters of its performance
indicators with annual targets met or exceeded their targets. The
performance of the four remaining long-term programs suggests they
encountered more difficulties in meeting their targets, with less than
one third of the performance indicators for three of these programs
meeting or exceeding their targets.
Figure 8: Percentages of Performance Indicators Meeting Targets: Five
Long-Term Programs:
[Figure: stacked horizontal bar graph; refer to PDF for image]
Lower FATA Livelihood Development Program:
Percentage of indicators that met 51%-99% of target: 33.3%; Percentage
of indicators that met 1%-50% of target: 66.7%.
Upper FATA Livelihood Development Program[A]:
Percentage of indicators that met or exceeded target: 13.3%;
Percentage of indicators that met 51%-99% of target: 13.3%;
Percentage of indicators that met 1%-50% of target: 26.7%;
Percentage of indicators that met none of their targets: 46.7%.
Pakistan Maternal and Newborn Health Program:
Percentage of indicators that met or exceeded target: 21.7%;
Percentage of indicators that met 51%-99% of target: 34.8%;
Percentage of indicators that met 1%-50% of target: 4.3%;
Percentage of indicators that met none of their targets: 39.1%.
Improved Child Health in FATA[B]:
Percentage of indicators that met or exceeded target: 38.2%;
Percentage of indicators that met 51%-99% of target: 32.4%;
Percentage of indicators that met 1%-50% of target: 26.5%;
Percentage of indicators that met none of their targets: 2.9%.
Pakistan HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project:
Percentage of indicators that met or exceeded target: 77.8%;
Percentage of indicators that met 51%-99% of target: 22%.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
Note: For a discussion of our sampling methodology, see Appendix I,
Scope and Methodology. See Appendix III for more information on
program results.
[A] The total number of indicators included in the annual report was
46. However, no target was set for one performance indicator, and this
indicator was not included in the performance analysis.
[B] The total number of indicators included in the annual report was
50. However, no target was set for nine performance indicators, an
annual target of zero was set for two indicators, non-numeric targets
that were dependent upon outside factors were set for four indicators
(i.e. the target for number of diarrhea cases treated was the number
of cases that presented themselves), and one indicator set an unclear
target. These indicators were excluded from the analysis.
[End of figure]
For the USAID OTI activities we reviewed associated with the FATA
Transition Initiative (USAID's quick-impact program), targets were
generally met. Different from USAID's long-term programs, USAID's OTI
program focuses on short-term activities that respond quickly to both
local needs and U.S. foreign policy priorities. Therefore, performance
management plans with annual program indicators are not considered the
best way to measure success in the environment in which OTI operates.
[Footnote 15] Instead, output indicators are developed in individual
plans for each activity within the program. USAID managed 437 OTI
activities, from which we selected a judgmental sample of 48
activities for review. That sample was further refined to determine
those activities in the most advanced stage of completion. The
resulting 17 activities in our sample that were closed[Footnote 16]
had a total of 34 performance indicators,[Footnote 17] 32 of which met
or exceeded their targets (see figure 9).[Footnote 18]
Figure 9: Percentages of Performance Indicators Meeting Targets: A
Sample of USAID's OTI Quick-Impact Activities:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Percentage of indicators that met or exceeded target: 88%;
Percentage of indicators that met 51%-99% of target: 6%;
Percentage of indicators that met 1%-50% of target: 0;
Percentage of indicators that met none of their targets: 6%.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[End of figure]
Performance of INL Projects in the FATA: While we were able to
identify long-term goals or targets for eight of the nine INL
projects, INL did not provide documentation of performance against
intermediate targets on a project level. In addition, INL did not
generally develop performance indicators or targets for individual
activities in its planning documentation, but in most cases INL set
out specific technical specifications and timelines for activity
completion. When work has finished on an activity, completion
certificates are generally required to certify each activity has been
fully completed both physically and financially to specification. Of
the 22 activities in our sample for which INL officials reported that
work was finished, 12 activities had been certified as completed. Of
the remaining 10 programs, seven activities had photographic or
documentary evidence of some progress made, and INL did not have
documentation of progress made for three activities for which work was
considered finished.
The Difficult Security Environment Hinders the Ability of Implementing
Partners to Complete Planned Work:
USAID, State and implementing partners noted difficulties in program
implementation were caused by violence in the western frontier region,
such as militant activities and suicide bombings. State's most recent
annual report on terrorism noted that terrorist attacks were centered
on Pakistan's border with Afghanistan, including the FATA, and that
Pakistan had seen a marked increase of suicide bombings. In most cases
government and military compounds were targeted, and the government of
Pakistan rule of law was challenged throughout the region. Violence
made program implementation a challenge in some areas and impossible
in others. For example, work on the Lower FATA Development Program was
delayed when the implementing partner's Chief of Party was killed in
Pakistan in November 2008. USAID also noted an attack on U.S.
consulate staff and a tenuous security situation that required the
relocation of U.S. staff to Islamabad. In addition, the Border
Security Project's road construction halted in November 2008 due to
the worsening security situation and 53 percent of the 62 outposts
that were built by the Levy Outpost project have been destroyed by
militants. INL also noted that these were very small outposts, which
were designed to hold 6 to 9 people to guard the lines of
communication. They were designed and constructed before the current
unrest and no facilities of this nature are currently being built by
INL in the FATA.
Procedures Developed to Monitor Assistance Programs in the FATA, but
Their Use Has Not Been Fully Documented:
USAID has developed a set of procedures to monitor implementation and
verify results of their programs in areas too dangerous for U.S.
officials to access. However, USAID is not documenting its use of some
procedures for all of its programs. State's INL is using a combination
of monitoring procedures, but also is not documenting its use of all
of these procedures.
USAID Has Alternative Monitoring Procedures to Mitigate Its Difficulty
in Directly Monitoring Programs, but Is Not Sufficiently Documenting
Monitoring of Long-Term Programs:
As part of its regular procedures, USAID designates staff to
administer and monitor foreign assistance awards. Included in staff
responsibilities are visits to project sites and verification of
program performance. Due to the dangerous environment in the FATA,
USAID officials have had no direct access to project sites in the FATA
to monitor the implementation of the assistance programs.
To mitigate this challenge, in addition to taking steps to establish a
geographic information system, USAID has developed a set of six
monitoring procedures to monitor implementation programs and verify
results in the FATA. These procedures are:
* USAID Locally Employed Staff Reports: USAID employees from the FATA
region hired to visit sites and report on the conditions of programs:
* Implementing partner Reports: Routine reports from each of the
implementing partners:
* Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: A partner contracted to
independently monitor USAID programs in the FATA by hiring local
residents to conduct site visits, take photographs, and write reports
about conditions:
* Government of Pakistan: Reliance on monitoring done by the
government of Pakistan, including the FATA Secretariat Monitoring Cell:
* Media Reports: Media coverage of development activities in the FATA:
* Community Oversight Committees: Groups of community members formed
to monitor the quality of program implementation and provide feedback
to the government of Pakistan and USAID:
Monitoring of Long-Term USAID Programs:
Although USAID has established these procedures to monitor programs in
the FATA, it has not consistently documented their use for its long-
term programs. As figure 10 shows, USAID was able to provide
documentation for the use of three of these procedures: implementing
partner reports, monitoring and verification unit reports, and media
reports, with evidence showing a reliance mostly on implementing
partner reports.
Figure 10: USAID Documentation of Monitoring for Long-Term Programs:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Program name: Lower FATA Livelihood Development Program:
USAID Locally Employed Staff Site Visit Reports: Not documented by
USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Not documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring: Not documented
by USAID.
Program name: Upper FATA Livelihood Development Program:
USAID Locally Employed Staff Site Visit Reports: Not documented by
USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Not documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring: Not documented
by USAID.
Program name: Links to Learning: Education Support to Pakistan:
USAID Locally Employed Staff Site Visit Reports: Documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Not documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring: Not documented
by USAID.
Program name: FATA Capacity Building Development Program:
USAID Locally Employed Staff Site Visit Reports: Not documented by
USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Not documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring: Not documented
by USAID.
Program name: Pakistan Maternal and Newborn Health Program:
USAID Locally Employed Staff Site Visit Reports: Not documented by
USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Not documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring: Not documented
by USAID.
Program name: Improved Child Health in FATA:
USAID Locally Employed Staff Site Visit Reports: Not documented by
USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Not documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring: Not documented
by USAID.
Program name: Polio Eradication Initiative in FATA:
USAID Locally Employed Staff Site Visit Reports: Not documented by
USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Not documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring: Not documented
by USAID.
Program name: Pakistan HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project:
USAID Locally Employed Staff Site Visit Reports: Not documented by
USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Not documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring: Not documented
by USAID.
Program name: Pakistan Safe Drinking Water and Hygiene Promotion
Project:
USAID Locally Employed Staff Site Visit Reports: Not documented by
USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Not documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring: Not documented
by USAID.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID documentation.
[End of figure]
We identified several reasons for the gaps in USAID's documentation of
its monitoring efforts. For example, USAID officials noted that while
locally employed staff visit activity sites, they do not write reports
to document what they observe and that the monitoring and verification
unit was not designed to monitor all programs. Additionally, a USAID
official noted that they do not have a system for tracking and
cataloging media coverage of development efforts.[Footnote 19]
Monitoring of USAID's OTI Quick-Impact Development Activities:
According to USAID, the three main procedures it uses to monitor its
quick-impact development activities in the FATA are (1) locally
employed staff reports, (2) implementing partner reports, and (3)
independent monitoring unit[Footnote 20] reports, which are prepared
by local nongovernemental organizations. In addition, USAID may use
government of Pakistan monitoring, media reports, community oversight
committees[Footnote 21], and photographs to supplement these reports.
A specific monitoring plan is developed for each development activity.
USAID has generally documented its use of each of these monitoring
procedures for its OTI development activities. In the sample of 15
closed activities we reviewed, as shown in figure 11, all activities
used multiple procedures to monitor progress.
Figure 11: USAID Documentation of Monitoring for OTI Quick-Impact
Activities:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Activity description: Local Government Office Renovation;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Not
documented by USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: Emergency Assistance to Internally Displaced
Persons I[B];
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Not documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Not
documented by USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: Emergency Assistance to Internally Displaced
Persons II;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Documented by
USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: Emergency Assistance to Internally Displaced
Persons III;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Not
documented by USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: Emergency Assistance to Internally Displaced
Persons IV;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Not
documented by USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: Improvement and Rehabilitation of Irrigation
System I;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Documented by
USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: Improvement and Rehabilitation of Irrigation
System II;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Documented by
USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: Providing Tree Seedings;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Not documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Documented by
USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: Institutional Support to Local Government;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Not
documented by USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: Preventing Student Riots;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Not documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Not
documented by USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: Multilingual Publication of Arts and Essays;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Documented by
USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: Flood Response;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Documented by
USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: School Equipment for Village Schools;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Not
documented by USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: Education Kits for Children and Teachers;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Not documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Not
documented by USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: Installation of Drinking Water Hand Pumps;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: Not documented by USAID;
Implementing Partner Reports: Documented by USAID;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: Documented by USAID;
Media Reports: Documented by USAID;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: Documented by
USAID;
Pictures: Documented by USAID;
Activity description: Total;
USAID‘s OTI Locally Employed Staff Reports: 4;
Implementing Partner Reports: 14;
Monitoring and Verification Unit Reports: 8;
Evidence of Government of Pakistan Monitoring: 11;
Media Reports: 13;
Evidence of Community Oversight Committee Monitoring[A]: 7;
Pictures: 15.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID documentation.
[A] An OTI official noted that community oversight committees for the
first OTI activities did not sign agreements. Also, they are not used
for all activities because they are not appropriate in all
circumstances, especially when the community is not responsible for
maintaining the project.
[B] Emergency assistance provided to internally displaced persons in
temporary camps included non-food items such as cloth, gas stoves,
cooking utensils and soap.
[End of figure]
USAID Is Developing a Geographic Information System to Enhance
Monitoring Procedures:
To enhance USAID monitoring efforts, USAID hired an implementing
partner to develop a geographic information system and train
implementing partners to use it. One purpose of this system is to
allow USAID to track the status of its implementing partners'
development activities. It will allow USAID to access information on
development activities taking place in the FATA, such as geographic
location, type of project, financial data, and outcomes. During our
visit to Pakistan in June 2009, USAID and the implementing partner
informed us that the system would be fully operational by August 2009.
As of January 2010, although all implementers had access to the system
it had not been fully populated with data. In March 2010, USAID
informed us that all relevant program information had been entered
into the geographic information system.
State's INL Uses a Combination of Monitoring Procedures, but Is Not
Documenting All of Its Monitoring Procedures:
INL's activities--including construction of outposts, roads, and small
development projects--in the FATA are generally monitored at various
stages by INL staff. The U.S. government has signed agreements with
the government of Pakistan to carry out INL's activities. According to
these agreements, INL approves project cost estimates, which include
technical specifications and timelines for project implementation. The
agreements also call for INL to make field visits during
implementation--independently or along with government of Pakistan --
and verify that these activities are taking place to monitor the use
of U.S. funds. Additionally, INL also relies on photos of projects to
monitor progress. According to INL, all photos, aside from a few for
projects in North and South Waziristan, were taken by INL personnel.
However, some of the photographs did not have dates, locations, or
sources, which made it impossible for us to determine what activities
these photos were intended to document. Upon project completion, INL
is expected to conduct a final inspection and sign a completion
certificate along with government of Pakistan officials. As shown in
figure 12, INL did not always document its use of its monitoring
procedures.
Figure 12: INL Documentation of FATA Project Monitoring:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Project (# of Activities): Border Security Roads (6);
Cost Estimate Approvals[A]: INL did not have documentation for any
activity in sample;
Site Visit Reports: INL had documentation for every activity in sample;
Photos: INL had documentation for every activity in sample;
Completion Certificates: Documentation not required[B].
Project (# of Activities): Border Security Small Schemes (4):
Cost Estimate Approvals[A]: INL had documentation for one or more
activities in sample, but not every activity in sample;
Site Visit Reports: INL had documentation for every activity in sample;
Photos: INL had documentation for every activity in sample;
Completion Certificates:
Project (# of Activities): Border Security Bridges (5);
Cost Estimate Approvals[A]: INL did not have documentation for any
activity in sample;
Site Visit Reports: INL had documentation for one or more activities
in sample, but not every activity in sample;
Photos: INL had documentation for every activity in sample;
Completion Certificates: INL did not have documentation for any
activity in sample.
Project (# of Activities): Counter-narcotics Roads (3);
Cost Estimate Approvals[A]: INL had documentation for one or more
activities in sample, but not every activity in sample;
Site Visit Reports: INL had documentation for every activity in sample;
Photos: INL had documentation for every activity in sample; INL had
documentation for every activity in sample;
Completion Certificates: INL had documentation for every activity in
sample.
Project (# of Activities): Counter-narcotics Small Schemes (3);
Cost Estimate Approvals[A]: INL had documentation for one or more
activities in sample, but not every activity in sample;
Site Visit Reports: INL had documentation for every activity in sample;
Photos: INL had documentation for every activity in sample;
Completion Certificates: INL had documentation for every activity in
sample.
Project (# of Activities): Frontier Constabulary Outposts (8);
Cost Estimate Approvals[A]: INL had documentation for one or more
activities in sample, but not every activity in sample;
Site Visit Reports: INL had documentation for one or more activities
in sample, but not every activity in sample;
Photos: INL had documentation for one or more activities in sample,
but not every activity in sample;
Completion Certificates: INL did not have documentation for any
activity in sample.
Project (# of Activities): Frontier Corps Outposts (6);
Cost Estimate Approvals[A]: INL did not have documentation for any
activity in sample;
Site Visit Reports: INL had documentation for one or more activities
in sample, but not every activity in sample;
Photos: INL had documentation for every activity in sample;
Completion Certificates: Documentation not required[C].
Project (# of Activities): Levy Outposts (6);
Cost Estimate Approvals[A]: INL had documentation for one or more
activities in sample, but not every activity in sample;
Site Visit Reports: INL had documentation for one or more activities
in sample, but not every activity in sample;
Photos: INL had documentation for one or more activities in sample,
but not every activity in sample;
Completion Certificates: INL had documentation for one or more
activities in sample, but not every activity in sample.
Project (# of Activities): Levy Training Center (1);
Cost Estimate Approvals[A]: INL did not have documentation for any
activity in sample;
Site Visit Reports: INL had documentation for every activity in sample;
Photos: INL had documentation for every activity in sample;
Completion Certificates: Documentation not required[D].
Source: GAO analysis of INL documentation.
Note: For more detailed information, including the number of
activities and documentation received for each activity, see Appendix
IV.
[A] Approval of cost estimates were determined by approval memos or
signatures on the cost estimates. Other cost estimates were provided
without documentation of INL approval.
[B] These activities were suspended prior to completion due to the
inability of INL staff to monitor the activities.
[C] All of the activities in the sample were still underway.
[D] The construction of the Levy Training Center was canceled before
it was completed.
[End of figure]
INL reported that it had made arrangements for the government of
Pakistan to provide evidence of monitoring when INL cannot perform on-
site monitoring, However, INL had no documentation from the government
of Pakistan.
Conclusion:
The FATA is an area of great strategic interest for the United Sates
and Pakistan, and because the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act
of 2009 authorizes $7.5 billion in new nonmilitary assistance to
Pakistan, accountability for development efforts there takes on
particular importance. Although U.S. agencies have taken steps to
track the funds and align U.S. efforts in the FATA with Pakistan's
development objectives, the United States continues to face security
and access to Pakistani government document challenges that make
monitoring of projects difficult. Without addressing gaps in planning,
performance, and monitoring documentation, the U.S. government cannot
fully and accurately assess the status of current assistance efforts
or accountability of funds associated with U.S. development efforts in
the FATA. Of critical importance is the completion of the development
of joint strategic implementation plans with Pakistan that would help
ensure that U.S. funds are used in accordance with U.S. national
security goals and the needs of the seven FATA agencies. These plans
would aid U.S. officials in determining specific objectives and
priorities for providing sustainable development assistance based on
local needs. Similarly, including all of the funding data for FATA-
related assistance in one document such as USAID's FATA pipeline
report would present, in a single document, a more complete picture of
U.S. funding of development efforts in the FATA and fulfillment of its
pledge. In addition, developing complete performance management plans
would enhance the ability of the U.S. government to track progress
toward planned results, allocate resources toward identified
priorities, and advance organizational knowledge of which development
activities are likely to be more successful in the FATA and western
frontier region. Finally, it is vital that USAID and State improve the
documentation of their monitoring. Without this information, it is
difficult to accurately assess the status of U.S. assistance efforts
and to ensure proper accountability and oversight over appropriated
U.S. funds.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that U.S. development projects associated with the U.S.
pledge and future spending plans for Pakistan continue to be aligned
with our national security goal of assisting Pakistan in addressing
terrorist threats, and have clearly articulated monitoring
responsibilities, indicators, and performance tracking, we recommend
that USAID work with the government of Pakistan to complete the
development of joint strategic implementation plans as originally
called for in the agreement between USAID and the government of
Pakistan.
To provide a more complete picture and enhance the tracking of U.S.
assistance for the FATA we recommend that USAID take steps to
incorporate the funding amounts for its nationwide attributed programs
into the USAID controller in Islamabad's FATA pipeline report.
To improve upon existing efforts to measure the progress of U.S.
development assistance projects associated with the fulfillment of the
U.S. pledge, consistent with ADS requirements, and to provide a basis
for planning future development assistance for FATA, we recommend that
the USAID Administrator include in its performance management plan for
the FATA Development Program:
* possible evaluation efforts,
* a calendar of performance management tasks,
* the baseline and targeted values for each performance indicator in
the Performance Management Plan, and:
* a description of the known data limitations for each performance
indicator.
* To help ensure that the government of Pakistan is using U.S. funds
as intended, we recommend that the Secretary of State take steps to
improve INL's performance reporting documentation.
* To improve upon U.S. efforts to monitor assistance programs in the
FATA, we recommend that the USAID Administrator take steps to improve
USAID's documentation of its alternative monitoring efforts related to
the FATA.
* We also recommend that the Secretary of State take steps to improve
State's documentation of its monitoring efforts for programs that
cover FATA and the western frontier region.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of
State provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are
reproduced in appendixes V and VI, respectively. The U.S. Agency for
International Development and the Department of State also provided
technical comments and updates that we have incorporated throughout
the report as appropriate.
USAID concurred with our overall recommendation that U.S. assistance
in the FATA should be well planned and documented but noted that they
and the FATA Secretariat have jointly agreed that the development of
the FATA-level strategies was no longer a relevant and worthwhile
activity. USAID noted that they have initiated other measures to
ensure that U.S. funds are being used in accordance with the needs of
the seven FATA Agencies. While we acknowledge the ongoing efforts to
coordinate U.S. assistance efforts with the government of Pakistan, we
do not think these efforts alone are enough to ensure sufficient
oversight and accountability of U.S. funded development programs in
the FATA. In addition, we believe that joint U.S. Pakistan strategic
implementation plans would help to ensure that U.S. efforts in the
FATA are not only based on the needs of each of the seven geographic
FATA areas, but also U.S. national security goals. Additionally,
because of the challenging security environment, developing joint
implementation plans could help to ensure clear implementation and
monitoring expectations between the U.S. and Pakistani government for
FATA development projects. This includes the extent to which the U.S.
will be granted access to project data collected by the government of
Pakistan.
Additionally, USAID concurred with the recommendation to enhance the
tracking of U.S. assistance for the FATA and noted that it is in the
process of working on a system to enhance expenditure monitoring.
USAID also concurred with our recommendations to improve both
performance measurement and monitoring and evaluation and noted that
it has taken steps to implement our recommendations, including
increasing the number of Foreign Service nationals staff at their
office in Peshawar in an effort to enhance monitoring of FATA projects
and fully implementing a geographic information system to address
weaknesses identified in our report.
The Department of State concurred with our overarching recommendation
that assistance programs should align with U.S. national security
objectives and the Government of Pakistan's requirements and that
efforts to monitor and report on programs, performance, and spending
should be robust and transparent. State concurred with our
recommendation to improve INL's performance reporting and noted that
it will take the recommendation under consideration as it refines the
existing process and defines new requirements for performance
measurement and reporting.
State also concurred with our recommendation to improve documentation
of its monitoring efforts, highlighted its year-round end use
monitoring program, and noted that our audit prompted INL to initiate
new efforts to improve its monitoring documentation and organization
systems, including labeling all monitoring photos, improving
electronic and physical filing systems, producing electronic minutes
of all meetings with government of Pakistan counterparts, and planning
regional training for its monitoring staff this calendar year.
USAID and State both reiterated the impact that the security
environment in Pakistan has had on U.S. assistance efforts in the FATA
and western frontier region.
We are sending copies of this report to the Administrator of the U.S.
Agency for International Development, the Secretary of State, and
other interested parties. The report is also available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII.
Signed by:
Charles Michael Johnson Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
List of Congressional Addressees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Ike Skelton:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard P. McKeon:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Chairman:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey:
Chairman:
The Honorable Kay Granger:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Jeff Flake:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Harkin:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Robert Menendez:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Michael Honda:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The objectives of this review were to examine (1) the extent to which
U.S. development objectives align with U.S. goals and Pakistan's
objectives, (2) U.S. efforts to track the fulfillment of the U.S.
pledge, (3) efforts to measure and report the performance of
development programs, and (4) efforts to monitor development
assistance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
To determine the extent to which U.S. development objectives align
with U.S. goals and Pakistan's objectives, we obtained copies of the
planning documents for U.S. activities in the FATA, U.S. strategic
documents, and Pakistan's FATA Sustainable Development Plan. We
interviewed relevant U.S. officials for the planning history of U.S.
development assistance efforts in the FATA. We compared the three
objectives for the U.S. government's FATA Development Program with the
relevant goals and recommendations described in the Interagency Policy
Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. We also
compared the U.S. development objectives for the FATA with the primary
objectives in the Pakistani plan.
To determine how the U.S. is tracking the fulfillment of the U.S.
pledge, we interviewed Department of State (State) and U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) officials. To determine how the U.S.
is tracking allocations counted toward the pledge, we interviewed
officials and obtained data from State's Office of the Director of
U.S. Foreign Assistance (F Bureau). To determine U.S. obligations and
expenditures for the FATA Development Program, we interviewed and
obtained financial data from the USAID controller in Islamabad. To
determine the tracking and amounts of funding for USAID's nationwide
programs that were attributed to the FATA, activities generally
counted toward the pledge by State's F Bureau, we interviewed and
obtained data from the USAID controller in Islamabad. We also analyzed
State documents and interviewed State officials to determine the
amount of Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs' (INL) obligations and expenditures applicable to the
presidential pledge.
In order to determine how the United States is measuring and reporting
the performance of its development activities in the FATA, we reviewed
federal and agency guidelines for performance planning and reporting
requirements, as well as U.S. assistance agreements with implementing
partners and the government of Pakistan. For this objective, we
limited our focus to the reporting on U.S. activities in the FATA,
rather than the broader western frontier region and compared
performance planning and reporting documentation required against that
which was provided. In addition, we reviewed the ADS Chapter 203 to
determine the requirements for the assistance objective performance
management plan. We also reviewed the most recent annual performance
reporting instruments for each USAID program and INL and F Bureau
performance reports to determine the progress of programs against
targets in the programs' most recent year of operation. Specifically,
in reviewing the long-term USAID programs we compared performance
indicator annual targets against actual progress made in their most
recent year of operation, using their most recent annual reporting
instruments. Indicators were placed in the following categories based
on their level of actual progress: Indicator met or exceeded target
(100% or above); Progress made, more than 50% of target achieved (51%-
99%); Progress made, 50% or less achieved (1%-50%); Indicator made no
progress (0%). In appendix III indicators were further broken out into
quartiles (1%-25%, 26%-50%, 51%-75% and 76%-99%) and indicators for
which progress could not be determined were included (i.e. indicators
such as those for which no target was set or long-term targets were
set, but no annual targets were set). In categorizing the progress
made by performance indicators against targets, the indicators were
weighted equally (whether output, intermediate result or outcome).
There are limitations to this approach, since some indicators may be
much more important than others, and there are likely large
qualitative differences between them. USAID's Office of Transition
Initiatives (OTI) program does not use program-level performance
indicators or set annual targets and INL sets out many technical
specifications for their construction activities in cost estimate
documents, but INL did not provide information on performance
indicators. We therefore modified our approach to report on
performance of their programs, studying planning and reporting
documentation on an activity level for OTI and INL, rather than
program-wide. In designing the analysis for the OTI and INL
activities, we wanted to ensure that we reviewed a range of programs
reflecting differences that could affect program implementation and
results. However, we were not able to clearly identify a population,
which led us to select a judgmental rather than a random sample. Our
judgmental sample consisted of 48 out of 437 USAID OTI activities and
42 out of 426 INL activities in the FATA for further analysis based on
the following criteria:
* geographical location--we ensured each FATA agency in which
activities were taking place was represented in the samples;
* type of activity--we included examples of each type of activity
including education, health, road construction, and border outpost
construction;
* budgeted cost of the activity--we targeted the activities with
higher costs; and:
* status of the project--we ensured that both ongoing and completed
activities were represented.
For our analysis of USAID's OTI program results, we focused on those
activities that had reached the most advanced stage of completion.
USAID defines closed activities as those reported to have finished all
work. There were 17 closed activities in our sample of 48. We
eliminated 2 activities because they were surveys, for which the very
use of the monitoring procedures would be counterproductive, as the
attention would possibly influence responses. The resulting 15
activities we analyzed further because output targets were set for the
end of each activity. We compared the output targets set for
individual activities against actual performance and placed the output
indicators in the same categories used for the long-term USAID
programs. To analyze INL's performance we could not compare
performance indicators against targets as we did with USAID's long-
term and OTI efforts because INL did not provide information on
indicators. Instead, we compared documentation of activity completion
certification against the activities INL reported as completed - which
were 22 of the 42 activities in our sample. For those activities
reported as completed, but not certified, we reviewed reporting
documentation for evidence of progress made. As this is a judgmental
sample, we cannot make generalizations using this analysis. However,
given the care taken in the selection of our sample, we determined
that this methodology is adequate for our purpose of providing insight
into program planning and performance.
To assess U.S. monitoring efforts, we focused on the monitoring of
U.S. activities in the FATA, rather than the broader western frontier
region. We conducted interviews with U.S. officials in the United
States and Pakistan to learn about monitoring procedures and how the
United States is monitoring activities in the FATA. We also reviewed
planning and other documents that described monitoring procedures for
U.S. activities. While in Pakistan, we were able to visit two training
programs operating in Islamabad. However, we were not allowed to
conduct site visits of U.S. projects in the FATA or Peshawar due to
security concerns, including a terrorist attack that occurred in
Peshawar during our visit. In order to verify U.S. monitoring efforts,
we requested documentation of monitoring efforts for the judgmental
sample of 48 USAID OTI and 42 INL activities, described above. We
conducted an in-depth analysis of the monitoring documentation
provided by USAID's OTI and State's INL and compared this
documentation to the procedures described in monitoring plans and in
interviews with U.S. officials. We also compared USAID's documentation
of monitoring efforts for long-term programs (on a program-wide basis,
rather than through a sample of individual activities within each
program) against USAID's monitoring procedures as described in its
monitoring fact sheet.
We interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and in Islamabad,
Pakistan. We interviewed U.S. officials from the F Bureau, State's
South and Central Asia Bureau, INL, USAID's Pakistan desk, controller
in Islamabad, OTI, and the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. We also
interviewed several of USAID's implementing partners, representatives
from other international donors, and officials from the government of
Pakistan, including the FATA Secretariat and political agents. In
Pakistan we conducted site visits to a cultural exchange program, one
of the livelihood development programs, a maternal health program, and
the capacity building program, where we observed a demonstration of
the geographic information system.
The information on foreign law in this report is not the product of
GAO's original analysis, but is derived from interviews and secondary
sources. We conducted our audit work from February 2009 to April 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings,
conclusions and recommendations.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Descriptions of FATA Development Programs:
Table 3: United States Agency for International Development Long-Term
Programs:
Lower FATA Livelihood Development Program:
The FATA Livelihoods Development Program is a community-based program
comprised of the following components: 1) creating jobs, increasing
incomes and teaching employable skills with a focus on unemployed
youth; 2) revitalizing community infrastructure and essential
services; and 3) supporting established businesses and developing new
sustainable businesses.
Start date: 2/29/2008;
End date: 2/28/2013;
Agreement amount:$149,998,130.
Upper FATA Livelihood Development Program:
The upper FATA Livelihoods Development Program has the same components
as the lower FATA program. It is a community-based program comprised
of the following components: 1) creating jobs, increasing incomes and
teaching employable skills with a focus on unemployed youth; 2)
revitalizing community infrastructure and essential services; and 3)
supporting established businesses and developing new sustainable
businesses. The upper and lower FATA programs are under the direction
of two separate implementing partners in geographically separate areas
of the FATA.
Start date: 5/1/2008;
End date: 4/30/2013;
Agreement amount: $149,999,282.
Links to Learning: Education Support to Pakistan:
This program has three goals: 1) to improve teacher education and
professional development through providing institutional and academic
support that is centered on student achievement and learning outcomes;
2) to improve student learning and the learning environment through
developing systems for gauging student learning and achievement,
strengthening of assessment cells at the district and provincial
levels and by providing learning tools and classroom inputs aimed at
improving student achievement; and 3) to support governance reforms
and strengthen public sector capacity at the federal, provincial and
district levels to sustain quality teaching and learning.
Start date: 10/19/2007;
End date: 10/30/2012;
Agreement amount: $675,729.
FATA Capacity Building Development Program:
The scope of work for the Capacity Building program is to: 1) develop
strategic approaches to utilize the anticipated significant increase
in government of Pakistan and donor resources expected as a result of
the FATA Sustainable Development Plan; 2) support the building of
civilian/paramilitary cooperation in FATA development; 3) build
capacity of FATA institutions to plan, implement and manage funds and
to communicate effectively with constituents and communities to ensure
that development initiatives are aligned with local needs and
expectations; and 4) strengthen the capacity of the indigenous NGO
community to deliver resources in support of strategic plans.
Start date: 1/1/2008;
End date: 12/31/2010;
Agreement amount: $43,350,072.
Pakistan Maternal and Newborn Health Program:
The goal of the Pakistan Maternal and Newborn Health Program is to
reduce maternal, newborn, and child mortality in Pakistan, through
viable and demonstrable initiatives and capacity building of existing
programs and structures within health systems and communities to
ensure improvements and supportive linkages in the continuum of health
care for women from the home to the hospital.
Start date: 12/12/2007;
End date: 9/30/2010;
Agreement amount: $4,000,000.
Improved Child Health in FATA:
The strategic objective of the Improved Child Health in FATA program
is to be achieved through the following three intermediate results: 1)
increased access to and availability of child health services at
facility and community levels; 2) improved quality of child health
services at facility and community levels; and 3) increased community
knowledge and acceptance of key child health services and behaviors.
The following intervention packages will be implemented: Immunization,
Acute Respiratory Infection, Control of Diarrheal Diseases, Essential
Newborn Care, and Nutrition and Micronutrients.
Start date: 9/21/2006;
End date: 8/31/2010;
Agreement amount: $14,750,000.
Polio Eradication Initiative in FATA:
The overall goal of the Polio Eradication Initiative in FATA is the
complete interruption of transmission from person to person. Polio
eradication in Pakistan cannot be achieved until transmission of the
virus is stopped in FATA. The only way to interrupt transmission in
Pakistan is to increase the coverage of children receiving oral polio
vaccine and to simultaneously nurture community demand and
responsiveness to vaccine services.
Start date: 3/4/2008;
End date: 12/9/2010;
Agreement amount: $2,375,000.
Pakistan HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project:
The task order for this project is to develop and strengthen technical
and organizational capacities of the Pakistani non-governmental
organization sector, community-based organizations, networks, and
other institutions to: 1) implement targeted HIV/AIDS prevention
interventions for most at risk populations and high risk youth that
will result in changed behavior, reducing risk and transmission; 2)
provide assistance that supports people living with HIV/AIDS with
appropriate care in a sustainable manner; and 3) establish a
competitive and transparent grants program that supports Pakistani non-
governmental organizations, community organizations, and networks
supporting people living with HIV/AIDS to better ensure long-term self
sufficiency and sustainability beyond the life of this project with
respect to points one and two above.
Start date: 1/11/2008;
End date: 6/30/2009;
Agreement amount: $600,000.
Pakistan Safe Drinking Water and Hygiene Project:
The Pakistan Safe Drinking Water and Hygiene program is to be
implemented through three main activities:1) assist the government of
Pakistan in designing a comprehensive hygiene and sanitation promotion
strategy for safe water management, hygienic behaviors, and safe
sanitation practices; 2) provide support to governmental agencies and
non-governmental organizations and communities through capacity-
building and training in operations and management of water treatment
units, hygiene, and sanitation promotion, community mobilization,
planning, cost-recovery, and water resources management, to help
ensure that investments in hardware and promotional activities will be
sustainable over the long-term; and 3) provide a comprehensive
technical review of water treatment and water quality testing
technologies for use at the community and household levels, and
supporting pilot tests of technologies that show potential for
technical, social and economic acceptability.
Start date: 1/8/2008;
End date: 3/31/2010;
Agreement amount: $1,200,000.
Source: USAID.
[End of table]
Table 4: United States Agency for International Development's Office
of Transition Initiatives (Quick-Impact Activities):
FATA Transition Initiative:
The overall objective of the FATA Transition Initiative is to enhance
confidence and trust between communities and the government of
Pakistan in the FATA through quick-impact, community-based grants
grounded in a public and transparent consultative process. In support
of this objective, the FATA Transition Initiative intends to: 1) help
the government of Pakistan extend its writ and legitimacy to FATA
through confidence building measures and increased consultations with
communities; and 2) increase public access to information about
government of Pakistan social, economic, and political activities and
policies in FATA. The program is being implemented by two partners,
but is managed as one program.
Start date: 11/6/2007;
End date: 11/5/2010;
Agreement amount: $44,399,347.
Start date: 11/12/2007;
End date: 9/3/2012;
Agreement amount: $100,000,000.
Source: USAID.
[End of table]
Table 5: Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs:
Matani Bypass:
The Matani Bypass project goal is to construct high priority roads and
bridges to enhance the government of Pakistan's ability to deliver
goods and services to the FATA, while at the same time enhancing the
access of Pakistani border security and law enforcement personnel to
these critical areas.
Agreement amount: $10,000,000.
Landi Kotal Bypass:
The Landi Kotal Bypass project goal is to construct high priority
roads and bridges to enhance the government of Pakistan's ability to
deliver goods and services to the FATA, while at the same time
enhancing the access of Pakistani border security and law enforcement
personnel to these critical areas.
Agreement amount: $5,000,000.
FATA Supplemental:
USAID transferred $17 million in Economic Support Funds to INL for
road construction and supporting the Levy police force. INL planned to
use the funds to enhance the government of Pakistan's capability to
establish the rule of law in the FATA region by providing
infrastructure; training and training facilities; and communication
equipment and vehicles to Levy police forces in the FATA agencies with
a view to increase their mobility and effectiveness against
insurgents, terrorists and criminal elements. $5 million of this
funding was to be used to build up managerial expertise of the FATA
Construction Unit, as well as provide construction equipment and tools
to prepare for road construction in subsequent years. $7 million of
this funding was for training and equipping Levy police forces in the
FATA. $5 million of this funding was to be used for the construction
of a Levy Training Center. However $5 million of these funds were
later re-programmed for aviation support.
Agreement amount: $17,000,000.
Source: State.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Detailed Performance Results for FATA-Specific USAID
Programs:
The following is a detailed snapshot of program performance measured
by the performance of indicators against their targets, as reported in
programs' most recent annual reporting instruments. Indicators have
been categorized by the percentage of the target that was achieved.
Special circumstances--such as indicators without targets or targets
of zero--are placed in separate categories to form a complete picture
of program performance.
Livelihoods Development Program: The Livelihoods Development Program
completed its first year of operations in spring 2009 and the
following information was taken from the programs' first annual
reports The program is being implemented by two separate partners, one
operating in the upper FATA and the other in lower FATA.
Table 6: Lower FATA Development Program, Year 1 Results:
Indicator status: More than 100%;
# of indicators: 0;
% of total: 0%.
Indicator status: 100%;
# of indicators: 0;
% of total: 0%.
Indicator status: 76%-99%;
# of indicators: 0;
% of total: 0%.
Indicator status: 51%-75%;
# of indicators: 3;
% of total: 33%.
Indicator status: 26%-50%;
# of indicators: 4;
% of total: 44%.
Indicator status: 1%-25%;
# of indicators: 2;
% of total: 22%.
Indicator status: 0%;
# of indicators: 0;
% of total: 0%.
Indicator status: Total number of indicators;
# of indicators: 9;
% of total: 100%.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[End of table]
Table 7: Upper FATA Development Program, Year 1 Results:
Indicator status: More than 100%;
# of indicators: 3;
% of total: 6.5%.
Indicator status: 100%;
# of indicators: 3;
% of total: 6.5%.
Indicator status: 76%-99%;
# of indicators: 3;
% of total: 6.5%.
Indicator status: 51%-75%;
# of indicators: 3;
% of total: 6.5%.
Indicator status: 26%-50%;
# of indicators: 1;
% of total: 2%.
Indicator status: 1%-25%;
# of indicators: 11;
% of total: 24%.
Indicator status: 0%;
# of indicators: 21;
% of total: 46%.
Indicator status: No target was set;
# of indicators: 1;
% of total: 2%.
Indicator status: Total number of indicators;
# of indicators: 46;
% of total: 100%.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[End of table]
Links to Learning: Education Support to Pakistan: This program
completed its second full year of operation in October of 2009. In
Year 2 it reported on 49 performance indicators, 45 of which had life
of program (5 year) targets. In the absence of interim targets, GAO
could not determine if performance indicators were on track to meet 5-
year goals after two years of operation.
Table 8: Links to Learning: Education Support to Pakistan: Year 2
Results:
Indicator status: No progress made;
# of indicators: 1;
% of total: 2%.
Indicator status: Immeasurable targets;
# of indicators: 45;
% of total: 92%.
Indicator status: No target set;
# of indicators: 3;
% of total: 6%.
Indicator status: Total number of indicators;
# of indicators: 49;
% of total: 100%.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[End of table]
Pakistan Maternal and Newborn Health Program: This program completed
its first full year of operation in December 2008. The following
represents the progress it reported in its fourth quarterly report.
Table 9: Pakistan Maternal and Newborn Health Program: Year 1 Results:
Indicator status: More than 100%;
# of indicators: 2;
% of total: 9%.
Indicator status: 100%;
# of indicators: 3;
% of total: 13%.
Indicator status: 76%-99%;
# of indicators: 3;
% of total: 13%.
Indicator status: 51%-75%;
# of indicators: 5;
% of total: 22%.
Indicator status: 26%-50%;
# of indicators: 0;
% of total: 0%.
Indicator status: 1%-25%;
# of indicators: 1;
% of total: 4%.
Indicator status: 0%;
# of indicators: 9;
% of total: 39%.
Indicator status: Total number of indicators;
# of indicators: 23;
% of total: 100%.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[End of table]
Improved Child Health in FATA: This program completed its third full
year of operation in September 2009.
Table 10: Improved Child Health in FATA: Year 3 Results:
Indicator status: More than 100%;
# of indicators: 8;
% of total: 16%.
Indicator status: 100%;
# of indicators: 5;
% of total: 10%.
Indicator status: 76%-99%;
# of indicators: 5;
% of total: 10%.
Indicator status: 51%-75%;
# of indicators: 6;
% of total: 12%.
Indicator status: 26%-50%;
# of indicators: 6;
% of total: 12%.
Indicator status: 1%-25%;
# of indicators: 3;
% of total: 6%.
Indicator status: 0%;
# of indicators: 1;
% of total: 2%.
Indicator status: No target set;
# of indicators: 9;
% of total: 18%.
Indicator status: Target of "0" set;
# of indicators: 2;
% of total: 4%.
Indicator status: Immeasurable target set;
# of indicators: 5;
% of total: 10%.
Indicator status: Total number of indicators;
# of indicators: 50;
% of total: 100%.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[End of table]
Polio Eradication Initiative in FATA: This program completed its first
full year of activity in March of 2009. GAO was unable to measure its
short-term success because targets for 11 indicators were life of
program targets or not time sensitive, and therefore difficult to
measure. For example, one performance goal was to hold vaccination
campaign reviews after each campaign, but the number of campaigns was
not specified and performance was not tracked cumulatively in the
fourth quarterly report.
Table 11: Polio Eradication Initiative in FATA: Year 1 Results:
Indicator status: Reported no progress toward target (0%);
# of indicators: 2;
% of total: 15%.
Indicator status: Immeasurable target set;
# of indicators: 11;
% of total: 85%.
Indicator status: Total number of indicators;
# of indicators: 13;
% of total: 100%.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[End of table]
Pakistan HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project: This program completed
its first full year in January 2009 and the data presented is from its
first annual report.
Table 12: Pakistan HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care Project: Year 1
Results:
Indicator status: More than 100%;
# of indicators: 3;
% of total: 33%.
Indicator status: 100%;
# of indicators: 4;
% of total: 44%.
Indicator status: 76%-99%;
# of indicators: 2;
% of total: 22%.
Indicator status: 51%-75%;
# of indicators: 0;
% of total: 0%.
Indicator status: 26%-50%;
# of indicators: 0;
% of total: 0%.
Indicator status: 1%-25%;
# of indicators: 0;
% of total: 0%.
Indicator status: 0%;
# of indicators: 0;
% of total: 0%.
Indicator status: Total number of indicators;
# of indicators: 9;
% of total: 100%.
Source: GAO analysis of USAID data.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Details of INL Documentation of Monitoring for a Sample
of 42 Activities:
Figure 13: INL Documentation of FATA Project Monitoring:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Project (# of Activities): Border Security Project Roads (6);
Cost Estimate Approvals: 0 of 6;
Site Visit Reports: 6 of 6;
Photos: 6 of 6;
Completion Certificates: NA[A].
Project (# of Activities): Border Security Project Small Schemes (4)
Cost Estimate Approvals: 1[B] of 4;
Site Visit Reports: 4 of 4;
Photos: 4 of 4;
Completion Certificates: 4 of 4.
Project (# of Activities): Border Security Project Bridges (5);
Cost Estimate Approvals: 0[C] of 5;
Site Visit Reports: 3 of 5;
Photos: 5 of 5;
Completion Certificates: 0 of 2.
Project (# of Activities): Counter-narcotics Roads (3);
Cost Estimate Approvals: 2[D] of 3;
Site Visit Reports: 3 of 3;
Photos: 3 of 3;
Completion Certificates: 1 of 1.
Project (# of Activities): Counter-narcotics Small Schemes (3);
Cost Estimate Approvals: 2[E] of 3;
Site Visit Reports: 3 of 3;
Photos: 3 of 3;
Completion Certificates: 3 of 3.
Project (# of Activities): Frontier Constabulary Outposts (8);
Cost Estimate Approvals: 1[F] of 8;
Site Visit Reports: 7 of 8;
Photos: 7 of 8;
Completion Certificates: 0 of 6.
Project (# of Activities): Frontier Corps Outposts (6);
Cost Estimate Approvals: 0 of 6;
Site Visit Reports: 5 of 6;
Photos: 6 of 6;
Completion Certificates: NA[G].
Project (# of Activities): Levy Outposts (6);
Cost Estimate Approvals: 3[H] of 6;
Site Visit Reports: 4 of 6;
Photos: 4 of 6;
Completion Certificates: 4 of 6.
Project (# of Activities): Levy Training Center (1);
Cost Estimate Approvals: 0 of 1[I];
Site Visit Reports: 1 of 1;
Photos: 1 of 1;
Completion Certificates: NA[J].
Source: GAO analysis of INL documentation.
[A] These road projects were canceled in November 2008 due to
difficulty in monitoring the work. While the work was completed, the
government of Pakistan has not provided completion certificates for
these activities.
[B] Four cost estimates were provided to GAO, they were approved at
FATA Secretariat meetings, but only one meeting documented that an INL
representative attended so it is unclear whether INL approved the cost
estimate. Additionally, the cost estimates had a signature block for
INL approval, which was blank.
[C] Three cost estimates were provided to GAO, but none showed
evidence of INL review.
[D] One cost estimate was signed by INL, one cost estimate was
approved by the Project Review Board (which included an INL
representative). The third project's cost estimate was approved by the
FATA Secretariat, but had no documentation of INL approval.
[E] Three cost estimates were provided to GAO, but only two had been
reviewed.
[F] Seven cost estimates were provided to GAO, but only one had been
reviewed.
[G] All Frontier Corps outposts in our sample were still being
constructed at the time of our review.
[H] INL provided GAO with cost estimates for 4 of 6 Levy Outposts, but
only one included documentation of INL approval of the cost estimate.
[I] A cost estimate was provided to GAO, but had no documentation of
INL approval.
[J] This construction project was canceled. The packet included a
letter from INL that indicated the Levy Training Center would now be
included as part of the North West Frontier Province Joint Police
Training Center.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USAID:
U.S. Agency for International Development:
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW:
Washington, DC 20523:
[hyperlink, http://www.usaid.gov]
Mr, Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Johnson:
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) appreciates the
opportunity to review and respond to your draft audit report entitled
"Combating Terrorism: Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development
Assistance in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Need to
be Improved" (GAO 10-289).
USAID concurs with your overall recommendation that U.S. assistance in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) should be well planned
and documented, and is pleased with your finding that USAID's plans
and goals have been generally aligned with U.S. national security
goals and Pakistan's FATA development plans.
Given the security situation, USAID and the FATA Secretariat jointly
agreed that the development of FATA Agency-level strategies,
originally included in the Scope of Work of the Capacity Building
Program, was no longer a relevant and worthwhile activity, However,
USAID and the FATA Secretariat initiated several other measures to
ensure that U.S. funds are being used in accordance with the needs of
the seven FATA Agencies. USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (DTI)
completes quarterly implementation strategies for each Agency and
Frontier Region. These strategies, which also serve as work plans, are
developed in close coordination with FATA Secretariat officials. The
annual work plans of all other FATA programs are developed in
consultation with the FATA Secretariat, with consultations and
planning exercises with Political Agents, to ensure coordination of,
and responsiveness to, the Government of Pakistan (GOP) and USG
priorities and efforts.
USAID has also helped create a Project Management Unit in the FATA
Secretariat for improved coordination. USAID will continue to
strengthen our cooperation with the GOP in developing and implementing
projects.
USAID generally concurs with the finding regarding performance
monitoring and measurement. Since the audit, we have taken several
additional steps to improve monitoring and evaluation, and performance
measurement.
USAID has increased the number of Foreign Service National (FSN) staff
at our office in Peshawar to increase direct monitoring of FATA
projects; launched recruitment of a dedicated FSN to monitor and
evaluate activities; and completed a Geographic Information System to
track activities. USAID will continue to improve our performance
management system to further address the weaknesses identified in the
audit, USAID also concurs with the need to further improve existing
systems to track USAID expenditures in the FATA. USAID is working on a
system to enhance expenditure monitoring.
Finally, USAID believes that the GAO report needs to stress more
strongly the significant security constraints of working in the area.
This was the principal reason for projects not meeting planned
performance targets. The first two years of the program were plagued
by a seriously deteriorating security environment marked by several
major security incidents, including the outbreak of conflict
throughout the FATA, an attack on U.S. Consulate staff, the murder of an
American Chief of Party and a Pakistani staff member of one of the
programs, and the relocation of expatriates to Islamabad. The
situation in FATA remains quite tenuous. However, USAID has learned a
great deal about how to operate in the environment and has seen a
continued acceleration in implementation of our FATA program. USAID
will continue to identify measures to work more effectively within the
circumstances and to improve implementation.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to comment on this report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this
review.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Drew Luten:
Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator:
Bureau for Management:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
March 25, 2010:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Combating
Terrorism: Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development Assistance
in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas to Be Improved," GAO
Job Code 320656.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Erica Miller, Foreign Affairs Officer, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at (202) 776-8565.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc:
GAO ” Hynek Kalkus:
INL ” David Johnson:
State/OIG ” Tracy Burnett:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Combating Terrorism: Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development
Assistance in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Need to
Be Improved (GAO-10-289, GAO Code 320656):
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled
"Combating Terrorism: Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development
Assistance in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Need to
Be Improved." Enhancing the effectiveness of civilian assistance to
Pakistan is one of the U.S. Government's top foreign policy and
national security priorities. Foreign assistance is vital to help the
Government of Pakistan (GOP) overcome the political, economic, and
security challenges that threaten Pakistan's long-term stability. For
this reason and in light of the significant increase in foreign
assistance funding for Pakistan, we welcome the GAO review of our
programs and the opportunity to improve upon our efforts.
The Department of State concurs with the overarching recommendation of
the GAO report that assistance programs should align with U.S.
national security objectives and the Government of Pakistan's
requirements and that efforts to monitor and report on programs,
performance, and spending should be robust and transparent. The
Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL), as the primary State Department entity
providing significant civilian assistance programming in the FATA, has
been working since the 1980s to implement development assistance
programs in close coordination with Pakistani partners.
The Department generally concurs with GAO's recommendation to improve
INL's performance reporting and will take the recommendation under
consideration as it refines the existing process and defines new
requirements for performance measurement and reporting. INL uses well-
established procedures to produce project-level performance documents
that set out quantifiable measurements, which are mutually agreed upon
with GOP partners. These documents include project proposals and cost
estimates (PC-1s), which outline the project description,
justification, objective(s), and target(s), and memoranda of
understanding, which provide USG-GOP agreement on implementation
procedures for specific projects.
The Department generally concurs with GAO's recommendation that the
Department of State improve documentation of its monitoring efforts.
While the Department acknowledges that reporting on these efforts
needs improvement, Pakistan-based INL staff conduct regular monitoring
and oversight visits to project sites throughout the FATA, NWFP, and
Balochistan as well as other locations throughout the country, as the
security environment permits. As a testament to this personalized
approach, INL provided GAO with site visit reports, drafted by INL in-
country staff, for 36, and photos taken by INL personnel for 39, of
the 42 projects for which GAO requested data. Three of the six
projects lacking site visit reports and two of the three projects
lacking photos are located in North and South Waziristan, where
militant activities and military operations have created a security
situation where site visits could not be safely conducted in recent
years.
The GAO report did not reference INL's rigorous End Use Monitoring
(EUM) program, which is a year-round effort overseen by the INL
Director and Management Officer in Pakistan and executed by four
locally-employed staff, to track and monitor all INL assistance
provided to Government of Pakistan entities. INL EUM staff members
conduct scheduled and unscheduled on-site inspections at locations
throughout Pakistan, process quarterly reports on assistance from
Government of Pakistan partners, and maintain day-to-day contact with
relevant GOP officials. In recent years, the EUM reports for Pakistan
have found that the vast majority of INL assistance to Pakistani
partners is being used as intended and that recipients' procedures for
tracking locations and use of resources has been excellent. Given the
tenuous security situation, this is an impressive record of USG
employees conducting hands-on field monitoring in a highly difficult
operating environment. The GAO audit prompted INL to initiate new
efforts to improve its monitoring documentation and organization
systems, including labeling all monitoring photos, improving
electronic and physical filing systems, and producing electronic
minutes of all meetings with GOP counterparts. INL is also planning
regional training for monitoring staff this calendar year.
Finally, the Department of State believes that, as drafted, the GAO
report underestimates the impact of the security environment on the
implementation and monitoring of U.S. Government programs in the FATA
and western frontier.
[End of section]
Appendix VII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Charles Michael Johnson Jr., Director, International Affairs and
Trade, (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Hynek P. Kalkus, Assistant
Director; Claude Adrien; Brandon Hunt; Jodi Munson; Bruce Kutnick;
Karen Deans; Virginia Chanley; Martin De Alteriis; Mark Dowling; Jena
Sinkfield; and Holly Dye made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan's Border Area with
Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-263SP]. Washington, D.C.: February
23, 2009.
Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed
over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-806]. Washington, D.C.:
June 24, 2008.
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Oversight of Pakistan Reimbursement Claims
for Coalition Support Funds. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-932T]. Washington, D.C.: June 24,
2008.
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts to Address the Terrorist Threat in
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas Require a Comprehensive
Plan and Continued Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-820T]. Washington, D.C.: May 20,
2008.
Preliminary Observations on the Use and Oversight of U.S. Coalition
Support Funds Provided to Pakistan. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-735R]. Washington, D.C.: May 6,
2008.
Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to
Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622]. Washington, D.C.: April 17,
2008.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See Related GAO Products in this report.
[2] Of the $728 million in allocations, $306 million of these
allocations was not available to USAID until September 2009 and was
not available to State until November 2009.
[3] For more information on USAID programs in the FATA, see appendix
II.
[4] Such programs include State's Border Security Program, State's
Anti-Terrorism Assistance, and USAID's nationwide programs that
operate in the FATA.
[5] In addition to the Pakistan Army, the government of Pakistan has
several security forces that operate in the western frontier region,
including the Frontier Constabulary, the Frontier Corps, and Levies.
The Frontier Constabulary is a federal force charged with guarding the
border between the FATA and the rest of Pakistan. The Frontier Corps
is a paramilitary force which acts as border police between the FATA
and Afghanistan. Levies serve as an auxiliary security force,
providing law enforcement services in the FATA. These forces largely
draw recruits from tribal clans within the FATA.
[6] For a description of the FATA Development Program and its
activities, see appendix II.
[7] While State noted they have signed letters of agreement to spend
$32 million, they have obligated (in the form of contracts) about $6
million as of the end of fiscal year 2009.
[8] The ADS is USAID's directives management program. It includes
agency policy directives, required procedures, and optional material.
The requirement for performance management plans is detailed in ADS
Chapter 201: Planning and ADS Chapter 203: Assessing and Learning.
[9] The ADS calls for a "calendar of performance management tasks,"
which sets a timeline for duties such as assessing the quality of data
obtained and reviewing implementing partners' reports.
[10] This regulation is detailed in the code of federal regulations,
title 22 Foreign Relations, Chapter II Agency for International
Development, Part 226, Administration of Assistance Awards to U.S. Non-
Governmental Organizations.
[11] Documentation provided by INL refers to these reports as
"progress reports," but for consistency we use the term "performance
report" throughout our report.
[12] For a discussion of our sampling methodology, see appendix I,
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology.
[13] The 2007 Performance Plan and Report is narrative. In the 2008
Performance Plan and Report, two health indicators are specifically
for the FATA region. Other indicators are nationwide or include other
areas of the country.
[14] The Pakistan Safe Drinking Water and Hygiene Program and the
Capacity Building Program, both in their first year of operation, did
not report on performance indicators. Both programs started tracking
progress against indicators in their second year of operation, but
have not completed their second year of operation.
[15] OTI evaluates success by its program's ability to respond to U.S.
foreign policy priorities and local needs, rather than using a
performance monitoring plan with program indicators.
[16] We were informed by a USAID official that activities are regarded
as "closed" when all administrative and financial aspects of these
activities have been verified as completed by USAID's OTI staff.
[17] For the purposes of this analysis we refer to the metrics found
in USAID's OTI activity plans as performance indicators to maintain
consistency in the report. The metrics in the source documents are
labeled outputs and USAID may use other means to judge overall program
performance. We have used them in this report to obtain the best
available quantitative measurement of OTI activities' performance
against targets. For a discussion of our methodology, see Appendix I,
Scope and Methodology.
[18] Based on the methodology used to select the sample, these results
are not generalizable to the population. However, both the methodology
used and the results observed are sufficient to support the conclusion.
[19] Late in the review, USAID officials told us that community
oversight committees are not used to monitor long-term programs.
[20] This unit serves a similar function to the Monitoring and
Verification Unit, which monitors long-term USAID programs.
[21] These committees were variously referred to as "community
oversight committees," "project oversight committees" and "project
management committees." We use "community oversight committees" to
maintain consistency in the report.
[End of section]
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