Diplomatic Security
Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose Critical Challenges to Training Efforts Gao ID: GAO-11-780T June 29, 2011This testimony discusses the training efforts of the U.S. Department of State's (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security). The testimony is based on our report, which is being released today. Diplomatic Security is responsible for the protection of people, information, and property at over 400 embassies, consulates, and domestic locations and, as we reported in previous testimony, experienced a large growth in its budget and personnel over the last decade. Diplomatic Security trains its workforce and others to address a variety of threats, including crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud, technological intrusions, political violence, and terrorism. To meet its training needs, Diplomatic Security relies primarily on its Diplomatic Security Training Center (DSTC), which is an office of Diplomatic Security's Training Directorate and is the primary provider of Diplomatic Security training. Diplomatic Security's training budget grew steadily from fiscal years 2006 to 2010--increasing from approximately $24 million in fiscal year 2006 to nearly $70 million in fiscal year 2010. In fiscal year 2010, DSTC conducted 342 sessions of its 61 courses and trained 4,739 students. Our prior work identified the challenges that Diplomatic Security experienced as a result of growth stemming from the reaction to a number of security incidents. GAO found that State is maintaining a presence in an increasing number of dangerous posts, is facing staffing shortages and other operational challenges that tax Diplomatic Security's ability to implement all of its missions and has not provided Diplomatic Security with adequate strategic guidance. This statement discusses (1) how Diplomatic Security ensures the quality and appropriateness of its training and the extent to which Diplomatic Security ensures that training requirements are being met, and (2) challenges that Diplomatic Security faces in carrying out its training mission.
In brief, DSTC has had to meet the challenge of training more personnel to perform additional duties while still getting Diplomatic Security's agents, engineers, technicians, and other staff--as well as a growing number of personnel outside of its workforce--into the field, where they are needed. DSTC has largely met this challenge by maintaining high standards for its training. Specifically, DSTC incorporated Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) standards into its operating procedures and became the first federal law enforcement agency to receive accreditation. Certain issues, however, constrain the effectiveness of DSTC's systems. DSTC lacks the systems needed to evaluate the effectiveness of some required training despite its own standards to do so, and its systems do not accurately and adequately track the use of some of its training. More importantly, we identified three key challenges that DSTC faces: an increasing number of training missions in Iraq, a potential increase in the number of students it has to train, and inadequate training facilities. The report this testimony is based on(GAO-11-460) includes three recommendations for the Secretary of State.
GAO-11-780T, Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose Critical Challenges to Training Efforts
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:30 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, June 29, 2011:
Diplomatic Security:
Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose Critical Challenges
to Training Efforts:
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
GAO-11-780T:
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Johnson, and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here to discuss the training efforts of the U.S.
Department of State's (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security
(Diplomatic Security). My testimony is based on our report, which is
being released today.[Footnote 1] Diplomatic Security is responsible
for the protection of people, information, and property at over 400
embassies, consulates, and domestic locations and, as we reported in
previous testimony, experienced a large growth in its budget and
personnel over the last decade.[Footnote 2] Diplomatic Security trains
its workforce and others to address a variety of threats, including
crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud, technological intrusions,
political violence, and terrorism. To meet its training needs,
Diplomatic Security relies primarily on its Diplomatic Security
Training Center (DSTC), which is an office of Diplomatic Security's
Training Directorate and is the primary provider of Diplomatic
Security training. Diplomatic Security's training budget grew steadily
from fiscal years 2006 to 2010--increasing from approximately $24
million in fiscal year 2006 to nearly $70 million in fiscal year 2010.
In fiscal year 2010, DSTC conducted 342 sessions of its 61 courses and
trained 4,739 students.
Our prior work identified the challenges that Diplomatic Security
experienced as a result of growth stemming from the reaction to a
number of security incidents.[Footnote 3] GAO found that State is
maintaining a presence in an increasing number of dangerous posts, is
facing staffing shortages and other operational challenges that tax
Diplomatic Security's ability to implement all of its missions and has
not provided Diplomatic Security with adequate strategic guidance.
Today I will discuss (1) how Diplomatic Security ensures the quality
and appropriateness of its training and the extent to which Diplomatic
Security ensures that training requirements are being met, and (2)
challenges that Diplomatic Security faces in carrying out its training
mission.
To address these objectives in our report, we interviewed numerous
State and Diplomatic Security officials at headquarters, several
training facilities, and five overseas posts, as well as officials at
other relevant agencies. We reviewed and analyzed government standards
and other legislative and regulatory guidance, data and documentation
related to Diplomatic Security-provided training efforts, information
and data on recent DSTC and other Diplomatic Security-provided course
offerings, and overall funding for training from 2006 to 2011. We also
observed classroom-and exercise-based training at several Diplomatic
Security training facilities and viewed examples of other types of
DSTC-provided learning. Because we recently reviewed training provided
by the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), this report did not include an
assessment of the training that Diplomatic Security personnel received
through FSI.[Footnote 4] We conducted this performance audit from June
2010 to May 2011, in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. More information on our scope and methodology and detailed
findings are available in the full report.[Footnote 5]
In brief, DSTC has had to meet the challenge of training more
personnel to perform additional duties while still getting Diplomatic
Security's agents, engineers, technicians, and other staff--as well as
a growing number of personnel outside of its workforce--into the
field, where they are needed. DSTC has largely met this challenge by
maintaining high standards for its training. Specifically, DSTC
incorporated Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA)
standards into its operating procedures and became the first federal
law enforcement agency to receive accreditation. Certain issues,
however, constrain the effectiveness of DSTC's systems. DSTC lacks the
systems needed to evaluate the effectiveness of some required training
despite its own standards to do so, and its systems do not accurately
and adequately track the use of some of its training. More
importantly, we identified three key challenges that DSTC faces: an
increasing number of training missions in Iraq, a potential increase
in the number of students it has to train, and inadequate training
facilities.
Diplomatic Security Generally Adheres to Standards and Tracks
Training, but Its Systems Have Weaknesses:
To ensure the quality and appropriateness of its training, Diplomatic
Security primarily adheres to FLETA standards. Diplomatic Security
incorporated FLETA standards into its standard operating procedures,
using a course design framework tailored for DSTC. In our report, we
used the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) course to demonstrate
how DSTC modified the design of one of its courses over time. The FACT
course provides mandatory training on conducting surveillance
detection, aspects of personnel recovery, emergency medical care,
improvised explosive device awareness, firearms familiarization, and
defensive/counterterrorist driving maneuvers to all U.S. government
employees serving under chief of mission authority in Afghanistan,
Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan, Yemen, and parts of Mexico. Since 2003, FACT
has been redesigned and modified several times in response to changing
high-threat environments. For instance, a 2005 State Office of
Inspector General report noted that U.S. government personnel were not
expected to drive themselves in Iraq but regularly did so. As a
result, DSTC added driving skills to the FACT course. In 2009, because
of indirect fire attacks, the Ambassador to Iraq noted that personnel
needed to know what the sirens announcing a rocket attack sounded like
and what the protective bunkers looked like. In response, DSTC built
two bunkers on one of its leased facilities and now uses them in
conducting duck-and-cover exercises to recorded sirens. DSTC officials
noted that FACT is very well received by the students, and one State
official stated that the reason she survived a bombing attack was
because of her FACT training.
Diplomatic Security does have some weaknesses when it comes to
evaluating all of its training population and tracking the training to
ensure that training requirements are met. Distributed or online
training is a growing part of DSTC efforts to save costs and reach
people in the field. However, DSTC's systems do not have the
capability to obtain feedback on its online training. DSTC officials
also stated that DSTC has difficulty obtaining feedback from non-State
personnel, a growing portion of its student body. DSTC instead relies
on voluntary comments from the agencies or individual students from
those agencies. Without feedback, DSTC is less able to ensure the
effectiveness of these efforts.
DSTC's systems also do not have the capability to track whether
personnel have completed all required training. For example, DSTC
officials are using an unofficial method to track completion of FACT
training; called the FACT tracker, it is used on DSTC's internal web
site to log in all personnel who take the class, including non-State
students. Additionally, agents are required to pass a firearms
requalification every 4 months when they are posted domestically and
once a year if posted overseas. However, DSTC systems do not
effectively track this requirement, and it is the agents' and
supervisors' responsibility to keep track of when their next
requalification is due. Moreover, DSTC systems are not designed to
track training delivered through distributed or online training or
keep records of participation or performance. For example, DSTC
provides "Knowledge from the Field" DVDs--information and professional
development products that include lessons learned from attacks and
other incidents at consulates and embassies. However, DSTC cannot say
for certain which of its personnel have accessed the training.
DSTC officials noted that they are pursuing access to a more robust
learning management system to address some of the difficulties with
their existing systems. According to State officials, DSTC and FSI are
currently discussing whether DSTC will be able to use or modify FSI's
learning management system for DSTC's purposes.
Diplomatic Security Faces Significant Challenges to Carrying Out Its
Expanded Training Mission:
Diplomatic Security faces significant ongoing challenges to carrying
out its training mission, including (1) an increasing number of
training missions in Iraq, (2) a potential increase in the number of
students it has to train, and (3) inadequate training facilities.
Expanding Missions in Iraq Challenge DSTC's Ability to Meet Training
Needs:
DSTC must train Diplomatic Security personnel to perform new missions
in Iraq as they take on many of the protective and security functions
previously provided by the U.S. military and which Diplomatic Security
has had little or no experience in providing, including downed
aircraft recovery, explosives ordnance disposal, and rocket and mortar
countermeasures, among others. DSTC officials pointed to a number of
coordination mechanisms and other efforts to meet new training needs.
For example, as of March 2011, DSTC, in coordination with the
Diplomatic Security Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) armored
vehicles working group, had completed the design and development of an
MRAP training course. However, Diplomatic Security officials noted
that the additional training will likely increase the time needed to
get Diplomatic Security personnel into the field.
Proposed Increase in Number of Students Requiring Training May Further
Strain DSTC Resources:
DSTC faces a proposal that will dramatically increase the number of
State and non-State personnel required to take high-threat training
(see fig. 1), including FACT training, but State does not have an
action plan and time frames to manage the proposed increases. These
expanded training missions constrain DSTC's ability to meet training
needs. State's 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
(QDDR) stated that all personnel at high-threat posts, as well as
those at critical-threat posts, will now receive FACT training.
[Footnote 6] According to Diplomatic Security officials, this would
increase the number of posts for which FACT is required from 23 to
178, increasing the number of students taking FACT each year from
about 2,000 to over 10,000. DSTC officials noted that they lack the
capacity to handle so many students and that current FACT classes are
already filled to capacity. DSTC would need to locate or build
additional driving tracks, firearms ranges, and explosives ranges, as
well as obtain instructors and other staff to support such a dramatic
increase in students. According to Diplomatic Security officials,
State has not completed an action plan or established time frames to
carry out the QDDR recommendation. Given these difficulties,
Diplomatic Security officials noted that they did not see how the new
requirement could be implemented.
Figure 1: Increase in DSTC-Provided High-Threat Training from 2006 to
2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Number of students: 971.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Number of students: 1,135.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Number of students: 1,504.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Number of students: 1,760.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Number of students: 2,132.
Source: GAO analysis of DSTC data.
[End of figure]
Existing Facilities Hamper Training Efforts and Strain Resources:
In addition, DSTC's training facilities do not meet its training
needs, a situation that hampers efficient and effective operations.
Diplomatic Security leases, rents, or borrows all of the 16 facilities
it uses, and the number of facilities in use at any given time and how
they are used vary based on training requirements and facility
availability. For example, Diplomatic Security uses the firearms
ranges at Marine Corps Base Quantico to train with heavier weapons.
However, according to Diplomatic Security officials, the Marines
occasionally force Diplomatic Security to change its training
schedule, sometimes with minimal notice, which increases costs and
makes it difficult for DSTC staff to meet training objectives within
the time available.
Several leased facilities, such as State Annex-7, are overcrowded and
need various repairs, in part because of disputes between Diplomatic
Security and its lessor over which party is responsible for structural
repairs (see figure 2). DSTC's main firearms ranges are in these
buildings, but according to DSTC officials, the ranges are small and
have some unusable firing lanes. In addition, because of the
limitations of its facilities, Diplomatic Security has had to
improvise with makeshift solutions to provide some types of training--
for example, placing tape on the floors of its garage at State Annex-
11 to simulate walls for conducting room-entry training (see figure 3).
Figure 2: Disrepair and Crowding at State Annex-7:
[Refer to PDF for image: 4 photographs]
Leaking ceiling;
Crowded storeroom;
Broken firing range lane;
Storage in firing range area.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Figure 3: Simulated Tape Walls Used in Training:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Recognizing that its existing facilities were inadequate, DSTC
developed an Interim Training Facility in 2007. Nevertheless,
Diplomatic Security officials noted that the facility is a stopgap
solution and cannot meet a number of Diplomatic Security's training
needs such as the firing of heavier weapons, the use of more powerful
explosives to train agents in incident management, and the integrated
tactical use of driving and firearms training in a mock urban
environment. The Interim Training Facility also lacks space for
Diplomatic Security to train its personnel for many of the additional
missions that they are expected to take over from the U.S. military in
Iraq. In order address its inadequate facilities, State has been
pursuing the development of a consolidated training facility. State
was allocated $136 million in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to begin
development of the facility and is currently in the process of
identifying a suitable location.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Our report being released today includes three recommendations for the
Secretary of State, the first two of which are to develop or improve
the processes to obtain participant evaluations for all of DSTC
required training, including distributed training efforts, and to
track individual DSTC training requirements and completion of DSTC
training. We also recommend that the Secretary develop an action plan
and associated time frames needed to carry out the QDDR recommendation
to increase the number of posts at which FACT is required. State
agreed with our findings and recommendations. In addition, we found
that State had not followed through on its commitment to carry out a
strategic review of Diplomatic Security as recommended in our 2009
report.[Footnote 7] Given the restrained fiscal environment and
growing mission in Iraq, it is even more critical today that State
carry out such a review.
Chairman Akaka and Ranking Member Johnson, this concludes my prepared
statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or
other Members of the Subcommittee may have at this time.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jess. T. Ford
at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this testimony. GAO staff who made significant contributions
to this testimony are Anthony Moran, Assistant Director; Thomas Costa;
Anh Nguyen; David Dayton; Cheron Green; and Mark Speight.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate
Facilities Pose Critical Challenges to Training Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-460] (Washington, D.C.: June 1,
2011).
[2] GAO, Department of State: Challenges Facing the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-290T] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 9,
2009).
[3] GAO, Department of State: Diplomatic Security's Recent Growth
Warrants Strategic Review, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-156] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12,
2009).
[4] GAO, Department of State: Additional Steps Are Needed to Improve
Strategic Planning and Evaluation of Training for State Personnel,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-241] (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 25, 2011).
[5] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-460].
[6] Department of State, Leading through Civilian Power: The First
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (2010).
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-156].
[End of section]
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