Drug Control
International Programs Face Significant Challenges Reducing the Supply of Illegal Drugs but Support Broad U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives Gao ID: GAO-10-921T July 21, 2010The overall goal of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy, prepared by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), is to reduce illicit drug use in the United States. GAO has issued more than 20 products since 2000 examining U.S.-funded international programs aimed at reducing the supply of drugs. These programs have been implemented primarily in drug source countries, such as Colombia and Afghanistan as well drug transit countries, such as Mexico, Guatemala, and Venezuela. They have included interdiction of maritime drug shipments on the high seas, support for foreign military and civilian institutions engaged in drug eradication, detection, and interdiction; and rule of law assistance aimed at helping foreign legal institutions investigate and prosecute drug trafficking, money laundering, and other drug-related crimes.
GAO's work on U.S.-funded international counternarcotics-related programswork has centered on four major topics: (1) Counternarcotics-related programs have had mixed results. In Afghanistan, Colombia, and drug transit countries, the United States and partner nations have only partially met established targets for reducing the drug supply. In Afghanistan, opium poppy eradication efforts have consistently fallen short of targets. Plan Colombia has met its goals for reducing opium and heroin but not coca crops, although recent data suggest that U.S.-supported crop eradication efforts over time may have caused a significant decline in potential cocaine production. Data also indicate an increase in coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia that may eventually offset these declines. Interdiction programs have missed their performance targets each year since goals were established in 2007. (2) Several factors have limited program effectiveness. Various factors have hindered these programs' ability to reduce the supply of illegal drugs. In some cases, we found that U.S. agencies had not planned for the sustainment of programs, particularly those providing interdiction boats in transit countries. External factors include limited cooperation from partner nations due to corruption or lack of political support, and the highly adaptive nature of drug producers and traffickers. (3) Counternarcotics-related programs often advance broader foreign policy objectives. The value of these programs cannot be assessed based only on their impact on the drug supply. Many have supported other U.S. foreign policy objectives relating to security and stabilization, counterinsurgency, and strengthening democracy and governance. For example, in Afghanistan, the United States has combined counternarcotics efforts with military operations to combat insurgents as well as drug traffickers. U.S. support for Plan Colombia has significantly strengthened Colombia's security environment, which may eventually make counterdrug programs, such as alternative agricultural development, more effective. In several cases, U.S. rule of law assistance, such as supporting courts, prosecutors, and law enforcement organizations, has furthered both democracy-building and counterdrug objectives. (4) Judging the effectiveness of some programs is difficult. U.S. agencies often lack reliable performance measurement and results reporting needed to assess all the impacts of counterdrug programs. In Afghanistan, opium eradication measures alone were insufficient for a comprehensive assessment of U.S. efforts. Also, the State Department has not regularly reported outcome-related information for over half of its programs in major drug transit countries. Furthermore, DOD's counternarcotics-related measures were generally not useful for assessing program effectiveness or making management decisions. GAO has made recommendations to the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and other agencies to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. counternarcotics- related programs. In particular, GAO has recommended that these agencies develop plans to sustain these programs. GAO has also recommended that they improve performance measurement and results reporting to assess program impacts and to aid in decision making. Agencies have efforts under way to implement some of these recommendations.
GAO-10-921T, Drug Control: International Programs Face Significant Challenges Reducing the Supply of Illegal Drugs but Support Broad U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, July 21, 2010:
Drug Control:
International Programs Face Significant Challenges Reducing the Supply
of Illegal Drugs but Support Broad U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives:
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-10-921T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-921T, a report to House Government Oversight
Committee, Subcommittee on Domestic Policy.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The overall goal of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy, prepared
by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), is
to reduce illicit drug use in the United States. GAO has issued more
than 20 products since 2000 examining U.S.-funded international
programs aimed at reducing the supply of drugs. These programs have
been implemented primarily in drug source countries, such as Colombia
and Afghanistan, as well drug transit countries, such as Mexico,
Guatemala, and Venezuela. They have included interdiction of maritime
drug shipments on the high seas, support for foreign military and
civilian institutions engaged in drug eradication, detection, and
interdiction; and rule of law assistance aimed at helping foreign
legal institutions investigate and prosecute drug trafficking, money
laundering, and other drug-related crimes.
What GAO Found:
GAO‘s work on U.S.-funded international counternarcotics-related
programs has centered on four major topics:
* Counternarcotics-related programs have had mixed results. In
Afghanistan, Colombia, and drug transit countries, the United States
and partner nations have only partially met established targets for
reducing the drug supply. In Afghanistan, opium poppy eradication
efforts have consistently fallen short of targets. Plan Colombia has
met its goals for reducing opium and heroin but not coca crops,
although recent data suggest that U.S.-supported crop eradication
efforts over time may have caused a significant decline in potential
cocaine production. Data also indicate that increases in cocaine
production in Peru and Bolivia have partially offset these declines.
Interdiction programs have missed their performance targets each year
since goals were established in 2007.
* Several factors have limited program effectiveness. Various factors
have hindered these programs‘ ability to reduce the supply of illegal
drugs. In some cases, we found that U.S. agencies had not planned for
the sustainment of programs, particularly those providing interdiction
boats in transit countries. External factors include limited
cooperation from partner nations due to corruption or lack of
political support, and the highly adaptive nature of drug producers
and traffickers.
* Counternarcotics-related programs often advance broad foreign policy
objectives. The value of these programs cannot be assessed based only
on their impact on the drug supply. Many have supported other U.S.
foreign policy objectives relating to security and stabilization,
counterinsurgency, and strengthening democracy and governance. For
example, in Afghanistan, the United States has combined
counternarcotics efforts with military operations to combat insurgents
as well as drug traffickers. U.S. support for Plan Colombia has
significantly strengthened Colombia‘s security environment, which may
eventually make counterdrug programs, such as alternative agricultural
development, more effective. In several cases, U.S. rule of law
assistance, such as supporting courts, prosecutors, and law
enforcement organizations, has furthered both democracy-building and
counterdrug objectives.
* Judging the effectiveness of some programs is difficult. U.S.
agencies often lack reliable performance measurement and results
reporting needed to assess all the impacts of counterdrug programs. In
Afghanistan, opium eradication measures alone were insufficient for a
comprehensive assessment of U.S. efforts. Also, the State Department
has not regularly reported outcome-related information for over half
of its programs in major drug transit countries. Furthermore, DOD‘s
counternarcotics-related measures were generally not useful for
assessing program effectiveness or making management decisions.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO has made recommendations to the Departments of Defense (DOD) and
State and other agencies to improve the effectiveness and efficiency
of these programs. In particular, GAO has recommended that agencies
develop plans to sustain programs. GAO has also recommended that
agencies improve performance measurement and results reporting to
assess program impacts and to aid in decision making. In most cases,
the agencies have either implemented these recommendations or have
efforts underway to address them.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-921T] or key
components. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-
4268 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here to discuss our analysis of the United States'
international counternarcotics effort over the past several years.
Since 2000, we have published over 20 reports on U.S. international
counternarcotics programs and other international programs related to
counternarcotics. Today, I will discuss the overall findings from
these reports and some of the recommendations we have made.
Specifically, I will focus on four major topics with regard to U.S.
international counternarcotics-related programs: (1) their results in
reducing the supply of illegal drugs; (2) factors limiting their
effectiveness; (3) their alignment with broad U.S. foreign policy
objectives, such as counterinsurgency and the promotion of political
stability, and democracy, and (4) difficulties in judging their
effectiveness, given a lack of reliable performance measurement and
results reporting.
My statement today is based on our extensive body of work examining
U.S. efforts to reduce the flow of drugs into this country (see app.
I). We have conducted extensive on-the-ground work in the United
States as well as in major illicit drug producing countries, such as
Afghanistan, Colombia, and Peru, and major drug transit countries,
such as the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico Panama, and
Venezuela.[Footnote 1] Our reports incorporate information we obtained
and analyzed from foreign officials in these countries as well as U.S.
officials posted both overseas and in Washington, D.C., from the
Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security, State (State),
Justice, Treasury; the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID); the Defense Intelligence Agency; the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), and the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP). In the United States we also obtained information from U.S.
officials at other agencies and organizations involved in
international drug control and interdiction, such as the U.S. Southern
Command and the Joint Interagency Task Force-South in Florida and the
El Paso Information Center in Texas, and the Central Intelligence
Agency's Crime and Narcotics Center in Virginia. Our work was
conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence we obtained provides a reasonable basis
for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
During the past decade, the overarching goal of the U.S. National Drug
Control Strategy has been to reduce illegal drug use in the United
States. A main priority of the strategy has been to disrupt illegal
drug trade and production abroad in the transit zone[Footnote 2] and
production countries by attacking the power structures and finances of
international criminal organizations and aiding countries with
eradication and interdiction efforts.[Footnote 3] This involves
seizing large quantities of narcotics from transporters, disrupting
major drug trafficking organizations, arresting their leaders, and
seizing their assets. The strategy also called for the United States
to support democratic institutions and the rule of law in allied
nations both in the transit zone and in drug producing countries,
strengthening of these nations' prosecutorial efforts, and the
prosecution of foreign traffickers and producers. According to State's
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, the goal of U.S.
counternarcotics assistance to other countries is to help their
governments become full and self-sustaining partners in the fight
against drugs.
The updated U.S. National Drug Control Strategy, released in May 2010,
endorses a balance of drug abuse prevention, drug treatment, and law
enforcement. International efforts in the strategy include
collaborating with international partners to disrupt the drug trade,
supporting the drug control efforts of major drug source and transit
countries, and attacking key vulnerabilities of drug-trafficking
organizations.
Counternarcotics-Related Programs Have Had Mixed Results in Meeting
Supply Reduction and Interdiction Goals:
Our work in Afghanistan, Colombia, and the transit zone has shown that
the United States and its partner nations have partially met
established targets for reducing the supply of illicit drugs. Most
programs designed to reduce cultivation, production, and trafficking
of drugs have missed their performance targets.
Some Afghan Opium Poppy Reduction Targets Have Been Achieved:
In Afghanistan, one of the original indicators of success of the U.S.-
funded counternarcotics effort was the reduction of opium poppy
cultivation in the country, and for each year from 2005 to 2008, State
established a new cultivation reduction target. According to State,
the targets were met for some but not all of these years. We recently
reported that cultivation data show increases from 2005 to 2007 and
decreases from 2007 to 2009 and that 20 of the 34 Afghan provinces are
now poppy-free. However, the U.S. and Afghan opium poppy eradication
strategy did not achieve its stated objectives, as the amounts of
poppy eradicated consistently fell short of the annual targeted
amounts. For example, based on the most recent data we analyzed--for
2008-2009--slightly more than one-quarter of the total eradication
goal for that year was achieved: of the 20,000 hectares targeted, only
5,350 hectares were successfully eradicated.[Footnote 4]
These eradication and cultivation goals were not met due to a number
of factors, including lack of political will on the part of Afghan
central and provincial governments. In 2009, the United States
revamped its counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan to deemphasize
eradication efforts and shift to interdiction and increased
agricultural assistance.
Plan Colombia Partially Met Six-Year Drug Supply Reduction Goals and
Recent Data Suggest More Improvements Have Been Made:
In 2008, we reported that Plan Colombia's goal of reducing the
cultivation and production of illegal drugs by 50 percent in 6 years
was partially achieved.[Footnote 5] From 2001 to 2006, Colombian opium
poppy cultivation and heroin production decreased by about 50 percent
to meet established goals. However, estimated coca cultivation rose by
15 percent with an estimated 157,000 hectares cultivated in 2006
compared to 136,200 hectares in 2000.[Footnote 6] State officials
noted that extensive aerial and manual eradication efforts during this
period were not sufficient to overcome countermeasures taken by coca
farmers. U.S. officials also noted the increase in estimated coca
cultivation levels from 2005 through 2007 may have been due, at least
in part, to the U.S. government's decision to increase the size of the
coca cultivation survey areas in Colombia beginning in 2004.[Footnote
7] Furthermore, in 2008 we reported that estimated cocaine production
was about 4 percent greater in 2006 than in 2000, with 550 metric tons
produced in 2006 compared to 530 metric tons in 2000.[Footnote 8]
Since our 2008 report, ONDCP has provided additional data that
suggests significant reductions in the potential cocaine production in
Colombia despite the rising cultivation and estimated production
numbers we had cited. ONDCP officials have noted that U.S.-supported
eradication efforts had degraded coca fields, so that less cocaine was
being produced per hectare of cultivated coca. According to ONDCP
data, potential cocaine production overall has dropped from 700 metric
tons in 2001 to 295 metric tons in 2008--a 57 percent decrease.
According to ONDCP officials, decreases in cocaine purity and in the
amount of cocaine seized at the Southwest Border since 2006 tend to
corroborate the lower potential cocaine production figures.
In interpreting this additional ONDCP data, a number of facts and
mitigating circumstances should be considered. First, increasing
effectiveness of coca eradication efforts may not be the only
explanation for the data that ONDCP provided. Other factors, such as
dry weather conditions, may be contributing to these decreases in
potential cocaine production. Also, other factors, such as increases
in cocaine flow to West Africa and Europe could be contributing to
decreased availability and purity of cocaine in U.S. markets.
Additionally, ONDCP officials cautioned about the longer-term
prospects for these apparent eradication achievements, because
weakened economic conditions in both the U.S. and Colombia could
hamper the Colombian government's sustainment of eradication programs
and curtail the gains made. Moreover, as we noted in 2008, reductions
in Colombia's estimated cocaine production have been partially offset
by increases in cocaine production in Peru and, to a lesser extent,
Bolivia. Although It remains to be seen whether cocaine production in
Peru and Bolivia will continue to increase and these whether Peru will
return to being the primary coca producing country that it was through
the 1980's and into the 1990's.[Footnote 9]
Cocaine Interdiction Programs in the Transit Zone Has Fallen Short of
Targets:
According to ONDCP data, the United States has fallen slightly short
of its cocaine interdiction targets each year since the targets were
established in 2007. The national interdiction goal calls for the
removal of 40 percent of the cocaine moving through the transit zone
annually by 2015. The goal included interim annual targets of 25
percent in 2008 and 27 percent in 2009.[Footnote 10] However, since
2006, cocaine removal rates have declined and have not reached any of
the annual targets to date. The removal rate dropped to 23 percent in
2007 and 20 percent in 2008 (5 percentage points short of the target
for that year) then rose to 25 percent in 2009 (2.5 percentage points
short of the target for that year). ONDCP has cited aging interdiction
assets, such as U.S. Coast Guard vessels, the redirection of
interdiction capacity to wars overseas, and budget constraints, as
contributing factors to these lower-than-desired success rates.
Moreover, the increasing flow of illicit narcotics through Venezuela
and the continuing flow through Mexico pose significant challenges to
U.S. counternarcotics interdiction efforts.
Several Factors Have Limited the Effectiveness of U.S. Programs:
A number of factors to counternarcotics-related programs have limited
the effectiveness of U.S. counternarcotic efforts. These factors
include a lack of planning by U.S. agencies to sustain some U.S.-
funded programs over the longer term, limited cooperation from partner
nations, and the adaptability of drug producers and traffickers.
Lack of Planning by U.S. Agencies to Sustain Some Programs:
U.S. agencies had not developed plans for how to sustain some
programs, particularly those programs providing assets, such as boats,
to partner nations to conduct interdiction efforts. Some
counternarcotics initiatives we reviewed were hampered by a shortage
of resources made available by partner nations to sustain these
programs. We found that many partner nations in the transit zone had
limited resources to devote to counternarcotics, and many initiatives
depended on U.S. support. Programs aimed at building maritime
interdiction capacity were particularly affected, as partner nations,
including Haiti, Guatemala, Jamaica, Panama and the Dominican
Republic, were unable to use U.S.-provided boats for patrol or
interdiction operations due to a lack of funding for fuel and
maintenance. Despite continued efforts by DOD and State to provide
these countries with boats, these agencies had not developed plans to
address long-term sustainability of these assets over their expected
operating life.[Footnote 11]
Also, we found in 2006 that the availability of some key U.S. assets
for interdiction operations, such as maritime patrol aircraft, was
declining, and the United States had not planned for how to replace
them. According to JIATF-South and other cognizant officials, the
declining availability of P-3 maritime patrol aircraft was the most
critical challenge to the success of future interdiction operations.
[Footnote 12] Since then, DOD has taken steps to address the issue of
declining availability of ships and aircraft for transit zone
interdiction operations by using other forms of aerial surveillance
and extending the useful life of P-3 aircraft. Recently, DOD's
Southern Command officials told us that they plan to rely increasingly
upon U.S.-supported partner nations for detection and monitoring
efforts as DOD capabilities in this area diminish. However, given the
concerns we have reported about the ability of some partner nations to
sustain counternarcotics-related assets, it remains to be seen whether
this contingency is viable.
Limited Cooperation Between the United States and Partner Nations:
Our work in Colombia, Mexico, and drug transit countries has shown
that cooperative working relationships between U.S. officials and
their foreign counterparts is essential to implementing effective
counternarcotics programs. The United States has agreed-upon
strategies with both Colombia and Mexico to achieve counternarcotics-
related objectives and has worked extensively to strengthen those
countries' capacity to combat illicit drug production and trafficking.
For example, to detect and intercept illegal air traffic in Colombian
air space the United States and Colombia collaborated to operate the
Air Bridge Denial Program, which the Colombian Air Force now operates
independently. Also, in Mexico, increased cooperation with the United
States led to a rise in extraditions of high-level cartel members,
demonstrating a stronger commitment by the Mexican government to work
closely with U.S. agencies to combat drug trafficking problems.
Similarly, in 2008 we reported that in most major drug transit
countries, close and improving cooperation has yielded a variety of
benefits for the counternarcotics effort. In particular, partner
nations have shared information and intelligence leading to arrests
and drug seizures, participated in counternarcotics operations both at
sea and on land, and cooperated in the prosecution of drug
traffickers.[Footnote 13]
However, corruption within the governments of partner nations can
seriously limit cooperation. For example, in 2002, the U.S. government
suspended major joint operations in Guatemala when the antinarcotics
police unit in that country was disbanded in response to reports of
widespread corruption within the agency and its general lack of
effectiveness in combating the country's drug problem. In the Bahamas,
State reported in 2003 that it was reluctant to include Bahamian
defense personnel in drug interdiction operations and to share
sensitive law enforcement information with them due to corruption
concerns. Corruption has also hampered Dominican Republic-based, money-
laundering investigations, according to DEA.[Footnote 14]
Afghan officials objected to aerial eradication efforts and the use of
chemicals in Afghanistan, forcing eradication to be done with
tractors, all-terrain vehicles, and manually with sticks, making the
effort less efficient. Furthermore, Afghan governors had been slow to
grant permission to eradicate poppy fields until the concept for the
central government's eradication force was changed in 2008 so that
this force could operate without governor permission in areas where
governors either would not or could not launch eradication efforts
themselves.[Footnote 15]
Deteriorating relations with Venezuela have stalled the progress of
several cooperative counternarcotics initiatives intended to slow drug
trafficking through that country. In 2007, Venezuela began denying
visas for U.S. officials to serve in Venezuela, which complicated
efforts to cooperate. Additionally, the overall number of
counternarcotics projects supported by both the United States in
Venezuela has fallen since 2005. For example, the Government of
Venezuela withdrew support from the Prosecutor's Drug Task Force in
2005 and a port security program in 2006.[Footnote 16]
Highly Adaptive Nature of Drug Traffickers and Producers:
Drug trafficking organizations and associated criminal networks have
been extremely adaptive and resourceful, shifting routes and operating
methods quickly in response to pressure from law enforcement
organizations or rival traffickers. In 2008, we reported that drug
traffickers typically used go-fast boats and fishing vessels to
smuggle cocaine from Colombia to Central America and Mexico en route
to the United States. These boats, capable of traveling at speeds over
40 knots, were difficult to detect in open water and were often used
at night or painted blue and used during the day, becoming virtually
impossible to see. Traffickers have also used "mother ships" in
concert with fishing vessels to transport illicit drugs into open
waters and then distribute the load among smaller boats at sea. In
addition, traffickers have used evasive maritime routes and changed
them frequently. Some boats have traveled as far southwest as the
Galapagos Islands in the Pacific Ocean before heading north toward
Mexico, while others travel through Central America's littoral waters,
close to shore, where they could hide among legitimate maritime
traffic. Furthermore, the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-
South), under DOD's U.S. Southern Command, reported an increase in
suspicious flights--particularly departing from Venezuela. Traffickers
have flown loads of cocaine to remote, ungoverned spaces and abandoned
the planes after landing. Traffickers have also used increasingly
sophisticated concealment methods. For example, they have built
fiberglass semisubmersible craft that could avoid both visual-and
sonar-detection, hidden cocaine within the hulls of boats, and
transported liquefied cocaine in fuel tanks.[Footnote 17]
According to DOD officials, these shifts in drug trafficking patterns
and methods have likely taken place largely in response to U.S. and
international counternarcotics efforts in the Pacific Ocean and
Caribbean, although measuring causes and effects is imprecise. In
addition, according to DOD, drug trafficking organizations and
associated criminal networks commonly enjoy greater financial and
material resources (including weapons as well as communication,
navigation, and other technologies) than do governments in the transit
zone.[Footnote 18]
In addition to maritime operations, drug trafficking organizations
have adopted increasingly sophisticated smuggling techniques on the
ground. For example, from 2000 to 2006, U.S. border officials found 45
tunnels--several built primarily for narcotics smuggling. According to
DEA and Defense Intelligence Agency officials, the tunnels found were
longer, deeper, and more discrete than in prior years. One such tunnel
found in 2006 was a half-mile long. It was the longest cross border
tunnel discovered, reaching a depth of more than nine stories below
ground and featuring ventilation and groundwater drainage systems,
cement flooring, lighting, and a pulley system.[Footnote 19]
In production countries, such as Colombia, drug producers also proved
to be highly adaptive. In 2009 we reported that coca farmers adopted a
number of effective countermeasures to U.S. supported eradication and
aerial spray efforts. These measures included pruning coca plants
after spraying; replanting with younger coca plants or plant grafts;
decreasing the size of coca plots; interspersing coca with legitimate
crops to avoid detection; moving coca cultivation to areas of the
country off-limits to spray aircraft, such as the national parks and a
10 kilometer area along Colombia's border with Ecuador; and moving
coca crops to more remote parts of the country--a development that
created a "dispersal effect."[Footnote 20] While these measures
allowed coca farmers to continue cultivation, they also increased the
coca farmers and traffickers' cost of doing business.
Counternarcotics Initiatives Have Been Closely Aligned with Broad U.S.
Foreign Policy Objectives:
U.S. counternarcotics programs have been closely aligned with the
achievement of other U.S. foreign policy goals. U.S. assistance under
Plan Colombia is a key example where counternarcotic goals and foreign
policy objectives intersect. While, as of 2007, Plan Colombia had not
clearly attained its cocaine supply reduction goals, the country did
improve its security climate through systematic military and police
engagements with illegal armed groups and degradation of these group's
finances. Colombia saw a significant drop in homicides and kidnappings
and increased use of Colombian public roads during Plan Colombia's six
years. In addition, insurgency groups such as the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) saw a decline in capabilities and finances.
While these accomplishments have not necessarily led to a decrease in
drug production and trafficking, they signaled an improved security
climate, which is one of the pillars of Plan Colombia.
In Afghanistan, we recently reported that the U.S. counternarcotics
strategy has become more integrated with the broad counterinsurgency
effort over time. Prior to 2008, counterinsurgency and
counternarcotics policies were largely separated and officials noted
that this division ignored a nexus between the narcotics trade and the
insurgency. For example, DEA drug raids yielded weapons caches and
explosives used by insurgents, as well as suspects listed on Defense
military target lists, and military raids on insurgent compounds also
yielded illicit narcotics and narcotics processing equipment.[Footnote
21] DOD changed its rules of engagement in November 2008 to permit the
targeting of persons by the military (including drug traffickers) who
provide material support to insurgent or terrorist groups.
Additionally, in December 2008, DOD clarified its policy to allow the
military to accompany and provide force protection to U.S. and host
nation law enforcement personnel on counternarcotics field operations.
DEA and DOD officials stated that these changes enabled higher levels
of interdiction operations in areas previously inaccessible due to
security problems. DEA conducted 82 interdiction operations in
Afghanistan during fiscal year 2009 (compared with 42 in fiscal year
2008), often with support from U.S. military and other coalition
forces. These operations include, among other things, raiding drug
laboratories; destroying storage sites; arresting drug traffickers;
conducting roadblock operations; and seizing chemicals and drugs. The
U.S. military and International Security and Assistance Force are also
targeting narcotics trafficking and processing as part of regular
counterinsurgency operations.[Footnote 22] In addition, DEA efforts to
build the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) has
contributed to the goals of heightening security in Afghanistan. The
DEA has worked with specialized units of the CNPA to conduct
investigations, build cases, arrest drug traffickers, and conduct
undercover drug purchases, while also working to build Afghan law
enforcement capacity by mentoring CNPA specialized units. By putting
pressure on drug traffickers, counternarcotics efforts can bring
stabilization to areas subject to heavy drug activity.
Many counternarcotics-related programs involve supporting democracy
and the rule of law in partner nations, which is itself a U.S. foreign
policy objective worldwide. In Colombia , assistance for rule of law
and judicial reform have expanded access to the democratic process for
Colombian citizens, including the consolidation of state authority and
the established government institutions and public services in many
areas reclaimed from illegal armed groups. Support for legal
institutions, such as courts, attorneys general, and law enforcement
organizations, in drug source and transit countries is not only an
important part of the U.S. counternarcotic strategy but also advance
State's strategic objectives relating to democracy and governance.
Judging the Effectiveness of Some Counternarcotics-Related Programs is
Difficult:
In many of our reviews of international counternarcotic-related
programs, we found that determining program effectiveness has been
challenging. Performance measures and other information about program
results were often not useful or comprehensive enough to assess
progress in achieving program goals.
Existing Performance Measures and Results Reporting Are Often Not
Useful for Assessing Progress in Achieving Program Goals:
The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires federal
agencies to develop performance measures to assess progress in
achieving their goals and to communicate their results to the
Congress.[Footnote 23] The act requires agencies to set multiyear
strategic goals in their strategic plans and corresponding annual
goals in their performance plans, measure performance toward the
achievement of those goals, and report on their progress in their
annual performance reports. These reports are intended to provide
important information to agency managers, policymakers, and the public
on what each agency accomplished with the resources it was given.
Moreover, the act calls for agencies to develop performance goals that
are objective, quantifiable, and measurable, and to establish
performance measures that adequately indicate progress toward
achieving those goals. Our previous work has noted that the lack of
clear, measurable goals makes it difficult for program managers and
staff to link their day-to-day efforts to achieving the agency's
intended mission.[Footnote 24]
Performance Measures Established for Afghanistan Do Not Reflect the
Full Impact of Counternarcotics Programs:
In Afghanistan, we have reported that the use of poppy cultivation and
eradication statistics as the principal measures of effectiveness does
not capture all aspects of the counternarcotics effort in the country.
For example, these measures overlook potential gains in security from
the removal of drug operations from an area and do not take into
account potential rises in other drug related activity such as
trafficking and processing of opium.[Footnote 25] Some provinces that
are now poppy-free may still contain high levels of drug trafficking
or processing. Additionally, according to the Special Representative
for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the use of opium poppy cultivation as a
measure of overall success led to an over-emphasis on eradication
activities, which, due to their focus on farmers, could undermine the
larger counterinsurgency campaign. ONDCP officials also criticized
using total opium poppy cultivation as the sole measure of success,
stating that measures of success should relate to security, such as
public safety and terrorist attacks.
Alternative Development Performance Measures in Colombia Do Not
Capture Programs' Effect on Drug Supply:
For Plan Colombia, several programs we reviewed were focused on root
causes of the drug problem and their impact on drug activity was
difficult to assess. In 2008 we reported that the United States
provided nearly $1.3 billion for nonmilitary assistance in Colombia,
focusing on economic and social progress and the rule of law,
including judicial reform. The largest share of U.S. nonmilitary
assistance went toward alternative development, which has been a key
element of U.S. counternarcotics assistance and has reportedly
improved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Colombians. Other
social programs have assisted thousands of internally displaced
persons and more than 30,000 former combatants.[Footnote 26] We
reported that progress tracking of alternative development programs,
in particular, needed improvement. USAID collected data on 15
indicators that measure progress on alternative development; however,
none of these indicators measured progress toward USAID's goal of
reducing illicit narcotics production through the creation of
sustainable economic projects. Rather, USAID collected data on program
indicators such as the number of families benefited and hectares of
legal crops planted. While this information helps USAID track the
progress of projects, it does not help with assessing USAID's progress
in reducing illicit crop production or its ability to create
sustainable projects.[Footnote 27]
State Does Not Measure Performance or Report Results for Most Transit
Zone Programs:
In 2008 we reported that U.S.-funded transit zone counternarcotics
assistance encompasses a wide variety of initiatives across many
countries, but State and other agencies have collected limited
information on results. Records we obtained from State and DEA,
including State's annual International Narcotics Control Strategy
Reports and End Use Monitoring Reports, provide information on
outcomes of some of these initiatives but do not do so
comprehensively. For example, in our review of State's International
Narcotics Control Strategy Reports for 2003 to 2007, we identified
over 120 counternarcotics initiatives in the countries we reviewed,
but for over half of these initiatives, the outcomes were unclear or
not addressed at all in the reports.[Footnote 28] State has attempted
to measure the outcomes of counternarcotics programs in its annual
mission performance reports, which report on a set of performance
indicators for each country. However, these indicators have not been
consistent over time or among countries. In our review of mission
performance reports for four major drug transit countries covering
fiscal years 2002 through 2006, we identified 86 performance
indicators directly and indirectly related to counternarcotics
efforts; however, over 60 percent of these indicators were used in
only one or two annual reporting cycles, making it difficult to
discern performance trends over time. Moreover, nearly 80 percent of
these performance indicators were used for only one country, making it
difficult to compare program results among countries.[Footnote 29]
DOD and DEA Performance Measures Do Not Reflect the Results of Key
Efforts:
Based on our report on DOD performance measures released today, we
found that DOD has developed performance measures for its
counternarcotics activities as well as a database to collect
performance information, including measures, targets, and results.
However, we have found that these performance measures lacked a number
of the attributes that we consider key to being successful, such as
being clearly stated and having measurable targets. It is also unclear
to what extent DOD uses the performance information it collects
through its database to manage its counternarcotics activities.
[Footnote 30]
In 2008, we reported that DEA's strategic planning and performance
measurement framework, while improved over previous efforts, had not
been updated and did not reflect some key new and ongoing efforts.
While DEA had assisted in counterterrorism efforts through information
collection and referrals to intelligence community partners, DEA's
strategic plan had not been updated since 2003 to reflect these
efforts. As such, the strategic plan did not fully reflect the
intended purpose of providing a template for ensuring measurable
results and operational accountability. The performance measures that
were to be included in DEA's 2009 annual performance report did not
provide a basis for assessing the results of DEA's counterterrorism
efforts--efforts that include giving top priority to counternarcotics
cases with links to terrorism and pursuing narcoterrorists.[Footnote
31]
Recommendations:
We have made many recommendations in past reports regarding
counternarcotics programs. Several of our more recent recommendations
were aimed at improving two key management challenges that I have
discussed in my testimony today--planning for the sustainment of
counternarcotics assets and assessing the effectiveness of
counternarcotics-related programs.
* Improved planning for sustainment of counternarcotics assets. In our
2008 report on U.S. assistance to transit zone countries, we
recommended that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense (1) develop a plan to ensure that partner nations
in the transit zone could effectively operate and maintain all
counternarcotics assets that the United States had provided, including
boats and other vehicles and equipment, for their remaining useful
life and (2) ensure that, before providing a counternarcotics asset to
a partner nation, agencies determined the total operations and
maintenance cost over its useful life and, with the recipient nation,
develop a plan for funding this cost.
* More consistent results reporting. In our report on U.S. assistance
to transit zone countries, we recommended that the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the Director of ONDCP, the Secretaries of Defense
and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Administrator of
USAID, report the results of U.S.-funded counternarcotics initiatives
more comprehensively and consistently for each country in the annual
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.
* Improved performance measures. Several agencies we reviewed did not
have sufficient performance measures in place to accurately assess the
effectiveness of counternarcotics programs. In our DOD report released
today, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take steps to
improve DOD's counternarcotics performance measurement system by (1)
revising its performance measures, and (2) applying practices to
better facilitate the use of performance data to manage its
counternarcotics activities. For Colombia, we recommended that the
Director of Foreign Assistance and Administrator of USAID develop
performance measurements that will help USAID (1) assess whether
alternative development assistance is reducing the production of
illicit narcotics, and (2) determine to what extent the agency's
alternative development projects are self-sustaining. The existence of
such measures would allow for a greater comprehension of program
effectiveness. For Afghanistan, we recommended that the Secretary of
Defense develop performance targets to measure interim results of
efforts to train the CNPA. We also recommended to the Secretary of the
State that measures and interim targets be adopted to assess Afghan
capacity to independently conduct public information activities.
Lastly, we recommended that the Secretary of State, in consultation
with the Administrator of DEA and the Attorney General, establish
clear definitions for low-, mid-, and high-level traffickers that
would improve the ability of the U.S. and Afghan governments to track
the level of drug traffickers arrested and convicted.
In most cases, the agencies involved have generally agreed with our
recommendations and have either implemented them or have efforts
underway to address them.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, this concludes my prepared
statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Drug Control: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International
Efforts. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-97-75]
Washington, D.C. February 27, 1997.
Drug Control: U.S.-Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts Face Difficult
Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-98-154].
Washington D.C., June 30, 1998.
Drug Control: Narcotics Threat From Colombia Continues to Grow.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-99-136]. Washington
D.C., June 22, 1999.
Drug Control: Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug
Supply Have Declined. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-9]. Washington D.C., December
21, 1999:
Drug Control: U.S. Efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-00-90R]. Washington
D.C., February 18, 2000.
Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce
Results. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-126].
Washington D.C., October 17, 2000.
International Counterdrug Sites Being Developed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-63BR]. Washington D.C., December
28, 2000.
Drug Control: State Department Provides Required Aviation Program
Oversight, but Safety and Security Should be Enhanced. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1021]. Washington D.C., September
14, 2001.
Drug Control: Difficulties in Measuring Costs and Results of Transit
Zone Interdiction Efforts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-13]. January 25, 2002.
Drug Control: Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit
Crops in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious
Obstacles. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-291].
Washington D.C., February 8, 2002.
Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-319R]. Washington D.C.,
January 8, 2003.
Drug Control: Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term Costs for
U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-783]. Washington, D.C., June 16,
2003.
Drug Control: Aviation Program Safety Concerns in Colombia Are Being
Addressed, but State's Planning and Budgeting Process Can Be Improved.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-918]. Washington D.C.,
July 29, 2004.
Drug Control: Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented
New Safeguards, but Its Effect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-970]. Washington, D.C.,
September 6, 2005.
Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug
Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-200]. Washington, D.C., November
15, 2005.
Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating
Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-78]. Washington D.C., November 15,
2006.
State Department: State Has Initiated a More Systematic Approach for
Managing Its Aviation Fleet. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-264]. Washington D.C., February 2,
2007.
Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotic
Efforts, But Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow into the United
States. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1018].
Washington D.C., August 17, 2007.
Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics
Efforts, But the Flow of Illicit Drugs Into the United States Remains
High. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-215T]. Washington
D.C., October 25, 2007.
Drug Control: Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has
Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans
Are Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-784].
Washington D.C., July 15, 2008.
Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security
Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing
Assistance. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-71].
Washington D.C., October 6, 2008.
Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland
Security and An Updated Accountability Framework Can Further Enhance
DEA's Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-63]. Washington D.C., March 20,
2009.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to
Rebuilding Efforts Should be Addressed in U.S. Strategies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-476T]. Washington D.C., March 25,
2009.
Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Cooperation with Venezuela Has
Declined. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-806].
Washington D.C., July 20, 2009.
Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-235R]. Washington D.C., December 3,
2009.
Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress Reported, but
Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice Reform Efforts
Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-291].
Washington D.C., March 9, 2010.
Preliminary Observations on the Department of Defense's
Counternarcotics Performance Measurement System. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-594R]. Washington, D.C., April 30,
2010.
Drug Control: DOD Needs to Improve Its Performance Measurement System
to Better Manage and Oversee Its Counternarcotic Activities.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-835]. Washington, D.C.,
July 21, 2010.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] As defined in State's International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report 2010, a major illicit drug producing country is one in which:
(a) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy are cultivated or
harvested during a year, (b) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca
are cultivated or harvested during a year, or (c) 5,000 hectares or
more of illicit cannabis are produced or harvested during a year,
unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis production
does not significantly affect the United States. A major drug transit
country is one (a) that is a significant direct source of illicit
narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances
significantly affecting the United States; or (b) through which are
transported such drugs or substances.
[2] The transit zone is defined as the 6 million square miles
encompassing Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean island nations,
the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean.
[3] Other priorities include stopping drug use before it starts and
healing America's drug users.
[4] See Afghanistan Drug Control: Strategy Evolving and Progress
Reported, but Interim Performance Targets and Evaluation of Justice
Reform Efforts Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-291]. Washington, D.C., March 9,
2010
[5] See Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but
Security has Improved: U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for
Reducing Assistance. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-71]. Washington, D.C., October 6,
2008.
[6] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-71].
[7] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-71].
[8] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-71].
[9] In 1995, Peru and Bolivia together accounted for 76 percent of the
world's cultivated coca crop while Colombia comprised 23 percent. See
Drug Control: Long-Standing Problems Hinder U.S. International
Efforts. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/NSIAD-97-75].
Washington, D.C. February 27, 1997.
[10] Subsequent targets increase 2 percentage points per year.
[11] See Drug Control: Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit
Countries Has Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and
Sustainability Plans Are Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-784]. Washington, D.C., July 15,
2008.
[12] See Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-200]. Washington, D.C., November
15, 2005.
[13] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-784].
[14] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-784].
[15] See vGAO-10-291
[16] See Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Cooperation with
Venezuela Has Declined. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-806]. Washington D.C., July 20,
2009.
[17] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-784].
[18] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-784].
[19] See Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican
Counternarcotic Efforts, But Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow
into the United States. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1018]. Washington D.C., August 17,
2007.
[20] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-71].
[21] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-291]
[22] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-291].
[23] Pub. L. No. 103-62, as amended.
[24] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-784].
[25] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-291].
[26] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-291].
[27] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-71].
[28] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-784].
[29] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-784].
[30] See Drug Control: DOD Needs to Improve Its Performance
Measurement System to Better Manage and Oversee Its Counternarcotic
Activities [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-835].
Washington, D.C., July 21, 2010.
[31] See Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of
Homeland Security and an Updated Accountability Framework can Further
Enhance DEA's Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-63]. Washington, D.C., March 20,
2009.
[End of section]
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