Iraq and Afghanistan
DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel Gao ID: GAO-11-886 September 15, 2011DOD, State, and USAID have relied extensively on contracts and assistance instruments (grants and cooperative agreements) for a range of services in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the last 3 years, GAO has provided information on the agencies' contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in the two countries, detailing the agencies' challenges tracking such information. Amendments from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 now require the agencies to provide this and other information to Congress through annual joint reports. They also direct GAO to review those reports. In response, GAO reviewed the first joint report and assessed (1) data and data sources used to prepare the report; (2) use of data from the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) for management, oversight, and coordination; and (3) efforts to improve SPOT's tracking of statutorily required information. GAO compared data in the joint report to agency data GAO previously obtained, reviewed supporting documentation, and interviewed agency officials, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan, on how the data were collected and used.
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) designated SPOT as their system in 2010 for tracking statutorily required information on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Citing limitations with SPOT's implementation, the agencies generally relied on data sources other than SPOT to prepare their 2011 joint report. Only State used SPOT but just for its contractor personnel numbers. However, GAO found that regardless of the data source used, the agencies' data had significant limitations, many of which were not fully disclosed. For example, while the agencies collectively reported $22.7 billion in fiscal year 2010 obligations, we found that they underreported the value of Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and assistance instruments by at least $4 billion, the majority of which was for DOD contracts. In addition, data presented in the joint report on personnel, including those performing security functions, are of limited reliability because of significant over- and undercounting. For example, DOD did not disclose that its contractor personnel numbers for Afghanistan were overreported for most of the reporting period because of double counting. Additionally, despite the reporting requirement, State did not provide information on its assistance instruments or the number of personnel working under them. As a result of such limitations, data presented in the joint report should not be used to draw conclusions or identify trends over time. DOD, State, and USAID have used SPOT to a limited extent, primarily to manage and oversee individual contracts and personnel. Agency officials cited instances of using SPOT to help identify contractors that should be billed for the use of government services, including medical treatment and dining facilities. State and DOD officials also identified instances of using SPOT to help inform operational planning, such as preparing for the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq. Officials from the three agencies indicated that shortcomings in data and reporting capabilities have limited their use of SPOT and, in some cases, led them to rely on other data systems to help manage and oversee contracts and assistance instruments. Further, the agencies cannot readily access each other's data in SPOT, which limits interagency coordination opportunities. Recent efforts have been made to improve SPOT's tracking of contractor and assistance personnel. SPOT now allows users to enter aggregate, rather than individual personal information into SPOT, which may overcome resistance to using the system based on security concerns. In addition, DOD and State report increased efforts to validate personnel data in SPOT. However, practical and technical challenges continue to affect SPOT's ability to track other statutorily required data. For example, SPOT cannot be used to reliably distinguish personnel performing security functions from other contractors. Also, while SPOT has the capability to record when personnel have been killed or wounded, such information has not been regularly updated. The agencies have identified the need for further modifications and new guidance to address some but not all of these limitations. It is unclear when SPOT will serve as a reliable source of data to meet statutory requirements and be used by the agencies for management, oversight, and coordination. As a result, the agencies still do not have reliable sources and methods to report on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2009, GAO recommended that DOD, State, and USAID develop a plan for addressing SPOT's limitations. The agencies disagreed, citing ongoing coordination as sufficient. GAO continues to believe such a plan is needed and is not making new recommendations.
GAO-11-886, Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Committees:
September 2011:
Iraq and Afghanistan:
DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for Contracts, Assistance
Instruments, and Associated Personnel:
GAO-11-886:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-886, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
DOD, State, and USAID have relied extensively on contracts and
assistance instruments (grants and cooperative agreements) for a range
of services in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the last 3 years, GAO has
provided information on the agencies‘ contracts, assistance
instruments, and associated personnel in the two countries, detailing
the agencies‘ challenges tracking such information.
Amendments from the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2011 now require the agencies to provide this and other information to
Congress through annual joint reports. They also direct GAO to review
those reports. In response, GAO reviewed the first joint report and
assessed (1) data and data sources to prepare the report; (2) use of
data from the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker
(SPOT) for management, oversight, and coordination; and (3) efforts to
improve SPOT‘s tracking of statutorily required information. GAO
compared data in the joint report to agency data GAO previously
obtained, reviewed supporting documentation, and interviewed agency
officials, including those in Iraq and Afghanistan, on how the data
were collected and used.
What GAO Found:
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) designated SPOT as their system in
2010 for tracking statutorily required information on contracts,
assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Citing limitations with SPOT‘s implementation, the
agencies generally relied on data sources other than SPOT to prepare
their 2011 joint report. Only State used SPOT but just for its
contractor personnel numbers. However, GAO found that regardless of
the data source used, the agencies‘ data had significant limitations,
many of which were not fully disclosed. For example, while the
agencies collectively reported $22.7 billion in fiscal year 2010
obligations, we found that they underreported the value of Iraq and
Afghanistan contracts and assistance instruments by at least $4
billion, the majority of which was for DOD contracts. In addition,
data presented in the joint report on personnel, including those
performing security functions, are of limited reliability because of
significant over- and undercounting. For example, DOD did not disclose
that its contractor personnel numbers for Afghanistan were
overreported for most of the reporting period because of double
counting. Additionally, despite the reporting requirement, State did
not provide information on its assistance instruments or the number of
personnel working under them. As a result of such limitations, data
presented in the joint report should not be used to draw conclusions
or identify trends over time.
DOD, State, and USAID have used SPOT to a limited extent, primarily to
manage and oversee individual contracts and personnel. Agency
officials cited instances of using SPOT to help identify contractors
that should be billed for the use of government services, including
medical treatment and dining facilities. State and DOD officials also
identified instances of using SPOT to help inform operational
planning, such as preparing for the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq.
Officials from the three agencies indicated that shortcomings in data
and reporting capabilities have limited their use of SPOT and, in some
cases, led them to rely on other data systems to help manage and
oversee contracts and assistance instruments. Further, the agencies
cannot readily access each other‘s data in SPOT, which limits
interagency coordination opportunities.
Recent efforts have been made to improve SPOT‘s tracking of contractor
and assistance personnel. SPOT now allows users to enter aggregate,
rather than individual personal information into SPOT, which may
overcome resistance to using the system based on security concerns. In
addition, DOD and State report increased efforts to validate personnel
data in SPOT. However, practical and technical challenges continue to
affect SPOT‘s ability to track other statutorily required data. For
example, SPOT cannot be used to reliably distinguish personnel
performing security functions from other contractors. Also, while SPOT
has the capability to record when personnel have been killed or
wounded, such information has not been regularly updated. The agencies
have identified the need for further modifications and new guidance to
address some but not all of these limitations. It is unclear when SPOT
will serve as a reliable source of data to meet statutory requirements
and be used by the agencies for management, oversight, and
coordination. As a result, the agencies still do not have reliable
sources and methods to report on contracts, assistance instruments,
and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan.
What GAO Recommends:
In 2009, GAO recommended that the agencies develop a plan for addressing
SPOT‘s limitations. They disagreed, citing ongoing coordination as
sufficient. GAO continues to believe a plan is needed and is not making
new recommendations. DOD and State provided technical comments on this
year‘s report, while USAID declined to comment.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-886] for key
components. For more information, contact John P. Hutton at (202) 512-
4841 or huttonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Agencies Relied on Sources Other Than SPOT, but Data Used Had
Significant Limitations:
Use of SPOT Hindered by Data and Reporting Shortcomings:
Recent Efforts Have Been Made to Improve SPOT, but Past Problems Have
Not Been Fully Addressed:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Data Sources Used by DOD, State, and USAID and Reasons Cited
in Joint Report for Not Relying on SPOT:
Abbreviations:
CENTCOM: U.S. Central Command:
DBA: Defense Base Act:
DOD: Department of Defense:
FAR: Federal Acquisition Regulation:
FPDS-NG: Federal Procurement Data System - Next Generation:
MOU: memorandum of understanding:
NDAA for FY2008: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008:
NDAA for FY2010: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010:
NDAA for FY2011: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2011:
SPOT: Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 15, 2011:
Congressional Committees:
Over the last three years, Congress has required us to report on
Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (State), and U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) contracts, grants, and
cooperative agreements with work performed in Iraq or Afghanistan.
[Footnote 1] In those reports, we also detailed challenges faced by
the agencies in tracking information on these contracts and assistance
instruments, as well as the personnel working under them in the two
countries. Reliable, meaningful data related to contractors, grantees,
and cooperative agreement recipients are a starting point for
informing agency decisions and ensuring proper management and
oversight. Our prior work has shown that the lack of complete and
accurate information may inhibit planning, increase costs, and
introduce unnecessary risk. The importance of such information is
heightened given the three agencies' extensive reliance on contractors
to provide a range of services, including security, transportation,
and base operations, relating to practically every facet of U.S.
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Additionally, State and USAID have
relied on recipients of grants and cooperative agreements--two types
of assistance instruments--to implement infrastructure, governance,
and economic development projects in both countries.
Congress has taken a series of actions to increase the oversight and
availability of information on Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and
assistance instruments. Specifically, the agencies are now required to
produce their own report that provides much of the information that
GAO was previously required to report. Amendments from the Ike Skelton
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (NDAA for
FY2011) require DOD, State, and USAID to submit annual joint reports
to Congress on their contracts and assistance instruments with work
performed in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 2] The reports are to
address several matters, such as the number and value of contracts and
assistance instruments,[Footnote 3] number of contractor and
assistance personnel, number of contractor personnel performing
security functions,[Footnote 4] and any plans for strengthening the
collection and coordination of contract information. In May 2011, the
three agencies transmitted to congressional committees the first
Annual Joint Report on Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (hereafter,
referred to as the joint report), which covers fiscal year 2010.
The joint reporting requirement builds upon earlier requirements for
the three agencies to track information on contracts, assistance
instruments, and associated personnel. Specifically, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (NDAA for FY2008)
directed DOD, State, and USAID to sign a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) regarding contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan.[Footnote 5] The
law specified several matters to be covered in the MOU, including
identifying common databases to serve as repositories of information
on contracts and contractor personnel in the two countries. In a July
2008 MOU, the agencies designated the Synchronized Predeployment and
Operational Tracker (SPOT) database as their common database for the
statutorily required contract and contractor personnel information.
With the passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010 (NDAA for FY2010), Congress expanded the requirement to
cover grants, cooperative agreements, and associated personnel.
[Footnote 6] In response, the agencies revised the MOU in April 2010
to specify that SPOT was also their system of record to track
statutorily required assistance instrument and personnel information.
Amendments from the NDAA for FY2011 also direct us to report annually
on the agencies' joint reports.[Footnote 7] Pursuant to that mandate,
we have reviewed the agencies' 2011 joint report and are providing our
assessments of (1) the data and data sources used by the agencies to
develop their report; (2) the agencies' use of data from SPOT to
manage, oversee, and coordinate their Iraq and Afghanistan contracts,
assistance instruments, and associated personnel; and (3) progress and
plans for improving SPOT to track statutorily required information.
We used the following methodologies to conduct our review.
* To assess the data and data sources used, we obtained the underlying
data the agencies used to prepare the joint report and performed
several analyses to identify limitations, omissions, duplicates, and
other errors that would affect the reliability of the data. This
included comparing data in the joint report with data we collected
from the agencies for the first half of fiscal year 2010 to prepare
our 2010 report, as well as a comparison to Federal Procurement Data
System - Next Generation (FPDS-NG) data from the second half of fiscal
year 2010. We also interviewed agency officials to discuss steps they
took to validate and verify the data presented in the report and
reviewed supporting documentation that the agencies provided at our
request. For our 2010 report, we obtained multiple data sets from DOD,
State, and USAID, including data from FPDS-NG, agency-specific
databases, and manually compiled lists of contracts and assistance
actions. We determined those data were sufficiently reliable to
identify the minimum number of active or awarded contracts and
assistance instruments, associated obligation amounts, and extent of
competition for the first half of fiscal year 2010. For that report,
we also obtained data on contractor and assistance personnel in the
two countries; these data were generally obtained by the agencies
through surveys and periodic reports submitted by contractors and
assistance recipients.
* We reviewed the joint report to determine the current status of and
future plans for agencies' use of SPOT data. We conducted interviews
with DOD, State, and USAID officials, including those in Iraq and
Afghanistan, responsible for maintaining SPOT and other data sources
and for managing, overseeing, and coordinating contracts to identify
examples of how the agencies have used the data.
* We obtained relevant documentation, including agency policies and
guidance, and interviewed agency officials to assess the progress and
plans for improving SPOT, particularly as they pertain to shortcomings
identified in our prior reports.
* We conducted this performance audit from May 2011 through September
2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
The first joint report on contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan required
under amendments from the NDAA for FY2011 was to be issued by February
1, 2011, with subsequent reports due in 2012 and 2013. In the reports,
DOD, State, and USAID are to provide the following for each 12-month
reporting period:
* total number and value of contracts and assistance instruments
awarded,
* total number and value of active contracts and assistance
instruments,
* the extent to which such contracts and assistance instruments used
competitive procedures,
* total number of contractor and assistance personnel at the end of
each quarter of the reporting period,[Footnote 8]
* total number of contractor and assistance personnel performing
security functions at the end of each quarter of the reporting period,
and:
* total number of contractor and assistance personnel killed or
wounded.
The joint reports are also to include the sources of information and
data used to compile the required information; a description of any
known limitations of the data reported, including known limitations of
the methodology and data sources used; and plans for strengthening
collection, coordination, and sharing of information on contracts and
assistance instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan through improvements to
common databases. The first joint report submitted by the agencies in
May 2011 provides an overview of the reporting requirements, an
introduction, and a section for each agency to present its data. Each
agency was responsible for collecting its fiscal year 2010 data from
relevant sources and compiling its section of the report.
The reporting requirements in the NDAA for FY2011 build upon prior
national defense authorization act requirements. Specifically, Section
861 of the NDAA for FY2008 directed the Secretaries of Defense and
State and the USAID Administrator to sign an MOU related to
contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The law, as amended by the NDAA
for FY2010, specified a number of issues to be covered in the MOU.
These include specifying each agency's roles and responsibilities in
matters related to contracting in the two countries, determining
responsibility for establishing procedures for and coordination of
movement of contractor personnel in the two countries, and identifying
common databases to serve as information repositories on contracts and
assistance instruments with more than 30 days of performance in Iraq
or Afghanistan and the personnel working in either country under those
contracts and assistance instruments. The common databases are to
include a brief description of each contract and assistance
instrument, its total value, and whether it was awarded competitively;
for personnel working under contracts or assistance instruments, the
databases will include the total number employed, total number
performing security functions, and total number killed or wounded.
Tracking this information should provide much of the information the
agencies are to include in the joint reports.
In July 2008, DOD, State, and USAID agreed in an MOU that SPOT would
serve as their common database and be the system of record for the
statutorily required contract and personnel information. The agencies
revised their MOU in April 2010, making SPOT their system for also
tracking assistance instruments and associated personnel. SPOT is a
web-based system initially developed by the U.S. Army to track
detailed information on a limited number of contractor personnel
deployed with U.S. forces. The 2010 MOU specified that SPOT would
include information on DOD, State, and USAID contracts and assistance
instruments with more than 30 days of performance in Iraq or
Afghanistan or valued at more than $100,000, as well as information on
the personnel working under those contracts and assistance
instruments. SPOT is configured so that it can track individuals by
name and unique identifier, such as Social Security number, and record
information, including the contracts they are working under,
deployment dates, and next of kin. The agencies agreed that contract-
related information, such as value and extent of competition, are to
be imported into SPOT from the FPDS-NG, the federal government's
system for tracking information on contracting actions. According to
the MOU, DOD is responsible for all basic maintenance, upgrades,
training, and systems operations costs, but the agencies agreed to
negotiate funding arrangements for any agency-unique requirements.
Within DOD, a program management office has responsibility for the
development, integration, testing, training, and deployment of SPOT
and as such, oversees the contractor that operates, maintains, and
sustains the system.
DOD, State, and USAID have phased in SPOT's implementation, with each
developing its own policies and procedures governing the system's use.
* DOD designated SPOT in January 2007 as its primary system for
collecting data on contractor personnel deployed with U.S. forces. At
that time, it implemented a contract clause directing firms to enter
data into SPOT on U.S., third country, and local nationals working
under its contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan that meet reporting
thresholds.[Footnote 9]
* State issued a policy in March 2008 that included language to be
incorporated in applicable contracts requiring contractors to enter
data into SPOT on U.S., third country, and local nationals working in
either Iraq or Afghanistan.[Footnote 10] State expanded this
requirement in January 2009 to cover personnel working under certain
assistance instruments in the two countries.[Footnote 11] As amended,
State's assistance policy directed that U.S. and third country
nationals working under grants must be entered into SPOT but allowed
for discretion in determining whether local nationals were entered
given safety and security concerns. In January 2011, State revised its
assistance guidance and related provision to allow grantees with
locally hired Iraqi or Afghan personnel to report aggregate numbers of
local nationals without providing personally identifying information
when safety concerns exist.[Footnote 12]
* USAID issued a directive in April 2009 that required the use of
contract clauses and assistance provisions requiring contractors and
assistance recipients in Iraq to enter personnel data into SPOT.
[Footnote 13] The directive explicitly excluded Iraqi entities and
nationals from having to be entered into SPOT until a classified
system is in place. In July 2010, USAID issued a directive
establishing a similar requirement for Afghanistan.[Footnote 14]
However, the policy notes that procedures will be provided separately
for entering information on Afghan nationals, but to date, such
procedures have not been issued.
Agencies Relied on Sources Other Than SPOT, but Data Used Had
Significant Limitations:
Variety of Data Sources Used to Prepare Joint Report:
DOD, State, and USAID's joint report cited a number of limitations
associated with SPOT's implementation, and as a result, the agencies
relied on a variety of other data sources to develop the report. The
only exception was State's use of SPOT as the basis for its contractor
personnel numbers. Whereas GAO previously collected and compiled data
from numerous sources including manually compiled lists of contracts
and assistance instruments and personnel data obtained through
surveys, officials from the three agencies told us they decided to
rely on existing databases and sources to the greatest extent
possible. Table 1 summarizes the data sources used to prepare the
joint report and the reasons cited by the agencies for not using SPOT.
Table 1: Data Sources Used by DOD, State, and USAID and Reasons Cited
in Joint Report for Not Relying on SPOT:
Data element: Number and value of new and active contracts and
assistance instruments and extent of competition;
Agency: DOD;
Data source used for joint report: FPDS-NG;
Agency: State;
Data source used for joint report: FPDS-NG;
Agency: USAID;
Data source used for joint report: USAID's Phoenix Financial
Management System (Phoenix)[A]/FPDS-NG;
Reasons cited for not relying on SPOT: SPOT does not yet have the
functionality to provide financial information about contracts.
Data element: Number of personnel working on contracts and assistance
instruments, including personnel performing security functions;
Agency: DOD;
Data source used for joint report: U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
Quarterly Contractor Census/SPOT-Plus[B];
Agency: State;
Data source used for joint report: SPOT;
Agency: USAID;
Data source used for joint report: Mission-collected data, estimates;
Reasons cited for not relying on SPOT: The full population of
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan were not registered in SPOT.
Data element: Number of personnel killed and wounded;
Agency: DOD;
Data source used for joint report: Department of Labor's Office of
Workers' Compensation Program Defense Base Act Summary[C];
Agency: State;
Data source used for joint report: Bureau-collected data;
Agency: USAID;
Data source used for joint report: Mission-collected data;
Reasons cited for not relying on SPOT: While SPOT has the ability to
reflect the number of personnel killed or wounded, contractors are not
routinely using this function and therefore the data are unreliable.
Source: The 2011 Annual Joint Report on Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
[A] Phoenix is USAID's financial management system that tracks
obligations on contracts and assistance instruments. Phoenix does not
contain information on competition and therefore USAID used FPDS-NG to
obtain competition information.
[B] The CENTCOM census relies on contractor firms to report their
personnel data to DOD components. The components then report the data
to CENTCOM at the end of each quarter. SPOT-Plus is a SPOT-populated
census template that is distributed to DOD contracting activities for
quarterly review and updates and is being used as DOD transitions from
the CENTCOM census to eventual reliance on SPOT.
[C] The Defense Base Act Summary is a Department of Labor system that
tracks claims for disability, medical, and death benefits for
contractors working outside the United States or on U.S. military
bases.
[End of table]
Data Presented in Joint Report Have Significant Limitations:
The data presented in the agencies' joint report had significant
limitations, many of which were not fully disclosed. As a result, the
data should not be used to draw conclusions about contracts,
assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq or
Afghanistan for fiscal year 2010 or to identify trends over time.
Contracts and Assistance Instruments:
While the agencies collectively reported $22.7 billion in fiscal year
2010 obligations, the joint report understates the three agencies'
obligations on contracts and assistance instruments with work
performed in Iraq and Afghanistan by at least $4 billion, nearly all
for DOD contracts. We identified this minimum amount by comparing the
underlying data the agencies used to prepare the joint report with
data we obtained from the agencies during our prior review of
contracts and assistance instruments with work in either country
during the first half of fiscal year 2010. The level of underreporting
we identified does not fully account for new awards or obligations
that the agencies made in the second half of fiscal year 2010.
DOD and State underreported their contracts and obligations in the
joint report because they relied solely on FPDS-NG to identify
contracts with work performed in Iraq or Afghanistan. FPDS-NG allows
agencies to only report one principal place of contract performance.
However, contracts can have performance in multiple countries, and the
reporting requirement applies to contracts with performance in Iraq or
Afghanistan, even if neither country is the principal place of
performance.[Footnote 15] Further, not all DOD contracts with
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan were entered into FPDS-NG. Neither
DOD nor State disclosed any limitations with their FPDS-NG queries or
that there could be additional contracts with associated obligations
with work in the two countries.
Using FPDS-NG to identify contracts with a principal place of
performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD reported $18.4 billion in
fiscal year 2010 obligations but underreported its contract
obligations by at least $3.9 billion. Specifically, we identified an
additional 20,810 contracts and orders that totaled to about $3.5
billion in fiscal year 2010 obligations that DOD had reported to us
last year but were not included in the joint report because the
principal place of performance was not Iraq or Afghanistan. For
example, DOD previously reported to us two contracts for translation
and interpretation services with performance in Iraq and/or
Afghanistan with $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2010 obligations, but
these contracts were not included in the joint report because FPDS-NG
identified the principal place of performance as the United States. We
also identified additional contracts that were previously reported to
us but not included in the joint report because they were not in FPDS-
NG. Among those, we identified 13 contracts with $418 million in
obligations during the first half of fiscal year 2010, including
combat support contracts for information technology services and
linguist support in the two countries. DOD did not report any
assistance instruments with performance in Iraq or Afghanistan. This
is consistent with our 2010 report for which we found DOD had no
assistance instruments with performance in either country during
fiscal year 2009 or the first half of fiscal year 2010.
For the joint report, State relied on FPDS-NG and reported $1.8
billion in contract obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan for fiscal
year 2010. We found, however, that State underreported its fiscal year
2010 contract obligations by at least $62 million by not including 49
contracts and orders that were reported to us last year. Specifically,
we identified a State delivery order for facility management with
about $54.3 million in obligations in fiscal year 2010 that was not in
the joint report because the United States was identified as the
principal place of performance in FPDS-NG, as opposed to either Iraq
or Afghanistan. We also identified another 48 contracts and orders
that State reported to us last year as having performance in either
country that were not identified through State's FPDS-NG query. These
include 23 contracts and orders awarded by the embassies in Iraq and
Afghanistan with about $1 million in obligations in the first half of
fiscal year 2010, even though the joint report states that it includes
all procurement activities contracted for by State's missions in the
two countries.
While the reporting requirement applies to both contracts and
assistance instruments, State did not report any assistance
instruments with performance in Iraq or Afghanistan or provide any
explanation in the joint report as to why such information was not
included. Based on data provided by State last year, we identified 155
assistance instruments with work performed in Iraq and/or Afghanistan
with $120 million obligated during the first half of fiscal year 2010.
These assistance instruments covered a wide range of activities, such
as media workshops, small business development, and capacity building
for nongovernmental organizations. State officials informed us that
they did not include information on assistance instruments as they
were not including information on personnel working under assistance
instruments because of limitations, as discussed below. They told us,
however, that they plan to include assistance instrument information
in next year's joint report.
Unlike DOD and State, USAID did not rely on FPDS-NG as its data source
for the number and value of contracts. As explained in the joint
report, USAID knew gaps existed in its FPDS-NG data, particularly for
Afghanistan, so it used data from its financial management system,
which contains information on the number and value of both contracts
and assistance instruments. USAID reported $2.6 billion in contract
and assistance instrument obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan for
fiscal year 2010. However, by comparing the data from the financial
management system to data USAID provided us last year, we found that
the agency underreported its obligations by about $3.9 million. These
obligations were for 16 contracts and 8 assistance instruments in the
first half of fiscal year 2010 that were not included in the joint
report. Almost all of the contracts that were not reported were
personal services contracts.[Footnote 16] USAID officials told us they
did not report personal services contracts because they consider such
contractor personnel to be USAID employees, but this was not disclosed
in the joint report. Further, unlike DOD and State, which provided
competition information for nearly all contracts included in the joint
report, USAID provided competition data on fewer than half the active
contracts and assistance instruments included in the joint report.
Other than acknowledging FPDS-NG data gaps, USAID provided no specific
explanation for why the competition data presented in the report are
incomplete.
Contractor and Assistance Personnel:
We identified a number of limitations and methodological challenges
that resulted in both over-and underreporting of contractor and
assistance personnel and call into question the overall reliability of
the data in the joint report. However, we were not able to determine
the full magnitude of the discrepancies.
For the joint report, DOD relied on quarterly censuses as its source
of data on contractor personnel, including personnel performing
security functions. DOD provided the numbers of contractor personnel,
broken out by nationality, in Iraq and Afghanistan at the end of each
quarter. However, the numbers for local nationals working under
contracts in Afghanistan were generally overreported. According to the
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) official who oversees the compilation
of the census, a methodological error resulted in double counting of
local nationals in Afghanistan for the first three fiscal year 2010
quarters. The error was discovered as the fourth quarter census was
being compiled, which resulted in a significant reduction in the number
of local national contractor personnel in Afghanistan for that
quarter. To illustrate the magnitude of the double counting, DOD
reported 73,392 local national contractor personnel in Afghanistan for
the third quarter of fiscal year 2010 and only 34,222 in the fourth
quarter--a difference of 39,170 personnel. No adjustments were made to
the prior three quarters to correct for the double counting.
Furthermore, this error and an explanation as to what occurred are not
provided in the joint report, except to note that there are challenges
associated with counting local national personnel in Afghanistan.
Officials from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Program Support and CENTCOM told us they have a high level of
confidence in the census numbers for all contractor personnel except
local nationals in Afghanistan.[Footnote 17] However, as we noted in
October 2010, DOD officials overseeing the census characterized the
census as providing rough approximations of the actual numbers of
contractor personnel in either country. They explained that several
challenges pertaining to counting local nationals and validating
contractor-reported data have hindered their ability to collect
accurate and reliable personnel data.
State relied on SPOT as its source for data on contractor personnel,
which led to several omissions and discrepancies. Based on our
analysis of State's reported personnel data and the contract data
reported from FPDS-NG, we identified 50 contracts that met SPOT
reporting requirements but were not in the system. Therefore,
personnel working on those contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan were not
included in the joint report. For example, we identified 5 contracts
for construction with about $525 million in fiscal year 2010
obligations with no contractor personnel reported in SPOT. Further, at
the end of the second quarter of fiscal year 2010, there were 1,336
fewer contractor personnel in SPOT than were reported to us last year
from State's surveys of contractor personnel in the two countries.
Such omissions are consistent with what State officials told us in
2010--that manually compiled surveys of contractor personnel in either
country have some limitations but provide more accurate information
than SPOT. Additionally, while the joint report presents the numbers
as "contractor personnel," and we confirmed with State officials that
the numbers were only to include contractor personnel, we found that
about 13 percent of the personnel State reported as contractor
personnel were actually working under assistance instruments.
In addition, State did not include in the joint report the number of
personnel working under assistance instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan
or explain why assistance personnel were not included. State officials
informed us that although State's policy required assistance personnel
to be entered into SPOT since January 2009, assistance recipients had
been reluctant to enter information into the system. As a result, for
fiscal year 2010, officials told us that little information regarding
personnel working under assistance instruments had been entered into
the system. However, State could have relied on other data sources to
provide the required personnel information. Last year, based on
surveys State conducted of its assistance recipients, we reported that
there were at least 8,074 personnel working under State's assistance
instruments in Iraq and Afghanistan at the end of the second quarter
of fiscal year 2010. We cautioned that the number was likely
understated because of several factors. State officials informed us
that response rates to their requests for personnel numbers from
assistance instrument recipients were low; they also stated that local
nationals were not always captured in personnel counts because it was
not feasible or it was too difficult to obtain accurate information.
In reporting the number of personnel performing security functions,
State relied exclusively on SPOT and did not disclose any limitations
with that source. As we reported last year, SPOT cannot be used to
reliably distinguish personnel performing security functions from
other contractor personnel, as each of the three available methods has
limitations.[Footnote 18] State officials responsible for compiling
the joint report told us they queried SPOT based on security-related
job titles.[Footnote 19] Upon review of the data, officials from the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security noticed that the numbers appeared low.
An analyst from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security identified five
large security contracts with numerous personnel who did not have the
word "security" in their job titles and as a result were not included
in the query results, a risk we noted in our prior report. The SPOT
query indicated that there were 3,924 State contractor personnel
performing security functions in Iraq and Afghanistan at the end of
the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2010. State revised this number and
reported 8,034 personnel performing security functions for that
quarter. Despite the fact that the SPOT data were incomplete and had
to be manually adjusted, the joint report provides no explanation and
does not identify limitations with the SPOT data for determining the
number of personnel providing security functions.
In presenting personnel numbers in the joint report, USAID was the
only agency that used estimates as opposed to actual counts for the
total number of contractor and assistance personnel, as allowed by the
reporting requirement. USAID also used estimates for the number of
personnel performing security functions, which is not provided for in
the reporting requirement. Specifically, USAID estimated the number of
personnel for Afghanistan. However, the full extent to which estimates
were used is not disclosed in the joint report. Further, the estimates
are based on unreliable data. USAID officials explained to us that the
estimates were based on data from several sources including databases
used to track aid effectiveness metrics, quarterly reports submitted
by its contractors and grantees, and data submitted to us for last
year's report. All of these sources have limitations. For example,
* while contractors and assistance recipients in Iraq report their
personnel numbers on a regular basis, a USAID official informed us
that only about 70 percent of their contractors and assistance
recipients in Afghanistan provide personnel information;
* a USAID official told us they have a limited ability to verify the
accuracy or completeness of the data that are reported, especially for
Afghanistan where they operate far more projects than in Iraq;
* the USAID official responsible for preparing the joint report raised
concerns about possible inconsistent reporting of security personnel
that could result in double counting; and:
* the data provided to us by USAID for our 2010 report did not include
personnel working under several contracts and assistance instruments,
such as four cooperative agreements for food security programs in
Afghanistan.
USAID officials also told us that the numbers in the joint report do
not include the number of personnel working under certain support
service contracts, such as facilities maintenance, or personal
services contractors. For example, a USAID official told us that at
least 109 contractor personnel supporting the Iraq mission were not
counted in the joint report because a decision was made not to include
support services and personal services contractors.
Personnel Killed and Wounded:
Although all three agencies are required to track the number of
personnel killed or wounded while working on contracts and assistance
instruments in Iraq or Afghanistan, DOD still does not have a system
that reliably tracks killed and wounded contractor personnel. For the
joint report, DOD relied on claims data maintained by the Department of
Labor (Labor) regarding Defense Base Act (DBA) claims.[Footnote 20]
While DOD acknowledged in the joint report that claims data from this
workers compensation program do not provide a true reflection of how
many DOD contractor personnel were killed or wounded while working in
either country, DOD did not fully disclose the limitations associated
with DBA claims data. First, the claims data presented in the joint
report are for death and injury claims filed in fiscal year 2010 for
all U.S. government contractors and civilians--including those employed
by State and USAID--and not just DOD contractors. Further, as we
concluded in 2009, DBA claims data do not provide an appropriate basis
for determining the number of contractor personnel killed or wounded
in either country. Most notably, not all deaths and injuries for which
claims are filed under DBA would be regarded as contractors killed or
wounded within the context of the NDAA for FY2011 reporting
requirement. For example, we previously identified DBA claims filed
for occupational injuries and medical conditions such as sprains and
appendicitis. Also, Labor officials previously explained to us that
injuries to local and third country contractor personnel, in
particular, may be underreported.
To provide their data on personnel killed and wounded, State and USAID
relied on data collected by State bureaus and USAID missions in Iraq
and Afghanistan. These data were based on reports submitted to State
by contractors and to USAID by contractors and assistance recipients.
Without alternative sources of data, we could not verify whether
State's and USAID's data were complete, except to note that State did
not include assistance personnel who were killed or wounded. However,
there are indications of underreporting by contractors and assistance
recipients. For example, a May 2010 report from the USAID Inspector
General indicated that not all contractors and assistance recipients
in Afghanistan were reporting incidents that result in personnel being
injured or killed.[Footnote 21] In addition, a USAID official in
Afghanistan acknowledged that for fiscal year 2010, it was voluntary
for contractors and assistance recipients to file serious incident
reports, which would provide information on personnel killed or
wounded. Earlier this year, USAID began modifying contracts in
Afghanistan to require its contractors to file serious incident
reports.
Use of SPOT Hindered by Data and Reporting Shortcomings:
Agencies Have Used SPOT to a Limited Extent:
Officials from the three agencies told us they have used SPOT in some
instances to obtain information on individual contracts and contractor
employees. For example, an official from State's Bureau of Diplomatic
Security said they have used SPOT during investigations to verify
whether the individuals involved were deployed in theater at the time
of the incidents being investigated. A USAID contracting officer in
Iraq told us that when a security incident involving a contractor
employee occurs, she uses SPOT to determine if the individual involved
has a letter of authorization, which should provide personal
information including whether the individual is authorized to carry a
weapon. A senior official with DOD's CENTCOM Contracting Command in
Iraq explained that he used SPOT to obtain information on specific
contracts, such as the name of the contracting officer or contracting
officer's representative, in response to questions about contracts
that were not awarded or managed by his office. State and DOD
officials have also reported using SPOT to better manage contractor
personnel. For example, DOD officials from the SPOT program management
office told us that SPOT has been used in conjunction with information
from other systems to identify contractors that should be billed for
the use of government services, including medical treatment and dining
facilities. Additionally, State Diplomatic Security officials told us
they have used SPOT to confirm that contractor personnel are
authorized to be in Iraq and determine to what government services those
personnel are entitled.
DOD and State officials also identified instances of using SPOT data
to inform operational planning for contractor support. Officials from
the SPOT program management office told us they have received requests
from U.S. Forces-Iraq commanders to identify the universe of
contractors and contractor capabilities in Iraq to assist with the
drawdown of U.S. forces. They also stated that base commanders in Iraq
are receiving contractor population reports to obtain insight into
which contractors are on their bases. Additionally, officials in the
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program
Support told us that data from SPOT are being used to help prepare
future operational plans. For example, SPOT data have been analyzed to
help determine what services contractors have provided and what level
of life support the U.S. government has provided to them, which can
aid combatant commanders in developing operational plans. State
officials also told us that the U.S. Embassy in Iraq has requested
SPOT data to help it determine the number of contractors in country
and to assist with planning for the future U.S. presence in Iraq once
the U.S. military withdraws at the end of this year. However, USAID
officials including those we spoke with in Iraq and Afghanistan told
us that they do not use SPOT data to manage, oversee, or coordinate
contracts aside from obtaining information on specific contractor
employees.
Data and Reporting Limitations Affect Opportunities for Using SPOT to
Manage, Oversee, and Coordinate:
DOD, State, and USAID officials informed us that shortcomings in SPOT
data and reporting capabilities limit their ability to use the system
in managing, overseeing, and coordinating contracts with work
performed in Iraq and Afghanistan. In some cases, officials have
relied on other data sources for such purposes. For example, DOD
officials with the Contracting Fusion Cell in Iraq told us that
because SPOT is designed to track contractor personnel on an
individual basis rather than to support the operational management of
contractors, they developed a new, separate database containing
aggregate-level data on contractor personnel at each base to help
manage the drawdown of personnel and equipment from the country.
[Footnote 22] While the new database includes information not
available from SPOT, such as information on contractor equipment, some
of the basic contract information overlaps with SPOT and was added to
the database from sources other than SPOT. Similarly, officials from
State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security told us that SPOT does not
provide the level of detail needed to manage their security contractor
employees and that they rely on their own data system for the day-to-
day management of their contractors.
Officials from all three agencies also raised concerns about the
reports that can be generated from SPOT. USAID officials in Iraq
explained that one reason they do not rely on SPOT to help manage
contractors and assistance recipients is that the types of reports
they need are not easily available from the system. State officials
also indicated that the standard reports available through SPOT do not
meet their needs and they have to request ad hoc reports from the SPOT
program management office's help desk. CENTCOM Contracting Command
officials in Iraq also told us that for a large data run they cannot
obtain data from SPOT in a timely manner, with it taking up to a week
to receive the data. SPOT program management officials acknowledged
that agency personnel are not fully aware of SPOT's reporting
capabilities and may not have confidence in the system given its data
reliability challenges. As a result, the program management officials
are seeking to expand their outreach to potential users of the data,
focusing on improving customer service, and exploring the development
of training on how SPOT data could be used for management and
operations, as opposed to the current training that has been focused
on entering data into the system. Also, the SPOT program management
office told us that they have taken steps to facilitate agency
officials' ability to query SPOT for contracts awarded by their
agencies, a process they described as cumbersome, to allow for better
coordination and leveraging of existing contracts within an agency.
Staff from the Office of the Senior Contracting Official in
Afghanistan told us that they recently began using this query
functionality and they expect it to better enable their use of SPOT in
responding to future data requests.
The agencies' ability to use SPOT for interagency coordination
purposes has been limited by the fact that they cannot easily access
each other's data. SPOT program management officials told us that SPOT
could be used by the agencies to identify and leverage contracts being
performed for common services so that agencies could minimize
duplication, share price information, and obtain cost savings.
However, agency officials are currently not able to access information
on other agencies' contracts unless DOD grants them permission to have
full access to the information in SPOT. SPOT program management
officials informed us that they are developing a separate reporting
and analysis functionality to allow users to more easily share,
analyze, and use data available in SPOT. However, this functionality
is currently being tested and there are no time frames for when it
will be available to all users. While USAID officials agreed that
coordination among the agencies is important, they did not share the
perspective that the agencies needed access to each others'
information in SPOT. They explained that this is partly due to the
fact that interagency coordination before the award of a contract or
assistance instrument is occurring without using SPOT.
Recent Efforts Have Been Made to Improve SPOT, but Past Problems Have
Not Been Fully Addressed:
Recent Efforts to Improve Tracking of Personnel in SPOT:
We previously reported that a significant challenge associated with
SPOT's implementation was ensuring that Iraqi and Afghan nationals
working under contracts and assistance instruments were consistently
and accurately entered in SPOT. Last year we reported that local
nationals were not always entered into the system because of agency
policies as well as practical and technical limitations. For example,
many local nationals work at remote locations, which limits agencies'
ability to track these personnel and verify the completeness of
reported information. Also, DOD, State, and USAID officials have told
us that some local national contractors refuse to submit information
on their personnel because of safety concerns. Additionally, some
information required for SPOT data fields, such as first and last
names and dates of birth, may not be known due, in part, to cultural
norms specific to each country.
The agencies have taken some steps to improve the reliability of the
personnel data in SPOT. DOD and State officials informed us that they
have increased efforts to validate SPOT data. In DOD's case, this is
done, in part, through the SPOT-Plus process, which began in January
2010. This process is used to reconcile contractor personnel numbers
in SPOT with the quarterly contractor census and identify information
that needs to be updated or entered into SPOT. DOD officials informed
us that they will continue comparing SPOT and census data until there
is confidence that 85 percent of the personnel reported through the
census are reported in SPOT, at which point the plan is to discontinue
the census and fully rely on SPOT. According to DOD officials, their
analyses indicate that for some categories of contractor personnel
they may have achieved the 85 percent confidence level, but that for
other categories--particularly local nationals in Afghanistan--they
are still below that level. The officials could not provide an
estimate as to when they will discontinue the census. However, they
noted that once the 85 percent confidence level is achieved, DOD plans
to conduct random samplings to ensure it is maintained. Similarly,
State officials informed us that program and contracting officials
have begun reviewing SPOT data on a quarterly or even monthly basis in
an effort to improve SPOT data entry. Given this emphasis, State
officials told us that they are increasingly confident in the
reliability of personnel data in SPOT. However, a USAID official
responsible for preparing the joint report told us that the agency
does not validate SPOT data and does not intend to do so, noting it
has experienced high staff turnover in Iraq and Afghanistan and has
other reporting priorities.
In April 2011, SPOT was modified to address concerns cited by State
and USAID officials, as well as by contractors and assistance
recipients, that the safety of local nationals could be at risk should
SPOT, with its detailed personal information, be compromised. The
system now allows users to enter the aggregate number of personnel
working under a contract or assistance instrument, rather than
requiring personnel to be entered individually with personally
identifiable information. This provides a means of counting local
nationals working under contracts and assistance instruments who
previously were not entered into the system. USAID officials said that
while guidance on the use of the aggregate count function has not yet
been issued, they have begun entering aggregate data on local
nationals in Afghanistan into SPOT. In January 2011, State revised its
assistance policy to allow grantees with locally hired Iraqi or Afghan
personnel to report their aggregate numbers of local nationals into
SPOT. State officials told us the modification appears to have
satisfied assistance recipients' concerns, as they are now providing
State officials with aggregate numbers for inclusion in SPOT. DOD
officials informed us that they will not be issuing guidance regarding
the aggregate count function, as DOD's policy continues to require
contractor personnel working under contracts that meet reporting
thresholds to be individually entered into SPOT.
Additional measures have been undertaken to help address the challenge
of tracking local nationals in SPOT. For example, the SPOT program
management office developed procedures for establishing unique
identification numbers for local nationals who are entered into the
system by name but whose personal identifying information does not
conform to the required SPOT data fields. Similarly, DOD officials
told us they have developed work-arounds for Iraqi and Afghan firms
that lack reliable Internet connections to submit their personnel
information via templates, which are then uploaded by DOD personnel
into SPOT. In an effort to improve the collection of data on personnel
working at remote locations, DOD officials informed us that the
department is also piloting a handheld device that does not require an
Internet connection and can be used to collect information on
personnel that is then uploaded into SPOT.
Practical and Technical Challenges Continue to Affect SPOT's Ability
to Track Statutorily Required Data:
In 2009, we recommended that the three agencies develop a joint plan
with associated time frames to address SPOT's limitations, but
agencies responded that a plan was not needed as their ongoing
coordination efforts were sufficient. However, we concluded last year
and our work continues to demonstrate that coordination alone is not
sufficient to ensure that statutory requirements are met.
Specifically, SPOT still cannot be used to reliably track statutorily
required contract, assistance instrument, and personnel data as agreed
to in the agencies' MOU because of a number of longstanding practical
and technical limitations. SPOT program management officials and the
agencies have identified plans for further modifications and new
guidance needed to address some but not all of these limitations.
SPOT still is not linked with FPDS-NG or other agency systems for
obtaining information on contracts and assistance instruments.
Consequently, SPOT cannot be used to obtain financial and competition
information on contracts and assistance instruments as agreed to in
the MOUs. According to the joint report, the link to FPDS-NG to obtain
contract information is scheduled to occur in early fiscal year 2012--
this functionality was previously planned to be available in 2010. As
we reported in 2009, one reason for this delay is that contract
numbers, which are the unique identifiers that would be used to match
records in SPOT to those in FPDS-NG, are entered into SPOT using
different formats. To help resolve this, the SPOT program management
office modified SPOT earlier this year to require DOD users to enter
contract numbers in a standardized manner that can be matched with
FPDS-NG information. SPOT program management officials told us that a
similar modification has not been made for State or USAID contracts.
Once the link is made between SPOT and FPDS-NG, information from the
two systems can only be merged if the contract number has been entered
into SPOT. If the contract is not in SPOT, because, for example, no
contractor personnel working on that particular contract have been
entered, its information cannot be linked with the information in FPDS-
NG. Conversely, current information on the contract has to be in FPDS-
NG, which does not always occur as we found in our analyses of the
information presented in the joint report. Most notably, officials
told us that information on USAID contracts awarded in Afghanistan
must still be manually entered into FPDS-NG, which has resulted in
known information gaps. USAID is planning to deploy a new system to
Afghanistan--already in place in Iraq and other countries--that will
automatically upload contract information into FPDS-NG by the end of
2011. Once the link between SPOT and FPDS-NG is established and the
necessary data are in both systems, then SPOT could be relied on to
provide more complete information on contracts with performance in
either country, as opposed to relying only on the FPDS-NG principal
place of performance. SPOT program management officials informed us
that there are currently no plans to establish links with the State or
USAID systems that contain assistance instrument information.
Officials stated that, therefore, information on those instruments
needs to be manually entered into SPOT.
SPOT does not provide a reliable means of obtaining information on
orders and subawards. The statutory requirement to track information
on contracts and assistance instruments includes a requirement to
track comparable information on task and delivery orders as well as
subcontracts and subgrants. However, SPOT does not have a specific
data field for this information. Instead, contractors and assistance
recipients are instructed by the agencies to enter information on
their subawards into a data field designed to track information on
task orders. As a result, it has not been possible to obtain accurate
counts of orders and subawards using SPOT. SPOT program management
officials told us that they expect to address this issue by creating a
new subaward data field in a September 2011 SPOT upgrade.
SPOT does not reliably distinguish personnel performing security
functions. As discussed in our 2010 report, there are three methods to
distinguish personnel performing security functions from others in
SPOT. Each method has limitations and yields different results, none
of which are fully consistent with the statutory definition of
contractor personnel performing security functions. SPOT program
officials acknowledge this limitation but informed us that they have
not yet developed a corrective action to ensure that security
personnel are consistently and reliably distinguished for statutory
tracking and reporting purposes.
SPOT is not being used to track the number of personnel killed and
wounded. As we reported last year and as noted in the joint report,
contractors and assistance recipients generally have not been
recording information on killed or wounded personnel in SPOT.
According to the joint report, the SPOT program management office is
working with users to explore ways of improving compliance by
clarifying the terminology and expanding data fields. For example,
there have been questions about whether deaths or injuries resulting
from car accidents should be recorded in SPOT or if SPOT should only
be used to track those killed or wounded while performing their
contractual duties. SPOT program officials informed us that there has
been some discussion of expanding the data fields in SPOT to include
information like the date of injury or death and details surrounding
the incident. However, officials told us these actions are still being
discussed internally and no plans are in place to include such changes
in upcoming versions of SPOT. Instead, DOD and State officials said
they are helping contractors and assistance instrument recipients gain
a better understanding of the requirement to report killed or wounded
personnel using SPOT. Additionally, State officials told us that they
have begun entering information into SPOT on killed and wounded
personnel based on information provided by contractors and assistance
recipients and anticipate using the data in SPOT to prepare future
joint reports.
Concluding Observations:
In 2008, DOD, State, and USAID designated SPOT as their system of
record for tracking statutorily required information on contracts and
contractor personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, a designation they
reaffirmed in 2010 when the requirement was expanded to include
assistance instruments and personnel. Yet the agencies still do not
have reliable sources and methods to report on contracts, assistance
instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is
evidenced by the fact that the agencies could not reliably use data
from SPOT to prepare their first joint report and instead relied on
other data sources and methods that had significant limitations. Over
the years, we have reported on the limitations associated with SPOT's
implementation and the agencies' resulting decisions to rely on other
methods of collecting and reporting data that have their own
shortcomings. We recommended in 2009 that the agencies develop a joint
plan with associated time frames to address limitations and ensure
SPOT's implementation to fulfill statutory requirements. The agencies
disagreed with the need for the plan, citing ongoing coordination
efforts as sufficient.
While the agencies' recent modifications to SPOT help address some
limitations, such as those related to tracking local nationals, other
limitations persist that undermine SPOT's ability to fulfill statutory
reporting requirements. Further, while agency officials have
recognized some benefits of using SPOT to help manage, oversee, and
coordinate contracts, assistance instruments, and associated
personnel, their ability to do so has been hindered by SPOT's
shortcomings. Our prior recommendation for a joint plan was intended
to provide an opportunity for the agencies to work with potential
users of the data to better understand their information needs and
determine how best to proceed with defined roles, responsibilities,
and associated time frames that could help hold the agencies
accountable and ensure timely implementation. We were concerned that
without such a plan, SPOT's implementation would continue to languish
with the agencies not collecting statutorily required information in a
reliable manner, either using SPOT or other sources. Based on our
review of the agencies' joint report, we continue to have this concern
and are uncertain when SPOT will be fully implemented and will serve
as a reliable source of data for management, oversight, and
coordination. We have, therefore, concluded that the recommendation
from our 2009 report still applies, and we are not making any new
recommendations.
Agency Comments:
We requested comments on a draft of this report from DOD, State, and
USAID. The three agencies informed us that they had no comments on the
draft's findings or concluding observations. DOD and State provided us
with technical comments that we incorporated into the final report, as
appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development, as well as interested congressional
committees. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO
website at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix I.
Signed by:
John P. Hutton:
Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable John McCain:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John F. Kerry:
Chairman:
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Dianne Feinstein:
Chairman:
The Honorable Saxby Chambliss:
Vice Chairman:
Select Committee on Intelligence:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon:
Chairman:
The Honorable Adam Smith:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Armed Services:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen:
Chairman:
The Honorable Howard L. Berman:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Foreign Affairs:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Darrell Issa:
Chairman:
The Honorable Elijah Cummings:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Michael Rogers:
Chairman:
The Honorable C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger:
Ranking Member:
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John P. Hutton, (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Johana R. Ayers, Assistant
Director; E. Brandon Booth; Virginia Chanley; Julia Kennon; Gilbert
Kim; Angie Nichols-Friedman; Anne McDonough-Hughes; Margaret McKenna;
Robert Swierczek; Michael Rohrback; and Alyssa Weir made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-181, § 863 (as amended) (NDAA for FY2008). See GAO, Iraq and
Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Face Continued Challenges in
Tracking Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-1] (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 1, 2010); Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Continue
to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and Contracts in
Iraq and Afghanistan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1,
2009); and Contingency Contracting: DOD, State, and USAID Contracts
and Contractor Personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-19] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1,
2008).
[2] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 835 (amending Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 863).
[3] For the purposes of the agencies' joint reporting requirement,
Section 864(a)(2) of the NDAA for FY 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181 as
amended by section 813(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84 (2009) (NDAA for FY2010),
defines a "contract in Iraq or Afghanistan" as "a contract with the
Department of Defense, the Department of State, or the United States
Agency for International Development, a subcontract at any tier issued
under such a contract, a task order or delivery order at any tier
issued under such a contract, a grant, or a cooperative agreement
(including a contract, subcontract, task order, delivery order, grant,
or cooperative agreement issued by another Government agency for the
Department of Defense, the Department of State, or the United States
Agency for International Development) if the contract, subcontract,
task order, delivery order, grant, or cooperative agreement involves
worked [sic] performed in Iraq or Afghanistan for a period longer than
30 days." The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines a
"subcontract" as a contract entered into by a subcontractor to furnish
supplies or services for performance of a prime contract or a
subcontract. The FAR defines a "task order" as an order for services
placed against an established contract or with government sources.
Throughout this report, when we use the term contract, we intend it to
refer to a contract, task order, or delivery order with work in Iraq
or Afghanistan, while the term assistance instrument refers to a grant
or cooperative agreement with work in Iraq or Afghanistan, within the
parameters established by the NDAA for FY2008 and the NDAA for FY2010.
[4] For the purposes of the agencies' joint reporting requirement, the
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,
Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 854(d) (2008) amended section 864 of the NDAA
for FY2008 to define "contractor personnel" as "any person performing
work under contract for the Department of Defense, the Department of
State, or the United States Agency for International Development, in
Iraq or Afghanistan, including individuals and subcontractors at any
tier." Section 813 of the NDAA for FY2010 expanded the NDAA for FY2008
definition of "contract" to include grants and cooperative agreements
and, therefore, personnel working under grants or cooperative
agreements in Iraq and Afghanistan fall within the definition of
"contractor personnel." Section 864 of the NDAA for FY2008 defines
private security functions as the "guarding of personnel, facilities
or property of a Federal agency, the contractor or subcontractor, or a
third party" and "any other activity for which personnel are required
to carry weapons in the performance of their duties."
[5] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 861.
[6] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 813 (2009).
[7] Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 835 (amending Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 863).
[8] The NDAA for FY2011 amendments to the NDAA for FY2008 permit the
use of estimates in determining the total number of personnel working
on contracts for any category of contractor personnel for which the
agencies determine it is not feasible to provide an actual count.
However, the agencies are to fully disclose in the joint report the
extent to which estimates are used in lieu of an actual count.
[9] This guidance was implemented in Department of Defense FAR
Supplement clause 252.225-7040(g), Class Deviation 2007-O0010, and
Class Deviation 2011-O0004, which set SPOT reporting thresholds.
[10] Department of State Office of the Procurement Executive,
Procurement Information Bulletin No. 2008-15, Use of Synchronized
Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) for Contractors
Supporting and Diplomatic or Consular Mission Outside the United
States, March 25, 2008. Under this policy, applicable contracts are
defined as those required to include FAR clause 52.225-19.
[11] Department of State Grants Policy Directive Number 33, Recipient
Performance in a Designated Area of Combat Operations, January 6,
2009, as amended on August 13, 2009.
[12] Department of State Grants Policy Directive Number 33, Recipient
Performance in a Designated Area of Combat Operations, as amended on
January 10, 2011. In addition, certain locally hired personnel, for
example, those performing a private security function or performing
duties as translators, must be individually entered into SPOT.
[13] USAID Acquisition & Assistance Policy Directive 09-01, Contract
Clause and Assistance Provision for Awards in Iraq, April 1, 2009.
[14] USAID Acquisition & Assistance Policy Directive 10-04, Contract
Clause and Assistance Provision for Awards in Afghanistan, July 20,
2010.
[15] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 863 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 111-383, §
835).
[16] The FAR defines "personal services contracts" as contracts that,
by their express terms or as administered, make the contractor
personnel appear to be, in effect, government employees. FAR 2.101.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, authorizes USAID to
enter into personal services contracts with individuals for services
abroad; these individuals are not regarded as employees of the U.S.
government for the purpose of civil service laws. 22 U.S.C. §
2396(a)(3).
[17] The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Program Support is responsible for oversight and program management
for the orchestration, synchronization, and integration of contingency
acquisition planning and its operational execution in the Department
of Defense. This office was responsible for compiling DOD's
contribution to the joint report.
[18] The three different methods that can be used are sorting by (1)
job titles, (2) common industry classification system code that
identifies contracts based on the type of service provided, or (3) the
weapon authorization data field that identifies personnel authorized
to carry firearms.
[19] The following job titles have been identified by the SPOT program
office to determine the number of security contractors under this
method: Security Advisor; Private Security Contractor; Security
Specialist; Site Security Advisor; and Security Supervisor.
[20] Congress enacted the DBA in 1941. The insurance required under
DBA provides employees with uniform levels of disability and medical
benefits or, in the event of death, provides benefits to eligible
dependents. Contractors, including subcontractors, are required to
provide DBA insurance coverage for all of their employees, regardless
of their nationality, working outside the United States on U.S.
military bases or under a contract with the U.S. government for public
works or national defense.
[21] USAID, Audit of USAID/Afghanistan's Oversight of Private Security
Contractors in Afghanistan, Audit Report Number 5-306-10-009-P (May
21, 2010).
[22] The Contracting Fusion Cell is responsible for monitoring and
assessing the contractor demobilization mission and compliance with
mission requirements for U.S. Forces-Iraq.
[End of section]
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