Maritime Security
Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa Gao ID: GAO-11-449T March 15, 2011Somali pirates have attacked 640 ships and taken more than 3,150 hostages since 2007. A few U.S.-flagged vessels have been affected--most recently the SV Quest, a private yacht on which four Americans were killed in February 2011. The growing frequency and severity of attacks renew the urgency to address the piracy threat. As Somalia is unable to repress piracy, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) developed the interagency Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan in December 2008 to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute piracy in collaboration with international and industry partners. In September 2010, GAO issued a report evaluating the extent to which U.S. agencies (1) have implemented the plan, and the challenges they face, and (2) have collaborated with partners. This testimony is based on the September 2010 report and its objectives, and work GAO conducted in March 2011 to update report findings.
As GAO reported in September 2010, the U.S. government has made progress in implementing its plan for countering piracy, in collaboration with industry and international partners. However, piracy is an escalating problem, and the U.S. government has not updated its plan as GAO recommended. The United States has advised industry partners on self-protection measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international coalition patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded a prosecution arrangement with the Seychelles. Many stakeholders credit collaborative efforts with reducing the pirates' rate of success in boarding ships and hijacking vessels, but since 2007 the location of attacks has spread from the heavily patrolled Gulf of Aden--the focus of the Action Plan--to the vast and much harder to patrol Indian Ocean. Also, from 2007 to 2010 the total number of reported hijackings increased sevenfold, and, after dropping in 2008 and 2009, the pirates' success rate rebounded from 22 percent in 2009 to almost 30 percent in 2010. In addition, the number of hostages captured and the amount of ransom paid increased sharply, and pirate attacks have grown more violent. The Action Plan's objective is to repress piracy off the Horn of Africa as effectively as possible, but as pirate operations have evolved, changes to the plan have not kept pace. The United States has not systematically tracked the costs of its counterpiracy efforts and is unable to determine whether counterpiracy investments are achieving the desired results. According to a statement by an NSS official, the United States is reviewing U.S. piracy policy to focus future U.S. efforts. These recent steps are encouraging because the growing frequency and severity of piracy off the Horn of Africa provides a renewed sense of urgency for taking action. GAO's September 2010 report found that U.S. agencies have generally collaborated well with international and industry partners to counter piracy, but they could take additional steps to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration. According to U.S. and international stakeholders, the U.S. government has, among other things, collaborated with international partners to support prosecution of piracy suspects and worked with industry partners to educate ship owners on how to protect their vessels from pirate attack. However, agencies have made less progress on several key efforts that involve multiple U.S. agencies--such as those to address piracy through strategic communications, disrupt pirate finances, and hold pirates accountable. For instance, the departments of Defense, Justice, State, and the Treasury all collect or examine information on pirate finances, but none has lead responsibility for analyzing that information to build a case against pirate leaders or financiers. In September 2010, GAO recommended that the NSC identify roles and responsibilities for implementing these tasks, and develop guidance to ensure agency efforts work together efficiently and effectively. In March 2011, an NSS official stated that an interagency policy review will examine roles and responsibilities and implementation actions to focus U.S. efforts for the next several years. It is too early to assess this effort's effectiveness in bolstering interagency collaboration in U.S. counterpiracy efforts. GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement. GAO previously recommended that the NSC (1) update its Action Plan; (2) assess the costs and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities; and (3) clarify agency roles and responsibilities. A National Security Staff (NSS) official provided a statement that an interagency group is reviewing U.S. piracy policy, costs, metrics, roles, and responsibilities. Agencies also commented to clarify information in this statement.
GAO-11-449T, Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-11-449T
entitled 'Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan
Gains Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa' which was
released on March 15, 2011.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of
Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, March 15, 2011:
Maritime Security:
Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan Gains Urgency as Piracy
Escalates off the Horn of Africa:
Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
and:
John H. Pendleton, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-11-449T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-449T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Somali pirates have attacked 640 ships and taken more than 3,150
hostages since 2007. A few U.S.-flagged vessels have been affected”
most recently the SV Quest, a private yacht on which four Americans
were killed in February 2011. The growing frequency and severity of
attacks renew the urgency to address the piracy threat. As Somalia is
unable to repress piracy, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC)
developed the interagency Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa:
Partnership and Action Plan in December 2008 to prevent, disrupt, and
prosecute piracy in collaboration with international and industry
partners. In September 2010, GAO issued a report evaluating the extent
to which U.S. agencies (1) have implemented the plan, and the
challenges they face, and (2) have collaborated with partners. This
testimony is based on the September 2010 report and its objectives,
and work GAO conducted in March 2011 to update report findings.
What GAO Found:
As GAO reported in September 2010, the U.S. government has made
progress in implementing its plan for countering piracy, in
collaboration with industry and international partners. However,
piracy is an escalating problem, and the U.S. government has not
updated its plan as GAO recommended. The United States has advised
industry partners on self-protection measures, contributed leadership
and assets to an international coalition patrolling pirate-infested
waters, and concluded a prosecution arrangement with the Seychelles.
Many stakeholders credit collaborative efforts with reducing the pirates
‘ rate of success in boarding ships and hijacking vessels, but since
2007 the location of attacks has spread from the heavily patrolled
Gulf of Aden”the focus of the Action Plan”to the vast and much harder
to patrol Indian Ocean. Also, from 2007 to 2010 the total number of
reported hijackings increased sevenfold, and, after dropping in 2008
and 2009, the pirates‘ success rate rebounded from 22 percent in 2009
to almost 30 percent in 2010. In addition, the number of hostages
captured and the amount of ransom paid increased sharply, and pirate
attacks have grown more violent. The Action Plan‘s objective is to
repress piracy off the Horn of Africa as effectively as possible, but
as pirate operations have evolved, changes to the plan have not kept
pace. The United States has not systematically tracked the costs of
its counterpiracy efforts and is unable to determine whether
counterpiracy investments are achieving the desired results. According
to a statement by an NSS official, the United States is reviewing U.S.
piracy policy to focus future U.S. efforts. These recent steps are
encouraging because the growing frequency and severity of piracy off
the Horn of Africa provides a renewed sense of urgency for taking
action.
GAO‘s September 2010 report found that U.S. agencies have generally
collaborated well with international and industry partners to counter
piracy, but they could take additional steps to enhance and sustain
interagency collaboration. According to U.S. and international
stakeholders, the U.S. government has, among other things,
collaborated with international partners to support prosecution of
piracy suspects and worked with industry partners to educate ship
owners on how to protect their vessels from pirate attack. However,
agencies have made less progress on several key efforts that involve
multiple U.S. agencies”such as those to address piracy through
strategic communications, disrupt pirate finances, and hold pirates
accountable. For instance, the departments of Defense, Justice, State,
and the Treasury all collect or examine information on pirate
finances, but none has lead responsibility for analyzing that
information to build a case against pirate leaders or financiers. In
September 2010, GAO recommended that the NSC identify roles and
responsibilities for implementing these tasks, and develop guidance to
ensure agency efforts work together efficiently and effectively. In
March 2011, an NSS official stated that an interagency policy review
will examine roles and responsibilities and implementation actions to
focus U.S. efforts for the next several years. It is too early to
assess this effort‘s effectiveness in bolstering interagency
collaboration in U.S. counterpiracy efforts.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making new recommendations in this statement. GAO
previously recommended that the NSC (1) update its Action Plan; (2)
assess the costs and effectiveness of U.S. counterpiracy activities;
and (3) clarify agency roles and responsibilities. A National Security
Staff (NSS) official provided a statement that an interagency group is
reviewing U.S. piracy policy, costs, metrics, roles, and
responsibilities. Agencies also commented to clarify information in
this statement.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-449T] or key
components. For more information, contact Stephen Caldwell at (202)
512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov, or John Pendleton at (404) 679-1816 or
pendletonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairman LoBiondo, Ranking Member Larsen, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the U.S. response to piracy
off the coast of Somalia. The killing of four Americans in February
2011 by Somali pirates has renewed a sense of urgency to address the
growing frequency and severity of piracy off the Horn of Africa.
Piracy threatens ships and mariners transiting one of the world's
busiest shipping lanes near key energy corridors and the route through
the Suez Canal. Since 2007, 640 ships have reported pirate attacks in
this area, and Somali pirates have taken more than 3,150 hostages and,
according to the Department of Defense (DOD), received over $180
million in ransom payments. While few U.S.-flagged vessels have been
attacked-- notably the MV Maersk Alabama in April 2009, and the SV
Quest in February 2011--pirates have attacked or attempted attacks on
chemical and oil tankers, freighters, cruise ships, fishing vessels,
and even warships. In addition to jeopardizing the lives and welfare
of the citizens of many nations, piracy contributes to regional
instability and creates challenges for shipping and freedom of
navigation. This illicit but profitable activity has raised concerns
that piracy ransom proceeds may undermine regional security and
contribute to other threats, including terrorism. See figure 2 in
appendix I for a map depicting the vast area in which incidents of
Somali piracy are occurring.
Since 2008, the international community has taken steps to respond to
the growing piracy problem, including patrols by the United States,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, and others
in waters near Somalia; the establishment of a multinational naval
task force with a specific mandate to conduct counterpiracy
operations; and several United Nations Security Council resolutions
such as the one that led to the formation of a multilateral Contact
Group to coordinate international counterpiracy efforts.[Footnote 1]
Recognizing that vibrant maritime commerce underpins global economic
security and is a vital national security issue, the United States has
also developed policies and plans to collaborate with its
international partners and to mobilize an interagency U.S. response.
In December 2008, the National Security Council (NSC) published the
Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan.
[Footnote 2] The Action Plan seeks to involve all nations,
international organizations, industry, and other entities with an
interest in maritime security in taking steps to repress piracy off
the Horn of Africa. The interagency initiatives of the Action Plan are
to be coordinated and undertaken by DOD, as well as the U.S.
Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, Transportation, and
the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
subject to the availability of resources. The international community,
shipping industry, and international military forces also have been
instrumental in efforts to prevent and disrupt acts of piracy off the
Horn of Africa and facilitate prosecutions of suspected pirates. Our
recent report on this subject, published in September 2010, includes
more information on the U.S. agencies and many of the key
international and industry partners involved in the response to piracy
off the Horn of Africa with whom the United States collaborates and
coordinates.[Footnote 3]
My statement today is based largely on our September 2010 report, in
addition to more recent work we conducted in March 2011 to update the
findings in that report. Today, as with our report, I would like to
focus on two issues: first, the extent to which U.S. agencies have
implemented the Action Plan and challenges they face in doing so, and
second, the extent to which U.S. agencies have collaborated among
partners in counterpiracy efforts. For our September 2010 report, we
examined counterpiracy plans, activities, collaborative practices, and
data; met with officials at six U.S. agencies and the Combined
Maritime Forces in Bahrain; and interviewed industry and international
partners. Details on the scope and methodology used for that review
can be found in appendix I of the report. Selected updates for my
statement today include a review of data on the nature and extent of
pirate attacks, hostages taken, and ransom payments made since our
published report. We assessed the reliability of the attack and
hostage data by reviewing the data and interviewing knowledgeable
officials as well as relevant subject matter experts; though the
sources and methods used to develop the ransom data are classified, we
compared it to information provided by other sources. We found these
data to be sufficiently reliable for providing a context for piracy
off the Horn of Africa. We also contacted officials from Coast Guard,
DOD, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury on actions taken
since our last report. We also provided a copy of this testimony to
the NSS for comment. We conducted this work in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.
Since the publication of our report, the piracy situation off the
coast of Somalia has continued to deteriorate. According to a variety
of sources,[Footnote 4] pirates are expanding their area of
operations--north toward the straits of Hormuz, east toward the coast
of India, and south to the coasts of Mozambique and Madagascar--
principally through the increasing use of larger vessels known as
"mother ships." In addition, the total number of reported pirate
attacks has increased from 30 in 2007 to 219 in 2010. In addition,
pirates are taking an increasing number of hostages and escalating the
level of violence and abuse toward those captives. Officials also have
cited reports of pirates using seafarers on the hijacked mother ships
as "human shields" to fend off attacks from naval vessels. Pirates
also are holding out for higher ransoms, which is leading to longer
negotiations and, hence, longer periods of captivity for those taken
hostage. Finally, officials report that pirates continue to show
evidence of organization, with well-defined networks and hierarchies
of financiers, senior leaders, and seagoing pirate crews. Appendix I
provides maps and graphics demonstrating several of these trends.
The United States Has Taken Steps to Implement Its Counterpiracy Plan
but Needs to Evaluate Its Efforts and Update Its Plan:
As we reported in September 2010, the U.S. government has made
progress implementing its Action Plan for countering piracy, in
collaboration with international and industry partners. However, the
effort faces several implementation challenges, and piracy remains a
persistent problem. At the time of our September 2010 review, U.S.
agencies had not evaluated the costs or effectiveness of their
counterpiracy efforts or updated the Action Plan. In commenting on our
testimony statement, the NSS told us that an ongoing interagency
review is examining the U.S. piracy policy needed to guide U.S.
efforts. We continue to believe that actions are needed to update the
Action Plan to respond to the evolving pirate threat, and enhance and
sustain interagency collaboration in U.S. efforts, but currently it is
too early to assess the interagency effort.
In collaboration with their international and industry partners, U.S.
agencies have taken steps across the three lines of action established
in the Action Plan to: (1) prevent attacks by reducing the
vulnerability of the maritime domain, (2) disrupt acts of piracy in
ways consistent with international law and the rights and
responsibilities of coastal and flag states, and (3) ensure that those
who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their actions by
facilitating the prosecution of suspected pirates. [Footnote 5] The
Action Plan establishes the U.S. role in countering piracy as a
collaborative one, seeking to involve all countries and shipping-
industry partners with an interest in maritime security. The NSC also
establishes some limits to the scope of the plan by focusing on
immediate measures to reduce the incidents of Somali piracy, rather
than longer-term stabilization of Somalia that the Action Plan asserts
is needed to fully repress piracy.
The United States has advised industry partners on self-protection
measures, contributed leadership and assets to an international
coalition patrolling pirate-infested waters, and concluded a
prosecution arrangement with the Seychelles.[Footnote 6] However, the
U.S. government has made less progress on tasks related to seizing and
destroying pirate vessels and equipment and delivering suspected
pirates for prosecution, and disrupting pirate revenue and bases
ashore. Figure 1 summarizes the results of our assessment. For more
detailed information about U.S. agencies' efforts to implement the
Action Plan and our analysis of their progress, see appendix II of our
September 2010 report.
Figure 1: Interagency Progress in Implementing the National Security
Council's Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa: Partnership and
Action Plan:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated table]
Prevent pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime
domain to piracy:
Task: Establish and maintain a Contact Group;
GAO assessment[A]: Substantial progress;
Status: U.S. government helped establish in January 2009; Coast Guard
and Maritime Administration lead working group on industry self-
protection.
Task: Strengthen and encourage the use of the Maritime Security Patrol
Area;
GAO assessment[A]: Substantial progress;
Status: U.S. government has made progress working with international
and industry partners, but has limited influence on commercial vessels
that are not flagged with the United States.
Task: Updating ships‘ security plans;
GAO assessment[A]: Substantial progress;
Status: Coast Guard has approved piracy annexes to ship security plans
for 100 percent of U.S.-flagged vessels over 500 gross tons identified
as transiting high-risk waters off the Horn of Africa.
Task: Strategic communication;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: U.S. government has issued counterpiracy statements and
supported international efforts; however, governmentwide plan not
finalized and lack of U.S. presence on land in Somalia inhibits full
implementation.
Disrupt acts of piracy consistent with international law and the
rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states:
Task: Support a regionally based Counter-Piracy Coordination Center
(CPCC);
GAO assessment[A]: Not applicable[B];
Status: U.S. government has no plans to support the establishment of a
CPCC since it would duplicate the reporting and monitoring functions
performed by other organizations.
Task: Seize and destroy pirate vessels and related equipment, and
deliver suspected pirates to prosecuting states;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: U.S. and international forces have seized more than 100 pirate
vessels and their related equipment but only delivered 39 percent of
captured suspects for reasons including difficulties in meeting
evidence standards and/or securing prosecution venues.
Task: Provide interdiction-capable presence;
GAO assessment[A]: Substantial progress;
Status: U.S. Navy and Coast Guard contribute assets and leadership to
coalition forces patrolling off the Horn of Africa with an average of
four to five ships in the region each day.
Task: Support shiprider programs and other agreements;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: The United States has supported an arrangement to bolster
regional capabilities to counter piracy, but U.S. agencies have not
established shiprider programs because they question the benefits to
facilitating prosecutions.
Task: Disrupt and dismantle pirate bases ashore;
GAO assessment[A]: Little or no progress;
Status: Action not authorized by the President at this time; lack of
U.S. presence in Somalia hinders implementation.
Task: Disrupt pirate revenue;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: In April 2010, President Obama signed an executive order that
blocks assets of certain designated individuals, including two
suspected pirates.[C] But, U.S. efforts to track financial assets or
transactions are hampered by a lack of government and financial
institutions in Somalia.
Facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates by flag, victim, and
coastal states, and, in appropriate cases, the United States to ensure
that those who commit acts of piracy are held accountable for their
actions:
Task: Conclude prosecution agreements;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: U.S. government concluded an arrangement with the Seychelles
and is attempting to conclude others; but faces challenges in finding
additional regional partners that are willing and able to prosecute.[D]
Task: Support the exercise of jurisdiction under the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: The United States exercised jurisdiction under the Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation to prosecute one pirate in the United States.
Task: Support the use of other applicable international conventions
and laws;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: The United States is using other laws to exercise jurisdiction
and prosecute 25 suspected pirates for attacks on U.S. vessels.
Task: Enhance regional states‘ capacity to prosecute;
GAO assessment[A]: Some progress;
Status: U.S. agencies provide assistance to countries in the region
for law enforcement and judicial capacity building and reform, the
focus of which includes, but is not limited to, piracy. Naval Criminal
Investigative Service special agents have testified in Kenyan courts,
and provided training and operational support to officials in the
Seychelles.
Source: GAO.
[A] We assessed "substantial progress" for those tasks where all
components specified by the NSC were implemented; "some progress" for
tasks where components were partially implemented or agencies had
taken steps toward implementation; and "little or no progress" where
agencies had made minimal or no effort toward implementing the
components of the task.
[B] We did not rate U.S. government progress on this task because,
according to DOD officials, there are no plans to establish a Counter-
Piracy Coordination Center since it would duplicate existing
international efforts.
[C] Executive Order 13536 blocks all property and property interests
within U.S. jurisdiction of persons listed in the Annex to the order
and provides the authority for the Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, to designate additional
persons that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Somalia,
including those who support or engage in acts of piracy off the coast
of Somalia. Property and property interests within U.S. jurisdiction
include property in the possession or control of any United States
person in the United States or overseas. United States person is
defined as "any United States citizen, permanent resident alien,
entity organized under the laws of the United States or any
jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or
any person in the United States." According to Treasury officials, as
of March 2011 this order listed two individuals connected to pirate
activity.
[End of figure]
Many stakeholders anecdotally credit international, industry, and U.S.
government efforts with preventing and disrupting piracy off the Horn
of Africa, but despite these efforts from 2007 through 2010 pirates
greatly expanded their area of operations, the number of pirate
attacks increased, the number of hostages captured rose substantially,
and the size of ransom payments grew. Appendix I includes graphics
illustrating the following developments:
* Area of Operations. Pirates have expanded their area of operations--
north toward the straits of Hormuz, east toward the coast of India,
and south to the coasts of Mozambique and Madagascar--and now threaten
an area of approximately 2 million square miles, an area much larger
and harder to patrol than the Gulf of Aden alone. (See figure 3 in
appendix I.) Pirates are expanding their reach principally through the
increasing use of vessels known as "mother ships." Mother ships are
often acquired or commandeered by acts of piracy and are used to store
fuel and supplies and to tow skiffs. These mother ships enable pirates
to launch attacks farther off shore and to operate in rougher seas. A
year after the NSC issued its Action Plan, reported pirate attacks in
the Gulf of Aden dropped from approximately 83 percent of the 111
reported pirate attacks in the region to 53 percent as Somali pirates
expanded their area of operations to the broader Indian Ocean. We
reported in September 2010 that countering piracy in the Indian Ocean
is more challenging due to the great expanse of water, and it requires
a different approach than that used in the Gulf of Aden. One U.S. Navy
analysis estimated that 1,000 ships equipped with helicopters would be
required to provide the same level of coverage in the Indian Ocean
that is currently provided in the Gulf of Aden--an approach that is
clearly infeasible.
* Pirate Attacks. The total number of reported pirate attacks
increased from 30 in 2007 to 219 in 2010. (See figure 4 in appendix
I.) Since 2007, there have been at least eight reported attempted
attacks on U.S.-flagged vessels, two of which involved pirates
successfully boarding or hijacking vessels--the attacks on the MV
Maersk Alabama and SV Quest. Although we reported in September 2010
that total attacks in the first half of 2010 had declined as compared
with the same period in 2009, since the issuance of our report, total
attacks in 2010 reached levels similar to 2009. Additionally, while we
previously reported the rate of successful attacks had dropped from 40
percent in 2007 to 22 percent in 2009, the rate had rebounded to
almost 30 percent at the end of 2010. Pirates have maintained the same
success rate of attacks for January and February 2011.
* Hostages Captured. Somali pirates captured more than six times the
number of hostages in 2010 than in 2007. (See figure 5 in appendix I.)
Such data show that piracy remains a persistent problem. Moreover, in
a February 2011 meeting of agency and international partners,
officials stated that, since the time of our report, the level of
violence has increased, the average length of time hostages spend in
captivity has grown, and more incidents of hostage abuse have been
reported. Officials have also cited reports of pirates using seafarers
on the hijacked mother ships as "human shields" to fend off attacks
from naval vessels.
* Ransom Payments. From 2007 to 2010 the estimated amount of total
ransom payments paid to pirates each year by the shipping industry
grew from about $3 million to more than $75 million, with the average
amount of ransoms paid per vessel increasing from $300,000 in 2007 to
more than $4 million in 2010, according to DOD. As ransoms continue to
rise, pirates continue to have an incentive to carry out attacks.
Furthermore, negotiation periods are lengthening, and hostages are
being held for greater lengths of time. Officials now report the
average length of time needed to negotiate ransoms has increased from
2 to 6 months. In addition, pirates have shown evidence of
organization--with well-defined networks and hierarchies of
financiers, senior leaders, and seagoing pirate crews--leading some
U.S. officials to express concerns that funds generated by piracy may
attract extremists or terrorists located in the region. However, as of
July 2010, U.S. agencies monitoring piracy had found no credible link
between pirates and extremist or terrorist organizations.
U.S. agencies have reported taking some steps to respond to the
changing methods and location of pirate attacks, including weekly
updates on piracy incidents to mariners and naval forces, and efforts
among coalition partners to improve coordination in the Somali Basin.
At the time we published our September 2010 report, the Action Plan
did not specifically address certain aspects of pirate operations,
such as the expansion to the broader Indian Ocean or how to apprehend
leaders of pirate organizations and their financiers, and U.S.
government officials told us that there were no plans to reassess or
revise the Action Plan. As a result, we recommended that the Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in
collaboration with the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security,
Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury re-assess and revise
the Action Plan to better address evolving conditions off the Horn of
Africa and their effect on priorities and plans. In following up with
cognizant departments on the current status of their counterpiracy
efforts, all of the departments provided comments to clarify
information in this statement, and an NSS official provided the
following information:
As part of a broader U.S. approach toward the region, the Maritime
Security Interagency Policy Committee (MSIPC) is conducting an ongoing
review of U.S. piracy policy.[Footnote 7] During this review, the
MSIPC is focusing on the Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa:
Partnership and Action Plan and as part of this effort, departments
and agencies are examining and developing metrics, roles and
responsibilities, and implementation actions to serve as the focus of
U.S. efforts for the next several years. In addition, the level of
effort and opportunity costs associated with counterpiracy work is
continuously monitored. The MSIPC has been focused, most recently, on
addressing the costs associated with bringing suspected pirates either
to the United States for prosecution or transferring them to third
party nations.
We also reported in September 2010 that as pirates operations had
evolved, the U.S. government had not systematically tracked the cost
or effectiveness of its counterpiracy activities to determine whether
its investment had achieved the desired results or should be revised.
Specifically, we found that government agencies were not tracking:
* Costs of Counterpiracy Efforts. The Action Plan did not specifically
charge the interagency group responsible for monitoring implementation
with tracking the cost of U.S. activities and neither the interagency
steering group nor the federal agencies involved were performing these
tasks. We also reported that DOD provided a partial estimate of
counterpiracy operations undertaken by the U.S. Central Command which
totaled about $64 million in fiscal year 2009[Footnote 8] and that a
key cost of counterpiracy operations was the diversion of ships, crew,
aircraft, intelligence assets, and other forces from other global
missions such as counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts. (See
our September 2010 report for a list of selected types of costs
incurred by the U.S. government to counter piracy.):
* Measures of Effectiveness. The Action Plan did not define measures
of effectiveness that could be used to evaluate progress toward
reaching its objectives or to assess the relative effectiveness of the
Action Plan's tasks to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute acts of piracy.
Agency officials have cited several challenges associated with
measuring the effectiveness of U.S. efforts, including the complexity
of the piracy problem, difficulty in establishing a desired end-state
for counterpiracy efforts, and difficulty in distinguishing the effect
of U.S. efforts from those of its international and industry partners.
Nevertheless, we reported that identifying measures of effectiveness
and systematically evaluating agency efforts could assist the U.S.
government in ensuring resources are being targeted most effectively,
weighing its investment of resources against its other interests in
the region, and determining whether adjustments to plans are required.
As a result, in our September 2010 report, we also recommended that
the NSC, in collaboration with the same federal departments, identify
measures of effectiveness to use in evaluating U.S. counterpiracy
efforts; and direct the Counter-Piracy Steering Group to identify the
costs of U.S. counterpiracy efforts including operational, support,
and personnel costs; and assess the effectiveness of U.S.
counterpiracy activities. In commenting on the draft of our September
2010 report, DOD stated that the interagency group charged with
monitoring implementation of the Action Plan was not tracking costs
and effectiveness because it was not specifically charged to do so in
the Action Plan. Officials from Coast Guard, Justice, State, and the
Treasury also were not aware of any systematic efforts to perform
these functions. When preparing for this hearing, State officials
informed us that the Secretary of State has since directed an internal
review and re-evaluation of State's approaches and actions to counter
piracy to determine the options for more effectively addressing this
regional threat and its widespread consequences. According to State
officials, identifying costs and effectiveness, as we recommended, is
to be a critical component of this evaluation. Similarly, the NSS
statement indicated that the policy review underway by the MSIPC is
examining and developing metrics, and addressing the costs associated
with U.S. action toward prosecuting suspected pirates. While recent
steps to begin implementing our recommendations are encouraging, it is
too early to tell what impact, if any, these efforts will have on the
United States' ability to respond to the dynamic nature of piracy. We
continue to believe that with continual evaluation of U.S. efforts the
United States may be in a better position to achieve its ultimate goal
of repressing piracy.
U.S. Agencies Have Worked Collaboratively with Partners but Could Take
Key Steps to Enhance and Sustain Collaboration in Counterpiracy Efforts:
As we reported in September 2010, U.S. agencies have generally
collaborated well with international and industry partners to counter
piracy; however, U.S. agencies could implement other key practices to
further enhance and sustain collaboration among U.S. interagency
partners. Industry partners play an important role in preventing and
deterring pirate attacks because they are responsible for implementing
self-protection measures on commercial vessels. Our September 2010
report includes more detail on the extent of this collaboration, but
we will highlight a few examples here:
* Collaboration with International Partners. U.S. agencies, primarily
State and DOD, have collaborated with international partners through
two organizations established to counter piracy off the Horn of
Africa. First, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia
(Contact Group) serves as an international forum for countries
contributing to the counterpiracy effort to share information that has
facilitated international, military coordination and established a
trust fund to support prosecution efforts. As part of the Contact
Group's efforts, the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration co-
chair a working group on shipping industry coordination, which has
reviewed and updated best management practices for industry self-
protection, and is developing guidance for seafarer training regarding
pirate attacks. Second, in 2008, as the leader of the Combined
Maritime Forces, the U.S. Navy, along with other international
partners, established Shared Awareness and Deconfliction meetings that
are intended to provide military coordination and information sharing
for naval patrols of pirate-infested waters.
* Partnering with Industry. U.S. agencies, primarily the Coast Guard
and the Maritime Administration, have worked with industry partners to
facilitate collaborative forums, share information, and develop joint
guidance for implementing counterpiracy efforts. Most recently, the
Coast Guard issued an updated version of Maritime Security Directive
104-6 in January 2011 amending the area at high risk of piracy and the
Maritime Administration issued an advisory in February 2011 that
addressed the piracy threat to yachts and recreational craft. For
those ship owners who choose or are required to carry armed security
teams, the Coast Guard and State have worked to identify viable
methods for doing so in accordance with applicable U.S.,
international, and port- state laws.[Footnote 9] In addition, the
Maritime Administration has developed training courses to inform
vessel crews about how to help prevent piracy and steps to take if
taken hostage.
U.S. government agencies have incorporated other key collaborative
practices, including developing an overarching strategy and
establishing mechanisms to share information with partners. As we
reported in September 2010, the NSC's Action Plan serves an
overarching strategy to guide U.S. interagency efforts and provides a
framework for interagency collaboration.[Footnote 10] Furthermore, in
certain circumstances, such as a pirate attack on a U.S.-flagged
vessel, the U.S. government uses the existing Maritime Operational
Threat Response process[Footnote 11]--part of the National Strategy
for Maritime Security--to facilitate a discussion among U.S. agencies
and decide on courses of action. For example, this response process
was activated for both the MV Maersk Alabama and SV Quest incidents.
Although the NSC and U.S. agencies have taken these collaborative
steps, we reported in September 2010 that the NSC could incorporate
two other key practices--assigning roles and responsibilities and
developing joint implementation guidance--to further enhance
interagency collaboration in counterpiracy efforts.[Footnote 12] As of
July 2010, the NSC had assigned roles and responsibilities for
implementing one of the 14 Action Plan tasks, providing persistent
interdiction to be performed by the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard.
Establishing roles and responsibilities can help agencies clarify
which agencies will lead or participate in activities, help organize
their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making.
Agencies could enhance collaboration by developing joint guidance to
implement and coordinate actions on several Action Plan tasks.
Effective joint guidance also addresses how agency activities and
resources will be aligned to achieve goals. In the absence of clearly
identified roles and responsibilities and joint implementation
guidance, agencies involved in countering piracy have made
comparatively more progress in implementing those Action Plan tasks
that fall firmly within one agency's area of expertise, such as Coast
Guard's enforcement of U.S.- regulated commercial-vessel compliance
with maritime security requirements and DOD's interdiction efforts.
In contrast, there are several tasks in the Action Plan for which
multiple agencies have relevant authorities, capabilities, or
interests, and on which less progress has been made. The NSC has not
identified roles and responsibilities for implementing these tasks,
and officials have acknowledged that the agencies have not developed
joint guidance to ensure their efforts work together efficiently and
effectively. For example:
* Strategic Communication. Multiple agencies are responsible for
communicating with various audiences about piracy, but there is no
governmentwide strategic communication plan in place to guide agency
efforts. According to State officials, State has drafted a
governmentwide counterpiracy strategic communication plan for
interagency review but as of March 2011, the department had not
finalized this plan.
* Disrupting Pirate Revenue. Multiple agencies collect or examine
information on pirates' financial activities, including DOD, Justice,
State, and the Treasury. However, officials agree that information
their agencies gather on pirate finances is not being systematically
analyzed, and it is unclear if any agency is using it to identify and
apprehend pirate leaders or financiers. U.S. efforts to track and
block pirates' finances in Somalia are hampered by the lack of
government and formal banking institutions there. According to Justice
officials, as of July 2010, the United States had not apprehended or
prosecuted any pirate leaders or enablers as provided for in the
Action Plan.
* Facilitating Prosecution of Suspected Pirates. Agencies face
challenges facilitating prosecution of suspected pirates without
defined roles and joint guidance. For example, after pirate attacks on
the USS Ashland and USS Nicholas, which resulted in the apprehension
of suspects, the U.S. government lacked interagency procedures for
transferring suspects and sharing costs among the agencies involved,
according to U.S. officials.
In September 2010, we reported that by enhancing interagency
collaboration, the NSC can reduce the risk of leaving gaps in its
counterpiracy efforts or the risk that agency efforts may overlap,
which could waste resources that could be applied to combat other
threats to national security, such as terrorism. We also recommended
that the NSC, in collaboration with the same federal departments,
clarify agency roles and responsibilities and develop joint guidance,
information sharing mechanisms, and other means to operate across
agency boundaries for implementing key efforts such as strategic
communication, disrupting pirate revenue, and facilitating
prosecution. Doing so could also help agency officials--who must
balance their time and resources among many competing priorities--more
fully and effectively carry out their roles in helping to repress
piracy and avoid duplication of effort. Agency officials we contacted
to prepare for this hearing were unaware of efforts to clarify agency
roles and responsibilities or develop joint guidance for implementing
key efforts. Commenting on our testimony statement, however, the NSS
provided a statement indicating that an ongoing MSIPC policy review is
examining roles and responsibilities and other implementation actions
to guide U.S. counterpiracy efforts. The recent statement from the NSS
official is encouraging and we continue to believe that actions are
needed to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration in U.S.
counterpiracy efforts, but currently it is too soon to know the impact
of the MSIPC review.
In closing, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, while U.S.
agencies have taken a collaborative approach in counterpiracy planning
and have taken many steps, the U.S. government faces escalating
challenges to meeting its objective of repressing piracy. These
challenges include inherent limits on the United States' ability to
influence industry and international partners and to encourage other
states to prosecute suspected pirates. In addition, the United States
must address the problem of piracy in an environment in which
counterpiracy efforts compete with other high-priority U.S. interests
in the region, and, as the NSC has acknowledged, longer-term efforts
to stabilize Somalia are needed to fully address the root causes of
piracy. Such challenges, along with the growing frequency and severity
of piracy off the Horn of Africa, provide a renewed a sense of urgency
to implement our recommendations to update the counterpiracy Action
Plan and take other steps to prevent, disrupt, and prosecute acts of
piracy.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy
to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have at this time.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions about this statement, please contact Stephen L. Caldwell
at 202-512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov, or John H. Pendleton at 404-679-
1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. In addition to the contacts named above, Susan
Ditto, Geoffrey Hamilton, Dawn Hoff, Brandon L. Hunt, Farhanaz
Kermalli, Ronald La Due Lake, Patricia Lentini, John Mingus, Amie
Steele, and Suzanne Wren made key contributions to this report. A full
list of staff acknowledgements for the September 2010 report can be
found in appendix VI of that report.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Maps and Statistics on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia:
This appendix provides several examples of the vast area in which
pirates operate and how piracy off the coast of Somalia has continued
to escalate. Pirate attacks have expanded from being close to the
eastern Somali shoreline in 2007, to targeting ships in the Gulf of
Aden in 2008, and since 2009 expanding east into the Indian Ocean,
south toward Madagascar, and north toward Oman. In addition, pirates
have captured more ships and taken more hostages each year from 2007
through 2010.
Figure 2: Somalia and a Comparison to the Eastern Coast of the United
States:
[Refer to PDF for image: map]
Map depicts areas in the Indian Ocean including the following:
Somalian coast line: approximately 1,880 coast miles;
Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor: between Yeman and
Somalia;
Line representing approximately 1,000 nautical miles from Somalia;
Comparison map of the East Coast of the U.S., showing approximately
1,880 coast miles.
Source: GAO (data), Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Figure 3: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of
Somalia, January 2007 to February 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map]
The map is interactive, as follows:
Interactivity instructions:
This map is interactive and uses color to distinguish years in the
electronic version of this report. For the print version, the map is
supplemented by a set of black and white maps that break out the data
by year, see figure 6.
Roll your mouse over the year in the legend box to see the data by
year.
Each dot represents a successful or attempted attack. The color of the
dot indicates the year of the incident.
Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data (data); Map
Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Figure 4: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Horn of
Africa, 2007 to 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Year: 2007;
Number of attempted attacks[A]: 19;
Number of successful attacks[A,B]: 11.
Year: 2008;
Number of attempted attacks[A]: 67;
Number of successful attacks[A,B]: 44.
Year: 2009;
Number of attempted attacks[A]: 170;
Number of successful attacks[A,B]: 48.
Year: 2010;
Number of attempted attacks[A]: 154;
Number of successful attacks[A,B]: 65.
Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data.
Note: Successful attacks include those that resulted in vessel
boardings or hijackings. The types of vessels attacked included: bulk
carriers, container ships, fishing vessels, passenger ships, research
vessels, roll-on roll-off ships, supply ships, tankers, tugs, and
yachts. These numbers are based on information provided by individual
vessels and therefore may be understated.
[End of figure]
Figure 5: Total Hostages Captured by Somali Pirates, 2007 to 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Year: 2007;
Total number of hostages: 163.
Year: 2008;
Total number of hostages: 815.
Year: 2009;
Total number of hostages: 867.
Year: 2010;
Total number of hostages: 1,065.
Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data.
[End of figure]
Figure 6: Successful and Attempted Pirate Attacks off the Coast of
Somalia, January 2007 to February 2011:
[Refer to PDF for image: 4 illustrated maps]
Maps for each year, 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010-11.
Maps depict the location of each attack occurring during the designated
time period.
Source: GAO analysis of International Maritime Bureau data (data); Map
Resources (map).
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005), and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP].
Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and
Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off
the Horn of Africa. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-856]. Washington, D.C.: September
24, 2010.
Coast Guard: Deployable Operations Group Achieving Organizational
Benefits, but Challenges Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-433R]. Washington, D.C.: April 7,
2010.
Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of
National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and
Information Sharing. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP]. Washington, D.C.: September
25, 2009.
Combating Illicit Financing: Treasury's Office of Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence Could Manage More Effectively to Achieve Its
Mission. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-794].
Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2009.
Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information,
but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-337]. Washington, D.C.: March 17,
2009.
Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were
Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-672]. Washington, D.C.: June 20,
2008.
Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International
Stabilization, Humanitarian, and Development Efforts. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-351]. Washington, D.C.: February
19, 2008.
Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in
Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity
Tankers. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-141].
Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007.
Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on
a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-316]. Washington, D.C.:
February 22, 2007.
Maritime Security: Information-Sharing Efforts Are Improving.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-933T]. Washington,
D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. Washington, D.C.: October 21,
2005.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See, for example, S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16,
2008).
[2] The White House NSC is the principal forum used by the President
of the United States for considering national security and foreign
policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet
officials and is part of the Executive Office of the President of the
United States. The function of the NSC is to advise and assist the
president on national security and foreign policies. The NSC also
serves as the president's principal arm for coordinating these
policies among various government agencies. On May 26, 2009, President
Obama merged the White House staff supporting the Homeland Security
Council (HSC) and the National Security Council into one National
Security Staff (NSS). The HSC and NSC each continue to exist in
statute as bodies supporting the president.
[3] GAO, Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan
and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy
off the Horn of Africa, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-856] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24,
2010).
[4] Sources include documents and statements from U.S. government and
foreign officials, international organizations, and shipping industry
representatives involved in counterpiracy operations and analysis. For
a listing of such sources, see appendix I of our September 2010 report.
[5] The flag state is the country in which the vessel is registered.
[6] The U.S. government previously had concluded a prosecution
arrangement with Kenya to accept transfers of suspected pirates.
According to officials at State, Kenya terminated its arrangement with
the United States and other partners in September 2010, but continues
to consider accepting transfers of suspects on a case-by-case basis.
[7] The Maritime Security Interagency Policy Committee (MSIPC) is a
high-level interagency group that is focused on maritime issues.
[8] We did not independently verify the data that support DOD's $64
million estimate.
[9] According to Maritime Administration officials and shipping
industry representatives, challenges remain that have made it
difficult to for U.S. vessels to transit the area with security teams
carrying weapons onboard, including restrictions in national or port-
state laws in the region.
[10] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce,
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2009).
[11] The Maritime Operational Threat Response is an interagency
process used during maritime security incidents. The response is
coordinated by a Global Maritime Operational Threat Response
Coordination Cell, a Department of Homeland Security office located at
the U.S. Coast Guard headquarters, and follows documented protocols
that, among other things, provide guidance on conducting coordination
activities.
[12] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005), and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP].
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
