Wildfire Suppression
Funding Transfers Cause Project Cancellations and Delays, Strained Relationships, and Management Disruptions Gao ID: GAO-04-612 June 2, 2004In 2003, wildfires burned roughly 4 million acres, destroyed over 5,000 structures, took the lives of 30 firefighters, and cost over $1 billion to suppress. The substantial expense of fighting wildfires has exceeded the funds appropriated for wildfire suppression nearly every year since 1990. To pay for wildfire suppression costs when the funds appropriated are insufficient, the U.S. Forest Service and the Department of the Interior have transferred funds from their other programs. GAO was asked to identify (1) the amount of funds transferred and reimbursed for wildfire suppression since 1999, and the programs from which agencies transferred funds; (2) the effects on agency programs from which funds were taken; and (3) alternative approaches that could be considered for estimating annual suppression costs and funding wildfire suppression.
The Forest Service and Interior transferred over $2.7 billion from other agency programs to help fund wildfire suppression over the last 5 years. On average, the Congress reimbursed agencies about 80 percent of the amounts transferred. Interior primarily used funds from its construction and land acquisition accounts. In recent years, the Forest Service used funds from many different programs; while before 2001, it transferred funds from a single reforestation program/timber sale area restoration trust fund. Transferring funds for wildfire suppression resulted in canceled and delayed projects, strained relationships with state and local agency partners, and difficulties in managing programs. These impacts affected numerous activities, including fuels reduction and land acquisition. Although transfers were intended to aid fire suppression, some projects that could improve agency capabilities to fight fires, such as purchasing additional equipment, were canceled or delayed. Further, agencies' relationships with states, nonprofit groups, and communities were negatively impacted because agency officials could not fulfill commitments, such as awarding grants. Transfers also disrupted the agencies' ability to manage programs, including annual and long-term budgeting and planning. Although the agencies took some steps to mitigate the impacts of transfers, the effects were widespread and will likely increase if transfers continue. To better manage the wildfire suppression funding shortfall, the agencies should improve their methods for estimating suppression costs by factoring in recent changes in the costs and uncertainties of fighting wildfires. Also, the Congress could consider alternative funding approaches, such as establishing a governmentwide or agency-specific reserve account.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-04-612, Wildfire Suppression: Funding Transfers Cause Project Cancellations and Delays, Strained Relationships, and Management Disruptions
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
June 2004:
WILDFIRE SUPPRESSION:
Funding Transfers Cause Project Cancellations and Delays, Strained
Relationships, and Management Disruptions:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-612]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-612, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
In 2003, wildfires burned roughly 4 million acres, destroyed over 5,000
structures, took the lives of 30 firefighters, and cost over $1 billion
to suppress. The substantial expense of fighting wildfires has exceeded
the funds appropriated for wildfire suppression nearly every year since
1990. To pay for wildfire suppression costs when the funds appropriated
are insufficient, the U.S. Forest Service and the Department of the
Interior have transferred funds from their other programs.
GAO was asked to identify (1) the amount of funds transferred and
reimbursed for wildfire suppression since 1999, and the programs from
which agencies transferred funds; (2) the effects on agency programs
from which funds were taken; and (3) alternative approaches that could
be considered for estimating annual suppression costs and funding
wildfire suppression.
What GAO Found:
The Forest Service and Interior transferred over $2.7 billion from
other agency programs to help fund wildfire suppression over the last 5
years. On average, the Congress reimbursed agencies about 80 percent of
the amounts transferred. Interior primarily used funds from its
construction and land acquisition accounts. In recent years, the Forest
Service used funds from many different programs; while before 2001, it
transferred funds from a single reforestation program/timber sale area
restoration trust fund.
Transferring funds for wildfire suppression resulted in canceled and
delayed projects, strained relationships with state and local agency
partners, and difficulties in managing programs. These impacts affected
numerous activities, including fuels reduction and land acquisition.
Although transfers were intended to aid fire suppression, some projects
that could improve agency capabilities to fight fires, such as
purchasing additional equipment, were canceled or delayed. Further,
agencies‘ relationships with states, nonprofit groups, and communities
were negatively impacted because agency officials could not fulfill
commitments, such as awarding grants. Transfers also disrupted the
agencies‘ ability to manage programs, including annual and long-term
budgeting and planning. Although the agencies took some steps to
mitigate the impacts of transfers, the effects were widespread and will
likely increase if transfers continue.
To better manage the wildfire suppression funding shortfall, the
agencies should improve their methods for estimating suppression costs
by factoring in recent changes in the costs and uncertainties of
fighting wildfires. Also, the Congress could consider alternative
funding approaches, such as establishing a governmentwide or agency-
specific reserve account.
Wildfire Suppression Costs Have Exceeded Appropriations Almost Every
Year since 1990:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends several measures to minimize the impacts of funding
transfers and to improve the estimates on which the agencies base their
wildfire budgeting requests. Further, GAO is asking the Congress to
consider alternative approaches for funding wildfire suppression.
In commenting on the draft report, Forest Service and Interior
generally agreed with the report‘s findings and recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-612
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Barry T. Hill at (202)
512-3841 or hillbt@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Agencies Transferred over $2.7 Billion from Numerous Programs to Fund
Wildfire Suppression from 1999 through 2003; 80 Percent Was Reimbursed:
Transfers Caused Project Cancellations and Delays, Strained
Relationships with Agency Partners, and Created Difficulties in Program
Management:
Improvements for Estimating Suppression Costs and Alternatives for
Funding Wildfire Suppression Could Be Considered:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Summary of Funds Transferred from and Reimbursed to Forest
Service and Interior Programs, 1999 through 2003:
Appendix III: Summary of Funds Made Available for Transfers, by Forest
Service Region:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Agriculture:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of the Interior:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Summary of Funds Transferred from and Reimbursed to Forest
Service and Interior Programs, 1999 through 2003:
Table 2: Comparison of Alternative Types of Reserve Accounts to Help
Fund Wildfire Suppression:
Table 3: Forest Service Regional Offices Visited by GAO:
Table 4: Transfers to Wildfire Suppression, by Forest Service and
Interior Program, 1999 through 2003:
Table 5: Transfer Reimbursements to Forest Service and Interior
Programs, 1999 through 2003:
Table 6: Funds Made Available for Transfers to Wildfire Suppression, by
Forest Service Washington Office and Regions, 1999 through 2003:
Table 7: Funds Made Available for Transfers to Wildfire Suppression, by
Forest Service Region and Program, 1999 through 2003:
Table 8: Transfers to Wildfire Suppression, by Forest Service Washington
Office and Regions, as a Percentage of Total Budget Authority, 2002:
Figures:
Figure 1: Suppression Costs Have Exceeded Suppression Appropriations in
Most Years since 1990:
Figure 2: Funding Transfers Delayed Replacement of a Failing
Backcountry Bridge (Inyo National Forest, California):
Figure 3: Property Purchased by the Forest Service Cost an Additional
$195,000 Because of a Delay Caused by Funding Transfers (Coconino
National Forest, Arizona):
Figure 4: Funding Transfers Delayed Stabilization of Collapsing Road,
Causing Sediment Runoff and Compromising Fish Habitat (Bitterroot
National Forest, Montana):
Figure 5: Areas with and without Subsequent Treatments to Ensure the
Success of Reforestation Efforts (Hiawatha National Forest, Michigan):
Figure 6: The Forest Service Directed Reimbursement Funds to High-
Priority Rehabilitation Projects after the Hayman Fire (Pike - San
Isabel National Forests, Colorado):
Figure 7: Actual Suppression Costs Have Frequently Exceeded Estimated
Costs and Appropriations since 1990:
Letter June 2, 2004:
The Honorable Jeff Bingaman:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Larry E. Craig:
Chairman:
The Honorable Ron Wyden:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Forests and Public Lands:
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Charles H. Taylor:
Chairman:
The Honorable Norman Dicks:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
In 2003, wildfires burned roughly 4 million acres, destroyed over 5,000
structures, and took the lives of 30 firefighters. While extreme, this
past fire season does not stand out among recent ones, which have
broken records not only in the number of acres burned but also in the
cost of suppressing the fires. In 2000, 2002, and 2003, costs to
suppress wildfires were well over $1 billion and reached nearly $1
billion in 2001.[Footnote 1] The substantial expense of suppressing
wildfires has exceeded the amount appropriated for wildfire suppression
every year for the past 5 years. One reason for this difference is that
suppression appropriations are based on estimates of wildfire
suppression costs, which are difficult to make due to the inherent
unpredictability of wildfires. The federal agencies responsible for
wildfire management--the U.S. Forest Service in the Department of
Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land
Management, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service
in the Department of the Interior--provide the bulk of the resources
needed to suppress these fires. To pay for wildfire suppression when
appropriated funds for suppression are insufficient, the Forest Service
and Interior transfer funds from other programs within their respective
agencies as permitted by law.
Seeking information on the effects of transferring funds to pay for
wildfire suppression on other Forest Service and Interior programs, you
asked us to identify (1) the amount of funds transferred and reimbursed
from nonsuppression programs from 1999 through 2003, the programs
affected, and the procedures the Forest Service and Interior followed
when transferring and reimbursing funds; (2) the effects on the
agencies' programs from which funds were transferred; and (3)
alternative approaches that could be considered for estimating annual
suppression costs and funding wildfire suppression.
In conducting our review, we contacted budget officers at Forest
Service and Interior headquarters, as well as in the Forest Service's
nine regions, to collect information on the amount of funds transferred
from and reimbursed to various Forest Service and Interior
programs.[Footnote 2] We also visited six Forest Service regional
offices and 7 national forests and contacted an additional 14 national
forests to examine impacts to the programs from which funds were
transferred to support fire suppression. Where appropriate, we also met
with officials from the four Interior agencies that are involved with
wildfire suppression activities as well as grant recipients, a state
forester, and representatives of nonprofit organizations. In our review
of impacts, we focused on 2002 and 2003 because in these 2 years
transfers for wildfire suppression involved many more programs than
they had previously. To determine alternatives for estimating wildfire
suppression costs, we reviewed the agencies' current estimation
methods, compared the estimates with actual costs and discussed reasons
for differences between them with agency officials, and identified
alternatives for estimating suppression costs. Also, to determine
alternative approaches for funding wildfire suppression, we reviewed
previous GAO and Congressional Budget Office reports, as well as a
Forest Service study related to budgeting for emergencies, and
discussed alternative funding options with agency officials. We took
the appropriate measures to ensure that Forest Service and Interior
data on the amount of funds transferred and reimbursed from 1999
through 2003 were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our study.
We performed our work between July 2003 and March 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix I
for additional details on our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
From 1999 through 2003, the Forest Service and Interior transferred
over $2.7 billion from numerous programs to help fund wildfire
suppression activities. Before 2001, the Forest Service used a single
reforestation/timber sale area restoration trust fund as the primary
source of transfers. Since then, however, the agency began using funds
from numerous other programs, including its national forest system
program that manages forests, rangelands, and recreation and wilderness
areas, out of growing concerns about the financial viability of the
reforestation program. Interior, on the other hand, transferred funds
primarily from its construction and land acquisition programs. When
transfers were necessary, both agencies relied on monthly forecasting
models to predict the additional funds needed to support suppression
activities for the remainder of the fire season. These forecasts,
however, have not been very accurate and produced estimates that have
varied by hundreds of millions of dollars from actual suppression
costs. In deciding which programs to tap for additional firefighting
funds, both the Forest Service and Interior primarily selected programs
with projects that would not need all of the funds provided to them
until subsequent years. The Congress reimbursed, on average, about 80
percent of the funds that the agencies transferred during the 5-year
period-nearly 100 percent of the funds transferred between 1999 and
2001 were reimbursed; while during the last 2 years, the Forest Service
was reimbursed about 74 percent and Interior about 81 percent. Because
reimbursements generally were provided in years after funds were
originally transferred, the Forest Service distributed these reimbursed
funds to projects reflecting current priorities, which were not always
the same projects from which the funds were transferred. Interior
followed various strategies, such as fully reimbursing high-priority
projects at the expense of lower priority projects or reimbursing all
projects at the same rate.
Despite Forest Service and Interior efforts to minimize the effects on
programs, transferring funds caused numerous project delays and
cancellations, strained relationships with state and local agency
partners, and disrupted program management efforts. The agencies
canceled and delayed contracts, grants, and other activities for
projects involving, among other things, fuels reduction, construction,
land acquisition, and resource management. In some cases, these
cancellations and delays increased costs and the time needed to
complete the projects. Although the agencies transferred funds to help
suppress wildfires, doing so actually resulted in delays of some
projects that were intended to reduce fire risk or improve firefighting
capabilities, such as purchasing additional firefighting equipment.
Funding transfers also strained agency relationships with other federal
and state agencies, nonprofit organizations, and communities because
Forest Service and Interior officials were unable to fulfill
commitments, such as awarding grants to communities for fuels reduction
projects. Further, transfers disrupted the agencies' efforts to manage
their programs, including budgeting and planning annual and long-term
programs of work. Recently, the Forest Service and Interior took
actions to mitigate the impacts of transfers, including awarding
contracts early in the year to avoid the loss of program funds to
transfers. However, these and other Forest Service actions, such as
relying on rough estimates of salary costs and transferring funds that
were needed for the later part of the fiscal year, resulted in some
programs exceeding their budget allocations to meet existing contract
obligations and essential expenses. Overall, transfers have caused
widespread impacts that will likely increase if the agencies continue
transferring funds to cover fire suppression costs. Although Forest
Service and Interior officials are generally aware of these impacts,
the agencies do not consistently track the impacts of funding transfers
at a national level. If transfers continue to be necessary, the
agencies could enhance their understanding of how transfers affect
programs by tracking nationwide impacts on all programs through their
accomplishment reporting systems.
To help mitigate the negative effects of funding transfers,
improvements in estimating annual suppression costs and alternative
approaches for funding wildfire suppression should be considered. To
estimate annual suppression costs, the Forest Service and Interior use
a 10-year average of these costs. The agencies use these estimates to
develop annual budget requests, and the Congress uses them to make
appropriations decisions for wildfire suppression. Although estimating
the costs of wildfires is inherently difficult because of their
unpredictable nature, size, and intensity, the agencies' estimates have
been about $1.8 billion less than the actual total costs for the last 5
years. According to agency officials, abnormal drought conditions have
contributed to unusually severe wildfire seasons, making it even more
difficult to estimate suppression costs. Nonetheless, the 10-year
average may not provide accurate or timely information when
firefighting costs change rapidly from year to year as they have
recently. Alternative methods that more effectively account for annual
changes in costs and that convey the uncertainties associated with
making the estimates should be considered for improving the information
provided to agency and congressional decision makers. Additionally, to
further mitigate the impacts of funding transfers, alternative
approaches could be considered for funding wildfire suppression. Two
previously issued GAO reports and testimony from the Congressional
Budget Office outline several alternative approaches to funding
wildfire suppression, such as establishing a governmentwide or agency-
specific reserve account to pay for wildfire suppression activities.
Each alternative has advantages and disadvantages with respect to,
among other things, reducing the need to transfer funds for
nonsuppression programs, creating incentives for agencies to contain
suppression costs, and allowing for congressional review. In selecting
any alternative, the Congress will need to make difficult decisions,
taking into consideration the effect on the federal budget deficit.
We are making recommendations to the Secretaries of Agriculture and the
Interior to take actions to help mitigate the effects of funding
transfers, including improving the agencies' methods for estimating
annual wildfire suppression costs and conducting formal assessments of
how their budget and forecast models performed relative to actual
costs. In addition, we are proposing that the Congress consider
alternative approaches for funding wildfire suppression in order to
help the agencies suppress wildfires without negatively impacting their
programs. In responding to a draft of this report, the Forest Service
and Interior generally agreed with our findings and recommendations.
Both agencies expressed some concern with our recommendation that the
agencies pursue alternative methods for estimating suppression costs.
Background:
About one-third of all land in the United States is federally owned and
consists largely of forests, grasslands, and other vegetated lands.
Over the years, underbrush has grown substantially on these lands, and
along with recent drought conditions and disease infestation, has
fueled larger and more intense wildfires. Further, there has been an
increase in the number and size of communities that border these
areas-in what is known as the wildland urban interface. Suppressing
wildfires that threaten these areas costs significantly more because
protecting homes and other structures is costly. In 2000 and 2002,
wildfires burned nearly 8.5 million and 7 million acres, respectively;
and in 2003, wildfires burned about another 4 million acres. In both
2000 and 2002, suppression costs were over $1.4 billion each year; in
2003, suppression costs nearly reached that amount.
Because suppression costs have exceeded appropriated funds, the
agencies have had to transfer funds from other programs to supplement
their suppression funds. Two years in advance of when funds are
appropriated, the Forest Service and Interior develop budget requests
by estimating the annual costs to suppress wildfires. Estimating these
costs is inherently difficult because of the unpredictable nature of
wildfires, including where they will occur, how intense they will be,
and how quickly they will spread. As a result, these estimates, at
times, result in funding for wildfire suppression that is insufficient
to cover actual suppression costs. Historically, the Forest Service and
Interior have used a 10-year rolling average of suppression
expenditures as the foundation for their suppression budget
requests.[Footnote 3] During each year's fire season, the Forest
Service and Interior also develop monthly forecasts to update the
overall suppression costs estimate and determine how much additional
funding, if any, will be needed. When it becomes apparent that annual
appropriated funds are insufficient to support forecasted suppression
needs, the Forest Service and Interior are authorized to use funds from
other programs within their agency to pay for emergency firefighting
activities.
Agencies Transferred over $2.7 Billion from Numerous Programs to Fund
Wildfire Suppression from 1999 through 2003; 80 Percent Was Reimbursed:
From 1999 through 2003, the Forest Service and Interior transferred
over $2.7 billion from various agency programs to help fund wildfire
suppression when appropriated funds were insufficient. The Forest
Service transferred monies from numerous programs supporting the
breadth of its activities, while Interior transferred funds primarily
from two programs-construction and land acquisition. To determine the
amount of funds to transfer, the agencies used similar monthly
forecasting models to determine suppression funding needs during the
fire seasons. Agency officials acknowledged, however, that the models
produced widely varying forecasts of suppression costs that
substantially underestimated actual costs. Also, in determining the
programs from which to transfer funds, the agencies attempted to select
programs with projects that would not be significantly impacted by
transfers because a portion of their funds would not be needed until
subsequent years. Between 1999 and 2003, the Congress reimbursed the
agencies for about 80 percent of the funds that were transferred on
average. However, the Congress did not always reimburse the programs in
amounts proportionate to the transfers. In addition, the Forest Service
and Interior had some discretion in distributing the reimbursements
among various projects, depending on their priorities at the time of
reimbursement.
From 1999 through 2003, Agencies Transferred over $2.7 Billion from
Numerous Programs:
For each of the last 5 years, wildfire suppression costs have been
substantially greater than the amount of funds appropriated for
suppression, necessitating the Forest Service and Interior to transfer
over $2.7 billion from other agency programs to help fund wildfire
suppression activities. Of this amount, the Forest Service transferred
the majority--almost $2.2 billion--while Interior transferred over $500
million. Nearly half of the total amount was transferred in 1 year
alone, 2002, but substantial transfers were needed for other recent
severe fire seasons as well. For example, during the 2000 and 2003 fire
seasons, almost $400 million and about $870 million were transferred,
respectively. As illustrated in figure 1, suppression costs have
exceeded suppression appropriations almost every year since 1990.
Figure 1: Suppression Costs Have Exceeded Suppression Appropriations in
Most Years since 1990:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
To determine the amount of funds to transfer each year, the agencies
used monthly forecasting models to estimate likely wildfire suppression
costs during the wildfire season. Agency officials acknowledged,
however, that the models produced forecasts of suppression costs that
varied by hundreds of millions of dollars when compared with actual,
year-end suppression costs. For example, in June 2003, Interior's
forecasting model predicted that suppression costs for the year would
exceed suppression appropriations by about $72 million. A month later,
the model predicted costs would exceed appropriations by about $56
million; by late August, the model predicted that costs would exceed
appropriations by more than $100 million. By the end of the fiscal
year, Interior had transferred over $175 million to cover actual
suppression costs. Forest Service forecasts also were well short of
year-end suppression costs during 2003. The agency's forecasting model
predicted that annual suppression costs would reach nearly $800
million, indicating that current year funds would be about $375 million
less than projected needs. By the end of the fiscal year, however, the
Forest Service had transferred nearly $700 million to cover suppression
costs of over $1 billion. Both Forest Service and Interior officials
indicated there is a high degree of uncertainty in trying to estimate
the current year's suppression costs, primarily because weather
conditions are difficult to predict-even over the short term. Despite
the discrepancies between agency forecasts and actual suppression
costs, the agencies have performed no formal assessments of their
forecasting models' accuracy. Agency officials acknowledged that such
assessments would be useful for monitoring and improving the
reliability of their models and enhancing their ability to predict when
transfers will be needed and how much to transfer. The agencies also
acknowledged that the forecasts have not been accurate and are revising
the models in an effort to improve the forecasts.
In deciding the programs from which to transfer funds, Interior and
Forest Service officials primarily selected programs with projects that
would not be significantly impacted by transfers because a portion of
their funds would not be needed until subsequent years. Interior
transferred funds mostly from its construction and land acquisition
programs, with about two-thirds of the funds coming from construction.
These two programs are used to construct and maintain facilities,
roads, and trails on Interior lands, among other things, and to acquire
additional public lands. In 2002 and 2003, Interior also transferred
some funds from fire-related preparedness, postfire rehabilitation, and
hazardous fuels reduction projects in order to support suppression
activities. Within Interior, the National Park Service transferred
substantially more funds than the other three agencies over the last 5
years, transferring about 60 percent of the $540 million transferred.
Unlike Interior, the Forest Service transferred monies from numerous
programs supporting the breadth of its activities. These programs
included its construction; land acquisition; national forest system,
which among other things conducts postwildfire rehabilitation and
restoration work; and state and private forestry programs, which
support activities such as grants to states, tribes, communities, and
private landowners for fire management, urban forestry, and natural
resource education as well as insect suppression. Before 2001, the
Forest Service had transferred funds solely from its Knutson-Vandenberg
Fund (K-V Fund), because historically this restoration program had
large amounts of money that could not be used by the end of the fiscal
year.[Footnote 4] Since the mid-1980s, the Forest Service has
transferred more than $2.3 billion from this program; however, more
than $400 million has not been reimbursed. As a result, the Forest
Service became concerned about the viability of the K-V Fund as a
source of transfers and in 2001 began transferring funds from other
major Forest Service programs.
The Forest Service and Interior programs from which funds were
transferred and the amount of funds transferred and reimbursed from
1999 through 2003 are outlined in table 1. Additional details on these
matters are included in appendixes II and III.
Table 1: Summary of Funds Transferred from and Reimbursed to Forest
Service and Interior Programs, 1999 through 2003:
Agency/Program: Forest Service/K-V Fund;
Activity: A trust fund that collects a portion of timber sale receipts
for reforestation in the timber sale area and for other activities,
such as fuels reduction and habitat improvement;
Funds: Transfer: $639,924,829;
Funds: Reimbursement: $537,988,484;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 84%.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Capital improvements and maintenance;
Activity: Construction and maintenance of facilities, roads, and trails
on national forest land, including fire facilities;
Funds: Transfer: $317,320,407;
Funds: Reimbursement: $281,911,320;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 89%.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/National forest system;
Activity: Management activities for forests, minerals and geology,
rangeland, recreation and wilderness, wildlife and fisheries--includes
postwildfire nonemergency rehabilitation;
Funds: Transfer: $282,536,335;
Funds: Reimbursement: $115,014,534;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 41%.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Land acquisition;
Activity: Land purchases and related realty activities, such as
appraisals, surveys, and negotiations with landowners;
Funds: Transfer: $245,339,974;
Funds: Reimbursement: $241,339,974;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 98%.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Working Capital Fund;
Activity: A revolving fund that collects fees from programs for
purchase and maintenance of vehicles--including light trucks, fire
vehicles, and heavy equipment--as well as computers and other
technology equipment;
Funds: Transfer: $169,305,873;
Funds: Reimbursement: $92,242,248;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 54%.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/State and private forestry;
Activity: Financial and technical assistance to states, tribes,
communities, and private landowners, such as grants for fire
management, urban forestry, and conservation education, as well as
invasive species and insect suppression on federal, state, and private
land;
Funds: Transfer: $112,259,986;
Funds: Reimbursement: $109,259,986;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 97%.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Wildland fire management;
Activity: Preparedness (including firefighting equipment purchases,
training, and salaries of reserve firefighters); fuels reduction; and
postfire emergency rehabilitation and restoration. This account also
provides funding for wildfire suppression and receives the transfers
from the other Forest Service accounts listed in this table;
Funds: Transfer: $81,309,076;
Funds: Reimbursement: $60,981,807;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 75%.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Forest and range research;
Activity: Forest and rangeland research, such as insect and disease
studies, and fire sciences research;
Funds: Transfer: $33,376,359;
Funds: Reimbursement: $33,376,359;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 100%.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Other appropriations;
Activity: Specific funds for programs such as range betterment, as well
as economic assistance funds and some acquisitions for future land
exchanges;
Funds: Transfer: $287,959,245;
Funds: Reimbursement: $247,959,245;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 86%.
Subtotal;
Funds: Transfer: $2,169,032,083;
Funds: Reimbursement: $1,720,073,957;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 79%.
Agency/Program: Interior/Construction;
Activity: Construction and maintenance of facilities, roads, and trails
on Interior land;
Funds: Transfer: $329,374,433;
Funds: Reimbursement: $272,997,313;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 83%.
Agency/Program: Interior/Land acquisition;
Activity: Land purchases and related realty activities, such as
appraisals, surveys, and negotiations with landowners;
Funds: Transfer: $184,906,505;
Funds: Reimbursement: $159,337,629;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 86%.
Agency/Program: Interior/Wildland fire management;
Activity: Fire preparedness, fuels reduction, emergency stabilization,
and fire facilities construction and maintenance. This account also
provides funding for wildfire suppression and receives the transfers
from the other Interior accounts listed in this table;
Funds: Transfer: $24,963,248;
Funds: Reimbursement: $23,013,248;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 92%.
Subtotal;
Funds: Transfer: $539,244,186;
Funds: Reimbursement: $455,348,190;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 84%.
Agency/Program: Total;
Funds: Transfer: $2,708,276,270;
Funds: Reimbursement: $2,175,422,147;
Percentage of funds reimbursed: 80%.
Sources: Forest Service and Interior financial data.
Note: This table highlights selected fire-related activities that are
typically funded by each program, as appropriate.
[A] Includes the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management,
Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service.
[End of table]
The Congress Reimbursed Agencies for about 80 Percent of the Funds
Transferred:
Over the last 5 years, the Congress reimbursed, on average, about 80
percent of the funds that the Forest Service and Interior transferred
for wildfire suppression expenses. Although the agencies received
nearly full reimbursement for funds transferred in 2000 and 2001, the
Forest Service and Interior were reimbursed about 74 percent and about
81 percent, respectively, of the funds transferred in 2002 and
2003.[Footnote 5] For these later 2 years, individual Forest Service
programs were reimbursed at varying rates. For example, the Congress
reimbursed the Forest Service's state and private forestry program for
nearly 100 percent and its national forest system program for 40
percent of the funds transferred in 2002. In contrast, the Congress
reimbursed Interior's construction and land acquisition programs at
about 81 percent each.
Congressional appropriators and Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
officials worked with Forest Service and Interior officials to
determine the amount of funds to reimburse to the numerous agency
programs impacted by funding transfers in order to help the agencies
meet their current program needs. For example, according to Forest
Service officials, state and private forestry projects, such as
community assistance grants and forest legacy project grants, were
important priorities when the Forest Service received reimbursements in
2003 for funds transferred in 2002. As a result, the state and private
forestry program received full reimbursement. In contrast, the national
forest system had a large amount of funds transferred in 2002 that was
dedicated for the salaries of staff diverted from their normal duties
to fight wildfires. OMB officials indicated that since these employees
had been paid--albeit out of the wildfire suppression account--the
transferred salaries required no reimbursement. Therefore, the national
forest system program was reimbursed for a much smaller amount--about
40 percent.
When the Forest Service and Interior received less than full
reimbursement for funds transferred in 2002 and 2003, the agencies used
different procedures to distribute the reimbursed funds within their
programs. Forest Service officials distributed the funds to projects
reflecting current priorities within individual programs, which were
not necessarily the same projects from which funds were
transferred.[Footnote 6] For example, Forest Service officials in
California targeted the funds to projects within the San Bernardino
National Forest to help address the increased wildfire risk created by
insect infestation, even though no funds had been transferred from
these projects. Similarly, officials in Colorado directed the
reimbursed funds to high-priority rehabilitation efforts in the
aftermath of the Hayman fire that had occurred in the Pike-San Isabel
National Forest in June 2002. In contrast to the Forest Service's
approach, Interior reimbursed funds solely to projects from which funds
were transferred; however, the four agencies within Interior did this
in varying ways.[Footnote 7] For example, the Fish and Wildlife Service
fully repaid its high-priority construction projects for transfers made
in 2002, although it did not repay lower priority construction projects
that also transferred funds, such as the restoration of a visitors
center. The Bureau of Indian Affairs, on the other hand, fully repaid
all projects from which funds were transferred in 2002, except one--a
school renovation project that agency officials believed could be
delayed pending future additional funding. In contrast, the Bureau of
Land Management repaid all construction projects at the same
percentage, while the National Park Service repaid construction
projects at widely varying amounts depending on their perceived
priorities.[Footnote 8]
Table 1 provides information on the amount of funds reimbursed to the
various Forest Service and Interior programs. Additional details on
reimbursements are provided in appendix II.
Transfers Caused Project Cancellations and Delays, Strained
Relationships with Agency Partners, and Created Difficulties in Program
Management:
The Forest Service and Interior canceled or delayed numerous projects,
failed to fulfill certain commitments to partners, and faced
difficulties in managing their programs when funds were transferred for
fire suppression. The agencies canceled or delayed contracts, grants,
and other activities, which in some cases increased the costs and time
needed to complete projects. Further, agency relationships with state
agencies, nonprofit organizations, and communities became strained when
the agencies could not fulfill commitments, such as awarding grants on
time. In addition, transfers disrupted agency efforts to effectively
manage programs, causing planned activities to go unfunded and, in some
cases, causing program funds to be depleted or overspent. If transfers
continue, the impacts on projects, relationships, and program
management will likely continue and increase. Although Forest Service
and Interior local units generally are aware of these impacts, the
agencies have no systems in place to track the impacts at a national
level. (Dollars noted in the remaining text of this section are not
adjusted for inflation.):
Numerous Projects Were Delayed or Canceled:
Projects in a variety of Forest Service and Interior programs were
delayed or canceled as a result of funding transfers, thereby affecting
agency firefighting capabilities, construction and land acquisition
goals, state and community programs, and other resource management
programs. Furthermore, officials often had to duplicate their efforts
because of transfers, which prolonged delays and added costs. For
example, officials had to revise budgets and construction plans, update
cost estimates, and rewrite land acquisition documents when delays
caused them to become outdated, all of which further compounded project
delays. In some cases, preparation of such documents added substantial
costs. For example, appraisal and legal fees for certain land
acquisition efforts added thousands of dollars to project costs. In
addition, when delays were prolonged, supply costs increased, land
prices rose, and impacts to natural resources spread, which also
increased projects' costs.[Footnote 9]
Projects Related to Firefighting Capabilities:
Although funding transfers were intended to aid fire suppression, in
some cases, the Forest Service and Interior delayed projects that were
intended to reduce fire risk or improve agency firefighting
capabilities. Following are examples of such projects:
* Fuels reduction projects, New Mexico: In 2003, $191,000 was
transferred from three fuels reduction projects covering 480 acres of
Forest Service land in the wildland urban interface. All three thinning
projects were near communities, affecting about 325 homes. The projects
are scheduled to be completed in 2004.
* National Park Service fire facilities projects, nationwide: In 2002,
about $3.4 million was transferred from 13 fire facilities projects at
10 different parks. The projects-including construction of facilities
for fire equipment storage; a crew dormitory; and fire engine storage
buildings, among others-were delayed for several months. Four of these
projects--in Big Bend National Park (Texas); Yellowstone National Park
(Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming); Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks
(California); and Shenandoah National Park (Virginia)-were again
delayed in 2003 when about $1.9 million was transferred.
* Forest Service fire facilities projects, California: In 2003, the
Forest Service deferred construction of two engine bays, one fire
station, and three fire barracks in California because of funding
transfers. Consequently, fire crews at one forest must live in housing
that, according to agency officials, is substandard and has required
recurring maintenance to address roof leaks, plumbing malfunctions, and
electrical failures caused by rodents damaging the wires. Additionally,
officials told us that such conditions make it difficult to recruit and
retain fire crews.
* Wildfire management courses, southern region: In 2003, the Forest
Service canceled two required training courses for officials who
approve wildfire management decisions and expenses. About 80 officials
who represent national forests in at least 12 states had planned to
attend. One course emphasized cost containment, and the other covered a
wide range of fire management issues, including safety. Both courses
were rescheduled and held in 2004.
* Fire research projects, Montana: When funds were transferred in 2002,
the LANDFIRE project--a multiagency effort to collect comprehensive
data on fire risk--was delayed about 3 months, the collection of data
critical for modeling fire behavior was delayed about 6 months, and
data on smoke levels were lost because an instrument was not purchased
in time to use it during the 2002 fire season. In addition, temporary
staff were released early in 2002, further reducing the amount of
research that could be performed.
Construction and Land Acquisition Projects:
Agency officials also targeted construction and land acquisition
programs for funding transfers because these projects are often funded
one year, with the expectation that the project will be implemented--
and the funds spent--over several years. Consequently, these programs
often have large unused fund balances, and transfers can sometimes be
made with minimal impact as long as the funds are reimbursed before
they are needed. Accordingly, some officials, especially in the
Interior agencies, told us that impacts to projects had been relatively
limited. Nevertheless, many construction and land acquisition projects
were delayed or canceled, particularly in the Forest Service.
Some construction projects that were delayed due to funding transfers
were delayed for 1 year or more because of seasonal requirements, even
when funds were reimbursed after only a few months. For example, a
project to replace three backcountry bridges at the Inyo National
Forest in California was planned for late summer when stream flows
would be low and conditions would be safe for workers. According to a
Forest Service official, the project was important for public safety
because one bridge was completely washed out and the other two bridges
were at risk of failing while people were crossing them. Figure 2 shows
one of these bridges before--when handrails were sagging or missing and
support logs were decaying-and after it was replaced. Project funds
were transferred in 2002, so the project was deferred to late summer
2003; however, funds were once again transferred, and the project was
not completed until 2004.
Figure 2: Funding Transfers Delayed Replacement of a Failing
Backcountry Bridge (Inyo National Forest, California):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Top (left and right): Deteriorating bridge was at risk of failing while
people crossed it. Bottom: New bridge was completed after multiple
delays that were caused by funding transfers.
In other cases, additional adverse effects resulted when projects with
seasonal requirements were delayed. For example, according to a Forest
Service official, a popular campground in Arizona may be closed during
the 2004 operating season while improvements are made because seasonal
requirements combined with fire transfers resulted in extended delays.
In 2003, $450,000 was transferred from this project, delaying it 2
months into the winter. Because of the weather construction crews could
not work on the project, thus it was delayed several additional months.
Further, this campground was already closed during the 2003 operating
season because funding transfers in 2002 had delayed planned
improvements.
In some cases, construction projects that were initially delayed were
canceled when supply costs rose and the Forest Service no longer had
sufficient funds to pay for the projects. For example, a 2003 project
to rehabilitate a historic residence at the Sierra National Forest in
California was delayed when funds were transferred for wildfire
suppression. According to an agency official, the project, which would
have converted the residence into a public information facility, was
intended to attract tourists and help diversify the local economy in an
area where a 1994 lumber mill closure contributed to a deteriorating
economy. The lowest bid that the Forest Service received for the
project was about $186,000. However, before the funds were reimbursed,
the contractor-citing a 300 percent increase in lumber prices-rescinded
the bid and estimated the new cost of the project at $280,000, an
increase of nearly $100,000. Consequently, the Forest Service canceled
the project and resubmitted it in its 2005 budget, with a higher cost
estimate.
Land acquisition costs can also increase when projects are delayed. For
example, figure 3 shows a portion of a 65-acre property in Arizona that
the Forest Service intended to purchase for approximately $3.2 million
in 2002, but had to defer due to funding transfers. About a year later,
the Forest Service purchased the property, but the value had increased,
costing about $195,000 more than it had a year earlier. A nonprofit
organization also incurred additional costs of about $3,000 because it
paid for the updated appraisal.
Figure 3: Property Purchased by the Forest Service Cost an Additional
$195,000 Because of a Delay Caused by Funding Transfers (Coconino
National Forest, Arizona):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition, the agencies sometimes risked losing the opportunity to
purchase land when funds were transferred from land acquisition
programs. For example, in 2003, the Fish and Wildlife Service planned
to purchase property in Alabama that contains habitat for the gopher
tortoise, which is a species of concern in Alabama. However, because of
funding transfers and only partial reimbursement, the service no longer
had sufficient funds. Agency officials were concerned that the property
would be sold privately. To prevent a sale to private owners, a
nonprofit organization agreed to buy the property and hold it until the
Fish and Wildlife Service could purchase it from them.
Grants to States and Communities:
When funds were transferred for fire suppression, many Forest Service
grants were delayed or canceled, which affected states, communities,
nonprofit organizations, and others. Examples of such projects are
discussed below:
* Urban and community forestry grants in seven states, southern region:
The Forest Service did not fund eight urban and community forestry
grants totaling $993,000 due to 2003 funding transfers. State forestry
departments planned to "subgrant" about 80 percent of the funds to
local communities for more than 75 projects, such as planting trees,
developing local land use plans, and holding several workshops and
conferences on topics such as urban forestry.
* Community assistance grant, New Mexico: A 2002 grant to a small
business owner was delayed about 6 months because of funding transfers.
The business processes small-diameter wood to make signs and other
marketable products, and the grant would have paid for a wood chipper
essential to the process. When the grant was delayed, the business
owner could not purchase the chipper and process the wood. As a result,
he closed his business for a year, laid off some staff, and reported
estimated revenue losses of millions of dollars.
* Watershed education grant, New Mexico: A 2003 economic action grant
for $32,000 was canceled and will not be funded. The grant would have
paid for a nonprofit organization to conduct an education project about
sustainable grazing in a severely degraded watershed where the intended
audience included ranchers, community members, public officials, and
others. The nonprofit organization reported investing about $5,250 in
preparation for the project.
Resource Management Projects:
When resource management projects were delayed and canceled, natural
resources were affected (e.g., soils eroded, insects infested forests,
and encroaching plants spread and threatened newly planted trees).
Further, prolonged delays sometimes compounded these effects because
additional time allowed the damage to spread. For example, at the
Lincoln National Forest in New Mexico, a project to repair a washout in
a road was deferred when funds were transferred in 2002. During a 2-
year delay that was partially caused by funding transfers, the washout
grew dramatically. Consequently, a more significant structure is now
needed to prevent erosion, which will result in additional costs of
between $9,000 and $15,000, according to an agency official.
Additionally, at the White River National Forest in Colorado in 2003,
$111,000 was transferred from a project to remove about 150 acres of
trees infested with spruce beetle-thereby deferring the project. As a
result, the infestation grew to about 230 acres, killing additional
trees and raising the cost of the project about $24,000 more than
previously estimated, according to an agency official. Further, there
is a chance that the beetle population will spread to the point where
it cannot be contained at any cost and where tree mortality will
increase dramatically--affecting up to 6,000 acres. If this further
infestation occurs, an agency official said the project would be
canceled.
According to an official at the Bitterroot National Forest in Montana,
a project to stabilize 9 miles of a dirt road was delayed when about
$1.2 million was transferred in 2002. As shown in figure 4, the road
was collapsing. As a result, sediment was running into a creek,
jeopardizing the habitat of two species of fish, one of which is a
threatened species. Two years after the transfer, $430,000 was
reimbursed to the project, and officials expect to stabilize about 2 of
the 9 miles of road. Because of the prolonged delay, however,
additional sediment has run into the stream and further compromised the
fish habitat. Furthermore, agency officials do not expect to receive
any additional reimbursement to complete the remaining stabilization,
and they are concerned about the increasing sedimentation and
continuing decline of the fish habitat.
Figure 4: Funding Transfers Delayed Stabilization of Collapsing Road,
Causing Sediment Runoff and Compromising Fish Habitat (Bitterroot
National Forest, Montana):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition, sometimes canceling one project affects the success of
others. For example, at the Hiawatha National Forest in Michigan, a
project intended to ensure the success of reforestation efforts--by
removing encroaching plants--will be canceled in 2004. The encroaching
plants are crowding newly planted trees, as shown in the photograph on
the left in figure 5, and threatening their survival, according to
agency officials. As a result, one official estimated that 20 to 25
percent of the newly planted trees will die, and that it will cost
about $24,000 to remove the dead trees and reforest the area. In
contrast, the photograph on the right shows a site where young trees
were protected by removing encroaching plants, and, consequently, the
trees survived.
Figure 5: Areas with and without Subsequent Treatments to Ensure the
Success of Reforestation Efforts (Hiawatha National Forest, Michigan):
[See PDF for image]
Left: Encroaching plants in reforested area, threatening newly planted
trees. Right: A successful reforestation project, in which subsequent
treatments to remove encroaching "weed trees" were completed,
protecting the newly planted trees.
[End of figure]
Examples such as these were widespread in the six regions we visited.
For example, because of funding transfers in 2002 and 2003, the Forest
Service's northern region deferred reforestation on 5,900 acres, weed
control on 74,000 acres, maintenance on 1,500 miles of road,
replacement of 150 culverts to improve fish habitat, repair of five
damaged bridges, and award of 11 stewardship contracts.[Footnote 10]
Agency Relationships with Partners Were Strained:
When the Forest Service and Interior transferred funds for fire
suppression, they sometimes failed to fulfill commitments to partners,
which caused relationships to be strained. Federal agencies rely on
partnerships and other forms of collaboration with each other, state
and local governments, nonprofit organizations, and others to
accomplish their work. For example, federal land acquisitions are often
facilitated by nonprofit organizations and involve private landowners,
agency recreation programs depend on volunteers, and some research
projects are joint efforts between the Forest Service and Interior and
may involve university participants as well. In addition, communities,
state forestry programs, and others depend on federal grant programs
for financial support. When funds were transferred for fire
suppression, not only were federal programs impacted, but nonprofit
organizations, states, and communities were also affected.
In transferring funds from land acquisition programs, agency
relationships with nonprofit organizations were affected. Nonprofit
organizations often facilitate agency land acquisitions by negotiating
with landowners and by sometimes purchasing the land, then selling it
to the agency. When agencies delayed land acquisitions, nonprofit
organizations sometimes incurred interest costs of thousands of dollars
on loans they took out for the purchase of the land. These costs were
generally absorbed by the nonprofit organization and not passed on to
the federal agencies. For example, one organization bought a parcel of
land in South Carolina with the intent of selling it to the Forest
Service in 2002; however, the funds to purchase the land were
transferred for wildfire suppression. The Forest Service eventually
purchased the land in 2003, but in the meantime, the nonprofit
organization had incurred about $300,000 in interest costs. One
nonprofit organization reported that 22 land acquisition projects were
delayed in 2002, and 21 projects in 2003, due to transfers. A
representative from the organization said that if funds are again
transferred in 2004, the organization will view this practice as a
trend, rather than an anomaly, and will likely invest its funds
elsewhere rather than work with the Forest Service and Interior.
Agency relationships with landowners were affected as well. For
example, the Forest Service has been working for several years with
state officials and others to obtain a conservation easement in Hawaii.
According to a Forest Service official, it "has been a major effort to
build a high enough level of trust with the private landowner." The
official is concerned that transfers--which depleted the necessary
funds for this project in both 2002 and 2003--may jeopardize their
relationship with the landowner, who may choose to develop the property
rather than wait for the Forest Service to secure the necessary funds.
If the land is developed, an important habitat for two endangered bird
species will be lost.
Community groups and volunteer or nonprofit organizations also invest
considerable time and money to prepare projects and grant proposals.
When the Forest Service and Interior did not fulfill their commitments,
some of these investments were lost. For example, a 2002 Collaborative
Forest Restoration Program grant in New Mexico would have paid for
thinning treatments to be conducted by a local workforce, with the
resulting wood chips to be processed into marketable products. A
nonprofit organization that was a partner in the project conducted a
$30,000 training program to prepare the local workforce. However, the
grant was delayed for about 6 months because of 2002 funding transfers,
and when funds became available, the trainees were employed elsewhere
and unavailable. Another example involves a nonprofit organization that
works collaboratively with communities and Forest Service and Interior
agencies to design and implement large-scale fire restoration projects
across the country. The collaborative teams collectively review the
outcomes of projects, such as controlled burns, and share their
knowledge and experience with one another. Of the 30 projects that were
to receive federal funding, 12 have been delayed as a result of funding
transfers. According to a representative of this organization, the
practice of transferring funds for wildfire suppression "hurts the
credibility of agencies," and has led two of the project teams to not
apply for further funding because of the uncertainty caused by the
possibility of transfers.
The fire transfers also affect state forestry departments, which depend
on Forest Service grants to support their programs. In recent years,
state budgets have been strained, making it difficult for state
governments to compensate for the loss of federal funding. When the
Forest Service began transferring funds for fire suppression in 2002,
some states were concerned about the viability of their forestry
programs. For example, Forest Service grants supply nearly 60 percent
of Nebraska's annual State Forest Service budget, without which the
state would have to significantly reduce its operation--including
laying off staff. According to the Nebraska State Forester, when funds
were transferred in 2002, the state had already spent over $1 million
beyond its existing budget because it anticipated receiving a Forest
Service grant. After a period of uncertainty, the grant was awarded.
However, the State Forester said that, partly as a result of ongoing
budget uncertainties, one staff member left the agency and two
candidates declined job offers, leaving another position vacant.
States were also affected when, in 2003, $50 million was transferred
from the 5-year, $100 million Forest Land Enhancement Program, and only
$10 million was reimbursed. This program, which is managed by states,
helps private landowners improve the health of their forestlands
through activities such as timber improvement, wildlife habitat
management, and fuels reduction. The $100 million was intended to last
for 5 years. In the first year, the Forest Service allocated $20
million to the states, leaving an $80 million balance in the program.
When only $10 million of the $50 million transfer was reimbursed, the
program was left with a balance of $40 million--or half of the expected
budget--for the remaining 4 years. Foresters are concerned about the
viability of the program, which provides an economically feasible
alternative to landowners who might otherwise sell their land for
development. Further, foresters believe that by preventing development
of such land, the program helps avoid habitat fragmentation, which was
identified by the Forest Service Chief as one of the four largest
threats to the nation's forests. Nonetheless, with so much of the
program's budget lost to funding transfers and its viability in
question, agency officials did not expect to receive any funding for
the program in 2004 and did not request any funding for 2005. According
to agency officials, the Forest Service will not be able to continue
the program unless the Congress appropriates funds for fiscal year 2005
or subsequent years of the authorization period.
Agencies' Management Efforts Were Disrupted:
When funds were transferred for fire suppression, the agencies' efforts
to manage their programs--including budgeting and planning for annual
and long-term programs of work--were disrupted. Some programs, such as
the Forest Service K-V and Working Capital Funds, are managed like
savings accounts, accumulating funds over multiple years to be spent
according to a specific schedule for activities such as forest
improvement and vehicle maintenance and replacement. When transfers
were made from these programs without subsequent reimbursement,
agencies had to begin accumulating the funds again or cancel the
planned expenses. For other programs, such as construction and land
acquisition, transfers interfered with agency and congressional
priorities. In some cases, Forest Service programs went into deficit
because transfers disrupted planned budgets and officials overspent
program funds in order to pay for essential expenses. Actions taken by
the agencies may have mitigated some of these impacts, but compounded
others.
Program Funding Shortfalls:
Funding transfers have left the Forest Service with insufficient funds
to pay for all of the K-V projects it planned at the time the funds
were collected. Over the past 5 years, about $640 million has been
transferred from the K-V Fund for wildfire suppression, while only $540
million has been reimbursed. Moreover, transfers have been made from
the K-V Fund for decades with only partial reimbursement. Since the
mid-1980s, about $2.3 billion has been transferred from the K-V Fund,
and only $1.9 billion has been reimbursed. According to agency
officials, there have been sufficient funds to fully implement the K-V
reforestation projects in any given year. However, there have not
always been sufficient funds over the years to implement other programs
that rely on the K-V Fund. For example, before reimbursements were
received for 2003 transfers, Forest Service officials said they would
only be able to fund about $60 million of $96 million in K-V projects
for 2004 dealing with activities such as habitat improvement. Even
though reimbursements for 2003 transfers were later received, Forest
Service officials indicated that many of the habitat improvement
projects that had been deferred to absorb the shortfall will not be
accomplished in 2004 due to the shortened period of work. Faced with
unpredictable information about funding transfers and reimbursements,
it has been difficult for the Forest Service to reliably estimate how
much will be deposited into and withdrawn from the K-V Fund and,
therefore, to effectively manage the fund and the programs it supports.
Similarly, transferring funds from the Working Capital Fund disrupted
the Forest Service's efforts to carry out long-term expense planning,
making it difficult for agency officials to effectively manage
programs. For example, the Forest Service no longer has enough funds to
pay for its planned vehicle and computer replacements because of
funding transfers. Each program that uses vehicles or computers
allocates a portion of its budget to pay monthly charges into the
Working Capital Fund, which accrues these deposits over a period of
years to spend on vehicle and computer purchases and maintenance.
Vehicles and computers are then maintained as needed and replaced
according to a schedule designed to maximize cost effectiveness. In
2002 and 2003, however, some of the funds that agency officials had
been accumulating for years were transferred and no longer available
for maintenance and planned replacements. As a result, maintenance and
replacement schedules were disrupted, and purchases had to be delayed.
For example, in 2002, the Forest Service postponed planned purchases of
fire engines, helitack trucks, fire crew carriers, and patrol rigs when
funds were transferred in California. Since more than 90 percent of
these transfers were not reimbursed, agency officials had to either
continue using older vehicles or reduce their fleet size and will have
to make additional payments to accrue enough savings for the planned
purchases.
Changes in Project Priorities:
Forest Service efforts to prioritize projects were also disrupted. In
an attempt to avoid project delays and cancellations after having lost
funds to transfers in 2002, agency officials awarded contracts and
grants earlier in the year in 2003. Although such efforts mitigated
some impacts of funding transfers, they also interfered with agency
attempts to implement high-priority projects. When officials expected
funds to be transferred, they implemented projects that could be
completed quickly and early in the year, although they were not
necessarily their highest priority projects. On the other hand, the
Forest Service was able to implement some of its high-priority projects
later by redirecting reimbursements to them. For example, in
California, agency officials targeted funds to the San Bernardino
National Forest, where insect infestation had caused widespread tree
mortality and elevated fire risk. In Colorado, officials directed
reimbursements to high-priority rehabilitation efforts in the aftermath
of the Hayman fire, shown in figure 6.
Figure 6: The Forest Service Directed Reimbursement Funds to High-
Priority Rehabilitation Projects after the Hayman Fire (Pike - San
Isabel National Forests, Colorado):
[See PDF for image]
Left: Straw bails, used to prevent erosion of soil, "exploding" in the
air over the Hayman burn area. Right: A Hayman rehabilitation team
member sprays grass seed and fertilizer to help stabilize soil and
prevent mudslides.
[End of figure]
The redirection of funds was authorized by the Congress and may have
helped preserve agency priorities. However, under some programs, such
as construction and land acquisition, appropriations committee reports
direct the agencies to fund specific projects (which agency officials
refer to as "congressionally directed" projects).[Footnote 11] In some
cases, officials paid for congressionally directed projects by shifting
funds from projects that the committee reports had not specifically
identified, or projects that were less expensive than anticipated, and
therefore had "savings." However, one National Park Service official
expressed concern about these unfunded projects, suggesting that if
transfers continue without complete reimbursement, the construction
program may no longer have sufficient funds to pay for all
congressionally directed projects, even though funds were already
appropriated for them.
Program Funding Deficits:
Funding transfers also disrupted annual budgeting efforts, contributing
to numerous individual Forest Service programs going into deficit in
2003 when agency officials overspent funds internally set aside for the
programs. Forest Service officials attributed the deficits in part to
actions they took to execute the transfer of funds--specifically, the
combination of spending early and transferring late. In 2002, the fire
season began unusually early, and the Forest Service ordered an
agencywide spending freeze on all nonessential expenses beginning in
early July. By doing so, the Forest Service ensured that enough funds
were available to pay for suppression costs. However, at the end of the
fiscal year, there were substantial funds left in some programs, and
officials believed that more projects could have been completed. In an
effort to avoid this situation and to complete more projects while
still providing for suppression costs in 2003, the Forest Service did
not start transferring funds until mid-August and, even then, did not
order a spending freeze. In addition, agency officials focused on
spending money earlier in the year, so that they could complete more
projects before funds were transferred for suppression. After funds
were transferred, some programs had nearly depleted their financial
resources. Nevertheless, agency officials said they continued spending
in a number of cases because they had made commitments to contractors
or others, or because expenses such as vehicle maintenance were
essential. At year-end, some programs were in deficit. For example, all
11 forests in the Forest Service's southwestern region ended 2003 with
deficits in at least 30 percent of the programs from which transfers
were made. Seven of the 11 forests had deficits in 50 percent or more
of these programs.[Footnote 12]
Another factor that contributed to 2003 program deficits was that the
Forest Service used unreliable estimates to determine the amount of
money available for transfers. Specifically, when the Forest Service
made transfers in 2003, its headquarters officials estimated the
minimum balance necessary for each program by projecting salary needs
for the remainder of the fiscal year and adding a small amount for
contingencies. The estimate was based on two pay periods in July, and,
in most cases, headquarters transferred all of the balance above this
estimated amount. However, headquarters officials made this transfer
without adequately consulting the regions or local forest units to
obtain information on their specific salary needs for the remainder of
the fiscal year. As such, in some cases, the salary estimates were
understated because some staff were on suppression duty during the two
pay periods and the suppression program was paying their salaries.
Consequently, when these staff returned from suppression duty before
the end of the fiscal year, the balance remaining was not always
sufficient to cover their salary costs. According to headquarters
officials, they used rough salary estimates because suppression program
funds were nearly depleted and they needed to make transfers
immediately, leaving inadequate time for forest-level officials--who
have access to detailed payroll information--to estimate salary costs.
Nevertheless, officials in the Washington Office directed regional and
forest-level officials to ensure that all full-time staff continued to
be paid in full. In order to do so, in some cases, staff worked in
alternate programs so that they could be paid through those programs.
In other cases, agency officials continued to draw salaries from
depleted programs, and, as a result, the programs went into deficit.
Further, to avoid this situation, some officials said their managers
encouraged them to go on fire suppression detail where there was a
need, so that their salaries would be paid from the suppression
program. Forest Service officials indicated they used the following
year's appropriation to replenish the programs that went into deficit;
however, this practice reduced the amount of funds available for that
year's program of work.
Finally, if transfers to pay for wildfire suppression continue, project
cancellations and delays, strained relationships, and management
difficulties will likely continue and be compounded. According to
agency officials, some impacts have yet to become apparent. For
example, some projects are funded in one year with the expectation that
the funds will be spent over several years as the project is
implemented. For such projects, the impacts of transfers may only
become apparent as the project nears its completion. Additionally, when
projects are deferred to the next year, agency officials often must use
resources originally dedicated to other projects. The result is a
domino effect: deferring one year's projects displaces the next year's
projects, which must in turn be deferred to the following year.
Furthermore, because of 2003 program deficits, the impacts of funding
transfers will continue into 2004. For programs that were in deficit at
the end of 2003, officials had to first pay off the deficit at the
beginning of 2004, effectively reducing their annual budget and the
number of projects they will be able to fund.
If funding transfers continue, the agencies and the Congress will
repeatedly confront difficult decisions in determining how much funding
to transfer from which programs and how much to reimburse. In making
such decisions, the Forest Service and Interior have attempted to
minimize impacts to programs and projects, but neither agency
systematically tracks such impacts at a national level. To identify the
impacts of funding transfers on its programs in 2003, Forest Service
officials collected some information about impacts from regional
offices. However, the information was neither consistent nor
comprehensive because not every region provided it, and those that did,
provided it in different forms with varying degrees of detail.
Enhancing their understanding of how funding transfers affect programs
could improve the ability of the agencies and the Congress to minimize
negative impacts to programs and projects.
In 2003, the Forest Service added a feature to its accomplishment
reporting system to track the impacts of funding transfers. The feature
allows agency officials to identify which national performance goals
are affected by transfers and to what extent. For example, officials
can identify how many acres of land were not acquired because of
funding transfers. However, there are several agency programs that do
not use this system to track their accomplishments. If more programs
used this system and tracked accomplishment shortfalls caused by
funding transfers, the Forest Service and the Congress would have more
comprehensive information and could make more informed decisions about
wildfire suppression funding, transfers, and reimbursements. Interior
similarly could refine its existing accomplishment tracking systems to
collect nationwide information about the impacts of transfers on their
programs. Because accomplishment information is compiled at the end of
the fiscal year, it would be of limited value in determining potential
effects of current year transfers before they are made. Nevertheless,
nationwide information on impacts from prior years could help agency
officials and the Congress make informed decisions about current year
transfers and reimbursements.
Improvements for Estimating Suppression Costs and Alternatives for
Funding Wildfire Suppression Could Be Considered:
To help mitigate the negative impacts of funding transfers, the Forest
Service and Interior should improve their method for estimating annual
suppression costs and the Congress could consider alternative
approaches for funding wildfire suppression. The agencies' use of a 10-
year average of wildfire suppression costs to estimate and budget for
annual suppression costs has substantially underestimated actual costs
during the last several years. While uncertainties about the number of
wildfires and their location, size, and intensity make it difficult to
estimate wildfire suppression costs, alternative methods that more
effectively account for these uncertainties and annual changes in
firefighting costs should be considered for improving the information
provided to agency and congressional decision makers. Additionally, to
further mitigate the impacts of funding transfers, the Congress could
consider several alternative approaches to funding wildfire
suppression, such as establishing a governmentwide or agency-specific
reserve account dedicated to funding wildfire suppression activities.
Each alternative has advantages and disadvantages with respect to,
among other things, reducing the need to transfer funds, creating
incentives for agencies to contain suppression costs, and allowing for
congressional review. Thus, selecting any alternative would require the
Congress to make difficult decisions, including taking into
consideration the effect on the federal budget deficit.
Annual Wildfire Suppression Budgets and Appropriation Decisions Have
Been Based on Cost Estimates That Have Significantly Understated Actual
Costs:
For the past several years, the Forest Service, Interior, and the
Congress have made annual wildfire suppression budget and
appropriations decisions based on estimates of suppression costs that
frequently have substantially understated actual costs. In developing
their annual suppression budgets, the Forest Service and Interior use a
10-year average of suppression costs to estimate annual suppression
costs. The agencies calculate this estimate up to 2 years in advance of
when suppression funds are actually needed. The Congress also uses this
estimate in deciding how much to appropriate for wildfire suppression
activities. However, since 1990, these annual estimates frequently have
understated actual suppression costs by hundreds of millions of
dollars, as illustrated in figure 7. In fact, over the last 5 years,
the estimates have understated actual suppression costs by about $1.8
billion. This shortfall in funding to cover actual suppression costs
has occurred, in part, because the agencies and the Congress developed
annual budget requests and made appropriation decisions for suppression
activities on the basis of these estimates. In funding suppression
activities based on these estimates, the Congress was able to fund, and
the agencies were able to address, other program priorities without
negatively affecting the federal budget deficit. However, in doing so,
the agencies have had insufficient funds to pay for all suppression
activities in recent years because of the increase in the number and
intensity of wildfires and the costs to suppress them. As a result, the
agencies have had to transfer hundreds of millions of dollars from
other programs.
Figure 7: Actual Suppression Costs Have Frequently Exceeded Estimated
Costs and Appropriations since 1990:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The suppression cost estimate, which is based on a 10-year
average of suppression costs, is lagged 2 years to be consistent with
the suppression appropriations.
[End of figure]
Improvements in Estimating Suppression Costs Should Be Considered:
Alternative methods should be considered for improving the suppression
cost estimates that are provided to agency and congressional decision
makers for use in estimating and funding wildfire suppression costs.
Agency officials acknowledged that the 10-year average has
substantially understated actual suppression costs in recent years.
Although agency officials indicated they have considered alternative
methods for improving the forecasts, they believe that the 10-year
average is a reasonable and inexpensive way to estimate wildfire
suppression costs. However, the usefulness of a 10-year average is
limited when actual costs change rapidly from year to year, as they
have recently. Furthermore, because the average is presented as a
"point estimate" of likely costs instead of in conjunction with a range
of cost estimates reflecting the uncertainties of wildfires, it may
convey an unwarranted sense of precision to decision makers. For
example, as shown in figure 7, recent actual suppression costs have
been higher than earlier levels. Agency officials believe that recent
abnormal drought conditions have contributed to unusually large and
catastrophic wildfires that are much more expensive to suppress than
typical fires prevalent for most of the previous 10 years. In addition,
over the last few years, the cost of fighting wildfires in the wildland
urban interface has risen significantly due to the number of homes
built in these areas and the increased resources needed to protect them
from wildfires. Also, costs related to the use of aircraft to fight
wildfires, especially insurance rates, have increased significantly
since September 11, 2001. Alternative methods that more effectively
account for annual changes in expenditures and that convey the
uncertainties associated with making the forecasts should be considered
for improving the information provided to agency and congressional
decision makers. For example, an estimate based on a weighted 10-year
average, in which more weight in the average is given to recent
expenditures relative to older ones, may be more effective in
accounting for annual changes in expenditures.[Footnote 13] This
information could provide agency and congressional decision makers with
more useful data to develop budget requests and fund suppression
activities at a level that reduces the need for funding transfers and
subsequent reimbursements. However, in doing so, higher estimated costs
for suppression could result, at least in the near term. In this
context, the Congress would have to make difficult decisions about
whether to increase funding for wildfire suppression to more closely
reflect estimated costs, and, if so, whether to reduce appropriations
to other government programs in order to avoid adding to the federal
budget deficit.
Alternative Wildfire Funding Approaches Merit Further Consideration:
In addition to the agencies refining their estimates of suppression
costs, the Congress also could consider alternative funding approaches
to further mitigate the effects of funding transfers on agency programs
and reduce the need to provide supplemental appropriations. For
example, the Congress might consider creating an emergency reserve
account that is governmentwide or agency-specific, and that provides a
specific amount of funds when the reserve is created or allows for as
much funding as is necessary. Each alternative has advantages and
disadvantages related to influencing the need for transferring funds,
creating incentives for the agencies to contain suppression costs, and
allowing for congressional review. We previously issued two reports,
and the Congressional Budget Office issued testimony, that presented
various alternatives for funding wildfire suppression and other
emergency needs.[Footnote 14] Some of the alternatives presented in
these reports and testimony are summarized in table 2 and described
below:
Table 2: Comparison of Alternative Types of Reserve Accounts to Help
Fund Wildfire Suppression:
Governmentwide reserve account: Current year funds;
Definition: A certain amount of funding would be available for various
emergencies for 1 year;
Advantages: Pooling resources would allow for fluctuations in funding
needs; Annual opportunity for congressional review;
Disadvantages: Transfers may still be necessary; Supplemental
appropriations may add to the federal budget deficit if funding for
other agency or other government programs is not cut; May create
incentive to spend entire fund before year- end; Less incentive to
contain suppression costs;
Governmentwide reserve account: No-Year funds;
Definition: A certain amount of funding would be available for various
emergencies over multiple years;
Advantages: Pooling resources would allow for fluctuations in funding
needs; Annual opportunity for congressional review; No incentive to
spend entire fund before year-end;
Disadvantages: Transfers may still be necessary; Supplemental
appropriations may add to the federal budget deficit if funding for
other agency or other government programs is not cut; Less incentive to
contain suppression costs;
Agency-Specific reserve account: Permanent indefinite appropriation;
Definition: As much funding as needed would always be available for
fire suppression;
Advantages: No need to transfer funds;
Disadvantages: Federal budget deficit could increase if funding for
other agency or other government programs is not cut; Less incentive to
contain suppression costs; No opportunity for annual congressional
review;
Agency-Specific reserve account: Current indefinite appropriation;
Definition: As much funding as needed would be available for fire
suppression for 1 year;
Advantages: No need to transfer funds; Annual opportunity for
congressional review;
Disadvantages: Federal budget deficit could increase if suppression
costs exceeded budget estimates; Less incentive to contain suppression
costs;
Agency-Specific reserve account: Definite appropriation;
Definition: A specific amount of funding would be available for fire
suppression for a specific time period, such as 1 year.
Advantages: Federal budget deficit would not increase if funding for
other agency or other government programs was cut; Inherent incentive
to contain suppression costs; Annual opportunity for congressional
review.
Disadvantages: Transfers may still be necessary; Supplemental
appropriations may add to the federal budget deficit if funding for
other agency or other government programs is not cut.
Sources: GAO and GAO analysis of Congressional Budget Office data.
[End of table]
Reserve accounts provide early recognition that there will likely be a
demand on federal resources for natural disasters-thus providing
greater transparency in the budget process. The greater the amount of
funds in the reserve account, the less likely agencies would need to
transfer funds from other programs. Reducing the need to transfer funds
would mitigate the need for supplemental appropriations that have added
hundreds of millions of dollars to the federal budget deficit. However,
the greater the amount of funds in the reserve account, the more
difficult it would be for the Congress to limit total government
spending. On the other hand, if the Congress limited the amount of
funds appropriated for wildfire suppression, including the amount in
the reserve account, there would be a greater chance that the agencies
would need to transfer funds, and the Congress would need to reimburse
the transfers through supplemental appropriations. The amount and
accessibility of funds in the reserve account also may affect the
agencies' incentives to contain the costs of suppression activities.
However, the effect of such incentives would likely be limited, given
that many unpredictable and uncontrollable factors affect the costs of
fire suppression activities.
Governmentwide Reserve Account:
The Congress could create a governmentwide reserve account into which
funds normally appropriated to agencies having responsibility for
addressing unforeseen situations and emergencies would be appropriated.
These agencies would include not only the Forest Service and Interior,
but also the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of
Defense, among others. Combining the emergency funds of all these
agencies into one account might alleviate the need for supplemental
appropriations, because in any given year an increase in spending for
one agency may be offset by a lower than usual spending by another
agency. Without supplemental appropriations, there would be no increase
in the budget deficit. A possible disadvantage of using a
governmentwide reserve that is funded annually is that it could produce
the expectation that the entire fund should be spent each year and, as
the year progresses, claims on the fund might increase. Similarly, a
governmentwide reserve might not provide incentives for agencies to
contain the costs of wildfire suppression.
A governmentwide reserve account could be created using funds
designated as no-year money, so that funds not spent in a given year
remain in the account for use in following years. Under such an
account, there would be no incentive to spend the entire fund each
year. To further control the use of the reserve account, the agencies'
access to the fund could be tied to specific criteria. Criteria could
parallel those previously offered by OMB in designating funds as an
emergency requirement; namely, that the emergency (1) require a
necessary expenditure-an essential or vital expenditure, not one that
is merely useful or beneficial; (2) occur suddenly-quickly coming into
being, not building up over time; (3) be urgent-a pressing and
compelling need requiring immediate action; (4) be unforeseen-not
predictable or anticipated as a coming need; and (5) not be
permanent-the need to fund is temporary. Nevertheless, whether the
funds are designated as no-year or not, additional funding could still
be needed at year-end. If so, the agencies would need to transfer funds
from other program accounts, and the Congress would have to choose
between providing supplemental appropriations to reimburse the funding
transfers--which would add to the federal budget deficit--or providing
no reimbursements. In such cases, even if the agencies did need to
transfer funds, the amount transferred would be less than it would have
been without the reserve.
Agency-Specific Reserve Accounts:
Another approach for funding wildfire suppression activities cited in
one of our earlier reports is to establish agency-specific reserve
accounts for those agencies that regularly respond to federal
emergencies and require those agencies to satisfy criteria similar to
the OMB criteria previously described, before the funds are released.
Agency-specific reserve accounts could be funded through a permanent,
indefinite appropriation, which would provide as much funding as needed
for specific purposes and would always be available for those purposes
without any further action by the Congress. A permanent, indefinite
appropriation would eliminate the need to transfer funds from other
programs and to provide supplemental appropriations to reimburse
funding transfers. A disadvantage of an indefinite appropriation is
that if actual expenditures exceed the estimates, the federal budget
deficit will be greater than anticipated. A disadvantage of a permanent
appropriation is that it would lessen the opportunity for the Congress
to regularly review the efficiency and effectiveness of fire
suppression activities, because such reviews are typically conducted
during the annual appropriations process.
Alternatively, funding for agency-specific reserve accounts could be
provided through a current, indefinite appropriation, which provides as
much funding as needed for the current fiscal year. Funding wildfire
suppression using a current, indefinite appropriation would allow the
Congress to periodically review suppression activities through the
annual appropriations process since the Congress would appropriate
reserve funds each year. However, an indefinite appropriation could
still result in higher than estimated costs and a higher than
anticipated federal budget deficit. Additionally, any indefinite
appropriation would have no inherent incentives for the agencies to
contain suppression costs because the funding level would be unlimited.
Agency-specific reserve accounts also could be funded by a definite
appropriation with a specific amount of funds, not to be exceeded in a
given year. With such limits, there would be an incentive for the
agencies to contain suppression costs. As with a current, indefinite
appropriation, the Congress could review suppression activities each
year during its annual appropriations process. This alternative also
could avoid increasing the federal budget deficit if appropriations to
other agency program accounts were reduced by an amount corresponding
to the amount in the reserve. However, should suppression costs be
higher than the amount provided in the reserve account for the current
year, a decision would need to be made on whether to transfer funds
from other agency programs and, if so, whether to reimburse the funding
transfers with a supplemental appropriation that would increase the
federal budget deficit.
Recently, the Senate Committee on the Budget has proposed an option for
funding wildfire suppression activities in its resolution on the budget
for fiscal year 2005. The resolution would provide for a reserve
account funded through a definite appropriation of up to $500 million
in additional annual funding for fiscal years 2004 through
2006.[Footnote 15] The funds in the account would be available to the
Forest Service and Interior for fire suppression activities only if (1)
the agencies are initially appropriated funds equal to or greater than
the 10-year average of wildfire suppression costs and (2) the initial
appropriations are insufficient to cover actual costs. Such an
alternative would add to the federal budget deficit, unless the $500
million was reduced from other Forest Service, Interior, or other
governmentwide programs when the Congress initially develops the
federal budget. Further, if the funds in this account were sufficient
to pay for all wildfire suppression activities above the 10-year
average of suppression costs, there would be no need for the Forest
Service or Interior to transfer funds from other program accounts. Had
there been a $500 million reserve account available for wildfire
suppression over the last 5 years, transfers would still have been
necessary, but to a lesser extent, because suppression costs greatly
exceeded the 10-year average in the extensive fire seasons in 2002 and
2003.
Other Funding Options:
During our visits with agency officials, we also discussed various
other ideas for acquiring additional revenues to help pay for wildfire
suppression. One idea was to charge fees for visitors, and state,
local, and private entities that use federal land and resources, or to
people who own property adjacent to federal forest land. For example,
agencies could place a surcharge on existing user fees at national
forests, parks, and other federal lands and use the additional revenue
to help fund wildfire suppression. Another idea was to establish a
special fund, similar to the K-V Fund, whose revenues would be
dedicated to wildfire suppression. Revenues accruing to such a fund
could come from fees charged for state, local, or private use of
federal lands and its resources. Still another option was to levy a
stipend on property owners' federal tax for living in the wildland
urban interface. Some other, more unconventional methods for mitigating
the federal share of wildfire suppression costs also were discussed,
such as allowing private companies to "sponsor" fire suppression
efforts by providing funding as a measure of corporate goodwill to the
local community. The advantage of all of these options would be to
reduce the federal government's burden to pay for fire suppression.
Because the Forest Service and Interior do not have the authority to
increase funding for suppression over the amount provided in
appropriations, any of these options would require congressional
action. Further, all of these options could strain agency relations
with the public and others.
Conclusions:
Wildfires burn millions of acres of federal land every year, and the
Forest Service and Interior spend billions of dollars suppressing them.
In doing so, the agencies must balance the goal of protecting lives,
property, and resources against the goal of containing costs.
Transferring funds from other agency programs has helped fund needed
wildfire suppression activities but not without a cost. These transfers
have had widespread negative effects on Forest Service and Interior
programs, projects, relationships, and management. In addition, the
subsequent repayment of transfers with supplemental appropriations has
added hundreds of millions of dollars to the federal budget deficit.
These effects are likely to increase should funding transfers continue
to be necessary in the future.
Notwithstanding the uncertainties and difficulty of accurately
estimating wildfire suppression costs, there are a number of factors
that exacerbate the problem of transferring funds to help suppress
wildfires. First, the methodology the agencies use to estimate
suppression costs and determine their budgets is flawed because it does
not adequately account for recent increases in the costs to suppress
wildfires. Without this information, the Congress may have insufficient
information to make prudent funding decisions. Second, the estimates
generated by the monthly forecasting models have been inaccurate and
did not provide a sound basis for deciding if, and to what extent,
funding transfers were needed. Third, the agencies have inadequate
information to understand the effects that transfers are having on
their programs. As such, they are not well positioned to report the
impacts to the Congress or make informed decisions about future
transfers. Finally, the Forest Service's method for estimating salary
costs for the remainder of the fiscal year without adequately
consulting with local forest units is problematic. Consequently, Forest
Service headquarters officials do not have sufficiently accurate data
to make transfer decisions and preclude agency programs from going into
deficit.
Because of the difficulty of accurately estimating suppression costs
and the budget implications of providing additional funding for
suppression, it is likely that suppression funding shortfalls will
continue in the future. To minimize the budgetary implications, the
intended goal should be to achieve an appropriate balance between the
shortfall and the impacts that transfers will have on agency programs.
Despite the best efforts to achieve this balance, there will be times
when the size of the shortfall will create problems and impacts to
important programs. Currently, there is no budgeting or funding
mechanism that can help mitigate these impacts. Consequently, the
agencies are forced to make difficult decisions to fund wildfire
suppression at the expense of meeting other important programmatic
goals.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help minimize the impacts of wildfire funding transfers on other
agency programs and to improve the agencies' budget estimates for
wildfire suppression costs, we are recommending that the Secretaries of
Agriculture and the Interior direct the Forest Service and Interior
agencies to work together to:
* improve their methods for estimating annual wildfire suppression
costs by more effectively accounting for annual changes in costs and
the uncertainties associated with wildfires in making these estimates,
so that funding needs for wildfire suppression can be predicted with
greater accuracy;
* annually conduct a formal assessment of how the agencies' methods for
estimating annual suppression costs and their monthly forecasting
models performed in estimating wildfire suppression costs relative to
actual costs, to determine if additional improvements are needed; and:
* consistently track accomplishment shortfalls caused by funding
transfers across all programs and include this information in annual
accomplishment reports to provide agency decision makers and the
Congress with better information for making wildfire suppression
transfer and funding decisions.
In addition, to more accurately determine the amount of funds available
to transfer for wildfire suppression, we recommend that the Secretary
of Agriculture direct the Chief of the Forest Service to estimate
remaining salary needs for the fiscal year by consulting with local
forest officials to obtain more current, specific payroll information,
so that the risk of programs going into deficit can be reduced.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
To reduce the potential need for the Forest Service and Interior to
rely on transferring funds from other programs to pay for wildfire
suppression on public lands, the Congress could consider alternative
funding approaches for wildfire suppression, such as, but not limited
to, establishing a governmentwide or agency-specific emergency reserve
account.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Agriculture
and the Interior for review and comment. In responding, the Forest
Service generally concurred with our findings and recommendations, and
Interior concurred with our findings, but both agencies expressed
concerns about our recommendation that they pursue alternative methods
for estimating suppression costs. Both the Forest Service and Interior
provided written comments, which are included in appendixes IV and V,
respectively.
Concerning our recommendation that the agencies improve their methods
for estimating annual wildfire suppression costs, Interior commented
that the current method--relying on the 10-year average of suppression
costs--has proved to be "a reasonable and durable basis for suppression
budgeting." In support of this point, they noted that between 1995 and
1998, their actual suppression costs were below the 10-year average in
three seasons. While we do not dispute this fact, we disagree that
using the 10-year average has been "a reasonable and durable basis" for
budgeting for suppression costs. As noted in our report, since 1990,
the agencies' reliance on the 10-year average has frequently resulted
in annual budget estimates well below actual suppression costs. For
Interior, the 10-year average was below actual costs in 8 of the 14
years since 1990; for the two agencies together, the 10-year average
was below actual costs in 11 of the 14 years. Further, in the years
when the average has understated actual costs, the difference has
frequently been significant. Over the last 5 years, the 10-year average
has understated the two agencies' actual suppression costs by a total
of about $1.8 billion.
The Forest Service, in commenting on the use of the 10-year average,
recognized the weaknesses associated with using the average to estimate
annual wildfire suppression costs and noted the agency has looked into
other methods that could more accurately predict future suppression
costs. Some of the methods considered included using a 5-year average
and inflating the historical costs to current dollar values. The Forest
Service also noted that agency officials have discussed various
modeling methods with researchers who said they could design a very
expensive, complex model that would be more accurate than the 10-year
average. We support the Forest Service for taking this initial step and
encourage the agency to continue its efforts to identify and implement
a cost-effective method for improving their estimates of annual
suppression costs. As noted in our report, alternative methods that
more effectively account for annual changes in expenditures and that
convey the uncertainties associated with making the forecasts should be
considered.
The Forest Service also noted that our report does not address the
potential consequences associated with not making the funding
transfers. These negative impacts could include (1) not having adequate
personnel and equipment, (2) an increase in the number of acres burned,
and (3) an increase in the loss of homes and other property. While we
believe that such impacts could result if funding transfers did not
occur, the objective of our report is to identify the effects on Forest
Service and Interior programs from which funds were actually
transferred.
In addition, Interior noted that shifting funds from one program to
another within the wildland fire management account does not constitute
a transfer, and, as such, we were incorrect in saying that Interior
transferred funds from wildland fire programs. However, as noted in
footnote 2, for ease of explanation throughout the report, we use the
word "transfer" to refer both to the transfer of funds from one
appropriation account to another and to the reprogramming of funds
between programs within a single appropriation account. In either
situation, the program from which the funds were taken is affected.
The agencies also provided other comments and technical clarifications
on the draft that we incorporated into the report where appropriate.
As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until
30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send
copies of this report to the Chairman, Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources; the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House
Committee on Resources; the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member,
Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health, House Committee on
Resources; and other interested congressional committees. We will also
send copies of this report to the Secretary of Agriculture; the
Secretary of the Interior; the Chief of the Forest Service; the
Directors of the Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service,
and the Fish and Wildlife Service; the Acting Director, Bureau of
Indian Affairs; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and
other interested parties. We will make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Barry T. Hill:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To determine the amount and the programs from which the U.S. Forest
Service and the Department of the Interior transferred funds from 1999
through 2003, we collected data from the agencies' headquarters on
funds transferred and reimbursed by agency, program, and year. We
identified the procedures the agencies follow when transferring and
reimbursing funds by obtaining and reviewing agency strategy and
planning documents and discussing the procedures actually used with
agency officials in headquarters, regional offices, and local units. We
also interviewed agency officials about the internal controls they use
to carry out these procedures. In addition, we contacted budget
officers at the Forest Service's nine regional offices and obtained
information on the amounts transferred and reimbursed to their units.
Where appropriate, we also met with officials from the Interior
agencies that are involved with wildfire suppression activities--the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, and National Park Service. We interviewed budget
officers in Forest Service and Interior headquarters about the
financial systems they use to ensure the accuracy of the amount of
funds transferred and reimbursed. We also interviewed Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) officials to obtain their views on the
reliability and completeness of the data they receive from each agency,
as well as the adequacy of the agencies' internal procedures to
generate and track these data. Although we relied primarily on agency
data, we compared these data with budget documents that corroborated
the amounts transferred and reimbursed, where possible. We took
appropriate measures to ensure that the Forest Service and Interior
data on the amount of funds transferred and reimbursed and on actual
suppression costs were sufficiently reliable for our purposes, and that
the internal procedures at the Forest Service and Interior were
sufficient to generate these data. In addition, we used the Gross
Domestic Product Price Index to adjust dollars for inflation.
To identify the impacts on agency programs from which funds were
transferred, we interviewed Forest Service and Interior headquarters
officials with responsibility for the affected programs. We also
visited six Forest Service regional offices; 7 national forests, and
contacted an additional 14 national forests; and visited seven Interior
field offices. Although we did not visit all Forest Service regions, we
chose a nonprobability sample of regions that reflected a range of
funds transferred as well as the geographic diversity of program
impacts (see table 3).[Footnote 16]
Table 3: Forest Service Regional Offices Visited by GAO:
Forest Service region: Region 1;
Geographic area: Montana, North Dakota, Northeastern Washington,
Northern Idaho, and South Dakota;
Funds transferred, 1999-2003: $71,337,000.
Forest Service region: Region 2;
Geographic area: Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Wyoming;
Funds transferred, 1999-2003: $46,102,000.
Forest Service region: Region 3;
Geographic area: Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma panhandle, and Texas
panhandle;
Funds transferred, 1999-2003: $73,794,000.
Forest Service region: Region 5;
Geographic area: California, Hawaii, and U.S. Pacific Islands;
Funds transferred, 1999-2003: $94,440,000.
Forest Service region: Region 8;
Geographic area: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia;
Funds transferred, 1999-2003: $90,860,000.
Forest Service region: Region 9;
Geographic area: Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin;
Funds transferred, 1999-2003: $57,000,000.
Sources: For geographic information, [Hyperlink, http://www.fs.fed.us]
www.fs.fed.us. For funds transferred, GAO analysis of Forest Service
financial data.
[End of table]
Where appropriate, we also met with Interior field offices, grant
recipients, a state forester, and representatives of nonprofit
organizations who were collocated in the Forest Service regions
visited. In addition, we contacted national forests officials in each
region we visited and obtained detailed information regarding the
specific impacts to their programs and projects. We interviewed
representatives of impacted programs in both regional and national
forest offices. We collected documents that listed the projects
deferred or canceled due to transfers; obtained information on the cost
of the impact to some affected projects; and--in some instances--
conducted site visits to affected project locations. In our review of
impacts, we focused on fiscal years 2002 and 2003 because in these 2
fiscal years transfers for wildfire suppression involved many more
programs than they did previously.
In reviewing the agencies' methods for estimating suppression costs, we
discussed the details of each method with agency officials responsible
for developing the estimates. We reviewed the agencies' current
estimation methodology, compared the estimates with actual costs and
discussed the reasons for differences between them with agency
officials, and identified alternatives for estimating suppression
costs. In reviewing alternative approaches for funding wildfire
suppression, we reviewed previous GAO and Congressional Budget Office
reports,[Footnote 17] as well as a Forest Service study related to
budgeting for emergencies, and discussed alternative funding options
with agency officials. We also obtained the views of OMB officials on
other appropriation approaches for funding wildfire suppression. In
addition, we analyzed Forest Service and Interior budget documents,
congressional appropriations documents, and agency suppression cost
forecasting models.
We performed our work between July 2003 and March 2004 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Summary of Funds Transferred from and Reimbursed to Forest
Service and Interior Programs, 1999 through 2003:
These tables summarize the amount of funds transferred from and
reimbursed to Forest Service and Interior programs from 1999 through
2003. Table 4 summarizes the funds transferred from major Forest
Service programs and from the construction and land acquisition
programs, as well as various fire programs, within Interior's four
agencies that have responsibility for wildfire suppression activities.
Table 5 summarizes the amount of funds reimbursed to these programs
over the 5-year period. The information presented in the tables was
obtained from Forest Service and Interior budget documents.
Table 4: Transfers to Wildfire Suppression, by Forest Service and
Interior Program, 1999 through 2003:
Agency/Program: Forest Service/K-V Fund;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $292,156,240;
Year: 2001: $20,686,802;
Year: 2002: $172,781,787;
Year: 2003: $154,000,000;
Program total: $639,624,829.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Capital improvements and maintenance;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $52,751,345;
Year: 2002: $159,569,062;
Year: 2003: $105,000,000;
Program total: $317,320,407.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/National forest system;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $157,536,335;
Year: 2003: $125,000,000;
Program total: $282,536,335.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Land acquisition/Land and Water
Conservation Fund;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $145,339,974;
Year: 2003: $100,000,000;
Program total: $245,339,974.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Working Capital Fund;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $52,751,345;
Year: 2002: $96,554,528;
Year: 2003: $20,000,000;
Program total: $169,305,873.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/State and private forestry;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $78,259,986;
Year: 2003: $34,000,000;
Program total: $112,259,986.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Wildland fire management;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $81,309,076;
Year: 2003: $0;
Program total: $81,309,076.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Forest and range research;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $23,376,359;
Year: 2003: $10,000,000;
Program total: $33,376,359.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Other appropriations[A];
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $40,339,264;
Year: 2002: $100,619,982;
Year: 2003: $147,000,000;
Program total: $287,959,245.
Subtotal;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $292,156,240;
Year: 2001: $166,528,755;
Year: 2002: $1,015,347,088;
Year: 2003: $695,000,000;
Program total: $2,169,032,084.
Agency/Program: Bureau of Indian Affairs/Construction;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $37,605,448;
Year: 2003: $43,400,000;
Program total: $81,005,448.
Agency/Program: Bureau of Indian Affairs/Land acquisition;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $0;
Year: 2003: $0;
Program total: $0.
Agency/Program: Bureau of Indian Affairs/Fire programs;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $5,531,050;
Year: 2003: $500,000;
Program total: $6,031,050.
Agency/Program: Bureau of Land Management/Construction;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $2,041,918;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $5,081,817;
Year: 2003: $4,300,000;
Program total: $11,423,735.
Agency/Program: Bureau of Land Management/Land acquisition;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $2,011,220;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $6,098,181;
Year: 2003: $4,200,000;
Program total: $12,309,401.
Agency/Program: Bureau of Land Management/Fire programs;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $3,750,381;
Year: 2003: $6,500,000;
Program total: $10,250,381.
Agency/Program: Fish and Wildlife Service/Construction;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $20,145,020;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $17,278,179;
Year: 2003: $14,600,000;
Program total: $52,023,198.
Agency/Program: Fish and Wildlife Service/Land acquisition;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $6,890,018;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $19,310,906;
Year: 2003: $13,900,000;
Program total: $40,100,924.
Agency/Program: Fish and Wildlife Service/Fire programs;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $0;
Year: 2003: $1,000,000;
Program total: $1,000,000.
Agency/Program: National Park Service/Construction;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $24,367,524;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $96,554,528;
Year: 2003: $64,000,000;
Program total: $184,922,052.
Agency/Program: National Park Service/Land acquisition;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $50,398,010;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $61,998,171;
Year: 2003: $20,100,000;
Program total: $132,496,180.
Agency/Program: National Park Service/Fire programs;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $5,081,817;
Year: 2003: $2,600,000;
Program total: $7,681,817.
Subtotal;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $105,853,710;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $258,290,477;
Year: 2003: $175,100,000;
Program total: $539,244,186.
Total;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $398,009,950;
Year: 2001: $166,528,755;
Year: 2002: $1,273,637,565;
Year: 2003: $870,100,000;
Program total: $2,708,276,270.
Sources: Forest Service and Interior Financial Data.
Note: Funds listed are in 2003 dollars.
[A] Other appropriations include the forest land enhancement, brush
disposal, timber salvage sale, forest restoration and improvements, and
recreation fee demonstration programs.
[End of table]
Table 5: Transfer Reimbursements to Forest Service and Interior
Programs, 1999 through 2003:
Agency/Program: Forest Service/K-V Fund;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $292,156,240;
Year: 2001: $20,686,802;
Year: 2002: $71,145,442;
Year: 2003: $154,000,000;
Program total: $537,988,484.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Capital improvements and maintenance;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $52,751,345;
Year: 2002: $134,159,976;
Year: 2003: $95,000,000;
Program total: $281,911,320.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/National forest system;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $63,014,534;
Year: 2003: $52,000,000;
Program total: $115,014,534.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Land acquisition;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $145,339,974;
Year: 2003: $96,000,000;
Program total: $241,339,974.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Working Capital Fund;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $52,751,345;
Year: 2002: $30,490,904;
Year: 2003: $9,000,000;
Program total: $92,242,248.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/State and private forestry;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $78,259,986;
Year: 2003: $31,000,000;
Program total: $109,259,986.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Wildland fire management;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $60,981,807;
Year: 2003: $0;
Program total: $60,981,807.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Forest and range research;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $23,376,359;
Year: 2003: $10,000,000;
Program total: $33,376,359.
Agency/Program: Forest Service/Other appropriations[A];
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $40,339,264;
Year: 2002: $100,619,982;
Year: 2003: $107,000,000;
Program total: $247,959,245.
Subtotal;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $292,156,240;
Year: 2001: $166,528,755;
Year: 2002: $707,388,962;
Year: 2003: $554,000,000;
Program total: $1,720,073,957.
Agency/Program: Bureau of Indian Affairs/Construction;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $29,614,290;
Year: 2003: $35,457,800;
Program total: $65,072,090.
Agency/Program: Bureau of Indian Affairs/Land acquisition;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $0;
Year: 2003: $0;
Program total: $0 .
Agency/Program: Bureau of Indian Affairs/Fire programs;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $5,531,050;
Year: 2003: $408,000;
Program total: $5,939,050.
Agency/Program: Bureau of Land Management/Construction;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $2,037,684;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $4,002,439;
Year: 2003: $3,513,100;
Program total: $9,553,223.
Agency/Program: Bureau of Land Management/Land acquisition;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $2,006,986;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $4,802,317;
Year: 2003: $3,431,400;
Program total: $10,240,704.
Agency/Program: Bureau of Land Management/Fire programs;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $3,750,381;
Year: 2003: $5,304,000;
Program total: $9,054,381.
Agency/Program: Fish and Wildlife Service/Construction;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $20,145,020;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $13,606,566;
Year: 2003: $11,928,200;
Program total: $45,679,785.
Agency/Program: Fish and Wildlife Service/Land acquisition;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $6,890,018;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $15,207,338;
Year: 2003: $11,356,300;
Program total: $33,453,656.
Agency/Program: Fish and Wildlife Service/Fire programs;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $0;
Year: 2003: $816,000;
Program total: $816,000.
Agency/Program: National Park Service/Construction;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $24,367,524;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $76,036,691;
Year: 2003: $52,288,000;
Program total: $152,692,215.
Agency/Program: National Park Service/Land acquisition;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $50,398,010;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $48,823,559;
Year: 2003: $16,421,700;
Program total: $115,643,269.
Agency/Program: National Park Service/Fire programs;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $5,081,817;
Year: 2003: $2,122,000;
Program total: $7,203,817.
Subtotal;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $105,845,242;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $206,456,449;
Year: 2003: $143,046,500;
Program total: $455,348,190.
Total;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $398,001,482;
Year: 2001: $166,528,755;
Year: 2002: $913,845,411;
Year: 2003: $697,046,500;
Program total: $2,175,422,147.
Sources: Forest Service and Interior financial data.
Notes:
Funds generally were reimbursed in the fiscal year following the year
in which the funds were transferred. In this table, however, we listed
reimbursements in the year in which the funds were transferred.
Funds listed are in 2003 dollars.
[A] Other appropriations include the forest land enhancement, brush
disposal, timber salvage sale, forest restoration and improvements, and
recreation fee demonstration programs.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Summary of Funds Made Available for Transfers, by Forest
Service Region:
These tables include information on funds made available for transfers,
by Forest Service region. Table 6 summarizes information on funds made
available for transfers by region for each year from 1999 through 2003.
Table 7 summarizes information on funds made available for transfers by
major Forest Service program and by region, aggregated over the 5-year
period. Table 8 summarizes information on funds made available for
transfers as a percentage of overall budget authority for each Forest
Service region and by major program for 2002.
Table 6: Funds Made Available for Transfers to Wildfire Suppression, by
Forest Service Washington Office and Regions, 1999 through 2003:
Dollars in thousands.
Forest Service[A]:
Washington Office[B];
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $292,156;
Year: 2001: $118,046;
Year: 2002: $531,347;
Year: 2003: $489,265;
Total: $1,430,814.
Region 1;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $1,150;
Year: 2002: $56,692;
Year: 2003: $13,495;
Total: 71,337.
Region 2;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $3,103;
Year: 2002: $28,994;
Year: 2003: $14,005;
Total: $46,102.
Region 3;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $2,374;
Year: 2002: $56,051;
Year: 2003: $15,369;
Total: $73,794.
Region 4;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $0;
Year: 2002: $50,632;
Year: 2003: $17,295;
Total: $67,927.
Region 5;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $8,627;
Year: 2002: $60,441;
Year: 2003: $25,372;
Total: $94,440.
Region 6;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $8,975;
Year: 2002: $52,664;
Year: 2003: $31,874;
Total: $93,512.
Region 8;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $9,345;
Year: 2002: $40,761;
Year: 2003: $40,754;
Total: $90,860.
Region 9;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $5,181;
Year: 2002: $40,213;
Year: 2003: $11,606;
Total: $57,000.
Region 10;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $3,381;
Year: 2002: $24,743;
Year: 2003: $13,371;
Total: $41,495.
Labs and research units[C];
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $0;
Year: 2001: $6,346;
Year: 2002: $88,944;
Year: 2003: $31,630;
Total: $126,920.
Total;
Year: 1999: $0;
Year: 2000: $292,156;
Year: 2001: $166,529;
Year: 2002: $1,031,481;
Year: 2003: $704,035;
Total: $2,194,202.
Sources: Forest Service and Interior financial data.
Notes:
Funds listed are in 2003 dollars.
Forest Service regions made available slightly more funds than were
actually used for fire suppression. The data for each region reflect
the funds the regions made available for transfers. The funds that were
made available for transfers, but not used for wildfire suppression,
were kept in the wildfire suppression account and carried over into the
following fiscal year.
[A] There is no region 7 in the Forest Service.
[B] Transfers from the Washington Office come from programs such as the
K-V Fund and land acquisition, whose funds are managed initially at the
Washington Office.
[C] Funds also were made available from research units and labs, such
as the north central forest experiment station and the northeastern
forest experiment station, the pacific northwest, pacific southwest,
rocky mountain, and southern research stations;
the forest products laboratory;
the international institute for tropical forestry;
and the northeastern area state and private forestry.
[End of table]
Table 7: Funds Made Available for Transfers to Wildfire Suppression, by
Forest Service Region and Program, 1999 through 2003:
Dollars in thousands.
Forest Service:
Washington Office;
K-V Fund: $639,625;
Capital improvements and maintenance: $6,651;
National forest system: $62,708;
Land acquisition: $242,664;
Working Capital Fund: $169,306;
State and private forestry: $10,393;
Wildland fire management: $10,215;
Forest range research: $1,293;
Other[A]: $287,959;
Total: $1,430,814.
Region 1;
K-V Fund: $0;
Capital improvements and maintenance: $15,387;
National forest system: $40,086;
Land acquisition: $114;
Working Capital Fund: $0;
State and private forestry: $3,733;
Wildland fire management: $12,011;
Forest range research: $5;
Other[A]: $0;
Total: $71,337.
Region 2;
K-V Fund: $0;
Capital improvements and maintenance: $19,327;
National forest system: $18,182;
Land acquisition: $299;
Working Capital Fund: $0;
State and private forestry: $2,429;
Wildland fire management: $5,852;
Forest range research: $13;
Other[A]: $0;
Total: $46,102.
Region 3;
K-V Fund: $0;
Capital improvements and maintenance: $21,251;
National forest system: $28,054;
Land acquisition: $0;
Working Capital Fund: $0;
State and private forestry: $5,042;
Wildland fire management: $19,427;
Forest range research: $20;
Other[A]: $0;
Total: $73,794.
Region 4;
K-V Fund: $0;
Capital improvements and maintenance: $19,472;
National forest system: $37,239;
Land acquisition: $46;
Working Capital Fund: $0;
State and private forestry: $4,680;
Wildland fire management: $6,379;
Forest range research: $112;
Other[A]: $0;
Total: $67,927.
Region 5;
K-V Fund: $0;
Capital improvements and maintenance: $43,212;
National forest system: $24,302;
Land acquisition: $27;
Working Capital Fund: $0;
State and private forestry: $8,323;
Wildland fire management: $18,576;
Forest range research: $0;
Other[A]: $0;
Total: $94,440.
Region 6;
K-V Fund: $0;
Capital improvements and maintenance: $56,686;
National forest system: $17,843;
Land acquisition: $76;
Working Capital Fund: $0;
State and private forestry: $9,281;
Wildland fire management: $9,621;
Forest range research: $5;
Other[A]: $0;
Total: $93,512.
Region 8;
K-V Fund: $0;
Capital improvements and maintenance: $59,575;
National forest system: $16,371;
Land acquisition: $2,114;
Working Capital Fund: $0;
State and private forestry: $11,667;
Wildland fire management: $1,118;
Forest range research: $15;
Other[A]: $0;
Total: $90,860.
Region 9;
K-V Fund: $0;
Capital improvements and maintenance: $33,079;
National forest system: $19,998;
Land acquisition: $0;
Working Capital Fund: $0;
State and private forestry: $173;
Wildland fire management: $3,751;
Forest range research: $0;
Other[A]: $0;
Total: $57,000.
Region 10;
K-V Fund: $0;
Capital improvements and maintenance: $18,552;
National forest system: $17,507;
Land acquisition: $0;
Working Capital Fund: $0;
State and private forestry: $4,671;
Wildland fire management: $746;
Forest range research: $19;
Other[A]: $0;
Total: $41,495.
Labs, research stations, and other units[B];
K-V Fund: $0;
Capital improvements and maintenance: $34,127;
National forest system: $4,654;
Land acquisition: $0;
Working Capital Fund: $0;
State and private forestry: $53,841;
Wildland fire management: $1,886;
Forest range research: $32,411;
Other[A]: $0;
Total: $126,920.
Total;
K-V Fund: $639,625;
Capital improvements and maintenance: $327,319;
National forest system: $286,943;
Land acquisition: $245,340;
Working Capital Fund: $169,306;
State and private forestry: $114,232;
Wildland fire management: $89,583;
Forest range research: $33,894;
Other[A]: $287,959;
Total: $2,194,202.
Source: Forest Service financial data.
Note: Funds are listed in 2003 dollars.
[A] Other appropriations include the forest land enhancement, brush
disposal, timber salvage sale, forest restoration and improvements, and
recreation fee demonstration programs.
[B] Funds also were made available from research units and labs, such
as the north central forest experiment station and the northeastern
forest experiment station, the pacific northwest, pacific southwest,
rocky mountain, and southern research stations;
the forest products laboratory;
the international institute for tropical forestry;
and the northeastern area state and private forestry.
[End of table]
Table 8: Transfers to Wildfire Suppression, by Forest Service
Washington Office and Regions, as a Percentage of Total Budget
Authority, 2002:
Forest Service: Washington Office;
K-V Fund: 37.9%;
Capital improvements and maintenance: 24.2%;
National forest system: 9.8%;
Land acquisition: 52.6%;
Working Capital Fund: 71.5%;
State and private forestry: 18.8%;
Wildland fire management: 5.5%;
Forest range research: 7.8%;
Other: 35.9%;
Total: 18.1%.
Forest Service: Region 1;
K-V Fund: 0%;
Capital improvements and maintenance: 15.7%;
National forest system: 19.6%;
Land acquisition: 6.8%;
Working Capital Fund: 0%;
State and private forestry: 11.4%;
Wildland fire management: 14.2%;
Forest range research: 6.4%;
Other: 0%;
Total: 15.0%.
Forest Service: Region 2;
K-V Fund: 0%;
Capital improvements and maintenance: 18.7%;
National forest system: 8.5%;
Land acquisition: 6.7%;
Working Capital Fund: 0%;
State and private forestry: 10.0%;
Wildland fire management: 10.3%;
Forest range research: 93.3%;
Other: 0%;
Total: 10.9%.
Forest Service: Region 3;
K-V Fund: 0%;
Capital improvements and maintenance: 21.1%;
National forest system: 16.5%;
Land acquisition: 0%;
Working Capital Fund: 0%;
State and private forestry: 27.1%;
Wildland fire management: 15.9%;
Forest range research: 96.3%;
Other: 0%;
Total: 16.7%.
Forest Service: Region 4;
K-V Fund: 0%;
Capital improvements and maintenance: 20.9%;
National forest system: 16.7%;
Land acquisition: 1.1%;
Working Capital Fund: 0%;
State and private forestry: 24.7%;
Wildland fire management: 7.6%;
Forest range research: 95.7%;
Other: 0%;
Total: 13.7%.
Forest Service: Region 5;
K-V Fund: 0%;
Capital improvements and maintenance: 24.1%;
National forest system: 8.5%;
Land acquisition: 0.1%;
Working Capital Fund: 0%;
State and private forestry: 19.3%;
Wildland fire management: 6.7%;
Forest range research: 0%;
Other: 0%;
Total: 8.9%.
Forest Service: Region 6;
K-V Fund: 0%;
Capital improvements and maintenance: 45.4%;
National forest system: 5.5%;
Land acquisition: 0.3%;
Working Capital Fund: 0%;
State and private forestry: 30.3%;
Wildland fire management: 44.9%;
Forest range research: 93.7%;
Other: 0%;
Total: 16.5%.
Forest Service: Region 8;
K-V Fund: 0%;
Capital improvements and maintenance: 22.9%;
National forest system: 6.7%;
Land acquisition: 12.5%;
Working Capital Fund: 0%;
State and private forestry: 7.2%;
Wildland fire management: 3.5%;
Forest range research: 16.9%;
Other: 0%;
Total: 9.5%.
Forest Service: Region 9;
K-V Fund: 0%;
Capital improvements and maintenance: 36.1%;
National forest system: 11.3%;
Land acquisition: 0%;
Working Capital Fund: 0%;
State and private forestry: 0%;
Wildland fire management: 11.1%;
Forest range research: 0%;
Other: 0%;
Total: 13.3%.
Forest Service: Region 10;
K-V Fund: 0%;
Capital improvements and maintenance: 19.5%;
National forest system: 13.1%;
Land acquisition: 0%;
Working Capital Fund: 0%;
State and private forestry: 17.4%;
Wildland fire management: 18.4%;
Forest range research: 100%;
Other: 0%;
Total: 15.5%.
Source: GAO analysis of Forest Service financial data.
Note: Total budget authority includes the allocation for the current
year plus carryover from the previous fiscal year.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Agriculture:
United States Department of Agriculture:
Forest Service
Washington Office:
14TH & Independence SW
P.O. Box 96090
Washington, DC 20090-6090:
File Code: 1310/5130
Date: MAY 18 2004:
Mr. Barry T. Hill:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
U.S. General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Hill:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) draft report,"Wildfire Suppression: Funding
Transfers Cause Project Cancellations, Strained Relationships, and
Management Disruptions (GAO-04-612)." The Agency generally concurs with
the findings and recommendations presented in the report. The enclosed
comments are intended to clarify a few areas of the report.
If you have any questions, please contact Sandy Coleman, Agency Audit
Liaison, at (703) 605-4940.
Sincerely,
Signed for
Dale N. Bosworth:
Chief:
Enclosure:
cc: Sandra Cantler, Hank Kashdan, Ted Beauvais:
Forest Service Comments on GAO Audit Report,"Funding Transfers Cause
Project Cancellations, Strained Relationships, and Management
Disruptions (GAO-04612)"
General Comments:
1. The Forest Service agrees that improving fire suppression cost
estimates would be beneficial in terms of both budget planning and
reducing the impacts on other important Agency programs. However,
ultimately the best strategy for reducing the impacts on other programs
is to reduce fire suppression costs through continued aggressive fuel
reduction activities and maintaining a strong initial attack force.
2. While GAO's report adequately portrays the negative impacts funding
transfers have on the programs that the money is taken from, it does
not address the potential consequences associated with not making these
transfers. The negative impacts could include: (1) not having adequate
personnel or equipment to address the fires as they occur, (2) an
increase in the number of acres burned, and (3) an increase in the loss
of homes and other property-all of which could lead to a further
increase in suppression expenditures. Additional impacts could include
a decrease in fire-fighter safety and long-term economic consequences
to rural communities.
Specific comments:
Page 3, 1st paragraph: Change"single reforestation program" to"single
reforestation/timber sale area restoration trust fund." The K-V fund
is more than just reforestation.
Page 4: The discussion hints that there were"program deficits" which
is true but can be misleading. External parties would be inclined to
criticize the Agency as a result of this discussion. The Forest Service
concurs with GAO that specific Unit deficits occurred; however, a
deficit did not occur at the Agency-level. The discussion should note
that"no violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act occurred."
Page 9, top of the page: Although no formal assessments have been
performed, the Agency is implementing a new model in an effort to
improve forecasting. This should be acknowledged in the report.
Page 12, 1st paragraph: Add"Forest Legacy" to the sentence as follows:
"...such as community assistance and Forest Legacy project
grants..." This acknowledges the program in the report and gives credit
for restoring those funds.
Page 25, 1ST paragraph, last sentence: Change the sentence to read,"As
of April 2004, the Forest Service will not be able to continue the
program unless Congress appropriates funds for FY 2005 or subsequent
years of the authorization period"
Page 26, 1st paragraph: The paragraph discusses insufficient funds in
the K-V Fund. However, due to fire repayments and reconciliations,
there is sufficient cash to fully implement the planned FY 2004 and FY
2005 programs of work. These repayments and reconciliations had not
occurred when GAO performed their field work. The paragraph should be
replaced as follows:
Funding transfers have left the Forest Service with insufficient funds
to pay for all of the K-V projects it planned at the time the funds
were collected Over the past S years, about $640 million has been
transferred from the K-V fund for wildfire suppression, while only $540
million has been reimbursed Moreover, transfers have been made from the
K-V fund for decades with only partial reimbursement. Since the mid-
1980s, about $2.3 billion has been transferred from the K-V fund and
only $1.9 billion has been reimbursed While there has always been
sufficient cash in the K-V fund to fully implement the planned K-V
program of work in any given year, faced with unpredictable information
about funding transfers and reimbursements, it has been difficult for
the Forest Service to reliably estimate how much will be deposited into
and withdrawn from the K-V fund and therefore to effectively manage the
fund and the program it supports.
Page 29: The discussion hints that there were"program deficits" which
is true but can be misleading. As a result of this discussion, many
external parties would be inclined to criticize the Agency. The Forest
Service concurs with GAO that specific Unit deficits occurred; however,
a deficit did not occur at the Agency level. Footnote #15 is not
sufficient. The discussion (and footnote) should note that"no
violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act occurred."
Page 33, bottom of page: The paragraph states that"Agency officials
... believe the 10-year average is the best available method for
estimating wildfire suppression costs." In fact, Agency officials have
recognized the weaknesses associated with using the 10-year average for
some time and have looked into other methods that could more accurately
predict future suppression costs. Proposals have included continued use
of the 10-year average, using a 5-year average or inflating the
historical costs to current dollar values to more accurately predict
future suppression costs. In addition, Agency officials have also
discussed various modeling methods with researchers who have said that
they can design a model that would be more accurate than the 10-year
average. However, this would require developing a very expensive,
complex model.
Page 47, Appendix II, Table 4: Change"LW&CF' to"L&WCF (Land and Water
Conservation Fund)."
Page 47, Appendix II, Table 4, footnote 21: Change `federal land
enhancement" to"Forest Land Enhancement."
Page 50, Appendix III, Table 6, footnote 27: Include in the list
"Northeastern Area State and Private Forestry."
Page 51, Appendix III, Table 7, footnote 31: Include in the list
"Northeastern Area State and Private Forestry," considering they are
the major source of State and Private Forestry funds for the $53.841
million.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of the Interior:
United States Department of the Interior:
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY:
POLICY, MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, DC 20240:
MAY 12 2004:
Barry T. Hill, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
United States General Accounting Office:
441 G Street, N. W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Director Hill:
Thank you for giving us the opportunity to review the draft report,
Wildfire Suppression: Funding Transfers Cause Project Cancellations,
Strained Relationships, and Management Disruptions (GAO-04-612). The
report is well-researched and well-prepared and appropriately focuses
on the impacts to agency programs resulting from the transfers of funds
to pay for wildfire suppression activities. We agree with the
fundamental premise of the report that there are multiple negative
impacts that result from moving funds from approved projects and
purposes to emergency wildland fire response. The report also correctly
notes that predicting wildland fire suppression costs is inherently
difficult because of the unpredictable nature of wildfires.
The Department of the Interior does not dispute the findings of the GAO
study. However in summarizing these impacts, careful attention should
be given to distinguishing between the Department of the Interior and
the U.S. Forest Service to avoid giving the impression that the methods
of borrowing funds for fire suppression, and the resulting impacts to
non-fire programs, are the same for both agencies. The subtle caveats
and distinctions buried in the report may be insufficient to dispel
more prominent and blanket statements made at other places in the
report. For example, at the bottom of page three in the Results in
Brief section of the report, GAO states: "Both agencies cancelled and
delayed contracts, grants, and other activities for projects involving,
among other things, fuels reduction, construction, land acquisition,
and resource management." The Department of the Interior has limited
its fire borrowings to construction and land acquisition accounts and
relatively small amounts from within the Wildland Fire Management
account. It has not borrowed from resource management or other
operating accounts that would disrupt or impede on-the-ground
activities such as park and refuge operations, resource protection, or
BIA school operations. Similarly, the clarification on page six of the
report that Interior transferred funds "primarily" from two programs,
construction and land acquisition, is incorrect. The Department
transferred funds only from these accounts. Even when Interior has
shifted funds within the Wildland Fire Management account to
suppression, most of these funds have been redirected from the fire
facilities and maintenance budget, which like the other Interior
construction accounts, has significant carryover balances.
As noted in the report, the inherent uncertainty of predicting fire
costs has been problematic during the fire season. To compensate for
this uncertainty, the Department deliberately borrows funds in
conservative increments to avoid excessive borrowing that could be more
disruptive to the construction and land acquisition programs.
Incremental borrowing, considered alone, should not be interpreted as
evidence of poor forecasting.
One of the major recommendations in the report is that the agencies
"Improve their methods for estimating annual wildfire suppression costs
by more effectively accounting for annual changes in costs and the
uncertainties associated with wildfires in making estimates, so that
funding needs for wildfire suppression can be predicted with greater
accuracy..." The Department concurs with GAO that the program's methods
for forecasting suppression costs during the course of the fire season
are not highly accurate in predicting future fire activity and
suppression costs. In recognition of this, Interior has contracted with
the Forest Service's Intermountain Research Station to develop a new
statistical forecasting system designed to improve the agency's ability
to predict the potential costs for suppression operations each year.
The model will consider historical costs and fire season severity,
comparing the predicted fire season conditions with those of the past.
It will then project probabilities for costs for the approaching fire
season. The model data will be updated with the actual occurrences as
the season progresses, improving the reliability of the projections. It
will be used for the first time during the 2004 western fire season.
The GAO recommends that alternative methods should be considered for
improving the annual suppression cost estimates that are used in
formulating agency budget requests and Congressional appropriations.
The Department recognizes that predicting future fire activity and
suppression costs is inherently difficult. Given these uncertainties,
the Department believes that the use of the 10-year suppression cost
average has proved to be a reasonable and durable basis for suppression
budgeting. Although suppression costs have exceeded the 10-year average
in the past several fire seasons, looking back historically there have
been years in which suppression costs were below the average. For
example, during the four fire seasons from 1995 to 1998 costs were
below the average in three seasons.
Our final comment is in response to the suggestion that a government-
wide reserve account might see an increase in spending for one agency
offset by a lower than usual spending by another agency. In recent
years, the costs for both agencies have tended to move in tandem. As
most of the suppression costs are incurred in a relatively small
percentage of large fires each year, the costs are borne by all of the
agencies who send firefighters and equipment. As a rule, each agency
helps fight large fires on lands managed by the other. Consequently,
the costs tend to rise and fall proportionately for both. Therefore, it
is unlikely that one agency would be able to offset the costs of the
other.
In closing, I would like to express my appreciation for a balanced and
through examination of the issues surrounding wildland fire
suppression funding. The Department of the Interior will use this
report as a point of reference as we deal with fire management funding
issues in the future.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
P. Lynn Scarlett:
Assistant Secretary:
Policy, Management and Budget:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David P. Bixler (202) 512-7201:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Nathan Anderson, Paul
Bollea, Christine Bonham, Christine Colburn, John Delicath, Timothy
Guinane, and Richard Johnson made key contributions to this report.
(360360):
FOOTNOTES
[1] Unless otherwise noted, all dollars stated are in constant 2003
dollars.
[2] For ease of explanation, in this report we use the word "transfer"
to refer both to transfers and reprogramming of funds by the Forest
Service and Interior. "Transfer" is a legal term referring to the
movement of money between one appropriations account and another and is
prohibited unless specifically authorized by law. "Reprogramming"
refers to the movement of funds between programs within a single
appropriation account and is generally authorized. The Forest Service
and Interior are authorized to transfer funds from other programs to
fund wildfire suppression.
[3] The agencies calculate a simple rolling or moving average by
computing the average annual expenditure over a 10-year period and
updating it each year using expenditures from the most recent 10 years.
Each year's value receives equal weight in the average. The moving
average is generally considered to be a lagging indicator of current
costs.
[4] The Knutson-Vandenberg Act of 1930 (16 U.S.C. 576-576b) established
a special trust fund to collect a portion of timber sale receipts to
pay for reforesting the area from which the timber was cut. The act was
amended in 1976 to allow the Forest Service to use these funds for
other activities, such as creating wildlife habitat or improving
recreation facilities on the sale-area lands. For each timber sale
area, Forest Service officials prepare a plan, usually covering 5
years, detailing the amount of funds they expect to collect and the
reforestation or habitat improvement projects they plan to implement
with those funds. Because the plans cover 5 years of work, there is
typically a large balance in the fund at the end of the fiscal year
that is designated for future projects and that can be transferred for
fire suppression without affecting current-year projects.
[5] In 1999, the agencies did not transfer any funds for wildfire
suppression. According to Forest Service documents, in 1999, the
Congress reimbursed the K-V Fund for $100 million, which were
reimbursements for transfers made prior to 1999. For the purposes of
this report, we list reimbursements in the year that funds were
transferred.
[6] Reimbursements were generally not redistributed in the capital
improvements and maintenance program because most of these projects'
budgets were greater than $250,000 and, by law, cannot be redistributed
by the agency.
[7] According to a Bureau of Land Management official, however, land
acquisition projects for each bureau were reimbursed at the same
percentage.
[8] In the National Park Service's construction program, the service
also reduced the budgets of all projects by about 1.5 percent to help
cover the shortfall between fiscal year 2002 transfers and
reimbursements.
[9] Social costs, such as the effect of project delays on recreational
activities, have not been estimated.
[10] Stewardship contracting involves the use of any of several
contracting authorities that were first authorized for use by the
Forest Service on a pilot basis in 1999. Goals of stewardship contracts
include road and trail maintenance, watershed restoration, and
prescribed burning and thinning to improve forest health.
[11] Although an agency's decision to ignore committee report language
"may expose it to grave political consequences," such language does not
by itself establish legal requirements that agencies must follow. See
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 192-93 (1993).
[12] Although some Forest Service programs within appropriation
accounts were in deficit, the Forest Service did not obligate or expend
money in excess of the total amounts available in its appropriations
accounts, and no violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act occurred.
[13] In addition, regression analysis could be used to develop costs
estimates and upper and lower confidence limits to provide information
on the uncertainty associated with the cost estimates.
[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, Budgeting for Emergencies: State
Practices and Federal Implications, GAO/AIMD-99-250 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 30, 1999), and Budget Issues: Funding Alternatives for Fire-
Fighting Activities at USDA and Interior, GAO/AFMD-91-45 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 4, 1991); and Congressional Budget Office, Budgeting for
Emergency Spending (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 1998).
[15] Of the $500 million, $400 million would be available to the Forest
Service, and $100 million would be available to Interior.
[16] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population. This is because in a nonprobability
sample, some elements of the population being studied have no chance or
an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[17] U.S. General Accounting Office, Budgeting for Emergencies: State
Practices and Federal Implications, GAO/AIMD-99-250 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 30, 1999), and Budget Issues: Funding Alternatives for Fire-
Fighting Activities at USDA and Interior, GAO/AFMD-91-45 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 4, 1991); and Congressional Budget Office, Budgeting for
Emergency Spending (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 1998).
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