Homeland Security
Actions Needed to Better Protect National Icons and Federal Office Buildings from Terrorism Gao ID: GAO-05-790 June 24, 2005The threat of terrorism has made physical security for federal real property assets a major concern. Protecting these assets can be particularly complex and contentious for agencies whose missions include ensuring public access such as the Department of the Interior (Interior) and the General Services Administration (GSA). GAO's objectives were to (1) identify any challenges that Interior faces in protecting national icons and monuments from terrorism, as well as related actions intended to address these challenges; and similarly, (2) determine any challenges GSA faces related to the protection of federal office buildings it owns or leases and actions that have been taken.
Interior faces a range of major challenges in protecting national icons and monuments from terrorism--these include balancing security and public access; addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues; and securing assets in rugged, remote areas. In addition, there was concern among Interior officials about the department's ability to leverage limited resources for security. Since September 11, 2001, Interior has improved security at high-profile sites, created a central security office to oversee its security efforts, developed physical security plans required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, and developed a uniform risk management and ranking methodology. As Interior moves forward, linking the results of its risk rankings to security funding priorities at national icons and monuments is an important next step. Also, given Interior's complex and often contentious environment, setting forth the guiding principles by which the department balances its core mission with security could have benefits. Other organizations have used guiding principles to foster greater transparency in complex environments. GSA also faces a range of major challenges, some similar to Interior's, that include balancing security and public access, addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues, securing federally leased space, and adjusting to the transfer of the Federal Protective Service (FPS) from GSA to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Actions GSA has taken to address the challenges include working to develop security standards for securing leased space and establishing a memorandum of agreement with DHS on security at GSA's facilities. However, despite these actions, GSA lacks a mechanism--such as a chief security officer position or formal point of contact--that could serve in a liaison role with FPS and tenant agencies, work to address the challenges GSA faces related to security at its buildings, and enable GSA to better define its overall role in security given the transfer of FPS to DHS.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-790, Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Better Protect National Icons and Federal Office Buildings from Terrorism
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, House of
Representatives:
June 2005:
Homeland Security:
Actions Needed to Better Protect National Icons and Federal Office
Buildings from Terrorism:
GAO-05-790:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-790, a report to the Chairman, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The threat of terrorism has made physical security for federal real
property assets a major concern. Protecting these assets can be
particularly complex and contentious for agencies whose missions
include ensuring public access such as the Department of the Interior
(Interior) and the General Services Administration (GSA). GAO‘s
objectives were to (1) identify any challenges that Interior faces in
protecting national icons and monuments from terrorism, as well as
related actions intended to address these challenges; and similarly,
(2) determine any challenges GSA faces related to the protection of
federal office buildings it owns or leases and actions that have been
taken.
What GAO Found:
Interior faces a range of major challenges in protecting national icons
and monuments from terrorism”these include balancing security and
public access; addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder
issues; and securing assets in rugged, remote areas. In addition, there
was concern among Interior officials about the department‘s ability to
leverage limited resources for security. Since September 11, 2001,
Interior has improved security at high-profile sites, created a central
security office to oversee its security efforts, developed physical
security plans required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7,
and developed a uniform risk management and ranking methodology. As
Interior moves forward, linking the results of its risk rankings to
security funding priorities at national icons and monuments is an
important next step. Also, given Interior‘s complex and often
contentious environment, setting forth the guiding principles by which
the department balances its core mission with security could have
benefits. Other organizations have used guiding principles to foster
greater transparency in complex environments.
GSA also faces a range of major challenges, some similar to Interior‘s,
that include balancing security and public access, addressing
jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues, securing federally
leased space, and adjusting to the transfer of the Federal Protective
Service (FPS) from GSA to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Actions GSA has taken to address the challenges include working to
develop security standards for securing leased space and establishing a
memorandum of agreement with DHS on security at GSA‘s facilities.
However, despite these actions, GSA lacks a mechanism”such as a chief
security officer position or formal point of contact”that could serve
in a liaison role with FPS and tenant agencies, work to address the
challenges GSA faces related to security at its buildings, and enable
GSA to better define its overall role in security given the transfer of
FPS to DHS.
Examples of Security Measures at National Icons and Federal Buildings:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Interior (1) link the results
of its risk assessments and related risk rankings to its funding
priorities and (2) develop guiding principles for balancing security
initiatives with Interior‘s core mission. Interior did not comment on
our recommendations. GAO also recommends that the Administrator of GSA
establish a mechanism”such as a chief security officer position or
formal point of contact”so it is better equipped to address security-
related matters related to its federal building portfolio. GSA
concurred with the recommendation.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-790.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Mark Goldstein at (202)
512-2834 or GoldsteinM@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Terrorist Threat Poses a Range of Challenges for Interior in Protecting
National Icons and Monuments:
The Threat Against Federal Office Buildings is Significant, and GSA
Faces Various Challenges as the Owner and Landlord of These Assets:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the General Services Administration:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: The Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor:
Figure 2: Security Checkpoint for Liberty Island:
Figure 3: Hoover Dam and Linked Boom Line Used to Enhance Perimeter
Security:
Figure 4: Security Checkpoint on the Arizona Side of Hoover Dam:
Figure 5: Independence Hall in Philadelphia:
Figure 6: Vehicle Traffic in Front of Independence Hall and Park
Service Staff Allowing Visitors to Cross Chestnut Street:
Figure 7: Jersey Barriers and Fencing on the East Side of the Lincoln
Memorial:
Figure 8: Jersey Barriers and Snow Fencing at the Jefferson Memorial:
Figure 9: Security Camera near the Amphitheatre at Mt. Rushmore:
Figure 10: Rugged Terrain Surrounding Mt. Rushmore:
Figure 11: Bollards in Front of a Federal Building in New York:
Abbreviations:
BOR: Bureau of Reclamation:
CFA: U.S. Commission on Fine Arts:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
EIS: Environmental Impact Statement:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FPS: Federal Protective Service:
FSRM: Federal Security Risk Management:
GSA: General Services Administration:
HSPD-7: Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 7:
ICE: Immigrations and Customs Enforcement:
IG: Inspector General:
IMBARC: Independence Mall Business and Residents Coalition:
Interior: Department of the Interior:
INHP: Independence National Historical Park:
ISC: Interagency Security Committee:
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding:
NCPC: National Capital Planning Commission:
NHPA: National Historic Preservation Act:
NPS: National Park Service:
NPCA: National Parks Conservation Association:
NYPD: New York Police Department:
OLES: Office of Law Enforcement and Security:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
Park Service: National Park Service:
Park Police: U.S. Park Police:
SEPTA: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority:
SHPO: State Historic Preservation Officer:
SSA: sector-specific agency:
USMS: U.S. Marshals Service:
Letter June 24, 2005:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman, Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City and the September 11, 2001, attacks, federal agencies
have devoted significant resources and attention to the physical
security of their real property assets. Protecting federal real
property assets can be particularly complex and contentious for
agencies whose missions include ensuring public access to their assets,
including the Department of the Interior (Interior) and the General
Services Administration (GSA). Interior and its eight bureaus are
charged with protecting the nation's natural, historic, and cultural
treasures, including thousands of facilities. GSA houses agencies in
over 8,000 owned and leased facilities that contain roughly 338 million
square feet. These facilities are used by over a million federal
employees and contractors and are visited by citizens receiving
services from, and conducting business with, the federal government.
In November 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created
to bring a central focus to the government's efforts to prevent and
respond to terrorist threats, including threats to its physical
infrastructure. DHS, through its Federal Protective Service (FPS), is
directly responsible for law enforcement and related security functions
at GSA facilities and also provides policy leadership on facility
protection issues to other agencies, including Interior. Although law
enforcement and related security functions were transferred from GSA to
DHS when FPS transferred to DHS, GSA officials said that it still
assists FPS and tenant agencies with facility security, implements
various security measures that FPS recommends, and incorporates
enhanced security measures into new space it constructs or leases.
Our objectives were to (1) identify any challenges that Interior faces
in protecting national icons and monuments from terrorism, as well as
related actions intended to address these challenges; and similarly,
(2) determine any challenges GSA faces related to the protection of
office buildings it owns or leases and the actions that have been
taken. To do this work, we interviewed officials from Interior,
including officials at the department level, the National Park Service
(Park Service), U.S. Park Police (Park Police), and the Bureau of
Reclamation (BOR); GSA; and DHS, including FPS. We also interviewed
other agencies and organizations that have an interest in security
issues, including the National Capital Planning Commission and the
National Parks Conservation Association. We also reviewed pertinent
documents and policies that we obtained from these agencies and related
laws and directives. Our work included visiting sites that Interior and
GSA identified as particularly illustrative of the challenges they face
and how they are trying to address them. Additional information about
our methodology and the sites we visited, along with a complete
description of the organizations we interviewed, appears at the end of
this report. We conducted our work between January 2004 and March 2005
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Separately, we issued a "For Official Use Only" report detailing the
results of our review. This version of the report, for public release,
provides a general summary of the challenges identified and our
recommendations to help Interior and GSA enhance their protection of
national icons and federal office buildings from terrorism. (The "For
Official Use Only" report provided technical details to assist Interior
and GSA in their efforts.)
Results in Brief:
Interior faces a range of major challenges in protecting national icons
and monuments from terrorism. First, there is an inherent conflict
between physical security initiatives and Interior's mission to provide
access to, and education about, the nation's natural and cultural
heritage. Striking a balance between protecting its assets from
terrorism and maintaining public access is a new role for Interior,
which has historically focused mainly on its preservation and education
mission. Second, jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder
interests are another challenge. Pursuing security improvements that
Interior believes are needed often puts the department at odds with
other entities--such as planning commissions, private foundations, and
local governments--that have jurisdiction over, or input regarding,
physical enhancements. Third, some icons and monuments are in rugged,
remote locations and, therefore, pose additional challenges related to
securing perimeters and ensuring an adequate response in the event of
an attack. Lastly, leveraging limited resources is an ongoing
challenge. Interior officials responsible for security at the
individual icons and monuments were concerned about whether the
department will have a sustained level of staff and funding resources
for security initiatives. Effectively addressing these challenges is
vital for Interior because highly visible assets such as the Washington
Monument and Mt. Rushmore National Memorial (Mt. Rushmore) could be
targeted for symbolic reasons and for the purpose of harming people.
Information from Interior shows that these and other assets are
vulnerable to attack in a variety of ways.
In addition to security improvements Interior has made at individual
locations, several broader actions have been taken that are intended to
address the department's challenges and improve its security program
overall. These security improvements are as follows:
* The administration has identified goals for overcoming challenges and
vulnerabilities unique to national icons and monuments as part of its
national strategy for homeland security.
* Interior has developed physical security plans in response to
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). This directive
establishes a national policy for prioritizing the protection of
critical infrastructure and requires all departments and agencies to
develop physical and cyber security plans for the assets they own. In
addition, the directive designates Interior as a sector-specific agency
(SSA) for the national icons and monuments sector--SSAs are responsible
for coordinating protection in their respective sectors across all
levels of government and the private sector.
* To centrally manage Interior's security initiatives and address its
challenges, the department established a central coordination and
oversight office for homeland security-related activities. This office-
-the Office of Law Enforcement and Security (OLES)--has worked within
Interior to identify assets that are likely targets, conduct risk
assessments using a number of external experts, and coordinate efforts
by Interior's bureaus to enhance security at individual locations.
* Interior has developed a uniform risk assessment methodology that it
has used to generate risk rankings for high-profile national icons and
monuments.
Overall, these efforts have been positive steps. As Interior moves
forward, linking the results of its risk assessments and related risk
rankings to security funding priorities at national icons and monuments
is an important next step that we are recommending. This should allow
for well-informed decisions by stakeholders--such as Interior, OMB, and
Congress--about where to direct resources so that they have an optimal
return on investment in terms of better protection. Furthermore, given
Interior's complex and often contentious environment, setting forth the
guiding principles by which the department balances its core mission
with security--which we are also recommending--could have benefits.
Guiding principles have been used by other organizations to foster
greater transparency and thus allow stakeholders to better understand
the basis for decisions. By identifying and conveying the principles it
follows for making security-related decisions, Interior could be better
positioned to achieve additional transparency and more mutually
acceptable outcomes with its stakeholders. Interior did not comment on
our recommendations.
GSA also faces a range of major challenges--some similar to those
facing Interior--related to security at buildings it owns or leases.
First, federal buildings are where the government and the public
transact business, and striking a balance between security and public
access is an ongoing challenge. This challenge is of particular concern
with federally leased space, where the government does not have
complete control over building access. Second, GSA faces challenges in
addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder interests,
particularly in urban areas where local governments and others have a
role in the type of security that is employed. Finally, the transfer of
FPS to DHS has presented a major challenge for GSA. In addition to no
longer having direct control over security services in its buildings,
GSA officials were concerned about their ability to track security
expenditures and stay informed about FPS protection activities in GSA
buildings. In general, GSA officials said that GSA is still trying to
define its overall role in security given the transfer of FPS.
Addressing these challenges is critical because the terrorist threat
against federal office buildings is significant. The Oklahoma City
bombing and September 11 attacks demonstrated that terrorists possess
the capabilities to destroy these types of assets. In the post-
September 11 era, warnings from DHS have shown that there is still a
concern regarding the threat that terrorists will use methods such as
truck bombs to destroy office buildings. GSA owns many federal office
buildings, on which an attack could seriously disrupt the business of
government and harm federal employees and the public.
To address the challenges associated with protecting federal office
buildings, a number of actions have been taken. GSA has continued with
the implementation of security enhancements to buildings in its
inventory that it began after the Oklahoma City bombing--these
enhancements are designed, in part, to achieve a balance between
security and access. GSA has worked with the Interagency Security
Committee (ISC) to develop security design criteria for newly
constructed office buildings and security standards for addressing
challenges associated with federally leased space. Established after
the Oklahoma City bombing, ISC has a range of governmentwide
responsibilities related to protecting nonmilitary facilities and has
representation from all the major property-holding agencies. The
administration has also identified the challenge of protecting federal
office buildings as a top priority in the critical infrastructure area.
In addition, ISC is responsible for coordinating agencies' building
security efforts. The transfer of FPS to DHS--though a challenge for
GSA--was intended to improve law enforcement and related functions by
centralizing building security activities with other homeland security
functions. A March 2003 operational memorandum of agreement between GSA
and DHS made FPS responsible for the same types of security services
that FPS provided for GSA properties prior to the transfer to DHS.
These include performing risk assessments, managing the installation of
some security equipment, conducting criminal investigations, and
managing the contract guard program. These actions are all steps in the
right direction. However, despite the range of challenges GSA faces, it
lacks a mechanism--such as a chief security officer position or formal
point of contact--to coordinate homeland security efforts at its
buildings with FPS and tenant agencies. The officer/official in such a
position, which we are recommending, could serve in a liaison role with
FPS and tenant agencies, work to address the challenges GSA faces
related to security in buildings it owns and leases, and enable GSA to
better define its overall role in security given the transfer of FPS to
DHS. Having such a position is recognized in the security community as
essential in organizations that own and operate large numbers of
mission-critical facilities. GSA concurred with this recommendation.
Background:
Interior is responsible for the safety of 70,000 employees and 200,000
volunteers, 1.3 million daily visitors, and over 507 million acres of
public lands that include a number of sites of historical or national
significance (national monuments and icons), and the security of dams
and reservoirs. The Park Service's mission is the unimpaired
preservation of the natural and cultural resources and values of the
national park system for the enjoyment, education, and inspiration of
current and future generations. According to Interior officials, the
Park Service cooperates with various partners to extend the benefits of
natural and cultural resource conservation and outdoor recreation
throughout this country and the world. Within Interior, the Park
Service is responsible for managing and protecting some of the nation's
most treasured icons, including the Washington Monument, the Lincoln
and Jefferson Memorials, the Statue of Liberty, Independence Hall and
the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia, and Mt. Rushmore in South Dakota. The
Park Service welcomes 428 million visitors to its 388 national park
units each year throughout the United States, American Samoa, Guam,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
The Park Police provides security and law enforcement services to Park
Service monuments and memorials in the District of Columbia, New York
City, and in conjunction with Park Service rangers in San Francisco.
Park superintendents and rangers manage and provide security and law
enforcement services at the other parks throughout the United States in
conjunction with their other duties. These other duties include
management of public use, dissemination of scientific and historical
information, and protection and management of natural and cultural
resources.
Among Interior's other bureaus, BOR has an important role in protecting
critical infrastructure because of its responsibilities related to
dams. BOR's core mission is to manage, develop, and protect water and
related resources in an environmentally and economically sound manner.
It is the largest wholesale water supplier in the nation, delivering 10
trillion gallons of water to over 30 million people each year.
According to information from BOR, it manages 471 dams, making it the
nation's second largest producer of hydropower; the dams generate
approximately 42 billion kilowatt hours each year. BOR, among other
things, is responsible for managing and protecting well-known assets,
such as Hoover Dam in Arizona and Nevada.
While Interior is responsible for protecting icons, monuments, and
dams, GSA serves as the federal government's landlord and designs,
builds, and manages facilities to support the needs of other federal
agencies throughout all three branches of government. GSA is
responsible for managing over 8,000 owned and leased buildings that
comprise roughly 3 billion square feet of building floor area. FPS was
created in 1971 to provide security services and law enforcement to GSA-
owned facilities across the United States. FPS has the authority to,
among other things; enforce laws and regulations that protect federal
property, and persons on such property, and conduct investigations. As
a result of the Homeland Security Act, 22 agencies-
-including FPS--were centralized under DHS, and FPS retained its role
related to law enforcement and security at GSA buildings. In accordance
with the act, the transfer of FPS from GSA to DHS became effective on
March 1, 2003. GSA officials said that GSA still assists FPS and tenant
agencies with facility security, implements various security measures
that FPS recommends, and incorporates enhanced security measures into
new space it constructs or leases. Within DHS, FPS fell under the
authority of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which,
according to DHS, is its largest investigative arm. DHS also chairs
ISC, which has representation from all the major property-holding
agencies and was established after the Oklahoma City bombing. ISC has a
range of governmentwide responsibilities related to protecting
nonmilitary facilities. In July 2004, we reported on issues related to
the transfer of FPS from GSA to DHS; and in November 2004, we reported
on progress ISC has made and key practices in facility
protection.[Footnote 1]
Terrorist Threat Poses a Range of Challenges for Interior in Protecting
National Icons and Monuments:
The September 11 attacks demonstrated the nation's vulnerability to the
threat posed by formidable, well-organized terrorists. As evidenced by
the attacks, the terrorists are sophisticated, relentless, and patient
in their planning and execution. This new type of threat represents a
shift from historical assumptions about national security, where the
military, foreign policy establishment, and intelligence community are
responsible for protecting the nation, to a new paradigm where others-
-such as Interior, state and local governments, and the private sector-
-also have a role in homeland security. National icons and monuments
represent the nation's heritage, tradition, values, and political
power. Among Interior assets that could logically be categorized as
potential symbolic targets are national icons and monuments such as Mt.
Rushmore and the Washington Monument. Destroying these icons would
likely have a profound effect on the nation's morale. In addition,
Interior's portfolio includes assets that are part of the nation's
critical infrastructure, such as the 471 dams it operates that provide
hydropower to Western states. Information from Interior shows that
these assets are vulnerable to attack in a variety of ways and that
Interior faces a range of challenges to improving protection. These
challenges include the inherent conflict between security and public
access, jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder issues
regarding such matters as access and oversight of enhancements, the
effect that the rugged and remote location of some assets has on
perimeter security, and the ability to leverage available resources to
address vulnerabilities by implementing security enhancements.
Balancing Security with Public Access at Icons and Monuments Is a Major
Challenge:
Interior officials and staff at the icons and monuments we visited
acknowledged, and the Interior Inspector General (IG) has reported,
that balancing security with access is a major challenge facing the
department. Implementing appropriate physical protection measures can
be a challenge because such measures often run counter to societal
values that associate access to icons and monuments with living in a
free society. And, the core missions of some of the Interior's
agencies--including the Park Service--reflect a high level of public
accessibility and interaction. As reported by the Interior IG and
discussed by Interior officials we interviewed, the organizational
challenge of shifting to a homeland security focus in a culture rooted
in preservation and education is also significant.[Footnote 2] Overall,
the challenge of balancing protection against terrorism with public
access is formidable and transcends other challenges Interior faces,
including jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder interests.
Security versus Access: The Statue of Liberty:
The Park Service's efforts to balance security with access at the
Statue of Liberty demonstrate this challenge. The Statue of Liberty is
one of the nation's most treasured sites and is an international symbol
of American values. Located on 12-acre Liberty Island in New York
Harbor, the Statue of Liberty was a gift of international friendship
from the people of France to the people of the United States and is one
of the most universal symbols of political freedom and democracy. It is
a popular tourist attraction for visitors from around the world. In
fiscal year 2003, over 3.2 million people visited the Statue. Park
Service management of the Statue of Liberty and Liberty Island also
includes Ellis Island and its facilities. The Statue consists of three
sections: the Statue, the pedestal, and a base known as Fort Wood. The
Park Service and Park Police oversee the monument's security program,
including operation of screening facilities housed at Battery Park in
Lower Manhattan in New York and Liberty State Park in New Jersey. Park
Service and Park Police officials consider these locations, plus
Governor's Island, part of a 5-point security perimeter that they
monitor within New York Harbor. Figure 1 shows the Statue of Liberty,
which is surrounded by New York Harbor.
Figure 1: The Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Due to concerns about additional terrorist attacks, the Park Service
closed Liberty Island and the Statue of Liberty immediately following
September 11. The Park Service reopened Liberty Island in December 2001
but refrained from allowing access to the Statue until additional
security and fire safety assessments could be done. These assessments
identified a number of steps that needed to be taken before visitors
could be allowed back into the Statue. In addition, the primary threats
included aerial attacks and explosives detonated inside the structure.
In August 2004, the Park Service reopened the Statue to visitors with
access restricted to the top of the pedestal and the exterior
observation deck. The security improvements were primarily aimed at
preventing would-be terrorists from gaining access to the interior of
the Statue and its grounds. Under this revised plan, visitors are able
to tour the Statue of Liberty Museum, see close-up views of the statue
from the promenade, view the inside structural elements of the statue,
and experience a 360-degree panoramic view of New York Harbor from the
observation deck. In addition, the Park Service and Park Police
implemented other improvements, including more rigorous visitor
screening, better explosive detection capabilities, improved fire
safety, and enhanced communications. Park Service officials also noted
that new barriers were installed at the Ellis Island service bridge and
that Park Service and Park Police staffing has been increased since
September 11 to implement the improved security plan. The Park Service
reported in mid-2004 that, to make these improvements, it had invested
$19.6 million and was anticipating an additional $9 million in future
spending. In addition, the Park Service reported that the Statue of
Liberty-Ellis Island Foundation, which is a consortium of private
donors, had partnered with the Park Service to assist with funding a
number of the safety improvements. Figure 2 shows the security
checkpoint for Liberty Island.
Figure 2: Security Checkpoint for Liberty Island:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to Park Service officials, the issue of public access to the
Statue received high visibility and publicity while a new security plan
was being developed. Some of the editorial press from this time
expressed a concern that by closing the Statue, it had "ceded to al
Qaeda." The Mayor of New York was quoted in a newspaper saying that as
long as the Statue is closed, "in some sense, the terrorists have won."
Interior and Park Service officials said that it was difficult to
communicate the rationale for initially prohibiting, then later
limiting, public access to the Statue without revealing the specific
vulnerabilities that led to their decisions. A major reason for
limiting access to the Statue was the need to adhere to building codes
related to fire safety. For example, the Statue did not meet standards
for exits and fire suppression capability. However, Interior and Park
Service officials were also concerned with the security vulnerabilities
of the Statue and the fact that knowledge of these vulnerabilities
could make the Statue an even more attractive target. Although many
security improvements have been implemented at the Statue of Liberty
National Monument and Ellis Island, Park Service officials noted that
several key security challenges remain.
Security versus Access: Hoover Dam:
Hoover Dam in Nevada and Arizona is another icon that presents Interior
with challenges related to public access. Located approximately 38
miles southeast of Las Vegas, Hoover Dam is a national, historical,
hydrological, and structural icon that is part of the nation's critical
infrastructure. Managed by BOR, it receives approximately 1 million
paid visitors every year and provides water and electricity for
millions of people throughout the Southwest. Its 4.4 million cubic
yards of concrete is recognized as a marvel of civil engineering. In
addition, nearly 9 million people visit adjacent Lake Mead every year,
which is the nation's largest man-made lake and is a national
recreational area managed by the Park Service. Hoover generates
electricity for southwestern states through its 17 turbines using water
from Lake Mead. Also, Interstate 93 sits on top of the dam, serving as
the region's main vehicular route across the Colorado River.
According to BOR officials, following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, BOR implemented a range of security enhancements, such as
hiring additional security officers and guards and revising and
canceling some public tours. In addition, BOR is taking steps to
provide a long-term solution for its biggest security concern to
visitors--the proximity of Interstate 93 to large crowds of visitors
who also have access to the top of the dam. Related to security
staffing, BOR nearly doubled the number of federal police officers and
added new contract security guards. To help control the flow of
tourists and provide additional security, BOR added access doors, and
contract guards to certain areas of the visitor center. BOR also
improved security at the visitor center by adding blast-resistant films
to the windows. In addition, BOR improved gates and fencing in some
areas surrounding the dam to improve perimeter security. BOR also
installed a series of buoys and linked "boom lines" to serve as a
security perimeter at water access points. Figure 3 shows the dam and a
linked boom line in the water.
Figure 3: Hoover Dam and Linked Boom Line Used to Enhance Perimeter
Security:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
To further secure the dam's perimeter, BOR created two traffic security
checkpoints, one in Arizona and one in Nevada, to screen and inspect
passenger vehicles crossing the dam. Figure 4 shows a security
checkpoint on the Arizona side of the dam.
Figure 4: Security Checkpoint on the Arizona Side of Hoover Dam:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Since September 11, BOR also made other changes to its security
operations, including performing additional background checks on
contractor personnel, obtaining security clearances for office
directors and key personnel, conducting various site security
inspections, initiating boat patrols on Lake Mead, contracting for the
design of a new integrated security system, and installing additional
surveillance cameras to monitor traffic checkpoints and other parts of
the dam and visitor areas. To address one security concern as far as
visitors are concerned--public access to the top of the dam due to the
proximity to Interstate 93--BOR is currently working with Arizona,
Nevada, the Federal Highway Administration, and others to construct a
new four-lane bridge across the Colorado River approximately 1,500 feet
from the dam. This bridge and additional roadways would re-route
Interstate 93 off of the dam and improve traffic flow for the thousands
of trucks and vehicles that use this road daily and reduce security
vulnerabilities for the dam and its visitors. The cost of the project
is currently estimated at $234 million, with funding coming through a
combination of federal and state sources. Construction has already
begun on new highways that approach the bridge, and the project is
currently scheduled to be completed in 2008. Nonetheless, although it
appears that BOR has taken the necessary steps to address the security
concern with the highway, ensuring adequate security while allowing
vehicle access will remain a unique and significant challenge for the
next few years.
Addressing Jurisdictional Issues and Competing Stakeholder Interests Is
Another Challenge for Interior:
Complicating its efforts to balance security and access, balancing
jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder interests represents
another challenge facing Interior. Pursuing security improvements that
Interior believes are needed often puts the department at odds with
other entities--such as planning commissions, private foundations, and
local governments--that have jurisdiction over, or input regarding,
physical security enhancements. For example, efforts to secure the
perimeter of a national monument or icon in an urban setting by closing
streets and/or alleyways can be prevented by local governments.
Similarly, local planning commissions and other oversight groups can
prevent the placement of various protective measures because of
aesthetic concerns and other considerations, such as perceived loss of
revenue. According to information from Interior, limiting the types of
measures it can employ can lead to delays in enhancing security and the
use of potentially more costly and/or less effective alternatives.
Jurisdictional and Competing Stakeholder Issues: Independence National
Historical Park in Philadelphia:
One location that illustrates the major challenges Interior faces
related to jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder interests is
Independence National Historical Park (INHP) in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. INHP is an open, national park space in the center of a
densely populated urban area. Spanning approximately 45 acres, the park
has about 20 buildings open to the public, including Independence Hall
(site of the signing of the Declaration of Independence) and the
Liberty Bell Center. Additionally, INHP houses multiple historically
irreplaceable buildings and documents, including Carpenter's Hall (site
of the first Continental Congress), Congress Hall, and an original copy
of the Declaration of Independence. Figure 5 shows a security sign near
Independence Hall, where the Declaration of Independence and U.S.
Constitution were created.
Figure 5: Independence Hall in Philadelphia:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Due to its urban location, oversight responsibility at INHP involves
several stakeholders. The Park Service and the city of Philadelphia
have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding emergency response
responsibilities and other jurisdictional issues. Public city streets
that carry both pedestrian and vehicular traffic surround the park and
its buildings. According to Interior officials, the park is surrounded
by local businesses that, along with city officials, are consulted
regarding any change in park operations. Complicating oversight, the
Park Service owns the land that covers the three blocks known as
Independence Mall, and the city of Philadelphia owns the Independence
Hall building and the Liberty Bell. The city and the Park Service
operate under a cooperative agreement for the management and operation
of Independence Mall. Also, the focus on security in this area of
Philadelphia is further heightened because of the presence of other
federal assets. Within a few block radius of INHP are multiple federal
buildings, including the U.S. Mint, the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, and a federal courthouse that houses the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Park Service officials reported that prior to September 11, INHP
managed its law enforcement and security operation consistently with
the majority of urban parks across the nation. After the Oklahoma City
bombing, a blast assessment focused primarily on Independence Hall was
conducted and influenced the design of the new Liberty Bell Center.
Aside from this assessment, no comprehensive risk assessment had been
completed that addressed overall threat potential. Following September
11, the Park Service decided to keep the park open but added staff
patrols from parks around the country to support INHP staff for
approximately 6 to 9 months. A perimeter consisting of temporary
fencing and concrete jersey barriers was also placed around the two
city blocks containing the Liberty Bell and Independence Hall and, with
the approval of city officials, Chestnut Street was closed on December
12, 2001. With these security improvements, staff coverage was roughly
doubled, but the Park Service had to have rangers work overtime to
allow for 24-hour coverage. The Park Service also implemented security
measures that included the use of magnetometers and individual hand
searches conducted at Liberty Bell Center and Independence Hall.
After September 11, the Park Service also contracted with a private
firm to conduct a threat assessment, which used a pre-existing blast
assessment. Park Service officials added that the blast assessment,
however, was too narrowly focused, and the lack of a comprehensive
assessment of threats and vulnerabilities limited their ability to
identify the full range of security measures that were needed to fully
protect the park. In early 2005, an Interior security official told us
that a comprehensive assessment conducted in compliance with HSPD-7 had
been completed, and Interior officials are evaluating this assessment
to determine additional security enhancements.
Interior officials told us that jurisdictional issues at INHP and the
political sensitivity of related disagreements have been the greatest
challenges in terms of implementing security enhancements since
September 11. These officials said that although there is a standing
operational agreement between the Park Service and the city of
Philadelphia, there is no current MOU regarding law enforcement and
security. INHP security officials stated that their ability to
effectively secure the park is limited by a lack of authority over
Chestnut Street and consensus among stakeholders as to how to provide
the best protection. This challenge is evidenced most clearly by the
ongoing disagreement between INHP and the city of Philadelphia over the
closure of Chestnut Street, the street that carries both pedestrian and
vehicular traffic between Independence Hall and the Liberty Bell
Center. INHP officials said that the city reopened Chestnut Street on
April 1, 2003, after local residents and business owners made the case
to the city that the closure would have an adverse impact on business.
Chestnut Street currently remains open to pedestrians and traffic with
the use of a controlled pedestrian intersection at Sixth and Chestnut
Streets managed by Park Service security staff and contract guards to
monitor park visitors transiting from the Liberty Bell Center to
Independence Hall. Figure 6 shows traffic in front of Independence Hall
and park rangers allowing screened visitors to cross Chestnut Street.
Figure 6: Vehicle Traffic in Front of Independence Hall and Park
Service Staff Allowing Visitors to Cross Chestnut Street:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition to addressing jurisdictional issues related to differences
with the city, Park Service officials at INHP said that their views on
what security measures are needed often put them directly at odds with
local stakeholder groups and business owners, specifically the
Independence Mall Business and Residents Coalition (IMBARC). IMBARC was
created for the purpose of challenging the closure of Chestnut Street.
IMBARC's chairman told us that IMBARC members are united in their
belief that the security measures implemented at INHP since September
11 are excessive and aesthetically unappealing. In addition, potential
street closures surrounding Independence Mall also affect the
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), the
regional transit provider. Chestnut and Sixth Street are considered
thoroughfares through the city's downtown, and Park Service officials
said that major changes to the traffic patterns would likely meet
additional resistance. We did not evaluate the competing views of the
Park Service, the city of Philadelphia, or IMBARC regarding the Park
Service's security efforts at INHP. Nonetheless, the situation the Park
Service faces at this park illustrates the complex and often differing
jurisdictional and competing stakeholder views that Interior faces
related to security in the post-September 11 era.
Jurisdictional and Competing Stakeholder Issues: Monuments on the
National Mall in Washington, D.C.
Other national icons where Interior faces jurisdictional and competing
stakeholder challenges are the monuments on the National Mall (the
Mall) in Washington, D.C. In particular, Interior has responsibility
for several major monuments on or near the Mall--including the
Washington Monument; the Lincoln, Jefferson, and Roosevelt Memorials;
and the World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam War Memorials. The Park
Police provides protection for these monuments and icons.
Prior to September 11, there was a concern that monuments and icons on
or near the Mall could be the focus of a terrorist attack. According to
Interior officials, after September 11, Interior worked with a private
security firm to assess the risk of terrorist attacks at Mall
monuments. This assessment examined potential threats and alternate
methods of both prevention and protection. Additionally, the Park
Service identified specific protection criteria and designated key
areas with the highest vulnerability as priority status for increased
security. According to Interior and Park Service officials, they have
used the report's findings to determine where to allocate appropriated
funds and implement security upgrades for high-risk structures.
The Park Service has pursued a number of security enhancements to the
Washington Monument and Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials, which were the
focus of our review. Construction is currently under way on a landscape
security solution for the grounds of the Washington Monument. When
construction is complete, a 30-inch-high granite retaining wall along
newly constructed pedestrian pathways will surround the monument. The
wall will serve as a vehicle barrier while also providing visitor
seating. In addition, the monument grounds will receive nearly 800 new
shade and flowering trees, upgraded lighting, and granite paving on the
plaza. The Park Service closed the monument to the public in September
2004 to complete the final phase of the security enhancement project
and reopened it on April 1, 2005. At the Lincoln Memorial, the Park
Service plans to construct a 35-inch-high granite retaining wall at the
edge of the roadway around the north, west, and south sides of Lincoln
Memorial Circle, and install retractable bollards for a portion of the
circle that does not handle everyday traffic. The Park Service is also
developing an alternative to a 715-foot line of jersey barriers on the
memorial's east side, facing the Mall. Figure 7 shows the temporary
jersey barriers and fencing on the east side of the memorial.
Figure 7: Jersey Barriers and Fencing on the East Side of the Lincoln
Memorial:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
For the Jefferson Memorial, the Park Service has proposed the
construction of a security barrier, closure of a U-shaped driveway next
to the monument to create a pedestrian plaza, and creation of
additional parking away from the monument to improve security by
limiting vehicular access. The Park Service's proposal includes the
elimination of parking adjacent to the monument. According to the Park
Service's environmental assessment of various options, the options
under consideration would have adverse impacts on historic structures
and the cultural landscape because the proposed security barrier would
introduce a new element within the historic scene. However, the Park
Service also said that the historic structures, cultural landscape, and
aesthetic and visual quality would benefit due to the removal of the
existing security measures that currently compromise the views, vistas,
and historic scene. According to the Park Service, safety and security
would be improved because the barrier would provide a first line of
defense from the potential threat of a vehicle bomb and would serve as
a deterrent to terrorists. Figure 8 shows a jersey barrier and
temporary snow fencing at the memorial. According to Park Service
officials, the snow fencing is used to control pedestrian flow to and
from the memorial.
Figure 8: Jersey Barriers and Snow Fencing at the Jefferson Memorial:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition to these improvements at the monuments, the Park Service
has upgraded its security camera capabilities in and around the Mall.
The camera system began its initial test run in July 2002 and was fully
operational by the fall of 2002. Park Service officials reported that
the system consists of cameras mounted in and around the Mall that
digitally record footage. It is designed for redundancy; if one camera
fails, another camera could quickly cover the same area. Park Service
officials stated that in the near future, they would like to expand
coverage and progressively upgrade the camera system. Since September
11, Interior has also established internal security protocols directly
tied to the Homeland Security Advisory System.[Footnote 3]
In implementing security enhancements, several entities have an
oversight, advisory, or advocacy role for the monuments on the National
Mall and have an interest in security enhancements at the monuments.
These entities include the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC),
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (Advisory Council), the U.S.
Commission on Fine Arts (CFA), and the District of Columbia's State
Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO). In addition, advocacy groups,
including the National Coalition to Save Our Mall and the National
Parks Conservation Association (NPCA), are involved in, and offer their
views on, security enhancements to the monuments. The roles of the
major entities and organizations are as follows:
* NCPC (www.ncpc.gov) is the central planning agency for the federal
and District of Columbia governments in the national capital.
Established in 1924 as the National Capital Park Commission and later
renamed, NCPC's responsibilities include conducting comprehensive
planning to direct federal activities and protect federal interests,
reviewing and approving all federal development projects in the city
and outlying region, leading specific initiatives to enhance the
region, and preparing an annual Federal Capital Improvements Program.
NCPC is composed of three presidential appointees, two D.C. mayoral
appointees, the Secretaries of Defense and the Interior, the Chairmen
of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
and House Committee on Government Reform, the Administrator of GSA, the
Mayor of the District of Columbia, and the Chairman of the D.C. City
Council.
* The Advisory Council (www.achp.gov) is an independent federal agency
that promotes the preservation, enhancement, and productive use of the
nation's historic resources and advises the president and Congress on
national historic preservation policy. The National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA) established the Advisory Council in 1966.
According to the Advisory Council, it seeks to have federal agencies
act as responsible stewards of our nation's resources when their
actions affect historic properties. The Advisory Council recommends
administrative and legislative improvements for protecting the nation's
heritage; advocates full consideration of historic values in federal
decision making; and reviews federal programs and policies to promote
effectiveness, coordination, and consistency with national preservation
policies.
* CFA (www.cfa.gov) was established by Congress in 1910 as an
independent agency to advise the federal and District of Columbia
governments on matters of art and architecture that affect the
appearance of the nation's capital. CFA's primary role is to advise on
proposed public building projects, but it also reviews private
buildings adjacent to important public buildings and grounds.
* NHPA provides for the designation of a SHPO in each state. SHPOs have
duties that include locating and recording historic resources;
nominating significant historic resources to the National Register of
Historic Places; fostering historic preservation programs at the local
government level; reviewing all federal projects for their impact on
historic properties in accordance with Section 106 of NHPA; and
providing technical assistance on rehabilitation projects and other
preservation activities to federal agencies, state and local
governments, and the private sector.
* The National Coalition to Save Our Mall (www.savethemall.org) was
founded in 2000 as a coalition of professional and civic organizations
and other concerned artists, historians, and citizens to provide a
national constituency dedicated to the protection and preservation of
the National Mall in Washington, D.C. According to the Coalition's Web
site, its mission is to:
"defend our national gathering place and symbol of Constitutional
principles against threats posed by recent and ongoing proposals--for
new memorials, security barriers, service buildings and roads--that
would encroach on the Mall's historical and cultural integrity, its
open spaces and sweeping vistas, and its significance in American
public life."
* NCPA (www.ncpa.org) is an advocacy organization whose mission is to
protect and enhance the National Park System for present and future
generations. According to its Web site, NCPA has been in existence for
85 years and has 300,000 members. NCPA's objectives are to advocate for
the national parks and the Park Service, educate decision makers and
the public about the importance of preserving the parks, help to
convince Members of Congress to uphold the laws that protect the parks
and support of new legislation to address threats to the parks, fight
attempts to weaken these laws in the courts, and assess the health of
the parks and park management to better inform its advocacy work.
Interior and Park Service officials said that implementing security
measures can be particularly challenging at monuments on the Mall in
Washington, D.C., because of the number of entities and organizations
that have jurisdictional, advisory, or advocacy roles regarding
changes. These officials said that in gaining the approval for projects
from NCPC and incorporating the views of the other organizations, the
Park Service tries to strike a balance among the various stakeholders
and build consensus. For example, in an effort to streamline the
process for gaining approval and input for enhancements at the
Washington Monument, the Park Service, NCPC, ACHP, and the D.C. SHPO
established a streamlined review process in 2002 that allows for public
participation. However, Interior and Park Service officials
acknowledged that there is often disagreement over how to balance
security with public access and aesthetic beauty. For example, as part
of its plans for security enhancements at the Washington Monument, the
Park Service gained approval from the NCPC in April 2003 to build an
underground visitor screening area and tunnel that would lead to the
basement of the monument. However, after meeting significant resistance
from NCPA, the Save Our Mall Coalition, and other interested
stakeholders, a senior Park Service official told us that the Park
Service abandoned this concept in the interest of maintaining support
for security enhancements. Due to the high visibility that security
enhancements at Mall monuments receive, Interior officials said that
addressing jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder interests on
the Mall will remain their biggest challenge.
Remote Location of Some Interior Assets Poses a Security Challenge:
Due to the remote and rugged location of some assets, Interior
officials reported that some icons and monuments pose additional issues
related to securing perimeters and ensuring an adequate response in the
event of an attack. According to information from Interior, although
the remoteness of the locations may reduce the threat exposure
associated with more "target rich" environments, it can present a
significant disadvantage when Interior attempts to implement security
measures.
Remote Locations: Mt. Rushmore:
Mt. Rushmore, which is located in the Black Hills of southwestern South
Dakota, typifies how difficult it can be for Interior to protect icons
and monuments that are located in remote and often rugged environments.
Mt. Rushmore is the world's largest sculpture and is one of the most
widely recognized symbols of the United States. In addition to its
cultural and symbolic significance, size, and location, Mt. Rushmore
hosts a large number of visitors each year, including numerous
dignitaries. The monument has a visitor center, restaurant, gift shop,
and amphitheatre that are used for various events. Each Fourth of July,
the park hosts a holiday celebration with fireworks and other
activities that attracts tens of thousands of visitors. The monument is
also about 50 miles south of Sturgis, the site of an annual motorcycle
rally that can bring over 500,000 tourists to the area--many of whom
visit Mt. Rushmore. Approximately 2.9 million tourists visit the
monument annually, with up to 40,000 visiting on some days during the
summer months.
Mt. Rushmore has a history prior to September 11 of security incidents
involving domestic terrorists, political demonstrators, and bomb
threats, according to Park Service officials. The threats and related
incidents have included the following:
* Between 1970 and 1973 there were multiple efforts by the American
Indian Movement to occupy the mountain and deface the monument.
* In 1975, a bomb was detonated in front of the visitor center--there
were no injuries because the detonation occurred early in the morning.
* In 1987, the environmental group Greenpeace illegally climbed the
mountain and attempted to unfurl a protest banner.
* In 1991, the Park Service received multiple, credible threats to
assassinate then-President George H.W. Bush during the 50th anniversary
celebration of the monument.
* In 1999, a Colorado man was arrested for making a threat to blow up
Mt. Rushmore.
According to Park Service officials, because of these incidents, the
Park Service took actions, including a security assessment in 1997 that
recommended a range of countermeasures costing approximately $2.9
million, most of which were subsequently implemented. However, Park
Service officials told us that prior to September 11, the focus of
their security efforts was directed at protecting the monument. In
light of the September 11 attacks, Park Service officials are now
including visitors and employees in their protection at Mt. Rushmore.
With increases in funding for security after September 11, Park Service
officials told us in mid-2004 that they were in the process of adding
protection park rangers and other employees. In addition, the Park
Service made other security enhancements, including the installation of
security fencing, lighting, and gates at multiple locations;
improvements to existing mechanical systems for dispatch and incident
management; and the purchase of all-terrain vehicles for use in patrols
and at special events. Figure 9 shows a security camera mounted near
the amphitheatre at the base of the monument.
Figure 9: Security Camera near the Amphitheatre at Mt. Rushmore:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Despite these improvements, security at Mt. Rushmore is a major Park
Service concern, due to the large area to patrol and large number of
visitors. The park has 1,278 acres, 40 acres of which are part of the
visitor service area that offers hiking and educational opportunities
at the sculptor's studio and visitor center's amphitheater, museum, and
bookstores. In addition, the area immediately surrounding the sculpture
has steep rock faces and a series of canyons. While terrain serves as a
natural barrier for most visitors and casual hikers, preventing
individuals seeking to climb to the top of the monument for nefarious
purposes is difficult. Park rangers at the monument told us that in
order to fully secure the monument's perimeter, rangers must regularly
hike and patrol the mountain--a time-consuming and physically
challenging task. Figure 10 shows the rugged terrain at the front of
the sculpture and a canyon in the area behind the sculpture.
Figure 10: Rugged Terrain Surrounding Mt. Rushmore:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition, the park relies on backup from state and county law
enforcement agencies, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
According to Park Service officials, these agencies also provide
support during major events at the park.
Leveraging Limited Resources for Security Improvements Is Viewed by
Interior Officials as a Challenge:
In addition to the range of challenges with protecting icons and
monuments, Interior officials were also concerned about the
department's ability to leverage limited resources for its protection
initiatives in terms of security staffing and funding. These officials
said that the increased emphasis on visitor protection and homeland
security demands that Interior maintain a well coordinated and highly
professional law enforcement capability. However, the department's law
enforcement staff is already spread thin, according to these officials,
averaging one law enforcement officer for about every 110,000 visitors
and 118,000 acres of land. Funding challenges for Interior homeland
security programs have been well documented. According to the August
2003 Interior IG report mentioned earlier, September 11 and the
resulting increase in icon park security have had an impact on other
parks and law enforcement officers across the Park Service.[Footnote 4]
According to the report, rangers have been detailed from their
permanent parks to supplement the icon park forces, leaving many other
parks with a diminished protection staff. The Interior IG also reported
that law enforcement staff were strained right after September 11
because officers were working 12-hour shifts 7 days a week for several
months and with no days off. The Interior IG reported that there is a
concern about the long-term effectiveness of the protection staff and
the officers who operate under these conditions.
At the icons and monuments we visited, concerns about having adequate
resources for security were evident. In Philadelphia at INHP, Park
Service officials said that law enforcement represents the largest
portion of the INHP budget at approximately $8 million per year and
accounts for more than one-third of the park's budget. By comparison,
prior to September 11, law enforcement accounted for about $2.4 million
per year. At the Jefferson Memorial, Park Service officials told us
that they sometimes leave the snow fencing (shown in fig. 8) in place
because they lack the staff resources to remove and reinstall the
fencing before and after each major event on the Mall. At Mt. Rushmore,
the need for additional staff was, as mentioned before, an ongoing
concern.
Although we did not do a detailed assessment of security funding
issues, officials at the sites we visited told us that they were
concerned about their ability to implement further security
enhancements that they believe are needed. They viewed lack of
additional funding as a major challenge. Interior officials with OLES,
including the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement and
Security, expressed concern about the department's inability to obtain
homeland security funding through DHS. These officials said that state
and local governments receive significant funding through DHS. These
officials said that there have been discussions within the
administration about allowing other federal agencies to receive funding
through DHS but such actions have not been taken. Nonetheless, with the
establishment of a central office to manage security matters and
Interior's efforts to respond to various governmentwide initiatives,
the department has taken some important steps to better position itself
to compete for homeland security-related funds. At the individual icons
and monuments we visited, steps clearly had been taken to improve
security since September 11, such as the Washington Monument perimeter
landscaping project, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorial security
projects, the visitor screening system at the Statue of Liberty,
increased staffing at Mt. Rushmore, and the rerouting of Interstate 93
at Hoover Dam.
Initiatives to Protect National Icons and Monuments Are Part of the
National Homeland Security Strategy:
Initiatives by Congress and the administration since September 11 to
improve homeland security have been intended to, among many objectives,
address the range of challenges associated with protecting national
icons, monuments, and other key assets held by Interior. The September
11 terrorist attacks prompted Congress to pass the Homeland Security
Act, which created DHS. DHS's mission includes preventing terrorist
attacks within the United States, reducing the vulnerability of the
United States to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and assisting in
the recovery from attacks that do occur. The creation of DHS
centralized the government's homeland security efforts, including
policy setting with regard to protecting national icons and monuments.
As discussed earlier, several of Interior's assets are highly visible
and symbolic icons, monuments, and critical infrastructure such as
dams. Due to the prominence of Interior's assets, protecting them has
figured heavily into the broad strategic goals set forth by the
administration after September 11.
More specifically, the President's July 2002 National Strategy for
Homeland Security recognized the potential for attacks on national
icons and monuments, which could be targets for symbolic reasons and
whose destruction could profoundly damage national morale.[Footnote 5]
The President's February 2003 National Strategy for the Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets provides a
statement of national policy to remain committed to protecting critical
infrastructures and key assets--including national monuments, icons,
and dams that Interior is responsible for--from terrorist attacks and
is based on eight guiding principles. These principles include
establishing responsibility and accountability and encouraging and
facilitating partnering among all levels of government and between
government and industry. The strategy also establishes three strategic
objectives, which are to (1) identify and ensure the protection of the
most critical assets, in terms of national level public health and
safety, governance, and economic and national security and public
confidence; (2) ensure protection of infrastructures and assets facing
specific, imminent threats; and (3) pursue collaborative measures and
initiatives to ensure the protection of other potential targets that
may become attractive over time.[Footnote 6]
The critical infrastructure strategy identifies Interior as the lead
federal entity for taking actions in a number of areas, in conjunction
with DHS, related to protecting icons, monuments, and other key assets.
These actions include developing guidance and standards for determining
criticalities and protection priorities, conducting threat and
vulnerability assessments, exploring opportunities for using technology
to protect visitors at monuments, and collaborating with state and
local governments and private foundations to ensure the protection of
symbols and icons outside the federal domain. In our prior work, we
assessed these plans and in February 2004 testified that the national
strategy related to critical infrastructure contained the most
desirable characteristics among the strategic plans for homeland
security that the administration has produced since September
11.[Footnote 7] These characteristics included addressing such areas as
purpose, scope, and methodology; problem definition and risk
assessment; and organizational roles, responsibilities, and
coordination.
While the 2002 and 2003 national strategies identified a broad
framework for homeland security as it relates to critical
infrastructure, HSPD-7, which the administration issued in December
2003, establishes a national policy for federal agencies to identify
and prioritize critical U.S. infrastructure and key resources and to
protect them from terrorism.[Footnote 8] The directive identified
several critical infrastructure sectors, such as agriculture, water
systems, public health, and national monuments and icons. For several
of the sectors, the directive identifies lead agencies that have sector-
specific knowledge, including Interior for national icons and
monuments. SSA responsibilities include collaborating with all relevant
federal entities, state and local governments, and the private sector;
conducting or facilitating vulnerability assessments of the specific
sector; and encouraging risk management strategies to protect against
and mitigate the effects of attacks. Section 35 of the directive also
requires, on an annual basis, that sector-specific agencies report on
their efforts to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection
initiatives in their respective sectors. In addition, section 34 of the
directive requires that all federal departments and agencies develop
physical and cyber security plans for the assets they own or operate.
Interior's Actions Have Been Positive, and Further Steps Could
Strengthen Its Efforts in the Security Area:
After September 11, the Secretary of the Interior took steps to address
serious organizational and management problems in the law enforcement
and security components of the department. Of particular concern,
according to Interior's IG, was the lack of coordination among these
components and the absence of a meaningful single point of contact that
the Secretary and senior managers could depend upon for reliable
information and advice.[Footnote 9] The Secretary approved a Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement and Security in July 2002,
established the security office named OLES, and approved the
implementation of the additional 24 recommendations from a January 2002
Inspector General report.[Footnote 10] OLES oversees the department's
security efforts and seeks to ensure consistent application across
bureaus and offices. OLES has responsibilities related to (1)
coordinating the development of policies and standards, (2)
coordinating and overseeing implementation of policies and standards,
(3) representing the department externally, (4) conducting compliance
reviews, and (5) providing leadership during incidents. Because
Interior was designated as an SSA, OLES prepared a sector-specific
security plan for icons and monuments, as required by section 35 of
HSPD-7. Interior also developed a physical security plan for the assets
it owns and operates in response to section 34 of HSPD-7. These plans
recognize many of the major challenges facing Interior, including
security versus access, jurisdictional considerations, security in
remote locations, and security staffing issues.
In response to HSPD-7's requirement that Interior formulate a plan for
identifying, assessing, prioritizing, and developing protective
programs for critical assets within the national icons and monuments
sector, Interior developed a uniform risk assessment and ranking
methodology called the National Monuments and Icons Assessment
Methodology (NM&I methodology). According to information from Interior,
the NM&I methodology is specifically designed to quantify risk,
identify needed security enhancements, and measure risk-reduction
benefits at icon and monument assets. The NM&I methodology has a
consequence assessment phase and a risk assessment phase. During the
consequence assessment phase, there is an asset tier ranking process,
in which each asset's iconic significance is subjectively determined.
Specific attack scenarios--such as chemical/biological, aircraft, or
improvised explosive device--are used to evaluate security at each
asset and score attack consequences. Consequence categories include
casualties, economic impact, and length of disruption. During the risk
assessment phase, Interior uses the methodology to determine the
effectiveness of existing security systems for preventing or mitigating
the specified attack scenarios. Using risk values calculated from this
comparison, Interior assigns asset risk ratings of high, medium, or
low, and specific mitigation recommendations are formulated. To date,
Interior has applied this methodology to assets that fall under the
purview of the Park Service. Interior officials said that BOR has used
a risk assessment methodology for dams for several years. These
officials said that BOR's methodology is similar, but also takes into
account several factors that are unique to dams, such as downstream
population at risk, structural vulnerability, and the economic impact
if the asset were to be destroyed.
Interior has made significant progress in the risk assessment area,
particularly regarding the new methodology for national icons and
monuments. Before the development of this approach, Interior did not
have a uniform, comprehensive risk management approach for icons and
monuments. It relied instead on the judgment of senior officials in
determining where resources should be directed, and the risk
assessments completed at individual sites were done by a number of
external experts using different methodologies. Given the range of
challenges Interior faces, particularly with regard to limited
resources, it is especially important that Interior's funding
priorities are linked with its risk rankings so that decision makers--
including Interior, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
Congress--can direct resources where they will have an optimal return
on investment in terms of better protection. Setting funding priorities
for protecting assets using a uniform approach is the foundation of the
National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for
the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets. For
example, the section of the National Strategy related to critical
infrastructure calls for DHS and stakeholders like Interior to develop
a uniform methodology for identifying facilities, systems, and
functions with national level criticality to help establish priorities.
Government agencies often face a variety of interests whose competing
demands force policymakers and managers to balance stakeholders'
concerns and other factors such as quality, cost, and customer
satisfaction. For Interior, the trade-offs that have to be made between
security and its cultural mission are often difficult, which was
apparent at the sites we visited. Full transparency regarding the basis
for its decisions on security matters could, in our view, improve
Interior's ability to achieve mutually acceptable and consistent
outcomes with stakeholders. As Interior continues with the
implementation of security measures, a clearly defined set of guiding
principles for balancing security with its core cultural mission could
also be beneficial due to the complex and often contentious environment
in which Interior operates. Such principles could be used in
conjunction with the broader guiding principles the administration set
forth in the national strategy for critical infrastructure and efforts
by the department to define its guiding principles in other areas that
are already in place. For example, the Park Service's strategic plan
for fiscal years 2001 to 2005 identifies a set of guiding principles
for achieving its mission that include excellent service, productive
partnerships, and citizen involvement.
Guiding principles have been used by other organizations to improve
transparency and thus allow stakeholders to better understand the basis
for decisions. For example, the administration has outlined guiding
principles for postal reform given the U.S. Postal Service's financial
difficulties and a complex operating environment that involves multiple
competing interests and stakeholders.[Footnote 11] These principles
relate to best practices, transparency, flexibility, accountability,
and financial self-sufficiency. In another example that relates
directly to security, the government of Canada has identified guiding
principles that are part of its long-term plan for the Parliament
Precinct area in Ottawa.[Footnote 12] These principles address the
issue of balancing openness, accessibility, and security; which, like
in the United States, is a concern in Canada.
The Threat Against Federal Office Buildings is Significant, and GSA
Faces Various Challenges as the Owner and Landlord of These Assets:
Terrorism is a major threat to federally owned and leased buildings,
the civil servants and military personnel who work in them, and the
public who visits them. This threat was evidenced by the Oklahoma City
bombing in 1995; the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa; the September 11,
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon; and the anthrax
attacks in the fall of 2001. Since the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, the focus on security in federal buildings has
been heightened considerably. More recently, DHS raised the national
threat level to Code Orange in some areas in August 2004 because of
specific threat information for office buildings with critical
missions. According to information from DHS, intelligence reports
indicated that al Qaeda was targeting several specific buildings,
including the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in the
District of Columbia, Prudential Financial in northern New Jersey, and
Citigroup buildings and the New York Stock Exchange in New York. GSA
owns several federal office buildings on which an attack could
seriously disrupt the business of government and harm federal employees
and the public. Overall, GSA controls more than 8,000 buildings that it
owns and leases nationwide, encompassing about 338 million square feet
of space. These properties include office buildings, courthouses,
border stations, and other types of facilities, representing about 6
percent of all federally owned space worldwide and 39 percent of all
federally leased space worldwide. In addition to most of the major
departmental headquarters in Washington, D.C., including the
Departments of State, Justice, and Interior, GSA owns most of the key
multiagency federal office buildings in major cities, including New
York, and Chicago, as well as every federal courthouse in the country.
Various potential threats--including large-scale attacks using truck
bombs to other breaches and attempts to bring weapons, explosives, or
chemical/biological agents into the buildings--pose several challenges
for GSA as the owner and landlord of these buildings. These include
maintaining a proper level of security without limiting the public's
access to federal offices for services that the government provides and
for other business; working with stakeholders and other jurisdictions
that have an interest in the type of security that is employed;
securing access to privately owned buildings and space where GSA leases
space for federal agencies, but where GSA and FPS do not have control
over security for the building; and the challenge GSA faces as a result
of the transfer of FPS, which has responsibility for providing law
enforcement and security related functions, to DHS.
Balancing Security with Public Access at Federal Facilities Is a Major
Challenge:
A major challenge in protecting federal buildings is balancing
increased security with the public's access to government offices for
services and to transact other business. According to GSA, its intent
is to create an environment that reflects an open, welcome atmosphere,
but one that challenges those with intent to do harm. In addition, GSA
also considers federal workers' convenience and privacy an important
part of these considerations. Nonetheless, striking a balance among
these competing factors is an ongoing challenge. It is particularly
challenging for federal agencies in GSA-owned buildings that require
regular public access such as courthouses, and federal office buildings
that have agencies that interact often with the public, such as the
Social Security Administration. A GSA-owned and managed federal
courthouse in Nevada demonstrates the challenge of balancing public
access with security needs and how GSA has fostered this balance. This
large courthouse houses multiple tenants requiring heightened security,
including the federal courts, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and the U.S.
Marshals Service (USMS).
According to GSA officials, the courthouse is unique because it hosts
cultural events such as concerts and contains many displays of
sculpture, painting, and photographic art that are open to the public.
Located in what GSA officials said is a neglected downtown area, the
courthouse is also a key part of a business and community
revitalization effort that offers free public events and encourages
public participation. Balancing the need for securing the facility and
public accessibility is especially important given the dual roles of
the courthouse.
The courthouse has many security features incorporated into its design.
It is the first courthouse to be designed with federal architectural
blast-resistance guidelines adopted after the Oklahoma City bombing.
According to GSA officials, the design of the courthouse incorporated
many of the lessons learned from Oklahoma City. Some of these many
security features incorporated into the building design include the
following:
* setback from the streets;
* window glazing and hardened exterior building;
* advanced structure design;
* bollards around building perimeter;
* controlled parking for building staff;
* security barriers entrance to mitigate the danger of high-speed
vehicle attempting to enter the parking garage;
* separate sally port for prisoner transfer and elevators for transfers
of prisoners to courtrooms;
* unique, unobtrusive design for magnetometer checkpoints at main
public entrance;
* access card operated doors and nonpublic elevators; and:
* surveillance cameras both within and outside the structure.
USMS and FPS provide law enforcement and security functions for federal
buildings that house court functions. Given the events of September 11,
FPS and USMS made a number of enhancements to their operations and
physical security features at the courthouse. For example, FPS and USMS
officials told us that they now hold weekly meetings with the
buildings' principal stakeholders to review security issues. In
addition, USMS officials told us that they have instituted new gun and
hazardous materials training for their officers and have stepped up
evacuation drills and training for building employees. FPS and USMS
officials said that since September 11 there has been a great deal of
cooperation amongst local law enforcement agencies. For example, one
local law enforcement agency allowed FPS to link to its radio systems
to enhance communication between the entities. The local law
enforcement agency also involved USMS in their regionwide security
efforts on New Year's eve 2003, when the national threat alert level
was raised to orange. Finally, USMS and FPS have made physical security
enhancements, including, among other things, hardening the exterior
wall of the courthouse that did not have a setback with a reinforced
retaining wall and a rock garden with large boulders, replacing the
gates to the vehicle sally port--which is a secure entryway for the
loading and unloading of prisoners and protected witnesses--with
stronger iron gates, adding surveillance cameras, adding alarms, and
constructing a secure gun locker for use by armed officers.
The fact that office buildings traditionally have been constructed with
an emphasis on ease of access makes security measures difficult to
implement. However, as mentioned above, the design of the courthouse
incorporated many of the lessons learned from the Oklahoma City bombing
with respect to building security and safety, as well as a design that
emphasizes openness and accessibility. Nonetheless, according to GSA
officials, balancing security design and enhancement with access is an
ongoing challenge.
Addressing Jurisdictional Issues and Competing Stakeholder Interests Is
Another Challenge for GSA:
In addition to the challenges related to balancing security with public
accessibility at GSA buildings, addressing the competing needs of
federal agencies, local governments, and private sector entities in
securing its buildings is a challenge. For example, local governments
get involved when GSA requests permits to implement additional security
enhancements that require such actions as closing streets, removing
public parking spaces, and installing bollards around the perimeter of
the facility. One location that typifies the jurisdictional and
stakeholder issues GSA faces is a federal building in New York City. It
is a GSA-owned and managed building that houses multiple federal
agencies and is visited by thousands of individuals each year
conducting business with the government.
GSA was focused on security at the federal building before the
September 11 terrorist attacks. In coordination with the FBI and the
city, GSA had developed a preliminary security upgrade plan, which
included improvements such as maintaining street control around the
building, increasing the use of building access controls, and hardening
the building to protect it from blasts. After September 11, GSA and FPS
implemented several additional security enhancements, including further
strengthening perimeter security, access control, surveillance, and
blast resistance. GSA and FPS took steps to improve the perimeter
security of the federal building by accelerating plans to install
bollards and barriers around the perimeter and working with city and
fire department officials to close some nearby streets to vehicular
traffic. In addition, GSA instituted a new building access system
employing smart card technology. Smart cards contain the name, title,
and picture of the employee; electronic data that can prove the
authenticity of the card; and biometric data about the employee. Figure
11 shows the bollards that were installed in front of the federal
building.
Figure 11: Bollards in Front of a Federal Building in New York:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
GSA officials said that to implement these and other security
enhancements, their greatest challenge has been dealing with competing
stakeholder interests and jurisdictional issues. GSA officials
indicated that the decision-making process involves multiple
stakeholders, steps, and requirements, most of which involve the city
of New York. GSA officials noted that in addition to new steps and
requirements that arose during the permit process, some requirements
changed after permit issuance. In these cases, city officials have
retracted some permits for security enhancements, and GSA has had to
restart the permitting process. Specifically, GSA officials noted that
they encountered delays when trying to install bollards along the
building perimeter. Initially, the city Department of Transportation
was supportive of the idea; but as the process continued, GSA officials
said that issues related to historic preservation arose that needed to
be addressed. Moreover, GSA officials also noted that the city has
prevented GSA from making some security enhancements that they believed
were needed.
GSA has also experienced opposition from various groups in trying to
close a nearby street due to security concerns. According to GSA
officials, the city has asked GSA to prepare an environmental impact
statement (EIS), hold public hearings, and consider traffic and
economic impacts on the street closure. In contrast with the challenges
they have encountered with the city, GSA officials said that the New
York Police Department (NYPD) has been supportive of their security
efforts. At a recent demonstration near the federal building, GSA
officials said that NYPD provided police officers to assist with crowd
control. Although GSA has been faced with various jurisdictional issues
and the process has been challenging, the city ultimately has also
allowed GSA to close streets and make several of the previously
mentioned security upgrades. Nonetheless, GSA's experience at the
federal building demonstrates the complexities it faces when attempting
to implement security enhancements for large, multitenant buildings in
urban settings.
The Challenge of Security for Leased Space:
Securing access to privately owned buildings and space that houses
federal tenants is a unique challenge that may put the government at
odds with private lessors and other nonfederal building occupants. GSA
has reported that its goal and biggest challenge in this area is to
provide the same level of security for occupants of leased facilities
as it provides for those that GSA owns. However, this is often
difficult because GSA has to work with lessors to implement changes and
in some instances coordinate with other nonfederal tenants. As a
result, GSA may have difficulty getting the lessor to allow security
countermeasures in buildings that are not fully occupied by federal
employees. This challenge arises because many private owners resisted
heightened levels of security because of the adverse impact or
inconvenience potentially caused to private tenants. GSA officials also
identified negotiating the need and costs of increased security
standards in leased properties as a significant challenge in the post-
September 11 environment. GSA officials said that negotiating with
private owners presents a challenge of determining how to effectively
secure mixed-tenant buildings without security being overly burdensome.
A GSA official, knowledgeable of leasing issues told us, however, that
September 11 changed the perspective of private owners as they realized
vulnerabilities and recognized that federal tenants would begin
requiring increased levels of security in order to continue to lease
space.
The D.C. metro area, managed by GSA's National Capital Region, has a
high concentration of federal leases. One such leased building is a 10-
story, privately owned facility located in Washington, D.C. The
property is a mixed-tenant space with both private sector and federal
tenants. The building posts guards and operates screening checkpoints
at each entrance and restricts access to elevator banks and stairwells
to only those authorized or with escort. In addition, a GSA official
said that at the request of the building's largest federal tenant,
every individual entering the building must be screened. Additionally,
the building also operates a mail facility to screen all mail,
packages, and deliveries.
Due to security concerns following the September 11 attacks, FPS, along
with GSA and the building's largest federal tenant, assessed the
building's risk and began to develop and implement a comprehensive
security program. FPS conducted a threat assessment of the building and
determined the building to be classified as a Level IV[Footnote 13]
property. Once the building had been assessed and classified, agency
officials from the building's largest federal tenant, GSA, and FPS
began developing a plan for security program development and
implementation. The program plan included armed contract guards manning
magnetometers and X-ray machines, random spot checks of vehicles
entering the parking garage, and close monitoring of visitor badges.
Additionally, a GSA official said that technology advancement has
changed since September 11. The leased building's security program
incorporates its newest technology, the E-Pop system. The E-Pop system
can be controlled by security officials; in the event of an emergency,
it is able to connect to computers in the building and deliver
emergency messages communicating evacuation instructions. Furthermore,
E-Pop allows tenants to be immediately informed of an incident, thereby
increasing their chances of exiting the building safely. The leased
building is also considering implementing smart card technology, a
building access system that uses plastic identification cards
containing an individual's personal and biometric data. This is the
same system used at the federal building in New York City.
A GSA leasing official stated that ISC's development of leased space
security standards, which will be discussed later, has been useful in
effectively communicating increased physical security needs to private
owners and involving them directly in the process of security program
development for their buildings. This official said that the standards
have established the credibility and validity of increased security
measures, where no or few guidelines existed before. A GSA official
said that even though the commercial real estate community in the
capital area has become attuned to the needs of the federal government
in the post-September 11 security environment, challenges still exist.
According to GSA and security officials, one challenge in leasing space
in property mixed with federal agency and private sector tenants is
incorporating increased security standards while balancing occupants'
varying interests and needs. Some private owners and their private
sector tenants may not want random car checks conducted or
magnetometers placed at the entrances to their buildings because this
may, in some way, adversely affect their business. GSA officials also
noted that negotiating the need and costs of increased security
standards in leased properties is still a significant challenge, as
security demands for privately owned buildings are still relatively
new.
FPS Transfer to DHS Poses a Challenge for GSA:
The Homeland Security Act transferred FPS to DHS, effective March 1,
2003.[Footnote 14] FPS's transfer to DHS was intended to improve law
enforcement and related security functions by centralizing building
security activities with other homeland security functions. Under the
act, DHS became responsible for protecting buildings, grounds, and
property owned, occupied, or secured by the federal government that are
under GSA's jurisdiction, as well as other DHS facilities. A March 2003
operational memorandum of agreement between GSA and DHS made FPS
responsible for the same types of security services that FPS provided
for GSA properties prior to the transfer to DHS. These include, among
other things, performing risk assessments, managing the installation of
some security equipment, conducting criminal investigations, and
managing the contract guard program.[Footnote 15] Although law
enforcement and security related functions were transferred to DHS from
GSA, GSA officials said that it still assists FPS and tenant agencies
in implementing various security measures that FPS recommends, and
incorporating enhanced security measures into new space it constructs
or leases. In October 2003, GSA and DHS agreed on a number of interim
support services GSA would provide to FPS during the transition in a
separate memorandum of agreement. In July 2004, we reported on the
challenges FPS was facing related to the transfer, including its
expanding homeland security mission and related increase in
responsibility; unresolved issues related to how it would be funded,
because its funds at that time were tied to the rent GSA charges tenant
agencies; and, difficulties with transferring mission-support functions
for FPS from GSA to DHS.[Footnote 16] DHS concurred with our findings
and related recommendations and agreed to take action.
In addition to the challenges facing FPS, our work for this review
showed that GSA is facing its own management challenges because it no
longer has control over the law enforcement and related security
functions of its properties. GSA officials expressed concern about
their ability to track security expenditures and stay informed about
FPS protection activities in GSA buildings. These officials also
expressed concern about not having a formal mechanism for communicating
with FPS and for ensuring that FPS is meeting its responsibilities with
regard to security enhancements and services. The Deputy Commissioner
of GSA's Public Buildings Service said that since the departure of FPS,
GSA has had difficulty adjusting to not having responsibility for
protecting its own buildings and is still trying to define its overall
role in security. This official said that GSA's new role should be that
of a coordinator between FPS and the tenant agencies and that GSA was
examining the MOU between GSA and DHS to determine if GSA's role and
visibility in facility protection could be enhanced. Concerns about the
departure of FPS were identified by GSA's Office of the Inspector
General (IG) in its August 2004 updated assessment of GSA's major
management challenges. The GSA IG identified protection of federal
facilities and personnel as one of seven major management challenges
facing the agency.[Footnote 17] The GSA IG said that although FPS was
transferred to DHS, GSA will have a continual need to closely interact
with security personnel due to GSA's mission of housing federal
agencies. The GSA IG concluded that ensuring federal employees have a
secure working environment and that building assets are adequately
safeguarded must remain a primary concern of GSA.
Prior to the creation of DHS, we expressed concern about separating
security from other real property portfolio functions, such as site
location, design, and construction for new federal buildings. Decisions
on these factors have implications for what type of security will be
necessary and effective.[Footnote 18] We concluded that if DHS was
given the responsibility for securing facilities, the role of
integrating security with other real property functions would be an
important consideration. Given the transfer of FPS to DHS, the range of
challenges FPS faces, and the concerns about GSA's new role expressed
by GSA officials and the GSA IG, it is critical that GSA be well-
equipped to engage in security-related matters given that it is still
the owner and landlord of these buildings. However, GSA does not have
an organizational unit or mechanism that is directly accountable for
security matters, such as a chief security officer position or formal
point of contact. Such an officer/official could coordinate GSA's
responsibilities related to the safety and security of its facilities,
similar to the role fulfilled by Interior's Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Law Enforcement and Security and OLES. GSA's Deputy Commissioner
for public buildings and other GSA officials who are knowledgeable of
security matters said that it would be beneficial for GSA to have a
designated position for coordination purposes. Having a chief security
officer position for physical assets is recognized in the security
industry as essential in organizations with large numbers of mission-
critical facilities. According to chief security officer guidelines
developed by ASIS International:[Footnote 19]
"Traditionally, what has previously been lacking is a single position
at the senior governance level having the responsibility for crafting,
influencing, and directing an organization-wide protection strategy. In
many organizations, accountability is dispersed, possibly among several
managers in different departments; with potentially conflicting
objectives—.the diversity of today's risks comes in a complex matrix of
interrelated threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts, the safeguards for
which must, therefore, be interdependent. The ability to influence
business strategy and address matters of internal risk exposure
requires a chief security officer at the appropriate level in the
organization."
Protecting Government Facilities Is Part of the National Homeland
Security Strategy:
The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical
Infrastructures and Key Assets mentioned earlier has clear implications
for GSA and its role as the owner and landlord of federal facilities.
The strategy identifies a number of actions intended to improve federal
facility protection. These included developing a process to screen
nonfederal tenants and visitors entering private sector facilities that
house federal organizations, determining the criticality and
vulnerability of government facilities, developing long-term
construction standards for facilities requiring specialized security
measures, and implementing new security technology at federally
occupied facilities.
GSA Actions in Response to the National Homeland Security Strategy and
Other Related Initiatives:
GSA has taken a number of positive actions, as follows:
* A senior GSA official chaired ISC's working group on security in
leasing; after receiving input from ISC member agencies, ISC issued its
policy on security standards for leased space in July 2003.
* GSA is working with DHS to utilize a risk management process called
Federal Security Risk Management (FSRM) for assessing federally owned
and leased facilities.
* GSA worked with ISC to develop security design criteria and is
involved with ISC's ongoing efforts to update the criteria annually.
* GSA is working with ISC on several technology-related initiatives,
including smart card and biometrics access control technology,
nonjersey barrier perimeter protection, and indoor air monitoring
systems to prevent uncontrolled movement of toxic air substances.
In the area of risk assessment, FPS uses a computer-based methodology
that allows FPS to evaluate risk and identify countermeasures on an
ongoing basis. FPS is able to use a series of input screens and queries
to maintain pertinent data that can be adjusted as threats and
vulnerabilities change. The tool allows the user to enter information
on each asset, identify existing countermeasures, assign an impact of
loss and a vulnerability rating to each threat, and input
countermeasure upgrade alternatives and their associated costs.
As mentioned earlier, HSPD-7 requires, on an annual basis, that sector-
specific agencies report on their efforts to identify, prioritize, and
coordinate the protection initiatives in various critical
infrastructure sectors. Although GSA was not given responsibility for
any of the sectors identified in the directive, all federal departments
and agencies are required, under the directive, to develop physical and
cyber security plans for the assets they own or operate. However, in a
July 2004 letter to the Director of OMB, GSA stated that "no GSA owned
or leased space meets the definitions for critical infrastructure and/
or key resources." The letter went on to say that "GSA owns and leases
many buildings where important activities take place, but GSA is unable
to make a determination as to whether these tenant activities are
critical infrastructure."
GSA officials said that OMB has not commented on GSA's response to HSPD-
7 regarding a physical security plan. The Executive Director of ISC--
which has responsibility for reviewing agencies' HSPD-7 plans for the
administration--said that ISC has not completed its review of agencies'
plans, including GSA's response to HSPD-7. We are deferring to ISC on
whether GSA's decision not to prepare a physical security plan is
reasonable. In the future, a chief security officer position or formal
point of contact could aid in determining GSA's involvement in
governmentwide critical infrastructure efforts such as HSPD-7.
Conclusions:
There is a heightened concern that terrorists may again try to exploit
the nation's vulnerabilities. In this environment, Interior has a
critical role in protecting our national icons and monuments and
ensuring the safety of the millions of people who visit them. National
icons such as the Statue of Liberty and Mt. Rushmore could be attacked
for symbolic reasons. Since September 11, Interior has made significant
progress in improving security by doing vulnerability assessments of
high-profile sites that are likely targets and implementing various
security measures. For example, at the individual icons and monuments
we visited, steps clearly had been taken to improve security since
September 11, such as the Washington Monument perimeter landscaping
project, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorial security projects, the
visitor screening system at the Statue of Liberty, increased staffing
at Mt. Rushmore, and the rerouting of Interstate 93 at Hoover Dam. In
addition, Interior has made management changes, including creating a
central security office, intended to enhance its homeland security
initiatives, and has recently developed a uniform risk management
methodology for national icons and monuments. These actions should help
Interior address the major challenges it faces--which include balancing
security and Interior's mission related to access and education;
addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues; securing
icons and monuments in rugged, remote areas; and leveraging limited
staff and funding resources.
As Interior moves forward, it could link the results of its risk
assessments and related risk rankings to its security funding
priorities. This could allow for well-informed decisions by
stakeholders--such as Interior, OMB, and Congress--about where to
direct resources so that they have an optimal return on investment in
terms of better protection. Also, a set of guiding principles for
balancing security with its core cultural and educational mission--
which Interior lacks but other organizations with complex environments
have developed--could help in addressing the challenges. A set of
guiding principles could provide decision makers and Interior's other
stakeholders with greater transparency regarding the rationale for
security decisions. An approach with these components should yield
results that would allow decision makers both within and external to
the department to better gauge and consider competing priorities.
Since September 11, security at office buildings has remained a
concern, as evidenced by threats revealed by DHS in August 2004 that al
Qaeda was targeting several office buildings in New York, northern New
Jersey, and Washington, D.C. GSA has taken action to address the
challenges it faces as the owner and landlord of federal office
buildings. These challenges include balancing security and public
access, addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues,
securing federally leased space, and adjusting to the transfer of FPS
to DHS. These actions have included working with ISC to develop
security standards, continuing with upgrades that GSA began
implementing after the Oklahoma City bombing, and establishing a
memorandum of agreement with DHS related to FPS. Despite these actions,
GSA lacks a mechanism such as a chief security officer position or
formal point of contact to coordinate security efforts for its federal
office building portfolio. As a result, GSA is less equipped to
effectively share information with FPS and tenant agencies, ensure that
FPS is fulfilling its responsibilities, track security expenditures,
and define its overall role in security--capabilities that GSA
officials were concerned the agency was lacking.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making two recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior and
one recommendation to the Administrator of GSA. First, to ensure that
useful information is available for decisions on resources for the
protection of national icons and monuments, we recommend that the
Secretary of the Interior link the results of the agency's risk
assessments and related risk rankings to its funding priorities.
Second, given the complex nature of the challenges Interior faces in
protecting national icons and monuments, the Secretary should also
develop guiding principles for balancing security initiatives with
Interior's core mission so that decision makers and stakeholders will
have a clearer, more transparent understanding of Interior's rationale
for security enhancements at individual assets. Regarding GSA, we
recommend that the Administrator establish a mechanism--such as a chief
security officer position or formal point of contact--that could serve
in a liaison role with FPS and tenant agencies, work to address the
challenges GSA faces related to security in buildings it owns and
leases, and enable GSA to define its overall role in security given the
transfer of FPS to DHS.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to Interior, GSA, and DHS for their
review and comment. Interior did not comment on our conclusions and
recommendations. However, Interior provided technical comments, which
we incorporated, where appropriate. GSA concurred with the report's
overall findings and stated that it concurs with the recommendation and
will address it. GSA comments are contained in appendix II. DHS
provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of the
Interior, Homeland Security, and the Administrator of GSA. Additional
copies will be sent to other interested Congressional Committees. We
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.
If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me on
(202) 512-2834 or at [Hyperlink, goldsteinm@gao.gov]. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Mark L. Goldstein:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to (1) identify any challenges that the Department
of the Interior (Interior) faces in protecting national icons and
monuments from terrorism, as well as related actions intended to
address these challenges, and similarly, (2) determine any challenges
the General Services Administration (GSA) faces related to the
protection of federal office buildings it owns or leases and the
actions that have been taken. To determine what challenges Interior and
GSA have faced in their efforts, we interviewed Interior and GSA
officials to identify the major challenges, and reviewed available
reports and other documents. In addition, in consultation with these
officials, we identified sites that are illustrative of these
challenges.
From the sites identified, we selected five Interior sites and three
GSA buildings for further analysis of the challenges. These eight sites
were geographically dispersed and represented a range of asset types,
including office buildings and national icons in both densely populated
and remote areas. The sites included, the Statue of Liberty, New York,
NY; Independence National Historical Park, Philadelphia, PA; Mt.
Rushmore National Memorial, Keystone, SD; Hoover Dam, Boulder City, NV;
the Washington Monument and Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials on the
National Mall in Washington, D.C.; and three major facilities in the
GSA inventory. Collectively, the sites we selected provided examples of
the range of challenges Interior and GSA reported facing. We included
the Hoover Dam because, in addition to being a source of hydropower,
the dam has iconic status and attracts large numbers of tourists. At
each site, we interviewed agency officials with primary responsibility
for security implementation, operation, and management. We toured each
site and observed the physical environment, the facilities, and the
principal security elements to gain firsthand insights on the
challenges. Furthermore, we interviewed stakeholders with significant
interest in the security program, including the National Parks
Conservation Association, the Commission on Fine Arts, the National
Capital Planning Commission, Independence Mall Business and Residents
Coalition, the National Coalition to Save our Mall, the U.S. Marshals
Service, a charitable organization, and local government and law
enforcement officials. We collected documents, when available, that
contained site-specific information on security plans, policies,
procedures, budgets and staffing. Finally, we considered prior GAO work
on challenges in facility protection and security.
To determine what actions have been taken by Interior and GSA to
address its challenges, we collected and analyzed documents from, and
conducted interviews with Interior and GSA officials. The documents
collected provided information on these agencies' past and present
security plans, policies and procedures, organizational structures,
funding and staffing. The interviews included officials from GSA's
Public Building Services and Interior's Office of Law Enforcement and
Security, National Park Service, and Bureau of Reclamation. We also
interviewed officials from the Federal Protective Service, which is
part of DHS and protects leased and owned GSA facilities. We reviewed
relevant laws and guidance including the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, and the
Interagency Security Committee Security Standards for Leased Space.
Additionally, we reviewed other pertinent reports, including the
National Strategy for Homeland Security[Footnote 20] and the National
Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and
Key Assets.[Footnote 21] We also considered past GAO work related to
facility protection and security issues at Interior and GSA, as well as
broader GAO work on homeland security issues.
Agency officials and the representatives of stakeholder organizations
provided much of the data and other information used in this report. In
cases where officials provided their views and opinions within the
context that they were speaking for their organization, we corroborated
the information with other officials. We requested official comments on
this report from Interior, GSA, and DHS.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the General Services Administration:
GSA Administrator:
May 5, 2005:
The Honorable David M. Walker:
Comptroller General of the United States:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Walker:
The General Services Administration (GSA) appreciates this opportunity
to submit agency comments on the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
"Draft Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, U.S.
House of Representatives, Homeland Security. Actions Needed to Better
Protect National Icons and Federal Office Buildings from Terrorism,"
GAO-05-367 (Draft Report). We agree with the draft report's findings
and recommendation concerning the challenges GSA faces related to
security in owned and leased buildings.
GSA shares GAO's concern about separating security from other real
property functions, such as site location, design, and construction for
new Federal buildings. We will continue to work closely with the
Federal Protective Service (FPS) in the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to protect Federal facilities and personnel. We will address
GAO's recommendation that GSA establish a mechanism-such as a chief
security officer position or formal point of contact-that could serve
in a liaison role with FPS and tenant agencies, work to address the
challenges GSA faces related to security in buildings under its custody
and control, and enable GSA to define its overall role in security
given the transfer of FPS to DHS.
If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me. Staff
inquiries may be directed to Mr. Anthony E. Costa, Deputy Commissioner,
Public Buildings Service, at (202) 501-1100.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Stephen A. Perry:
Administrator:
U.S. General Services Administration:
1800 F Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20405-0002:
Telephone: (202) 501-0800:
Fax: (202) 219-1243:
www.gsa.gov:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Mark Goldstein (202) 512-2834:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those individuals named above, David Sausville, Casey
Brown, Matt Cail, Erika Carter, Roshni Davé, Daniel Hoy, Anne Izod,
Donna Leiss, and Susan Michal-Smith were key contributors to this
report.
(543134):
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Homeland Security: Transformation Strategy Needed to Address
Challenges Facing the Federal Protective Service, GAO-04-537
(Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2004); GAO, Homeland Security: Further
Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal Agencies' Facility Protection
Efforts and Promote Key Practices, GAO-05-49 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
30, 2004).
[2] U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General,
Review of National Icon Park Security, Report 2003-I-0063 (Washington,
D.C.: August 2003).
[3] As we reported in GAO, Homeland Security: Communication Protocols
and Risk Communication Principles Can Assist in Refining the Advisory
System, GAO-04-682 (Washington, D.C.: June 2004), the Homeland Security
Advisory System is composed of five color-coded threat conditions,
which represent levels of risk related to potential terror attack. Red
is severe, orange high, yellow elevated, blue guarded, and green low.
[4] 2003-I-0063.
[5] The President of the United States, National Strategy for Homeland
Security (Washington, D.C.: July 2002).
[6] The President of the United States, National Strategy for the
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets
(Washington, D.C.: February 2003).
[7] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in
National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004).
[8] Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 7, Critical
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003).
[9] U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General,
Disquieting State of Disorder: An Assessment of Department of the
Interior Law Enforcement, Report 2002-I-0014 (Washington, D.C.: January
2002).
[10] 2002-I-0014.
[11] President's Commission on the United States Postal Service,
Embracing the Future: Making the Tough Choices to Preserve Universal
Mail Service (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2003).
[12] Public Works and Government Services Canada, A Legacy for Future
Generations: The Long-Term Vision and Plan for the Parliamentary
Precinct.
[13] According to Department of Justice standards, a Level IV facility
has over 450 federal employees. In addition, the facility likely has
more than 150,000 square feet; a high volume of public contact; and
tenant agencies that may include high-risk law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, courts, judicial offices, and highly sensitive
government records.
[14] Executive Order 13286 dated February 28, 2003, amended numerous
executive orders to reflect the transfer of certain functions and
responsibilities to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Section 23 of
the Executive Order transferred the ISC chairmanship responsibility
from GSA to DHS.
[15] As of September 30, 2003, FPS had approximately 1,100 uniformed
officer full-time equivalents and 13,000 contract guards to protect GSA-
owned or-occupied facilities.
[16] GAO-04-537.
[17] General Services Administration, Office of the Inspector General,
Updated Assessment of GSA's Major Management Challenges (Washington,
D.C.: August 2004). The other major management challenges the IG
identified were procurement activities, contract management,
information technology, management controls, aging federal buildings,
and human capital.
[18] GAO, Building Security: Security Responsibilities for Federally
Owned and Leased Facilities, GAO-03-8 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31,
2002).
[19] ASIS International has over 33,000 security industry members and
according to its Web site is the preeminent international organization
for professionals responsible for security, including managers and
directors of security.
[20] The President of the United States, National Strategy for Homeland
Security (Washington, D.C.: July 2002).
[21] The President of the United States, National Strategy for the
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets,
(Washington, D.C.: February 2003).
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