Foreign Operations
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight Gao ID: GAO-11-419T March 3, 2011The Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) implement a broad range of U.S. government activities and programs overseas, including the conduct of diplomacy, development and security assistance, and efforts to combat terrorism and narcotics trafficking, among others. The President has requested approximately $55.7 billion for State and USAID in fiscal year 2012, an increase of nearly 8 percent over fiscal year 2010 funding levels. This testimony discusses four cross-cutting areas of U.S. foreign policy as implemented by State and USAID: (1) investments in key partner nations, (2) building the capacity of U.S. agencies to advance foreign policy priorities, (3) contractor oversight and accountability, and (4) strategic planning and performance measurement. This statement is based on GAO's extensive body of work on foreign operations issues, including fieldwork in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico, and numerous other locations .
Since 2002, the United States has invested over $130 billion in security, economic, and governance assistance to Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Although the administration has requested additional funding in fiscal year 2012 to assist Iraq's security forces, opportunities exist for cost-sharing given the Iraqi government's continuing budget surpluses and unexpended security budgets. Regarding Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States has placed an increased focus on providing funding directly to the Afghan government and Pakistani organizations. This course of action involves considerable risk given the limited capacity of some prospective recipients--particularly the Afghan government--to manage and implement U.S.-funded programs, thereby highlighting the need for agency controls and safeguards over these funds. According to the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, State and USAID are engaged in efforts to build and support a workforce that is well-matched to the foreign affairs challenges of the twenty-first century. Accomplishing this objective is critical given that GAO's work has consistently found limitations in the ability of State and USAID to ensure that they are deploying the right people to the right places at the right time. For example, State has faced persistent staffing and foreign language gaps that put the department's diplomatic readiness at risk. Similarly, GAO found that State has experienced difficulties hiring and training staff to operate and maintain its new, more sophisticated embassy compounds. State has taken some actions in response to GAO's findings. For example, in 2010, the department introduced a new pilot program to expand its cadre of Chinese speakers. State also noted in 2010 that it planned to hire additional facilities managers at embassies and consulates. State and USAID rely extensively on contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan to support their direct-hire personnel, implement reconstruction efforts, and address workforce shortfalls such as insufficient numbers of trained agency personnel and the frequent rotations of staff posted to these countries. Robust management and oversight of contractor operations are essential in these challenging environments. However, GAO has found oversight to be inadequate at times, thus raising questions about the agencies' ability to ensure accountability for multibillion-dollar investments. GAO's reviews of international affairs programs have repeatedly found weaknesses in agencies' strategic planning and performance measurement efforts. For example, GAO reported that State significantly expanded its Bureau of Diplomatic Security without the benefit of strategic planning to ensure that the bureau's missions and activities address the department's priority needs. Such a review is vital given that the bureau will assume full responsibility for securing all diplomatic personnel and facilities in Iraq starting in October 2011 as the U.S. military completes its drawdown. GAO also reported that State generally lacked outcome-based measures for the M?rida Initiative--a $1.5 billion effort to provide law enforcement support to Mexico--thereby making it difficult to determine the initiative's effectiveness. GAO has made a variety of recommendations to State and USAID to help improve their foreign operations programs. In particular, GAO has recommended that agencies improve planning and performance measurement of their programs and take steps to enhance accountability of U.S. aid. State and USAID have efforts under way to implement some of these recommendations.
GAO-11-419T, Foreign Operations: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
Programs, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 1:00 p.m. EST:
Thursday, March 3, 2011:
Foreign Operations:
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight:
Statement of Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-11-419T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-419T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) implement a broad range of U.S. government
activities and programs overseas, including the conduct of diplomacy,
development and security assistance, and efforts to combat terrorism
and narcotics trafficking, among others. The President has requested
approximately $55.7 billion for State and USAID in fiscal year 2012,
an increase of nearly 8 percent over fiscal year 2010 funding levels.
This testimony discusses four cross-cutting areas of U.S. foreign
policy as implemented by State and USAID: (1) investments in key
partner nations, (2) building the capacity of U.S. agencies to advance
foreign policy priorities, (3) contractor oversight and
accountability, and (4) strategic planning and performance
measurement. This statement is based on GAO‘s extensive body of work
on foreign operations issues, including fieldwork in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico, and numerous other locations.
What GAO Found:
Since 2002, the United States has invested over $130 billion in
security, economic, and governance assistance to Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan. Although the administration has requested additional
funding in fiscal year 2012 to assist Iraq‘s security forces,
opportunities exist for cost-sharing given the Iraqi government‘s
continuing budget surpluses and unexpended security budgets. Regarding
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States has placed an increased
focus on providing funding directly to the Afghan government and
Pakistani organizations. This course of action involves considerable
risk given the limited capacity of some prospective recipients”-
particularly the Afghan government--to manage and implement U.S.-
funded programs, thereby highlighting the need for agency controls and
safeguards over these funds.
According to the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,
State and USAID are engaged in efforts to build and support a
workforce that is well-matched to the foreign affairs challenges of
the twenty-first century. Accomplishing this objective is critical
given that GAO‘s work has consistently found limitations in the
ability of State and USAID to ensure that they are deploying the right
people to the right places at the right time. For example, State has
faced persistent staffing and foreign language gaps that put the
department‘s diplomatic readiness at risk. Similarly, GAO found that
State has experienced difficulties hiring and training staff to
operate and maintain its new, more sophisticated embassy compounds.
State has taken some actions in response to GAO‘s findings. For
example, in 2010, the department introduced a new pilot program to
expand its cadre of Chinese speakers. State also noted in 2010 that it
planned to hire additional facilities managers at embassies and
consulates.
State and USAID rely extensively on contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan to support their direct-hire personnel, implement
reconstruction efforts, and address workforce shortfalls such as
insufficient numbers of trained agency personnel and the frequent
rotations of staff posted to these countries. Robust management and
oversight of contractor operations are essential in these challenging
environments. However, GAO has found oversight to be inadequate at
times, thus raising questions about the agencies‘ ability to ensure
accountability for multibillion-dollar investments.
GAO‘s reviews of international affairs programs have repeatedly found
weaknesses in agencies‘ strategic planning and performance measurement
efforts. For example, GAO reported that State significantly expanded
its Bureau of Diplomatic Security without the benefit of strategic
planning to ensure that the bureau‘s missions and activities address
the department‘s priority needs. Such a review is vital given that the
bureau will assume full responsibility for securing all diplomatic
personnel and facilities in Iraq starting in October 2011 as the U.S.
military completes its drawdown. GAO also reported that State
generally lacked outcome-based measures for the Mérida Initiative-”a
$1.5 billion effort to provide law enforcement support to Mexico”-
thereby making it difficult to determine the initiative‘s
effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO has made a variety of recommendations to State and USAID to help
improve their foreign operations programs. In particular, GAO has
recommended that agencies improve planning and performance measurement
of their programs and take steps to enhance accountability of U.S.
aid. State and USAID have efforts under way to implement some of these
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-419T] or key
components. For more information, contact Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers
at (202) 512-3101 or williamsbridgersj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to share with you the results of our
reviews of U.S. foreign policy implementation by the Department of
State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID). The President's fiscal year 2012 budget for State and USAID
requests approximately $55.7 billion--an increase of nearly 8 percent
over the agencies' fiscal year 2010 funding level of just over $51.6
billion as enacted.[Footnote 1] Today, I will discuss the findings
from some of our most recent work on State and USAID and the
recommendations we have made.[Footnote 2] My testimony will focus on
our reviews of State and USAID in four cross-cutting areas.
Specifically, I will discuss (1) U.S. investments in key partner
nations, (2) building the capacity of U.S. agencies to advance foreign
policy interests, (3) contractor oversight and accountability, and (4)
strategic planning and performance measurement. I will also raise a
number of issues to potentially inform the Subcommittee's oversight
agenda and, more immediately, its examination of the President's
fiscal year 2012 budget request within the context of today's fiscal
environment.
GAO Reviews of Investments in Key Partner Nations Have Identified Cost-
Sharing Opportunities and the Need for Agency Controls over U.S. Funds:
Since 2002, the United States has invested over $130 billion in
security, economic, and governance assistance to Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan. Although the administration has requested additional
funding in fiscal year 2012 to assist Iraq's security forces,
opportunities exist for cost-sharing given the Iraqi government's
continuing budget surpluses and unexpended security budgets. Regarding
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the United States has placed an increased
focus on providing funding directly to the Afghan government and
Pakistani organizations. This course of action involves considerable
risk given the limited capacity of some prospective recipients--
particularly the Afghan government--to manage and implement U.S.-
funded programs, thereby highlighting the need for agency controls and
safeguards over these funds.
Iraq:
Since 2003, the United States has provided about $58 billion for
reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq. Over 40 percent of
this amount (about $24 billion) has funded Department of Defense (DOD)
programs to train and equip Iraq's security forces. This substantial
investment has enabled the United States to develop a force of over
650,000 Iraqi personnel. In the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011, Congress authorized an additional $1.5 billion in
operation and maintenance funds for fiscal year 2011 for the Iraq
Security Forces Fund, which has been used in the past to train and
equip Iraqi security forces. However, Congress generally required at
least a 20 percent Iraqi cost share for the purchase of any item or
service for the Iraqi security forces if purchased with funds made
available to DOD for the fiscal year 2011 Iraq Security Forces Fund.
Congress also stated that not more than $1 billion of the funds for
the Iraqi security forces could be obligated until the Secretary of
Defense certifies that the Iraqi government had demonstrated a
commitment to adequately build the logistics and maintenance capacity
of its security forces, to develop the institutional capacity to
manage such forces independently, and to develop a culture of
sustainment for equipment provided by the United States or acquired
with U.S. assistance. For fiscal year 2012, the administration has
requested another $2 billion for State programs to assist the Iraqi
security forces, including $1 billion for a new civilian-led police
development program and $1 billion in Foreign Military Financing for
Iraq's military.
However, our September 2010 report on Iraq's budget surplus emphasizes
the need to ensure that Iraq shares in the cost for its own security.
[Footnote 3] Specifically, we found that, through the end of 2009,
Iraq had generated an estimated cumulative budget surplus of $52.1
billion, of which at least $11.8 billion was available after adjusting
for outstanding advances. In addition, we found that, between 2005 and
2009, Iraq's security ministries budgeted but did not use between $2.5
billion and $5.2 billion in funds that could have been devoted to the
country's security needs. Furthermore, while the Iraqi government
recently announced a 2011 budget that projects a $13.4 billion
deficit, our 2010 report noted that Iraq's budgets serve as imperfect
predictors of the country's year-end fiscal balance. For example, from
2005 through 2009, Iraq's budgets predicted deficits but ended each
year with budget surpluses, on a cash accounting basis. Accordingly,
we recommended that Congress consider Iraq's available financial
resources when reviewing the administration's fiscal year 2011 budget
request and any future funding requests to support the Iraqi security
forces.
In addition, we continue to follow the transition in Iraq from a
military to a civilian-led presence. The administration has requested
just over $3.2 billion[Footnote 4] in fiscal year 2012 contingency
funding for State and USAID operations in Iraq. These funds will
support the operations and protection of a large U.S. civilian
presence in the country, including personnel at the U.S. Embassy in
Baghdad; two consulates in Basrah and Erbil; two branch offices in
Mosul and Kirkuk; and three aviation facilities in Basrah, Erbil, and
Baghdad. In July 2010, we issued a report on State transition efforts
in Iraq, copies of which we provided to the Subcommittee.[Footnote 5]
Finally, we are also assessing the Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq. This
campaign plan provides a comprehensive, government-wide plan to guide
U.S. efforts in Iraq, including the transition from a DOD-led to a
State-led operation. The current plan identifies four lines of
operation--political, economic and energy, rule of law, and security--
and articulates the strategic priorities and risks in achieving goals
and objectives. Our review--the most recent in a series of classified
assessments we have conducted of joint campaign plans for Iraq--will
examine the extent to which the campaign plan adheres to military
doctrine and addresses the risks to the campaign.
Related issues for oversight include:
* the extent to which the Iraqi government has adequately built the
logistics and maintenance capacity of its security forces, developed
the institutional capacity to manage such forces independently, and
developed a culture of sustainment for equipment provided by the
United States or acquired with U.S. assistance; and:
* the intended goals and expected outcomes for State's programs to
assist the Iraqi security forces.
Afghanistan and Pakistan:
Since 2002, the United States has provided more than $55 billion for
Afghan security, governance, and development, and over $18 billion to
assist Pakistan in its security, economic, and development matters and
to provide reimbursements for its efforts to combat terrorism along
its border with Afghanistan. Our reviews of this assistance have
focused on U.S. efforts to develop capable Afghan National Security
Forces; the U.S. civilian-military campaign plan for Afghanistan; and
programs to develop Afghanistan's agriculture, roads, and water sector
and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. We have also
highlighted obstacles that have impeded the progress of U.S. programs
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including the unstable security situation
and the government of Afghanistan's lack of capacity to sustain many
of the programs put in place by donors.
In recent years, the United States has placed increased emphasis on
providing funding directly to the Afghan government and Pakistani
government and nongovernmental organizations instead of through large
international contractors and U.S.-based partners. For example, in
January 2010, the United States and the international community agreed
to deliver half of their development aid to Afghanistan over the next
2 years directly through the Afghan government. Our preliminary
observations indicate that USAID disbursed about $204 million in
direct assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2010, mostly through
the World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.
Similarly, the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009,
[Footnote 6] which authorizes up to $1.5 billion a year for
development, economic, and democratic assistance to Pakistan for
fiscal years 2010 through 2014, encourages, as appropriate, the
provision of this assistance through Pakistani organizations. As of
December 2010, the United States had disbursed about $120 million in
direct assistance to Pakistani organizations. However, the
vulnerability of U.S.-funded programs to waste, mismanagement, and
corruption is likely to increase under these circumstances, given the
limited capacity and weak internal controls of some of the Afghan and
Pakistani entities involved in implementing them. In February 2011, we
reported that USAID had undertaken or intends to take a number of risk
mitigation strategies and steps to identify weaknesses in Pakistani
organizations and improve the capacity of those that do not meet
minimum standards for managing U.S. funds.[Footnote 7] For example,
Pakistani organizations receiving U.S. funding for the first time
would undergo a preaward assessment of their internal controls and
financial management systems conducted by Pakistani Certified Public
Accounting firms. However, we also found that USAID's oversight of
assistance awarded to Pakistani organizations could be further
enhanced to prevent the misuse of U.S. funds. We recommended that
USAID, among other things, provide U.S. assistance to Pakistani
organizations identified in preaward assessments as high-or medium-
risk through contracts, grants, or agreements that would require these
organizations to address weaknesses that could endanger the
accountability of U.S. funds. USAID agreed with our recommendation,
stating that all contracts, grants, and agreements awarded to high-or
medium-risk recipients take into consideration weaknesses identified
in the preaward assessments. However, USAID did not specifically state
that it would make addressing such weaknesses a requirement in all of
its contracts, grants, and agreements awarded to high-or medium-risk
recipients.
In response to the Subcommittee's interest, we have also initiated
work on U.S. efforts to ensure accountability of direct assistance to
Afghanistan and to build the financial management capacity of the
Afghan government. Our preliminary observations on these programs
suggest that USAID has not consistently completed risk assessments of
Afghan ministries prior to providing them with direct assistance, but
that U.S. agencies have increased their focus on developing Afghan
financial management capacity. We currently have a team in Afghanistan
reviewing these programs and another team heading to Pakistan this
week to examine U.S. security assistance in Pakistan's western
frontier region.
Related issues for oversight include:
* the extent of State and USAID efforts to develop the Afghan
government's capacity to sustain donor-funded programs, the progress
made through such efforts, and the challenges faced, if any; and:
* the extent to which USAID has taken steps to obtain reasonable
assurance of the qualifications and independence of Pakistani
Certified Public Accounting firms that are conducting preaward
assessments of Pakistani organizations.
U.S. Agencies Need to Improve Their Capacity to Advance Foreign Policy
Interests:
According to the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review,
State and USAID are engaged in efforts to build and support a
workforce that is well-matched to the foreign affairs challenges of
the twenty-first century. Accomplishing this objective is critical
given that our work has consistently found limitations in the ability
of State and USAID to ensure that they are deploying the right people
to the right places at the right time. For instance, the February 2011
update to GAO's "High-Risk Series" states that current and emerging
critical skills gaps undermine agencies' abilities to meet their vital
missions.[Footnote 8] With regard to State, the report cites
insufficient foreign language capabilities. We reported in 2009 that
the department has had persistent shortages of staff with critical
language skills, such as Arabic and Chinese, and some foreign language
shortfalls in areas of geographic strategic interest, such as the Near
East and South and Central Asia--all gaps that jeopardize diplomatic
readiness and could hinder U.S. overseas operations.[Footnote 9] We
reported in 2009 that State's diplomatic readiness was also at risk
due to continuing staffing and experience gaps at key hardship posts,
such as Jeddah, Saudi Arabia; Lagos, Nigeria; and Shenyang, China.
[Footnote 10] Additionally, in our 2010 review of State's efforts to
construct new embassy compounds, we found that the department has
experienced difficulties hiring and training staff to operate and
maintain these more sophisticated facilities.[Footnote 11] State has
taken some actions in response to our findings. For example, in 2010,
the department introduced a new pilot program to expand its cadre of
Chinese speakers. State also noted in 2010 that it planned to hire
additional facilities managers at embassies and consulates.
Nonetheless, the widespread difficulties that State has faced in
aligning its workforce with its needs raise serious questions about
its readiness to manage the upcoming transition to a civilian-led
presence in Iraq--a presence that is slated to more than double in
size from nearly 8,000 civilian personnel to about 17,000. In
particular, the ability of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security to
assume full security responsibility for all diplomatic personnel and
facilities starting in October 2011 is uncertain.
USAID faces similar workforce challenges. Of particular note, USAID's
workforce plan does not include a comprehensive analysis of the
agency's gaps in critical skills and competencies or the specific
actions the agency intends to take to address such gaps. As we
reported in 2010, until USAID improves its workforce planning, the
agency will remain at risk of not deploying the workforce it needs to
meet current and future foreign assistance goals.[Footnote 12] USAID
subsequently agreed with our recommendation to develop a comprehensive
workforce plan that analyzes its workforce gaps and specific steps to
address such gaps.
Related issues for oversight include:
* additional actions State has taken or plans to take to address
longstanding staffing and foreign language gaps, and:
* the extent to which State, USAID, and DOD have planned for an
estimated doubling in civilian presence and an expanded diplomatic
"footprint" in Iraq, given the forthcoming transition from a military
to a civilian mission.
Agencies Can Do More to Ensure Oversight of Contractors and
Accountability of U.S. Investments:
During fiscal year 2009 and the first half of 2010, State and USAID
collectively reported obligations of nearly $6 billion on contracts,
grants, and cooperative agreements to support their direct-hire
personnel and implement development efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This reliance is due in part to agency workforce shortfalls, including
insufficient numbers of trained agency personnel and the frequent
rotations of staff posted to these countries. However, we have found
State and USAID's oversight of their contracts, grants, and
cooperative agreements to be inadequate at times, thus raising
questions about the agencies' ability to ensure accountability for
multibillion-dollar investments. For example, as we reported in 2010,
State and USAID continue to lack complete data on the number of
personnel working under their contracts, grants, and cooperative
agreements in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 13] We also found that
State and USAID did not consider the need to provide greater scrutiny
and an enhanced degree of management oversight when contractors
performed contract and grant administration functions, such as
evaluating other contractors' performance and recommending grant
awards--both of which closely support inherently governmental
functions.[Footnote 14] As a result, there is potential for loss of
government control and accountability for mission-related policy and
program decisions that can lead to decisions that are not in the best
interest of the government and increase vulnerability to waste, fraud,
and abuse.[Footnote 15]
Our work has also highlighted other challenges in ensuring
accountability of U.S. investments. For example, we previously
reported that USAID's efforts to manage and oversee development
assistance being carried out by contractors and grantees in
Afghanistan have been hampered by factors such as the high-threat
working environment and difficulties in preserving institutional
knowledge due to high staff turnover.[Footnote 16] Additionally, the
use of Afghan and Pakistani firms is expected to grow in accordance
with U.S. Embassy Kabul's Afghan First Policy and the Enhanced
Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009,[Footnote 17] which encourage,
respectively, the utilization of Afghan and Pakistani firms, including
through host country contracts. This expected increase heightens
existing concerns about the risk of U.S. contracting and assistance
funds being diverted to finance terrorist or insurgent groups. GAO is
currently conducting a review of DOD, State, and USAID's processes for
vetting prospective Afghan contractors to determine whether they are
affiliated with insurgent or criminal groups or appear to pose a
significant risk of diverting funds or security information to
terrorists, criminal, and other corrupt organizations.
Related issues for oversight include:
* actions State and USAID have taken to improve their ability to
account for personnel working under contracts, grants, and cooperative
agreements in Iraq and Afghanistan; and:
* the sufficiency of U.S. efforts to minimize the risk of Afghan and
Pakistani firms diverting contract and assistance funds to terrorist
and insurgent groups.
Sustained Agency Attention to Strategic Planning and Performance
Measurement Is Needed:
Sound strategic planning and performance measurement are critical for
managing U.S. government funds responsibly. In particular, agencies
should define the results they seek to accomplish, identify the
strategies for achieving the desired results, and determine how well
they succeed in achieving those results. However, our reviews of
international affairs programs have repeatedly found weaknesses in
agencies' strategic planning and performance measurement efforts. For
example, we reported that State significantly expanded its Bureau of
Diplomatic Security--from fewer than 1,000 direct-hire security
specialists in 1998 to over 2,000 in 2009--without the benefit of
strategic planning to ensure that the bureau's missions and activities
address the department's priority needs.[Footnote 18] Accordingly, we
recommended that State conduct a strategic review of the bureau that
addresses its key human capital and operational challenges. State
agreed with our recommendation.
We also found weaknesses in State's performance measurement of the
Mérida Initiative, a $1.5 billion effort launched in 2007 to provide
law enforcement support to Mexico in response to rising crime and
violence related to drug trafficking, particularly along the United
States-Mexico border.[Footnote 19] Last summer, we reported that U.S.
agencies had provided various types of equipment and training through
this initiative, including five Bell helicopters, several X-ray
inspection devices, and training for over 4,000 police officers.
[Footnote 20] However, we found that State generally lacked outcome-
based measures for Mérida, making it difficult to determine the
program's effectiveness and leaving unclear when its goals will be
met. Consequently, we recommended that State develop performance
measures that indicate progress toward Mérida's strategic goals.
[Footnote 21] State estimated in February 2011 that it would take
another 4 months before performance measures were completed for
Mérida. We similarly recommended that USAID take steps to enhance
monitoring and evaluation of its agricultural development programs in
Afghanistan, such as by consistently analyzing and interpreting
program data to determine the extent to which annual targets are met.
[Footnote 22] USAID concurred and described several ongoing
initiatives that addressed elements of our recommendation.
Related issues for oversight include:
* the extent to which State has strategically reviewed the capacity of
its Bureau of Diplomatic Security and developed contingency plans as
the bureau prepares to assume full responsibility from DOD starting in
October 2011 for the security of all diplomatic personnel and
facilities in Iraq, and:
* the extent to which State has made progress in developing
performance measures for the Mérida Initiative to aid in determining
the program's effectiveness.
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this statement, please contact Jacquelyn
Williams-Bridgers at (202) 512-3101 or williamsbridgersj@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals
making key contributions to this statement include Johana Ayers,
Vincent Balloon, Kathryn Bolduc, Burns Chamberlain, Joseph Christoff,
Aniruddha Dasgupta, Martin De Alteriis, Timothy DiNapoli, Jess Ford,
John Hutton, Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Hynek Kalkus, Bruce
Kutnick, Richard Lindsey, Grace Lui, Judith McCloskey, James Michels,
Erin O'Brien, Esther Toledo, and Adam Vogt. Joyce Evans, Elizabeth
Repko, and Cynthia Taylor provided technical assistance.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The fiscal year 2012 request for State and USAID includes a core
budget of $47 billion, as well as an additional $8.7 billion for State
and USAID operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq as part of the
fiscal year 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations request. We are
currently examining the fiscal year 2012 request for State and USAID
as part of our annual review of the international affairs budget for
possible realignments and reductions.
[2] This statement is based on our wide-ranging body of work examining
U.S. implementation of security, economic development, and governance
programs overseas as well as State and USAID operational issues. We
have conducted on-the-ground work in numerous locations, including
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Mexico, and our reports incorporate
information we obtained and analyzed from foreign government officials
and international partners in these countries, as well as from State,
USAID, and other U.S. officials posted both overseas and in
Washington, D.C. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that
we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence we obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[3] GAO, Iraqi-U.S. Cost-Sharing: Iraq Has a Cumulative Budget
Surplus, Offering the Potential for Further Cost-Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-304] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13,
2010).
[4] This figure does not include $2 billion requested for State
programs to assist the Iraqi security forces.
[5] Because our July 2010 report on transition efforts in Iraq
contains sensitive information, it is not available on GAO's Web site.
[6] Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (Oct. 15, 2009).
[7] GAO, Department of State's Report to Congress and U.S. Oversight
of Civilian Assistance to Pakistan Can Be Further Enhanced, GAO-11-
310R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 17, 2011).
[8] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-278] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16,
2011).
[9] GAO, Department of State: Comprehensive Plan Needed to Address
Persistent Foreign Language Shortfalls, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-955] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17,
2009).
[10] GAO, Department of State: Additional Steps Needed to Address
Continuing Staffing and Experience Gaps at Hardship Posts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-874] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17,
2009).
[11] GAO, New Embassy Compounds: State Faces Challenges in Sizing
Facilities and Providing for Operations and Maintenance Requirements,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-689] (Washington, D.C.:
July 20, 2010).
[12] GAO, Foreign Assistance: USAID Needs to Improve Its Strategic
Planning to Address Current and Future Workforce Needs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-496] (Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2010).
[13] GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued
Challenges in Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and
Associated Personnel, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-1] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1, 2010).
[14] Inherently governmental functions related to the public interest
require performance by government employees. Other functions, while
not inherently governmental, may approach the category because of the
nature of the function, the manner in which a contractor performs the
contract, or the manner in which the government administers
performance under a contract. Functions closely supporting the
performance of inherently governmental functions generally include
professional and management support activities, such as those that
involve or relate to supporting budget preparation, evaluation of
another contractor's performance, acquisition planning, or technical
evaluation of contract proposals.
[15] GAO, Contingency Contracting: Improvements Needed in Management
of Contractors Supporting Contract and Grant Administration in Iraq
and Afghanistan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-357]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2010).
[16] GAO, Afghanistan Development: USAID Continues to Face Challenges
in Managing and Overseeing U.S. Development Assistance Programs,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-932T] (Washington,
D.C.: July 15, 2010).
[17] Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (Oct. 15, 2009).
[18] GAO, State Department: Diplomatic Security's Recent Growth
Warrants Strategic Review, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-156] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12,
2009).
[19] The United States also provides law enforcement support to
Central American countries through the Mérida Initiative.
[20] GAO, Mérida Initiative: The United States Has Provided
Counternarcotics and Anticrime Support but Needs Better Performance
Measures, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-837]
(Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010). State data as of February 2011 show
that, while most Mérida funds have been obligated, nearly 80 percent
have not yet been expended.
[21] The Mérida Initiative's four strategic goals are to (1) Disrupt
Organized Criminal Groups, (2) Institutionalize Reforms to Sustain
Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights, (3) Create a 21ST Century
Border, and (4) Build Strong and Resilient Communities.
[22] GAO, Afghanistan Development: Enhancements to Performance
Management and Evaluation Efforts Could Improve USAID's Agricultural
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-368]
(Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2010).
[End of section]
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