Merida Initiative
The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures Gao ID: GAO-10-837 July 21, 2010Crime and violence related to drug trafficking in Mexico and Central America have increased in recent years and pose a threat not only to those areas but to the United States as well, particularly along the Southwest border. The Merida Initiative, announced in 2007, provides about $1.6 billion in law enforcement support to Mexico and Central American countries. The Department of State (State) manages the Initiative while other U.S. agencies play key roles in implementation. This report examines (1) the status of Merida program implementation; (2) State's strategy for implementation; and (3) coordination mechanisms in place for Merida. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed agency documents; interviewed officials at State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense, and other relevant agencies; and conducted fieldwork in Mexico and Central America.
The United States has delivered various equipment and training to Mexico under the Merida Initiative. While the pace of delivery has been slowed by a number of implementation challenges, it has increased recently. As of March 31, 2010, 46 percent of Merida funds for fiscal years 2008 to 2010 had been obligated, and approximately 9 percent had been expended. In Mexico, U.S. agencies have delivered major equipment including five Bell helicopters, several X-ray inspection devices, law enforcement canines and training for their handlers, and training for over 4,000 police officers. In Central America, U.S. agencies have delivered police vehicles and non-intrusive inspection equipment, and have provided various courses, including workshops on combating arms trafficking, and training on handling evidence from clandestine criminal laboratories. Deliveries of equipment and training have been delayed by challenges associated with an insufficient number of staff to administer the program, negotiations on interagency and bilateral agreements, procurement processes, changes in government, and funding availability. U.S. agencies are working to address these challenges. For example, the Embassy Narcotics Affairs Section in Mexico City has more than doubled its staff resources since Merida was launched. While State has developed some of the key elements of an implementation strategy for the Merida Initiative, including a mission, strategic goals, and a resource plan, its strategic documents lack certain key elements that would facilitate accountability and management. For example, its strategic documents do not include outcome performance measures that indicate progress toward achieving strategic goals. In addition, State has not developed a comprehensive set of timelines for all expected deliveries, though it plans to provide additional equipment and training in both Mexico and Central America. State has primary responsibility for coordinating the Merida Initiative. GAO identified several mechanisms that incorporate decision-makers at various levels of government that facilitate coordination between State headquarters and posts, within posts, and bilaterally with foreign governments. For example, several State bureaus regularly coordinate with other U.S. agencies on Merida policy and programmatic issues. State headquarters and U.S. embassies in Mexico and Central America have established mechanisms to coordinate and communicate on implementation. U.S. agencies at posts also have developed and adapted mechanisms to coordinate efforts within the U.S. Embassy community in Mexico and Central American countries. Moreover, State has established formal bilateral mechanisms to coordinate with Mexican authorities. GAO recommends that the Secretary of State incorporate into the strategy for the Merida Initiative outcome performance measures that indicate progress toward strategic goals and develop more comprehensive timelines for future program deliveries. State agreed with the recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Jess T. Ford Team: Government Accountability Office: International Affairs and Trade Phone: (202) 512-4268GAO-10-837, Merida Initiative: The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Measures
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2010:
Mérida Initiative:
The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support
but Needs Better Performance Measures:
GAO-10-837:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-837, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Crime and violence related to drug trafficking in Mexico and Central
America have increased in recent years and pose a threat not only to
those areas but to the United States as well, particularly along the
Southwest border. The Mérida Initiative, announced in 2007, provides
about $1.6 billion in law enforcement support to Mexico and Central
American countries. The Department of State (State) manages the
Initiative while other U.S. agencies play key roles in implementation.
This report examines (1) the status of Mérida program implementation;
(2) State's strategy for implementation; and (3) coordination
mechanisms in place for Mérida. To address these objectives, GAO
reviewed agency documents; interviewed officials at State, the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of
Defense, and other relevant agencies; and conducted fieldwork in
Mexico and Central America.
What GAO Found:
The United States has delivered various equipment and training to
Mexico under the Mérida Initiative. While the pace of delivery has
been slowed by a number of implementation challenges, it has increased
recently. As of March 31, 2010, 46 percent of Mérida funds for fiscal
years 2008 to 2010 had been obligated, and approximately 9 percent had
been expended. In Mexico, U.S. agencies have delivered major equipment
including five Bell helicopters, several X-ray inspection devices, law
enforcement canines and training for their handlers, and training for
over 4,000 police officers. In Central America, U.S. agencies have
delivered police vehicles and non-intrusive inspection equipment, and
have provided various courses, including workshops on combating arms
trafficking, and training on handling evidence from clandestine
criminal laboratories. Deliveries of equipment and training have been
delayed by challenges associated with an insufficient number of staff
to administer the program, negotiations on interagency and bilateral
agreements, procurement processes, changes in government, and funding
availability. U.S. agencies are working to address these challenges.
For example, the Embassy Narcotics Affairs Section in Mexico City has
more than doubled its staff resources since Mérida was launched.
While State has developed some of the key elements of an
implementation strategy for the Mérida Initiative, including a
mission, strategic goals, and a resource plan, its strategic documents
lack certain key elements that would facilitate accountability and
management. For example, its strategic documents do not include
outcome performance measures that indicate progress toward achieving
strategic goals. In addition, State has not developed a comprehensive
set of timelines for all expected deliveries, though it plans to
provide additional equipment and training in both Mexico and Central
America.
State has primary responsibility for coordinating the Mérida
Initiative. GAO identified several mechanisms that incorporate
decision-makers at various levels of government that facilitate
coordination between State headquarters and posts, within posts, and
bilaterally with foreign governments. For example, several State
bureaus regularly coordinate with other U.S. agencies on Mérida policy
and programmatic issues. State headquarters and U.S. embassies in
Mexico and Central America have established mechanisms to coordinate
and communicate on implementation. U.S. agencies at posts also have
developed and adapted mechanisms to coordinate efforts within the U.S.
Embassy community in Mexico and Central American countries. Moreover,
State has established formal bilateral mechanisms to coordinate with
Mexican authorities.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of State incorporate into the
strategy for the Mérida Initiative outcome performance measures that
indicate progress toward strategic goals and develop more
comprehensive timelines for future program deliveries. State agreed
with the recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-837] or key
components. For more information, contact Jess Ford at (202) 512-4268
or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The United States Has Delivered Equipment and Training under Mérida
and Is Working to Overcome Implementation Challenges:
State's Strategy for Mérida Is Missing Elements That Would Improve
Accountability and Management:
State Has Primary Responsibility for Coordinating the Mérida
Initiative:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Performance Measures for Mexico Corresponding to the
Original Mérida Strategic Goals:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Selected Equipment and Training Delivered to Mexico and
Central America under the Mérida Initiative, as of March 31, 2010:
Table 2: Mérida and CARSI Funding Status as of March 31, 2010:
Table 3: Selected Equipment and Training Pending Delivery to Mexico
and Central America under Mérida, as of March 31, 2010:
Table 4: Mérida Coordination at Various Levels:
Table 5: Mérida Initiative Policy Coordination Group for Mexico--Key
Actors by Mérida Initiative Pillar:
Table 6: Summary of U.S. Government and Foreign Entities Contacted:
Figures:
Figure 1: Total Mérida Funds Allocated by Region, FY 2008 through FY
2010 (in millions of dollars):
Figure 2: Mérida Initiative Timeline:
Figure 3: State Estimates in Dollar Value of Major Equipment
Deliveries to Mexico under Mérida as of March 2010:
Abbreviations:
ATF: Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives:
CARSI: Central America Regional Security Initiative:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
CBSI: Caribbean Basin Security Initiative:
CONADIC: Mexican National Addiction Council:
DAO: Defense Attaché Office:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
DTO: Drug Trafficking Organization:
ESF: Economic Support Fund:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FMF: Foreign Military Financing:
IAA: Interagency Agreement:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
ILEA: International Law Enforcement Academy:
INAMI: Mexican National Migration Institute:
INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement:
INL: Bureau for International Narcotics Affairs and Law Enforcement:
LOA: Letter of Agreement:
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding:
NAS: Narcotics Affairs Section:
NGO: Non-government Organization:
NSC: National Security Council:
OASISS: Operation Against Smugglers (and Traffickers) Initiative on
Safety and Security:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
ONDCP: Office of National Drug Control Policy:
OPDAT: Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training:
PAS: Public Affairs Section:
PGR: Mexican Office of the Attorney General:
PM: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs:
RSO: Regional Security Office:
SAT: Mexican Customs Service:
SEDENA: Mexican Army-Air Force:
SEMAR: Mexican Navy:
SICA: Central American Integration System:
SIEDO: Mexican Deputy Attorney General's Office for the Investigation
of Organized Crime:
SRE: Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
SSP: Mexican Ministry of Public Safety:
TAG: Transnational Anti-Gang Initiative:
UIF: Mexican Financial Intelligence Unit:
USAID: United States Agency for International Development:
WHA: Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
July 21, 2010:
The Honorable Eliot L. Engel:
Chairman:
The Honorable Connie Mack:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Finance:
United States Senate:
Crime and violence in Mexico and Central America have continued to
increase in recent years and pose a threat to the United States,
particularly along the U.S.-Mexico border. Recent estimates indicate
more than 22,000 people have been killed in drug related violence in
Mexico since December 2006. In March, three people connected to the
U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Juarez were killed by gunmen believed to be
linked to a drug trafficking organization. Other criminal incidents in
border communities highlight the threat drug trafficking in Mexico
poses to U.S. security. At the same time, gangs with ties to Central
America have been specifically identified as posing serious threats to
the public safety of communities in the United States and in Central
American countries due to their extremely violent nature, the breadth
and sophistication of their criminal activities, and their rapid
expansion.[Footnote 1]
To address growing narcotics and crime issues in the region, in
October 2007, the United States and Mexico launched the Mérida
Initiative, a $1.6 billion effort aimed at supporting law enforcement
activities.[Footnote 2] The Initiative brought a shift in both scale
and scope to U.S. support for Mexico. U.S. funding for
counternarcotics and related law enforcement activities in Mexico has
increased significantly from pre-Mérida levels.[Footnote 3] Moreover,
the level of collaboration between the United States and Mexico is
unprecedented, presenting the United States with a unique opportunity
to address not only the mutual problem of drug trafficking and
organized crime affecting the region, but also advance the bilateral
relationship in other areas.
The Department of State (State) manages the Mérida Initiative and, in
cooperation with several other U.S. agencies, is also responsible for
its implementation. State outlined its strategy in the fiscal year
2008 Spending Plan and in other documents that define a mission,
strategic goals, and a resource plan. As violence in Mexico and
Central America continues, some members of the U.S. Congress have
criticized the slow pace of delivery of training and equipment.
Mexican officials have also cautioned that delays could undermine
support for the Initiative and the Calderón Administration's decision
to seek support from the United States.
In December 2009, we issued a correspondence detailing the funding
status of the Mérida Initiative.[Footnote 4] This report is a broad
review of implementation and includes a funding update. Specifically,
we examined (1) the status of Mérida program implementation; (2)
State's strategy for implementation; and (3) coordination mechanisms
in place for Mérida.
To conduct our evaluation, we reviewed State's spending plans for
Mérida; State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
budget documents and bilateral agreements between the United States
and Mexico, the United States and the Central American countries;
[Footnote 5]and interagency agreements between State and other U.S.
agencies implementing Mérida programs. We also interviewed officials
at the Departments of State, Defense (DOD), Treasury (Treasury),
Justice (DOJ), and Homeland Security (DHS); and USAID, the Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). In addition, we interviewed foreign government officials
and reviewed documentation collected during site visits in Mexico, El
Salvador, Panama, and Guatemala. Field work included visits to
locations where programs and equipment have been delivered and
included police and military and other law enforcement organizations.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2009 to July 2010
in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
The Mérida Initiative provides training and equipment to help address
the problem of increasing crime and violence in Mexico and Central
America. It provides funding for:
* aircraft and boats to support interdiction activities and rapid
response of law enforcement entities and other security forces;
* inspection equipment and canine units to facilitate interdiction of
trafficked drugs, arms, cash, explosives, and persons;
* technical advice and training to strengthen the institutions of
justice and law enforcement; and:
* crime prevention programs that address the root causes of crime and
violence, especially amongst youth.
* The Mérida Initiative is one of several related U.S. government
efforts to engage the battle against crime in the region. The
Southwest Border Initiative, a cooperative effort by the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Attorney's offices, is designed to combat
the substantial threat posed by Mexico-based trafficking groups
operating along the Southwest Border. DOJ's Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) manages Project Gunrunner,
which focuses on stemming the flow of firearms into Mexico, and has
deployed a Spanish-language version of eTrace, a firearms tracking
technology,[Footnote 6] in Mexico City and five Central American
countries. Treasury is taking a comprehensive approach to countering
the illicit financial activity that fuels the drug trade, and since
2000, DOD initiatives have facilitated coincidental maritime
operations between Mexico and the United States and have resulted in
greater cooperation between the two countries, particularly with
respect to boarding, searching, and seizing suspected vessels
transiting Mexican waters. In Mexico and Central America, DOD provides
support to U.S. and foreign agencies with counternarcotics
responsibilities which has increased in recent years and is separate
from that provided under Mérida. This includes training, equipment,
information sharing, technical advice, and related support. In Mexico,
for example, DOD support includes pilot and maintenance training,
surveillance aircraft, and various other training activities. In
Central America, DOD support includes training and equipment for
maritime communications and intelligence sharing, boats, and spare
parts. DOD counternarcotics funding to Mexico totaled an estimated
$12.2 million in fiscal year 2008, $34.2 million in fiscal year 2009,
and $34.5 million in fiscal year 2010. In Central America, DOD
counternarcotics funding totaled an estimated $16.8 million in fiscal
year 2008, $17.7 in fiscal year 2009, and $22.4 million in fiscal year
2010.
* Mexico will receive the bulk of the approximately $1.6 billion in
Mérida funding for Mexico and Central America (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Total Mérida Funds Allocated by Region, FY 2008 through FY
2010 (in millions of dollars):
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Mexico: ($1,322): 84%;
Central America: ($258): 16%.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[End of figure]
Initial appropriations used to fund Mérida included funding for
Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic and Haiti. However,
since the initial appropriation that funded Mérida in fiscal year
2008, Congress has acknowledged the importance of targeting the
distinct needs of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean in
combating narcotics trafficking and crime. As a result, Haiti and the
Dominican Republic are now part of the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative (CBSI) and the Central American portion of Mérida funding
is now part of the Central America Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI)[Footnote 7]--two new initiatives under State. According to
State, the policy framework for CBSI aims to strengthen Caribbean
partner nations' capabilities, including maritime security, law
enforcement, information sharing, border and migration control,
transnational crime, and criminal justice. In fiscal year 2010,
Congress appropriated not less than $37 million to CBSI.[Footnote 8]
Dominican Republic funding was also requested as part of CBSI in
fiscal year 2011, but funding for Haiti--due to its unique post-
earthquake needs--was requested as an independent line-item. CARSI
seeks to address the corrosive impact of narcotics and weapons
trafficking, gangs, organized crime, porous borders, public safety,
and rule of law issues that exist in many Central American countries.
The initiative also facilitates further regional security cooperation
among the Central American nations in coordination with the Mérida
Initiative and CBSI.
To continue the Mérida effort in the future, the Obama Administration
has submitted to Congress its fiscal year 2011 budget request, which
asks for $310 million in assistance for Mérida in Mexico. The
Administration has also requested $100 million for CARSI and $79
million for CBSI. In addition to the Administration's request, the
Senate Appropriations Committee report on the fiscal year 2010
supplemental bill calls for an extra $175 million for Mexico under
Mérida to support judicial reform, institution building, anti-
corruption, and rule of law activities.[Footnote 9]
With the establishment of these new initiatives, State has revised its
strategic goals for Mexico and Central America. In 2009, Obama
Administration officials worked jointly with their Mexican
counterparts to develop new goals for the Mérida Initiative in Mexico,
known as the four pillars, which supersede the original goals
developed in September 2008:[Footnote 10]
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
1. Disrupt Organized Criminal Groups. This includes increasing
coordination and information sharing to fight drug trafficking
organizations (DTO) by focusing on intelligence collection and
analysis, training and equipping special units, enhancing police and
prosecutors' investigative capacity, conducting targeted
investigations against money laundering, improving interdiction
capability, and by supporting effective command and control centers
across Mexico.
2. Institutionalize Reforms to Sustain Rule of Law and Respect for
Human Rights. This involves continuing to build security and justice
sector institutions at the federal level and expanding these efforts
to additional federal, state, and local institutions.
3. Create a 21st Century Border. This involves advancing citizen
safety while increasing global competitiveness through efficient and
secure flows of two-way commerce and travel.
4. Build Strong and Resilient Communities. This includes programs that
will leverage support for greater community involvement in developing
a culture of lawfulness, as well as addressing socio-economic
challenges in the community, including stemming the flow of potential
recruits for the cartels by helping to promote constructive, legal
alternatives for young people.
5. According to State officials, all U.S.-Mexico cooperation related
to law enforcement and counternarcotics efforts have been folded into
and are now considered part of the four pillars, regardless of whether
any particular activity is Mérida funded or not. The four pillars are
the guiding principles for law enforcement and counternarcotics
activities in Mexico.
Efforts in Central America fell under the original September 2008
Mérida goals, but with the establishment of CARSI in 2010, State is in
the process of developing goals that are specific to Central America.
According to State, these goals are likely to reflect the following
five concepts: (1) establishing safe streets; (2) disrupting the
movement of criminals and contraband; (3) building strong, capable,
and accountable governments; (4) embedding government presence in
communities at risk; and (5) enhancing levels of intraregional
cooperation.
The United States Has Delivered Equipment and Training under Mérida
and Is Working to Overcome Implementation Challenges:
The United States has delivered various equipment and training to
Mexico and Central America under Mérida. For example, several
helicopters and biometric equipment have been provided to Mexico, as
well as contraband detection kits and police vehicles for some Central
American countries. As of March 31, 2010, 46 percent of fiscal year
2008 to fiscal year 2010 Mérida funds had been obligated, and
approximately 9 percent had been expended. The United States has faced
a range of implementation challenges that have delayed delivery of
equipment and training under the Initiative. U.S. agencies are working
to address these challenges, which include insufficient number of
staff to administer the program, negotiations on interagency and
bilateral agreements, procurement processes, changes in government,
and funding availability.
The United States Has Delivered a Range of Law Enforcement Equipment
and Training:
As of March 31, 2010, the United States had made several deliveries of
equipment and training in Mexico and Central America under the Mérida
Initiative. The United States has delivered items including five Bell
helicopters, biometric equipment, immigration computer equipment and
software, forensics lab equipment, and canines to Mexico. Table 1
provides a summary of equipment and training delivered to Mexico and
Central America as of March 31, 2010. In addition, the United States
has assisted in training over 4,000 police graduates from Mexico's
federal police training facility, the academy at San Luis Potosí. In
Central America, the United States has provided over 60 contraband
detection kits, police vehicles, and training.
Table 1: Selected Equipment and Training Delivered to Mexico and
Central America under the Mérida Initiative, as of March 31, 2010:
Mexico:
Equipment:
26 armored vehicles:
Delivery date[A]: May 2009.
62 Plataforma Mexico computer servers:
Delivery date[A]: June 2009.
Training equipment:
Delivery date[A]: July & December 2009.
5 X-ray vans:
Delivery date[A]: August 2009.
OASISS servers and software:
Delivery date[A]: August 2009.
Biometric equipment:
Delivery date[A]: September 2009 & January 2010.
Document verification software:
Delivery date[A]: September 2009.
Ballistic tracing equipment (IBIS):
Delivery date[A]: September 2009.
30 ion scanners:
Delivery date[A]: October 2009.
Rescue communication equipment & training:
Delivery date[A]: October & November 2009.
Personal protective equipment:
Delivery date[A]: October & November 2009.
5 Bell helicopters:
Delivery date[A]: December 2009.
10 Mobile X-ray minivans:
Delivery date[A]: December 2009.
Constanza software:
Delivery date[A]: February 2010.
100 Polygraph units:
Delivery date[A]: March 2010.
13 armored Suburbans:
Delivery date[A]: April 2010.
Training:
230 Officials attending arms trafficking conferences:
Delivery date[A]: April 2009 to October 2009.
187 Mexican Ministry of Public Safety (SSP) officers trained in
corrections instruction and classification:
Delivery date[A]: April 2009 to December 2009.
United Nation's human rights project inaugurated:
Delivery date[A]: July 2009.
4,392 SSP investigators trained:
Delivery date[A]: July 2009 to January 2010.
USAID training for capacity building programs throughout Mexico for
over 10,000 Mexican officials in the following areas:
* Citizen participation councils;
* Victim protection and restitution;
* Judicial exchanges;
* Trafficking in persons;
* Human rights;
* Pre-trial services and case resolution alternatives;
* Continuing education for police, prosecutors and other officials;
* Penal reform;
Delivery date[A]:
August 2009 to March 2010.
28 canine trainers trained:
Delivery date[A]: October 2009 to April 2010.
293 mid-level and senior-level SSP officers trained:
Delivery date[A]: October 2009 to November 2009.
45 Mexican state officials trained in anti-kidnapping:
Delivery date[A]: November 2009 to January 2010.
Central America:
Equipment:
67 CT-30 kits:
Delivery date[A]: October 2009 to December 2009.
3 police vehicles to Belize:
Delivery date[A]: April 2010.
Training:
52 students selected for U.S. study:
Delivery date[A]: Summer 2009.
Workshop to combat illicit trafficking in arms:
Delivery date[A]: July 2009.
8 corrections officers from Belize trained:
Delivery date[A]: January 2010 to February 2010.
Training on handling and investigating clandestine criminal
laboratories for 30 Guatemalan officials:
Delivery date[A]: February 2010.
10 Investigative personnel from the El Salvador National Police
trained on eTrace and firearms trafficking:
Delivery date[A]: February 2010.
40 Costa Ricans trained on eTrace:
Delivery date[A]: March 2010.
Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.
[A] Delivery of training may have occurred in more than one course
during the time indicated.
[End of table]
The equipment and training the United States has delivered thus far
have provided a variety of resources for recipient countries. For
instance, in our field visits, we observed several of the programs
that have been implemented:
* The canine program in Mexico has been implemented and several canine
units have been trained and are in operation, with plans to expand the
program to other areas in Mexico. According to State officials, with
assistance from other U.S. agencies like CBP and ATF, State is helping
to develop canine academies in Mexico so as to institutionalize this
capability.
* State officials informed us that the Bell helicopters are currently
in operation around Mexico, providing troop transport capabilities for
Mexican military operations against DTOs.
* The initial phase for collecting immigration data that can be used
to monitor and track the movements of criminals has been implemented,
with information currently being collected in Mexico City. Several
other cities will be receiving similar equipment, and data will
eventually be stored and shared through a central database.
* The biometric equipment at Mexico's southern border is installed and
in use, allowing Mexican officials to store information about
individuals crossing into the country, to support immigration control.
Eventually, the data from this facility will be connected to the
Mexican national data system, which uses servers and software provided
under Mérida.
* 115 Mexican corrections instructors were trained and certified at
the New Mexico Corrections Academy; this cadre of instructors in turn
trained almost 900 new corrections officers at the new Penitentiary
Academy in Xalapa. According to State officials, the Mexican
government intends to begin training Mexican state and local
penitentiary officers at the Xalapa academy, as well as open it to
Central American penitentiary systems, in the near future. These
officials also indicate that the United States has provided essential
technical assistance and training to modernize the Mexican prisoner
classification system, to ensure proper prisoner tracking and
management.
* The Mérida Initiative has supported programs in Central America.
Some of the programs that have been initiated in the Central American
countries we visited are described below:
* In El Salvador, Mérida funding will enhance the Transnational Anti-
Gang Initiative (TAG) by providing technical expertise and specialized
equipment such as computers, software, protective gear, radios, and
vehicles to law enforcement agencies. The funding will support the
deployment of FBI agents not only to El Salvador but also to Guatemala
and Honduras. The goal is to provide technical assistance to
aggressively investigate, disrupt, and dismantle violent gangs whose
activities rise to the level of criminal enterprises, and who pose the
greatest transnational threat, while enhancing the capabilities of the
law enforcement agencies involved. Other Mérida funds will support the
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in El Salvador, which
provides training and technical assistance, supports institution
building and enforcement capability, and fosters relationships of
American law enforcement agencies with their counterparts in the
Central American region.
* In Guatemala, the Villa Nueva Model Police Precinct, which has
reduced gang activity in that municipality, is being replicated in
other communities. USAID supported the project with existing program
funds in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 and will expand the effort to
other communities with CARSI funds in 2010.
* In Panama, a USAID crime prevention and anti-gang program provides
alternatives to narcotics use and gang membership for disadvantaged
youth. This program, which entails cooperation between USAID,
Panamanian authorities, civil society, and the private sector was
initiated with USAID bilateral funds but will be funded under the
Mérida Initiative as it proceeds. Under the program there is a
proposal to develop a new governmentwide working group to coordinate
all Panamanian government activities dealing with at-risk youth. This
working group is intended to bring together approximately 45 at-risk
youth programs and to facilitate assistance from donors, NGOs, and
corporations, including continuation of funding under Mérida.
Nearly Half of Mérida Funds Have Been Obligated:
As of March 31, 2010, 46 percent of Mérida funds for fiscal years 2008
to 2010 had been obligated, and approximately 9 percent had been
expended (see table 2). This represents approximately $115 million
more in expenditures since September 30, 2009, and nearly $19 million
in additional obligations during this time. Since our last report,
[Footnote 11] the pace of delivery of Mérida support has increased and
Congress has appropriated an additional $293 million for Mérida and
CARSI activities for fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 12]
Table 2: Mérida and CARSI Funding Status as of March 31, 2010:
Mexico:
FY08 Supplemental[C]:
Allocated[A]: $398.0 million;
Obligated balance[B]: $290.9 million;
Expended balance: $107.1 million.
FY09 Omnibus:
Allocated[A]: $300.0 million;
Obligated balance[B]: $44.1 million;
Expended balance: $2.7 million.
FY09 Supplemental:
Allocated[A]: $420.0 million;
Obligated balance[B]: $330.1 million;
Expended balance: $6.4 million.
FY10:
Allocated[A]: $204.3 million;
Obligated balance[B]: $4.6 million;
Expended balance: $5.0 million.
Mexico total:
Allocated[A]: $1,322.3 million;
Obligated balance[B]: $669.7 million;
Expended balance: $121.2 million.
Central America:
FY08 Supplemental[C]:
Allocated[A]: $69.8 million;
Obligated balance[B]: $49.5 million;
Expended balance: $19.8 million.
FY09 Omnibus:
Allocated[A]: $104.8 million;
Obligated balance[B]: $14.9 million;
Expended balance: 0.
FY09 Supplemental:
Allocated[A]: [Empty];
Obligated balance[B]: [Empty];
Expended balance: [Empty].
FY10[D]:
Allocated[A]: $83.0 million;
Obligated balance[B]: $0.1 million;
Expended balance: $0.2 million.
Central America total:
Allocated[A]: $257.6 million;
Obligated balance[B]: $64.5 million;
Expended balance: $20.0 million.
Mérida total[E]:
Allocated[A]: $1,579.9 million;
Obligated balance[B]: $734.3 million;
Expended balance: $141.2 million.
Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.
Note: Appropriated funds give budget authority to incur obligations
and to make payments from the Treasury for specified purposes.
Obligated funds are commitments that create a legal liability of the
U.S. government for the payment of goods and services ordered or
received. Expenditures are funds that have been spent.
[A] Includes amounts appropriated "to combat drug trafficking and
related violence and organized crime, and for judicial reform,
institution building, anti-corruption, rule of law activities" in
these countries, amounts congressionally directed for programs for the
aforementioned purposes in these countries, and amounts allocated by
State to fund Mérida activities. For the purposes of this report, we
consider "to combat drug trafficking and related violence and
organized crime, and for judicial reform, institution building, anti-
corruption, rule of law activities" to be Mérida activities. Amounts
differ slightly from those previously reported in December 2009 (GAO-
10-253R) due to reprogramming of some funds.
[B] Although the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs reports both its bulk obligations and sub-
obligations to the Office of Management and Budget, its bulk
obligations, as the first record of a legal liability to pay for goods
and services, are what we are reporting as its obligations. Obligated
balance refers to unliquidated obligations.
[C] In the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, Congress
appropriated $352 million into various accounts "to combat drug
trafficking and related violence and organized crime, and for judicial
reform, institution building, anti-corruption, rule of law activities"
in Mexico for Mérida Initiative activities, in addition to $48 million
for the same purposes from the FY 2009 Supplemental Bridge. In
addition to these amounts appropriated, State reprogrammed $9 million
of pre-fiscal 2008 funds to go toward Mérida programs.
[D] Section 7045(f) of the State, Foreign Operations and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2010 provides up to $83 million for the
countries of Central America only to combat drug trafficking and
related violence and organized crime, and for judicial reform,
institution building, anticorruption, rule of law activities, and
maritime security. However, State has not yet notified Congress of
final fiscal year 2010 Central America funding levels, which are still
pending as of this publication.
[E] While they are part of the Mérida Initiative for the Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2008, and the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009,
Haiti and Dominican Republic are not included in this table.
[End of table]
State Holds That Expenditure Levels Are Not an Accurate Measure of
Progress:
State officials have indicated that expenditure levels alone are not
an accurate measure of progress on program delivery. According to
State, expended funds do not capture all program activity because of
timing issues associated with procurement, billing and reporting
systems of State and DOD. Officially, funds are considered expended
when payment has been made from the U.S. Treasury. This action can be
delayed significantly beyond the actual delivery of goods and services
due to a variety of factors, including incomplete documentation, slow
vendor invoicing, or other issues.
In addition, funds must be obligated before they can be spent, and
State employs different obligation processes depending on the bureau
that manages the funding account. For Mérida, three different State
bureaus manage the funding accounts and obligate funds through
distinct processes, as follows:
* The majority of Mérida funding has been appropriated under the
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account,
which is administered by the State Bureau for International Narcotics
Affairs and Law Enforcement (INL). INL can not begin to implement
programs until a Letter of Agreement (LOA) that details the programs
to be delivered is signed by both the United States and the
beneficiary country. Once the LOA is signed, the funds and programs
agreed to in the LOA are obligated, thus incurring legal liability to
pay for goods and services. INL officials told us that they refer to
this as a "bulk obligation" and consider this the first of two
separate stages in their funding process in which they incur a legal
liability to pay. Only a small portion of the fiscal year 2009 INCLE
funds had been obligated as of March 31, 2010, because the LOA with
Mexico had not been signed by this date.[Footnote 13] After the LOA is
signed, however, INL officials told us they have a second stage in
which they incur legal liability to pay, which INL designates as a
"sub-obligation." During this second stage of obligation, the Bureau
begins to implement projects by entering into contracts with suppliers
or other agencies to deliver the planned equipment or service. As of
March 31, 2010, about $131 million of fiscal year 2008 INCLE funds had
been sub-obligated to specific projects. Delivery of equipment is
dependent upon the procurement process and negotiations with foreign
countries (see below for a discussion of implementation challenges).
* Funds for Mérida programs have also been allocated from
appropriations in the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account. The Bureau
of Western Hemisphere Affairs (WHA) administers the ESF account,
although USAID actually is responsible for implementation of programs
supported by ESF funding. In most cases, USAID can begin to obligate
the funds when they are apportioned from OMB. Although USAID also
negotiates agreements with the recipient countries prior to
implementing programs in the form of Assistance Agreements (or a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) in the case of Mexico), in some
Central American countries USAID has programs that were established
before Mérida funding became available, and already had agreements in
place.
* Funding for Mérida has been made available through the Foreign
Military Financing (FMF) account, as well. FMF funds are administered
by State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) and are obligated
upon apportionment to DOD.[Footnote 14] Delivery of equipment is
dependent upon the procurement process and negotiations with foreign
countries (see below for further discussion). Thus, while obligation
of FMF funds can occur more quickly than obligation of INCLE funds,
delivery may not occur for years due to the length of time required to
manufacture the equipment being provided. For instance, in September
2009, State obligated FMF funds to procure three Black Hawk
helicopters and estimates that they will not be delivered until 2011.
* While the timing of expenditures is not necessarily impacted by the
account through which they are funded, using expenditures to interpret
the status of program delivery can be misleading because expenditures
do not necessarily indicate whether programs have, or have not, been
delivered. Some funds may be expended throughout the course of a
project, while others are not expended until final delivery. For
instance, State officials indicated that some expenditures for
training and equipment may occur in the form of administrative or
progress payments prior to delivery, but the full amount of funds is
not expended until after delivery takes place and the invoice is paid.
In addition, State officials explained to us that, in some instances,
it can take months for funds to be expended because the implementing
agencies may not submit an invoice to be paid for their goods or
services for several months or longer after delivery.
* As noted in our December 2009 report,[Footnote 15] tracking Mérida
funds is difficult. This is because each of the three State bureaus
managing Mérida funds has a different method for tracking. Each uses
different budgeting terms as well as separate spreadsheets for the
Mérida funds it administers, and State currently has no consolidated
database for these funds. For example, each of the three accounts with
funds for Mérida uses a different mechanism to reach obligation, and
the three bureaus do not all refer to this stage of incurring legal
liability to pay for services with the term "obligation." While
tracking funds remains a challenge, State is beginning to implement a
new system for INCLE funds. State officials told us that State does
not have an agencywide system that can track obligations and
expenditures across all accounts by program, such as Mérida. Each
bureau that manages the accounts must report these data separately for
each program. Compiling this information for each account from which
funding for Mérida is allocated is difficult, particularly for the
INCLE account. INCLE funds for Mérida are tracked using separate
spreadsheets for the post in Mexico (which includes some Central
America funding information) and headquarters in Washington, D.C.,
since different portions of the funds are managed by both locations.
State officials told us that INL recognized the need to develop a
system that provides funding information by program and that can more
quickly and easily produce reports on the status of funds and provide
relevant and timely information to Congress.
Since the new fund tracking system is still under development, it is
too soon to determine whether it will assist State (specifically, INL)
in providing timely information on the status of funds. We received a
demonstration of the system's capabilities, which include the ability
to report on allotments, obligations (both bulk-and sub-obligations
that are unique to INL), and expenditures. State officials told us
that they are hopeful that the system will come online in Mérida
recipient countries in the coming months.
Various Implementation Challenges Have Contributed to Delays, but
Agencies Are Working to Address Them:
The United States has faced a range of implementation challenges
associated with program administration that have slowed the pace of
delivery of Mérida-funded equipment and training. These challenges
include an insufficient number of staff to administer the program,
negotiations on interagency and bilateral agreements, procurement
processes, changes in government, and funding availability. U.S.
agencies are working to address these challenges.
Staff:
According to State, an insufficient number of staff to manage the
sevenfold increase in support for Mexico under Mérida contributed to
implementation delays. According to a January 2010 State Inspector
General report, at State headquarters the Initiative has consumed many
working hours of several WHA officials over the past 2 years,
including the Regional Deputy Assistant Secretary and Mexico Office
Director. In addition, INL officials indicated that they were not
adequately staffed to handle the sudden expansion of Mérida activity
and their capacity to process funding and to manage other essential
related administrative tasks was limited. To address this issue, State
has hired additional staff and plans to continue the effort until
resource needs are better balanced. For example, in 2007, the total
number of headquarters INL staff dedicated to supporting Mérida was 3,
compared to a planned level of 18 at the end of 2010. In addition, to
help remedy staffing issues, USAID is hiring a personal services
contractor in Washington to assist in the management of CARSI and
Mérida.
At posts in Mexico and Central America, State and other agency teams
faced similar challenges. In 2008, the Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS)
in Mexico City, which holds primary responsibility for implementing
Mérida in Mexico, had a total staff of 19. NAS has been ramping up
since then with 51 staff as of March 2010 and anticipates more than
tripling its numbers to 69 by the end of 2010. Some agency officials
at post in Mexico also told us that personnel shortages constrained
their ability to implement Mérida. For example, an ICE official at
post indicated that nearly half the agency's in-country positions were
vacant. According to ICE, recruiting efforts are underway but the
limited pool of available senior agent applicants, the high demand for
agents for domestic investigative initiatives, and the time consuming
clearances needed to work in an overseas post have contributed to
bottlenecks in deployment. In embassies in Central America, positions
from all U.S. agencies dedicated to supporting Mérida programs totaled
42 in 2008 and are planned to increase to 54 by the end of 2010.
Negotiations:
Negotiating agreements with beneficiary governments and reaching
understanding with other U.S. agencies on implementation logistics can
be time consuming. According to State, negotiations with Mexican and
Central American governments on key mechanisms used to stipulate the
terms for major training and equipment programs, such as Letters of
Agreement (LOA) and Letters of Offer and Acceptance, often take months
and involve many steps such as identifying the most suitable foreign
agency, determining the appropriate individual contact, assessing
partner country needs, and conferring on specifications. State
officials told us that it took several months to work with Mexican
officials to finalize details of the initial 2008 LOA, which covered
approximately $200 million worth of equipment and training. It took
even longer to complete the 2009 LOA with Mexico, ultimately signed in
May 2010. In Mexico in particular, the unprecedented scope and need
for both sides to learn respective ways of conducting business also
contributed to the length of time it took to complete the LOA. State
officials told us that, by leveraging lessons learned and best
practices, future negotiations should take less time.
According to State, Interagency Agreements (IAA) are contracts used to
formalize U.S. agency roles and responsibilities for major Mérida
programs. This process involves several iterations of negotiation and
requires the approval of multiple stakeholders, any one of which can
hold up the sequence. While the process normally takes 4 to 6 weeks,
State and agency officials told us that the process can be frustrating
and slow in some cases. For example, it took State and Department of
Justice (DOJ) approximately 10 months to complete an IAA regarding an
Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT)
Mérida program. Proposed changes to the standard IAA template and
disagreements over issues such as cost, roles, responsibilities, and
reporting relationships contributed to delays. In another instance,
according to Treasury, Treasury and State completed an IAA in about 3
months, but it took an additional 3 months to resolve an issue related
to the availability of funds before money could be allocated,
effectively lengthening the total time to about 6 months.
Procurement:
U.S. government procurement processes are also time consuming. For
example, according to State, it typically takes between 3 and 6 months
to negotiate and sign a contract for the provision of aircraft, after
the specific model and modifications have been identified and agreed
upon with the beneficiary country. If the airframe is one that has not
been purchased by State officials before, as of March 2009, they are
legislatively required to submit an "Analysis of Alternatives" to
Congress, which can take between 3 and 6 months to deliver.[Footnote
16] Then, the aircraft are built to the agreed upon specifications.
According to State, helicopters typically take 12 to 18 months to be
built--though Black Hawks normally take longer to procure due to the
high demand for the aircraft--and airplanes require 18 to 24 months.
According to DOD, the negotiation and contracting process for aircraft
generally takes 9 to 12 months and can take as long as 18 months
depending on complexity. In addition, according to DOD and Mexican
officials, Mérida marked the first time the United States and Mexico
have entered into such large-scale arrangements on the provision of
new equipment, so it took extra time for Mexican officials to
understand the nuances and limitations of the U.S. government
procurement process. For example, in some cases, Mexican officials
initially did not properly fill out equipment request forms, which
caused delays. In addition, negotiating agreements for the provision
of CASA aircraft, to be used for maritime patrol, involved rework due
to misunderstandings about the cost and availability of certain
technical options. Still further, factors outside the control of the
signatories may lead to snags, such as waivers and bid
protests.[Footnote 17] For example, according to DOD officials,
because the CASA aircraft are more than 50 percent foreign made,
regulations stipulate that the Department of Treasury must provide an
offshore procurement waiver, which adds time. According to State, in
another case related to State's provision of a particular set of
nonintrusive inspection equipment, an ongoing series of bid protests
has led to indefinite delays. Mexican officials told us that they were
unaware of the impact that the U.S. procurement process would have on
the timing of delivery.
The U.S. government has made efforts to address the pace of
procurement processes. State officials told us that in recognition of
the lengthy procurement processes for aircraft, Congress appropriated
more than what was requested by the Administration for the Fiscal Year
2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act so that State would have the
funds available to start those processes sooner. The Obama
administration requested $66 million in INCLE assistance for Mexico
under Mérida, yet Congress appropriated $420 million for Mexico. Of
this amount, $160 million is INCLE funding, which State plans to use
to fund Black Hawk helicopters, and $260 million is FMF funding for
expedited aviation assistance to the Mexican Navy. In addition, State
and DOD officials told us that they are making efforts to manage
expectations and explain the procurement process so that their foreign
counterparts have a better understanding of how long it takes, how
best to approach it, and how to expedite it.
Changes in government:
State must also contend with factors outside of its control, such as
changes in government and lack of continuity in public administration.
According to U.S. officials, frequent political changes and
organizational restructurings present a challenge to implementation of
Mérida programs. In Mexico, we learned from U.S. authorities that law
enforcement officials who receive training may or may not stay in a
position that makes optimal use of acquired skills. For example, one
official told us that after his agency provided training at a cost of
approximately $250,000 to a cadre of Mexican investigators, the unit
was disbanded. In El Salvador and Panama, new governments came to
power in 2009, which meant that negotiations on the provision of
Mérida equipment and training had to be restarted after the
transition. In Guatemala, post officials explained that in recent
months, repeated changes of top-level officials at both the Ministry
of Interior and the National Civil Police have delayed implementation
of Mérida plans and new Mérida initiatives as well as ongoing projects.
Funding availability:
Timing of funding availability, due to statutory conditions and State
processes for distributing funds, is another factor that has affected
the pace of delivery of training and equipment. The United States and
Mexico issued a Joint Statement announcing the Mérida Initiative on
October 22, 2007, but funds were not appropriated until the
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 was signed on June 30, 2008.
According to State, signing Letters of Agreement with recipient
countries, required for obligating INCLE funds, did not begin until
Mexico's was completed in December 2008. Additionally, statutory
requirements have affected the availability and delivery of funds (see
figure 2).
Figure 2: Mérida Initiative Timeline:
[Refer to PDF for image: timeline]
Funding activities:
First appropriation: 6/2008;
First funds available for obligation: 10/2008;
Second appropriation: 3/2009;
Third appropriation: 6/2009;
Fourth appropriation: 12/2009;
$141 million expended, $734 million obligated: 3/2010.
Mérida activities:
State‘s first spending plan: 9/2008;
First letter of agreement with Mexico: 12/2008;
First report on human rights, police transparency, and cooperation with
NGOs for Central America: 4/2009;
State‘s second and third spending plans: 8/2009;
Second human rights report for Central America: 8/2009;
First human rights report for Mexico: 8/2009;
5 Bell Helicopters delivered: 12/2009;
Second letter of agreement signed with Mexico: 5/2010.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.
[End of figure]
Congress requires State to submit notifications and reports before
some of the funds used to finance Mérida activities in specific
countries can become available for obligation. For example, some of
the funds are not available for obligation until State meets a
statutory requirement to submit a report detailing Mexican and Central
American government progress relating to police transparency,
cooperation with NGOs, and human rights.[Footnote 18] In the
Supplemental Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2008, 15 percent of
the funds made available to Mexico under the INCLE and FMF accounts
were not available for obligation until State submitted such a report,
which included information on whether the Government of Mexico is
ensuring that members of the federal police and military forces who
have been credibly alleged to have committed violations of human
rights are appropriately investigated and prosecuted. These human
rights reports are sometimes referred to as the "15 percent reports,"
as 15 percent of certain INCLE and FMF funds may not be obligated
until State submits the reports.[Footnote 19]
Under other conditions, State may have to comply with notification
requirements regarding planned uses of appropriations as established
by law. For example, under 22 U.S.C. § 2413(a), State is required to
notify Congress regarding the type of assistance and level of funding
to be provided to individual countries and international
organizations. This is commonly known as the 653(a) consultation
process.[Footnote 20] Similarly, in the Supplemental Appropriations
Act for fiscal year 2008, Congress required State to submit a spending
plan for funds appropriated or otherwise made available for Mexico
within 45 days of enactment of the appropriations act.[Footnote 21] To
comply with this particular requirement, State must submit a detailed
spending plan that shall include a strategy with concrete goals,
actions to be taken, budget proposals, and anticipated results. The
conference report for the fiscal year 2010 appropriations act directs
that State submit an additional report to Congress on the status of
the programs.
Separate from statutory conditions, according to officials at Central
American posts we visited, delays in funding have hindered planning
and slowed implementation. For example, an official in Guatemala told
us that his agency had built relationships and worked out plans for
support with local community members on the expectation that funding
would be forthcoming for a Mérida program. However, because State
needed additional time to address certain congressional concerns, it
did not provide funds within the official's expected time frame. As a
result, the program was stopped while waiting for funding to resume.
According to this official, this delay compromised the program's
credibility with host country counterparts. Another official in El
Salvador relayed a similar experience and added that funding delays
result in missed opportunities to provide support to address urgent
issues.
Efforts to Expedite Implementation:
To address issues associated with the timing of fund availability,
agencies have sought alternative methods to initiate and speed the
implementation of certain programs in Mexico and some Central American
countries. In Mexico, for example, Treasury's Office of Technical
Assistance used its own funds to start developing programs while an
Amended Letter of Agreement was negotiated and signed with Mexico. In
addition, according to USAID, it identified approximately $2 million
in existing program funds to initiate community involvement and
training projects while waiting for Mérida funds to become available.
Still further, according to OPDAT, it used funding advanced by NAS at
post to begin implementing its Mérida initiatives. Specifically, in
March 2009, 5 months before the receipt of any Mérida funding, OPDAT
hosted a high-level official event on arms trafficking strategy and
built on it with two subsequent working-level conferences.
Similarly, posts in some Central American countries have used existing
programming funds to initiate activities because anticipated Mérida
funding did not materialize when expected. For example, in fiscal year
2008, the FBI expended approximately $133,000 from its operating
account to support the Transnational Anti-Gang (TAG) unit in El
Salvador. In Panama, post officials told us that NAS provided funding
from the Andean Counterdrug Initiative to launch a community policing
project that was originally slated to be funded under Mérida. In
Guatemala, post officials said most law enforcement assistance
programs initiated over the past 18 months have been implemented using
existing programming funds with the expectation that Mérida funding
will be coming soon.
State's Strategy for Mérida Is Missing Elements That Would Improve
Accountability and Management:
While State has developed some of the key elements of a strategy for
implementing the Mérida Initiative, including a mission, strategic
goals, and a resource plan, its strategic documents lack certain key
elements that would facilitate accountability and management. For
example, State's strategic documents do not include performance
measures that indicate progress toward achieving the four strategic
goals or timelines for all future deliveries and completion of Mérida
programs. Our prior work has shown that including these elements is
important because they enable decision-makers to determine whether the
program is successful and if any adjustments need to be made and in
what ways.[Footnote 22]
State's Performance Measures Lack Key Attributes That Would Facilitate
Assessment of Progress:
State's current performance measures for the Mérida Initiative,
revised in 2009 in consultation with Mexico, lack some of the key
attributes that would facilitate assessing whether agencies are making
progress toward meeting strategic goals. In general, State's
performance measures do not align with existing strategic goals, do
not provide measurable targets, and do not measure outcomes. We have
reported before that performance measures that include such attributes
are key characteristics of successful program management.[Footnote 23]
Such measures provide valuable information for decision-makers to
identify strengths and weaknesses in programs, identify the factors
that may be contributing to any problems, and adjust processes to
address the problems.
The existing measures do not align with the strategic goals of Mérida
or the agencywide goals for State. In its initial fiscal year 2008
Spending Plan for Mérida, State laid out four strategic goals and
measures linked to these goals for both Mexico and Central America.
For Mexico, State officials told us that these original goals have
been superseded by new strategic goals, referred to as the four
pillars.[Footnote 24] However, State has not updated the original
performance measures presented in its fiscal year 2008 Spending Plan
to reflect the new strategic goals or pillars, which State officials
told us are now the focus of U.S. strategy in Mexico. For CARSI, State
officials told us that the new strategic goals would be somewhat
distinct from those of Mexico since the issues needing to be addressed
are different in each region. However, State has not updated the
original performance measures to reflect progress toward these new
goals and how they help to achieve State's agencywide goals for
foreign assistance. See appendix II for a list of strategic goals and
associated performance measures for Mexico under Mérida.
Additionally, almost all the performance measures do not provide
specific measurable targets with milestones to indicate success in the
short term and the long term. Without targets to strive toward, State
cannot determine if it is meeting expectations under the Mérida
Initiative. For example, one of the performance measures for Mexico
under the first original strategic goal to "Break the Power and
Impunity of Criminal Organizations" is to measure the percentage of
vehicles and containers inspected by non-intrusive means at each port
of entry. State indicates that it will measure the percentage
difference from zero as a baseline: however, it did not develop an
expected target to reach and a time frame within which such a target
might be achieved. Thus, it is unclear what percentage of non-
intrusive inspections indicates successful implementation of the
program.
In addition, State is generally missing indicators to measure the
outcome of the programs.[Footnote 25] While some of the implementing
agencies, such as USAID, DOJ, and DHS, have developed outcome measures
for their Mérida programs, State has not developed such measures for
many of the programs it is responsible for implementing under Mérida.
Most of the indicators that State has developed for Mexico only
measure the outputs of the Mérida Initiative, such as the number of
officials trained. This limits State's ability to assess its
performance under the Mérida Initiative, and does not provide valuable
information to Congress regarding the success of the Initiative. For
instance, State's performance indicators measure the number of Mexican
law enforcement officials trained under Mérida, but do not measure the
impact of the training and if it has been successfully employed.
[Side bar:
USAID Has Developed Some Performance Measures for Central America:
In the case of some ESF funds allocated for Mérida programs in Central
America, USAID, with support from the Department of State, has
developed a Mérida Initiative Central America Results Framework that
includes an impact evaluation to be conducted by Vanderbilt University
through a cooperative arrangement with USAID. USAID and State intend
for this evaluation to assess the long-term effect and measure the
results of its Mérida and CARSI programs in select, yet
representative, Central American communities that are the focus of crime
prevention efforts under CARSI. The evaluation consists of five
elements: (1) community surveys, (2) reviews of demographic data in
the communities, (3) focus groups, (4) interviews with stakeholders
such as community leaders, and (5) community observations such as
physical infrastructure. Vanderbilt University officials are to
conduct the evaluations every 18 months in communities where CARSI-
sponsored crime prevention activities have been implemented by USAID and
communities where no activities have been implemented, with these
latter communities serving as control groups in order to establish a
baseline. Specifically, with respect to the surveys, USAID and State
plan to use the results to gauge the effect of its CARSI crime
prevention programs through community and citizen perceptions on
safety and security, as well as to more effectively allocate
assistance to programs that are likely to be contributing to
communities that have experienced a perceived increase in the level of
citizen safety. Building on the work of this survey, a State official
informed us that State will seek to expand this and/or similar
instruments, subject to the availability of funding, to further assess
and measure the outcomes of CARSI‘s Economic and Social Development
Fund strategic goals and objectives.
End Side bar]
State Does not Have Comprehensive Timelines for All Future Deliveries:
Although Mexican officials and some members of Congress have expressed
concerns about the pace of delivery, State has not developed
comprehensive timelines to estimate the time required to deliver all
the equipment and training planned under Mérida. For Mexico, State has
not developed a comprehensive timeline for all of the planned projects
for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, though it has developed some limited
timelines to track the status of major equipment and some training,
including information on what has been delivered and when, estimated
timelines for future deliveries, and intended recipients. For Central
America, State does not have such timelines to track deliveries of
equipment and training.
As described earlier, U.S. agencies have already provided major
equipment and some training using Mérida funds, but, as of March 31,
2010, a significant amount of equipment and training intended to be
provided under the Initiative is still pending delivery. For Mexico,
this includes between 9 and 11 Black Hawk helicopters, 4 CASA
aircraft, an additional 3 Bell helicopters, over 200 polygraph units,
mobile gamma radiation inspection trucks, as well as railroad units to
detect weapons and other contraband, and multiple professionalization
programs and projects in various training and technical assistance
(see table 3). Of the major equipment provided under the plans for
fiscal years 2008 and 2009 State estimates that it will deliver about
half of the funding associated with this equipment by the end of
fiscal year 2010 (see figure 3).[Footnote 26] For Central America,
some of the items that have not been delivered include up to 8
interceptor boats and maritime support equipment and various training
and technical support, including for anti-gang activities.
Table 3: Selected Equipment and Training Pending Delivery to Mexico
and Central America under Mérida, as of March 31, 2010:
Mexico:
Equipment:
218 Polygraph units:
Estimated delivery date: April 2010.
2 Railroad x-ray inspection units:
Estimated delivery date: August 2010.
2 Bell helicopters:
Estimated delivery date: October 2010.
3 Black Hawk helicopters (SSP):
Estimated delivery date: October to December 2010.
Mobile gamma radiation trucks:
Estimated delivery date: 2010.
3 Black Hawk helicopters (SEMAR):
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
4 CASA airplanes: Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
aircraft:
Estimated delivery date: 2011.
3 to 5 Black Hawk helicopters (SSP):
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
Additional equipment for Mexican national data system:
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
Additional equipment for Mexican Communication and Transportation
Secretariat:
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
1 Bell helicopter:
Estimated delivery date:
Training:
Various training expected, for example:
* Drug demand reduction;
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
* Financial intelligence unit & financial crimes;
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
* Support for law schools and bar associations;
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
* Institution building and rule of law;
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
* Stand up robust internal controls;
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
Central America:
Equipment:
Interdiction boats to Costa Rica, Belize, and El Salvador:
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
Various maritime interdiction equipment and support including
refurbishment of interdiction and patrol boats, communications
equipment, and spare parts:
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
INTERPOL connectivity:
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
Training:
Various training expected, for example:
* Capacity enhancement:
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
* Financial crimes and bulk currency smuggling:
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
* Improved police academies and entry-level training:
Estimated delivery date: No estimated delivery date.
Source: GAO analysis of State Department data.
[End of table]
Figure 3: State Estimates in Dollar Value of Major Equipment
Deliveries to Mexico under Mérida as of March 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Delivery year: 2009;
Delivered: $81.6 million.
Delivery year: 2010;
Delivered: $32.6 million;
Pending: $189.0 million.
Delivery year: 2011 and beyond;
Pending: $369.5 million.
Source: GAO, based on Department of State data.
[End of figure]
Mexican officials expressed concerns regarding the need for time
frames for delivery of equipment and training under Mérida, and in a
few cases, the Government of Mexico has purchased equipment on its own
because it needed the equipment earlier than the United States could
provide it. For instance, Mexican officials told us that they needed
equipment for investigating money laundering, which they expected to
receive from the United States under Mérida. However, rather than
waiting for the United States to provide it, they went forward with
the purchase on their own. When informed of this decision, U.S.
officials stated that they redirected the funds intended for this
equipment to other needs.
In response to these concerns, State recently developed a mechanism
for tracking the status of these programs in the form of a spreadsheet
that provides some timelines for delivery of major equipment and
scheduled training as well as any delays with the programs. This
spreadsheet is updated jointly by both U.S. and Mexican officials
prior to a monthly bilateral implementation group meeting described
below. In a separate document, State also tracks the status of the
deliverables (notably equipment and training), including information
on what has been delivered and when, estimated timelines for future
deliveries, and intended recipients. While both of these documents
address the current status of some of the major equipment provided
under Mérida and the immediate training expected to be delivered, such
as whether it is delayed or completed, they do not provide
comprehensive timelines for all of the planned projects using fiscal
year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 funds. For instance, State does not
have an estimated target date for providing the rest of the training
planned for Mexico. Both documents also do not provide a clear
explanation to the Mexican government of the time needed to procure
equipment and plan and initiate training programs. Mexican officials
told us that they were frustrated by the lack of information on the
time frame for delivery and said they need this information to be able
to proceed with other programs that they are implementing in
conjunction with Mérida. When asked about these concerns, a State
official acknowledged that State could do more to educate the
Government of Mexico on U.S. procedures, such as various agencies'
procurement processes.
Other agencies to which State has provided Mérida funds for
implementing specific programs are required to develop a workplan for
each program that includes goals; objectives; plans for
implementation, including detailed timelines; and performance measures
to assess the success of the program. State did not provide us with
all of the workplans for these programs as some were still being
developed, so we were unable to completely assess how other agencies
implement and monitor the progress of Mérida programs for which they
are responsible. Of those we reviewed, several included timelines for
implementing the programs and conducting evaluations. Of those that
included performance measures, several included both output and
outcome measures as well as some targets for the programs.
State Has Primary Responsibility for Coordinating the Mérida
Initiative:
The Mérida Initiative is an assistance package with diverse program
components that is being implemented by a wide range of U.S. agencies
under the leadership and management of the State Department. Although
State has not comprehensively documented a coordinating structure for
Mérida, we identified several mechanisms in place involving decision-
makers at various levels of government. For example, several State
bureaus regularly coordinate with other U.S. agencies on Mérida policy
and programmatic issues. Headquarters and U.S. embassies in Mexico and
Central America have established mechanisms to coordinate and
communicate on implementation. Under the leadership of the U.S.
ambassadors, agencies at posts also have developed and adapted
mechanisms to coordinate efforts within the U.S. Embassy community in
Mexico and Central American countries. Moreover, State has established
formal bilateral mechanisms to coordinate with Mexican authorities.
State Bureaus, U.S. Embassies, and USAID Play Different Roles in
Coordination:
State bureaus, U.S. embassies in Mexico and Central America, and
several other agencies play a role in coordinating various aspects of
Mérida. According to State officials, the National Security Council
(NSC) has a key policy role in coordinating the Initiative. State
officials told us that the NSC leads the inter-agency policy effort on
the U.S. government counternarcotics and law enforcement approach to
the region, which includes the Mérida Initiative and domestic efforts,
such as the Southwest Border Strategy. State has designated the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for North America of WHA as the "principal" Mérida
coordinator. However, other State offices, such as INL, and other
agencies have also designated their own "coordinators" for Mérida. The
WHA coordinator and her counterparts in other bureaus and USAID
communicate programmatic activity via a weekly Mérida Initiative Core
Group meeting, described below.
In Mexico, two State bureaus--WHA and INL--and the U.S. Embassy in
Mexico City primarily share responsibility for coordinating policy and
programs funded under the Initiative. In Central America, WHA, INL,
and USAID, along with the U.S. embassies in each country, play key
roles in coordinating Mérida implementation. Table 4 provides a
description of the roles and responsibilities of the entities involved
in coordinating Mérida.
Table 4: Mérida Coordination at Various Levels:
Office: NSC;
Role: NSC holds bimonthly Interagency Policy Committee meetings to
coordinate on high-level international law enforcement issues, such as
reducing illicit arms to Mexico and money laundering, as well as the
Mérida Initiative. Specifically, State officials cited the role NSC
played in approving the ’Four Pillars“ strategic goals that set the
framework for bilateral collaboration with Mexico under Mérida.
Office: State WHA;
Role: WHA is the policy lead which manages the separate elements of
the Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America, and serves as
the principal Mérida coordinator. In addition, the Central American
Affairs Office, within WHA, plays the key role in overseeing and
implementing Mérida Initiative programs specifically for Central
America.
Office: State INL;
Role: INL coordinates implementation of Mérida law enforcement and
counternarcotics programs with NAS Mexico City and Narcotics Affairs
Offices at Central America posts and supports WHA in the process of
coordination with other U.S. agencies, also referred to as interagency
coordination.
Office: USAID;
Role: USAID coordinates implementation of Mérida economic and social
development and rule of law programs with USAID Missions in Central
America as well as Mexico and supports WHA in the process of interagency
coordination.
Office: U.S. Embassies;
Role: U.S. Embassies oversee on-the-ground implementation and
coordination of the Initiative in beneficiary countries. At all posts,
the ambassadors and/or Deputy Chiefs of Missions (DCM) have overall
responsibility for coordinating the Mérida Initiative with other law
enforcement activities in country and with State headquarters.
In posts where there is a NAS presence, a NAS official has been
designated to oversee coordination and implementation of the INCLE-
funded Mérida programs. Where NAS is not present this responsibility is
generally assigned to a Political Section officer. The NAS in Mexico
also serves as account manager for Central America INCLE funds.
Source: GAO analysis of State data.
[End of table]
Headquarters and Posts Have Established Mechanisms to Coordinate:
State officials described two formal coordination mechanisms between
headquarters and the U.S. Embassy in Mexico, as follows:
* A weekly teleconference between NAS staff at the U.S. Embassy in
Mexico City and INL officials at State headquarters to discuss
implementation of the Mérida Initiative. Participants in these
meetings include the INL and NAS designated Mérida coordinators.
Issues discussed at these meetings include the status of procurement
of equipment and implementation of training projects.
* The Mérida Core Group meeting, a broader weekly teleconference that
includes not only INL officials but also USAID and other State
offices, such as PM, Legislative Affairs, and the WHA Deputy Assistant
Secretary Mérida Coordinator, who leads the meeting. U.S. Embassy,
Mexico City, officials participating in this meeting include NAS,
USAID, and the Political Affairs Section. The purpose of these
meetings is to discuss Mérida budgets and programs, and other issues,
such as following the status of the signing of the LOA with the
Government of Mexico.
In our field work, State officials at post in Mexico reported being
generally satisfied with coordination between headquarters and posts,
but also expressed some frustrations. For example, a U.S. Embassy
Mexico official expressed concern with the slow pace of hiring
additional staff at INL in State headquarters to expedite
implementation of the Mérida Initiative.
For Central American countries, INL has a monthly call with posts that
focuses on pragmatic aspects of Mérida implementation, such as
procurement procedures. State officials at posts in Central American
countries we visited also reported being generally satisfied with
coordination between headquarters and posts but noted some
frustrations. For example, officials at posts we visited expressed
frustration with NAS Mexico serving as the account manager for INCLE
funds destined for Central America because "it adds an extra layer" to
an already complex funding process for Mérida activities. Some post
officials in Central America stated that this situation has created a
bottleneck on the progress of bilateral procurement, training, and
Mérida-related travel. For example, officials at the post in El
Salvador reported that they had to wait several months for
clarification of procedures for accessing Mérida funds held in Mexico.
U.S. officials in the three Central American countries we visited
noted that returning Mérida funds to embassy control would speed up
procurement, and facilitate Mérida travel, training, and exchange
programs. However, officials at INL headquarters explained that NAS
Mexico serves as the centralized account manager for all Mérida INCLE
funds because it has the staffing and resources capabilities to carry
out this task that are not present in Central America.[Footnote 27]
For Central American countries there are currently no broader meetings
on the level of Mexico's Core Group meeting, but a State official told
us of plans to create a weekly Core Group meeting for Central America
countries under the CARSI umbrella, which would mirror the current
Mérida Core Group meeting that focuses on Mexico. According to State
officials, WHA would also lead these meetings.
U.S. Agencies at Posts Have Developed and Adapted Mechanisms to
Coordinate Efforts:
In response to the increase in funding and staffing associated with
the Mérida Initiative, recipient countries have developed and adapted
mechanisms at posts to coordinate efforts. At the U.S. Embassy in
Mexico City, two formal mechanisms are in place to communicate and
coordinate progress on Mérida activities:
* NAS weekly meeting - This group was formed to deal with the growth
of NAS project portfolio due to the Mérida Initiative. These meetings
provide NAS staff an opportunity to report to management on progress
of projects and any difficulties encountered.
* Law Enforcement Committee - This group pre-dates Mérida and
coordinates the activities of all U.S. agencies and organizations that
are involved in counternarcotics and law enforcement activities in
Mexico. Since Mérida was launched, this meeting has evolved into a
forum where U.S. agencies represented at the post discuss progress in
implementing programs under the Initiative, as well as continue
discussions on other law enforcement programs that are not funded
under Mérida. A key participant in these meetings explained that
whether programs are funded through Mérida or not, they are
coordinated to further the four pillars for Mexico described above.
For example, recently ATF rolled out its Spanish language electronic
firearms tracing system, which is not funded under Mérida, and NAS
provided Mérida funds to boost training for Mexican officials who will
be working with this system. Similarly, NAS leveraged its Information
Technology Team, which was created under Mérida, to facilitate
implementation of a $50 million DOD cross border communications
project that will enable secure radio communications between Mexican
and U.S. security entities along 10 southwest border locations.
Participants in the Law Enforcement Committee meetings include NAS,
USAID, DEA, ATF, DOJ, ICE, CBP, and DOD. The meeting is chaired by the
Ambassador or DCM.
In all Central American countries, the embassies' Law Enforcement
Committee meetings, which were also in place prior to Mérida, are used
as a formal inter-agency mechanism to discuss progress on the
Initiative. In some of the countries these meetings have been re-
branded as a "Mérida" or "CARSI working groups," and meet, at minimum,
on a monthly basis. In all Central American countries this group is
chaired by the Ambassador or DCM. Participation in these meetings
depends on the relevant agencies present at each post. In Panama, for
example, this group includes ICE, DEA, CBP, NAS, FBI, USAID, Public
Affairs Section (PAS), Defense Attaché Office (DAO),
Political/Economic Section, and Regional Security Office (RSO).
According to a State official, this group works exceptionally well in
Central American countries, providing an opportunity to harmonize U.S.
government policy on how to disburse Mérida Initiative support.
Furthermore, State officials noted that a key outcome of this meeting
is that it reduces redundancy across agency efforts in-country.
State Has Established Formal Bilateral Mechanisms to Coordinate with
Mexican Authorities:
Given the unprecedented opportunity the Mérida Initiative presents for
bilateral collaboration, in Mexico formal structures to facilitate
cooperation are necessary. According to State officials, there are
intense efforts in Washington, D.C., and in Mexico City at the U.S.
Embassy to coordinate Mérida efforts bilaterally with the Government
of Mexico across every level of government. From our discussions with
U.S. and Mexican officials, there appears to be a strong sense of co-
responsibility and high level of cooperation in implementing the
Mérida Initiative. To facilitate coordination on Mérida, the U.S. and
Mexican governments have created a multi-level working group structure
to develop and implement bilateral security efforts, as follows:
* High-Level Consultative Group--This is a cabinet-level group
including all U.S. and Mexican officials with some responsibility for
implementing aspects of Mérida. The group is chaired by the Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton and Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Patricia Espinosa. The purpose of this group is "to set strategic
direction" for the Mérida Initiative; that is, reaffirm commitment and
willingness of both governments to continue in this partnership. This
group first met in December 2008 under the Bush Administration and
again in March 2010 under the Obama Administration. Following the
March 23, 2010, meeting in Mexico City, a joint statement declared "a
strategic vision for the coming years to ensure continuity of
bilateral actions already in place and advance new opportunities and
areas of cooperation." In particular, the March 2010 meeting
highlighted plans to implement pilot programs in a coordinated manner
in the Tijuana-San Diego and Ciudad Juárez-El Paso regions that will
entail strengthening information exchange mechanisms and promote the
social and economic development of these communities that have
suffered the effects of violence.
* Policy Coordination Group--This group is chaired by national
security representatives from both countries, the offices of the
ambassadors from the United States and Mexico serve as "secretariats"
for this group, and members are at the assistant secretary level from
both governments. The focus of this group is to set policy and monitor
the progress on the strategic direction--set by the High-Level
Consultative Group--and the broad country and bilateral efforts.
Initiated in August 2009 with the arrival of current Ambassador to
Mexico, this was meant to be a mid-level group to bridge the policy
and operational aspects of Mérida. This group was tasked by the High-
Level Consultative Group to develop a new strategy for México that
reflects the dual challenges of building national and transnational
capabilities and effectiveness; and take into account the
implementation of existing programs under the Mérida Initiative and
present a framework to move beyond Mérida. The outcome was the
development of the four pillars also known as the new Mérida strategic
goals for Mexico, discussed above. Given this expansion, many agencies
from both sides are part of the discussion of the work to complete
under each pillar. Table 5 lists the U.S. and Mexican key agencies
working together under each pillar.
Table 5: Mérida Initiative Policy Coordination Group for Mexico--Key
Actors by Mérida Initiative Pillar:
Pillar: Disrupt Organized Criminal Groups:
U.S. Government:
Director of National Intelligence (DNI);
State;
DOJ;
DHS;
DOD;
ONDCP;
Mexican Government:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE);
Office of the Attorney General (PGR);
Ministry of Public Safety (SSP);
Army-Air Force (SEDENA);
Navy (SEMAR).
Pillar: Institutionalize Reforms to Sustain Rule of Law and Respect
for Human Rights;
U.S. Government:
State;
DOJ;
DHS;
DOD;
USAID;
ONDCP;
SRE;
PGR;
SSP;
Customs Service (SAT);
National Migration Institute (INAMI);
SEDENA;
SEMAR.
Pillar: Create 21st Century Border;
U.S. Government:
State;
DHS;
DOD;
DOJ;
USAID;
ONDCP;
Mexican Government:
SRE;
SAT;
SSP;
INAMI;
SEMAR.
Pillar: Build Strong and Resilient Communities;
U.S. Government:
State;
USAID;
DOJ;
ONDCP;
Mexican Government:
National Addiction Council (CONADIC);
PGR;
SRE.
Source: NAS, Mexico City.
[End of table]
* Bilateral Implementation Group--This group is chaired by the Deputy
Chief of Mission and NAS Director on the U.S. side and SRE
Undersecretary for North America for the Government of Mexico. This is
a working-level group that meets once a month and gathers
representatives from agencies of both governments working together on
Mérida projects to review status of projects and comment on any
successes or difficulties encountered. A notable outcome of these
meetings has been the "project tracking mechanism" discussed above.
Under the Bilateral Implementation Group working groups have been
formed to address key issues. For example, a working group on Money
Laundering is led by ICE for the U.S. government, and the Deputy
Attorney General's Office for the Investigation of Organized Crime
(SIEDO) and the Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) for the Government
of Mexico.[Footnote 28]
In addition to this bilateral coordination structure, the Mérida
Bilateral Implementation Office will provide a further step toward
closer cooperation when the office opens in Mexico City. This office
will provide a venue for officials from the United States and Mexico
to work together on a daily basis on Mérida Initiative projects,
strengthening coordination, and improving the pace of deliveries. This
shared workspace will be used for the implementation of Mérida
Initiative training and equipment projects but will not, in any way,
have an operational or law enforcement focus. According to State
officials, the office space was expected to be ready in May 2010. The
main NAS implementing staff of the Initiative--project coordinators--
currently located at the U.S. Embassy, will be located in this office,
and the Government of Mexico will have liaisons located in this office
from the Mérida Initiative partner agencies. Oversight of the office
will be managed by the NAS Director and an official from SRE. The NAS
Mérida Coordinator will also be located in this office to oversee the
implementation of the projects. State officials stated that this space
will not only help facilitate direct access and communication with the
Government of Mexico liaisons, but also among U.S. officials. As a
result of the increase in NAS staff from 19 to 51, the NAS
coordinators are currently spread over two floors in the U.S. Embassy.
According to NAS officials, bringing this staff together in this new
space will also facilitate internal NAS coordination. In addition,
while NAS is currently the only U.S. agency moving to this space, in
the future U.S. partner agencies involved in implementing Mérida
activities, such as DOJ/OPDAT, may also be located in this space to
further enhance inter-agency and bilateral coordination, according to
State officials.
Despite these multiple levels of bilateral coordination/
communication, some Mexican officials said they lacked an
understanding of aspects of the U.S. process for implementing the
Initiative. In particular, Mexican officials we met with expressed
frustration with the pace of the U.S. procurement process, and a need
to have better knowledge of expected time frames for deliveries.
Coordination Mechanisms in Central America Are Less Formal Than in
Mexico:
For Central American countries, unlike Mexico, no formal coordination
mechanism is in place between U.S. agencies and their host government
counterparts working on Mérida implementation. According to State
officials, while they have tried to coordinate the Mérida Initiative
on a regional level for Central America, this has been difficult
because there are seven recipient countries involved with distinct law
enforcement priorities that necessitate different programs or
strategies. For example, in El Salvador, the major issue is gangs.
Guatemala also faces significant gang-related violence, but Mexican
and locally based DTOs present a growing threat. In Panama, DTOs are
escalating cocaine trafficking from South America, and their growing
influence is seen as stimulating other criminal activities, such as
kidnappings. Given these distinct challenges and priorities, each
country carries out bilateral coordination with U.S. agencies
differently and less formally.
In spite of this, State officials describe a high level of security
dialogue and bilateral coordination between the United States and
Central American Mérida recipient countries. For example, State
officials reported that in Guatemala participating ministries have
assigned high-level points of contact, usually cabinet-level
officials, to work with U.S. agencies on Mérida implementation.
Similarly, in Belize, U.S. officials meet with the Minister of
national security regularly on Mérida and related law enforcement
issues. In El Salvador, the lead diplomatic official at post reported
meeting frequently with the President to discuss Mérida-related issues.
In addition, State officials informed us that the United States is
looking for ways to use Mérida/CARSI programs to support Central
American countries' efforts to work together on a regional level. For
example, using fiscal year 2008 Mérida funds, U.S. officials are
currently conducting assessments of border control capacities with
their Central American counterparts. The idea is that U.S. officials
will be able to use these assessments to work with the seven countries
in different groupings, based on key criminal activities identified.
State officials emphasized that this approach is necessary because
each country has unique problems. To strengthen regional efforts,
State also tries to work through the Central American Integration
System (SICA), a multilateral organization whose goal is to coordinate
and facilitate the gradual process of Central American integration
through the adoption of common strategies and policies to meet
regional challenges.[Footnote 29]
Conclusions:
The United States has made some progress delivering equipment and
training to Mexico and Central America under the Mérida Initiative and
supported efforts to combat crime and narcotics trafficking.
Nevertheless, violence continues to grow and needs are changing across
the region as criminals adjust their activities in reaction to
increased law enforcement efforts. This year, State revised its
strategy and defined new goals, but left out key elements that would
facilitate management and accountability. State generally lacks
outcome-based measures that define success in the short term and the
long term, making it difficult to determine effectiveness and leaving
unclear when the Initiative's goals will be met. Establishing better
performance measures could provide Congress and other stakeholders
with valuable information on outcomes, enabling them to make more
informed decisions on whether or not policies and approaches might
need to be revised and in what ways. Regarding program implementation,
there are no timelines for future deliveries of some equipment and
training, particularly for a range of capacity building programs that
will take on a large role going forward. Provision of time frames for
the commencement and completion of programs would set expectations for
stakeholders, including the Mexican government, which has expressed
concerns about the pace of delivery. It would also facilitate
coordination and planning for all organizations involved in
implementation.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of State incorporate into the strategy
for the Mérida Initiative outcome performance measures that indicate
progress toward strategic goals and develop more comprehensive
timelines for future program deliveries.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
The Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development,
Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and the Office
of National Drug Control Policy provided technical comments and
updates that we have incorporated throughout the report as appropriate.
We received written comments from State, which are reprinted in
appendix III. State concurred with our recommendations and noted that
additional progress had been made since our data collection cut-off
date. In particular, State indicated that it has created a weekly
program implementation tracking report and has signed an Amended
Letter of Agreement with Mexico in May. Regarding performance
measures, State explained that it is working on how to best understand
and manage indicators that may not always be linear. While determining
meaningful performance measures may be challenging, we believe that
they are critical for effective management and accountability and will
help Congress and other stakeholders understand the extent to which
the $1.6 billion Mérida Initiative is achieving success.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of State and
other interested parties. The report is also available at no charge on
the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions
to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Our objectives were to examine (1) the status of Mérida program
implementation, (2) State's strategy for implementation, and (3)
coordination mechanisms in place for Mérida. Overall, we conducted our
audit work in Washington, D.C., and at sites in Mexico, Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Panama in February and March 2010. We traveled to Mexico
because it receives the largest share of support, and we traveled to
the three Central America countries that had expended the most Mérida
funds so far to ensure that we observed a broad range of projects in
different countries across the region. In the countries we visited, we
directly observed or reviewed plans for law enforcement training
activities, communications equipment usage, anti-gang efforts,
sensitive investigation unit activities, foreign authorities vetting
processes, border inspection training, community policing, youth-at-
risk programs, and judicial system operations. In addition, we met
with U.S. officials at the U.S. embassies overseeing the
implementation of the Mérida Initiative, including NAS, USAID, DOJ,
CBP, DOD, and DEA. We also interviewed foreign government officials
responsible for program implementation in each country. In Mexico and
some Central American countries we visited, we interviewed officials
affiliated with the United Nations as well as members of
nongovernmental organizations and citizen groups. Field work included
visits to locations where programs have been implemented and where
equipment has been delivered and included police, military, and other
law enforcement organizations. In Washington, D.C., we interviewed
officials at State, DOD, DOJ, Treasury, DHS, USAID, ONDCP, and OMB.
Table 6 provides a summary of the U.S. government and foreign
government entities we met with for our review.
Table 6: Summary of U.S. Government and Foreign Entities Contacted:
U.S. government:
State, USAID, DOJ, DHS, DOD, ONDCP, Treasury, OMB, Congressional
Research Service, and Central Intelligence Agency.
Mexico:
U.S. Embassy: NAS, ICE, USAID, ODC, DEA, FBI, and CBP.
Government of Mexico: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE,) Office of the
Attorney General (PGR), National Migration Institute (INAMI), Mexican
Customs Service (SAT), Mexican Army/Air Force (SEDENA), Mexican Navy
(SEMAR), Ministry of Public Security (SSP), National Council against
Addictions (CONADIC), and National Security and Investigation Center
(CISEN).
Other organizations: United Nations High Council on Human Rights,
local nongovernmental organizations.
El Salvador:
U.S. Embassy: Mérida Initiative Working Group, Political/Narcotics
Affairs Section, DEA, FBI, ICE, MILGROUP, ATF, DOJ, and USAID.
Government of El Salvador: National Civilian Police.
Other: International Law Enforcement Academy.
Panama:
U.S. Embassy: Law Enforcement Working Group, NAS, Political Affairs
Section, USAID, ODC/DAO, FBI, ICE, DEA, CBP, IRS, RSA, and RSO:
Government of Panama: Coast Guard.
Guatemala:
U.S. Embassy: Mérida/CARSI Working Group, Political/Economic Section,
DCM, NAS, DEA, USAID, ICE, DAO, and MILGROUP.
Government of Guatemala: Public Ministry, Ministry of Government,
Ministry of National Defense.
Other organizations: Myrna Mack Foundation, The International
Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
To assess the status of training and equipment delivered under Mérida
and how State is working to overcome administrative challenges that
have led to delays, we reviewed State spending plans for Mérida;
[Footnote 30] we reviewed State budget documents; delivery status
spreadsheets and reports; documents describing resource plans, policy
and strategy development, and performance measures; bilateral
agreements between the United States and Mexico as well as between the
United States and the Central American countries; and interagency
agreements between State and other U.S. agencies implementing Mérida
programs. We also interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C.;
Mexico; Guatemala; El Salvador; and Panama to discuss how funds and
training and equipment deliveries are tracked, the mechanisms in place
to monitor implementation and delivery, as well as performance
measures developed to track the success of the initiative. The funding
data in this report is an update of data presented in our previous
report on the status of funds for the Mérida Initiative.[Footnote 31]
To determine the quality of these data, we reviewed the four laws that
appropriated funds which State allocated to the Initiative, primarily
from three accounts--the International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) account, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), and the
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account.[Footnote 32] We collected
data from each Bureau at State that administers those accounts--
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; Western Hemisphere
Affairs; and Political-Military Affairs. We also collected data from
USAID, which actually implements ESF. Each bureau administers the
accounts separately using their own spreadsheets and budgeting terms.
Since we had collected the data for our prior report, we were able to
request similar data from the same officials to correspond to the data
we reported previously. We carefully reviewed the data, including
detailed line item information by project, and consulted with State
officials on the accuracy and completeness of the information. When we
found discrepancies, such as data entry errors, we brought them to
State's attention and worked with State officials to correct the
discrepancies. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of this report. Finally, where possible, we checked the
data against other information such as budget spreadsheets arranged
either by project or by country; project plans detailing estimated
expenses; and implementation agreements between State and other U.S.
agencies. Furthermore, to describe the funding process and factors
affecting the timing of the process as well as of delivery of goods
and services under the Initiative, we interviewed State, DOD, and
USAID officials, analyzed data provided to us, and reviewed
documentation. We determined that these data were sufficiently
reliable to demonstrate the actual and planned timing of major
equipment deliveries by year and after 2011. To discuss the
challenges, we interviewed U.S. officials and foreign government
officials overseeing the implementation of the Mérida Initiative. We
discussed challenges pertaining to administrative requirements, the
surge in funds, and the timing of funds availability, as well as
issues associated with foreign government's capacity and continuity of
public administration. In addition, we reviewed U.S. government
documents, including law enforcement agency reports and strategies,
that address narcotics and crime in the region. We also reviewed
studies by the Congressional Research Service and State Inspector
General office and examined legislation related to Mérida.
To assess State's performance measures, we compared them to best
practices identified in previous GAO reports, including work that
defines key attributes of successful performance measures, and in the
Government Performance Results Act of 1993. Due to the fact that State
established its performance measures fairly recently and revised them
last year, we were only able to assess its measures against some of
the key attributes and focused on those that appeared most clearly
lacking in general in State's measures: linkage, measurable targets,
and outcomes. The operational definitions we used for our review are
as follows:
* Linkage: Measure is specifically aligned with current program goals.
* Measurable targets: Measure has a numerical goal.
* Outcome: Measure provides an assessment of the results of a program
activity compared to its intended purpose.
To describe coordination, we interviewed U.S. and foreign government
officials overseeing the Mérida Initiative - including, State WHA,
State INL, USAID, and NAS. In Mexico, we interviewed foreign
government officials, such as, SRE, SSP, PGR, SEDENA, SEMAR, SAT, and
INAMI. Based on this testimonial evidence, we identified roles,
responsibilities, and mechanisms in place to coordinate the Mérida
Initiative.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2009 to July 2010
in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Performance Measures for Mexico Corresponding to the
Original Mérida Strategic Goals:
Strategic Goal I: Break the Power and Impunity of Criminal
Organizations:
Objective 1: Disrupt trafficking routes and interdict air, land and
sea shipments of illicit contraband between Mexico and the United
States.
Action:
Support the Government of Mexico in creating downward cross-border
trend in illicit narcotics, weapons, precursor chemicals and cash
flows through the use of non-intrusive inspection equipment.
Performance Measures:
1. Percentage of vehicles and containers inspected by non-intrusive
means, per port of entry Baseline: 0% of vehicles and containers
inspected by non-intrusive means, from the time equipment transferred
under the Initiative is utilized.
2. Average time for inspection of commercial freight vehicles.
Baseline: 10 to 30 minutes to inspect a vehicle by traditional means.
Action:
Contribute to the fight against transnational organized crime.
Performance Measures:
1. Number of drug traffickers and criminal kingpins arrested. Baseline
2008: 22,000 individuals.
2. Number of drug-related extraditions to the United States. Baseline
2008: 95 individuals (S.R.E.).
3. Extraditions from the United States to Mexico. Baseline 2008: 32
individuals (U.S. DOJ).
Objective 2: Restructure and enhance law enforcement and intelligence
capacities to combat criminal organizations.
Action:
Strengthen the role of civilian federal law enforcement authorities in
the fight against organized crime.
Performance Measures:
1. 10 percent increase in specialized training courses on new
procedures and penal investigations for Federal Police and Prosecutors.
Baseline 2008: 300 courses to 7,600 police personnel.
2. Increase the polygraph capacity of the Secretariat of Public
Security‘s ’Center for Background Checks“ (measured in number of
polygraphs). Baseline 2008: 0.
3. Increase in the number of Federal Police officials evaluated in the
Secretariat of Public Security's "Center for Background Checks" with
polygraph equipment acquired with Mérida Initiative funds. Baseline
2008: 0.
Strategic Goal II: Assist Mexico in Strengthening Border, Air, and
Maritime Controls:
Objective 1: Increase security of border areas and ports of entry.
Action:
Improve the tracking, verification and collection of data to impede
criminal activity.
Performance Measures:
1. Number of checkpoints equipped with and operating non-intrusive
inspection equipment and/or canine teams. Baseline 2008: 160 NIIE
units, 90 canine units.
2. Number of OASISS sites along the U.S.-Mexico border. Baseline 2008:
9 sites.
Objective 2: Enhance secure communications and shipping.
Performance Measures:
1. Provide technical capability for an operational strategic
communications system for the Government of Mexico. Baseline 2008:
Backup infrastructure not in place.
2. Provide training in operating secure telecommunications system.
Baseline: 140 IT courses for 700 public security IT engineers.
Strategic Goal III: Improve the Capacity of Justice Systems:
Objective 1: Support the Government of Mexico in improving criminal
justice system efficiency and effectiveness.
Action:
Strengthen legal reforms that are already being implemented.
Performance Measures:
1. Number of judicial personnel trained for the new federal judicial
system with Initiative funds. Baseline 2008: 0.
2. Number of organized crime cases successfully brought to trial.
Baseline 2008: 1,040 individuals brought to trial.
Objective 2: Bolster the rule of law while ensuring the protection of
human rights.
Action:
Increase effectiveness, cooperation, and transparency.
Performance Measures:
1. Number of Federal Police officials trained in human rights with
initiative funds. Baseline 2008: 0.
Objective 3: Comprehensive prison reform to modernize and inhibit the
influence of incarcerated criminals on outside criminal organizations:
Action:
Specialized training to strengthen the procedures and regulations of
prison administration.
Performance Measures:
1. Train and certify corrections instructors in 2009 (in a U.S.
corrections training academy). Baseline 2008: 0 instructors trained
and certified.
2. Train and certify newly recruited corrections officials by the end
of 2009. Baseline 2008: 0 prison officials trained and certified.
Strategic Goal IV: Diminish the Demand for Drugs:
Objective: Assist the Government of Mexico in reducing the demand for
drugs through information, educational programs, and rehabilitation.
Action:
Enhance public awareness of the danger of drugs and provide specialized
attention.
Performance Measures:
1. Percentage completed in the design, acquisition and installation of
a digital communications network and a national database to serve
vulnerable population. Baseline: 0%.
2. Percentage of the target population served by "New Life Centers."
Baseline: 0% of the population at the time the new network was
launched.
3. Percentage of "New Life Centers" reporting to RENADIC. Baseline: 0%.
Source: Department of State.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, DC 20520:
July 9, 2010:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G St. NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report,
Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics
and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Metrics
(GAO-10-837, GAO Code 320706).
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Mark Smith, Senior Program Officer, Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs at (202) 663-1653.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc:
GAO - Jess Ford:
INL - David T. Johnson:
State/OIG - Tracy Burnett:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics and
Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Metrics (GAO-10-837,
GAO Code 320706):
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your draft report entitled
"Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided Counternarcotics
and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance Metrics." We
commend GAO for preparing a thorough report that shows insight into
the development and implementation of the Mérida Initiative. The
report goes far in documenting the obstacles to implementation and the
significant steps the Department has taken to overcome them, resulting
in accelerated implementation of programs.
The Department of State agrees with the main findings and conclusions
of the report, including the recommendation that "the Secretary of
State incorporate into the strategy for the Mérida Initiative outcome
performance measures that indicate progress toward strategic goals and
develop more comprehensive timelines for future program deliveries."
The Department has worked hard to increase our capacity to implement
the Mérida Initiative, including through the development of program
planning tools, which we look forward to strengthening even further.
One example of our efforts in this respect is the creation and
management of a program implementation tracking report that provides
weekly reporting on progress in delivering this assistance. The
Department has added a full-time staff member to the Narcotics Affairs
Section in Mexico City to track, maintain, and update this report ”
which is currently tracking 66 equipment deliveries and 306 training
and other capacity building programs. We are also developing automated
reporting tools to track funding.
Regarding the pace of obligations and expenditures, an Amended Letter
of Agreement (ALOA) was signed with Mexico on May 4, for an additional
$287 million in FY 2009 program funds. This ALOA increased
significantly the overall percentage of obligated funds. GAO's report
notes that expenditures have accelerated since their December 2009
report, and also mentions that expenditures lag, especially on major
equipment, because expenditures are recorded only once equipment is
delivered.
GAO's report recommends that the Mérida strategy should incorporate
outcome performance measures. A set of goals and performance
measurements was agreed to in December 2008 following close
collaboration with the Government of Mexico. Appropriately, these
metrics assess U.S. assistance ” not the overall strategy of the
Mexican government. However, as GAO noted in its Report, these metrics
have not been updated since the new Four-Pillar strategy was developed
earlier this year and affirmed in May by Presidents Obama and Calderon
during their meeting in Washington. We are currently exploring how
best to update program performance measures to reflect this new
strategy.
As was discussed during the GAO's completion of the report, we have
progressed in identifying indicators that should be tracked, but
progress against these indicators will not always be linear, and we
are working on how to best understand and manage against these
indicators. For example, the activities undertaken under Mérida should
result in the eventual reduction of homicides, but there will likely
be a period where transnational criminal organizations (TC0s)
will resist the increased pressures against them and seek to affirm
their control over plazas and border crossings against other TCOs.
This may well result in an increase in violence despite making
progress on the program. To manage successfully against these
indicators, we need to understand and predict how and why the trends
will change and possibly reverse, and avoid the temptation to
incorrectly adjust policies because we did not understand how to
interpret the indicators. Completing this task will take some time in
order to produce indicators that go beyond tracking inputs and
outputs, and provide a meaningful understanding of outcomes.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contacts named above, Juan Gobel, Assistant
Director; Marc Castellano; Marisela Perez; Erin Saunders Rath; Debbie
J. Chung; Grace Lui; Martin De Alteriis; and Judith Williams made key
contributions to this report. Elizabeth Curda, Victoria Green, Jena
Sinkfield, and Doug Cole provided technical assistance.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Combating Gangs: Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central
American Gang Strategy, but Could Strengthen Oversight and Measurement
of Efforts (Washington D.C.: April 2010), [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-395] .
[2] Legislation that provided the initial funding was enacted in June
2008; Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-252, 122
Stat. 2323.
[3] Average annual counternarcotics and related law enforcement
funding increased from about $57 million over the period of 2000 to
2006 to $400 million for fiscal year 2008.
[4] GAO, Status of Funds for the Mérida Initiative, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-253R] (Washington D.C.: December
2009).
[5] The Central American countries include Belize, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.
[6] GAO, U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico Face
Planning and Coordination Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-709] (Washington D.C.: June 18,
2009).
[7] State has renamed the "Mérida Initiative - Central America" as the
"Central America Regional Security Initiative" in recognition of the
Congress' intent to draw attention to the region and its issues. See
H. Rep. No. 111-366 (2009) (conference report to Pub. L. No. 111-117
using the term "Central America Regional Security Initiative
(CARSI).") Conference report H. Rep. No. 111-366 states: "The
conferees remain concerned with youth violence, criminal gangs,
organized crime, drug trafficking and other forms of criminal activity
and violence in Central America. The conferees support the budget
request under the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) heading for the Central America portion of the Mérida
Initiative and direct that such funds shall be made available from
Western Hemisphere Regional funds for CARSI."
[8] Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, Div. F, § 7045, 123
Stat. 3034, 3372 (2009). Countries included in the CBSI are Antigua
and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and
Tobago. State and USAID consider Belize part of CARSI for funding and
programming purposes, but the legislation defining the countries that
are CBSI includes Belize; therefore, State includes Belize in CBSI.
[9] S. Rep. No. 111-188 (2010).
[10] The original four primary goals of the Mérida Initiative were to:
(1) break the power and impunity of criminal organizations; (2) assist
the Mexican and Central American governments in strengthening border,
air, and maritime controls; (3) improve the capacity of justice
systems in the region; and (4) curtail gang activity in Mexico and
Central America and diminish the demand for drugs in the region.
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-253R.
[12] Section 7045(e) of the State, Foreign Operations and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2010, provides not more than $210.25
million for assistance for Mexico only to combat drug trafficking and
related violence and organized crime, and for judicial reform,
institution building, anti-corruption, and rule of law activities.
Section 7045(f) of the Act also provides up to $83 million for the
countries of Central America only to combat drug trafficking and
related violence and organized crime, and for judicial reform,
institution building, anticorruption, rule of law activities, and
maritime security. However, State has not yet notified Congress of
final fiscal year 2010 Central America funding levels, which are still
pending as of this publication.
[13] The fiscal year 2009 LOA with Mexico was signed on May 4, 2010,
thus obligating $208.2 million of fiscal year 2009 INCLE funds.
[14] See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 856. Funds are
apportioned by the Office of Management and Budget when it distributes
the amounts available for obligation to the fund account. In this
case, FMF funds are apportioned directly to DOD.
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-253R.
[16] Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, Div. H, §
7045(e), 123 Stat. 524, 887.
[17] The laws and regulations that govern contracting with the federal
government are designed to ensure that federal procurements are
conducted fairly. On occasion, bidders or others interested in
government procurements may have reason to believe that a contract has
been, or is about to be, awarded improperly or illegally, or that they
have been unfairly denied a contract or an opportunity to compete for
a contract. A major avenue of relief for those concerned about the
propriety of an award has been the Government Accountability Office,
which has historically provided an objective, independent, and
impartial forum for the resolution of disputes concerning the awards
of federal contracts. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-471SP].
[18] See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-252, §§ 1406-07.
[19] In the Fiscal Year 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act, ESF funds for
Mexico are also subject to the human rights conditionality. In the
Fiscal Year 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act, none of the funds
are statutorily subject to the human rights conditionality.
[20] This process is named after Section 653(a) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, now codified at 22 U.S.C. §2413(a). This
section states that no later than 30 days after the enactment of a law
appropriating funds to carry out a provision of this act (other than
section 451 or 637 of the Arms Export Control Act), the President
shall notify Congress of each foreign country and international
organization to which the U.S. government intends to provide any
portion of the funds under such law and the amount of funds under that
law, by category of assistance, that the U.S. government intends to
provide to each.
[21] Pub. L. No. 110-252, § 1406.
[22] GAO, Managing for Results: Critical Issues for Improving Federal
Agencies' Strategic Plans, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-97-180] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.
16, 1997); GAO, The Results Act: An Evaluator's Guide to Assessing
Agency Annual Performance Plans, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.20] (Washington, D.C.: April
1998).
[23] GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax
Filing Season Performance Measures, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143] (Washington, D.C.: November
2002).
[24] The new pillars for Mexico are to (1) Disrupt Organized Criminal
Groups, (2) Institutionalize Reforms to Sustain Rule of Law and
Respect for Human Rights, (3) Create a 21st Century Border, and (4)
Build Strong and Resilient Communities.
[25] The Results Act guidelines request outcome measures, not just
outputs.
[26] Major equipment includes such items as Bell helicopters and other
aircraft, armored vehicles, non-intrusive inspection equipment, and
computers and software. Our analysis did not include major equipment
for which State has not estimated a delivery date.
[27] CARSI INCLE funds are also expected to be managed by NAS Mexico
City.
[28] Other working groups include: Disrupting Drug Trafficking
Organizations, Institutional Reforms, Border Vision, Social and
Economic programming, Arms Trafficking, Ciudad Juarez-El Paso, and
Strategic and Social Communication.
[29] SICA was established on February 1, 1993. Central American
countries that belong to SICA are: El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Panama. Belize adheres to SICA principles,
and the Dominican Republic is an associate. Mexico is a regional
observer and China and Spain are observers outside the region.
[30] We reviewed three spending plans that State submitted to
Congress. These included fiscal year 2008 supplemental, fiscal year
2009 omnibus, and fiscal year 2009 supplemental spending plans.
[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-253R].
[32] State also allocated $6.2 million from the FY08 Supplemental
Appropriations Act Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and
Related Programs (NADR) account to fund activities for Mérida in
Central American countries. We reflect this amount in table 2 in the
text, but given the relatively small size of the appropriations and
the fact that they did not receive any subsequent NADR appropriations
for the Mérida Initiative, we did not include NADR in our description
of the general funding process for Mérida.
[End of section]
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