Combating Terrorism
U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens Gao ID: GAO-11-561 June 3, 2011Denying safe haven to terrorists has been a key national security concern since 2002. Safe havens allow terrorists to train recruits and plan operations against the United States and its interests across the globe. As a result, Congress has required agencies to provide detailed information regarding U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. In this review, GAO assesses the extent to which (1) the Department of State (State) has identified and assessed terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism and (2) the U.S. government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting requirements. To address these objectives, GAO interviewed U.S. officials and analyzed national security strategies; State reporting; and country-level plans for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen.
State identifies existing terrorist safe havens in its annual "Country Reports on Terrorism" but does not assess them with the level of detail recommended by Congress. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) requires State to include in its annual "Country Reports on Terrorism" a detailed assessment of each foreign country used as a terrorist safe haven. It also recommends that State include, to the extent feasible, details in the report such as actions taken to address terrorist activities by countries whose territory is used as a safe haven. Since 2006, State has identified terrorist safe havens in its "Country Reports on Terrorism." In August 2010, State identified 13 terrorist safe havens, including the southern Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen. However, none of the assessments in State's August 2010 report included information on one of the four elements recommended by Congress--the actions taken by countries identified as having terrorist safe havens to prevent trafficking in weapons of mass destruction through their territories. Also, about a quarter of the assessments in State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism lacked information on another element recommended by Congress--the actions taken by countries identified as terrorist safe havens to cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. Including this information in State's reports could help better inform congressional oversight related to terrorist safe havens. The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. In IRTPA and the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010, Congress required the President to submit reports identifying such efforts. State responded to IRTPA with a 2006 report and subsequent annual updates to its "Country Reports on Terrorism." However, efforts identified in State's August 2010 report include only certain efforts funded by State and do not include some State and other U.S. government agency funded efforts, such as those of the Departments of Defense and Justice. For example, our discussions with agency officials and analysis of agency strategic documents identified at least 14 programs and activities not included in State's reporting that may contribute to denying terrorists safe haven in Yemen. According to officials from the National Security Staff, the National Security Council is responsible for producing the report required by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. As of March 2011, the report, which was due in September 2010, was not completed. According to agency officials, compiling such a list is challenging because it is difficult to determine if a given activity addresses terrorist safe havens or contributes to different, though possibly related, foreign policy objectives. While we recognize this challenge, a more comprehensive list that includes the efforts of all relevant agencies could provide useful information to Congress to enhance oversight activities, such as assessing U.S. efforts toward the governmentwide goal of denying terrorists safe haven. GAO recommends State and the National Security Council (NSC) improve reporting on assessments of and U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. State concurred with our recommendation on assessments. State partially concurred with our recommendation on U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens, citing other reports it completes related to counterterrorism. However, the additional reports cited by State do not constitute a governmentwide list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. The NSC reviewed our report but did not provide comments on its recommendations.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Charles M. Johnson Jr Team: Government Accountability Office: International Affairs and Trade Phone: (202) 512-7331GAO-11-561, Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
June 2011:
Combating Terrorism:
U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens:
GAO-11-561:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-561, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Denying safe haven to terrorists has been a key national security
concern since 2002. Safe havens allow terrorists to train recruits and
plan operations against the United States and its interests across the
globe. As a result, Congress has required agencies to provide detailed
information regarding U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens.
In this review, GAO assesses the extent to which (1) the Department of
State (State) has identified and assessed terrorist safe havens in its
Country Reports on Terrorism and (2) the U.S. government has
identified efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with
reporting requirements. To address these objectives, GAO interviewed
U.S. officials and analyzed national security strategies; State
reporting; and country-level plans for the Philippines, Somalia, and
Yemen.
What GAO Found:
State identifies existing terrorist safe havens in its annual Country
Reports on Terrorism but does not assess them with the level of detail
recommended by Congress. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) requires State to include in its annual
Country Reports on Terrorism a detailed assessment of each foreign
country used as a terrorist safe haven. It also recommends that State
include, to the extent feasible, details in the report such as actions
taken to address terrorist activities by countries whose territory is
used as a safe haven. Since 2006, State has identified terrorist safe
havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism. In August 2010, State
identified 13 terrorist safe havens, including the southern
Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen. However, none of the assessments in
State‘s August 2010 report included information on one of the four
elements recommended by Congress”the actions taken by countries
identified as having terrorist safe havens to prevent trafficking in
weapons of mass destruction through their territories. Also, about a
quarter of the assessments in State‘s August 2010 Country Reports on
Terrorism lacked information on another element recommended by
Congress”the actions taken by countries identified as terrorist safe
havens to cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. Including this
information in State‘s reports could help better inform congressional
oversight related to terrorist safe havens.
The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to
identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. In IRTPA and
the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010, Congress
required the President to submit reports identifying such efforts.
State responded to IRTPA with a 2006 report and subsequent annual
updates to its Country Reports on Terrorism. However, efforts
identified in State‘s August 2010 report include only certain efforts
funded by State and do not include some State and other U.S.
government agency funded efforts, such as those of the Departments of
Defense and Justice. For example, our discussions with agency
officials and analysis of agency strategic documents identified at
least 14 programs and activities not included in State‘s reporting
that may contribute to denying terrorists safe haven in Yemen.
According to officials from the National Security Staff, the National
Security Council is responsible for producing the report required by
the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. As of
March 2011, the report, which was due in September 2010, was not
completed. According to agency officials, compiling such a list is
challenging because it is difficult to determine if a given activity
addresses terrorist safe havens or contributes to different, though
possibly related, foreign policy objectives. While we recognize this
challenge, a more comprehensive list that includes the efforts of all
relevant agencies could provide useful information to Congress to
enhance oversight activities, such as assessing U.S. efforts toward
the governmentwide goal of denying terrorists safe haven.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends State and the National Security Council (NSC) improve
reporting on assessments of and U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe
havens. State concurred with our recommendation on assessments. State
partially concurred with our recommendation on U.S. efforts to address
terrorist safe havens, citing other reports it completes related to
counterterrorism. However, the additional reports cited by State do
not constitute a governmentwide list of U.S. efforts to address
terrorist safe havens. The NSC reviewed our report but did not provide
comments on its recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-561] or key
components. For more information, contact Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
The Country Reports on Terrorism Identifies Existing Terrorist Safe
Havens but Does Not Assess these Safe Havens as Recommended by
Congress:
The U.S. Government Has Not Fully Addressed Reporting Requirements to
Identify Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Terrorist Safe Haven Assessments as Included in State's
August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism:
Appendix III: Terrorist Safe Havens That Pose the Greatest Threats to
U.S. National Security:
Appendix IV: Profiles of Selected Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in
State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism:
Appendix V: State-Funded Efforts to Address Terrorist Safe Havens in
Selected Countries:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Selected Legislation and Associated Reporting Requirements
Related to Denying Terrorists Safe Haven:
Table 2: Details Recommended by Congress for Inclusion in State's
Terrorist Safe Haven Assessments:
Table 3: Extent to Which the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism
Includes Details on Terrorist Safe Havens Recommended Congress:
Table 4: U.S. Efforts to Address Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in
State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism:
Table 5: Non-State-Funded Efforts that May Contribute to Addressing
Terrorist Safe Havens in Selected Countries:
Table 6: Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in State's August 2010
Country Reports on Terrorism That Pose the Greatest Threat to U.S.
National Security as Identified by Subject Matter Experts:
Table 7: State-Funded Efforts to Address Terrorist Safe Havens in
Selected Countries and Their Inclusion in the August 2010 Country
Reports on Terrorism:
Figures:
Figure 1: Selected U.S. Government Strategic Documents Emphasizing the
Importance of Denying Safe Haven to Terrorists:
Figure 2: Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in State's August 2010
Country Reports on Terrorism:
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FACTS: Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System:
IRTPA: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004:
MSRP: mission strategic and resource plan:
State: Department of State:
Treasury: Department of the Treasury:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:
June 3, 2011:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: United States
Senate:
The Honorable John F. Tierney:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign
Operations: Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: House of
Representatives:
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management: Committee
on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
According to the 2010 National Security Strategy, denying safe haven
to terrorists is an essential component of the U.S. strategy to defeat
al Qaeda and its affiliates.[Footnote 1] In its August 2010 Country
Reports on Terrorism,[Footnote 2] the Department of State (State)
declared denying safe haven to terrorists central to combating
terrorism, which it cited as the United States' top security threat.
Terrorist safe havens provide security for terrorists, allowing them
to train recruits and plan operations. U.S. officials have concluded
that various terrorist incidents demonstrate the dangers emanating
from terrorist safe havens, such as the November 2008 attacks in
Mumbai, India, planned, in part, from safe havens in Pakistan, and the
attempted airliner bombing on December 25, 2009, planned from safe
havens in Yemen.
This report provides information on U.S. efforts to address physical
terrorist safe havens since 2005.[Footnote 3] Specifically, we assess
the extent to which (1) State has identified and assessed terrorist
safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism, and (2) the U.S.
government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe haven
consistent with reporting requirements.
To address our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed relevant national
security strategies, key congressional legislation, and planning
documents related to U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens.
Additionally, we discussed U.S. strategies, programs, and activities
related to terrorist safe havens with U.S. officials from the
Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ),
State, and the Treasury (Treasury); the Office of Management and
Budget; the National Security Staff; the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID); and the intelligence community. We also spoke to
subject matter experts from academia and governmental and
nongovernmental organizations.
To evaluate the extent to which State has identified and assessed
terrorist safe havens, we reviewed U.S. agency reports, such as
State's annual Country Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, we evaluated
assessments of terrorist safe havens included in State's August 2010
Country Reports on Terrorism against criteria recommended by Congress
in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA). Further, we interviewed U.S. agency officials to determine
the process and criteria used to identify and assess terrorist safe
havens, and spoke with subject matter experts to obtain their views on
the characteristics of and threats posed by terrorist safe havens
identified by State.
To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has identified
efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting
requirements, we reviewed agency budget documents, agency reports, and
interagency strategies against provisions included in IRTPA. For a
more detailed analysis of U.S. efforts to deny terrorists safe haven,
we selected three countries identified as having terrorist safe havens
by State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism--the Philippines,
Somalia, and Yemen. For these safe havens, we examined country-
specific strategies, such as mission strategic and resource plans, and
discussed efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe
havens with U.S. officials. We also considered information obtained
during our previous reviews of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe
havens in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. To obtain a more in-depth
understanding of specific programs and activities, we traveled to
Kenya (where State's Somalia unit is based) and the Philippines, where
we met with U.S. government personnel involved in efforts to address
terrorist safe havens in Somalia and the southern Philippines. We
planned to travel to Yemen but were unable to do so due to the
unstable security environment during the time of our review. Programs
and activities identified are meant to serve as examples of U.S.
efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens, not
an exhaustive list of efforts to address terrorist safe havens. Our
analysis does not include intelligence-related programs and
activities. See appendix I for more information on our objectives,
scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to June 2011
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
The Value of Safe Haven to Terrorist Groups:
According to State, a terrorist safe haven is an area of relative
security that can be exploited by terrorists to undertake activities
such as recruiting, training, fundraising, and planning operations.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(9/11 Commission) noted that the physical safe haven in Afghanistan
allowed al Qaeda the operational space to gather recruits and build
logistical networks to plan the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
Concluding that the dangers posed by terrorist safe havens were
significant, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the U.S. government
identify and prioritize terrorist safe havens, as well as develop
strategies to address them.
U.S. Strategic Documents Related to Terrorist Safe Havens:
The United States highlights the denial of safe haven to terrorists as
a key national security concern in a number of U.S. government and
agency strategic documents. For example, National Security Strategies
released in 2002, 2006, and 2010 emphasize the importance of denying
safe haven to terrorists. In addition, plans issued by various U.S.
agencies, such as DOD, DOJ, State, and USAID, as well as the National
Intelligence Strategy issued by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, include language emphasizing the importance of
addressing terrorist safe havens (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Selected U.S. Government Strategic Documents Emphasizing the
Importance of Denying Safe Haven to Terrorists:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Selected national strategies:
2010 National Security Strategy:
Deny safe havens and strengthen at-risk states: ’Wherever al-Qa‘ida or
its terrorist affiliates attempt to establish a safe haven...we will
meet them with growing pressure...These efforts will focus on
information-sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and establishing new
practices to counter evolving adversaries. We will also help
states...build their capacity for responsible governance and security
through development and security sector assistance.“
2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: Eliminate physical
safe haven:
’The War on Terror...involves the application of all instruments of
national power and influence to kill or capture the terrorists; deny
them safe haven and control of any nation; prevent them from gaining
access to WMD; render potential terrorist targets less attractive by
strengthening security; and cut off their sources of funding and other
resources they need to operate and survive.“
Selected agency strategic documents:
DOD:
National Military Strategic Plan:
’One of the most important resources to extremists is safe haven. Safe
havens provide the enemy with relative freedom to plan, organize,
train, rest, and conduct operations.“
State/USAID:
Strategic Plan:
’The most intractable safe havens exist astride international borders
and in regions where ineffective governance allows their presence; we
must develop the means to deny these havens to terrorists.
Intelligence community:
National Intelligence Strategy:
’Failed states and ungoverned spaces offer terrorist and criminal
organizations safe haven and possible access to weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)."
DOJ:
Strategic Plan:
’Deny safe havens to criminal organizations involved in drug-related
terrorist activities.“
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. and agency strategic documents.
[End of figure]
State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism coordinates
policies and programs of U.S. agencies to counter terrorism overseas.
According to State, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
works with all appropriate elements of the U.S. government to ensure
integrated and effective counterterrorism efforts that utilize
diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, law enforcement, and military
power. These elements include those in the White House, DOD, DHS, DOJ,
State, Treasury, USAID, and the intelligence community. The Office of
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism's role is to provide supervision
of international counterterrorism activities, including oversight of
resources. Its guiding principles reflect the goals of the National
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, including denying safe haven to
terrorists.
Legislative Reporting Requirements:
Congress has enacted several laws that require the submission of
reports to Congress on issues related to the denial of terrorist safe
havens. See table 1 for selected legislation.
Table 1: Selected Legislation and Associated Reporting Requirements
Related to Denying Terrorists Safe Haven:
Type: Assessment;
Report to include: Detailed assessments of terrorist safe havens;
Actor: State;
Legislation: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7102(d)(1)(D)); Frequency: Annual, to be
included in State's Country Reports on Terrorism.
Type: Assessment;
Report to include: Intelligence assessment that identifies and
describes each country or region that is a terrorist safe haven;
Actor: Director of National Intelligence; Legislation: Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Pub. L. No. 108-487, Section
305); Frequency: Once, to be completed by June 1, 2005.
Type: U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens; Report to
include: Report on strategy for addressing terrorist safe havens,
including information on tools and tactics to disrupt terrorist safe
havens[A]; Actor: President;
Legislation: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7120(b)); Frequency: Once, to be
completed by June 15, 2005.
Type: U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens; Report to
include: Updates, to the extent feasible, of the report on strategy,
including information on tools and tactics to disrupt terrorist safe
havens[A]; Actor: State;
Legislation: Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7102(d)(2)(E)); Frequency: Annual, to be
included in State's Country Reports on Terrorism.
Type: U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens; Report to
include: Counterterrorism status reports, including a list of U.S.
counterterrorism efforts relating to the denial of terrorist safe
havens; Actor: President;
Legislation: National Defense Authorization Act of 2010 (Pub. L. No.
111-84, Section 1242 (b)(1)(F)(iv)); Frequency: Three times, to be
completed September 30, 2010, 2011, and 2012.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. public law.
Note: This table does not include legislation with reporting
requirements related to specific safe havens, such as Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iraq.
[A] Specifically, Section 7120 of IRTPA requires the President to
submit a report to Congress on the activities of the U.S. government
to carry out provisions in the subtitle to IRTPA on Diplomacy, Foreign
Aid, and the Military in the War on Terrorism. The report was to
include a description of the strategy for addressing terrorist safe
havens, as well as a description of (1) terrorist safe havens that
exist, (2) efforts by the U.S. government to work with other countries
in bilateral and multilateral fora, and (3) long-term goals and
actions designed to reduce the conditions that allow for the formation
of terrorist safe havens.
[End of table]
In response to reporting requirements, State annually releases the
Country Reports on Terrorism. State's August 2010 report includes a
strategic overview of terrorist threats and a country-by-country
discussion of foreign government counterterrorism cooperation. In
addition, it includes chapters on weapons of mass destruction
terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism, designated foreign terrorist
organizations, and terrorist safe havens. According to State, the
Country Reports on Terrorism aims to enhance understanding of the
terrorist threat, as well as serve as a reference tool to inform
policymakers, the public, and U.S. foreign partners about U.S.
efforts, progress, and challenges in the campaign against
international terrorism. While released by State's Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Country Reports on Terrorism
incorporates the views of the National Counterterrorism Center and
National Security Staff, as well as other key agencies involved in
addressing international terrorism.
The Country Reports on Terrorism Identifies Existing Terrorist Safe
Havens but Does Not Assess these Safe Havens as Recommended by
Congress:
State identifies existing terrorist safe havens in its annual Country
Reports on Terrorism, but does not assess these safe havens with the
level of detail recommended by Congress. IRTPA[Footnote 4] requires
State to include a detailed assessment in its annual Country Reports
on Terrorism of each country whose territory is being used as a
terrorist sanctuary, also known as a terrorist safe haven.[Footnote 5]
The act further recommends that these assessments include, to the
extent feasible, details regarding the knowledge of and actions taken
to address terrorist activities by countries whose territory is being
used as a terrorist safe haven. While State has identified existing
terrorist safe havens since 2006, its assessments of these safe havens
do not always include the details recommended by Congress. For
instance, none of the assessments in State's August 2010 report
included information on the actions taken by countries identified as
having terrorist safe havens to prevent trafficking in weapons of mass
destruction through their territories. Including this information in
State's reporting could help inform congressional oversight related to
terrorist safe havens.
State Has Reported on Existing Terrorist Safe Havens Since 2006:
IRTPA requires State to include a detailed assessment in its annual
Country Reports on Terrorism with respect to each foreign country
whose territory is being used as a safe haven for terrorists or
terrorist organizations.[Footnote 6] To fulfill this requirement,
State first identifies and then assesses existing terrorist safe
havens.[Footnote 7] Since 2006, State has identified existing
terrorist safe havens in a dedicated chapter of its Country Reports on
Terrorism. In August 2010, State identified 13 terrorist safe havens.
See figure 2 for the terrorist safe havens identified.
Figure 2: Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in State's August 2010
Country Reports on Terrorism:
[Refer to PDF for image: world map]
Location of terrorist safe havens depicted on the map:
Afghanistan;
Colombia Border Region (Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela);
Iraq;
Lebanon;
Northern Iraq;
Pakistan;
Somalia;
Southern Philippines;
Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral (maritime boundaries of Indonesia,
Malaysia, and the Philippines);
Trans-Sahara (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger); Tri-Border Area
(Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay); Venezuela;
Yemen.
Sources: Department of State‘s August 2010 Country Reports on
Terrorism; Map Resources (map).
Interactive instructions:
The online version of this map is interactive. Hover your mouse over
each text box to read State‘s August 2010 assessment of why each
identified country or region is considered a terrorist safe haven. To
view these assessments in the offline version, please see appendix II.
[End of figure]
State has made few changes to the terrorist safe havens identified in
its report since the April 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism, which
identified 15 terrorist safe havens. Since that report, State has
removed two terrorist safe havens--the Afghan-Pakistan Border and
Indonesia--from the Country Reports on Terrorism. State officials
explained that the Afghan-Pakistan Border was removed in 2009, but
Afghanistan and Pakistan are each still identified as terrorist safe
havens to highlight the different safe haven issues facing each
country. State officials said that Indonesia was removed in 2008
because the country passed counterterrorism legislation and captured
several members of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah.
State's Safe Haven Assessments Do Not Include All Details Recommended
by Congress:
IRTPA includes congressional findings that the planning of complex
terrorist operations requires safe haven from government and law
enforcement interference and that terrorists remain focused on finding
such safe havens. Further, IRTPA states that it is the sense of
Congress that it should be U.S. policy to identify foreign countries
that are being used as terrorist sanctuaries and assess current U.S.
tools being used to assist foreign governments to eliminate these safe
havens. Accordingly, IRTPA requires State to include detailed
assessments of terrorist safe havens in its annual Country Reports on
Terrorism.[Footnote 8] IRTPA also states that these detailed
assessments should include, to the extent feasible, a variety of
provisions, including information regarding knowledge of and actions
to address terrorist activities taken by countries whose territory is
being used as a terrorist safe haven.[Footnote 9] See table 2 for a
list of these details.
Table 2: Details Recommended by Congress for Inclusion in State's
Terrorist Safe Haven Assessments:
Recommended details:
The extent of knowledge by the government of the country with respect
to terrorist activities in the territory of the country;
The actions of the country to eliminate terrorist safe havens in its
territory;
The actions of the country to cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism
efforts;
The actions of the country to prevent the proliferation of and
trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in and through the
territory of the country.
Source: GAO analysis of 22 U.S.C. § 2656f and IRTPA.
[End of table]
In its Country Reports on Terrorism, State includes a terrorist safe
havens chapter with assessments of each terrorist safe haven it
identifies to explain why that country or region has been classified
as a terrorist safe haven. However, our analysis of the assessments in
State's August 2010 report determined that, while State included
information on each identified terrorist safe haven, State did not
assess them with the level of detail recommended by Congress. For
instance, our evaluation determined that while State generally
included information on the extent of knowledge by the government of
the country with respect to terrorist activities, it did not include
any information in its assessments about the actions countries took to
prevent the proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass
destruction in and through their territories.
We also analyzed the "country reports" chapter of State's August 2010
report and found that some of the information not included in the
assessments in the terrorist safe haven chapter was contained in the
country reports chapter. For instance, the country report for Yemen
contained information regarding the Yemeni government's actions to
cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. However, like the
terrorist safe haven assessments, none of these country reports
contained information regarding the actions that countries took to
prevent the proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass
destruction in and through their territories. Table 3 shows the number
of safe havens for which State included the recommended details.
Table 3: Extent to Which the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism
Includes Details on Terrorist Safe Havens Recommended Congress:
Recommended detail: The extent of knowledge by the government of the
country with respect to terrorist activities in the territory of the
country; Number of safe havens for which recommended details were
included: 13 of 13.
Recommended detail: The actions of the country to eliminate terrorist
safe havens in its territory; Number of safe havens for which
recommended details were included: 11 of 13.
Recommended detail: The actions of the country to cooperate with U.S.
counterterrorism efforts; Number of safe havens for which recommended
details were included: 9 of 13.
Recommended detail: The actions of the country to prevent the
proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in and
through the territory of the country; Number of safe havens for which
recommended details were included: 0 of 13.
Source: GAO analysis of State's August 2010 Country Reports on
Terrorism.
[End of table]
State officials agreed that details related to the trafficking of
weapons of mass destruction through terrorist safe havens were not
included in its August 2010 report. These officials stated that time
constraints and a limited number of staff present challenges to
including these details in the terrorist safe haven assessments.
Despite these challenges, officials told us that, after reviewing our
analysis, they will gather--and believe they will be able to include--
details regarding weapons of mass destruction in the Country Reports
on Terrorism to be released in 2011. In previous reporting, we have
found that assessments can be used to define requirements and properly
focus programs to combat terrorism.[Footnote 10] Moreover, in IRTPA,
Congress has said that it should be U.S. policy to assess U.S. efforts
to assist foreign governments to address terrorist safe havens. As
such, including all of the details recommended by Congress in the safe
haven assessments in State's Country Reports on Terrorism could help
improve congressional understanding and inform congressional oversight
related to terrorist safe havens.
The U.S. Government Has Not Fully Addressed Reporting Requirements to
Identify Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven:
The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to
identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. Congress
required the President to submit reports outlining U.S. government
efforts to deny or disrupt terrorist safe havens in two laws, IRTPA
and the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. While
reports produced in response to IRTPA contain some information on U.S.
efforts to address terrorist safe havens, none provides a
comprehensive, governmentwide list of U.S. efforts. According to
agency officials, compiling a list of U.S. efforts is challenging
because of difficulties determining which U.S. efforts specifically
address terrorist safe havens. However, a more comprehensive list of
U.S. efforts would enhance oversight activities, such as assessing
U.S. efforts toward the governmentwide goal of denying safe haven to
terrorists.
Country Reports on Terrorism Has Not Fully Identified U.S. Efforts to
Deny Terrorists Safe Haven:
IRTPA required the President to submit a report to Congress that
includes an outline of the strategies, tactics, and tools of the U.S.
government for disrupting or eliminating the security provided to
terrorists by terrorist safe havens.[Footnote 11] IRTPA also
recommended that State update the report annually, to the extent
feasible, in its Country Reports on Terrorism.[Footnote 12] IRTPA
notes that it is the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of
the United States to implement a coordinated strategy to prevent
terrorists from using safe havens and to assess the tools used to
assist foreign governments in denying terrorists safe haven.
In response to IRTPA provisions, State submitted a report to Congress
in April 2006, which it has updated annually as part of its Country
Reports on Terrorism. These reports include a section on U.S.
strategies, tactics, and tools that identifies several U.S. efforts to
address terrorist safe havens. In the August 2010 Country Reports on
Terrorism, State identified several U.S. efforts for addressing
terrorist safe havens, including programs such as State's Regional
Strategic Initiative, Rewards for Justice, and Antiterrorism
Assistance programs. See table 4 for the list of U.S. efforts
identified in State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism.
[Footnote 13]
Table 4: U.S. Efforts to Address Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in
State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism:
Identified effort: Antiterrorism Assistance; Description: Builds
partner counterterrorism law enforcement capacity.
Identified effort: Countering Violent Extremism; Description: Aims to
prevent at-risk individuals from turning to extremist violence,
amplify credible voices that reject extremist violence, and persuade
disengaged terrorists to renounce violence.
Identified effort: Counterterrorist Finance Training; Description:
Assists U.S. partners in detecting, isolating, and dismantling
terrorist financial movements and networks to deprive terrorists of
funding for their operations.
Identified effort: Designation of Foreign Terrorists and Terrorist
Organizations; Description: Blocks funding of terrorists and their
supporters and promotes international cooperation against them.
Identified effort: Middle East Partnership Initiative; Description:
Seeks to build partnership between the United States and citizens of
the Middle East to support the development of more prosperous,
successful, participatory, and pluralistic societies.
Identified effort: Rewards for Justice; Description: Offers and pays
rewards for (1) information that prevents or successfully resolves an
act of international terrorism against U.S. persons or property or (2)
information that leads to the location of key terrorist leaders.
Identified effort: Regional Security Initiative; Description: Enables
ambassadors and their country teams to coordinate counterterrorism
strategies across borders to help host nations understand threats and
strengthen their political will and capacity to counter them.
Identified effort: Terrorist Interdiction Program/Personal
Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System; Description:
Implements biometric capabilities to assist partner nations to
correctly identify and track individuals entering and departing
countries by land, sea, and airports of entry.
Source: GAO analysis of State's August 2010 Country Reports on
Terrorism and Congressional Budget Justification documents.
Note: The Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center, Millennium Challenge
Account, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries, and Multilateral Debt Relief
Initiative have been included in earlier versions of the Country
Reports on Terrorism but do not appear in the August 2010 Country
Reports on Terrorism. The Proliferation Security Initiative and the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative/Program have also been
included in previous reports and are mentioned in the August 2010
Country Reports on Terrorism, but not in the chapter on terrorist safe
havens.
[End of table]
However, State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism did not
include some U.S. efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist
safe havens according to our review of related budget information,
strategic documents, and discussions with U.S. officials.
Specifically, the list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe
havens in the Country Reports on Terrorism did not include (1) all of
the programs and activities State funds to address terrorist safe
havens and (2) programs and activities funded by agencies other than
State, such as DOD, DOJ, and Treasury that may contribute to
addressing terrorist safe havens.
Some State-Funded Efforts Are Not Included:
State's budget information, strategic documents, and discussions with
State officials indicate that some State-funded efforts that may
contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens were not included in
the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism.
* First, budget information in State's Foreign Assistance Coordination
and Tracking System (FACTS) identifies programs and activities to
eliminate safe havens that were not included in State's August 2010
Country Reports on Terrorism.[Footnote 14] State identified in its
budget database budget accounts that fund programs and activities for
eliminating safe havens. However, certain activities funded by four of
these accounts were not included in State's August 2010 Country
Reports on Terrorism.[Footnote 15] For example, activities in Chad, a
Trans-Saharan country, funded by the development assistance budget
account were identified in FACTS as eliminating safe havens, as were
some activities in Pakistan funded through the Economic Support Fund.
However, neither of these budget accounts was included in State's
August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism.[Footnote 16]
* Second, selected State strategic documents identify additional
efforts funded by State that may contribute to denying terrorists safe
haven but were not included in the August 2010 Country Reports on
Terrorism. For the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen,[Footnote 17] we
reviewed each country's fiscal year 2012 mission strategic and
resource plan (MSRP), submitted in April 2010, which included program
funding information for goals related to addressing terrorist safe
havens for fiscal years 2009 through 2015.[Footnote 18] (For more
information on these three countries, see appendix IV.) Our review
identified several examples of State-funded efforts that may
contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens but were not included
in State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. For example, the
Yemen MSRP indicates that the State-funded Foreign Military Financing
program contributed to addressing safe havens in Yemen by funding
activities to support border security and counter piracy. In addition,
the MSRP for the Philippines included Foreign Military Financing
program activities to sustain progress in developing the Philippine
Defense Department capability to address terrorist safe havens.
However, this program was not included in State's August 2010 Country
Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, USAID development assistance in the
Philippines focuses on mitigating conflict, increasing economic
opportunities, strengthening health services, and improving education,
which, according to the country's MSRP, can inhibit terrorists from
exploiting those living under marginal conditions. Development
assistance was not included in State's August 2010 report.
* Third, according to State officials, additional efforts undertaken
by State, but not identified in State's August 2010 Country Reports on
Terrorism, may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. For
example, State officials indicated that activities funded through
State's Peacekeeping Operations account contributed to addressing the
terrorist safe haven in Somalia because it helped the Transitional
Federal Government of Somalia keep the terrorist group al-Shabaab from
gaining control of the country's capital city, Mogadishu. In addition,
State's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs funded a
DOJ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
effort in the Philippines that may contribute to addressing the
terrorist safe haven in that country by providing police development
and capacity building programs in areas used by terrorists for illicit
travel. Similarly, officials indicated that State-funded Immigrations
and Customs Enforcement training for Filipino and Yemeni officials to
combat money laundering and bulk cash smuggling may contribute to
addressing the safe havens in their countries. State-funded
Peacekeeping Operations, the International Criminal Investigative
Training Assistance Program, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
training programs were not included in State's August 2010 Country
Reports on Terrorism.
In total, our analysis identified nine examples of State-funded
efforts in the Philippines, four examples in Somalia, and nine
examples in Yemen not included in State's August 2010 Country Reports
on Terrorism that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens.
Table 7 in appendix V describes U.S. efforts funded by State to
address terrorist safe havens as identified by agency officials or
MSRPs for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen and indicates which of
these efforts were included in State's August 2010 report.
Agency officials explained that compiling a list of U.S. efforts, such
as the one in State's Country Reports on Terrorism, is challenging
because of difficulties determining which U.S. efforts specifically
address terrorist safe havens. According to State and USAID officials,
counterterrorism programs and activities may simultaneously contribute
to multiple foreign policy goals. For example, according to State
officials, U.S. programs assisting refugees on the Somali border may
be considered as combating violent extremism or denying terrorists
safe haven. Similarly, USAID officials explained that governance
programs in Yemen aim to help local governments meet community needs,
but in doing so may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens in
Yemen by shrinking the terrorists' operating spaces in those
communities. However, documents authored and databases managed by
State contain information on additional U.S. efforts to address
terrorist safe havens that would be feasible to include in State's
reporting.
Efforts Funded by Other U.S. Agencies Are Not Included:
Our discussions with officials from various agencies and our review of
MSRPs from the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen indicate that State's
reports also do not include efforts funded by agencies other than
State that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens.
* First, officials from DOD, DOJ, and Treasury indicated that their
agencies fund efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe
havens. Officials from DOD indicated that DOD-funded activities to
build capacity of foreign partners' security forces to combat
terrorism are key DOD efforts to address terrorist safe havens. For
example, some DOD train and equip activities funded through the
department's Global Train and Equip "Section 1206" and country-
specific funding accounts, such as the Afghanistan and Iraq Security
Forces Funds, contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. For
example, DOD has used Section 1206 funding to conduct train and equip
programs to build the capacity of security forces in Yemen and the
Philippines to conduct counterterrorism operations. U.S. Coast Guard
officials indicated that some coastal security training and technical
assistance activities funded largely by DOD and implemented by the
U.S. Coast Guard may also contribute to addressing terrorist safe
havens in Yemen and the Philippines.
* Second, our review of MSRPs for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen
indicated that additional efforts funded by agencies other than State
and not included in State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism
may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. For example, the
safe haven-related goal in the fiscal year 2012 MSRP for the
Philippines indicated that efforts will be made through the DOD Joint
Special Operations Task Force-Philippines to enhance counterterrorism
capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The safe haven-
related goal in Yemen's fiscal year 2012 MSRP indicated that DOJ's
Federal Bureau of Investigation legal attachés participate in
activities that empower Yemeni law enforcement officials to better
identify and prosecute suspected terrorists. These efforts were not
included in State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism.
In total, our analysis identified seven examples of non-State-funded
efforts in the Philippines, one example in Somalia, and five examples
in Yemen that were not included in State's August 2010 Country Reports
on Terrorism that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens,
as shown in table 5.
Table 5: Non-State-Funded Efforts that May Contribute to Addressing
Terrorist Safe Havens in Selected Countries:
Selected country: The Philippines; Funding agency: DOD;
Identified efforts: Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines
enabling activities; Example activities: Engagement to enable Armed
Forces of the Philippines capacity to plan and execute Civil Military
Operations.
Selected country: The Philippines; Funding agency: DOD;
Identified efforts: Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group capacity
building activities; Example activities: Engagement to build Armed
Forces of the Philippines capacity to plan and execute Civil Military
Operations.
Selected country: The Philippines; Funding agency: DOD;
Identified efforts: Global Train and Equip "Section 1206" program;
Example activities: Equipment and training to enhance Philippines'
national military capacity to conduct CT operations.
Selected country: The Philippines; Funding agency: DOD[A];
Identified efforts: Coast Guard equipment[B]; Example activities:
Provision of Coast Guard ship.
Selected country: The Philippines; Funding agency: DOD;
Identified efforts: Counterterrorism Fellowship Program professional
education; Example activities: Special Operations Combating Terrorism
course.
Selected country: The Philippines; Funding agency: DOJ;
Identified efforts: Federal Bureau of Investigations Legal Attaché;
Example activities: Counterterrorism Financing and Money Laundering
training.
Selected country: The Philippines; Funding agency: Treasury;
Identified efforts: U.S. Treasury Technical Assistance Programs;
Example activities: Training to build foreign financial intelligence
unit capacity.
Selected country: Somalia;
Funding agency: DOJ;
Identified efforts: Federal Bureau of Investigations Legal Attaché
activities; Example activities: Collaboration with the Transitional
Federal Government in Somalia.
Selected country: Yemen;
Funding agency: DOD;
Identified efforts: Global Train and Equip "Section 1206" program;
Example activities: Equipment and training to provide the Yemeni
Border Security Force with the capability to deter, detect, and detain
terrorists along Yemen's borders with Saudi Arabia, and Oman.
Selected country: Yemen;
Funding agency: DOD;
Identified efforts: Section 1205 authority to train and equip Yemeni
Ministry of Interior Counterterrorism Force; Example activities: Train
and equip activities with the Yemeni Ministry of Interior
Counterterrorism Force.
Selected country: Yemen;
Funding agency: DOD;
Identified efforts: Coast Guard equipment[A]; Example activities:
Delivery of water craft.
Selected country: Yemen;
Funding agency: DOD;
Identified efforts: Counterterrorism Fellowship Program professional
education; Example activities: Mobile education team counterterrorism
training.
Selected country: Yemen;
Funding agency: DOJ;
Identified efforts: Federal Bureau of Investigations Legal Attaché;
Example activities: Training and mentoring activities.
Sources: GAO analysis of MSRPs, interviews with U.S. agency officials,
and U.S. agency data.
[A] DOD is providing the cutter ship to the Philippines as a no-cost
excess defense article.
[B] The Coast Guard is a DHS component; however, Coast Guard capacity
building activities are funded primarily by DOD. State also sometimes
contributes funding for these activities.
[End of table]
IRTPA calls for a report on the activities of the U.S. government to
address terrorist safe havens, and a stated intention of the Country
Reports on Terrorism is to provide policymakers with an overview of
U.S. counterterrorism efforts. As such, State's report is incomplete
without including the contributions of its various interagency
partners to address terrorist safe havens. As this information is
included in State documents, and State approves certain activities
funded by other agencies such as DOD's Section 1206 and 1205 programs,
it is feasible for State to include this information in its annual
report.
The National Security Council Has Not Completed the Required Report
Identifying U.S. Efforts to Deny Terrorists Safe Haven:
In addition to the provisions in IRTPA, Congress demonstrated an
ongoing interest in the identification of U.S. efforts to deny
terrorist safe havens in the National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year 2010. The conference report accompanying the act noted
that existing executive branch reporting on counterterrorism does not
address the full scope of U.S. activities or assess overall
effectiveness. The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year
2010 requires the President to submit a report to Congress on the U.S.
counterterrorism strategy, including an assessment of the scope,
status, and progress of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in fighting al
Qaeda and its affiliates and a list of U.S. counterterrorism efforts
relating to the denial of terrorist safe havens. The act required the
President to produce this report by September 30, 2010, and every
September 30th until September 30, 2012. According to the act, the
report is to be submitted in an unclassified form to the maximum
extent practicable and accompanied by a classified appendix, as
appropriate.[Footnote 19] According to the conference report
accompanying the act, the required report would help Congress in
conducting oversight, enhance the public's understanding of how well
the government is combating terrorism, and assist the administration
in identifying and overcoming related challenges.
According to the President's National Security Staff, the National
Security Council has been assigned responsibility for completing the
report required under the National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year 2010. However, officials on the national security staff--
who are taking the lead in drafting the report--stated that while they
were working on a draft, no report had been submitted to Congress as
of March 2011. They were unsure when the report--including information
requested by Congress to assist it in assessing the success of
counterterrorism efforts to deny terrorists safe haven--would be
completed.
Conclusions:
Given that dismantling terrorist safe havens is a top U.S. national
security priority, it is important that accurate assessments of and
comprehensive information on terrorist safe havens and U.S. efforts to
address them is available. Congress has expressed its desire to
receive this type of information in order to better understand the
status of efforts related to terrorist safe havens and to better
assess U.S. efforts to address them. While some reports have been
provided to Congress on these issues, critical details recommended by
Congress are not included in these documents, such as complete
assessments of the actions taken by countries identified as terrorist
safe havens to address terrorist activities. Further, despite multiple
requests from Congress, neither State nor the National Security
Council has compiled a list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe
havens that includes the contributions of all relevant U.S. agencies.
Providing this type of information to Congress could better define the
nature of the threats posed by terrorist groups, as well as the status
of and challenges faced by U.S. efforts to address them. Without this
information, Congress and other decision makers may lack facts
essential to assessing progress toward the U.S. goal of denying
terrorists safe haven, making decisions on the allocation of
resources, and conducting effective oversight.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the information provided to Congress and other decision
makers, we make the following three recommendations:
1. The Secretary of State should include in the Country Reports on
Terrorism detailed assessments of identified terrorist safe havens
using the provisions recommended by Congress in IRTPA.
2. The Secretary of State, in collaboration with relevant agencies as
appropriate, should include a governmentwide list of U.S. efforts for
addressing terrorist safe havens when it updates the report requested
under IRTPA.
3. The National Security Council, in collaboration with relevant
agencies as appropriate, should complete the requirements of the
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 to report to
Congress on a list of U.S. efforts related to the denial of terrorist
safe havens.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury,
USAID, the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security
Council, and members of the intelligence community for their review
and comment. State and DHS provided written comments, which are
reprinted in appendix VI and VII respectively. In addition, DOD, DHS,
DOJ, State, and the Office of Management and Budget provided technical
comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. The National
Security Council reviewed the report but did not provide comments on
its recommendations.
State concurred with our recommendation that it include detailed
assessments of terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on
Terrorism, and noted it will implement this recommendation in its
updated report to be released in 2011. Related to our recommendation
for State to include a governmentwide list of efforts to address
terrorist safe havens when it updates the report requested under the
IRTPA, State concurred that reporting on U.S. efforts to deny
terrorist safe havens should be more comprehensive. However, State did
not agree that such a list should be part of its annual Country
Reports on Terrorism, citing the fact that it completes other reports
related to counterterrorism. However, in the IRTPA, Congress
recommended that this information be included in the Country Reports
on Terrorism. Moreover, while it is possible that other reports
produced by State address IRTPA provisions, the antiterrorism
assistance report cited by State in its comments does not constitute a
governmentwide list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens,
as it does not include the contributions of key agencies such as DOD.
We maintain that such a list could assist decisionmakers in assessing
progress toward the U.S. goal of denying terrorist safe havens and
conducting effective oversight.
DHS concurred with our report, noting its acknowledgment of several
DHS training efforts to address terrorist safe havens in selected
countries. DHS also stated it will continue to support, as
appropriate, State and other relevant agency efforts to improve
reporting on terrorist safe havens.
We are sending copies of this report to DOD, DHS, DOJ, State,
Treasury, USAID, the Office of Management and Budget, the National
Security Council, and the intelligence community. In addition, the
report will be available on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions
to this report are listed in appendix VIII.
Signed by:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director: International Affairs and
Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This report provides information on U.S. efforts to address physical
terrorist safe havens since 2005. Specifically, we assess the extent
to which (1) the Department of State (State) has identified and
assessed terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism and
(2) the U.S. government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe
haven consistent with reporting requirements.
To address our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed relevant national
security strategies, key congressional legislation, and planning
documents related to U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens.
Additionally, we discussed U.S. strategies, programs, and activities
related to terrorist safe havens with U.S. officials from the
Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ),
State (State), and the Treasury (Treasury); the Office of Management
and Budget; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the
National Security Staff; and the intelligence community. We focused on
these agencies because they are involved in efforts that may
contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. We also spoke to 13
subject matter experts from academic, governmental, and
nongovernmental organizations. We selected experts who met at least
four of the following criteria: (1) knowledge of and experience in one
or more of the following areas: (a) identification of terrorist safe
havens or failed states, (b) factors that contribute to terrorist safe
havens, or (c) process of terrorist recruitment or radicalization; (2)
knowledge and experience regarding key safe havens; (3) travel to at
least one key safe haven country or region; (4) writing and publishing
of articles on key safe haven countries, regions, or issues; and (5)
knowledge of and experience in government, for-profit organizations,
nonprofit organizations, academia, or journalism.
To evaluate the extent to which State has identified and assessed
terrorist safe havens, we reviewed U.S. agency reports, such as
State's annual Country Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, we evaluated
assessments of terrorist safe havens included in the chapter specific
to terrorist safe havens in State's August 2010 Country Reports on
Terrorism against criteria recommended, to the extent feasible, by
Congress in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
(IRTPA). To evaluate the assessments, two analysts independently
analyzed the terrorist safe havens assessments against details
included in IRTPA. Those analysts then discussed and resolved any
differences in the results of their analyses; a supervisor reviewed
and approved the final results of the analysis. We also interviewed
U.S. agency officials to determine the process and criteria used to
identify, assess, and prioritize these terrorist safe havens, and
spoke with subject matter experts to obtain their views on the
characteristics of and threats posed by terrorist safe havens
identified by State.
To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has identified
efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting
requirements, we evaluated national counterterrorism and security
strategies; agency budget and planning documents, including reports
from State's Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System
(FACTS); and agency reports against requirements included in IRTPA.
Although we did not independently audit the funding data in the FACTS
database, and are not expressing an opinion on them, based on our
examination of the documents received and our discussions with
cognizant agency officials, we concluded that the FACTS data we
obtained were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
engagement. We also examined country-specific strategies related to
addressing terrorist safe havens by interviewing U.S. agency officials
and reviewing mission strategic and resource plans (MSRP) for three
countries identified as having terrorist safe havens--the Philippines,
Somalia, and Yemen. We selected these countries based on consideration
of the following criteria: (1) identification of a country or area as
a terrorist safe haven by State in its August 2010 Country Reports on
Terrorism, (2) priority placed on a particular safe haven as expressed
U.S. officials and subject matter experts, (3) consideration of
related GAO work, and (4) congressional interest. Our analysis does
not include intelligence-related efforts. We also considered
information obtained during our previous reviews of U.S. efforts to
address terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan,[Footnote 20] Pakistan,
[Footnote 21] and Iraq.[Footnote 22] To obtain a more in-depth
understanding of specific programs and activities, we traveled to
Kenya (where State's Somalia unit is located) and the Philippines,
where we met with U.S. government personnel involved in efforts to
address terrorist safe havens in Somalia and the southern Philippines.
We planned to travel to Yemen, but were unable to do so due to the
unstable security environment during the time of our review. To
supplement our understanding of U.S. efforts related to denial of
terrorist safe haven in Yemen we spoke with officials based in
Washington, D.C., from DOD, State, USAID, and the intelligence
community. We compiled our list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist
safe haven in the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen based on: (1) the
efforts identified by cognizant U.S. officials as those contributing
to addressing terrorist safe havens and (2) programs and activities
associated with MSRP goals related to addressing terrorist safe
havens. Programs and activities identified are meant to serve as
examples of U.S. efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist
safe havens not as an exhaustive list of efforts to address terrorist
safe havens.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to June 2011
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Terrorist Safe Haven Assessments as Included in State's
August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism:
Terrorist safe haven: Afghanistan; Assessments: "The Government of
Afghanistan, in concert with the International Security Assistance
Force and the international community, continued its efforts to
eliminate terrorist safe havens and build security, particularly in
the country's south and east where the main Taliban based insurgents
threatened stability. Many insurgent groups, including Taliban
elements, the Haqqani Network, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, al-Qa'ida
(AQ), and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, continued to use territory across the
border in Pakistan as a base from which to plot and launch attacks
within Afghanistan and beyond. Narcotics trafficking, poppy
cultivation, and criminal networks were particularly prevalent,
constituting a significant source of funding for the insurgency as
well as fueling corruption within Afghanistan. AQ leadership in
Pakistan maintained its support to militants conducting attacks in
Afghanistan and provided funding, training, and personnel to
facilitate terrorist and insurgent operations. Anti-Coalition
organizations continued to operate in coordination with AQ, Taliban,
and other insurgent groups, primarily in the east."
Terrorist safe haven: Colombia Border Region (Venezuela, Ecuador,
Peru, Panama, and Brazil); Assessments: "Columbia's borders with
Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Brazil include rough terrain and
dense forest cover. These conditions, coupled with low population
densities and historically weak government presence, create potential
safe havens for insurgent and terrorist groups, particularly the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The FARC, retreating in
the face of Colombian military pressures, thus operated with relative
ease along the fringes of Colombia's borders, and also uses areas in
neighboring countries along the border to rest and regroup, procure
supplies, and stage and train for terrorist attacks with varying
degrees of success. The FARC elements in these border regions often
engaged the local population in direct and indirect ways, including
recruitment and logistical assistance. This appeared to be less so in
Brazil and Peru where potential safe havens were addressed by stronger
government responses. Ecuador and Panama have responded with a mix of
containment and non-confrontation with Colombian narco-terrorist
groups, although some confrontations do occur depending on local
decisions and cross-border relations."
Terrorist safe haven: Iraq;
Assessments: "Iraq was not a terrorist safe haven in 2009, but
terrorists, including Sunni groups like al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI), and
Ansar al-Islam (AI), as well as Shia extremists and other groups,
viewed Iraq as a potential safe haven. Together, U. S. and Iraqi
security forces continued to make progress against these groups. The
significant reduction in the number of security incidents in Iraq that
began in the last half of 2007 continued through 2009, with a steady
downward trend in numbers of civilian casualties, enemy attacks, and
improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. AQI, although still
dangerous, experienced the defection of members, lost key mobilization
areas, suffered disruption of support infrastructure and funding, and
was forced to change targeting priorities. A number of factors have
contributed to the substantial degradation of AQI. The alliance of
convenience and mutual exploitation between AQI and many Sunni
populations has deteriorated. The Baghdad Security Plan, initiated in
February 2007, along with assistance from primarily Sunni tribal and
local groups, has succeeded in reducing violence to late 2005 levels
and disrupted and diminished AQI infrastructure, driving some
surviving AQI fighters from Baghdad and Anbar into the northern Iraqi
provinces of Ninawa, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. New initiatives with
tribal and local leaders in Iraq have led Sunni tribes and local
citizens to reject AQI and its extremist ideology. The continued
growth, professionalism, and improved capabilities of the Iraqi forces
have increased their effectiveness in rooting out terrorist cells.
Iraqis in Baghdad, Anbar and Diyala Provinces, and elsewhere have
turned against AQI and were cooperating with the Iraqi government and
Coalition Forces to defeat it."
Terrorist safe haven: Northern Iraq; Assessments: "The Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK) maintained an active presence in northern Iraq,
from which it coordinated attacks into Turkey, primarily against
Turkish security forces, local officials and villagers who opposed the
organization. In October, the Turkish Parliament overwhelmingly voted
to extend the authorization for cross-border military operations
against PKK encampments in northern Iraq. Iraq, Turkey, and the United
States continued their formal trilateral security dialogue as one
element of ongoing cooperative efforts to counter the PKK. Iraqi
leaders, including those from the Kurdistan Regional Government,
continued to publicly state that the PKK was a terrorist organization
that would not be tolerated in Iraq. Turkish and Iraqi leaders signed
a counterterrorism agreement in October."
Terrorist safe haven: Lebanon;
Assessments: "Hizballah remained the most prominent and powerful
terrorist group in Lebanon, with deep roots among Lebanon's large Shia
community, which comprises at least one third of Lebanon's population.
The Lebanese government continued to recognize Hizballah, a U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, as a legitimate "resistance
group" and political party. Hizballah maintained offices in Beirut and
military-style bases elsewhere in the country and was represented by
elected deputies in parliament. AQ associated extremists also operated
within the country, though their presence was small compared to that
of Palestinian groups operating in Palestinian refugee camps who were
not aligned with AQ. The camps are officially controlled by the
Lebanese government. While the Lebanese Armed Forces do not have a day-
to-day presence in the camps, they have at times conducted operations
in the camps to combat terrorist threats."
Terrorist safe haven: Pakistan;
Assessments: "Despite increased efforts by Pakistani security forces,
al-Qa'ida (AQ) terrorists, Afghan militants, foreign insurgents, and
Pakistani militants continued to find safe haven in portions of
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), North-West
Frontier Province (NWFP), and Baluchistan. AQ and other groups such as
the Haqqani Network used the FATA to launch attacks in Afghanistan,
plan operations worldwide, train, recruit, and disseminate propaganda.
The Pakistani Taliban (under the umbrella moniker Tehrik-e-Taliban or
TTP) also used the FATA to plan attacks against the civilian and
military targets across Pakistan. Outside the FATA, the Quetta-based
Afghan Taliban and separate insurgent organizations such as Hizb-e-
Islami Gulbuddin used the areas in Baluchistan and the NWFP for safe
haven. Islamist Deobandi groups and many local tribesmen in the FATA
and the NWFP continued to resist the government's efforts to improve
governance and administrative control. Despite the August death of the
Pakistani Taliban's leader Baitullah Mehsud and Pakistani military
operations throughout the FATA and NWFP, the Pakistani Taliban, AQ,
and other extremist groups remained dangerous foes to Pakistan and the
international community. Despite international condemnation for its
November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) continued to
plan regional operations from within Pakistan. LT is an extremely
capable terrorist organization with a sophisticated regional network.
It continued to view American interests as legitimate targets. While
the Government of Pakistan has banned LT, it needs to take further
action against this group and its front organizations, which find safe
haven within Pakistan."
Terrorist safe haven: Somalia;
Assessments: "A small number of al-Qa'ida (AQ) operatives remained in
East Africa, particularly Somalia, where they posed a serious threat
to U.S. and allied interests in the region. These elements were
disrupted in late 2006 and early 2007 as a result of Ethiopian
military actions and again by the death of AQ operative Saleh Nabhan
in September 2009. Somalia remained a concern given the country's
long, unguarded coastline, porous borders, continued political
instability, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, all of which
provide opportunities for terrorist transit and/or safe haven and
increased the regional threat level. AQ remains likely to make common
cause with Somali extremists, most notably al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has
expanded its area of control during its protracted insurgency against
the Transitional Federal Government and particularly since the
withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in early 2009. The group controlled
most of southern Somalia at year's end."
Terrorist safe haven: Southern Philippines; Assessments: "Terrorist
operatives have sought safe haven in areas of the southern
Philippines, specifically in the Sulu archipelago and Mindanao.
Philippine government control and the rule of law in this area is weak
due to rugged terrain, poverty, and local Muslim minority resentment
of central governmental policies. In addition to Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
fugitives and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists, the New People's Army
and Rajah Solaiman Movement also operated in the southern Philippines."
Terrorist safe haven: Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral (maritime boundaries
of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines); Assessments: "In
Southeast Asia, the terrorist organizations Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) have sought safe haven in the vicinity of the
Sulawesi Sea and the Sulu Archipelago, which encompasses the maritime
boundaries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The area's
thousands of islands make it a difficult region for authorities to
monitor, while a range of licit and illicit activities that occur there
- worker migration, tourism, and trade, for example - pose another
challenge to identifying and countering the terrorist threat. Although
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have improved their efforts
to control their shared maritime boundaries, the expanse nevertheless
remains difficult to control. Surveillance is improved but remains
partial at best, and traditional smuggling and piracy groups have
provided an effective cover for terrorist activities, such as movement
of personnel, equipment, and funds."
Terrorist safe haven: Trans-Sahara (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and
Niger); Assessments: "The primary terrorist threat in this region was
al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM was based primarily in
northeastern Algeria but factions also operated from a safe haven in
northern Mali, from which they transited areas of the Maghreb and
Sahel, especially Mali, Niger, and Mauritania. AQIM continued to
conduct small scale ambushes and attacks on Algerian security forces
in northeastern Algeria, but in 2009 the group was not able to conduct
the "spectacular" attacks that were more common a few years ago such
as their bombing of the UN and Algerian government buildings. AQIM
factions in northern Mali used the safe haven to conduct kidnappings
for ransom and murder of Western hostages and to conduct limited
attacks on Malian and Mauritanian security personnel. AQIM derived
financial support from the ransoms it collected, which were used to
sustain the organization and plan further terrorist operations. AQIM
routinely demanded the release of their operatives in custody in the
region and elsewhere as a condition of release of hostages. Regional
governments sought to take steps to counter AQIM operations, but there
was a need for foreign assistance in the form of law enforcement and
military capacity building in order to do so."
Terrorist safe haven: Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Paraguay, and
Brazil); Assessments: "No corroborated information showed that
Hizballah, HAMAS, or other Islamic extremist groups used the Tri-
Border Area (TBA) for military-type training or planning of terrorist
operations, but the United States remained concerned that these groups
use the region as a safe haven to raise funds. Suspected supporters of
Islamic terrorist groups, including Hizballah, take advantage of
loosely regulated territory and the proximity of Ciudad del Este,
Paraguay and Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil to participate in a wide range of
illicit activities and to solicit donations from within the sizable
Muslim communities in the region. The Argentine, Brazilian, and
Paraguayan governments have long been concerned with arms and drugs
smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, trafficking in persons,
and the manufacture and movement of contraband goods through the TBA.
Concerns about the region moved the three governments to invite the
United States to participate in the Three Plus One Group on Tri-Border
Area Security, which focuses on practical steps to strengthen
financial and border controls and enhance law enforcement and
intelligence sharing. Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay have made
notable strides in launching initiatives to strengthen law enforcement
institutions and cooperation, including developing financial
intelligence units, broadening border security cooperation, augmenting
information sharing among prosecutors responsible for counterterrorism
cases, and establishing trade transparency units."
Terrorist safe haven: Venezuela;
Assessments: "Corruption within the Venezuelan government and
military, ideological ties with the FARC, and weak international
counternarcotics cooperation have fueled a permissive operating
environment for narco-traffickers. Other than some limited activities,
such as the bombing of remote dirt airstrips on the border, there is
little evidence that the government of Venezuela is moving to improve
this situation in the near future. The FARC, as well as Colombia's
second largest rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN),
regularly used Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup, engage in
narcotics trafficking, as well as to extort protection money and
kidnap Venezuelans to finance their operations."
Terrorist safe haven: Yemen;
Assessments: "The security situation in Yemen continued to
deteriorate. As Saudi security forces have clamped down on terrorism
and foreign fighters have returned from Afghanistan and Pakistan,
Yemen's porous borders have allowed many terrorists to seek safe haven
within Yemen. Al-Qa'ida in Yemen (AQY) announced its merger with al-
Qa'ida (AQ) elements in Saudi Arabia in January 2009, creating al-
Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The creation of AQAP coincided
with fewer attacks within Yemen, possibly due to the desire of its
leadership to use Yemen as a safe haven for planning of future attacks
and recruitment because the central government lacks a strong presence
in much of the country. The absence of effective counterterrorism
legislation contributed to Yemen's appeal as a safe haven and
potential base of operations for terrorists. The Yemeni government's
response to the terrorist threat was intermittent, and its ability to
pursue and prosecute suspected terrorists remained weak for most of
the year due to a number of shortcomings, including the stalling of
draft counterterrorism in Parliament. The government's response
improved dramatically in December with security forces taking strong
action against a number of terrorist cells. Even with this turn of
events, the government was often distracted by the "Sixth War" of the
Houthi rebellion in the Sa'ada governorate in the north of the country
and political unrest in southern Yemen."
Source: GAO analysis of State's August 2010 Country Reports on
Terrorism.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Terrorist Safe Havens That Pose the Greatest Threats to
U.S. National Security:
We spoke with 13 subject matter experts with knowledge related to
terrorist safe havens. We asked these experts to determine which five
terrorist safe havens identified in the State's August 2010 Country
Reports on Terrorism posed the greatest risk to U.S. national security
(see table 6).
Table 6: Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in State's August 2010
Country Reports on Terrorism That Pose the Greatest Threat to U.S.
National Security as Identified by Subject Matter Experts:
Countries and regions: Pakistan;
Number of experts[A,B]: 12 of 12.
Countries and regions: Yemen;
Number of experts[A,B]: 10 of 12.
Countries and regions: Somalia;
Number of experts[A,B]: 9 of 12.
Countries and regions: Afghanistan; Number of experts[A,B]: 8 of 12.
Countries and regions: Iraq;
Number of experts[A,B]: 5 of 12.
Countries and regions: Trans-Sahara; Number of experts[A,B]: 2 of 12.
Countries and regions: Lebanon;
Number of experts[A,B]: 1 of 12.
Countries and regions: Colombia's Border Region; Number of
experts[A,B]: 0 of 12.
Countries and regions: Northern Iraq; Number of experts[A,B]: 0 of 12.
Countries and regions: Southern Philippines; Number of experts[A,B]: 0
of 12.
Countries and regions: Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral; Number of
experts[A,B]: 0 of 12.
Countries and regions: Tri-Border Area; Number of experts[A,B]: 0 of
12.
Countries and regions: Venezuela;
Number of experts[A,B]: 0 of 12.
Source: GAO interviews with subject matter experts.
[A] One expert chose not to identify the terrorist safe havens that
posed the greatest risk to U.S. national security. Therefore, our
results are presented based on the 12 experts who answered.
[B] While experts could identify up to five terrorist safe havens,
some chose to identify less than five.
[End of table]
Although included in State's August 2010 report, none of our experts
identified Colombia's border region, northern Iraq, the southern
Philippines, the Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral, the Tri-Border area, and
Venezuela as among the top five terrorist safe havens posing the
greatest risk to U.S. national security.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Profiles of Selected Terrorist Safe Havens Identified in
State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism:
Profiles on the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen can be found on the
following pages.
Terrorist Safe Havens: The Republic of the Philippines (Philippines)
Fact Sheet:
Key Facts About the Philippines:
Population: Approximately 102 million people live in the Philippines,
with about 35 percent of the population below the age of 15. The
Philippines‘ estimated population growth rate is the world‘s 60th
fastest.
Government: The Philippines is a republic with a legal system based on
Spanish and Anglo-American law. Its president, Benigno Aquino, has
been in office since June 2010.
Economy: The Philippines‘ 2010 gross domestic product was estimated at
about $353 billion, which represented a 7.3 percent growth rate that
year. This growth was spurred by consumer demand, exports, and
investments; yet because of high population growth rate and unequal
distribution of income, poverty worsened.
Programs and Activities to Address Terrorist Safe Haven in the
Philippines:
U.S. agencies have implemented a number of programs and activities to
address terrorist safe havens in the Philippines. Examples include:
* Training and equipping the Philippines‘ security forces through the
Department of Defense‘s Section 1206 program.
* Law enforcement training through the Department of State‘s
Antiterrorism Assistance.
* Police transformation training through the Department of Justice‘s
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program.
* Seaport interdiction training by the Department of Homeland Security‘
s Customs and Border Protection officials.
Figure: Map of the Philippines, depicting the capital of Manila:
Sources: GAO; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
U.S. Strategy in the Philippines:
U.S. strategy in the Philippines combines security and development
assistance to address several policy objectives, including
counterterrorism, economic growth, and the development of responsive
democratic institutions. To address the terrorist groups that find
safe haven on the islands of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, the
United States has deployed military personnel to train and assist the
Philippine armed forces and to engage in civil-military operations to
change the conditions that allow terrorist safe havens.
U.S. assistance to the Philippines has been more than $120 million in
each of the past three years, and $135 million has been requested for
fiscal year 2011. About 60 percent of this assistance has supported
development programs in Muslim areas of Mindanao and the Sulu
Archipelago with the aim of reducing the economic and political
conditions that foster extremist ideologies and activities. U.S.
military assistance is aimed primarily at Muslim insurgents and has
supported intelligence gathering, operations planning, and
communications support; supplied modern equipment; and provided U.S.
special operations advisors to assist two Philippine Regional
Combatant Commands in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.
Terrorist Groups in the Philippines:
The Department of State (State) reports that multiple terrorist groups
are active in the Philippines, including the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),
elements of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), and the New People‘s Army (NPA).
The National Counterterrorism Center described ASG as the most violent
of the Islamic separatist groups operating out of the southern
Philippines. State reports the ASG engages in kidnappings for ransom,
bombings, beheadings, assassinations, and extortion. The stated goal
of the group is to promote an independent Islamic state in heavily
Muslim populated areas of the southern Philippines.
JI is based in Indonesia, but believed to have elements in the
Philippines. The group‘s goal is the establishment of an Islamic
caliphate in Southeast Asia. In December 2000, JI was involved in
several bombings in Manila. A faction of the group was also
responsible for attacks in July 2009 at hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia.
NPA is the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
The group‘s aim is to overthrow the government through guerilla
warfare. The Philippine government reports NPA killed 132 soldiers and
55 civilians in 2009.
Other groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), are
also active in the southern Philippines. The MILF is a Muslim
separatist group seeking political autonomy. It has been reported that
without resolving political questions related to the MILF, instability
that could create the conditions for safe haven could persist in the
southern Philippines.
Challenges to Addressing Terrorist Safe Haven in the Philippines:
Cognizant U.S. officials and agency reports note several challenges to
addressing terrorist safe havens in the Philippines, including
lawlessness, corruption, and poor economic conditions.
* Lawlessness in the southern Philippines: According to State‘s
Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, Philippine government control and
the rule of law are weak due to rugged terrain, poverty, and local
Muslim minority resentment of central government policies.
* Corruption of local leaders and police: Officials told us that
corruption, as well as the limited capacity of the Philippine police,
is a major challenge to denying terrorists safe haven. Corruption is
rampant in the Philippine police, the group that implements law
enforcement approaches to denying safe haven.
* Poor economic conditions: Officials noted that poor economic
conditions in the Philippines contribute to an environment that allows
terrorist groups to increase recruitment. Economic development
programs are essential to reduce the conditions that allow for
terrorists to build safe havens in the Philippines.
Figure: Terrorist Attacks in the Philippines, 2005–2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2005;
Number of attacks: 139.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Number of attacks: 256.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Number of attacks: 219.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Number of attacks: 376.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Number of attacks: 279.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Number of attacks: 260.
Source: National Counterterrorism Center.
Note: The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System is the National
Counterterrorism Center's database of terrorist incidents. According
to the National Counterterrorism Center‘s definition, terrorism occurs
when groups or individuals acting on political motivation deliberately
or recklessly attack civilians or noncombatants or their property and
the attack does not fall into another special category of political
violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribal violence.
[End of figure]
[End of Philippines Fact Sheet]
Terrorist Safe Havens: Somalia Fact Sheet:
Key Facts About Somalia:
Population: An estimated 10 million people live in Somalia, with an
estimated 45 percent below the age of 15. Somalia‘s estimated
population growth rate is the 71st fastest in the world.
Government: Somalia has no permanent national government and no
national legal system. Transitional Federal President Sheikh Sharif
Sheikh Ahmed has been in office since January 2009.
Economy: Somalia‘s 2010 gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at
$6 billion, representing a growth of almost 3 percent that year.
Despite lacking an official national government, Somalia has
maintained an informal economy, largely based on livestock
(agriculture contributes about 40 percent of GDP), remittance and
money transfer companies, and telecommunications.
Programs and Activities to Address Terrorist Safe Haven in Somalia:
The Department of State (State), with the assistance of implementing
agencies, has put in place a number of programs and activities to
address terrorist safe havens in Somalia. Examples include:
* Augment the capacity of Somalia‘s emerging security forces to
identify and eliminate terrorists through State‘s Peacekeeping
Operations activities and security enhancement activities through State‘
s Antiterrorism Assistance program.
* Activities supporting the social reintegration of demobilized youth
through State‘s Economic Support Fund.
Figure: Map of Somalia, depicting the capital of Mogadishu.
Sources: GAO; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
U.S. Strategy in Somalia:
U.S. strategy in Somalia is described as ’dual-track“”providing
continued support to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of
Somalia and also recognizing the potential role of other actors in
ending conflict and establishing basic governing institutions. Efforts
include, among other things, degrading the abilities of al-Shabaab-”a
designated foreign terrorist organization based in Somalia-”and
increasing the capacity of the TFG while also increasing engagement
and support for Somaliland, Puntland, and local administrative
entities and civil society groups. The administration has requested
almost $85 million for State and the U.S. Agency for International
Development assistance for fiscal year 2011 to continue conflict
mitigation, governance, and economic growth programs in Somalia.
In addition, the Partnership for Regional East African
Counterterrorism is the current State strategy for long-term
engagement and capacity building in East Africa to combat evolving
terrorism threats in, and emanating from, the Horn of Africa and along
the Swahili Coast. The Partnership for Regional East African
Counterterrorism aims to, among other things, contain and reduce the
operational capacity of terrorist networks in Somalia; deter and
reduce the appeal of and support for violent extremism across East
Africa; and improve and expand border security in East Africa,
particularly around Somalia.
Terrorist Groups in Somalia:
Al-Shabaab”also known as the Mujahideen Youth Movement, among other
names”is the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council
that took control of most of southern Somalia in the latter part of
2006. In a 2-week war during December 2006 and January 2007, the
Somalian government and Ethiopian forces defeated the Somali Islamic
Courts Council. Since that time, al-Shabaab has led an insurgency
against the TFG and international peacekeepers in Somalia. At various
times during the last 4 years, the group has controlled strategic
locations in southern and central Somalia.
According to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), al-Shabaab
is not monolithic in its goals. State reports that many rank and file
members of al-Shabaab are interested in issues within Somalia, rather
than pursuing a global agenda. However, NCTC and State note that
members of al-Shabaab‘s core leadership is linked ideologically to al
Qaeda and that some members of the group previously trained and fought
with al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility
for several bombings and shooting throughout Somalia, as well as
assassinations of government officials, journalists, and peace
activists. The group also claimed responsibility for suicide bomb
attacks in Kampala, Uganda, in July 2010, which killed more than 70
people.
Challenges to Addressing Terrorist Safe Haven in Somalia:
U.S. officials and agency reports note several challenges to addressing
terrorist safe havens in Somalia, including limited access to the
country as well as the lack of a central government.
* Limited access: U.S. officials told us that because the United States
does not have an embassy in Somalia and few personnel are allowed
to travel there for safety reasons, implementing programs in the
country is complicated. For example, the absence of U.S. diplomatic
presence makes monitoring the implementation of security assistance
activities difficult.
* Lack of a central government: Officials stated that a lack of a
central government in Somalia limits the number of credible partners
with which U.S. agencies can work to implement assistance programs.
According to officials, this void legally constrains agencies‘ ability
to use resources from some security assistance programs, such as
Global Train and Equip ’Section 1206“ and Foreign Military Financing,
to undertake assistance activities in Somalia.
Figure: Terrorist Attacks in Somalia, 2005–2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2005;
Number of attacks: 25.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Number of attacks: 31.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Number of attacks: 413.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Number of attacks: 448.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Number of attacks: 501.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Number of attacks: 589.
Source: National Counterterrorism Center.
Note: The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System is NCTC‘s database of
terrorist incidents. According to NCTC definition, terrorism occurs
when groups or individuals acting on political motivation deliberately
or recklessly attack civilians or noncombatants or their property and
the attack does not fall into another special category of political
violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribal violence.
[End of figure]
[End of Somalia Fact Sheet]
Terrorist Safe Havens: Republic of Yemen (Yemen) Fact Sheet:
Key Facts About Yemen:
Population: Approximately 24 million people live in Yemen, with 43
percent of its population below the age of 15. Yemen‘s estimated
population growth rate is the 23rd fastest in the world.
Government: Yemen is a republic with a legal system based on Islamic
law, Turkish law, English common law, and local tribal customary law.
Ali Abdullah Saleh, who served as the president of the Yemen Arab
Republic (North Yemen) from 1978 to 1990, has been the president of
Yemen since May 1990.
Economy: Yemen‘s 2010 gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at
about $62 billion. Petroleum accounts for nearly 25 percent of Yemen‘s
GDP. As oil resources have declined, Yemen has tried reforms to
diversify its economy. Despite these actions, Yemen faces long term
challenges, including declining water resources and rapidly expanding
population.
Programs and Activities to Address Terrorist Safe Haven in Yemen:
U.S. agencies have implemented a number of programs and activities to
address terrorist safe havens in Yemen. Examples include:
* Training and equipping Yemeni security forces through the Department
of Defense‘s (DOD) Section 1206 program.
* Anticorruption training through the Department of Justice‘s (DOJ)
Overseas and Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training program.
* Airport security and police training through the Department of
State‘s (State) Antiterrorism Assistance program.
Figure: Map of Yemen, depicting the capital of Sanaa.
Sources: GAO; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
U.S. Strategy in Yemen:
U.S. strategy in Yemen, as articulated by the White House, takes a
comprehensive approach, including both security assistance to counter al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and development assistance to
address the environment that allows AQAP to exist. According to State
testimony, this strategy has two parts: (1) strengthening the Yemeni
government‘s ability to promote security and minimize the threat from
violent extremists within its borders, and (2) mitigating Yemen‘s
economic crisis and deficiencies in government capacity, provision of
services, transparency, and adherence to the rule of law.
The President‘s fiscal year 2011 budget requests $106 million for
Yemen. The United States is also engaged with international partners
to provide assistance to Yemen. In 2006, an international donors‘
conference in London pledged $5.2 billion for Yemen, although,
according to State, a significant portion of this funding has yet to
be provided. At a Friends of Yemen (an international coordination
group) meeting in September 2010, the international community called
for the creation of a development fund for Yemen and more coordination
of international aid.
Terrorist Groups in Yemen:
AQAP is based in Yemen. The group emerged in January 2009, formed by a
merger of Yemeni and Saudi operatives.
AQAP‘s predecessor, al Qaeda in Yemen, came into existence after 23 al
Qaeda members escaped from a prison in Sanaa, Yemen, in February 2006.
Al Qaeda in Yemen was responsible for a September 2008 attack on the
U.S. embassy in Sanaa that killed 19 people, including 6 terrorists.
According to the National Counterterrorism Center, AQAP is pursuing a
global agenda. The group attempted to bomb a plane headed to the
United States on December 25, 2009. The group also claimed
responsibility for the attempted package bombings of planes in October
2010.
Members of AQAP have been named Specially Designated Nationals by the
U.S. government. In July 2010, the United States designated Anwar al-
Aulaqi, a key leader for AQAP, for supporting acts of terrorism and
for acting for or on behalf of AQAP. In March 2011, the United States
designated Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri, describing him as an AQAP
operative and bomb maker. State noted that Al-Asiri gained notoriety
for recruiting his younger brother as a suicide bomber in a failed
assassination attempt of Saudi Prince Muhammed bin Nayif.
Challenges to Addressing Terrorist Safe Haven in Yemen:
Cognizant U.S. officials and agency reports note several challenges to
addressing terrorist safe havens in Yemen, including the limited
capacity of Yemeni security forces, inconsistent cooperation of the
Yemeni government, and instability in Yemen.
* Limited capacity of Yemeni security forces: Officials noted that
Yemeni security forces have limited, but improving, capacity. This
creates a problem for addressing terrorist safe havens, according to
officials, because it limits the ability of the Yemeni government to
control territory that AQAP may want to use as a safe haven.
* Inconsistent cooperation with the government of Yemen: According
to State‘s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism, the Yemeni
government‘s response to terrorism was intermittent. The report also
cites the absence of effective counterterrorism legislation as
contributing to Yemen‘s appeal as a safe haven for terrorists.
* Instability in Yemen: Officials told us that instability in Yemen
creates challenges to addressing safe haven. Specifically, they cited
unstable conditions in northern and southern Yemen and political
unrest resulting from the 2011 uprisings against President Saleh‘s
rule.
Figure: Terrorist Attacks in Yemen, 2005–2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2005;
Number of attacks: 16.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Number of attacks: 11.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Number of attacks: 6.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Number of attacks: 31.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Number of attacks: 56.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Number of attacks: 196.
Source: National Counterterrorism Center.
Note: The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System is NCTC‘s database of
terrorist incidents. According to NCTC definition, terrorism occurs
when groups or individuals acting on political motivation deliberately
or recklessly attack civilians or noncombatants or their property and
the attack does not fall into another special category of political
violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribal violence.
[End of Yemen Fact Sheet]
[End of section]
Appendix V: State-Funded Efforts to Address Terrorist Safe Havens in
Selected Countries:
We identified nine examples of State-funded efforts in the
Philippines, four examples in Somalia, and nine examples in Yemen not
included in State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism that may
contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. We compiled our list
of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe haven in the Philippines,
Somalia, and Yemen based on: (1) the efforts identified by cognizant
U.S. officials as those contributing to addressing terrorist safe
havens and (2) programs and activities associated with MSRP goals
related to addressing terrorist safe havens. Table 7 describes U.S.
efforts funded by State to address terrorist safe havens as identified
by agency officials or MSRPs for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen
and indicates which of these efforts were included in State's August
2010 report.
Table 7: State-Funded Efforts to Address Terrorist Safe Havens in
Selected Countries and Their Inclusion in the August 2010 Country
Reports on Terrorism:
Selected country: The Philippines;
State-funded effort: Antiterrorism Assistance[A];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Law enforcement training and capacity building to
enhance ability to detect, deter, counter, and investigate terrorist
activities and enable police to secure lawless areas.
Selected country: The Philippines;
State-funded effort: Counterterrorist Finance Training[A,B,C];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Financial investigative, analysis, and
prosecutorial training to improve capacity to combat terrorist
financing.
Selected country: The Philippines;
State-funded effort: Designation of Foreign Terrorists and Terrorist
Organizations[A,C];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Designation of Abu Sayyaf Group as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization.
Selected country: The Philippines;
State-funded effort: Regional Strategic Initiative (East Asia);
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Activities to counter the regional proliferation
of violent extremist ideology.
Selected country: The Philippines;
State-funded effort: Rewards for Justice Program;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Rewards to motivate Filipinos to target and arrest
terrorist leaders.
Selected country: The Philippines;
State-funded effort: Customs and Border Protection training
programs[B];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Seaport interdiction training.
Selected country: The Philippines;
State-funded effort: Development Assistance programs[D];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Peace and development activities to inhibit
terrorists and lawless elements from exploiting those living under
marginal conditions.
Selected country: The Philippines;
State-funded effort: Export Control and Related Border Security
Assistance;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Aid to the Philippines to strengthen
customs/border controls to detect/interdict weapons.
Selected country: The Philippines;
State-funded effort: Foreign Military Financing programs[E];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Support to sustain progress in Philippine Defense
Department development such as transport and logistics capabilities.
Selected country: The Philippines;
State-funded effort: International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program capacity building[D];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Police transformation training.
Selected country: The Philippines;
State-funded effort: Immigration and Customs Enforcement
training[A,B,C];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Training to combat money laundering and bulk cash
smuggling.
Selected country: The Philippines;
State-funded effort: International Military Education and Training[C];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Long-term military professional development.
Selected country: The Philippines;
State-funded effort: International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement capacity building;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Capacity building of the Philippine criminal
justice system to prevent, investigate, and successfully prosecute
domestic and transnational crimes.
Selected country: The Philippines;
State-funded effort: Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and
Training[A];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Anti-trafficking training.
Selected country: Somalia;
State-funded effort: Antiterrorism Assistance;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Capacity building activities to equalize regional
counterterrorism abilities.
Selected country: Somalia;
State-funded effort: Designation of Foreign Terrorists and Terrorist
Organizations[A,C];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Designation of al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization.
Selected country: Somalia;
State-funded effort: Regional Strategic Initiative (East Africa);
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Included in discussions regarding regional partner
capacity.
Selected country: Somalia;
State-funded effort: Conventional Weapons and Small Arms/Light Weapons
Destruction;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Destruction of stockpiles of conventional weapons.
Selected country: Somalia;
State-funded effort: Economic Support Fund programs[D];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Support for social reintegration of demobilized
youth.
Selected country: Somalia;
State-funded effort: International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement capacity-building;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Capacity building activities to equalize regional
counterterrorism abilities.
Selected country: Somalia;
State-funded effort: Peacekeeping Operations capacity-building;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Capacity building of Somalia's emerging security
forces to identify and eliminate terrorists.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: Antiterrorism Assistance;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Airport security and police training.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: Countering Violent Extremism;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Secure Border Initiative.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: Counterterrorist Finance Training[A,B,C];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Financial investigations training.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: Designation of Foreign Terrorists and Terrorist
Organizations[A,C];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Designation of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: Middle Eastern Partnership Initiative activities;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Establishment of high school student councils to
educate Yemeni youth about the concept of democracy.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: Regional Strategic Initiative (East Africa)[D];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Activities focused on political and economic
reform while increasing counterterrorism capacity.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: Terrorist Interdiction Program;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Included;
Example activities: Provision of immigration system computer equipment.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: Customs and Border Protection training program[B];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: International Visitors Program.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: Export Control and Related Border Security
Assistance programs;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Customs, coast guard, and other border security
agency engagement.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: Foreign Military Financing programs[E];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Counterterrorism, border security, and counter-
piracy support.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: Humanitarian Demining;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Efforts to secure communities from the threat
posed by civil war mine fields.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: Immigration and Customs Enforcement
training[A,B,C];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Training to combat money laundering and bulk cash
smuggling.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: International Military Education and Training[E];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Long-term military professional development.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement capacity building;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Community policing and rule of law enhancement.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and
Training[A];
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Anti-corruption training.
Selected country: Yemen;
State-funded effort: Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction;
Inclusion in State's Country Reports on Terrorism: Not included;
Example activities: Efforts to mitigate destabilizing effects of
illegal weapons dealing.
Source: GAO analysis of State's August 2010 Country Reports on
Terrorism, MSRPs, interviews with U.S. agency officials, and U.S.
agency program data.
Note: Some additional programs were identified as relevant to MSRP
goals related to addressing terrorist safe havens, but if no specific
activities were discussed, they are not included in the table above.
These include Economic Support Fund programs, Food for Peace
activities, and USAID Global Health and Child Survival programs in the
Philippines; and Food for Peace activities in Yemen.
[A] Implemented in part by DOJ.
[B] Implemented in part by DHS.
[C] Implemented in part by Treasury.
[D] Implemented in part by USAID.
[E] Implemented in part by DOD.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
May 23, 2011:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Combating
Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist
Safe Havens," GAO Job Code 320804.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Rhonda Shore, Public Affairs & Outreach Advisor, Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism at (202) 647-1845.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
James L. Millette:
cc: GAO - Charles M. Johnson:
S/CT - Robert F. Godec:
State/OIG - Evelyn Klemstine:
[End of letter]
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on
Terrorist Safe Havens (GAO-11-561, GAO Code 320804)L
The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to comment on
GAO's draft report entitled "COMBATING TERRORISM: U.S. Government Should
Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens."
Recommendation: Include in the Country Reports on Terrorism detailed
assessments of identified terrorist safe havens using the provisions
recommended by Congress in the IRTPA.
Response: The Department concurs with the GAO's recommendation to
include detailed assessments of identified terrorist safe havens using
the provisions recommended by Congress in the IRTPA. The Department
has already begun to more fully implement this recommendation in the
soon-to-be issued Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, including
detailed assessments of efforts to prevent the proliferation of and
trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in and through the
territory of the country.
Recommendation: The Secretary of State, in collaboration with relevant
agencies as appropriate should, when it updates the report requested
under the IRTPA, include a government-wide list of U.S. efforts for
addressing terrorist safe havens.
Response: The Department concurs with GAO's general recommendation to
make more comprehensive the reporting on U.S. efforts to deny safe
haven to terrorists. The Department does not concur, however, that a
comprehensive government-wide list of U.S. efforts should be included
as part of the annual Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT). As noted in
the GAO report, there are multiple reporting requirements concerning
U.S. efforts to deny safe havens to terrorists and to provide
antiterrorism assistance. To avoid duplication of effort and ensure
efficient use of government resources, the Department will undertake
to include information related to those separate reporting
requirements already in the CRT.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department a Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
May 25, 2011:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr.
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Re: Draft Report GAO 11-561, "Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government
Should Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens"
Dear Mr. Johnson:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this draft
report. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the
U.S. Government Accountability Office's work in planning and
conducting its review and issuing this report.
The Department is pleased to note the report's positive acknowledgment
of several of its efforts to address terrorist safe havens in selected
countries, including training related to counterterrorist financing,
customs and border protection, and immigration and customs
enforcement. DHS will continue to support Department of State and
other relevant agency efforts to improve reporting on terrorist safe
havens, as appropriate.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on this
draft report. We look forward to working with you on future Homeland
Security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jim H. Crumpacker:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Jason Bair, Assistant
Director; Christy Bilardo; Kathryn Bolduc; Lynn Cothern; Martin de
Alteriis; Mary Moutsos; Elizabeth Repko; and Celia Thomas made key
contributions to this report. Tonita Gillich, Julia Jebo, Eileen
Larence, Heather Latta, Marie Mak, Sarah McGrath, John Pendleton, Nina
Pfeiffer, and Jena Sinkfeld provided additional support.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The Department of State defines terrorist safe havens as
ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a country and
nonphysical areas where terrorists that constitute a threat to U.S.
national security interests are able to organize, plan, raise funds,
communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security because
of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.
[2] State's annual Country Reports on Terrorism is required to be
transmitted to Congress by April 30th of each year and covers
terrorist events in the preceding year. For instance, State's Country
Reports on Terrorism 2009 covers events from January 1 to December 31,
2009, but was released in August 2010. In this report, we refer to
Country Reports on Terrorism by their release date. Thus, State's
August 2010 report refers to the Country Reports on Terrorism 2009.
[3] The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that, in
addition to physical terrorist safe havens in geographic territories,
terrorist safe havens can also be nonphysical or virtual, existing
within legal, cyber, and financial systems. In this report, however,
we focus on physical terrorist safe havens.
[4] Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7102.
[5] In this report, we use the term terrorist safe haven, which,
according to State, has the same meaning as terrorist sanctuaries.
[6] The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 required
the Director of National Intelligence to submit to Congress an
intelligence assessment identifying and describing each country or
region that is a sanctuary for terrorists or terrorist organizations.
We plan to provide additional information on this topic in a
classified product later this year.
[7] State is not required to identify potential terrorist safe havens.
In its April 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism, State wrote that its
report identified "selected potential and physical safe havens."
However, in the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism, State
identified safe havens in which terrorists are able to operate in
relative security. We spoke with subject matter experts who identified
Bangladesh, Nigeria, Kenya, the Caucasus, and urban areas such as
Karachi, Pakistan, as areas at risk of becoming terrorist safe havens
in the next 5 years.
[8] Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7102(d)(1)(D).
[9] Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7102(d)(2)(C).
[10] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism
and Public Health Initiatives, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-NSAID-99-112] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 16, 1999).
[11] Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7120(b).
[12] Pub. L. No. 108-458, Section 7102(d)(2)(E).
[13] State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism also identifies
several multilateral efforts, not discussed in this report, for
disrupting or eliminating terrorist safe havens. These include efforts
by the United Nations Security Council, European Union, Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
[14] FACTS is a database used by State to collect foreign assistance
planning and reporting data, including plans for implementing current-
year appropriated budgets and performance planning and reporting data.
It tracks State-funded foreign assistance spending by aligning each
dollar of assistance with categories State calls "program areas,
elements, and sub-elements." The FACTS standardized program structure,
known as the "F Framework," includes a "counter-terrorism" program
area that has an element--"deny terrorist sponsorship, support and
sanctuary"--with a sub-element--"eliminate safe havens."
[15] The four budget accounts identified in FACTS as funding
activities for eliminating safe havens that were not included in
State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism are the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative, Counterterrorism Engagement with Allies,
Development Assistance, and the Economic Support Fund.
[16] These budget accounts fund some activities that FACTS identifies
as eliminating safe haven. However, other funding from these accounts
is assigned to different program areas. For instance, while some
activities funded by the development assistance budget account are
identified by FACTS as eliminating safe havens, other development
assistance funds are identified by FACTS in program areas such as
Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation, Good Governance, Health,
Education, Rule of Law and Human Rights, and Economic Opportunity.
[17] Programs and activities identified in the Philippines, Somalia,
and Yemen are meant to serve as examples of U.S. efforts that may
contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens, not an exhaustive list
of efforts to address terrorist safe havens.
[18] MSRPs for all three countries included a goal related to
addressing terrorist safe havens. For example, the Somalia MSRP
includes a goal "Successful Dialogue and Reconciliation Contributing
Toward a More Stable Somalia" describing that "political, economic,
and developmental stability will make it increasingly difficult for
transnational terrorists to find a safe haven in Somalia." Financial
data included in fiscal year 2012 MSRPs include actual fiscal year
2009 funding; estimated fiscal year 2010 funding; requested fiscal
years 2011 and 2012 funding; and projected fiscal years 2013, 2014,
and 2015 funding.
[19] We plan to provide additional information on terrorist safe
havens in a classified product later this year.
[20] GAO, Afghanistan Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-473SP] (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 21, 2009).
[21] GAO, Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive
Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17,
2008).
[22] GAO, Security, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Iraqi Government
Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1195] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 4, 2007).
[End of section]
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