Maritime Security
Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa Gao ID: GAO-10-856 September 24, 2010Somali pirates operating off the Horn of Africa have attacked more than 450 ships and taken nearly 2,400 hostages since 2007. A small number of U.S.-flagged vessels and ships have been among those affected. As Somalia lacks a functioning government and is unable to repress piracy in its waters, the National Security Council (NSC) developed the interagency Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan) in December 2008 to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute piracy off the Horn of Africa in collaboration with international and industry partners. GAO was asked to evaluate the extent to which U.S. agencies (1) have implemented the plan, and any challenges they face in doing so, and (2) have collaborated with partners in counterpiracy efforts. GAO examined counterpiracy plans, activities, collaborative practices, and data, and interviewed industry and international partners and officials at U.S. agencies and the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain.
The U.S. government has made progress in implementing its Action Plan, in collaboration with international and industry partners, but pirates have adapted their tactics and expanded their area of operations, almost doubling the number of reported attacks from 2008 to 2009, and the U.S. government has yet to evaluate the costs, benefits, or effectiveness of its efforts or update its plan accordingly. The United States has advised industry partners on self-protection measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international coalition patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded prosecution arrangements with Kenya and the Seychelles. Officials credit collaborative efforts with reducing the pirates' rate of success in boarding ships and hijacking vessels in 2009. However, from 2007 to 2009, the most recent year for which complete data were available, the total number of hijackings reported to the International Maritime Bureau increased, ransoms paid by the shipping industry increased sharply, and attacks spread from the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden--the focus of the Action Plan--to the vast Indian Ocean. The Action Plan's objective is to repress piracy as effectively as possible, but the effectiveness of U.S. resources applied to counterpiracy is unclear because the interagency group responsible for monitoring the Action Plan's implementation has not tracked the cost of U.S. activities--such as operating ships and aircraft and prosecuting suspected pirates--nor systematically evaluated the relative benefits or effectiveness of the Action Plan's tasks. GAO's prior work has shown that federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts need to evaluate their activities to identify areas for improvement. Moreover, as pirates have adapted their tactics, the Action Plan has not been revised. Without a plan that reflects new developments and assesses the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. efforts, decision makers will lack information that could be used to target limited resources to provide the greatest benefit, commensurate with U.S. interests in the region. The U.S. government has collaborated with international and industry partners to counter piracy, but it has not implemented some key practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration among U.S. agencies. According to U.S. and international stakeholders, the U.S. government has shared information with partners for military coordination. However, agencies have made less progress on several key efforts that involve multiple agencies--such as those to address piracy through strategic communications, disrupt pirate finances, and hold pirates accountable--in part because the Action Plan does not designate which agencies should lead or carry out 13 of the 14 tasks. For instance, the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury all collect information on pirate finances, but none has lead responsibility for analyzing that information to build a case against pirate leaders or financiers. The NSC, the President's principal arm for coordinating national security policy among government agencies, could bolster interagency collaboration and the U.S. contribution to counterpiracy efforts by clarifying agency roles and responsibilities and encouraging the agencies to develop joint guidance to implement their efforts. GAO recommends that the NSC reassess and update its Action Plan; identify metrics; assess the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; and clarify agency roles and responsibilities. The NSC did not comment. The Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury provided comments to clarify facts in the report.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: John H. Pendleton Team: Government Accountability Office: Defense Capabilities and Management Phone: (404) 679-1816GAO-10-856, Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2010:
Maritime Security:
Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration
among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa:
GAO-10-856:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-856, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Somali pirates operating off the Horn of Africa have attacked more
than 450 ships and taken nearly 2,400 hostages since 2007. A small
number of U.S.-flagged vessels and ships have been among those
affected. As Somalia lacks a functioning government and is unable to
repress piracy in its waters, the National Security Council (NSC)
developed the interagency Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa:
Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan) in December 2008 to prevent,
disrupt, and prosecute piracy off the Horn of Africa in collaboration
with international and industry partners. GAO was asked to evaluate
the extent to which U.S. agencies (1) have implemented the plan, and
any challenges they face in doing so, and (2) have collaborated with
partners in counterpiracy efforts. GAO examined counterpiracy plans,
activities, collaborative practices, and data, and interviewed
industry and international partners and officials at U.S. agencies and
the Combined Maritime Forces in Bahrain.
What GAO Found:
The U.S. government has made progress in implementing its Action Plan,
in collaboration with international and industry partners, but pirates
have adapted their tactics and expanded their area of operations,
almost doubling the number of reported attacks from 2008 to 2009, and
the U.S. government has yet to evaluate the costs, benefits, or
effectiveness of its efforts or update its plan accordingly. The
United States has advised industry partners on self-protection
measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international
coalition patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded prosecution
arrangements with Kenya and the Seychelles. Officials credit
collaborative efforts with reducing the pirates‘ rate of success in
boarding ships and hijacking vessels in 2009. However, from 2007 to
2009, the most recent year for which complete data were available, the
total number of hijackings reported to the International Maritime
Bureau increased, ransoms paid by the shipping industry increased
sharply, and attacks spread from the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden”-
the focus of the Action Plan-”to the vast Indian Ocean. The Action
Plan‘s objective is to repress piracy as effectively as possible, but
the effectiveness of U.S. resources applied to counterpiracy is
unclear because the interagency group responsible for monitoring the
Action Plan‘s implementation has not tracked the cost of U.S.
activities”such as operating ships and aircraft and prosecuting
suspected pirates”nor systematically evaluated the relative benefits
or effectiveness of the Action Plan‘s tasks. GAO‘s prior work has
shown that federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts need to
evaluate their activities to identify areas for improvement. Moreover,
as pirates have adapted their tactics, the Action Plan has not been
revised. Without a plan that reflects new developments and assesses
the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of U.S. efforts, decision
makers will lack information that could be used to target limited
resources to provide the greatest benefit, commensurate with U.S.
interests in the region.
The U.S. government has collaborated with international and industry
partners to counter piracy, but it has not implemented some key
practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration among U.S.
agencies. According to U.S. and international stakeholders, the U.S.
government has shared information with partners for military
coordination. However, agencies have made less progress on several key
efforts that involve multiple agencies”-such as those to address
piracy through strategic communications, disrupt pirate finances, and
hold pirates accountable”-in part because the Action Plan does not
designate which agencies should lead or carry out 13 of the 14 tasks.
For instance, the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the
Treasury all collect information on pirate finances, but none has lead
responsibility for analyzing that information to build a case against
pirate leaders or financiers. The NSC, the President‘s principal arm
for coordinating national security policy among government agencies,
could bolster interagency collaboration and the U.S. contribution to
counterpiracy efforts by clarifying agency roles and responsibilities
and encouraging the agencies to develop joint guidance to implement
their efforts.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the NSC reassess and update its Action Plan,
identify metrics; assess the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of
U.S. counter-piracy activities; and clarify agency roles and
responsibilities. The NSC did not comment. The Departments of Defense,
Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury
provided comments to clarify facts in the report.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-856] or key
components. For more information, contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-
3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov or Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or
caldwells@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The United States Has Taken Steps to Implement Its Counterpiracy Plan,
but Has Not Evaluated Its Efforts or Updated Its Plan:
The U.S. Government Has Not Evaluated the Costs, Benefits, or
Effectiveness of Its Counterpiracy Efforts, Reported Results, or
Updated Its Action Plan Accordingly:
U.S. Agencies Have Worked Collaboratively with Partners but Could Take
Key Steps to Enhance and Sustain Collaboration in Counterpiracy
Efforts:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: U.S. Government Agency Progress in Implementing the
National Security Council's Action Plan:
Appendix III: International and Shipping-Industry Partners Involved in
Counterpiracy Efforts:
Appendix IV: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of
Somalia, January 2007 to June 2010:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Selected Types of Costs Incurred by the U.S. Government to
Counter Piracy:
Table 2: International Partners Involved in Counterpiracy Efforts:
Figures:
Figure 1: Somalia and a Comparison to the Eastern Coast of the United
States:
Figure 2: U.S. Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure Team Boards a
Suspicious Boat in the Indian Ocean:
Figure 3: U.S. Agencies Involved in the Response to Piracy off the
Horn of Africa:
Figure 4: International and Industry Partners Involved in the Response
to Piracy off the Horn of Africa:
Figure 5: Interagency Progress in Implementing the National Security
Council's (NSC) Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership
and Action Plan (Action Plan):
Figure 6: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Horn of
Africa, 2007-2009:
Figure 7: Total Hostages Captured by Somali Pirates, 2007-2009:
Figure 8: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of
Somalia, January 2007 to June 2010:
Figure 9: Total and Average Ransom Payments to Somali Pirates, 2007-
2009:
Figure 10: U.S. Personnel Respond to the MV Maersk Alabama Incident in
2009:
Figure 11: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of
Somalia, January 2007 to June 2010:
Abbreviations:
Action Plan: Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and
Action Plan:
BIMCO: Baltic and International Maritime Council:
Contact Group: Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia:
CPCC: Counter-Piracy Coordination Center:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
INTERCARGO: International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners:
INTERTANKO: International Association of Independent Tanker Owners:
ISPS: International Ship and Port Facility Security:
ITF: International Transportation Workers Federation:
NSC: National Security Council:
SIGTTO: Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators
Limited:
U.K. United Kingdom:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 24, 2010:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John L. Mica:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
Piracy off the Horn of Africa has been growing in frequency and
severity over the past several years and threatens one of the world's
busiest shipping lanes near key energy corridors and the route through
the Suez Canal. Since 2007, more than 450 ships have reported pirate
attacks in this area, and Somali pirates have taken nearly 2,400
hostages and received over $100 million in ransom payments.[Footnote
1] Although only a few U.S.-flagged vessels--notably the MV Maersk
Alabama in April 2009--have been attacked, pirates have attacked or
attempted attacks on chemical and oil tankers, freighters, cruise
ships, fishing vessels, and even warships. In addition to jeopardizing
the lives and welfare of the citizens of many nations, piracy
contributes to regional instability and creates challenges for
shipping and freedom of navigation. With Somalia's lack of a
functioning government, this illicit but profitable activity has
raised concerns that piracy ransom proceeds may undermine regional
security and contribute to other threats including terrorism.
The international community has taken several steps to respond to the
growing piracy problem. The United Nations Security Council has
adopted several resolutions addressing an international response to
piracy off the Horn of Africa.[Footnote 2] In 2008, the United States,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, regional
naval forces, and others began patrolling waters near Somalia. In
January 2009, a multinational naval task force--Combined Task Force
151--was established under the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces with
a specific mission to conduct counterpiracy operations. Additionally,
in January 2009, a multilateral Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast
of Somalia (Contact Group) was formed pursuant to United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1851 to coordinate international
counterpiracy efforts.[Footnote 3]
Recognizing that vibrant maritime commerce underpins global economic
security and is a vital national security issue, the United States has
developed policies and plans to collaborate with its international and
interagency partners to address piracy off the Horn of Africa and to
mobilize an interagency U.S. response. In December 2008, the National
Security Council (NSC) published the Countering Piracy off the Horn of
Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan).[Footnote 4] This
plan implements the National Strategy for Maritime Security (September
2005) and the Policy for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal
Acts of Violence at Sea (June 2007) as applied to piracy off the Horn
of Africa. Consistent with the U.S. policy to continue to lead and
support international efforts to repress piracy and to urge other
states to take decisive action both individually and through
international efforts, the Action Plan seeks to involve all nations,
international organizations, industry, and other entities with an
interest in maritime security to take steps to repress piracy off the
Horn of Africa.[Footnote 5] The interagency initiatives of the Action
Plan are to be coordinated and undertaken by the U.S. Departments of
Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the
Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
subject to the availability of resources.
Over the last few years, we have completed a number of reviews that
examine issues related to piracy off the Horn of Africa. In December
2007, we reported that the vast areas at risk for piracy off the Horn
of Africa combined with the small number of ships available for
patrolling them make protecting energy tankers and other commercial
vessels difficult.[Footnote 6] In February 2008, we reported that
several challenges limit U.S. and international stabilization,
humanitarian, and development efforts in Somalia and recommended that
the United States develop a more detailed strategy to address these
challenges.[Footnote 7] In June 2008, we evaluated the National
Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans and determined
that the implementation status of the eight supporting plans varied.
[Footnote 8] In September 2009, we reported on the Department of the
Treasury's collaboration with interagency partners to safeguard the
financial system against illicit use and combat national security
threats, and recommended mechanisms to improve interagency
collaboration.[Footnote 9] Also in September 2009, we reported on the
key actions agencies need to take to enhance interagency collaboration
on national security issues.[Footnote 10] A list of our related GAO
products is included at the end of this report.
Interested in U.S. efforts to respond to piracy, your offices asked us
to review the extent to which the U.S. government agencies: (1) have
made progress in implementing the Action Plan to counter piracy off
the Horn of Africa and any challenges they face; and (2) are
collaborating with each other, and with international and industry
partners to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa.
To assess U.S. government progress and challenges in implementing the
Action Plan for countering piracy off the Horn of Africa, we reviewed
the Action Plan, the 2007 Policy for the Repression of Piracy and
other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, relevant U.S. laws, and United
Nations Security Council resolutions. We also reviewed program
documents, analyzed data on the incidents of piracy off the Horn of
Africa for the years 2007 through June 2010, and interviewed officials
from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State,
Transportation, and the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence as well as component agencies including the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Coast Guard, and National
Maritime Intelligence Center to discuss implementation of the Action
Plan and collaboration with partners in counterpiracy efforts. We
selected these departments and agencies because the Action Plan states
they shall contribute to, coordinate, and undertake initiatives in
accordance with the plan. We also reviewed prior GAO work related to
results-oriented government and evaluated the extent to which the
interagency Counter-Piracy Steering Group followed select key
practices for achieving results.[Footnote 11] In addition, we met with
international and industry partners involved in developing best
practices for protecting ships from pirate attack, working with the
international Contact Group, and participating in naval patrols off
the Horn of Africa. We discussed data-collection methods, processes
for data entry, and the steps taken to ensure reasonable accuracy of
the data with both the International Maritime Bureau and the Combined
Maritime Forces. We determined the data to be sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of this report.
To identify the extent to which U.S. government agencies are
collaborating with each other, and with international and industry
partners, we evaluated the extent to which department and agency
actions incorporate key practices for enhancing and sustaining
collaboration on complex national security issues.[Footnote 12] In
addition, we observed information sharing forums; reviewed program
documents; and interviewed agency, international, and industry
officials about collaboration efforts. We conducted this performance
audit from October 2009 to September 2010 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. The scope and methodology
used in our review are described in further detail in appendix I.
Background:
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea share the same definition of piracy,
and, under that definition, piracy consists of any of several acts,
including any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers
of a private ship and directed against another ship, aircraft,
persons, or property onboard another ship on the high seas; or against
a ship, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any
state.[Footnote 13] Additionally, according to both conventions, all
states have the duty to cooperate to the fullest extent possible in
the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place
outside the jurisdiction of any state. Furthermore, both conventions
authorize states to seize pirate ships or a ship under the control of
pirates and arrest the persons and seize the property onboard, on the
high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state.
In addition, a single piratical attack often affects the interests of
numerous countries, including the flag state of the vessel, various
states of nationality of the seafarers taken hostage, regional coastal
states, owner states, and cargo owner, transshipment, and destination
states.[Footnote 14]
Somali pirates attack and harass vessels transiting the Indian Ocean
and in the Gulf of Aden, a natural chokepoint that provides access to
the Red Sea and the Suez Canal and through which over 33,000 ships
transit each year.[Footnote 15] Pirates operate from land-based
enclaves along the 1,880-mile coastline of Somalia, which is roughly
equivalent to the distance from Portland, Maine, to Miami, Florida.
Figure 1 illustrates the vast area in which incidents of piracy are
occurring, 1,000 nautical miles from Somalia's coast. Figure 1 also
shows the location of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
in the Gulf of Aden, where coalition forces have established naval
patrols to help ensure safe passage for transiting vessels.
Figure 1: Somalia and a Comparison to the Eastern Coast of the United
States:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 maps]
First map depicts the coastline around Somalia in the Indian Ocean,
and specifically indicates the following:
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor;
Somalia coastline: approximately 1,880 coast miles;
Approximate location of a line 1,000 nautical miles from Somalia.
Second map offers a comparison to Somalia's 1,800 coast miles by
depicting the East Coast of the United States, where an approximation
of 1,880 coat miles stretches from Miami, Florida to Portland, Maine.
Source: GAO (data), Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
To conduct their attacks, Somali pirates generally use small skiffs,
carrying between four and eight persons armed with AK-47 rifles or
similar light arms and, at times, with rocket-propelled grenades. Once
they target a vessel, pirates typically coordinate a simultaneous two-
or three-pronged attack from multiple directions. Depending on the
characteristics and acquiescence of the victim vessel, pirates can
board and commandeer a vessel in less than 20 minutes. Pirate vessels
usually are equipped with grappling hooks, ladders, and other
equipment to assist the boarding of a larger craft. Pirate vessels
vary in sea-worthiness and speed with some able to travel at speeds
between 25 and 30 knots and operate in high sea conditions, while
others have more restricted capabilities. According to the Office of
Naval Intelligence, Somali pirates do not typically target specific
vessels for any reason other than how easily the vessel can be
boarded. Pirates patrol an area and wait for a target of opportunity.
Vessels that travel through the high-risk area at a speed of less than
15 knots and have access points close to the waterline are at higher
risk of being boarded and hijacked. According to a June 2010 self-
protection guide published by maritime industry organizations, there
have been no reports of pirates boarding ships proceeding at speeds
over 18 knots. Figure 2 shows U.S. authorities boarding a suspected
pirate skiff.
Figure 2: U.S. Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure Team Boards a
Suspicious Boat in the Indian Ocean:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
Unlike pirates in other parts of the world, Somali pirates kidnap
hostages for ransom and, up to this point, have not tended to harm
captives, steal cargo, or reuse pirated ships for purposes other than
temporarily as mother ships. Mother ships are typically larger fishing
vessels often acquired or commandeered by acts of piracy that pirates
use to store fuel and supplies, and tow skiffs, which allow them to
operate and launch attacks further off shore. This "hostage-for-
ransom" business model is possible in part because the pirates have
bases on land in ungoverned Somalia where they can bring seized
vessels, cargoes, and crews and have access to food, water, weapons,
ammunition, and other resources during ransom negotiations. In an
ungoverned state with widespread poverty, the potential for high
profits with low costs and relatively little risk of consequences has
ensured that Somali pirate groups do not lack for recruits and
support. Moreover, some U.S. and international officials suspect that
Somali businessmen and international support networks may provide
financing, supplies, and intelligence to pirate organizations in
exchange for shares of ransom payments.
In addition to posing a threat to the lives and welfare of seafarers,
piracy imposes a number of economic costs on shippers and on
governments. Costs to shippers include ransom payments, damage to
ships and cargoes, delays in delivering cargoes, increased maritime
insurance rates, rerouting vessels, and hardening merchant ships
against attack. According to officials at the Departments of State and
Defense, governments incur costs by conducting naval patrols, as well
as the costs of transporting, prosecuting, and incarcerating suspected
and convicted pirates.
The United States' National Strategy for Maritime Security, issued in
2005, declares that the United States has a vital national interest in
maritime security. The strategy recognizes that nations have a common
interest in facilitating the vibrant maritime commerce that underpins
economic security, and in protecting against ocean-related terrorist,
hostile, criminal, and dangerous acts, including piracy. The National
Strategy for Maritime Security also requires full and complete
national and international coordination, cooperation, and intelligence
and information sharing among public and private entities to protect
and secure the maritime domain. The 2007 Policy for the Repression of
Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea states that it is
the policy of the United States to "continue to lead and support
international efforts to repress piracy and urge other states to take
decisive action both individually and through international efforts."
In December 2008, the NSC developed the Countering Piracy off the Horn
of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan) to implement the
2005 strategy and the 2007 policy as applied to piracy off the Horn of
Africa. The Action Plan establishes three main lines of action for
interagency stakeholders to take to repress piracy in collaboration
with industry and international partners: (1) prevent pirate attacks
by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain to piracy; (2)
disrupt acts of piracy consistent with international law and the
rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states; and (3) ensure
that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their
actions by facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag,
victim, and coastal states, and, in appropriate cases, the United
States. The NSC--including the Maritime Security Interagency Policy
Committee--develops policy for the U.S. response to piracy off the
Horn of Africa. The Action Plan directed the Secretary of State and
Secretary of Defense to establish a high-level interagency,
operational task force--the Counter-Piracy Steering Group--to
coordinate, implement, and monitor the actions centered in the Action
Plan. In addition, the NSC directed that the Departments of Defense,
Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury
and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence contribute to,
coordinate, and undertake initiatives in accordance with the Action
Plan, subject to available resources. Figure 3 shows the U.S.
departments and agencies involved in implementing the three lines of
action contained in the Action Plan.
Figure 3: U.S. Agencies Involved in the Response to Piracy off the
Horn of Africa:
[Refer to PDF for image: organization chart]
Top level:
National Security Council.
Second level, reporting to National Security Council:
Maritime Security Interagency Policy Committee.
Third level, reporting to Maritime Security Interagency Policy
Committee:
Counter-Piracy Steering Group.
Fourth level, reporting to Counter-Piracy Steering Group (Coleaders of
the Counter-Piracy Steering Group):
Department of State;
Department of Defense.
Fourth level, reporting to Counter-Piracy Steering Group (Contributors
on the Counter-Piracy Steering Group):
Department of the Treasury;
Department of Justice;
Department of Homeland Security;
Department of Transportation;
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Fourth level direct reporting relationships:
Department of the Treasury:
* Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence[B].
Department of Justice:
* National Security Division[C];
* Criminal Division[C];
* Federal Bureau of Investigation[B];
* U.S. Attorneys' Office[C].
Department of State:
* Bureau of African Affairs[A,C];
* Bureau of Political-Military Affairs[A,C];
* Bureau of Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs[B];
* Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs[B];
* Office of the Legal Advisor[C].
Department of Defense:
* Office of the Secretary of Defense[A,B,C];
* Joint Staff[A,B,C];
* U.S. Central Command[A,B,C];
* U.S. Africa Command[A,B]
* U.S. Navy[B].
Department of Homeland Security:
* U.S. Coast Guard[A,B].
Department of Transportation;
* Maritime Administration[A].
Source: GAO.
[A] Involved in efforts to prevent pirate attacks.
[B] Involved in efforts to disrupt acts of piracy.
[C] Involved in efforts to hold pirates accountable.
[End of figure]
The Department of State (State) is involved in efforts to prevent acts
of piracy and hold pirates accountable, primarily by leading U.S.
interaction with international partners working through the Contact
Group, building regional judicial capacity to prosecute suspected
pirates, and encouraging states to prosecute when their interests are
involved. Additionally, State is involved in efforts to disrupt acts
of piracy by tracking ransom payments and following financing issues
related to piracy. Within Defense, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command
is involved in prevention, interdiction, and prosecution efforts by
contributing forces to the Combined Maritime Forces, an international
maritime coalition. Within the Combined Maritime Forces, Combined Task
Force 151 conducts counterpiracy operations in international waters,
including the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian
Gulf and the waters off the Somali coast in the Indian Ocean. The
Naval Criminal Investigative Service supports and assists interdiction
and prosecution efforts by conducting incident investigations,
supervising detention of suspected pirates, assisting U.S. and
international prosecutions, debriefing released crews, and providing
criminal intelligence information. U.S. Africa Command assists in
preventing piracy through strategic communication efforts and building
partner capacity in regional states and would plan and, if authorized,
conduct any land-based military activities in Somalia to interrupt
pirate operations. U.S. Africa Command also conducts counterpiracy
naval patrols and interdiction efforts in its area of responsibility.
Treasury is involved in disrupting pirates' revenue sources by
examining pirate financial activity and implementing an executive
order to block the assets of certain persons. Justice is involved in
holding pirates accountable through prosecution as well as judicial
capacity-building in African states. The Coast Guard, under Homeland
Security, helps prevent piracy through its work with and regulation of
the U.S. shipping industry and assists in interrupting piracy by
providing law enforcement units and boarding teams on Navy vessels.
Transportation's Maritime Administration assists with preventing
piracy by working with the shipping industry to develop best practices
for the industry to protect itself from piracy. In addition, within
the intelligence community, the Office of Naval Intelligence-as part
of the National Maritime Intelligence Center--provides maritime
intelligence assistance.
The international community, shipping industry, and international
military forces also have been involved in taking steps to prevent and
disrupt acts of piracy off the Horn of Africa, and facilitate
prosecutions of suspected pirates. Over the past few years, the United
Nations adopted a number of United Nations Security Council
resolutions related to countering piracy in the Horn of Africa region,
including resolutions 1816 which authorizes states to enter the
territorial waters of Somalia in coordination with the Somali
Transitional Federal Government, for the purpose of repressing acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea, and to use all necessary and
appropriate means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery within
Somali territorial waters.[Footnote 16] In January 2009, the Contact
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Contact Group) formed under
the auspices of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851, and
facilitates discussion and coordination of actions among states and
organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. In
addition, in February 2009 organizations representing the interests of
ship owners, seafarers, and marine insurance companies worked to
publish the first version of voluntary commercial vessel self-
protection measures to avoid and respond to pirate attacks, referred
to as "best management practices." In May and September 2009, 10
countries signed the New York Declaration, and committed to (1)
promulgate the internationally recognized best management practices
for self-protection to vessels on their registry and (2) ensure that
vessels on their registry have adopted and documented appropriate self-
protection measures in their ship security plans when carrying out
their obligations under an existing international agreement.[Footnote
17]
The United States also has provided forces and leadership to the
Combined Maritime Forces, which is a coalition of 25 contributing
nations that are working to conduct maritime security operations in
the region. In January 2009, the Combined Maritime Forces established
Combined Task Force 151, a multinational naval task force with the
sole mission of conducting counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of
Aden and the waters off the Somali coast in the Indian Ocean. That
role previously had been filled by Combined Task Force 150, which
continues to perform counterterrorism and other maritime security
operations as it has since 2001. There are 11 nations that have
participated and several others that have agreed to send ships or
aircraft or both to participate in Combined Task Force 151. In
addition, the United States has contributed assets to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's counterpiracy effort since its
inception. Its current effort, Operation Ocean Shield, focuses on at-
sea counterpiracy operations and offers assistance to regional
countries in developing their own capacity to combat piracy
activities. Moreover, as part of the Combined Maritime Forces, the
United States also works with the European Union, which conducts
counterpiracy operations and escorts World Food Programme vessels
delivering humanitarian aid to countries in the region, as well as
independent deployers not part of the coalition that escort vessels
and patrol area waters.
Figure 4 shows many of the key international and industry partners
involved in the response to piracy off the Horn of Africa with whom
the United States collaborates and coordinates. More information on
international and shipping-industry partners is included in appendix
III.
Figure 4: International and Industry Partners Involved in the Response
to Piracy off the Horn of Africa:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Efforts to prevent pirate attacks:
* Ship owners and shipping companies[C];
* Seafarers and vessel operators[C];
* Flag state administrators (e.g., Panama, Marshall Islands, and
Bahamas)[B];
* Signatories of the New York Declaration[A];
* Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Working Group
3)[A];
* Industry associations[C];
* Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Working Group
4)[A];
* International Maritime Organization (United Nations agency)[A].
Efforts to disrupt acts of piracy:
* Combined Maritime Forces (Combined Task Force 151)[A];
* European Union Naval Forces–Somalia and Maritime Security Centre–-
Horn of Africa[A];
* North Atlantic Treaty Organization maritime forces[A];
* Independent deployers (e.g., India, China, and Malaysia)[B];
* Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Working Group
1)[A];
* United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (Dubai)[B].
Efforts to hold pirates accountable:
* Countries with prosecution arrangements with the United States
(e.g., Kenya and Seychelles[B]);
* Countries independently prosecuting suspected pirates (e.g., France,
Netherlands, Spain, and Yemen)[B];
* Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Working Group
2[A]);
* United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime[A].
Source: GAO.
[A] Multilateral forums.
[B] Bilateral relationships.
[C] Industry partners.
[End of figure]
According to officials at State and Justice, the United States will
consider prosecuting suspected pirates in appropriate cases when U.S.
interests are directly affected, such as what occurred when suspected
pirates attacked the U.S.-flagged ships MV Maersk Alabama, USS
Nicholas, and USS Ashland.[Footnote 18] When suspected pirates are
captured by U.S. forces and Justice determines not to prosecute the
case in the United States, the United States works with the affected
states and regional partners to find a suitable venue for prosecution.
In January 2006, 10 suspected pirates were captured by U.S. forces
after they hijacked the Indian-flagged dhow Safina al Bisarat and used
it to attack the Greek-owned and Bahamian-flagged Delta Ranger.
[Footnote 19] This was the first incident where U.S. forces captured
suspected pirates in the region and transferred them into the custody
of Kenya. As of July 2010, the United States had formalized two
arrangements with regional states--Kenya and the Seychelles--to
facilitate the transfer and prosecution of suspected pirates.[Footnote
20] The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the International
Maritime Organization, and individual governments have assisted in
developing the judicial capacity of regional states.
The United States Has Taken Steps to Implement Its Counterpiracy Plan,
but Has Not Evaluated Its Efforts or Updated Its Plan:
U.S. agencies have made progress implementing the NSC's Countering
Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action
Plan) to lead and support international efforts to counter piracy, but
the effort faces several implementation challenges. The United States
has made the most progress on working with partners to implement
efforts to prevent attacks, such as by encouraging the shipping
industry to transit in areas patrolled by international navies.
However, the U.S. government has had less success in other areas. For
example, the United States has not disrupted pirate bases on shore,
and the international community has made only limited progress to
disrupt pirates' revenue and prosecute suspected pirates. While many
stakeholders credit international, industry, and U.S. government
efforts with contributing to a decline in the percentage of successful
attacks that resulted in a vessel boarding or hijacking, since 2007
pirates have increased their total number of attacks, become more
organized, and greatly expanded their area of operations. Meanwhile,
the Action Plan has not been updated to address these changes since it
was published in December 2008, and the U.S. government has not
evaluated the costs or effectiveness of its counterpiracy efforts or
reported on the results of the interagency effort.
U.S. Government Has Taken Steps to Implement Planned Efforts to
Prevent, Disrupt, and Prosecute Pirate Attacks but Faces Challenges:
In collaboration with their international and industry partners, U.S.
agencies have taken steps across the three lines of action established
in the Action Plan to: (1) prevent attacks by reducing the
vulnerability of the maritime domain, (2) disrupt acts of piracy in
ways consistent with international law and the rights and
responsibilities of coastal and flag states, and (3) ensure that those
who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their actions by
facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates. The Action Plan
establishes the U.S. role in countering piracy as a collaborative one,
seeking to involve all countries and shipping-industry partners with
an interest in maritime security. For U.S. agencies, the Action Plan
states that, subject to available resources, the Departments of
Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the
Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will
contribute to, coordinate, and undertake initiatives in accordance
with the Action Plan. The NSC also establishes some limits to the
scope of the plan by focusing on immediate measures to reduce the
incidents of piracy, rather than longer-term stabilization of Somalia
that the Action Plan asserts is needed to fully repress piracy.
Our review focused on the steps U.S. agencies have made to repress
piracy off the Horn of Africa, but given the international nature of
the issue, our analysis frequently refers to the related efforts of
international and industry partners. We found that, of the 14 total
tasks established within the three lines of action in the Action Plan,
substantial progress has been made in implementing 4 tasks, the
majority of which are related to preventing piracy. The United States
has made some progress toward implementing 8 other tasks, including
all of the tasks involved in facilitating the prosecution of suspected
pirates. Little or no progress has been made with regard to 1 task
that relates to disrupting acts of piracy, and we did not assess 1
task because agencies decided it would duplicate the efforts of
international partners and should not be implemented. Figure 5
summarizes the results of our assessment. For more detailed
information about U.S. agencies' efforts to implement the Action Plan
and our analysis of their progress, see appendix II.
Figure 5: Interagency Progress in Implementing the National Security
Council's (NSC) Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership
and Action Plan (Action Plan):
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Prevent pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime
domain to piracy:
Task: Establish and maintain a Contact Group;
GAO assessment[A]: Substantial progress;
Status: U.S. government helped establish in January 2009; Coast Guard
and Maritime Administration lead working group on industry self-
protection.
Task: Strengthen and encourage the use of the Maritime Security Patrol
Area;
GAO assessment[A]: Substantial progress;
Status: U.S. government has made progress working with international
and industry partners, but has limited influence on commercial vessels
that are not flagged with the United States.
Task: Updating ships‘ security plans;
GAO assessment[A]: Substantial progress;
Status: Coast Guard has approved piracy annexes to ship security plans
for 100 percent of U.S.-flagged vessels identified as transiting high-
risk waters, including those in the Horn of Africa.
Task: Strategic communication;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: U.S. government has issued counterpiracy statements and
supported international efforts; however, governmentwide plan not
finalized and lack of U.S. presence on land in Somalia inhibits full
implementation.
Disrupt acts of piracy consistent with international law and the
rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states:
Task: Support a regionally based Counter-Piracy Coordination Center
(CPCC);
GAO assessment[A]: Not applicable[B];
Status: U.S. government has no plans to support the establishment of a
CPCC since it would duplicate the reporting and monitoring functions
performed by other organizations.
Task: Seize and destroy pirate vessels and related equipment, and
deliver suspected pirates to prosecuting states;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: U.S. and international forces have seized nearly 100 pirate
vessels and their related equipment but released 57 percent of
captured suspects for reasons including difficulties in meeting
evidence standards and/or securing prosecution venues.[C]
Task: Provide interdiction-capable presence;
GAO assessment[A]: Substantial progress;
Status: U.S. Navy and Coast Guard contribute assets and leadership to
coalition forces patrolling off the Horn of Africa with an average of
4-5 ships in the region each day.
Task: Support shiprider programs and other agreements;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: The United States has supported an arrangement to bolster
regional capabilities to counter piracy, but U.S. agencies have not
established shiprider programs because they question the benefits to
facilitating prosecutions.
Task: Disrupt and dismantle pirate bases ashore;
GAO assessment[A]: Little or no progress;
Status: Action not authorized by the President at this time; lack of
U.S. presence in Somalia hinders implementation.
Task: Disrupt pirate revenue;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: In April 2010, President Obama signed an executive order that
blocks assets of certain designated individuals, including two
suspected pirates.[D] But, U.S. efforts to track financial assets or
transactions are hampered by a lack of government and financial
institutions in Somalia.
Facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag, victim, and
coastal states, and, in appropriate cases, the United States to ensure
that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their
actions:
Task: Conclude prosecution agreements;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: U.S. government concluded arrangements with Kenya and the
Seychelles and is attempting to conclude others; but faces challenges
in finding additional regional partners that are willing and able to
prosecute.
Task: Support the exercise of jurisdiction under the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: The United States exercised jurisdiction under the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation to prosecute one pirate in the United States.
Task: Support the use of other applicable international conventions
and laws;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: The United States is using other laws to exercise jurisdiction
and prosecute 11 suspected pirates for attacks on the USS Nicholas and
USS Ashland.
Task: Enhance regional states‘ capacity to prosecute;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: U.S. agencies provide assistance to countries in the region
for law enforcement and judicial capacity building and reform, the
focus of which includes, but is not limited to, piracy. Naval Criminal
Investigative Service special agents have testified in Kenyan courts,
and provided training and operational support to officials in the
Seychelles.
Source: GAO.
[A] We assessed "substantial progress" for those tasks where all
components specified by the NSC were implemented; "some progress" for
tasks where components were partially implemented or agencies had
taken steps toward implementation; and "little or no progress" where
agencies had made minimal or no effort toward implementing the
components of the task.
[B] We did not rate U.S. government progress on this task because,
according to Defense officials, there are no plans to establish a
Counter-Piracy Coordination Center since it would duplicate existing
international efforts.
[C] According to the Department of Defense's May 2010 report to
Congress entitled "Piracy off the Somali Coast and within Somalia"
U.S. forces have transferred 24 suspected pirates to Kenya for
prosecution.
[D] Executive Order 13536 blocks all property and property interests
within U.S. jurisdiction of persons listed in the Annex to the order
and provides the authority for the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, to designate additional
persons that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia,
including those who support or engage in acts of piracy off the coast
of Somalia. Property and property interests within U.S. jurisdiction
include property in the possession or control of any United States
person in the United States or overseas. United States person is
defined as "any United States citizen, permanent resident alien,
entity organized under the laws of the United States or any
jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or
any person in the United States." As of July 2010 this order listed
two individuals connected to pirate activity.
[End of figure]
U.S. Agency Efforts to Prevent Acts of Piracy:
In collaboration with its international and industry partners, the
U.S. government has made substantial progress overall toward
implementing Action Plan tasks aimed at preventing acts of piracy.
First, the United States has been a key contributor among the 49
countries participating in the Contact Group, including leading a
working group on industry self-protection.[Footnote 21] Second, State,
Defense, Coast Guard, and the Maritime Administration, in
collaboration with international and industry partners, also have made
substantial progress on the second task to encourage commercial
vessels to transit high-risk waters through the Maritime Security
Patrol Area, which includes the Internationally Recommended Transit
Corridor patrolled by international naval forces. Third, the U.S.
government has made substantial progress to ensure shippers update
U.S.-flagged vessels' ship security plans to address the pirate
threat, and in encouraging the crews of commercial vessels to use
industry-developed self-protection measures to prevent piracy, often
referred to as "best management practices." These practices include
adding physical barriers to obstruct pirates from boarding a vessel
and taking evasive maneuvers to fend off attack.[Footnote 22]
Despite these and other actions to prevent attacks, U.S. government
and shipping industry officials stated that ensuring all vessels
transiting the area implement best management practices remains a
challenge. The Coast Guard has developed regulations mandating self-
protection measures, but these regulations only apply to U.S.-flagged
vessels, which comprise a small portion of the total shipping traffic
transiting the region.[Footnote 23] The shipping industry has
developed a document outlining self-protection measures, but
implementation is voluntary. While government and shipping industry
officials lack data on the extent to which best management practices
are used, they estimate that about a quarter of the vessels are not
using one of the easiest and least costly of the best practices,
registering their passage with a naval coordination center in the
region, which raises questions about the extent of their
implementation of the other practices. Coast Guard, the Maritime
Administration, and shipping industry officials stated it may be
challenging to find additional ways to encourage the remaining vessels
to self-protect from attack.
Regarding the Action Plan's fourth task aimed at preventing piracy, we
determined that U.S. agencies have made some progress on strategic
communication, described in the Action Plan as a global information
campaign to highlight the destructive elements of piracy and the
international efforts to coordinate a response to the problem. While
U.S. agencies have taken steps in this area, State has yet to finalize
a strategic communication plan to coordinate interagency
communications efforts to counter piracy. Defense officials stated
that the lack of a U.S. presence in Somalia presents additional
challenges to efforts to communicate with the Somali population to
discourage piracy and for measuring the effectiveness of U.S.
communication efforts.
U.S. Agency Efforts to Disrupt Acts of Piracy:
While the United States and its international partners have made
substantial progress overall on the task of providing forces and
assets capable of interdicting pirates off the Horn of Africa and have
made some progress on the tasks related to seizing and destroying
pirate vessels, supporting regional arrangements to counter piracy,
and disrupting pirate revenue, U.S. agencies have made little or no
progress toward implementing the task related to disrupting and
dismantling pirate bases. We found that the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard
have made substantial progress contributing assets and leadership to
coalition forces patrolling the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean.
According to Defense officials, typically, more than 30 ships from
coalition, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and
independent forces patrol the region at any given time, with the
United States contributing between 4 and 5 ships per day on average.
In addition, consistent with the Action Plan, U.S. forces have
responded to and successfully interdicted pirate attacks. For example,
in April 2009, U.S. forces successfully terminated the hostage
situation that occurred when pirates attacked the U.S.-flagged MV
Maersk Alabama and kidnapped the vessel's captain. U.S. forces
intervened and freed the captain after killing all but one of the
pirates conducting the attack.
However, as pirate activity has expanded to the larger Indian Ocean,
U.S. and international military officials stated that providing an
interdiction capable force similar to that provided in the Gulf of
Aden is not feasible. Though coalition forces developed guidance for
improving coordination of forces in the Indian Ocean, Defense
officials emphasized that there are not enough naval vessels among all
of the combined navies in the world to adequately patrol this
expansive area for pirates. Moreover, Defense officials acknowledged
that there are other competing U.S. national interests in the region,
such as the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as
counterterrorism missions that require the use of the limited naval
and air assets that are used to monitor and gather intelligence for
counterpiracy operations.
In addition, the U.S. government has made some progress to seize and
destroy pirate vessels and equipment, and deliver suspected pirates
for prosecution. For example, U.S. forces have contributed to
coalition forces that confiscated or destroyed almost 100 pirate
vessels. However, U.S. forces have encountered more difficulty in
delivering captured suspected pirates to states willing and able to
ensure they are considered for prosecution. From August 2008 to June
2010, international forces subsequently released 638 of 1,129
suspected pirates, almost 57 percent of those captured, in part
because of the difficulty finding countries that were willing or able
to prosecute them. Further, the United States has made some progress
on the task to disrupt pirate revenue. In April 2010, President Obama
signed an executive order[Footnote 24] that blocks assets of certain
persons, including two suspected pirates, who have engaged in acts
that threatened the peace, security or stability of Somalia.[Footnote
25] However, according to officials at Treasury, the department
charged with implementation, the executive order applies only to
assets subject to U.S. jurisdiction, and U.S. efforts to track and
block pirates' finances in Somalia are hampered by the lack of
government and formal banking institutions there and resulting gaps in
intelligence.
The U.S. government has made some progress on the task to support
"shiprider" programs and other agreements. The United States has
supported some bilateral and regional counterpiracy arrangements, most
notably the International Maritime Organization's effort to conclude a
regional arrangement, generally referred to as the Djibouti Code of
Conduct.[Footnote 26] This arrangement contains provisions related to
information sharing regarding pirate activity among the signatories,
reviews of national legislation related to piracy, and provision of
assistance between signatories.[Footnote 27] However, U.S. agencies
have made little progress on the second part of this task to develop
shiprider programs, in which regional law enforcement officials
accompany naval patrols to collect evidence to support successful
prosecutions. Justice officials explained that the potential benefits
do not warrant the resource investment the programs would require.
Specifically, the presence of shipriders would not significantly
enhance the ability of regional countries to prosecute suspected
pirates.
State and Defense officials report that no steps have been made to
disrupt and dismantle pirate bases ashore in part because the
President has not authorized this action, the United States has other
interests in the region that compete for resources, and long-standing
concerns about security hinder the presence of U.S. military and
government officials in Somalia. While the United States has not
supported the creation of a Counter-Piracy Coordination Center, as
called for in the Action Plan, we did not provide a progress
assessment for this task since government and industry officials have
stated that existing organizations and coordination centers[Footnote
28] currently fulfill the incident reporting and monitoring functions,
and that establishing a new center would duplicate those efforts.
U.S. Agency Efforts to Facilitate Prosecution of Suspected Pirates:
While the United States has made some progress on implementing the
tasks established in the Action Plan to hold pirates accountable, the
United States and its international partners have only prosecuted a
small number of pirates overall for a variety of reasons. As of July
2010, Kenya and the Seychelles were the only regional partners that
accepted transfers of suspected pirates from U.S. forces for purposes
of prosecution. According to officials from State, the reluctance of
affected states to prosecute and limited judicial capacity in the
region are barriers to the ability of the U.S. government to make
substantial progress on the task of concluding prosecution
arrangements. Officials also noted that the facts and circumstances of
each encounter differ, with not all cases eliciting evidence that
could be brought to court. As already described, these factors
contributed to the release of almost 57 percent of the suspected
Somali pirates that international forces encountered from August 2008
to June 2010. The United States has made some progress on the task to
support and encourage the exercise of jurisdiction under the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation as a framework to prosecute suspected pirates. For
example, the United States has used the convention while prosecuting
one pirate in the United States.[Footnote 29] The U.S. government has
also supported and encouraged the use of other applicable conventions
and laws by exercising jurisdiction over 11 suspected pirates who
attempted an attack on U.S. warships.[Footnote 30] However, Defense,
State, and Justice officials reported that the United States and its
international partners have faced significant challenges in
encouraging countries to prosecute pirates, due to a lack of political
will or judicial capacity, such as an inadequate number of attorneys
to prosecute the cases. Lastly, on the task to enhance the
capabilities of regional states to accept suspected pirates for
prosecution, the U.S. government has provided assistance to several
regional states, and the United States has contributed to
international efforts to build regional judicial capacity. For
example, according to State officials, the United States has worked
with the government of Tanzania to allow pirates to be prosecuted
there even when cases lack a domestic connection. However, regional
states continue to have a limited capacity to prosecute suspected
pirates and incarcerate convicted pirates.
Pirates Have Increased the Number of Attacks, Expanded Their Area of
Operations, and Become More Organized:
While many stakeholders anecdotally credit international, industry,
and U.S. government efforts with preventing and disrupting piracy off
the Horn of Africa, from 2007 through the first half of 2010 piracy
has evolved in many ways--pirates increased their attacks, claimed
more hostages and revenue from shipping industry's ransom payments,
expanded their area of operations, and became more organized. As
figure 6 illustrates, the total number of reported pirate attacks
increased from 30 in 2007 to 218 in 2009. These reported attacks
include four attempts on U.S.-flagged vessels in 2009, one of which
was successful--the attack on the MV Maersk Alabama.
Figure 6: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Horn of
Africa, 2007-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph]
Year: 2007;
Number of attempted attacks[A]: 19;
Number of successful attacks[A,B]: 11;
Total: 30.
Year: 2008;
Number of attempted attacks[A]: 67;
Number of successful attacks[A,B]: 44;
Total: 111.
Year: 2009;
Number of attempted attacks[A]: 170;
Number of successful attacks[A,B]: 48;
Total: 218.
Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data.
Note: Successful attacks include those that resulted in vessel
boardings or hijackings. The types of vessels attacked included: bulk
carriers, container ships, fishing vessels, passenger ships, research
vessels, roll-on roll-off ships, supply ships, tankers, tugs, and
yachts.
[End of figure]
However, the rate of successful attacks, or the proportion of total
reported attacks that resulted in vessel boardings or hijackings,
decreased from around 40 percent in 2008 to 22 percent in 2009. U.S.
and international officials interpret this as a sign that the efforts
of the shipping industry, governments, and the international naval
patrols to prevent or disrupt attacks are having a positive effect on
the situation. In addition, in the first 6 months of 2010, reports of
total attacks declined to about 100 attacks, as compared with 149
attacks during the first half of 2009. However, other data show that
piracy remains a persistent problem. For example, as figure 7 shows,
the number of hostages of various nationalities captured by Somali
pirates from 2007 to 2009 more than quintupled. The total number of
hostages includes 21 hostages from the U.S.-flagged MV Maersk Alabama
in 2009. Furthermore, in the first half of 2010, pirates took 529
hostages compared to 510 in the first half of 2009.
Figure 7: Total Hostages Captured by Somali Pirates, 2007-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Year: 2007;
Total hostages: 163.
Year: 2008;
Total hostages: 815.
Year: 2009;
Total hostages: 867.
Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data.
[End of figure]
In addition, pirates have expanded their area of operations with an
increasing number of attacks occurring in the Indian Ocean, an area
much larger to patrol than the Gulf of Aden. By the end of 2008, when
the NSC issued its Action Plan, approximately 83 percent of the 111
reported pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa that year took place in
the Gulf of Aden, an area just over 100,000 square miles, with the
remainder off the coast of Somalia. However, just a year later in
2009, only 53 percent of the 218 total attacks occurred in the Gulf of
Aden as Somali pirates expanded their area of operations to the
broader Indian Ocean. Pirates now threaten an area of nearly 2 million
square nautical miles in the Somali Basin, Gulf of Aden, and Northern
Arabian Sea. Figure 8 shows the number and location of pirate attacks
off the Horn of Africa reported to the International Maritime Bureau
in 2007, 2008, 2009, and the first half of 2010.
Figure 8: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of
Somalia, January 2007 to June 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: interactive illustrated map]
Interactivity instructions: Roll your mouse over the year in the
legend box to see the data by year. Each represents a successful or
attempted attack. The color of the indicates the year of the incident.
This map is interactive and uses color to distinguish years in the
electronic version of this report. For the print version, the map is
supplemented by a set of black and white maps that break out the data
by year, see figure 11 in appendix IV.
Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data (data); Map
Resources (map).
[End of figure]
While the Action Plan cites attacks as far as 450 miles from Somalia's
coast, in April 2010 the International Maritime Bureau reported that
pirates had increased their capability to attack and hijack vessels to
more than 1,000 nautical miles from Somalia using mother ships, from
which they launch smaller boats to conduct the attacks.[Footnote 31]
International officials stated that piracy in the Indian Ocean is more
challenging due to the great expanse of water, and requires a
different approach than that used in the Gulf of Aden. One U.S. Navy
analysis estimated that 1,000 ships equipped with helicopters would be
required to provide the same level of coverage in the Indian Ocean
that is currently provided in the Gulf of Aden--an approach that is
clearly infeasible.
Although U.S. and international officials have expressed concern that
international support networks may be providing pirate groups with
financing, supplies, and intelligence in return for shares of ransom
payments, as of March 2010 the intelligence community assessed that
Somali pirates are not receiving funding or coordination from non-U.S.
foreign sources outside Somalia, aside from ransom payments. Defense
supports FBI and Treasury efforts to monitor whether there is U.S.-
based support for piracy. Figure 9 shows that from 2007 to 2009 the
estimated amount of total ransom payments paid to pirates by the
shipping industry increased from about $3 million to $74 million, with
the average amount of ransoms paid per vessel increasing from $300,000
to more than $2 million.[Footnote 32]
Figure 9: Total and Average Ransom Payments to Somali Pirates, 2007-
2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 vertical bar graphs]
Calendar year: 2007;
Total paid: $3.2 million;
Average paid: $0.3 million.
Calendar year: 2008;
Total paid: $27.7 million;
Average paid: $1.5 million.
Calendar year: 2009;
Total paid: $74.1 million;
Average paid: $2.1 million.
Source: GAO analysis of Office of Naval Intelligence data.
[End of figure]
A December 2008 United Nations report revealed characteristics of
structural organization in piracy operations, including evidence of
pirate leaders and financiers who supply the equipment and provisions
for other pirates to carry out the attacks, and that ransom payments
are distributed according to organizational roles. In addition, State,
Defense, and FBI officials observed that piracy off the Horn of Africa
has become more organized, and Defense officials said that gathering
more information about pirate organizations that could be used to
identify pirate leaders would be beneficial. FBI officials noted that
pirate organizations lack the sophistication associated with other
types of organized crime, such as the American mafia. These officials
stated that the FBI continues to investigate potential ties Somali
pirates may have to individuals outside of Somalia. Moreover, U.S.
officials have expressed repeated concerns that funds generated by
piracy have the potential to attract extremists or terrorists located
in the region to become involved in piracy. Treasury, Justice, State,
and Defense are monitoring piracy on an ongoing basis to determine if
there is a link between pirates and extremist organizations, but as of
July 2010 had found no credible link.
The U.S. Government Has Not Evaluated the Costs, Benefits, or
Effectiveness of Its Counterpiracy Efforts, Reported Results, or
Updated Its Action Plan Accordingly:
The Action Plan's objective is to repress piracy in the interest of
the global economy, among other things, but the effectiveness of U.S.
resources applied to counterpiracy is unclear because the interagency
group responsible for monitoring the Action Plan's implementation was
not specifically charged with tracking the cost of U.S. activities or
systematically evaluating the relative benefits or effectiveness of
the Action Plan's tasks and neither the interagency steering group nor
the federal agencies involved have performed these tasks. Our prior
work has shown that federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts
need to evaluate activities to identify areas for improvement.
Moreover, as pirates have adapted their tactics, the Action Plan has
not been revised.
The U.S. government is not systematically tracking the costs or the
benefits and effectiveness of its counterpiracy activities to
determine whether its investment has achieved the desired results or
should be revised. According to officials at State and Defense, the
interagency Counter-Piracy Steering Group, which is jointly led by
these two agencies and charged with monitoring implementation of the
Action Plan, has not been systematically monitoring the cost or
evaluating the benefits or effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy
efforts. In commenting on a draft of this report, Defense stated that
the interagency group was not performing these functions because it
was not specifically charged to do so in the Action Plan. Instead,
State officials told us the group primarily provides a forum for U.S.
agencies to coordinate efforts before multilateral Contact Group
meetings or discuss ongoing initiatives such as the development of the
April 2010 executive order on Somalia. Officials from Justice,
Treasury, Coast Guard, and State reported that the NSC's Maritime
Security Interagency Policy Committee, a high-level interagency group
that is focused on maritime issues, generally tracks U.S. progress
toward implementing the Action Plan and discusses status updates on
piracy provided from the various agencies represented on the task
force. However, the officials were not aware of systematic efforts to
track the costs, or evaluate the benefits or effectiveness of U.S.
counterpiracy activities. Table 1 describes selected costs we
identified that may be incurred by U.S. agencies for counterpiracy
efforts.
Table 1: Selected Types of Costs Incurred by the U.S. Government to
Counter Piracy:
General costs:
Costs: Personnel;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense, Homeland Security,
Coast Guard, Justice, FBI, State, Transportation, Maritime
Administration, Treasury.
Costs: Information technology;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense, Homeland Security,
Coast Guard, Justice, FBI, State, Transportation, Maritime
Administration, Treasury.
Costs: Training;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense, Homeland Security,
Coast Guard, Justice, FBI, State, Transportation, Maritime
Administration, Treasury.
Efforts to prevent piracy:
Costs: Contact Group meeting logistics and coordination;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Coast Guard, Maritime
Administration, State.
Costs: Military coordination (e.g., Shared Awareness and Deconfliction
meetings);
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense.
Costs: Outreach to industry;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Coast Guard, Defense, Maritime
Administration, State, Treasury.
Costs: Anti-Piracy Assistance Teams;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense, Maritime
Administration.
Costs: Review of ship security plans;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Coast Guard.
Efforts to disrupt acts of piracy:
Costs: Operational costs of maritime assets;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Coast Guard, Defense.
Costs: Industry liaison;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense.
Costs: Flying hours for maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense.
Costs: Law enforcement support;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Coast Guard, Defense, Naval
Criminal Investigative Service.
Costs: Holding pirates on board naval vessels;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense.
Costs: Personnel costs for intelligence gathering and analysis
(including implementation of the piracy aspects of Executive Order
13536);
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense, Justice, State,
Treasury, Naval Criminal Investigative Service.
Costs: Interagency coordination (Global Maritime Operational Threat
Response process);
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Homeland Security.
Efforts to prosecute pirates:
Costs: Bilateral efforts to secure prosecution venues;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: State.
Costs: Transportation of suspected pirates for prosecution;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Defense, Justice.
Costs: Evidence collection and case development;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Coast Guard, Defense, Justice,
Naval Criminal Investigative Service.
Costs: Prosecution of suspected pirates;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Justice.
Costs: Judicial capacity-building (direct and indirect);
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Justice, State, Naval Criminal
Investigative Service.
Costs: Incarceration of pirates prosecuted by the United States;
Departments or agencies bearing costs: Justice.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by U.S. agencies.
[End of table]
While most of the agencies involved had not systematically tracked the
cost of their counterpiracy efforts, Defense developed a partial
estimate. Defense officials estimated that U.S. Central Command's
counterpiracy operations for fiscal year 2009 totaled approximately
$64 million for costs associated with 773 U.S. Navy ship steaming
days, flight hours to support ships operating in the area, port costs,
and those related to detaining and delivering suspected pirates to
proper authorities.[Footnote 33] However, officials said this estimate
does not include estimates for costs incurred for counterpiracy
operations by other combatant commands such as U.S. Africa Command. In
addition, Defense officials noted the deployment of naval forces in
support of the counterpiracy operations takes the ships, crew,
aircraft, intelligence assets, and other forces away from other global
missions such as counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts.
In addition to not tracking the costs of U.S. counterpiracy efforts,
U.S. agencies also are not evaluating the benefits of U.S.
counterpiracy efforts to U.S. interests. While the Action Plan
discusses the United States' national security interest in maintaining
freedom of navigation of the seas in order to facilitate vibrant
maritime commerce, the extent to which counterpiracy benefits U.S.
interests and maritime commerce has not been evaluated. The Maritime
Administration reports that piracy may pose costs to the maritime
industry for protecting vessels from being attacked or hijacked. For
example, industry may incur costs for rerouting ships to avoid pirate-
infested waters, higher insurance premiums, or enhancing vessel
security by hiring private security guards or installing nonlethal
deterrent equipment. Ultimately, according to the Maritime
Administration, any costs incurred would be passed along to the
taxpayer and the consumer. However, agencies are not systematically
evaluating the extent to which the U.S. investment in counterpiracy
operations is benefiting maritime commerce or weighing these benefits
against the costs incurred to conduct counterpiracy operations. In
addition, data show that the number of U.S. ships operating in the
region is low. The Coast Guard reports that, at any given time, there
are about six to eight U.S.-flagged vessels operating in the region
and the chance of a commercial vessel being attacked by pirates in the
Gulf of Aden is estimated to be less than 1 percent. Furthermore,
according to the Maritime Administration, vessels carrying commerce to
the United States are less susceptible to piracy given their high
speed. Moreover, in 2009, the Congressional Research Service reported
that despite the increased threats and estimates of rising costs
associated with piracy off the Horn of Africa, the effect on the
insurance industry appeared negligible and U.S. insurance rates had
not changed.[Footnote 34]
The Action Plan also establishes objectives related to repressing
piracy and reducing incidents of piracy, but it does not define
measures of effectiveness that can be used to evaluate progress toward
reaching those objectives, or assess the relative benefits or
effectiveness of the Action Plan's tasks to prevent, disrupt, and
prosecute acts of piracy. Further, the Action Plan does not specify
what information the NSC or other designated interagency groups should
use to monitor or evaluate to determine progress, or assess benefits
or effectiveness. Agency officials have cited several challenges
associated with measuring the effectiveness of U.S. efforts, including
the complexity of the piracy problem, difficulty in establishing a
desired end-state for counterpiracy efforts, and difficulty in
distinguishing the effect of U.S. efforts from those of its
international and industry partners. Nevertheless, U.S.,
international, and industry officials we spoke with attributed the
decrease in the pirates' rate of successful attacks in 2009 and shift
to the Indian Ocean to U.S. and international prevention and
interdiction efforts. We previously have reported that performance
information is essential to the ability of decision makers to make
informed decisions, and that specifying performance metrics can be one
tool in evaluating the effectiveness of government efforts in a
changing environment.[Footnote 35] Identifying measures of
effectiveness and systematically evaluating the effectiveness of
agency efforts could assist the U.S. government in determining the
costs and benefits of their activities to ensure that resources
devoted to counterpiracy efforts are being targeted most effectively,
and whether adjustments to plans are required.
Without information on the magnitude of U.S. resources devoted to
counterpiracy operations, or the benefits or effectiveness of its
actions, the U.S. government is limited in its ability to weigh its
investment of resources to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa
against its other interests in the region. The lack of systematic
evaluation of costs, benefits, and effectiveness also makes it
difficult for agencies to target and prioritize their activities to
achieve the greatest benefits. We have previously reported that
agencies should identify the human, information technology, physical,
and financial resources needed to initiate or sustain a joint effort
among multiple agencies, as one means of enhancing interagency
collaboration.[Footnote 36] In addition, a discussion of resources,
investments, and risk management is an important characteristic of
national strategies that can enhance their usefulness to resource and
policy decision makers and resource managers.[Footnote 37]
Moreover, despite the expansion of pirate attacks over a vastly larger
geographic area, increased ransom demands and payments, and better
organized pirate activities since the Action Plan was written,
according to U.S. government officials, there are no plans to reassess
the Action Plan in order to determine whether it should be revised.
Currently, the Action Plan does not specifically address how to
counter pirates in the broader Indian Ocean or what methods to use to
meets its objective of apprehending leaders of pirate organizations
and their financiers. U.S. agencies have reported taking some steps to
respond to the changing methods and location of pirate attacks. For
example, the Navy issues weekly updates on piracy incidents to inform
mariners and naval forces, which in 2010 have cautioned that pirates
are operating at considerable distances off the coast of Somalia.
Defense officials also have worked with coalition partners to develop
a coordination guide for operations in the Somali Basin and have
described measures they have taken to interdict and destroy pirate
mother ships. However, according to Coast Guard, Treasury, and Justice
officials, as of April 2010, the Maritime Security Interagency Policy
Committee affirmed the overall course of U.S. counterpiracy efforts
and did not identify a need to modify the current approach to
countering piracy. Furthermore, the Action Plan contains tasks such as
those to create a Counter-Piracy Coordination Center and support
shiprider programs that are no longer being pursued by U.S. agencies
because they have determined that these tasks are not needed or would
not be beneficial. We have established in prior work that federal
efforts are implemented in dynamic environments in which needs must be
constantly reassessed, and that agencies can enhance and sustain
collaborative efforts by, among other things, developing mechanisms to
report on results.[Footnote 38] By continually evaluating its approach
to countering piracy off the Horn of Africa and reporting on results
of its counterpiracy efforts to key stakeholders, the United States
may be in a better position to hold agencies accountable for results
and achieve its ultimate goal of repressing piracy.
U.S. Agencies Have Worked Collaboratively with Partners but Could Take
Key Steps to Enhance and Sustain Collaboration in Counterpiracy
Efforts:
U.S. agencies have generally collaborated well with international and
industry partners to counter piracy, but they could implement other
key collaborative practices for enhancing and sustaining collaboration
among U.S. interagency partners. According to U.S., international, and
industry stakeholders, U.S. agencies have collaborated effectively
with international and industry partners through mechanisms and
organizations to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa. The United
States also has collaborated well with international military partners
and industry groups. Within the U.S. government, while agencies have
implemented some collaborative practices, other practices could be
implemented to further enhance collaboration. The U.S. government has
not made substantial progress on those Action Plan tasks that involve
multiple agencies and those in which the NSC has not clearly
identified roles and responsibilities or coordinated with U.S.
agencies to develop joint guidance.
U.S. Agencies Have Collaborated Effectively with International and
Industry Partners:
U.S. agencies, primarily State and Defense, have collaborated with
international partners through two new organizations established to
counter piracy off the Horn of Africa: the Contact Group on Piracy off
the Coast of Somalia (Contact Group) and the Shared Awareness and
Deconfliction meetings. As previously discussed, the Action Plan
directed U.S. agencies to establish and maintain a Contact Group,
which serves as an international forum for countries contributing to
the counterpiracy effort to share information. State orchestrates U.S.
participation in the Contact Group, coordinating with officials from
Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, Transportation, and Treasury. As
part of the Contact Group, the United States has participated in six
plenary meetings with international partners in counter piracy efforts
since January 2009. These meetings have facilitated international
military coordination, provided guidance to international efforts, and
established a trust fund to support counterpiracy efforts. As part of
the Contact Group's efforts, the Coast Guard and the Maritime
Administration cochair a working group focusing on coordinating with
the shipping industry, which has reviewed and updated best management
practices for industry self-protection, encouraged continued
communication between industry and government organizations such as
the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa, and is developing
guidance for seafarer training regarding pirate attacks. In addition,
officials told us that State has participated in the working group on
strategic communication and assisted in developing draft strategic
communication documents considered by the group.
The United States also has worked to establish collaborative
organizations, share information, and develop joint guidance for
international military partners working to counter piracy. As the
leader of the Combined Maritime Forces, in 2008 the U.S. Navy, along
with other international partners, established the Shared Awareness
and Deconfliction meetings that are intended to provide a mechanism
for militaries active in the region to share information on their
movements and make efficient use of the limited naval assets
patrolling pirate-infested waters. We observed one of these meetings
that occur every 4 to 6 weeks with representatives from the European
Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the shipping industry,
as well as with nontraditional partners from countries such as Russia
and China. According to U.S. and international officials, these
meetings have improved coordination and led to the creation of the
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor within the Maritime
Security Patrol Area as well as coordination guides for military
operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. The coordination
guides provide joint guidance to participating international forces
intended to ensure the most effective use of the military assets in
the region by outlining shared practices and procedures.
The United States has also worked to support information sharing
efforts on investigative and prosecutorial techniques. In July, 2010,
the Naval Criminal Investigative Service hosted a workshop on
counterpiracy investigations that was attended by over 50
representatives from the United States, international military, law
enforcement, and industry organizations. According to Defense
officials, this workshop facilitated development of a draft
investigators manual designed to help standardize counterpiracy
operations.
U.S. agencies, primarily the Coast Guard and the Maritime
Administration, have worked with industry partners to facilitate
collaborative forums, share information, and develop joint guidance
for implementing counterpiracy efforts. Industry partners play an
important role in preventing and deterring pirate attacks since they
are responsible for implementing self -protection measures on
commercial vessels. According to officials, in late 2008 the Coast
Guard and the Maritime Administration encouraged industry groups to
develop best practices for industry to counter piracy and hosted
several meetings with U.S. and international industry groups.
According to U.S. and shipping industry officials, these meetings
resulted in the industry-published best management practices
guide.[Footnote 39] This document has provided critical guidance to
ship owners and operators on how to protect themselves from pirate
attacks. In addition, for those ship owners who choose or are required
to carry armed security teams, the Coast Guard and State have worked
to identify viable methods for doing so in accordance with applicable
U.S., international, and port-state laws.[Footnote 40] The Coast Guard
has communicated methods for taking arms on ships and the responses
from international partners to the shipping industry through two port
security advisories. As the U.S. agency responsible for implementing
national and international maritime security regulations on U.S.-
flagged vessels, the Coast Guard also has hosted four collaborative
forums with industry partners to address piracy issues since April
2009. These meetings have provided a forum to discuss changes required
to ship security plans to address the piracy threat, the evolving
piracy situation, and U.S. efforts to assist in protecting U.S.-
flagged vessels. For example, the Coast Guard facilitated a meeting
with industry representatives and officials from State and Treasury in
April 2010 to discuss the executive order on Somalia, which has
implications for the shipping industry's ability to pay ransoms to
secure the release of captive crews. Further, the Maritime
Administration developed training courses to inform vessel crews about
how to help prevent piracy and steps to take if taken hostage.
In addition, the Maritime Administration and the Military Sealift
Command have created a new collaborative mechanism for working with
industry in the form of Anti-Piracy Assistance Teams. When requested
by the owner of a U.S.-flagged vessel, a team consisting of the
Maritime Administration and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service
personnel will assess a ship's security and offer advice on ways to
improve. When the teams visit a vessel, Maritime Administration
officials meet with company officials to discuss their security
efforts and document these efforts so they can be shared with other
ship operators. Lastly, U.S. Central Command has used the Maritime
Liaison Office based in Bahrain as an additional mechanism to exchange
information between naval forces and industry. This office serves as a
conduit for information focused on safety of shipping and conducts
outreach with the shipping industry, such as through newsletters to
encourage the use of self-protection measures.
U.S. Agencies Have Implemented Some Collaborative Practices but Could
Enhance Efforts by Incorporating Others:
U.S. government agencies have implemented some collaborative practices
in working with interagency partners to counter piracy but could
enhance efforts where less progress has been made by incorporating
other key practices. Several key practices than can enhance
interagency collaboration include developing an overarching strategy,
establishing collaborative mechanisms to share information with
partners, assigning roles and responsibilities, and developing joint
guidance to implement interagency efforts. Consistent with key
practices, the NSC established its Action Plan, which serves an
overarching strategy to guide U.S. interagency efforts and provides a
framework for interagency collaboration.[Footnote 41] The Action Plan
creates an interagency task force that is intended to coordinate,
implement, and monitor the actions contained in the plan.
In addition, the U.S. departments and multiple component agencies
involved in counterpiracy efforts have also implemented another key
practice--using collaborative organizations to share information.
Collaborative organizations that provide adequate coordination
mechanisms to facilitate interagency collaboration and achieve an
integrated approach are particularly important when differences exist
between agencies that can impede collaboration and progress toward
shared goals by potentially wasting scarce resources and limiting
effectiveness.[Footnote 42] Within the NSC, which includes committees
with agency secretaries, deputy secretaries, and assistant
secretaries, are existing forums for discussing and coordinating
interagency efforts that officials have reported discuss counterpiracy
efforts. Additionally, as called for in the Action Plan, State and
Defense established the Counter-Piracy Steering Group, which includes
representatives from the U.S. departments and component agencies
involved in counterpiracy efforts.
Furthermore, in certain circumstances, such as a pirate attack on a
U.S.-flagged vessel, the U.S. government uses the existing Maritime
Operational Threat Response process to facilitate a discussion among
U.S. agencies and decide on courses of action, which is outlined in an
October 2006 plan that is part of the National Strategy for Maritime
Security.[Footnote 43] For example, when the MV Maersk Alabama was
attacked in April 2009, facilitators utilized established protocols to
activate the process and bring together the appropriate government
officials . Figure 10 shows U.S. authorities responding to the MV
Maersk Alabama incident in 2009. According to U.S. and Maersk
officials involved, over the course of several meetings--some of which
included Maersk representatives--U.S. officials decided on actions to
take in response to the attack, resulting in the release of a U.S.
merchant marine captain that had been taken hostage by pirates.
[Footnote 44] U.S. and Maersk officials considered the outcome of the
Alabama incident to be a success. Officials from Defense, State, Coast
Guard, the Maritime Administration, and Justice have reported that
this process has been an effective tool in responding to this and
other piracy incidents. In addition, the Coast Guard established a new
collaboration mechanism--a weekly interagency conference call--to
coordinate operational efforts among the agency partners working to
counter piracy, which we observed during this review.
Figure 10: U.S. Personnel Respond to the MV Maersk Alabama Incident in
2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
U.S. officials used the Maritime Operational Threat Response process
to coordinate the response to the kidnapping of a U.S. merchant marine
captain, who was held hostage by pirates for 5 days in the Indian
Ocean aboard the lifeboat pictured above.
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
Although the NSC and U.S. agencies have taken these collaborative
steps, the NSC could incorporate two other key practices--assigning
roles and responsibilities and developing joint implementation
strategies--to further enhance interagency collaboration in
counterpiracy efforts. As of July 2010, the NSC had only assigned
roles and responsibilities for implementing 1 of the 14 Action Plan
tasks. The Action Plan recognizes that, consistent with other U.S.
mission requirements, the U.S. Navy and the Coast Guard provide
persistent interdiction through their presence and can conduct
maritime counterpiracy operations. In addition, the Action Plan states
that those forces shall coordinate counterpiracy activities with other
forces operating in the region to the extent practicable and sets out
a number of specific actions to be taken in various piracy situations.
Although the Action Plan states that the Departments of Defense,
Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury,
and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall
contribute to, coordinate, and undertake initiatives in accordance
with the Action Plan, the NSC did not clearly identify roles and
responsibilities for specific agencies that will ensure the
implementation of the other 13 tasks in the Action Plan. Establishing
roles and responsibilities can help agencies clarify which agencies
will lead or participate in activities, help organize their joint and
individual efforts, and facilitate decision making.[Footnote 45]
Agencies could enhance collaboration by developing joint guidance to
implement and coordinate actions on several Action Plan tasks. Joint
guidance helps ensure that agencies involved in collaborative efforts
work together efficiently and effectively by establishing policies,
procedures, information-sharing mechanisms, and other means to operate
across agency boundaries.[Footnote 46] Effective joint guidance also
addresses how agency activities and resources will be aligned to
achieve goals.
Implementing Key Practices Could Enhance Efforts Involving Multiple
Agencies Where Less Progress Has Been Made:
In the absence of clearly identified roles and responsibilities and
joint implementation strategies, agencies involved in countering
piracy have made comparatively more progress in implementing those
Action Plan tasks that fall firmly within one agency's area of
expertise, such as those to establish a Contact Group, update ship
security plans, and provide an interdiction-capable presence, than
they have on those tasks for which multiple agencies may be involved.
For example, State, which has the authority and capability to work
with international partners in establishing the Contact Group, has
made substantial progress toward implementing that task. Furthermore,
the Action Plan calls for commercial vessels to review and update
their ship security plans in order to prevent and deter pirate
attacks. Officials explained that because the Coast Guard has
responsibility for enforcing U.S.-regulated commercial-vessel
compliance with maritime security requirements, the agency took the
lead on implementing this task and has made substantial progress.
Similarly, Defense has primary responsibility for providing a
persistent interdiction-capable presence in the region and has made
substantial progress as lead on that task.
In contrast, there are several tasks in the Action Plan for which
multiple agencies have relevant authorities, capabilities, or
interests, and on which less progress has been made. The NSC did not
identify roles and responsibilities for implementing these tasks and
officials have acknowledged that the agencies have not developed joint
guidance to ensure their efforts work together efficiently and
effectively. For example, the NSC included efforts related to
developing a strategic communications strategy, disrupting pirate
revenue, and holding pirates accountable as essential to implementing
the Action Plan.
* Strategic communication: The Action Plan calls for the United States
to lead and support a global public information and diplomatic
campaign to highlight, among other things, the international
cooperation undertaken to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa, as
well as piracy's destructive effects on trade, human and maritime
security, and the rule of law. In addition, according to the Action
Plan, any strategic communication strategy must also convey concerns
about the risks associated with paying ransoms demands. Multiple
agencies are involved in communicating with various audiences about
piracy. State communicates with international partners about
international cooperation; Defense communicates with military partners
about international military cooperation and with African audiences to
discourage piracy; the Naval Criminal Investigative Service
communicates with U.S. and international law enforcement partners
about law enforcement, investigative, and analytical cooperation; and
the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration communicate with the
shipping industry about self-protection measures and ransom concerns.
However, there is no governmentwide strategic communication plan in
place to guide agency efforts, optimize effects, and enhance the
achievement of goals. According to State officials, State has drafted
a governmentwide counterpiracy strategic communication plan for
interagency review but as of July 2010, the department was still
awaiting comments from interagency partners and did not have an
estimated date for when the plan would be finalized, though Treasury
officials had provided comments. Meanwhile agencies have taken varying
approaches to strategic communication. Defense has developed a
classified plan for its activities, and according to Coast Guard
officials, the Coast Guard suspended its effort to develop a plan upon
learning that State was drafting a governmentwide plan. As a result,
U.S. agencies have not implemented all the strategic communication
efforts called for by the Action Plan, and it is not clear that the
agencies' efforts are coordinated or as effective as possible in
communicating the intended messages about piracy.
* Disrupting pirate revenue: According to the Action Plan, the goal
for disrupting pirate revenue is to trace ransom payments and
apprehend leaders of pirate organizations and their enablers. Multiple
agencies are involved in collecting information on pirate finances.
Justice collects information on financial assets entering the United
States related to piracy. According to officials, Treasury examines
financial activities and reviews intelligence, law enforcement, and
publicly available information, to map illicit financial networks and
to determine appropriate action, including potential designation of an
individual or entity pursuant to the April 2010 executive order on
Somalia. State officials described their work with international
partners to gather information on illicit financial networks, while
Defense officials told us they collect intelligence on pirate
financial activities by questioning captured pirate suspects. However,
the NSC did not clearly identify any agency with specific
responsibility for disrupting pirate revenue. As a result, officials
at Justice, State, and Defense agree that information their agencies
gather on pirate finances is not being systematically analyzed, and it
is unclear if any agency is using it to identify and apprehend pirate
leaders or financiers. In addition, though Justice, State, and Defense
officials reported that Somali piracy exhibits characteristics of
international organized crime, currently pirate attacks prosecuted by
the United States are not investigated by the FBI's Organized Crime
Section but instead by the Violent Crimes Section. In the absence of
clearly identified roles and responsibilities, and with competing
priorities, officials indicated agencies have not taken initiative to
develop joint guidance to ensure these disparate efforts work together
efficiently and effectively. Similarly, officials acknowledged there
is no supporting plan or joint guidance to direct U.S. interagency
efforts to collect and analyze criminal intelligence on pirates.
However, State is in the process of creating a Counter-piracy Finance
Working Group intended to facilitate closer interagency coordination
of efforts to combat the financial flows and support networks of
piracy off Somalia. According to Justice officials, as of July 2010,
the United States has not apprehended or prosecuted the leaders of any
pirate organizations or their enablers as called for in the Action
Plan.
* Facilitating prosecution of suspected pirates: The Action Plan
contains several tasks related to facilitating the prosecution of
suspected pirates by parties with an interest in prosecution, but it
does not identify clear roles and responsibilities for U.S. agencies
needed to ensure implementation of these tasks. In some cases, U.S.
officials said roles are apparent where an agency's mission aligns
with the Action Plan's tasks, such as State's diplomatic work with
regional partners to conclude prosecution arrangements. However, a
lack of defined roles and joint guidance to implement U.S. efforts to
facilitate prosecutions poses challenges for prosecuting suspected
pirates when each agency's role is less clear. For example, absent
defined roles and responsibilities and interagency guidance, U.S.
officials explained that they had to dedicate time during a high-level
interagency meeting of the Maritime Security Interagency Policy
Committee to arrange details, including cost sharing, for the
transportation of suspects after the spring 2010 pirate attacks on the
USS Ashland and USS Nicholas. State officials told us that prior to
these attacks the U.S. government had limited experience being
involved with the prosecution of Somali pirates and had not
established the necessary interagency procedures for transferring
suspects and sharing costs among the agencies involved.
By enhancing interagency collaboration, the NSC can reduce the risk of
leaving gaps in its counterpiracy efforts or the risk that agency
efforts may overlap, which could waste resources that could be applied
to combat other threats to national security, such as terrorism.
Clarifying roles and responsibilities and developing joint
implementing guidance could also help agency officials--who must
balance their time and resources among many competing priorities--more
fully and effectively carry out their roles in helping to repress
piracy and avoid duplication of effort.
Conclusions:
Given that the President identified piracy as a threat to U.S.
national security interests and that it is a complex problem that
affects a variety of stakeholders, the U.S. government has taken a
collaborative approach in its counterpiracy plans. The U.S. government
has taken many steps to implement the Countering Piracy off the Horn
of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan), but still faces
a number of challenges to meeting the Action Plan's objective of
repressing piracy, including inherent limits on its ability to
influence industry and international partners and persuade other
states to consider prosecuting suspected pirates. In addition, the
United States must address the problem of piracy in an environment in
which counterpiracy efforts compete with other high-priority U.S.
interests in the region, and the NSC acknowledges that longer-term
efforts to stabilize Somalia are needed to fully address the root
causes of piracy. In the face of such challenges, the NSC's Action
Plan provides a roadmap for federal departments and agencies to follow
in implementing efforts to counter piracy. However, the U.S.
government is not tracking the costs, benefits, or effectiveness of
its counterpiracy activities and thus lacks information needed to
weigh resource investments. In addition, without a systematic
evaluation of interagency efforts to compare the relative
effectiveness of various Action Plan tasks, key stakeholders lack a
clear picture of what effect, if any, its efforts have had.
Establishing performance measures or other mechanisms to judge
progress and evaluating performance information could provide U.S.
government stakeholders with more specific information to update the
Action Plan and better direct the course of U.S. government plans and
activities to repress piracy. Without updating U.S. government plans
and efforts to reflect performance information and the dynamic nature
of piracy, the U.S. government is limited in its ability to ensure
that efforts and resources are being targeted toward the areas of
greatest national interest.
Federal agencies have made great strides to collaborate with each
other and with international and shipping-industry partners, but could
benefit from greater specificity in the Action Plan about their roles
and responsibilities and development of joint implementing guidance,
especially with regard to those Action Plan tasks that require a
variety of stakeholders to implement. Without specific roles and
responsibilities for essential aspects of its Action Plan--including
developing a U.S. government strategic communication plan, disrupting
pirate revenue, or facilitating prosecution of suspected pirates--U.S.
agencies have either developed their own approaches to these tasks or
developed no approach at all. In addition, developing joint
implementing guidance could help agencies work together more
effectively and potentially improve progress toward U.S. goals.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve U.S. government efforts to implement the Countering Piracy
off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan (Action Plan),
enhance interagency collaboration, provide information to decision
makers on results, and better target resources, we recommend that the
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in
collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security,
Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury:
* reassess and revise the Action Plan to better address evolving
conditions off the Horn of Africa and their effect on priorities and
plans;
* identify measures of effectiveness to use in evaluating U.S.
counterpiracy efforts;
* direct the Counter-Piracy Steering Group to (1) identify the costs
of U.S. counterpiracy efforts including operational, support, and
personnel costs; and (2) assess the benefits, and effectiveness of
U.S. counterpiracy activities; and:
* clarify agency roles and responsibilities and develop joint
guidance, information-sharing mechanisms, and other means to operate
across agency boundaries for implementing key efforts such as
strategic communication, disrupting pirate revenue, and facilitating
prosecution.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report for review to the Departments of
Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and the
Treasury; and the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC did not
provide comments on the report or our recommendations. Defense
provided written comments to clarify facts in the report which are
reprinted in their entirety in appendix V. Defense, Homeland Security,
Justice, State, Transportation, and Treasury provided technical
comments which we incorporated as appropriate.
In written comments, Defense stated that the department does not agree
that using percent of seized suspected pirates who were delivered for
prosecution is an appropriate measure of program success. Defense also
commented that the metric does not take into account that it is up to
individual countries within the coalition to determine the validity of
evidence and decide whether to prosecute. In the draft report, we
stated that the Action Plan establishes objectives related to
repressing piracy and reducing incidents of piracy, but does not
define measures of effectiveness that can be used to evaluate progress
toward reaching those objectives. In the absence of defined measures
of effectiveness, we made qualitative assessments of U.S. government
progress in implementing the Action Plan tasks by reviewing program
documents, analyzing data, and interviewing agency officials. We
determined that the U.S. government had made some progress on the
Action Plan task to seize and destroy pirate vessels and related
equipment and deliver captured suspected pirates for prosecution. In
response to Defense's comments, we have modified the report to
explicitly recommend that the NSC identify measures of effectiveness
to use in evaluating U.S. counterpiracy efforts. We also revised the
summary text contained in figure 5 for this line of action to better
incorporate some of the prosecution challenges discussed in appendix
II and more fully address the rationale for our assessment.
Defense also provided comments to better depict the contributions of
the Naval Criminal Investigative Service to counterpiracy operations
which we incorporated throughout the report. And finally, Defense
stated that U.S. Special Operations Command does not conduct
counterpiracy operations and stated in its technical comments that it
is a force provider to other combatant commands who are responsible
for conducting counterpiracy operations. As a result, we modified the
draft to eliminate reference to the U.S. Special Operations Command as
incurring costs for counterpiracy operations.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 7
days from its date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs; the Attorney General; the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland
Security, State, Transportation, and the Treasury; and interested
congressional committees. We also will make copies available to others
upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge
on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact either John H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or
pendletonj@gao.gov or Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or
caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
Signed by:
Stephen L. Caldwell:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To address our objectives, we analyzed data, reviewed documentation,
and interviewed officials from the U.S. government agencies that the
National Security Council (NSC) specifically tasked to contribute to,
coordinate, and undertake initiatives in accordance with NSC's 2008
Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan
(Action Plan). We met with and gathered information from officials
representing the various agencies tasked with implementing the Action
Plan and who participate on the committees within the NSC.[Footnote
47] We also conducted work with international and industry partners
involved in the response to piracy off the Horn of Africa.[Footnote 48]
To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has made progress in
countering piracy off the Horn of Africa and the challenges it faces,
we reviewed the Action Plan, the 2007 Policy for the Repression of
Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea, the 2005 National
Strategy for Maritime Security, relevant U.S. laws, United Nations
Security Council resolutions on piracy off the Horn of Africa, as well
as our prior work related to Somalia, maritime security, interagency
collaboration, and combating illicit financing. To assess the
implementation status of the actions called for in the Action Plan, we
reviewed program documents, analyzed data, and interviewed agency
officials. Our assessments are based on data from multiple sources,
are qualitative in nature, and are derived from consensus judgments.
We assessed "substantial progress" for those tasks where all
components specified by the Action Plan were implemented; "some
progress" for tasks where components were partially implemented or
agencies had taken steps toward implementation; and "little or no
progress" where agencies had made minimal or no effort toward
implementing the components of the task. We provided a "not
applicable" assessment for one task in the Action Plan that agency
officials and our analysis revealed to have been overtaken by events
and no longer relevant for U.S. counterpiracy efforts. We provided a
summary of our progress assessments to the agencies and incorporated
their comments as appropriate. We also reviewed our prior work related
to results-oriented government[Footnote 49] and evaluated the extent
to which the interagency Counter-Piracy Steering Group charged with
coordinating, implementing, and monitoring the actions in the NSC plan
followed select key practices for achieving results including
monitoring and evaluating efforts, using performance information to
improve efforts and revise plans as needed, and reporting on results.
In addition, we met with international and industry partners involved
in developing best practices for protecting ships from pirate attack,
working with the international Contact Group, and participating in
naval patrols off the Horn of Africa to gain their perspective on the
challenges and progress in countering piracy, the effectiveness of
counterpiracy actions, implementation of best management practices for
protecting ships, and how conditions off the Horn of Africa are
evolving. To gain insight on trends in pirate activity since the
United States and coalition partners began counterpiracy operations,
we obtained and analyzed data on the incidents of piracy off the Horn
of Africa for the years 2007 through June 2010 from the International
Chamber of Commerce's International Maritime Bureau. The International
Maritime Bureau operates a Piracy Reporting Center that collects data
on pirate attacks worldwide. According to its officials, there are
some limitations with International Maritime Bureau data because they
rely on ship officials to provide the information, which can vary, and
some information is not provided due to sovereignty issues regarding
investigations. However, we reviewed internal controls and measures
used by the bureau to protect the reliability and accuracy of their
data on pirate attacks and attempted attacks and discussed the
reliability of the bureau's data with international, industry, and
government subject-matter experts involved in counterpiracy operations
and determined that the bureau's data were the best data available on
pirate attacks and attempted attacks. Therefore, we determined the
data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of describing the
context of piracy as a threat to seafarers and the geographical scope
of pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa. To identify the results of
interdiction efforts led and supported by the United States we
obtained and reviewed data from the Combined Maritime Forces for the
years 2008 to June 2010. There are some limitations with Combined
Maritime Forces' data because these data are compiled from military
and nonmilitary sources and reporting. Although efforts are made to
correlate and confirm the accuracy of these data, Combined Maritime
Forces cannot fully guarantee their accuracy. We discussed data-
collection methods, processes for data entry, and the steps taken to
ensure reasonable accuracy of the data with both the International
Maritime Bureau and the Combined Maritime Forces. We determined the
data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To
identify the amount of ransoms being paid to Somali pirates we
reviewed monthly ransom data from the Office of Naval Intelligence for
2007 through 2009. Due to the classified nature of the sources and
methods used to develop this data, we did not independently verify the
reliability of this information.
To identify the extent to which U.S. government agencies are
collaborating with each other and with international and industry
partners, we synthesized key practices for enhancing and sustaining
collaboration on complex national security issues from our prior work.
[Footnote 50] We then evaluated the extent to which department and
agency actions incorporate select key practices including (1)
developing overarching strategies and mutually reinforcing plans, (2)
assigning roles and responsibilities, and (3) creating collaborative
organizations that share and integrate information. To obtain
information on the nature and extent of collaboration on counterpiracy
efforts among agencies, international and industry partners, we
reviewed the NSC's Action Plan, and department and agency program
documents; and interviewed agency, international, and industry
officials. To gain insight into new and existing coordination
mechanisms applicable to piracy, we observed the weekly interagency
conference calls on counterpiracy efforts, attended a Shared Awareness
and Deconfliction meeting in Manama, Bahrain, and reviewed program
documents.
U.S. Government Agencies:
For both of our objectives, we interviewed and, where appropriate,
obtained documentation from officials with the following U.S.
government agencies:
Department of Defense:
* Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy): the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity
Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (Counter-Narcotics and Global
Threats), the Oceans Policy Advisor in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs (Countering Weapons
of Mass Destruction), and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs (African Affairs):
* Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff: J5 (Strategic Plans and Policy
Directorate) for Oceans Policy/Counterpiracy, J3 (Operations
Directorate), and J2 (Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate), Piracy
Lead:
* Office of General Counsel:
* Under United States Africa Command: the Strategy, Plans and Programs
Directorate; the Intelligence and Knowledge Development Directorate;
the Operations and Logistics Directorate, Information Operations
Division; the Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems
and Chief Info Officer Directorate; and the Outreach Directorate,
Strategic Communications Division:
* Under United States Central Command: the Maritime Liaison Office
(Bahrain); and the Naval Forces Central Command's Maritime Operational
Center (Bahrain), Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General's Corps U.S.
Naval Forces Central Command (Bahrain), and Naval Criminal
Investigative Service (Bahrain):
* United States Special Operations Command:
* Under the Department of the Navy: the Naval Criminal Investigative
Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence:
Department of Homeland Security:
* United States Coast Guard's offices of Assessment, Integration, and
Risk Management; Counterterrorism and Defense Operations;
International Affairs and Foreign Policy Advisor; Public Affairs;
Vessel Activities; Prevention Policy; Maritime and International Law;
Policy Integration; Law Enforcement; Operations Law; and the Patrol
Forces Southwest Asia (Bahrain):
Department of Justice:
* National Security Division:
* Criminal Division's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development
Assistance Training and Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section:
* Federal Bureau of Investigation's Criminal Investigative Division,
Violent Crimes Section and Organized Crime Section:
* United States Attorneys' Office:
Department of State:
* Office of the Secretary of State:
* Bureau of African Affairs' Office of East African Affairs and Office
of Regional Security Affairs:
* Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of Plans, Policy and
Analysis and Office of International Security Operations:
* Office of the Legal Adviser for Law Enforcement and Intelligence;
Oceans, International Environmental and Scientific Affairs; Attorney-
Adviser (specializing in law of the seas); and Attorney-Adviser
(specializing in United Nations issues):
* Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs'
Office of Anti-Crime Programs, Money Laundering/Terrorism Financing
Unit:
* Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Office of Country
Reports and Asylum Affairs and Office of Africa and Eurasia:
* Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs' Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs:
* Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs' Office of
Transportation Policy and Office of Terrorism Finance and Economics
Sanctions Policy:
* Foreign Policy Advisor from the Department of State to the U.S.
Naval Forces Central Command (Manama, Bahrain), and the Permanent
Representative to the International Maritime Organization from the
Department of State/U.S. Embassy-London U.S.
Department of Transportation:
* The Maritime Administration's Office's of the Chief Counsel, Office
of International Activities, Associate Administrator for National
Security, Associate Administrator for Environment and Compliance and
its Office of Security, and the Office of Financial Approvals and
Marine Insurance's Division of Marine Insurance:
Department of the Treasury:
* Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence's offices of
Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, Foreign Assets Control, and
Intelligence and Analysis:
Office of the Director of National Intelligence:
* National Maritime Intelligence Center:
International, Industry, and Nongovernmental Organizations:
We also interviewed and, where appropriate, obtained documentation
from the following:
International Partners:
* International Maritime Organization (London, U.K.):
* European Union Naval Forces (Northwood, U.K.), Maritime Security
Centre-Horn Of Africa Industry Liaison, Chief of Staff, J4 Movements
and Transport, and Industry Liaison:
* Combined Maritime Forces (Manama, Bahrain), Coalition Forces' Chief
Air Coordination Element and Shared Awareness and Deconfliction
Meeting:
* North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Northwood, U.K.), Maritime Air
Operations, N2 Intelligence Division, N3 Operations Division, and
North Atlantic Treaty Organization Shipping Centre:
* United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defense,
and Department for Transport:
Industry Partners:
* APL Maritime; Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO);
Chamber of Shipping of America; International Association of Dry Cargo
Shipowners (INTERCARGO); International Association of Independent
Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO); International Chamber of Shipping;
International Group of P&I Clubs; International Maritime Bureau;
International Transportation Workers Federation (ITF); Lloyd's Market
Association; Maersk Line Limited; National Academy of Sciences,
Transportation Research Board, Marine Board; Society of International
Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators Limited (SIGTTO); and the World
Shipping Council.
Maritime Experts:
* Former Commander of the Combined Maritime Forces (Combined Task
Force 151), former United States Navy Judge Advocate General, Royal
United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the Royal Institute
of International Affairs (Chatham House).
We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to September
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: U.S. Government Agency Progress in Implementing the
National Security Council's Action Plan:
In December 2008, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) published
its Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action
Plan (Action Plan), which laid out 14 tasks to implement three lines
of action to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute acts of Somali piracy. We
assessed the extent to which U.S. government agencies involved in
countering piracy[Footnote 51] have made progress implementing the
Action Plan. In addition to the information provided earlier in this
report, this appendix contains further details on the steps that those
agencies have taken--or have yet to take--to implement various tasks
called for under each of the plan's three lines of action: (1) prevent
pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain to
piracy; (2) disrupt acts of piracy consistent with international law
and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states; and
(3) facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag, victim,
and coastal states, and, in appropriate cases, the United States to
ensure that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for
their actions.
We based our assessment on reviews of agency plans, status reports,
and interviews with U.S. government, international, and industry
officials involved in counterpiracy efforts.[Footnote 52] The scope
and methodology used in our review are described in further detail in
appendix I.
Progress in Implementing Actions to Prevent Pirate Attacks by Reducing
the Vulnerability of the Maritime Domain to Piracy:
Substantial Progress Has Been Made to Establish and Maintain a Contact
Group:
In concert with the United Nations and international partners, the
U.S. government has made substantial progress in helping to establish
and maintain a Contact Group of countries willing and able to help
combat piracy off the Horn of Africa. The Action Plan calls for the
immediate establishment of a Contact Group to combat piracy off the
Horn of Africa, which would meet as necessary to develop and
coordinate international policy initiatives, share information,
provide resources for building regional capacity to counter piracy,
and advocate for other mechanisms to repress piracy. In January 2009,
the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (Contact Group)
was formed in response to United Nations Security Council Resolution
1851, and, as of June 2010, it had 49 member nations as well as
international organization partners. The Contact Group established a
multidonor trust fund to help offset the cost of prosecuting suspected
pirates, and in April 2010, members approved $2.1 million for programs
in the Seychelles and Somalia.
The Department of State (State) orchestrates U.S. participation in the
Contact Group, coordinating with officials from the Departments of
Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, Transportation, and the Treasury.
In addition, the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration cochair
the working group on industry self-protection, which facilitated
development and adoption of best management practices for self-
protection, in coordination with industry and the International
Maritime Organization. Military, industry, and international officials
credit these self-protection measures, in part, for the reduction in
successful pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden from 2008 to 2009.
According to agency officials, the Department of Defense (Defense) and
State have participated in various other working groups, including
military coordination and judicial efforts.
Substantial Progress Has Been Made to Strengthen and Encourage the Use
of the Maritime Security Patrol Area:
The U.S. government has made substantial progress on strengthening the
use of the Maritime Security Patrol Area in collaboration with its
international partners, though there are limits to the reach of
government influence on commercial vessels. The Action Plan calls for
the United States to strengthen the use of the Maritime Security
Patrol Area--the area patrolled by coalition Combined Maritime Forces
and other navies--by encouraging other countries to assign naval
forces and assets to the area, coordinating and sharing information
with the other navies, and urging members of the shipping industry to
use the Maritime Security Patrol Area.[Footnote 53] State has
encouraged multinational military coordination through bilateral
channels and the Contact Group. The U.S. Navy has contributed to both
to the Combined Maritime Forces and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
patrols. In addition, the United States contributes to Shared
Awareness and Deconfliction meetings, established to share information
with and coordinate the counterpiracy patrols of coalition forces and
independent countries. International officials also told us that
Combined Maritime Forces, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and
European Union forces are coordinating surveillance and patrol of the
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, the recommended route
within the Maritime Security Patrol Area for commercial vessels
transiting the Gulf of Aden.
Defense, Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and the Maritime
Liaison Office have used a variety of methods to encourage commercial
vessels to use the Maritime Security Patrol Area and coordinate with
naval patrols, such as publishing advisories, maintaining
informational Web sites, and sponsoring information-sharing meetings.
The Coast Guard requires that U.S.-flagged vessels register their
transit plans through the Horn of Africa region with the Maritime
Security Centre-Horn of Africa and notify the United Kingdom Maritime
Trade Operations office in Dubai, which both monitor the transit of
vessels in the region. However, U.S.-flagged vessels comprise a small
proportion of the ships that transit the high-risk waters off the Horn
of Africa, and, and the Coast Guard regulations mandating self-
protection measures only apply to U.S.-flagged vessels. While the U.S.
government encourages commercial vessels from other flag states to
take advantage of the monitoring provided by navies patrolling the
Maritime Security Patrol Area, Defense, Maritime Administration,
shipping industry, and international officials estimate that
approximately 20 to 25 percent of the shipping traffic in the region
does not register its transit with patrolling forces. These officials
also told us that, as pirates have expanded their area of operations
into the Indian Ocean, coalition forces faced increased challenges in
disrupting attacks given the unfeasibility of establishing secured
transit corridors in this area similar to that used in the Gulf of
Aden.
Substantial Progress Has Been Made to Update Ships' Security
Assessments and Plans:
The Coast Guard has achieved substantial progress in ensuring that
ship security plans for U.S.-flagged vessels have been updated with
piracy annexes, and the United States is encouraging other countries
to implement similar measures. The Action Plan calls for the United
States to urge other nations to update their ship security plans and
to encourage vessels in the Gulf of Aden to take specific protective
measures. In May 2009, the Coast Guard promulgated the second revision
of Maritime Security Directive 104-6, which requires that all U.S.-
flagged vessels transiting high-risk areas have an approved security
plan to prevent and defend against pirate attacks.[Footnote 54]
Furthermore, the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration have
taken steps to implement this task by issuing guidance to support
industry efforts to prevent attacks.[Footnote 55] For example, the
Coast Guard's Port Security Advisories provide information on using
armed security teams to protect vessels transiting high-risk waters.
[Footnote 56] As of July 2010, the Coast Guard had approved the
additional security measures submitted by each of the 211 U.S.-flagged
vessels identified as traveling through high-risk waters, 108 of which
travel through the Horn of Africa region. The Coast Guard ensures
those U.S.-flagged vessels transiting high-risk waters have an updated
plan by monitoring the movement of U.S.-flagged vessels, checking for
approved plans, and investigating compliance when vessels are at
certain ports. However, U.S.-flagged vessels comprise only a small
proportion of the ships that transit the area, and according to
officials the influence of the U.S. government on international ships
is limited.
To encourage international implementation of self-protection measures
by commercial vessels, the United States has signed and promoted the
nonbinding New York Declaration. According to the declaration, the
signatory countries will ensure, when carrying out their obligations
under the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code,
that vessels on their registry have adopted and documented appropriate
self-protection measures in their ship security plans.[Footnote 57]
These plans specify how each vessel will employ the applicable self-
protection measures. While officials acknowledge that best management
practices do not provide guaranteed protection against a hijacking,
officials at the International Maritime Organization and the Maritime
Security Centre-Horn of Africa, established by the European Union
Naval Force, estimate that the majority of ships hijacked in the Gulf
of Aden were not following one of the easiest and least costly of self-
protection measures, registering their voyage through high-risk waters
with the centre. Although U.S., international, and industry officials
told us that no data are available on the extent to which ships
transiting high-risk waters are following best practices, U.S.,
international military, and industry officials estimate that
approximately 70 to 80 percent of ships are using best management
practices to deter piracy. However, the United States and its
international partners still face challenges urging compliance with
these practices among the remaining 20 to 30 percent of vessels.
Some Progress Has Been Made in Strategic Communication to Counter
Piracy:
In collaboration with the Contact Group, U.S. departments and agencies
involved in strategic communication efforts have made some progress in
implementing actions called for in the Action Plan. The Action Plan
calls for the U.S. government to lead and support a global public
information and diplomatic campaign to highlight the international
cooperation, coordination, and integration undertaken to repress
piracy off the Horn of Africa while emphasizing the destructive
effects of piracy and the rule of law. Agency officials have stated
that the lack of a U.S. presence in Somalia presents challenges to
efforts to communicate directly with the Somali population to
discourage piracy and makes it difficult to measure the effectiveness
of strategic communication efforts.
High-level U.S. government officials have warned of the threat of
piracy in public statements, and the Coast Guard and the Maritime
Administration have actively shared information with members of the
shipping industry to encourage self-protection from attack. For
example, in April 2009 the Secretary of State outlined four steps
State was taking in the aftermath of the hijacking of the MV Maersk
Alabama, primarily diplomatic engagement with international partners
and Somali government officials, and work with the shipping and
insurance industries. Further, the Coast Guard held a series of
roundtable discussions with the shipping industry to address concerns
about ransom payments following the issuance of an April 2010
executive order that prohibits persons under U.S. jurisdiction from
making payments to persons designated under the Order, and State and
the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) officials also told us they
established guidance for and communicated with the shipping industry
after the executive order was issued.
In addition, according to officials, Defense and State lead
interagency meetings held, in part, to gain U.S. consensus on piracy-
related strategic communication issues prior to meetings with
international partners. State officials also reported contributing to
interagency strategic communication efforts of the Contact Group and
have created a publicly available maritime security Web page, which
includes information on piracy.
The Department of Defense has developed a strategic communication
plan, but it is a classified document for internal use. State
officials told us they have drafted a plan to coordinate interagency
strategic communication on counterpiracy efforts, including outreach
to domestic and foreign audiences to inform them about U.S. and
international efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, but
at the time of this report, the draft was still undergoing review by
interagency partners and had not been finalized.
Progress in Disrupting Acts of Piracy Consistent with International
Law and the Rights and Responsibilities of Coastal and Flag States:
Progress Assessment Is Not Applicable for Efforts to Support and
Contribute to a Regionally Based Counter-Piracy Coordination Center:
The United States has not worked to create a Counter-Piracy
Coordination Center as called for in the Action Plan, but a progress
assessment toward this task was considered not applicable given
changing circumstances and the status of other ongoing counterpiracy
efforts since the time of the plan's publication. The Action Plan
calls for the creation of a Counter-Piracy Coordination Center to
establish a single, centralized service to receive reports of piracy
and suspicious vessels, alert maritime interests, gather and analyze
information regarding piracy off the Horn of Africa, provide a secure
common operating picture for stakeholder governments and the shipping
industry, and as appropriate, coordinate the dispatch of available
response assets. However, according to Defense officials, creating
such a center would duplicate existing capabilities provided by
international partners. Subsequent to the publication of the Action
Plan, Defense officials determined that existing efforts were in place
to meet the goals outlined for a coordination center. Three
organizations are currently involved in carrying out the tasks
outlined for a single coordination center, each of which covers the
functions of a Counter-Piracy Coordination Center. The Maritime
Security Centre-Horn of Africa is a coordination center for transiting
ships to voluntarily record their ships' movements and to receive
updated threat information. It also coordinates available response
assets to provide support and protection to mariners. The United
Kingdom's Maritime Trade Operations office in Dubai serves as the
first point of contact for reporting an attack. The Maritime Liaison
Office in Bahrain serves as the link between the commercial maritime
community and U.S. and coalition military forces. Other mechanisms
exist to coordinate stakeholder governments, such as the Contact Group
and its associated working groups, and to coordinate military patrols,
such as the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction meetings.
Some Progress Has Been Made in Seizing and Destroying Pirate Vessels
and Equipment, and Delivering Suspects for Prosecution:
The United States has made progress toward seizing and destroying
pirate vessels and equipment but has had limited progress delivering
suspected pirates for prosecution. The Action Plan calls for the
seizing and destroying of vessels outfitted for piracy and related
equipment, and states the U.S. government may conduct and urge others
to conduct counterpiracy operations in international waters around
Somalia. According to data from the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces,
coalition and other international partners destroyed or confiscated
nearly 100 pirate vessels and confiscated more than 380 weapons,
including small arms and rocket propelled grenades between August 2008
and June 2010. Coalition forces also report that international
partners confiscated approximately 140 items of pirate paraphernalia,
including automatic weapons, grappling hooks, ladders, and global
positioning system devices in that same time period.
According to military officials, interdicting forces determine a
vessel to be potentially used for piracy upon sight, given the
presence of certain gear and weaponry and the absence of typical
fishing gear. Military officials also told us that, once piracy
equipment is seized and destroyed, U.S. forces follow international
protocols and release the vessel and those onboard with sufficient
fuel and provisions to reach shore.[Footnote 58] According to
international military officials, European Union and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization forces also are monitoring pirate bases on shore
from warships, and then seizing and destroying pirate skiffs and
equipment as they leave bases. However, military and international
officials told us that the seizing of pirate paraphernalia provides
only a temporary obstacle to pirate operations.
U.S. efforts to deliver suspected pirates to states for prosecution
are hampered by a lack of states that are willing and able to
prosecute. The Action Plan states the U.S. government will deliver
suspected pirates to states that are willing and able to prosecute in
those cases where pirate vessels are seized or destroyed. As of June
2010, international forces had encountered more than 1,100 suspected
Somali pirates since August 2008 but had delivered only approximately
40 percent to states for prosecution. According to a report issued by
the Department of Defense in May 2010, U.S. military forces have
transferred 24 suspected pirates for prosecution to Kenya, the only
country with which the United States had an arrangement to accept
pirate transfers at the time. According to State and Department of
Justice (Justice) officials, Kenya is only willing to accept cases
with strong evidence, such as cases in which suspects are caught in
the act of committing piracy. According to Combined Maritime Forces
officials, when suspected pirates are interdicted at sea and are not
engaged in an act of piracy, but are in possession of pirate
equipment, interdicting forces typically will detain the suspected
pirates, confiscate their equipment, and then release the suspects.
Additionally, officials stated that because of evidence standards and
the limited options for prosecution, interdicting forces are left with
little choice but to catch and release the suspected pirates.
As of June 2010, approximately 57 percent of the suspects that
international forces encountered were caught and released.
Furthermore, military officials told us there have been cases of
suspects being encountered multiple times at sea, so the practice of
catching and releasing suspects could allow multiple attempts at
piracy. Although Defense officials we spoke with had varied opinions
on whether repeat offenders were a credible issue, since biometric
data--such as fingerprints--are not systematically gathered to track
such cases, U.S. and international forces cannot determine whether
they are finding repeat offenders.
Although, as noted in the Action Plan, piracy is a universal crime
that any state could potentially prosecute, most states, including the
United States, in practice will consider prosecuting suspected pirates
in appropriate cases when it is in their national interest to do so.
However, according to State officials, some countries lack sufficient
domestic law to support prosecution of suspected pirates. Others may
have the domestic legal frameworks, but lack the resources or
political will to take action. State officials also told us that
logistical difficulties exist in prosecuting piracy cases such as
evidence collection and preservation at sea, bringing in merchant
mariners or naval personnel to provide testimony and difficulty
proving intent in cases where suspects were not caught in the act.
Finally, some countries that might otherwise provide a venue for
prosecution may also have concerns that acquitted suspects or
convicted pirates who are released after serving a prison sentence may
seek asylum. Officials from State told us the U.S. government has
prosecuted cases against every suspected pirate captured who attempted
an attack on a U.S. vessel. Currently, a total of 12 suspects from
attacks on the MV Maersk Alabama (April 2009), USS Nicholas (March
2010) and USS Ashland (April 2010) are being tried in the United
States. The U.S. government will approach other affected states for
prosecution in cases interdicted by U.S. forces where there is no
interest for the U.S. government to prosecute. According to officials
at State, preference for prosecution is given to the flag state of a
vessel. State officials also said they are encouraging regional
countries to prosecute.
Substantial Progress Has Been Made to Provide Persistent Interdiction-
Capable Presence:
Since the Action Plan was issued, the U.S. military and Coast Guard
have made substantial progress in providing an interdiction-capable
presence by providing resources to a counterpiracy task force under
the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces, and the U.S. Navy has
contributed to North Atlantic Treaty Organization counterpiracy
operations. According to the Action Plan, the U.S. Navy and Coast
Guard forces operating in the region provide persistent interdiction
through presence, can conduct maritime counterpiracy operations, and
shall coordinate counterpiracy activities with other forces to
prevent, respond to, and disrupt pirate attacks. Since the Combined
Maritime Forces' counterpiracy task force was established in January
2009, the U.S. Navy has provided patrol ships, aircraft, surveillance
assets, medical response units, as well as leadership for the
international naval coalition conducting counter piracy operations in
the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean. According to Defense officials,
from June 2009 to June 2010, the U.S. Navy had an average of four to
five ships present daily in the Horn of Africa, with two or three of
those ships having embarked air assets. Defense officials told us as
many as eight U.S. Navy ships could be present on any given day, with
Navy ships supporting Combined Maritime Forces and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization counterpiracy operations, and other maritime
coalition and U.S. national efforts. For example, U.S. Marine Corps
aviation units have provided support to counterpiracy operations
during transits of the area and the Coast Guard has assigned
deployable specialized forces and a cutter to the combatant commander
to support counterpiracy operations. In addition, the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service also supports maritime counterpiracy operations
by providing special agents afloat to assist boarding teams and lead
immediate investigations into piracy incidents on the high seas.
U.S., international, and industry officials credit the reduction in
the rate of successful pirate attacks from approximately 40 percent in
2008 to 22 percent in 2009, in part, to international patrols in the
Gulf of Aden. The U.S. military also initiated and contributes to
tactical military coordination and information sharing with
international partners through Shared Awareness and Deconfliction
meetings that optimize patrol coverage of the transit corridor in the
Gulf of Aden and aid with coordination of coalition and independently
deployed counterpiracy forces. However, coalition officials
acknowledge U.S. and international forces face challenges in
interdicting pirate incidents as pirates have adapted their tactics
and expanded their area of activity to the much larger and harder-to-
patrol Indian Ocean. Pirates have attacked several vessels more than
1,000 nautical miles from Somalia and now threaten an area of nearly 2
million square nautical miles. Analytic estimates from Defense
officials show that full coverage of the area affected by piracy would
require more than 1,000 ships equipped with helicopters--a level of
support Defense officials say is beyond the means of the world's
navies to provide. With current resources, Combined Maritime Forces
officials estimate 25 to 30 international ships conduct counterpiracy
patrols in the Horn of Africa at any given time. In addition, military
officials noted it is hard to predict how long countries will sustain
counterpiracy investments, since countries participate in Combined
Maritime Forces patrols at will. The Action Plan also states that
effective and prompt consequence-delivery mechanisms are critical to
the success of interdiction efforts. However, challenges related to
judicial capacity and securing prosecution venues may complicate
interdiction efforts.
Some Progress Has Been Made in Supporting Shiprider Programs and Other
Bilateral and Regional Counterpiracy Agreements and Arrangements:
The U.S. government has discussed shiprider programs with several
countries but no counterpiracy shiprider programs have been finalized
for this region. The Action Plan calls for supporting and
participating in the development of shiprider programs and other
bilateral and regional counterpiracy agreements and arrangements.
Shiprider arrangements would allow foreign law enforcement officials
to operate from U.S. naval vessels and facilitate the prosecution of
suspected pirates. For example, shipriders from the country that would
prosecute suspected pirates would be able to arrest the suspects and
collect evidence directly, thereby facilitating the prosecution of the
suspected pirates.
According to officials at State, they determined, in discussion with
Kenyan officials, that a shiprider program would not facilitate
prosecution of suspected pirates in Kenya because Kenyan law requires
suspects to be presented before a magistrate within 24 hours of being
taken into custody by a Kenyan official, including a shiprider. This
requirement would be challenging to meet when suspected pirates are
interdicted far out in the Indian Ocean. A shiprider provision was
therefore not included in the prosecution arrangement facilitating
transfer of suspects between the United States and Kenya for
prosecution. According to officials at State, the Seychelles has a
similar law and therefore a shiprider provision was not included in
its arrangement with the United States. While State and Justice
officials told us there are ongoing discussions regarding arrangements
with other countries, such as Mauritius and the Philippines, the U.S.
government faces challenges in finding willing partners for such
programs. Officials acknowledged that shiprider programs may not be as
beneficial for counterpiracy efforts as the authors of the Action Plan
intended.
The U.S. government also has been involved in the International
Maritime Organization's effort to conclude a regional arrangement,
called the Djibouti Code of Conduct. This arrangement includes
sections that address topics similar to those addressed in the Action
Plan. For example, the code contains provisions related to information
sharing regarding pirate activity, reviews of national legislation
related to piracy, and the provision of assistance between the
signatories. The code also includes a section addressing the
possibility of using shipriders. Coast Guard and State officials were
involved in the development of the code and have also expressed
support for implementing elements of the code.
Little or No Progress Has Been Made to Disrupt and Dismantle Pirate
Bases Ashore:
The U.S. government has not taken any action toward disrupting and
dismantling pirate bases ashore, for a number of reasons including
that the President has not authorized this action, the United States
has other interests in the region that compete for resources, and long-
standing concerns about security hinder the presence of U.S. military
and government officials in Somalia. The Action Plan states that
piracy at sea can be abated only if pirate bases ashore are disrupted
or dismantled. Additionally, the plan states that the appropriate
authority to disrupt and dismantle pirate bases ashore has been
obtained from the United Nations Security Council and Somali
authorities, and states that the United States will work with
concerned governments and international organizations to disrupt and
dismantle pirate bases to the fullest extent permitted by national
law. However, as of April 2010, such action had not been authorized by
the President. In addition, Somalia has lacked a functioning central
government since 1991. Further, the United States closed its embassy
in Mogadishu in 1991, and there is currently no official U.S. military
or civilian presence in that country. While the international
community, including the United States, continues to provide
humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia, challenges have
limited efforts to establishing peace, security, stability, and an
effective and functioning government. According to officials at State
and Defense, U.S. agencies allow travel to Somalia; however, general
practice has severely limited the U.S. presence in Somalia since 1994.
Furthermore, State officials told us that there has been no recent
travel to Somalia other than a short trip by a senior official made in
February 2008. Defense and State officials said that the United States
has a number of other higher priority interests in Somalia and in the
region, which compete for military and civilian resources and that may
ultimately affect counterpiracy decisions.
Some Progress Has Been Made toward Disrupting Pirate Revenue:
While Treasury, State, and Justice have each taken steps to achieve
some progress toward disrupting pirate revenue, challenges inhibit
further implementation of this task. The Action Plan states that the
U.S. government will coordinate with all stakeholders to deprive
pirates and their supporters of any illicit revenue and the fruits of
their crime, advocating the development of national capabilities to
gather, assess and share financial intelligence on pirate financial
operations, with the goal of tracing payments to and apprehending the
leaders of pirate organizations and their enablers. Treasury served as
the lead agency for implementing an executive order signed by the
President in April 2010 that blocks all property or interests in
property within U.S. jurisdiction of any persons that are listed in
the order and allows for designation of other persons that threaten
the peace, security, or stability of Somalia, including those who
support or engage in acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia. However,
Treasury officials told us the order applies only to assets that pass
through U.S. financial institutions or come into the possession or
control of persons in the United States or U.S. citizens or permanent
residents, which limits the potential effect of the executive order on
piracy revenue. As a result, it is not clear the extent to which
designating pirates in the executive order will achieve the goal of
disrupting pirate revenue.
While officials told us the U.S. government has reserved the right to
take enforcement action against private companies for paying ransoms
to individuals designated in the executive order, only two pirates
have been designated thus far. Representatives of the shipping
industry have stated that ship owners have no viable option for
rescuing crews being held hostage other than to pay ransoms, and they
fear that a failure to pay ransoms could escalate pirates' violence
against crew members. State and Treasury officials told us they have
communicated to shipping industry representatives that Treasury and
Justice have discretion to decide whether or not to take enforcement
action for any violation of the order, and that a decision to take
enforcement actions will depend on the facts of each case.
Treasury officials told us their efforts to disrupt pirate revenue
also have been limited by the lack of sufficient information on pirate
networks in Somalia and on the flows of pirate finances, including
ransom payments. According to officials at State, the U.S.
intelligence community has the strongest understanding of pirate
financing, but no U.S. agencies have dedicated resources toward the
issue. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and State officials told
us that information related to pirate organizations may be collected
in the course of pursuing other U.S. interests in the area, but piracy
is not among their top priorities and is unlikely to be assigned
resources. As a result, according to FBI officials, the FBI Organized
Crime Section is not working to build a case against pirate leaders
and enablers. State officials described the need to better use
intelligence to target efforts by the U.S. government and other
stakeholders, but also acknowledged that the poor security situation
in Somalia poses challenges for gathering the intelligence needed to
disrupt pirate financing. Ultimately, officials from multiple agencies
told us U.S. agencies face resource constraints in disrupting pirate
financing given higher-priority concerns such as counterterrorism.
In addition, the absence of a formal financial sector in Somalia is a
major challenge to filling intelligence gaps. Treasury officials
stated that the lack of a formal financial sector in Somalia and the
pirates' reliance on informal financial systems presents a challenge
because many of the tools they normally would use to track financial
activity are implemented through formalized financial systems.
State has taken several actions to raise the issue of pirate financing
among international partners and to address misconceptions within the
shipping industry about the U.S. position on ransoms. The U.S.
government has helped elevate the issue of pirate financing within the
Contact Group, including releasing a paper to participants. State and
Justice also have worked with partner governments and international
organizations, such as Interpol and the United Nations, to develop
collaborative events linking experts on pirate financing, and
sponsored a workshop in Kenya with the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime that covered money laundering and organized crime.
Progress to Ensure That Those Who Commit Acts of Piracy Are Held
Accountable for Their Actions by Facilitating the Prosecution of
Suspected Pirates by Flag, Victim, and Coastal States, and, in
Appropriate Cases, the United States:
Some Progress Has Been Made toward Concluding Arrangements to
Formalize Custody and Prosecution:
The U.S. government has made some progress in concluding prosecution
arrangements for Somali piracy cases, by securing prosecution
arrangements with Kenya and the Seychelles, and is working toward
similar arrangements with other countries. The Action Plan calls for
the U.S. government to conclude agreements and arrangements to
formalize custody and prosecution arrangements both in and outside the
region. In January 2009, the U.S. government formalized an arrangement
with Kenya to facilitate transfers of piracy cases from U.S. forces.
The United States has transferred 24 suspected pirates to Kenya for
prosecution, and Defense officials told us one conviction has been
secured thus far. In July 2010, the U.S. government also concluded an
arrangement with the Seychelles for transfers of piracy cases from
U.S. forces. In addition, State officials said that discussions are
ongoing with countries that have a regional or commercial interest in
countering piracy, such as Mauritius, the Philippines, and Tanzania,
and it is taking steps to conclude further arrangements. As of May
2010, according to agency officials, State had encouraged 17 countries
to consider prosecution of suspected pirates. However, State officials
told us that the lack of prosecution venues is a primary challenge to
prosecuting pirates, which may undermine interdiction efforts.
According to State and Justice officials, challenges to establishing
prosecution arrangements include limited regional capacity and
interest of states outside the region to prosecute suspected pirates.
In addition the relatively low rate of prosecutions contributes to the
perception that pirates operate with relative impunity. As of June
2010, international forces had encountered more than 1,100 suspected
Somali pirates since August 2008 but had delivered only approximately
40 percent to states for prosecution. Although Kenya announced its
intent to withdraw from its arrangement with the United States in
April 2010, that decision was later reversed, and more than 100 piracy
cases were being processed through the Kenyan criminal justice system
as of June 2010.
Some Progress Has Been Made to Support and Encourage the Exercise of
Jurisdiction under the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts:
The United States has made some progress in using the United Nations
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation[Footnote 59] to exercise jurisdiction to prosecute
suspected pirates, but this effort involves several challenges. The
Action Plan calls for the United States to use--and encourage other
countries to use--appropriate jurisdiction of flag, port, and coastal
states, as well as states of the nationality of victims and
perpetrators of piracy, through the prosecution of any persons having
committed an act of piracy, and states that the United States will
urge other states party to the convention to use it as a vehicle for
the prosecution of acts violating the convention. For example, the
United States has exercised jurisdiction under the convention to
prosecute one pirate in the United States. U.S. officials told us that
State, Justice, Defense, and the Coast Guard have been involved in
efforts, through the Contact Group and the International Maritime
Organization, to encourage use of the Convention to prosecute
suspects. However, U.S. agency officials cited hurdles to prosecuting
pirates, such as limits to affected countries' willingness and
capacity to prosecute pirates, and difficulties associated with
collecting evidence in the maritime environment.
Some Progress Has Been Made to Support and Encourage the Use of Other
Applicable International Conventions and Customary International Law:
The United States has taken some steps to support and encourage the
use of other applicable international conventions and customary
international law as they relate to prosecuting piracy. The Action
Plan calls for the U.S. government to support and encourage the use of
relevant and appropriate jurisdiction through the framework of
applicable international conventions, in addition to the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, such as the 1979 Hostage Taking Convention, the 2000
Transnational Organized Crime Convention, and the 1999 Terrorist
Financing Convention, and customary international law. For example,
the U.S. government has exercised jurisdiction over 11 suspected
pirates who attempted attacks on the USS Nicholas in March 2010 and
the USS Ashland in April 2010.
The Action Plan also anticipates ongoing discussion with other states
on the possibility of an international court to prosecute suspected
pirates, if necessary. However, the U.S. government does not support
creation of a dedicated piracy court because of the amount of time,
resources, and infrastructure that would be required. State officials
said that the U.S. government is interested in solutions for
challenges to prosecution, including the possibility of a hybrid court
combining a piracy chamber within a national system. However, they
said despite interest expressed by members of the Contact Group and
other nations, no countries have offered their prosecutors or
territories for use in establishing a dedicated international court.
Some Progress Has Been Made toward Enhancing Regional States'
Capabilities to Accept Suspected Pirates for Prosecution, Extradition,
and Incarceration:
The Departments of Justice and State have achieved some progress in
providing assistance to several regional countries, and the United
States is contributing to international efforts to develop regional
judicial capacity. The Action Plan calls for the United States to work
with interested parties to identify the nature and scope of
international assistance needed to enhance the capacities of regional
states in connection with the arrest, detention, prosecution, and fair
trial of persons accused of involvement in piracy, and to pursue
bilateral programs to provide judicial capacity-building efforts.
State has created an assessment tool to identify gaps in regional
states' maritime capabilities including judicial issues. The U.S.
government provides support to regional partners for building judicial
capacity. For example, the resident legal advisor at the U.S. Embassy
in Nairobi has provided assistance to Kenya, Tanzania, and the
Seychelles. This advisor, a position within Justice's Office of
Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training but
supported by State, told us he provided assistance in developing
piracy cases, and helped develop guidance for U.S. forces on evidence
collection and transferring piracy cases to Kenya. Naval Criminal
Investigative Service special agents have testified in Kenyan courts,
and provided counter-piracy training and operational support to
officials in the Seychelles. In addition, the U.S. government, in
conjunction with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, has
sponsored conferences focused on piracy for law enforcement and judges
from countries in the Horn of Africa region.
Further, the United States has contributed $250,000 to the United
Nations counterpiracy effort for regional capacity-building. In April
2010, the Contact Group board that administers a trust fund for
prosecution issues, which includes the United States, approved $2.1
million for five projects primarily to support the prosecution of
suspected pirates in Somalia and the Seychelles. However, Justice and
State officials told us that regional states continue to have a
limited capacity to prosecute suspected pirates and incarcerate
convicted pirates. Although State officials said that they were
attempting to include a funding request for future operations, in the
current budget cycle, counterpiracy operations at State have no
dedicated budget.
[End of section]
Appendix III International and Shipping-Industry Partners Involved in
Counterpiracy Efforts:
Table 2: International Partners Involved in Counterpiracy Efforts:
Country: Australia;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Combined Task Force 151.
Country: Austria;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
Country: Bahamas;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
New York Declaration signatories[A].
Country: Bahrain;
Combined Task Force 151.
Country: Belgium;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta.
Country: Canada;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
Country: China;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Independent deployers.
Country: Comoros;
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B].
Country: Cyprus;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
New York Declaration signatories[A];
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta.
Country: Czech Republic;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
Country: Denmark;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Combined Task Force 151.
Country: Djibouti;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B].
Country: Egypt;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B].
Country: Ethiopia;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B].
Country: Finland;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta.
Country: France;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta;
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates.
Country: Germany;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield;
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta.
Country: Greece;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield;
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta.
Country: India;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Independent deployers.
Country: Indonesia;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
Country: Iran;
Independent deployers.
Country: Ireland;
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta.
Country: Italy;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield;
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta.
Country: Japan;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
New York Declaration signatories[A];
Independent deployers.
Country: Jordan;
Combined Task Force 151.
Country: Kenya;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B];
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates.
Country: Republic of Korea;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
New York Declaration signatories[A];
Combined Task Force 151.
Country: Liberia;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
New York Declaration signatories[A].
Country: Lithuania;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
Country: Luxembourg;
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta.
Country: Madagascar;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B].
Country: Malaysia;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Independent deployers.
Country: Maldives;
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B];
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates.
Country: Malta;
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta.
Country: Marshall Islands;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
New York Declaration signatories[A].
Country: Mauritius;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
Country: Mexico;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
Country: Morocco;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
Country: Netherlands;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield;
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta;
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates.
Country: Nigeria;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
Country: Norway;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta.
Country: Oman;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
Country: Pakistan;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Combined Task Force 151.
Country: Panama;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
New York Declaration signatories[A].
Country: Portugal;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
Country: Russia;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Independent deployers.
Country: Saudi Arabia;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B];
Independent deployers.
Country: Seychelles;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B];
Independent deployers;
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates.
Country: Singapore;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
New York Declaration signatories[A];
Combined Task Force 151.
Country: Somalia TFG;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B];
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates.
Country: Spain;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield;
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta.
Country: Sudan;
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B].
Country: Sweden;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta.
Country: Tanzania;
New York Declaration signatories[A];
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B].
Country: Thailand;
Combined Task Force 151.
Country: Turkey;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Combined Task Force 151;
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield.
Country: Ukraine;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
Country: United Arab Emirates;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
Country: United Kingdom;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
New York Declaration signatories[A];
Combined Task Force 151;
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield;
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta.
Country: United States;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
New York Declaration signatories[A];
Combined Task Force 151;
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield;
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates.
Country: Yemen;
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia;
Djibouti Code of Conduct signatories[B];
Independent deployers;
Countries prosecuting suspected pirates.
Source: GAO.
[A] Other countries occasionally contribute to Standing North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Maritime Group 2, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization group implementing Operation Ocean Shield.
[B] The Djibouti Code of Conduct is open for signature by the 21
countries in the region. As of March 2010, 13 countries had signed the
Code of Conduct.
[End of table]
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia:
In January 2009, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
(Contact Group) was formed in response to United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1851 to facilitate discussion and coordination of
actions among countries and organizations working to suppress piracy
off the coast of Somalia. The participating countries established four
working groups in which all Contact Group parties may participate.
Working Group 1 addresses activities related to military and
operational coordination and information sharing and the establishment
of the regional coordination center, and is chaired by the United
Kingdom with the support of the International Maritime Organization.
Denmark chairs Working Group 2, which addresses judicial aspects of
piracy with the support of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
The United States chairs Working Group 3 to strengthen shipping self-
awareness and other capabilities, with the support of the
International Maritime Organization. Egypt chairs Working Group 4
which focuses on improving diplomatic and public-information efforts
on all aspects of piracy. As of June 2010, 49 countries, 7
international organizations, and 3 industry observers participate in
the Contact Group.
New York Declaration:
First open for signature in May 2009, the New York Declaration is a
commitment by countries to promulgate the internationally recognized
best management practices for self-protection to vessels on their
registry and ensure that vessels on their registry have adopted and
documented appropriate self-protection measures. As of July 2010, 10
countries had signed the declaration.
Djibouti Code of Conduct:
The Djibouti Code of Conduct recognizes the problem of piracy and
armed robbery against ships in the Horn of Africa region. Signatories
declare their intention to cooperate to the fullest extent possible,
consistent with their available resources and related priorities,
their respective national laws and regulations, and international law
in the repression of piracy and armed robbery against ships. Among
other things, under the Djibouti Code of Conduct, participants should
set up national focal points to facilitate coordinated, timely, and
effective flow of information about piracy and armed robbery against
ships. Additionally, according to the Djibouti Code of Conduct, each
participant intends to review its national legislation to ensure its
has laws in place to criminalize piracy and armed robbery against
ships and adequate provisions for the exercise of jurisdiction,
conduct of investigations, and prosecution of alleged offenders. The
code is open for signature by the 21 countries in the region and, as
of March 2010, 13 of the 21 countries had signed.
Combined Maritime Forces and Combined Task Force 151:
Under the leadership of the commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Central
Command and U.S. 5th Fleet, the Combined Maritime Forces is a 25-
nation coalition that is focused on countering terrorism, preventing
piracy, reducing illegal trafficking of people and drugs, and
promoting safety of the maritime environment. Established in 2002, the
Combined Maritime Forces patrol more than 2.5 million square miles of
international waters to conduct both integrated and coordinated
operations. Additionally, the Combined Maritime Forces conducts
maritime security operations in the Arabian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of
Oman, and parts of the Indian Ocean. This expanse includes three
critical points in high-risk waters at the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez
Canal, and the Strait of Bab al Mandeb at the southern tip of Yemen.
In January 2009, the Combined Maritime Forces established Combined
Task Force 151 with the sole mission of conducting counterpiracy
operations in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast in
the Indian Ocean. This is a multinational naval task force made up of
countries willing and able to participate in counterpiracy operations.
So far, 11 countries have contributed forces to Combined Task Force
151 and several others that have agreed to send ships or aircraft or
both to participate in counterpiracy operations.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization--Operation Ocean Shield:
Operation Ocean Shield is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's
contribution to international efforts to combat piracy off the Horn of
Africa. This operation builds on the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's previous counterpiracy operations which began in late
2008 when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization began providing
escorts to United Nations World Food Programme vessels transiting the
high-risk waters off the Horn of Africa. The North Atlantic Council
approved Operation Ocean Shield in August 2009. This operation focuses
on at-sea counterpiracy operations, support to the maritime community
to take actions to reduce incidents of piracy, as well as regional-
state counterpiracy capacity building. This operation is designed to
complement the efforts of existing international organizations and
forces operating in the area. This operation is being implemented by
the Standing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Maritime Group 2
made up of vessels from eight different member countries that
routinely contribute to the group and other countries that
occasionally contribute.
European Union Naval Force Somalia--Operation Atalanta:
The European Union is conducting Operation Atalanta to help deter,
prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of
Somalia. This operation began in late 2008 following the adoption of
Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838, and 1846 by the United Nations Security
Council. The operation's objectives are to protect vessels of the
World Food Programme, humanitarian aid, and African Union Military
Mission in Somalia shipping; help deter, prevent, and repress acts of
piracy and armed robbery; protect vulnerable shipping; and monitor
fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. This operation is being
implemented by 14 countries with operational support provided by a
team at the Northwood Operation Headquarters. Operation Atalanta has
been extended by the European Council until December 2012.
Independent Deployers:
Independent deployers are countries that are not part of the coalition
forces. These countries deploy naval forces to the region under
national auspices to escort their ships through high-risk waters and
to monitor counterpiracy operations, and may coordinate with coalition
patrols.
Countries Prosecuting Suspected Pirates:
Although the Action Plan considers piracy to be a universal crime that
any country can prosecute, in practice, most countries, including the
United States, will consider prosecuting suspected pirates in
appropriate cases when it is in their national interest to do so. A
single piratical attack often affects the interests of numerous
countries, including the country in which the vessel is flagged, the
various countries of nationality of the seafarers taken hostage,
regional coastal countries, the country of the vessel or cargo owner,
and transshipment and destination countries.
Shipping-Industry Partners:
Various organizations representing interests of the shipping industry
have been involved in efforts to prevent or respond to piracy off the
Horn of Africa. For example, the 12 shipping industry organizations
actively involved in the development of the "Best Management Practices
to Deter Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia"
represent the interests of ship owners, seafarers, marine insurance
companies, and others, and included: the International Association of
Independent Tanker Owners, International Chamber of Shipping, Oil
Companies International Marine Forum, Baltic and International
Maritime Council, Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal
Operators, International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners,
International Group of Protection and Indemnity Clubs, Cruise Lines
International Association, International Union of Marine Insurers,
Joint War Committee & Joint Hull Committee, International Maritime
Bureau, and International Transport Workers Federation.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of
Somalia, January 2007 to June 2010:
Pirates have expanded their area of operations with an increasing
number of attacks occurring in the Indian Ocean, an area much larger
than the Gulf of Aden. Defense officials report that pirates now
threaten an area of nearly 2 million square nautical miles in the
Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden. Figure 11 shows the number and location
of pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa reported to the International
Maritime Bureau in 2007, 2008, 2009, and the first half of 2010.
Figure 11: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of
Somalia, January 2007 to June 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: 4 maps]
Map indicate the location in the Indian Ocean of attacks during the
years 2007-2010.
Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data (data); Map
Resources (map).
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Office Of The Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict & Interdependent
Capabilities:
2500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2500:
September 9, 2010:
Mr. John Pendleton:
Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Pendleton:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report GAO-10-856, "Maritime
Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance
Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the
Horn of Africa," dated September 2010.
We noted in our technical comments several areas whereby the
significant contributions of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service
(NCIS) to our counter-piracy efforts could be depicted more
accurately. The Department does not agree that using percent of seized
suspected pirates who were delivered for prosecution is an appropriate
measure of program success. The metric does not take into account that
fact that it is up to individual countries within the coalition to
determine the validity of the evidence to determine whether to
prosecute. Additionally, it should be noted that U.S. Special
Operations Command does not conduct counter-piracy operations.
Your consideration of these comments is appreciated.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
William F. Wechsler:
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense:
Counternarcotics and Global Threats:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov:
Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director;
Patricia Lentini, Assistant Director; Elizabeth Curda; Susan Ditto;
Nicole Harms; Barbara Hills; Brandon L. Hunt; Farhanaz Kermalli;
Eileen Larence; Tom Melito; Tobin McMurdie; John Mingus; Susan Offutt;
Terry Richardson; Mike Rohrback; Leslie Sarapu; Amie Steele; Gabriele
Tonsil; Suzanne Wren; and Loren Yager made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Anti-Money Laundering: Better Communication Could Enhance the Support
FinCEN Provides to Law Enforcement. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-622T]. Washington, D.C.: April 28,
2010.
Coast Guard: Deployable Operations Group Achieving Organizational
Benefits, but Challenges Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-433R]. Washington, D.C.: April 7,
2010.
Anti-Money Laundering: Improved Communication Could Enhance the
Support FinCEN Provides to Law Enforcement. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-141]. Washington, D.C.: December
14, 2009.
Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of
National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and
Information Sharing. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP]. Washington, D.C.: September
25, 2009.
Combating Illicit Financing: Treasury's Office of Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence Could Manage More Effectively to Achieve Its
Mission. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-794].
Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2009.
Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information,
but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-337]. Washington, D.C.: March 17,
2009.
Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were
Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-672]. Washington, D.C.: June 20,
2008.
Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International
Stabilization, Humanitarian, and Development Efforts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-351]. Washington, D.C.: February
19, 2008.
Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in
Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity
Tankers. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-141].
Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007.
Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on
a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-316]. Washington, D.C.:
February 22, 2007.
Maritime Security: Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-933T]. Washington,
D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Terrorist Financing: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Deliver Counter-
Terrorism-Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-632T]. Washington,
D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. Washington, D.C.: October 21,
2005.
Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration: Maritime
Security Program. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-
123R]. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 2005.
Maritime Security Fleet: Many Factors Determine Impact of Potential
Limits on Food Aid Shipments. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1065]. Washington, D.C.: September
13, 2004.
Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies Face Continuing Challenges in
Addressing Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-501T]. Washington, D.C.: March 4,
2004.
Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess
Terrorists' Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-163]. Washington, D.C.: November
14, 2003.
Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime
Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-1155T]. Washington, D.C.: September
9, 2003.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] According to the International Maritime Bureau, pirate attacks in
the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, and off the
coast of Oman have been attributed to Somali pirates.
[2] For example, Resolution 1816 authorized governments to enter the
territorial waters of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of
piracy and armed robbery at sea, but only with authorization from the
Somali Transitional Federal Government. S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1816 (June 2, 2008).
[3] S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008).
[4] The White House NSC is the principal forum used by the President
of the United States for considering national security and foreign
policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet
officials and is part of the Executive Office of the President of the
United States. The function of the Council is to advise and assist the
president on national security and foreign policies. The Council also
serves as the president's principal arm for coordinating these
policies among various government agencies. On May 26, 2009, President
Obama merged the White House staff supporting the Homeland Security
Council (HSC) and the National Security Council into one National
Security Staff (NSS). The HSC and NSC each continue to exist by
statute as bodies supporting the president.
[5] In the context of this report, the term "states" refers to nations
or countries involved in counterpiracy efforts.
[6] GAO, Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address
Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy
Commodity Tankers, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-141]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007).
[7] GAO, Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International
Stabilization, Humanitarian, and Development Efforts,[hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-351] (Washington, D.C.: Feb.19,
2008).
[8] GAO, Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans
Were Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-672] (Washington, D.C.: June 20,
2008).
[9] GAO, Combating Illicit Financing: Treasury's Office of Terrorism
and Financial Intelligence Could Manage More Effectively to Achieve
Its Mission, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-794]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2009).
[10] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce,
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2009).
[11] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP].
[13] The Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
84 U.N.T.S. 11, which has been ratified by the United States,
attempted to codify the rules of international law relating to the
high seas and contains provisions determined to be generally
declaratory of established principles of international law by the
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. The United States has
not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. Both conventions define piracy as any of
the following acts: (1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any
act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (a)
on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons
or property onboard such ship or aircraft; (b) against a ship,
aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of
any State; (2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of
a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate
ship or aircraft; (3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally
facilitating an act described in subparagraph 1 or subparagraph 2.
[14] The flag state is the country in which the vessel is registered.
In general, flag states have the authority to enforce their own as
well as international regulations, such as those relating to security
standards, with respect to such vessels. Most ships are not registered
under the same flag as the nationality of the owner. As of 2008 only
422 of the 1154 U.S.-owned commercial ships were registered in the
United States with the remaining 732, or 63 percent, registered in
other countries. Panama and Liberia have the two largest registries
and together register 23.5 percent of commercial vessels worldwide.
Panama has 6,323 ships registered, 85 percent of which are foreign-
owned; Liberia has 2,204 ships registered, 96 percent of which are
foreign-owned. Coastal states are countries with a sea coast. Some
regional coastal states include Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Yemen.
[15] According to the World Shipping Council, more than 7 percent of
the world's total ocean trade transited the Suez Canal in 2007. The
alternative to using the Suez Canal is to travel an additional 4,900
nautical miles around the African continent.
[16] S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008). The
authorities provided by that resolution were renewed in 2009 with the
adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1897, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009).
[17] According to the declaration, the signatory countries will
ensure, when carrying out their obligations under the International
Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code that vessels on their
registry have adopted and documented appropriate self-protection
measures in their ship security plans. The ISPS is a part of the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 32 U.S.T. 47,
T.I.A.S. No. 9700. See appendix III for complete listing of countries
that have signed the New York Declaration.
[18] In April 2009, Somali pirates seized the MV Maersk Alabama
approximately 250 nautical miles southeast of the Somali town of Eyl.
The pirates held the captain hostage for five days. U.S. naval forces
rescued the captain, killing three suspected pirates and taking one
into custody. In March 2010 pirates attacked the USS Nicholas while it
was operating west of the Seychelles in international waters. The USS
Nicholas captured five suspected pirates after exchanging fire,
sinking a skiff, and confiscating a suspected mother ship. In April
2010 pirates fired upon the USS Ashland about 330 nautical miles off
the coast of Djibouti. The USS Ashland captured six suspected pirates
after exchanging fire and sinking their skiff. The United States also
has brought charges related to the November 2008 attack on the Danish-
owned MV CEC Future that was carrying cargo belonging to a U.S.
company against one of the suspected pirates involved in the attack on
the USS Ashland.
[19] A dhow is a type of vessel used for coastal trading off the Horn
of Africa.
[20] Although Kenya announced its intent to withdraw from its
arrangement with the United States in April 2010, that decision was
later reversed. The United States formalized its arrangement with the
Seychelles in July 2010.
[21] As of June 2010, 49 countries, 7 international organizations, and
3 industry observers were participating in the Contact Group on Piracy
off the Coast of Somalia. For a list of participating countries, see
appendix III.
[22] The Coast Guard and Maritime Administration facilitated an
industry-led effort to develop measures to protect ships from pirate
attack, first published as "Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy
in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia" in 2009 and most
recently updated in June 2010. According to Coast Guard and shipping
industry officials, registering a vessel's transit through the region
with the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa provides an
indication of whether the vessel owner or operator is likely to be
following other best management practices. Additional information on
U.S. agency efforts to help prevent acts of piracy can be found in
appendix II.
[23] The Coast Guard reports that, at any given time, there are about
six to eight U.S.-flagged vessels operating in the region. More
information about Coast Guard's regulations and guidance regarding
piracy is provided in appendix II.
[24] Executive Order 13536, Blocking Property of Certain Persons
Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia (Apr. 12, 2010), blocks all
property and property interests within U.S. jurisdiction of persons
listed in the Annex to the Order, including two individuals determined
to be principal organizers and financiers of pirate activities. The
order provides authority for the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, to designate other persons
determined to have engaged in acts that threaten the peace, security,
or stability of Somalia, including those who support or engage in acts
of piracy.
[25] Representatives of the shipping industry have raised concerns
that the executive order could be used to block ransom payments to
secure the release of captive crews, and the U.S. government has
engaged with the shipping industry to address their concerns and
questions regarding the executive order. See appendix II for
additional information on Executive Order 13536.
[26] International Maritime Organization, Code of Conduct Concerning
the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the
Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, IMO Doc. C 102/14, Annex at
5 (Apr. 3, 2009). This is generally referred to as the Djibouti Code
of Conduct.
[27] See appendix III for more information about the Djibouti Code of
Conduct.
[28] The shipping industry is encouraged to share vessel transit
information through the Horn of Africa with naval organizations.
Specifically, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations is the
first point of contact for ships in the region and provides the daily
interface between vessel captains and naval forces. The Maritime
Security Centre-Horn of Africa is the planning and coordination
authority for European Union forces in the Gulf of Aden and Somali
Basin. The Maritime Liaison Office exchanges information between the
Combined Maritime Forces and industry within the region.
[29] The United States used the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation while
prosecuting Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse. As of June 25, 2010, Muse pled
guilty to charges associated with an April 2009 pirate attack on the
U.S.-flagged MV Maersk Alabama, a commercial container vessel, and
sentencing is scheduled for October 2010.
[30] Since the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation does not apply to attacks on
warships, the United States is using other authorities to exercise
jurisdiction and prosecute 11 suspected pirates for attacks on the USS
Nicholas and USS Ashland.
[31] For example, in March 2010, pirates hijacked a bulk carrier about
1,350 nautical miles east of Somalia, taking 21 crew members hostage.
In May 2010, pirates hijacked a fishing vessel about 1,350 nautical
miles east of Somalia, taking 28 crew members hostage.
[32] According to officials from Lloyds Market Association, the
vessels owner typically negotiates and pays the ransom to the pirates
and then declares a "general average." General average is the
principle of equity in which all parties in a sea adventure (ship,
cargo, and freight) proportionately share losses resulting from a
voluntary and successful sacrifice of part of the ship or cargo to
save the whole adventure from an impending peril, or extraordinary
expenses necessarily incurred for the joint benefit of ship and cargo.
A general average adjuster determines which entities had a share in
the voyage and their proportional interest. The insurance companies
that cover the ship, crew and cargo reimburse the owner for their
share of the cost. If the parties had kidnap and ransom coverage, the
cost of delivery and ransom may be covered by the kidnap and ransom
insurer.
[33] This figure does not reflect a number of other costs including,
but not limited to life-cycle costs for the applicable ships and
aircraft, as well as lost opportunity costs for other maritime
security missions. We did not independently verify the data that
support Defense's $64 million estimate.
[34] Congressional Research Service, Ocean Piracy and Its Impact on
Insurance, R40081, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 6 2009).
[35] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[36] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[37] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004).
[38] GAO, Agency Performance Plans: Examples of Practices That Can
Improve Usefulness to Decisionmakers, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69] (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 26, 1999) and GAO-06-15.
[39] The document provides guidance including actions to take before
transiting the region, such as installing razor wire and planning for
additional watch duty, and actions to take in the event of a pirate
attack, such as reporting to authorities and using evasive maneuvers.
"Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
and in the Arabian Sea Area," version 3, June 2010, [hyperlink,
http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Piracy_Best_Management_Practices_3.pd
f] (downloaded July 13, 2010).
[40] According to Maritime Administration officials and shipping
industry representatives, challenges remain that have made it
difficult to for U.S.-vessels to transit the area with security teams
carrying weapons onboard, including restrictions in national or port-
state laws in the region.
[41] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP].
[42] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP].
[43] The Maritime Operational Threat Response is an interagency
process used during maritime security incidents. The response is
coordinated by a newly established Global Maritime Operational Threat
Response Coordination Cell, an Department of Homeland Security office
located at the U.S. Coast Guard headquarters, and follows documented
protocols that, among other things, provide guidance on conducting
coordination activities.
[44] According to a facilitator of the process, under normal
circumstances, Coast Guard officials liaise with industry
representatives during an incident and the Maritime Operational Threat
Response meetings are restricted to U.S. government officials. Due to
the unique circumstances of the Alabama incident, Maersk
representatives were allowed to participate in some of the meetings.
[45] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[46] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP].
[47] During the course of our review, we made several requests to meet
with staff from the NSC to discuss the Action Plan and its
implementation but they did not respond to our requests.
[48] See below for a complete listing of agencies and partners we
obtained information from during our review.
[49] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[50] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce,
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2009).
[51] These include the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security,
Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury, and the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence as well as component agencies
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Coast Guard, and
National Maritime Intelligence Center.
[52] We provided an assessment of "substantial progress" for cases
where all components under a task specified by the NSC were
implemented; "some progress" for cases where components were at least
partially implemented or agencies demonstrated effort had been made
toward implementation; and "little or no progress" where there was
minimal or no result or effort made toward implementing any components
of that specific task.
[53] See appendix III for international partners contributing to
counterpiracy operations.
[54] The Coast Guard issued a third revision of Maritime Security
Directive 104-6 in May 2010.
[55] As of June 2010, the Coast Guard had issued eight Port Security
Advisories related to piracy, and the Maritime Administration had
issued four maritime security advisories on this topic.
[56] Port Security Advisories 4-09 and 8-09 provide information to
those ship owners who choose or may be required to use armed security
teams to protect vessels transiting high-risk waters off the Horn of
Africa. While the Coast Guard requires that U.S.-flagged vessels
transiting the Horn of Africa have a security team onboard, the
decision about whether the security team will be armed is left to the
ship owner. Many members of the shipping industry have raised concerns
about having weapons onboard commercial vessels. While there is no
consensus about whether or not to arm security teams, the United
States has worked with partners to facilitate the arming of vessels
when owners have chosen this approach as part of their security plan,
but challenges remain.
[57] The ISPS is a part of the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea, 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No. 9700.
[58] IMO, Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and
Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf
of Aden, IMO Doc. C 102/14, Annex at 5 (Apr. 3, 2009).
[59] Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1678 U.N.T.S. 221 (Mar. 10, 1988).
[End of section]
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