Indian Irrigation Projects
Numerous Issues Need to Be Addressed to Improve Project Management and Financial Sustainability Gao ID: GAO-06-314 February 24, 2006The Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) manages 16 irrigation projects on Indian reservations in the western United States. These projects, which were generally constructed in the late 1800s and early 1900s, include water storage facilities and delivery structures for agricultural purposes. Serious concerns have arisen about their maintenance and management. GAO was asked to examine (1) BIA's estimated deferred maintenance cost for its 16 irrigation projects, (2) what shortcomings, if any, exist in BIA's current management of its irrigation projects, and (3) any issues that need to be addressed to determine the long-term direction of BIA's irrigation program.
BIA estimated the cost for deferred maintenance at its 16 irrigation projects at about $850 million for 2005, although the agency is in the midst of refining this estimate. BIA acknowledges that this estimate is a work in progress, in part, because some projects incorrectly counted new construction items as deferred maintenance. To further refine its estimate, BIA plans to hire engineering and irrigation experts to conduct thorough condition assessments of all 16 irrigation projects to correctly identify deferred maintenance needs and costs. BIA's management of some of its irrigation projects has serious shortcomings that undermine effective decisionmaking about project operations and maintenance. First, under BIA's organizational structure, officials with the authority to oversee irrigation project managers generally lack the technical expertise needed to do so effectively, while the staff that have the expertise lack the necessary authority. Second, despite federal regulations that require BIA to consult with project stakeholders in setting project priorities, BIA has not consistently provided project stakeholders with the necessary information or opportunities to participate in project decisionmaking. The long-term direction of BIA's irrigation program depends on the resolution of several larger issues. Of most importance, BIA does not know to what extent its irrigation projects are capable of financially sustaining themselves, which hinders its ability to address long-standing concerns regarding inadequate funding. Information on financial sustainability, along with accurate deferred maintenance information, are two critical pieces of information that are needed to have a debate on the long-term direction of BIA's irrigation program. Once this information is available, the Congress and interested parties will be able to address how the deferred maintenance will be funded and whether entities other than BIA could more appropriately manage some or all of the projects.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-314, Indian Irrigation Projects: Numerous Issues Need to Be Addressed to Improve Project Management and Financial Sustainability
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate:
February 2006:
Indian Irrigation Projects:
Numerous Issues Need to Be Addressed to Improve Project Management and
Financial Sustainability:
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-314]:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-314, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Interior and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, U.S.
Senate:
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of the Interior‘s Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) manages
16 irrigation projects on Indian reservations in the western United
States. These projects, which were generally constructed in the late
1800s and early 1900s, include water storage facilities and delivery
structures for agricultural purposes. Serious concerns have arisen
about their maintenance and management.
GAO was asked to examine (1) BIA‘s estimated deferred maintenance cost
for its 16 irrigation projects, (2) what shortcomings, if any, exist in
BIA‘s current management of its irrigation projects, and (3) any issues
that need to be addressed to determine the long-term direction of BIA‘s
irrigation program.
What GAO Found:
BIA estimated the cost for deferred maintenance at its 16 irrigation
projects at about $850 million for 2005, although the agency is in the
midst of refining this estimate. BIA acknowledges that this estimate is
a work in progress, in part, because some projects incorrectly counted
new construction items as deferred maintenance. To further refine its
estimate, BIA plans to hire engineering and irrigation experts to
conduct thorough condition assessments of all 16 irrigation projects to
correctly identify deferred maintenance needs and costs.
BIA‘s management of some of its irrigation projects has serious
shortcomings that undermine effective decisionmaking about project
operations and maintenance. First, under BIA‘s organizational
structure, officials with the authority to oversee irrigation project
managers generally lack the technical expertise needed to do so
effectively, while the staff that have the expertise lack the necessary
authority. Second, despite federal regulations that require BIA to
consult with project stakeholders in setting project priorities, BIA
has not consistently provided project stakeholders with the necessary
information or opportunities to participate in project decisionmaking.
The long-term direction of BIA‘s irrigation program depends on the
resolution of several larger issues. Of most importance, BIA does not
know to what extent its irrigation projects are capable of financially
sustaining themselves, which hinders its ability to address long-
standing concerns regarding inadequate funding. Information on
financial sustainability, along with accurate deferred maintenance
information, are two critical pieces of information that are needed to
have a debate on the long-term direction of BIA‘s irrigation program.
Once this information is available, the Congress and interested parties
will be able to address how the deferred maintenance will be funded and
whether entities other than BIA could more appropriately manage some or
all of the projects.
Deferred Maintenance at the Crow Irrigation Project (March 2005):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that BIA (1) provide the necessary level of technical
support to project managers, (2) require project managers to meet at
least twice annually with water users, and (3) conduct studies to
determine the financial sustainability of the projects.
Although we requested comments from the Department of the Interior on
our findings and recommendations, none were provided in time to be
included as part of this report.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-314.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Robin M. Nazzaro at
(202)512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
BIA Estimates the Cost of Deferred Maintenance at about $850 Million,
but the Estimate Is Being Refined:
Shortcomings in BIA's Management of Some Irrigation Projects Undermine
Effective Decisionmaking:
Long-Term Direction of BIA's Irrigation Program Depends on Resolution
of a Number of Larger Issues:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Profiles of the Nine Irrigation Projects GAO Visited:
Blackfeet Irrigation Project:
Colorado River Irrigation Project:
Crow Irrigation Project:
Fort Belknap Irrigation Project:
Pine River Irrigation Project:
San Carlos Indian Works Irrigation Project (Pima):
San Carlos Joint Works Irrigation Project (Coolidge):
Wapato Irrigation Project:
Wind River Irrigation Project:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Tribe(s) Served and Year Authorized for BIA's 16 Irrigation
Projects:
Table 2: Land Ownership for BIA's 16 Irrigation Projects:
Figures:
Figure 1: Location of BIA's 16 Irrigation Projects by Region:
Figure 2: Example of an Irrigation Project Operated by BIA:
Figure 3: Examples of Deferred Maintenance on BIA's Irrigation Projects
(c. 2005):
Figure 4: Fiscal Year 2005 Cost Estimate of Deferred Maintenance by
Irrigation Project:
Figure 5: Fiscal Year 2005 Cost Estimate of Deferred Maintenance by
Type:
Figure 6: Misalignment of Expertise and Authority for a Typical BIA
Irrigation Project:
Figure 7: Opportunities for Water Users to Meet with BIA Varies by
Project:
Figure 8: Pictures of the Blackfeet Irrigation Project (July 2005):
Figure 9: Pictures of the Colorado River Irrigation Project (June
2005):
Figure 10: Pictures of the Crow Irrigation Project (March 2005):
Figure 11: Pictures of the Fort Belknap Irrigation Project (July 2005):
Figure 12: Pictures of the Pine River Irrigation Project (August 2005):
Figure 13: Pictures of the San Carlos Indian Works Irrigation Project
(June 2005):
Figure 14: Pictures of the San Carlos Joint Works Irrigation Project
(June 2005):
Figure 15: Pictures of the Wapato Irrigation Project (April 2005):
Figure 16: Pictures of the Wind River Irrigation Project (July 2005):
Abbreviation:
BIA: Bureau of Indian Affairs:
Letter February 24, 2006:
The Honorable Conrad Burns:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The scarcity of water in the western part of the United States makes
irrigation critical to the continued success of agricultural
activities. There are over 100 irrigation works on Indian reservations
primarily across the western United States. The Department of the
Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), which is responsible for
providing social and economic services to Indians, as well as managing
land and natural resources held in trust by the United States for
Indians, currently refers to these irrigation works as either
"irrigation projects" or "irrigation systems." There are 16 irrigation
projects where water users are charged for the operation and
maintenance of the irrigation works by BIA. The remaining systems, on
which BIA does not charge an annual operation and maintenance fee, are
operated and maintained through a collaborative effort which generally
involves other BIA programs, tribes, and water users.
The 16 irrigation projects, which were generally initiated in the late
1800s and early 1900s by the Department of the Interior, include water
storage facilities and delivery structures for agricultural purposes.
The projects were constructed as part of the federal government's
Indian assimilation policy to foster agricultural opportunities and
provide economic benefits to Indian communities. Over time, non-Indians
began buying or leasing the land served by the projects for
agricultural purposes, and project stakeholders evolved from Indian
water users and the tribes within the reservations to include non-
Indian water users as well. Many of the water users today are non-
Indian.
A number of prior reports on BIA's irrigation projects have documented
that the annual operations and maintenance fees have historically been
set too low to cover the full cost of running the projects.[Footnote 1]
In addition, problems have been reported with collecting the fees that
have been assessed. Because of insufficient funding, project
maintenance has been consistently postponed, resulting in an extensive
and costly list of deferred maintenance items. The kinds of such
deferred maintenance range from repairing or replacing dilapidated
irrigation structures to clearing weeds from irrigation ditches. In
addition to the deferred maintenance, water users have expressed
concern that BIA has been unresponsive in addressing the projects'
ongoing operations and maintenance needs.
The 16 irrigation projects are located in 4 of BIA's 12 regions--Rocky
Mountain, Northwest, Southwest, and Western. Management of these
projects is decentralized, with local or regional BIA offices
responsible for project management. Fourteen projects are overseen by
local BIA agency superintendents, and the 2 largest projects are
overseen directly by regional directors. The agency superintendents
that oversee projects report to their respective regional director.
BIA's irrigation and engineering experts, who provide technical
assistance to the projects, are located in each region as well as in
the BIA central Irrigation, Power, and Safety of Dams offices (central
irrigation offices) located in Washington, D.C., and other BIA
locations in the western United States. The regional irrigation staff
and central irrigation office staff do not have line authority over the
projects.
Federal regulations specify that in making judgments about the work and
actions necessary for the proper operation, maintenance and
administration of the projects, the official in charge "— consults with
water users and their representatives, and with tribal council
representatives, and seeks advice on matters of program priorities and
operational policies."[Footnote 2] Furthermore, the regulations state
that "close cooperation between the Indian tribal councils, the project
waters users and the Officer-In-Charge [of the project] is necessary
and will be to the advantage of the entire project."[Footnote 3] BIA's
irrigation manual and handbook also contain language directing project
staff to involve project stakeholders in the management of the
projects.
In response to ongoing concerns about maintenance and management of the
irrigation projects, in December 2003 Senator Conrad Burns and
Congressman Dennis Rehberg, both of Montana, sponsored a town hall
meeting with local water users and BIA officials to discuss problems at
BIA's irrigation projects. In this context, we were asked to examine
(1) BIA's estimated deferred maintenance cost for its 16 irrigation
projects; (2) what shortcomings, if any, exist in BIA's current
management of its irrigation projects; and (3) any issues that need to
be addressed to determine the long-term direction of BIA's irrigation
program.
To address the objectives of this report, we collected documentation on
BIA's 16 irrigation projects from officials in BIA's central irrigation
office, and we visited and collected information from each of BIA's
four regional offices that oversee the 16 irrigation projects. We also
visited 9 of the 16 projects, where we collected project-specific
information from BIA officials and project stakeholders. We also met
with and collected documentation from the Department of the Interior's
Bureau of Reclamation, the primary agency responsible for irrigation
management, for comparative purposes. Specifically, to examine
estimated deferred maintenance costs, we reviewed BIA's lists of
deferred maintenance items and cost estimates, and the methodology BIA
used to develop these lists and estimates. We concluded that these data
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report based on a
review of relevant controls, reliability tests, and interviews with
agency officials about the collection and management of the data. We
did not develop our own estimate of deferred maintenance. To determine
what, if any, management shortcomings exist, we reviewed relevant
federal regulations and agency guidance, and analyzed BIA-wide and
project-specific management protocols and systems for the 9 projects we
visited. Finally, to determine any issues needing to be addressed to
determine the long-term direction of the projects, we reviewed prior
studies on BIA's irrigation program and we discussed the long-term
direction of the program with BIA irrigation officials and project
stakeholders. A more detailed description of our objectives, scope and
methodology can be found in appendix I. We performed our work between
March 2005 and February 2006 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
BIA has estimated the cost for deferred maintenance at its 16
irrigation projects at about $850 million for 2005, although the agency
is in the midst of refining this estimate. BIA defines deferred
maintenance as upkeep, such as removing weeds from irrigation ditches
or repairing irrigation structures, that is postponed until some future
time. As part of its ongoing strategy to develop a cost figure for the
projects' total deferred maintenance, BIA had initially estimated this
cost at approximately $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2004. This estimate
was based, in part, on preliminary condition assessments of structures
and equipment at each of the 16 irrigation projects using a scale of
good, fair, poor, critical, and abandoned. The assessment of the
structures consisted of visual inspections generally conducted by
nonengineers. BIA acknowledged that the 2004 estimate would need
revision largely for three reasons: the individuals who conducted the
assessments did not have irrigation or engineering expertise, not all
projects used the same methodology to develop their deferred
maintenance estimates, and some projects incorrectly counted new
construction items as deferred maintenance. To improve its estimate in
2005, BIA implemented a facilities management system designed to help
projects track and continuously update deferred maintenance
information. BIA technical experts from the central irrigation office
conducted training for BIA irrigation projects on how to use this
system, as well as how to correctly define deferred maintenance.
Projects used this system to revise their list of deferred maintenance
items and associated cost estimates in fiscal year 2005, resulting in a
lower total deferred maintenance estimate of about $850 million.
However, some projects continued to classify items as deferred
maintenance when they were actually new construction, and some provided
BIA with incomplete information. To further refine the cost estimate,
BIA plans to hire experts in engineering and irrigation to conduct
thorough condition assessments of all 16 irrigation projects every 5
years to identify deferred maintenance needs and costs. The first such
assessment was completed in July 2005, with all 16 assessments expected
to be completed by 2010.
BIA's management of some of its irrigation projects has serious
shortcomings that undermine effective decisionmaking about project
operations and maintenance. First, under BIA's organizational
structure, in many cases, officials with the authority to oversee
project managers' decisionmaking lack the technical expertise needed to
do so effectively, while the staff who do have the expertise lack the
necessary authority. The BIA regional directors, agency superintendents
and deputy superintendents that oversee the projects do not generally
have engineering or irrigation expertise and they rely heavily on the
project managers to run the projects. However, this process breaks down
when the project managers themselves do not have the expertise required
for the position--that is, in cases in which BIA has had difficulty
filling project manager vacancies and has, as a result, hired less
qualified people. For example, at the Crow project in 2002, a project
manager with insufficient expertise decided to repair a minor leak in a
key water delivery structure by dismantling it and replacing it with a
different type of structure. The new structure was subsequently deemed
inadequate by BIA's irrigation experts, and the required reconstruction
delayed water delivery by about a month. Furthermore, the BIA staff
with such expertise--regional irrigation engineers and central
irrigation office staff--have no authority over the 16 projects. A
second serious management shortcoming involves the extent to which some
projects involve stakeholders in decisionmaking. Despite federal
regulations that require BIA to consult with project stakeholders in
setting project priorities, BIA has not consistently provided the
information or opportunities necessary for stakeholders--both Indian
and non-Indian water users--to participate in decisionmaking about
project operations and maintenance. For example, the Wapato Irrigation
Project shares little information on its spending with stakeholders,
and the Pine River Irrigation Project does not meet with its non-tribal
stakeholders, limiting stakeholders' ability to have an impact on
project decisions and BIA's ability to benefit from this input.
The long-term direction of BIA's irrigation program depends on the
resolution of several larger issues. Of most importance, BIA does not
know to what extent its irrigation projects are capable of financially
sustaining themselves, which hinders its ability to address long-
standing concerns regarding inadequate funding. The projects were
constructed without consideration for whether they could generate
adequate income to be self-supporting, yet since the 1960s many have
been considered generally self-supporting through fees paid by water
users. The future of BIA's irrigation program also depends on the
resolution of how the deferred maintenance will be funded. BIA
currently has no plan for how it will obtain funding to fix the
deferred maintenance items. Regardless of the precise cost estimate for
total deferred maintenance, funding deferred maintenance costs in the
hundreds of millions of dollars will be a significant challenge in
times of tight budgets and competing priorities. In the interim, the
Congress has appropriated approximately $7.5 million for some of BIA's
irrigation projects for fiscal year 2006. Finally, it might be more
appropriate for other entities, including other federal agencies,
tribes, and water users, to manage some or all of the projects. Given
that BIA must balance irrigation management with its many other
missions in support of Indian communities, such as providing education
and law enforcement, it may be beneficial to consider whether others
for whom irrigation is more of a priority or an area of expertise could
better manage some of the projects. Successful management of the
projects by other groups, however, would depend on the characteristics
of each project and its stakeholders. For example, turning over
projects to tribes may be better suited to projects where most of the
water users are Indian, whereas turning over projects to water users
would be better suited to projects where water users share similar
interests and have a desire to organize into an irrigation district or
association.
To improve the ongoing day-to-day management of the projects in the
short-term, we are recommending that the Secretary of the Interior
direct the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs to provide the
necessary level of technical support for project managers who have less
than the desired level of engineering qualifications and to adequately
involve project stakeholders in the management of the projects. To
address the long-term financial sustainability of the projects, we are
recommending that the Secretary direct the Assistant Secretary for
Indian Affairs to conduct studies to determine the extent to which
projects are capable of sustaining themselves. Information on financial
sustainability, along with accurate deferred maintenance information,
are two critical pieces of information that are needed to have a debate
on the long-term direction of BIA's irrigation program. Once this
information is available, the Congress and interested parties will be
able to address how the deferred maintenance will be funded and whether
entities other than BIA could more appropriately manage some or all of
the projects. Since how to fund the deferred maintenance and who should
manage the projects are future policy issues for the Congress to decide
in collaboration with all interested parties, we are not making any
specific recommendations to address them. Although we requested
comments from the Department of the Interior on our findings and
recommendations, none were provided in time to be included as part of
this report.
Background:
BIA's irrigation program was initiated in the late 1800s, as part of
the federal government's Indian assimilation policy, and it was
originally designed to provide economic development opportunities for
Indians through agriculture. The Act of July 4, 1884, provided the
Secretary of the Interior $50,000 for the general development of
irrigation on Indian lands.[Footnote 4] Over the years, the Congress
continued to pass additional legislation authorizing and funding
irrigation facilities on Indian lands.
BIA's irrigation program includes over 100 "irrigation systems" and
"irrigation projects" that irrigate approximately 1 million acres
primarily across the West. BIA's irrigation systems are non revenue-
generating facilities that are primarily used for subsistence gardening
and they are operated and maintained through a collaborative effort
which generally involves other BIA programs, tribes, and water users.
In contrast, BIA's 16 irrigation projects charge their water users an
annual operations and maintenance fee to fund the cost of operating and
maintaining the project.[Footnote 5] Most of BIA's irrigation projects
are considered self-supporting through these operations and maintenance
fees. The 16 irrigation projects are located on Indian reservations
across the agency's Rocky Mountain, Northwest, Southwest, and Western
regions (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Location of BIA's 16 Irrigation Projects by Region:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
BIA's management of the 16 irrigation projects is decentralized, with
regional and local BIA offices responsible for day-to-day operations
and maintenance. Table 1 provides the tribe or tribes served by each of
the 16 irrigation projects along with the year each project was
originally authorized.
Table 1: Tribe(s) Served and Year Authorized for BIA's 16 Irrigation
Projects:
Irrigation project: Blackfeet;
Tribe(s) served: Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation of
Montana;
Year authorized: 1907.
Irrigation project: Colorado River;
Tribe(s) served: Colorado River Indian Tribes of the Colorado River
Indian Reservation, Arizona and California;
Year authorized: 1867.
Irrigation project: Crow;
Tribe(s) served: Crow Tribe of Montana;
Year authorized: 1890.
Irrigation project: Duck Valley;
Tribe(s) served: Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Reservation,
Nevada;
Year authorized: [A].
Irrigation project: Flathead;
Tribe(s) served: Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation, Montana;
Year authorized: 1904.
Irrigation project: Fort Belknap;
Tribe(s) served: Fort Belknap Indian Community of the Fort Belknap
Reservation of Montana;
Year authorized: 1895.
Irrigation project: Fort Hall;
Tribe(s) served: Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation
of Idaho;
Year authorized: 1894.
Irrigation project: Fort Peck;
Tribe(s) served: Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian
Reservation, Montana;
Year authorized: 1908.
Irrigation project: Fort Yuma[B];
Tribe(s) served: Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation,
California & Arizona;
Year authorized: 1904.
Irrigation project: Pine River;
Tribe(s) served: Southern Ute Indian Tribe of the Southern Ute
Reservation, Colorado;
Year authorized: [A].
Irrigation project: San Carlos Indian Works;
Tribe(s) served: Gila River Indian Community of the Gila River Indian
Reservation, Arizona;
Year authorized: 1924.
Irrigation project: San Carlos Joint Works;
Tribe(s) served: Gila River Indian Community of the Gila River Indian
Reservation, Arizona;
Year authorized: 1924.
Irrigation project: Uintah;
Tribe(s) served: Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation,
Utah;
Year authorized: 1906.
Irrigation project: Walker River;
Tribe(s) served: Walker River Paiute Tribe of the Walker River
Reservation, Nevada;
Year authorized: [A].
Irrigation project: Wapato;
Tribe(s) served: Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation,
Washington;
Year authorized: 1904.
Irrigation project: Wind River;
Tribe(s) served: Arapahoe Tribe of the Wind River Reservation, Wyoming
and the Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Reservation, Wyoming;
Year authorized: 1905.
Source: GAO.
[A] No specific authorization date.
[B] The Fort Yuma Irrigation Project is operated and maintained by the
Bureau of Reclamation. The operations and maintenance fees collected by
BIA for the project are turned over to the Bureau of Reclamation.
[End of table]
The irrigation facilities constructed by BIA included a range of
structures for storing and delivering water for agricultural purposes.
Figure 2 highlights an example of the key structural features found on
BIA's irrigation projects.
Figure 2: Example of an Irrigation Project Operated by BIA:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The beneficiaries of BIA's projects have evolved over time and at
present are quite diverse. Over the years, non-Indians have bought or
leased a significant portion of the land served by BIA's irrigation
program. As a result, current water users on BIA's projects include the
tribes, individual Indian landowners, non-Indian landowners, and non-
Indian lessees of Indian lands. The extent of non-Indian landownership
and leasing ranges significantly across BIA's irrigation projects (see
table 2). For example, 100 percent of the land served by the Colorado
River Irrigation Project is Indian owned, while only about 10 percent
of the land served by the Flathead Irrigation Project is Indian owned.
Table 2: Land Ownership for BIA's 16 Irrigation Projects:
Irrigation project: Colorado River;
Total assessed acreage: 79,350;
Percentage of Indian owned land: 100;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 0.
Irrigation project: Duck Valley;
Total assessed acreage: 12,923;
Percentage of Indian owned land: 100;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 0.
Irrigation project: Fort Yuma[A];
Total assessed acreage: 7,524;
Percentage of Indian owned land: 100;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 0.
Irrigation project: San Carlos Indian Works;
Total assessed acreage: 50,000[B];
Percentage of Indian owned land: 99;
Percentage of non- Indian owned land: 1.
Irrigation project: Fort Belknap;
Total assessed acreage: 9,900;
Percentage of Indian owned land: 92;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 8.
Irrigation project: Walker River;
Total assessed acreage: 2,100;
Percentage of Indian owned land: 90;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 10.
Irrigation project: Pine River;
Total assessed acreage: 11,855;
Percentage of Indian owned land: 85;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 15.
Irrigation project: Fort Hall;
Total assessed acreage: 72,201;
Percentage of Indian owned land: 80;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 20.
Irrigation project: Wind River;
Total assessed acreage: 38,300;
Percentage of Indian owned land: 67;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 33.
Irrigation project: Blackfeet;
Total assessed acreage: 38,300;
Percentage of Indian owned land: 60;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 40.
Irrigation project: Wapato;
Total assessed acreage: 96,443;
Percentage of Indian owned land: 60;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 40.
Irrigation project: Crow;
Total assessed acreage: 38,900;
Percentage of Indian owned land: 56;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 44.
Irrigation project: Fort Peck;
Total assessed acreage: 18,800;
Percentage of Indian owned land: 53;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 47.
Irrigation project: Uintah;
Total assessed acreage: 62,200;
Percentage of Indian owned land: 52;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 48.
Irrigation project: San Carlos Joint Works;
Total assessed acreage: 100,000[B];
Percentage of Indian owned land: 50;
Percentage of non- Indian owned land: 50.
Irrigation project: Flathead;
Total assessed acreage: 128,105;
Percentage of Indian owned land: 10;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 90.
Irrigation project: Total;
Total assessed acreage: 716,901[B];
Percentage of Indian owned land: 57;
Percentage of non-Indian owned land: 43.
Source: GAO analysis of BIA data.
[A] The Fort Yuma Irrigation Project is operated and maintained by the
Bureau of Reclamation. The operations and maintenance fees collected by
BIA for the project are turned over to the Bureau of Reclamation.
[B] The acreage for the San Carlos Indian Works is also included in the
acreage for the San Carlos Joint Works. In calculating the total
acreage, the acreage for the San Carlos Indian Works is only counted
once.
[End of table]
Federal regulations and internal BIA guidance require that BIA
collaborate with water users, both Indian and non-Indian, in managing
the irrigation projects. For example, federal regulations state that
close cooperation between BIA and water users is necessary and that the
BIA official in charge of each project is responsible for consulting
with all water users in setting program priorities.[Footnote 6] In
addition, BIA's manual requires that BIA "provide opportunities for
water user participation in matters relating to irrigation project
operations" and that BIA's officer-in-charge "meet regularly with water
users to discuss proposed [operation and maintenance] assessment rates
— [and] general operations and maintenance." Although BIA guidance does
not define "regularly," BIA's Irrigation Handbook explicitly recommends
that project staff meet at least twice annually to discuss work
performed over the course of the year and allow for water user feedback
and suggestions for the coming year. Furthermore, BIA's Irrigation
Handbook states that, at a minimum, BIA should discuss annual project
budgets and work plans with water users.
Since their inception, BIA's 16 irrigation projects have been plagued
by maintenance concerns. Construction of the projects was never fully
completed, resulting in structural deficiencies that have continually
hindered project operations and efficiency. In addition, water users
and BIA have reported that operations and maintenance fees provide
insufficient funding for project operations. Due to insufficient
funding, project maintenance has been consistently postponed, resulting
in an extensive and costly list of deferred maintenance items. Such
deferred maintenance ranges from repairing or replacing dilapidated
irrigation structures to clearing weeds from irrigation ditches.
In addition, concerns regarding BIA's management of the projects have
been raised for years, particularly in regard to its financial
management practices. For example, problems concerning BIA's billing
practices for its operations and maintenance fees have been raised by
many, prompting independent review on more than one occasion. We and
the Department of the Interior's Inspector General have both identified
serious problems with the land use records BIA has used to develop its
annual operations and maintenance bills.[Footnote 7] In response, BIA
instituted a new financial management system called the National
Irrigation Information Management System, which has begun to address
some of the billing errors. However, concerns still exist regarding the
accuracy of the data in the billing system. The accuracy of some of the
information in the irrigation billing system is dependent on the
irrigation program receiving accurate and timely information from other
BIA programs, such as land ownership and leasing information from BIA's
Real Estate Services program.
In 2001, the Yakama tribe and individual tribal members filed appeals
challenging the Wapato Irrigation Project's operation and maintenance
fees for the pre-2000 and year 2000 bills. Furthermore, the Wapato
Irrigation Project agreed to not send any bills to the tribe or its
members since 2001. Although a settlement is under discussion, in the
interim the Wapato Irrigation Project has not been able to collect
about $2 million, annually, of its expected revenue.
BIA Estimates the Cost of Deferred Maintenance at about $850 Million,
but the Estimate Is Being Refined:
According to BIA's latest estimate, it will cost about $850 million to
complete the deferred maintenance on all of its 16 irrigation projects;
but this estimate is still being refined. BIA initially estimated its
deferred maintenance costs at over $1 billion in fiscal year 2004, but
acknowledged that this estimate was preliminary and would need to be
revised largely because it incorrectly included new construction items
and was developed by non-engineers. BIA revised this estimate downward
in fiscal year 2005 based on the implementation of a new facilities
management system. However, BIA plans to further refine this estimate
since some projects continued to incorrectly count new construction
items as deferred maintenance.
In 2004, BIA Initially Estimated Completing the Deferred Maintenance
Would Cost Over $1 Billion:
As part of its ongoing effort to identify the needs and costs of
deferred maintenance on its 16 irrigation projects, BIA estimated in
fiscal year 2004 that it would cost approximately $1.2 billion to
complete all deferred maintenance. This initial estimate was based, in
part, on preliminary condition assessments of irrigation structures and
equipment for each of BIA's 16 irrigation projects. These preliminary
condition assessments generally consisted of visual inspections to
classify each project's structure and equipment using a scale of good,
fair, poor, critical and abandoned based on the apparent level of
disrepair. BIA staff then estimated how much it would cost to repair
each item based on its condition classification.
BIA generally defines deferred maintenance as upkeep that is postponed
until some future time.[Footnote 8] Deferred maintenance varies from
project to project and ranges from cleaning weeds and trees which
divert water from irrigation ditches, to repairing leaky or crumbling
check gates designed to regulate water flow, to resloping eroded canal
banks to optimize water flow. Figure 3 shows examples of deferred
maintenance on some of the irrigation projects we visited (clockwise
from the upper left, figure 3 shows (1) a defunct check gate and
overgrown irrigation ditch at the Fort Belknap Irrigation Project, (2)
a cattle-crossing eroding a canal bank and impairing water flow at the
Wind River Irrigation Project, (3) a crumbling irrigation structure at
the Crow Irrigation Project, and (4) a check gate leaking water at the
Colorado River Irrigation Project). For detailed information on key
maintenance issues for each of the nine projects we visited, see
appendix II.
Figure 3: Examples of Deferred Maintenance on BIA's Irrigation Projects
(c. 2005):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
BIA officials acknowledged that their fiscal year 2004 deferred
maintenance estimate was only a starting point and that it needed to be
revised for three key reasons: (1) the individuals who conducted the
assessments were not knowledgeable about irrigation projects or
infrastructure; (2) not all projects used the same methodology to
develop their deferred maintenance cost estimates; and (3) some
projects incorrectly counted new construction items as deferred
maintenance.
* BIA's preliminary condition assessments were conducted by computer
specialists, rather than by people with the expertise in irrigation or
engineering needed to accurately assess project infrastructure. BIA
contracted with geographic information system experts primarily to
catalogue the structures on each project. These geographic information
system experts also observed the condition of the structures they
catalogued and classified the condition of each structure, based on the
level of apparent disrepair, as part of the overall effort to inventory
and map key structures on each project. Consequently, some items
identified as being in "poor" condition may in fact be structurally
sound but simply appear cosmetically dilapidated, whereas other
structures classified as being in "good" condition may in fact be
structurally dilapidated but appear cosmetically sound. For example,
according to BIA staff at the Colorado River Irrigation Project, the
recent repainting of certain check gates disguised severe rust and
structural deterioration of key metal parts.
* BIA staff used inconsistent methodologies to develop the cost
estimates for deferred maintenance. According to BIA staff, the
deferred maintenance cost estimates were developed by different people,
sometimes using different or unknown methodologies for assigning cost
values to deferred maintenance items. For example, some projects
developed their own cost estimates and sent them to BIA's central
office for inclusion in its overall figures, while BIA regional staff
developed cost estimates for other projects based, in part, on
information from BIA's preliminary condition assessments.
* Some projects incorrectly included new construction items as deferred
maintenance. According to BIA, work that would expand a project or its
facilities should not be categorized as deferred maintenance.
Therefore, expanding an existing water delivery system or constructing
a new building is not deferred maintenance. However, some projects
incorrectly counted new construction items as deferred maintenance. For
example, the Fort Hall Irrigation Project included increasing the
capacity of its main canal for about $15.3 million, the Duck Valley
Irrigation Project included building new canals for about $1.3 million,
and the Flathead Irrigation Project included building a new warehouse
for about $147,000.
In 2005, BIA Revised the Estimate Downward to about $850 Million, but
It Is Still a Work in Progress:
To improve the accuracy of its deferred maintenance estimate in 2005
and to help staff develop, track, and continuously update deferred
maintenance lists and cost estimates, BIA implemented MAXIMO--a
facilities management system linked to the geographic information
system mapping inventory developed from its preliminary condition
assessments.[Footnote 9] Using data from MAXIMO, BIA revised its total
deferred maintenance estimate for the irrigation projects downward to
about $850 million for fiscal year 2005. Figure 4 shows the current
deferred maintenance cost estimate for each of the 16 projects. In the
summer of 2005, BIA technical experts from the central irrigation
office conducted training for BIA irrigation projects on how to use
MAXIMO to enter information on maintenance needs, and how to correctly
define deferred maintenance. Projects used this system to revise their
list of deferred maintenance items and associated cost estimates in
fiscal year 2005. While MAXIMO is still being tailored to the needs of
the irrigation program, its implementation generally standardized the
process for identifying and calculating deferred maintenance among
projects.
Figure 4: Fiscal Year 2005 Cost Estimate of Deferred Maintenance by
Irrigation Project:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Despite the implementation of MAXIMO, BIA's fiscal year 2005 estimate
of deferred maintenance is still inaccurate for the following reasons:
* Some projects continued to incorrectly count certain items as
deferred maintenance. Despite training, some projects continued to
incorrectly count certain items, such as new construction items and
vehicles, as deferred maintenance. For example, the Fort Hall
Irrigation Project included the installation of permanent diversion
structures for about $2.1 million, the Wapato Irrigation Project
included constructing reservoirs for about $640,000, and the San Carlos
Indian Works Irrigation Project included building a new office for
about $286,000. In addition, some projects included the cost of
repairing vehicles or buying new ones in their deferred maintenance
estimates, despite BIA's new guidance that such items are not deferred
maintenance. According to BIA officials, while projects can consider
the weed clearing postponed due to broken vehicles as deferred
maintenance, the delayed repair of the vehicle itself is not deferred
maintenance. For example, the Wind River Irrigation Project included an
excavator vehicle for about $500,000 and the Crow Irrigation Project
included dump trucks for about $430,000.
* Some projects provided BIA with incomplete information. According to
BIA officials, some projects did not do thorough assessments of their
deferred maintenance needs, and some may not be including legitimate
deferred maintenance items, such as re-sloping canal banks that have
eroded by crossing cattle or overgrown vegetation. Moreover, both the
Walker River and the Uintah Irrigation Projects failed to provide
information detailing their deferred maintenance costs, and several
projects lumped items together as "other" with little or no explanatory
information other than "miscellaneous"--accounting for almost one-
third of BIA's total deferred maintenance cost estimate for its
irrigation projects (see fig. 5).
* BIA made errors when compiling the total deferred maintenance cost
estimates. For example, BIA inadvertently double-counted the estimate
provided by the Colorado River Irrigation Project when compiling the
overall cost estimate, according to BIA officials. Additionally, BIA
officials erroneously estimated costs for all structures, such as
flumes and check gates, based on the full replacement values even when
items were in good or fair condition and needed only repairs. These
structures account for over one-third of BIA's total deferred
maintenance estimate (see fig. 5).
While the inclusion of incorrect items and calculation errors likely
overestimate BIA's total deferred maintenance costs, the incomplete
information provided by some projects may underestimate total costs.
Figure 5: Fiscal Year 2005 Cost Estimate of Deferred Maintenance by
Type:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
To further refine its cost estimate and to develop more comprehensive
deferred maintenance lists, BIA plans to hire experts in engineering
and irrigation to periodically conduct thorough condition assessments
of all 16 irrigation projects to identify deferred maintenance needs
and costs. According to BIA officials, these thorough condition
assessments are expected to more accurately reflect each project's
actual deferred maintenance, in part because experts in engineering and
irrigation who can differentiate between structural and cosmetic
problems will conduct them. These assessments will also help BIA
prioritize the allocation of potential funds to complete deferred
maintenance items because they will assign a prioritization rating to
each deferred maintenance item based on the estimated repair or
replacement cost as well as the overall importance to the project. The
first such assessment was completed for the Flathead Irrigation Project
in July 2005,[Footnote 10] and BIA plans to reassess the condition of
each project at least once every 5 years, with the first round of such
condition assessments completed by the end of 2010.
Shortcomings in BIA's Management of Some Irrigation Projects Undermine
Effective Decisionmaking:
BIA's management of some of its irrigation projects has serious
shortcomings that undermine effective decisionmaking about project
operations and maintenance. Under BIA's organizational structure, in
many cases, officials with the authority to oversee project managers'
decisionmaking lack the technical expertise needed to do so
effectively, while the staff who do have the expertise lack the
necessary authority. In addition, despite federal regulations that
require BIA to consult with project stakeholders in setting project
priorities, BIA has not consistently provided the information or
opportunities necessary for stakeholders--both Indian and non-Indian
water users--to participate in decisionmaking about project operations
and maintenance. (See appendix II for detailed information on key
management concerns at each of the nine projects we visited.)
In Many Cases, BIA Officials with Oversight Authority Lack Expertise,
While Those with Expertise Lack Authority:
Under BIA's organizational structure, in many cases, officials with the
authority to oversee project managers' decisionmaking lack the
expertise needed to do so effectively, while the staff who do have the
expertise lack the necessary authority to oversee project managers'
decisionmaking. BIA regional directors, agency superintendents, and
agency deputy superintendents who oversee the projects do not generally
have engineering or irrigation expertise, and they rely heavily on the
project managers to run the projects. (See fig. 6 for an organizational
chart showing the lines of authority for providing oversight of a
typical BIA irrigation project.) Of the nine projects we visited, only
two had managers at the regional or agency levels who are experts in
irrigation or engineering. At the same time, BIA staff with the
irrigation and engineering expertise--regional irrigation engineers and
central irrigation office staff--have no authority over the 16 projects
under BIA's current organizational structure. Consequently, key
technical decisions about project operations and maintenance, such as
when or how to repair critical water delivery infrastructure, do not
necessarily get the technical oversight or scrutiny needed.
Figure 6: Misalignment of Expertise and Authority for a Typical BIA
Irrigation Project:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
This organizational structure and reliance on the project managers
breaks down when the person managing the project lacks the expertise
required for the position--that is, in cases in which BIA has had
difficulty filling project manager vacancies and has, as a result,
hired less qualified people or has the agency deputy superintendent
temporarily serving in the project manager position. Of the nine
projects we visited, four lacked project managers for all or part of
the 2005 irrigation season and five project managers were experts in
engineering or irrigation.
The GAO Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool recommends that
federal agencies analyze the knowledge and skills needed to perform
jobs appropriately and provides guidance on organizational structure
and identification of potential risks to the agency in that
structure.[Footnote 11] Specifically, it recommends that adequate
mechanisms exist to address risks--such as the risks associated with
staff vacancies or hiring less qualified staff.
When the project manager is under-qualified and unchecked by managers
who heavily rely on his or her decisionmaking, the potential for
adverse impacts on the operations and maintenance of an irrigation
project increases. For example, at the Crow Irrigation Project in 2002,
a project manager with insufficient expertise decided to repair a minor
leak in a key water delivery structure by dismantling it and replacing
it with a different type of structure. The new structure was
subsequently deemed inadequate by BIA's irrigation experts, and the
required reconstruction delayed water delivery by about a month. In
addition, at the Blackfeet Irrigation Project in 2000, the accidental
flooding and subsequent erosion of a farmer's land was inadequately
addressed by project and agency management who decided to use a short-
term solution over the objections of the regional irrigation engineer,
who lacked the authority to override the project manager and agency
superintendent's technical decision, despite their lack of expertise.
At the time of this report, the regional irrigation engineer continues
to negotiate the implementation of a long-term and technically sound
solution.
Furthermore, BIA lacks protocols to ensure that project managers
consult with, or get input from, BIA's technical experts before
implementing technically complex decisions about project operations and
maintenance, further exacerbating problems and undermining management
accountability. For example, in the 2002 incident at the Crow
Irrigation Project discussed above, the project manager was not
required to consult with, notify, or get approval from either the
regional irrigation engineer or central irrigation office staff,
despite his lack of expertise and the complexity of the flume
replacement project he undertook. According to BIA officials, if the
project manager had consulted an engineer, his plan to replace the
flume with two small culverts would have been rejected before work
began because it was technically insufficient and would not have been
completed before the start of the approaching irrigation season.
BIA Has Not Consistently Provided Information and Opportunities for
Stakeholders to Participate in Setting Project Priorities:
A second serious management shortcoming is the extent to which some
projects involve water users in decisionmaking. Federal regulations, as
well as BIA guidance, call for involving project stakeholders--that is,
tribal representatives as well as both Indian and non-Indian water
users--in the operations and maintenance of each project. Specifically,
federal regulations state that BIA is responsible for consulting with
all water users in setting program priorities; BIA's manual requires
that BIA provide regular opportunities for project water users to
participate in project operations; and BIA's Irrigation Handbook
recommends that BIA meet at least twice a year with project water users
to discuss project budgets and desired work.
Despite such requirements and recommendations, BIA has not consistently
provided the opportunities or information necessary for water users to
participate in such decisionmaking about project operations and
maintenance. The frequency of meetings between BIA and its project
water users varied considerably on the nine projects we visited, from
rarely (generally zero meetings per year), to periodically (generally
more than one meeting per year), to regularly (generally more than
three meetings per year), as shown in figure 9. For example, both the
Blackfeet and Colorado River Irrigation Projects hold regular meetings
with both tribal and individual water users, with meetings held
quarterly at the Blackfeet Irrigation Project and monthly at the
Colorado River Irrigation Project. In contrast, BIA officials on the
Pine River Irrigation Project do not meet with any non-tribal water
users, and BIA officials at the Fort Belknap Irrigation Project have
held few water users meetings in recent years. There was no meeting
with water users at the Fort Belknap Irrigation Project to kick-off the
2005 irrigation season because the project manager position was vacant,
worsening an already adversarial relationship between water users and
BIA, according to water users and a local government official. Also,
BIA officials on the Crow Irrigation Project have no regularly
scheduled meetings with either the tribe or individual water users and,
in fact, failed to send a single representative to the meeting it
called in 2005 for water users to voice their concerns about project
management and operations.
Figure 7: Opportunities for Water Users to Meet with BIA Varies by
Project:
[See PDF for image]
[A] Individual water users include Indians and/or non-Indians,
depending on the project.
[End of figure]
In addition to a lack of regular meetings with all project water users,
BIA has not consistently shared the type of information about project
operations and finances that water users need to meaningfully
participate in project decisionmaking. Although BIA officials at the
Colorado River Irrigation Project share information on their budgets
with water users and work collaboratively with water users to develop
annual work priorities in accordance with BIA's Irrigation Handbook,
not all projects we visited provide or solicit this type of
information. For example, BIA staff at the Wapato Irrigation Project
does not solicit water users' input on project priorities or share
information on the project's budget, according to water users we spoke
with, and BIA officials at the Crow Irrigation Project do not share
this type of critical information. However, some of the projects we
visited have recently begun to share information on project spending
and involve project water users in developing project priorities,
despite not doing so historically. For example, the project management
at the Blackfeet Irrigation Project began sharing budget information
with its water users during the 2005 season, and the new project
management at the Fort Belknap Irrigation Project stated that they plan
on involving project water users in setting project priorities in the
2006 season.
Moreover, although some project managers and their staff are
approachable and responsive on an individual basis, according to water
users on some projects we visited, others stated that project
management on some of BIA's irrigation projects were generally
inaccessible and non-responsive. For example, BIA officials
acknowledged that a former project manager at the Blackfeet Irrigation
Project told water users to sue BIA to get information on project
decisionmaking. In addition, some expressed concerns that BIA is less
responsive to non-Indians because BIA's mission does not specifically
include non-Indians. Consequently, some non-Indian water users have
opted to go directly to their congressional representatives to raise
their concerns. For example, non-Indian water users at the Wapato
Irrigation Project have sought congressional intervention on several
occasions to help compel BIA staff to disclose information about
project finances, such as information related to proposed operations
and maintenance fee debts and data on project land not being billed for
operations and maintenance. In addition, Senator Conrad Burns and
Congressman Dennis Rehberg of Montana co-sponsored a town hall meeting
in 2003 to provide local water users an opportunity to voice project
concerns to BIA officials. Requests by non-Indian water users for
project management and regional staff to address the lack of water
delivery at the Crow Irrigation Project during the month of August 2005
went largely unanswered by BIA, resulting in congressional
intervention. Such lack of access and communication about project
operations limits the ability of water users to have an impact on
project decisions as well as the ability of BIA to benefit from this
input.
Long-Term Direction of BIA's Irrigation Program Depends on Resolution
of a Number of Larger Issues:
The long-term direction of BIA's irrigation program depends on the
resolution of several larger issues. Of most importance, BIA does not
know the extent to which its irrigation projects are capable of
financially sustaining themselves, which hinders its ability to address
long-standing concerns regarding inadequate funding. The future of
BIA's irrigation program also depends on the resolution of how the
deferred maintenance will be funded. BIA currently has no plans for how
it will obtain funding to fix the deferred maintenance items, and
obtaining this funding presents a significant challenge in times of
tight budgets and competing priorities. Finally, it might be more
appropriate for other entities, including other federal agencies,
tribes, and water users, to manage some or all of the projects.
The Extent to Which Projects Are Capable of Sustaining Themselves Is
Unknown:
BIA does not know the extent to which Indian irrigation projects are
capable of sustaining themselves. Reclamation law and associated policy
require the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation to test
the financial feasibility of proposed projects comparing estimated
reimbursable project costs with anticipated revenues. The Bureau of
Reclamation then uses these reimbursable cost estimates to negotiate
repayment contracts with water users, where appropriate. In contrast,
Indian irrigation projects were authorized to support Indian
populations residing on reservations without regard to whether the
projects could be financially self-sustaining. As a result, neither the
Congress nor project stakeholders have any assurance that these
projects can sustain themselves. For example, a comprehensive 1930
study of BIA's irrigation program concluded that the Blackfeet and Fort
Peck Irrigation Projects should be abandoned. Specifically, the report
noted, "[a]fter a very careful study of all the available data relating
to these projects, including a field examination, we are firmly
convinced that any further attempts to rehabilitate and to operate and
maintain these projects — can result only in increasing the loss that
must be accepted and sustained by the Government. Adequate preliminary
investigations and studies to which every proposed project should be
subjected, in our opinion, would have condemned — these — projects as
unfeasible."[Footnote 12] [Emphasis added.]
Despite this lack of information on the overall financial situation for
each of the projects, in the early 1960s BIA classified more than half
of its 16 projects as fully self-supporting, on the basis of annual
operations and maintenance fees they collected from water users. These
self-supporting projects do not receive any ongoing appropriated funds.
These projects are subject to full cost recovery despite the absence of
financial information to demonstrate that the water users could sustain
this financial burden. The Blackfeet and Fort Peck Irrigation Projects
were two of the projects classified as fully self-supporting. While the
specific financial situations for the Blackfeet and Fort Peck
Irrigation Projects have likely changed since the 1920s, BIA does not
know if these projects, or any of the other Indian irrigation projects,
are financially self-supporting.
The heavy reliance on water users to sustain these projects has created
ongoing tension between the water users and BIA. Some water users have
complained to BIA that they cannot afford the operations and
maintenance fees and they pressure BIA to keep the fees as low as
possible. The Bureau of Reclamation recently conducted a study of the
Pine River Irrigation Project and concluded that some of the water
users could not conduct a profitable farming operation with the 2005
operations and maintenance fee of $8.50 per acre. BIA has not responded
to the Bureau of Reclamation study, and in October 2005 BIA proposed
doubling the rate to $17.00 per acre for the 2006 irrigation season
even though water users claim that they cannot afford to pay a higher
fee.[Footnote 13] The operations and maintenance fee has been set at
$8.50 at the Pine River Irrigation Project since 1992 and, according to
BIA officials, the collections do not provide adequate funds to
properly operate and maintain the project. As a result, BIA estimates
that the deferred maintenance at the project has grown to over $20
million. Without definitive information on the financial situation of
each project, BIA cannot determine what portion of project operations
and maintenance costs can be reasonably borne by the water users and to
what extent alternative sources of financing, such as congressional
appropriations, should be pursued.
There Is No Plan for How to Fund the Deferred Maintenance:
Despite the estimated $850 million in deferred maintenance and the
degree to which it impedes ongoing operations and maintenance at BIA's
irrigation projects, BIA currently has no plan for funding the list of
deferred maintenance items. Funding deferred maintenance costs in the
hundreds of millions of dollars will be a significant challenge in
times of tight budgets and competing priorities. Nonetheless, officials
stated that the agency has made little effort to identify options for
funding the deferred maintenance. BIA acknowledges that income from
ongoing operations and maintenance fees would likely be inadequate to
cover the deferred maintenance, yet the agency has done little to
identify alternative means of funding. According to officials, BIA has
not asked the Congress for supplemental funding to cover the deferred
maintenance. For example, water users report that the $7.5 million
appropriated for BIA's irrigation projects for fiscal year 2006
resulted from lobbying by concerned water users, not from BIA's
efforts.[Footnote 14] To date, BIA has primarily focused on developing
and refining an accurate estimate of the cost to fix the deferred
maintenance items. While developing an estimate of the projected cost
is important, BIA officials believe that the agency also needs to
develop a plan for ultimately funding the deferred maintenance.
Developing a plan for funding the deferred maintenance is complicated
by competing priorities and a crisis-oriented management style that
complicates preventative maintenance, according to BIA officials. The
current state of disrepair of most of the irrigation projects results
in frequent emergency situations concerning project operations and
maintenance. As a result, BIA irrigation staff spends a significant
amount of its time addressing emergency maintenance situations, to the
detriment of other maintenance needs that are essential to sustaining
the projects over the long term. As a result of this "crisis-style"
management, BIA has limited time to devote to non-emergency issues such
as the list of deferred maintenance items. Furthermore, this "crisis-
style" management prevents BIA from devoting adequate time to
preventative maintenance. For example, irrigation staff at Wind River
Irrigation Project stated that making "band-aid" emergency repairs on a
regular basis prevents them from addressing long-standing deferred
maintenance needs, as well as from conducting strategic improvements
that would help sustain the project over the long term.
It Might Be More Appropriate for Other Entities to Manage Some or All
of the Projects:
It may be beneficial to consider whether other groups for whom
irrigation is a priority or an area of expertise could better manage
some of the irrigation projects, including other federal agencies,
Indian tribes, and water users. BIA must balance its irrigation
management responsibilities with its many other missions in support of
Indian communities. As the federal agency charged with supporting
Indian communities in the United States, BIA's responsibility is to
administer and manage land and natural resources held in trust for
Indians by the U.S. government. Administration and management of these
trust lands and resources involves a wide variety of responsibilities,
including law enforcement, social services, economic development,
education and natural resource management. Given the multitude of
responsibilities that BIA must balance, there are inherent limits on
the resources and knowledge that BIA is able to devote to any one
program. As a result of these limitations and competing demands,
officials report that irrigation management is not a priority for BIA.
The fact that many water users on the irrigation projects are now non-
Indian may further encourage BIA to prioritize and devote more
resources to other programs before irrigation management.
Successful management of the irrigation projects by other groups would
depend on the unique characteristics of each project and its water
users. Potential groups who may be able to assume management for some
irrigation projects or portions of some irrigation projects include the
following:
* The Bureau of Reclamation. As the federal agency charged with
managing water in the western United States, the Bureau of Reclamation
has extensive technical experience in managing irrigation projects and
has served in a technical or advisory capacity to BIA's irrigation
staff. Furthermore, efforts have been made in the past to turn over
some BIA irrigation projects to the Bureau of Reclamation and the Fort
Yuma Irrigation Project is currently operated by the Bureau of
Reclamation. In addition, the Bureau of Reclamation utilizes management
practices for its irrigation projects that maximize information sharing
and collaboration with water users. For example, in contrast to BIA,
the Bureau of Reclamation delegates responsibility for much of the day-
to-day operations and maintenance on its irrigation projects to
irrigation districts, which are organized groups of water users.
* Indian Tribes. Officials report that some of the tribes have staff
with extensive knowledge of irrigation and water management, as well as
technical training. Some tribes stated that they have a vested interest
in seeing their respective projects succeed, and they would like to
assume direct responsibility for their reservation's irrigation
project, assuming the deferred maintenance items are fixed before the
turnover occurs. Turning over some of the BIA projects to Indian tribes
would be an option where tribes have the management and technical
capability to assume responsibility for an irrigation project.
* Water Users. Water users have extensive familiarity with the day-to-
day management of the projects and in some cases already handle many
day-to-day operations and maintenance activities. For example, the
Crowheart Water Users Association, a group of water users at the Wind
River Irrigation Project, have successfully assumed responsibility for
most of the maintenance needs on their portion of the project. In
exchange for their efforts, BIA refunds to the Crowheart Water Users
Association 50 percent of their annual operation and maintenance fees.
Through this arrangement, the Crowheart Water Users Association
believes it has been able to more effectively address maintenance needs
and increase project efficiency. Turning over some of the BIA projects
to water users would be an option where water users share similar
interests and have positive working relationships, as well as the
desire to organize an irrigation district or association.
Any successful alternative management option would have to consider the
sometimes disparate interests and priorities among water users. In some
cases, a combination of the various alternative management options may
be beneficial and feasible. This type of arrangement is currently being
considered for the Flathead Irrigation Project, where BIA is currently
in the process of turning over the operation and management of the
project to a collaborative management group that may include the tribe,
individual Indian water users, and non-Indian water users. However,
regardless of the alternative management option, water users and tribal
officials repeatedly stated that they would not be willing or able to
take over project operations and maintenance unless the deferred
maintenance had already been addressed or adequate funding was
available to address the deferred maintenance needs.
Conclusions:
Since BIA historically has not had adequate funds to operate and
maintain the projects, the projects are in a serious state of
disrepair. BIA is in the process of implementing its plan to develop an
accurate list and estimate of the deferred maintenance needs for each
project. However, some of the projects also have day-to-day management
shortcomings regarding technical support and stakeholder involvement
that need to be addressed. BIA's decentralized organizational structure
combined with the difficulty in attracting and retaining highly
qualified project managers at remote Indian reservations led to some
poor decisionmaking at some of the projects. It is critically important
that project managers, especially those with less than desirable
qualifications, have the necessary level of technical support to
prevent poor decisions from being made in the future.
A lack of adequate stakeholder involvement at some projects has also
seriously undermined project accountability. Unlike most other BIA
programs, the operations and maintenance of the irrigation projects are
funded almost entirely by the project beneficiaries--the water users,
many of whom are non-Indian. Consequently, BIA is accountable to these
water users and these water users expect to have an active voice in
project operations and maintenance. Some projects have not fulfilled
their obligations to regularly meet with project stakeholders, creating
an adversarial environment in which BIA and project water users do not
trust each other. This failure to involve stakeholders in the
management of their own projects means that BIA does not benefit from
water user expertise and has resulted in widespread feelings that BIA
is non-responsive and evasive, alienating many water users who feel
disenfranchised. Moreover, this failure has limited the ability of
stakeholders to hold BIA accountable for its decisions and actions.
In addition to some shortcomings with BIA's ongoing day-to-day
management of some of the projects, we also found that information on
the financial sustainability of the projects is needed to help address
the long-term direction of BIA's irrigation program. BIA's 16
irrigation projects were generally built in the late 1800s and early
1900s to further the federal government's Indian policy of
assimilation. The government made the decision to build these projects
to support and encourage Indians to become farmers. This decision was
generally not based on a thorough analysis designed to ensure that only
cost effective projects were built. As a result, the financial
sustainability of some of the projects has always been questionable,
ultimately creating tension between BIA and its water users. BIA is
under constant pressure to raise annual operations and maintenance fees
to collect adequate funds to maintain the projects, while many water
users contend that they do not have the ability to pay higher fees.
Without a clear understanding of the financially sustainability of the
projects, BIA does not know whether it is practical to raise operation
and maintenance fees, or whether alternative sources of financing
should be pursued. Information on financial sustainability, along with
accurate deferred maintenance information, are both critical pieces of
information needed to have a debate on the long-term direction of BIA's
irrigation program. Once this information is available, the Congress
and interested parties will be able to address how the deferred
maintenance will be funded and whether entities other than BIA could
more appropriately manage some or all of the projects.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of the Interior take the following
three actions.
To improve the ongoing management of the projects in the short-term, we
recommend that the Secretary direct the Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs to:
* provide the necessary level of technical support for project managers
who have less than the desired level of engineering qualifications by
putting these projects under the direct supervision of regional or
central irrigation office staff or by implementing more stringent
protocols for engineer review and approval of actions taken at the
projects; and:
* require, at a minimum, that irrigation project management meet twice
annually with all project stakeholders--once at the end of a season and
once before the next season--to provide information on project
operations, including budget plans and actual annual expenditures, and
to obtain feedback and input.
To obtain information on the long-term financial sustainability of each
of the projects, we recommend that the Secretary direct the Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs to conduct studies to determine both how
much it would cost to financially sustain each project, and the extent
to which water users on each project have the ability to pay these
costs. This information will be useful to congressional decisionmakers
and other interested parties in debating the long-term direction of
BIA's irrigation program.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided the Department of the Interior with a draft of this report
for review and comment. However, no comments were provided in time to
be included as part of this report.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretary of the Interior, the Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs, as well as to appropriate Congressional Committees, and other
interested Members of Congress. We also will make copies available to
others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report.
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-3841 or [Hyperlink, nazzaror@gao.gov]. Key
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Robin M. Nazzaro:
Director, Natural Resources and Environment:
[End of section]
Appendixes:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
We were asked to address several issues concerning the Department of
the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) management of its 16
irrigation projects. Specifically, we were asked to examine (1) BIA's
estimated deferred maintenance cost for its 16 irrigation projects; (2)
what shortcomings, if any, exist in BIA's current management of its
irrigation projects; and (3) any issues that need to be addressed to
determine the long-term direction of BIA's irrigation program.
For all three objectives, we collected documentation on BIA's 16
irrigation projects from officials in each of BIA's central Irrigation,
Power, and Safety of Dams offices (central irrigation offices) located
in Washington, D.C., and other locations in the western United States.
We also visited and collected information from each of BIA's four
regional offices that oversee the 16 irrigation projects, including the
Rocky Mountain, Northwest, Western, and Southwest regions. In addition,
we visited 9 of the 16 projects located across all 4 regions.
Specifically, we visited: (1) the Blackfeet Irrigation Project, (2) the
Colorado River Irrigation Project, (3) the Crow Irrigation Project, (4)
the Fort Belknap Irrigation Project, (5) the Pine River Irrigation
Project, (6) the San Carlos Indian Works Irrigation Project, (7) the
San Carlos Joint Works Irrigation Project, (8) the Wapato Irrigation
Project, and (9) the Wind River Irrigation Project. We selected these
projects based on a combination of factors aimed at maximizing our
total coverage (over 50 percent of the projects), visiting at least one
project in each of the regions where irrigation projects are located,
visiting the project with the highest deferred maintenance cost
estimate in each region using BIA's fiscal year 2004 data, and visiting
what BIA considered to be the three best projects and the five worst
projects. During the site visits, we collected project-specific
information from BIA officials and project stakeholders including
tribes and water users. We also met with and collected documentation
from the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, the
federal agency charged with managing water in the western United
States, for comparative purposes.
To examine BIA's estimated deferred maintenance cost for its 16
irrigation projects, we toured each of the 9 projects we visited to see
examples of deferred maintenance and their impact, and we reviewed
BIA's lists of deferred maintenance items and associated cost estimates
for both fiscal years 2004 and 2005. We also reviewed the methodology
BIA used to develop these lists and estimates and interviewed BIA staff
involved in developing these lists and estimates to identify major
deficiencies. Although we analyzed the cost estimates provided by BIA,
we did not develop our own estimate of deferred maintenance. To assess
the reliability of data we received from BIA on deferred maintenance,
we interviewed officials most knowledgeable about the collection and
management of these data. We reviewed the relevant controls and found
them adequate. We also conducted tests of the reliability of the
computerized data. On the basis of these interviews, tests, and
reviews, we concluded that BIA's estimates of deferred maintenance were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
To examine what shortcomings, if any, exist in BIA's current management
of its irrigation projects, we reviewed relevant federal regulations
and agency guidance, and analyzed BIA-wide and project-specific
management protocols and systems for the nine projects we visited. We
also reviewed general guidance on internal control standards, including
risk assessment, monitoring, and information and communication. We
interviewed BIA officials from the central irrigation office in
Washington, D.C., Colorado, Oregon, Arizona and Montana. We also
interviewed BIA regional officials as well as agency and project
officials associated with each of the 9 projects we visited for
information on key shortcomings in BIA's management of its irrigation
projects. Finally, we interviewed a variety of project stakeholders--
including tribal representatives, individual Indian water users, and
non-Indian water users--at each of the 9 projects we visited for
information on key shortcomings in BIA's management.
Finally, to examine any issues that need to be addressed to determine
the long-term direction of BIA's irrigation program, we reviewed
previous studies highlighting key issues impacting the future of BIA's
irrigation program. This included reviewing previous studies conducted
by GAO, the Department of the Interior's Office of Inspector General,
and the Bureau of Reclamation, as well as other studies conducted at
the request of the Congress. We also reviewed relevant federal
regulations and agency guidance, as well as historical information
relevant to BIA's management of the irrigation program, including
budget information and agency memos. Finally, we interviewed BIA
officials from the central irrigation office, regional offices, and the
9 projects we visited for information on the key challenges impacting
the long-term direction of the program. We also interviewed project
stakeholders--including tribal representatives and water users--at the
9 projects we visited for information on the key issues impacting the
future direction of BIA's irrigation program.
We performed our work between March 2005 and February 2006 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Profiles of the Nine Irrigation Projects GAO Visited:
This appendix contains brief profiles of the nine irrigation projects
we visited. Each project profile begins with a short overview of basic
facts about the project, followed by a set of bullet points describing
the key operations and maintenance concerns and the key management
concerns expressed to us by BIA officials, tribal officials, or water
users during our site visits.
Blackfeet Irrigation Project:
The Blackfeet Irrigation Project was authorized for construction in
1907, but construction was never completed. It consists of 38,300 acres
being assessed operations and maintenance fees (and 113,100 acres
authorized for irrigation). The project is located in Browning, Montana
on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation of Montana, home of the Blackfeet
Tribe. About 60 percent of the project's land is owned by either the
tribe or individual tribal members, and about 40 percent is owned by
non-Indians. BIA currently estimates the project's total deferred
maintenance costs to be $29,130,222. See figure 8 below for pictures of
the Blackfeet Irrigation Project.
Figure 8: Pictures of the Blackfeet Irrigation Project (July 2005):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Operations and Maintenance Concerns Expressed During Our Site
Visit:
* Fees are insufficient to cover the costs of project operations and
maintenance.
* Weeds and overgrown vegetation are problematic and impair water flow.
* Deferring maintenance has led to bigger and more costly maintenance
problems.
* Deferring maintenance decreases water efficiency and access to water.
* The project as built cannot meet the increased demand for water.
Key Management Concerns Expressed During Our Site Visit:
* Communication between BIA and the water users could be improved, such
as enhancing transparency, increasing involvement, and meeting
separately with the tribe.
* Lack of training and expertise undermines BIA's management of the
project.
* Inadequate oversight within BIA exacerbates problems associated with
lack of training and expertise.
* Project staff should report to managers with expertise in irrigation
and/or engineering.
* BIA protocols are too vague, such as when project staff should
consult with regional or central irrigation office engineers.
* BIA needs to be able to measure water in order to better manage water
deliveries and identify critical problems.
* Irrigation is a low priority for BIA.
Colorado River Irrigation Project:
The Colorado River Irrigation Project was the first BIA irrigation
project built, authorized for construction in 1867, but construction
was never completed. It is now considered the best of BIA's 16 revenue-
generating irrigation projects due, in part, to its innovative
leadership and customer service attitude. The project has adopted a
user fee system that measures and assesses water users based on their
actual usage as well as charging water users additional fees for using
more water than their individual allotment. The project is located in
Parker, Arizona on the Colorado River Indian Reservation, home of the
Colorado River Indian Tribes. The project, which has a 10-month-long
irrigation season, consists of 79,350 assessed acres (and 107,588 acres
authorized for irrigation), and is composed entirely of Indian land--
land owned by the tribe or its members. BIA currently estimates the
project's total deferred maintenance costs to be $134,758,664. See
figure 9 for pictures of the Colorado River Irrigation Project.
Figure 9: Pictures of the Colorado River Irrigation Project (June
2005):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Operations and Maintenance Concerns Expressed During Our Site
Visit:
* Development leases may no longer be allowed, potentially resulting in
irrigable land going un-irrigated and costing the tribe and project
potential revenues.
* Replacement of deteriorating irrigation structures needed.
* Canal needs new lining due to years of deterioration and, in some
cases, poor construction.
* Clearing moss and pondweed is needed lest the flow of water be
impaired.
* New irrigation structures needed to regulate water flow where ditches
converge.
Key Management Concerns Expressed During Our Site Visit:
* Understaffing and high turnover of project system operators adversely
impact water deliveries in that there are too few system operators to
deliver water in a timely manner.
* BIA procurement and contracting is time-consuming and costly.
* Annual project budget may understate actual funding because it does
not include possible additional fees.
* Operations and maintenance fees can only be used to address
operations and maintenance on the existing project, rather than expand
the project.
Crow Irrigation Project:
The Crow Irrigation Project was authorized for construction in 1890,
but construction was never completed. It is one of the oldest of BIA's
16 revenue-generating irrigation projects with 38,900 acres being
assessed operations and maintenance fees (and 46,460 acres authorized
for irrigation). The project is located in Crow Agency, Montana on the
Crow Reservation, home of the Crow Tribe of Montana. About 56 percent
of the project land is owned by either the tribe or individual tribal
members, and about 44 percent is owned by individual non-Indians. BIA
currently estimates the project's total deferred maintenance costs to
be $54,550,496. See figure 10 for pictures of the Crow Irrigation
Project.
Figure 10: Pictures of the Crow Irrigation Project (March 2005):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Operations and Maintenance Concerns Expressed During Our Site
Visit:
* Fees are insufficient to cover the project's operations as well as
maintenance costs.
* Weeds, overgrown vegetation, tree roots and garbage impair water flow
in the canals and ditches.
* Crumbling or dilapidated irrigation structures impair water delivery.
* The repair of Rotten Grass Flume needs further work.
* Canal erosion causes sink holes and impairs water flow.
* Deferred maintenance of certain structures leads to safety concerns,
such as when BIA staff must go into the canal to raise or lower broken
check gates.
Key Management Concerns Expressed During Our Site Visit:
* The project's recently reassigned project manager was under-
qualified, resulting in some decisions that hurt the project and
undermine water delivery, such as the Rotten Grass Flume incident.
* BIA has inadequate oversight of the project manager and his
decisions.
* BIA relies on "crisis-style" management rather than a long-term plan
to manager project.
* Allegations that a former project manager inappropriately used fees
and was not accountable for financial decisions.[Footnote 15]
* Communication breakdown between BIA and its water users.
* The project may be better managed if BIA turned over the project's
management to water users or tribe.
* Irrigation is a low priority for BIA.
Fort Belknap Irrigation Project:
The Fort Belknap Irrigation Project was authorized for construction in
1895, but construction was never completed. It is one of the smallest
of BIA's 16 revenue-generating irrigation projects with 9,900 acres
being assessed operations and maintenance fees (and 13,320 acres
authorized for irrigation). The project is located in Harlem, Montana
on the Fort Belknap Reservation, home of the Fort Belknap Indian
Community of the Fort Belknap Reservation of Montana. About 92 percent
of the land is owned by either the tribe or individual tribal members,
and about 8 percent is owned by individual non-Indians. BIA currently
estimates the project's total deferred maintenance costs to be
$17,535,494. See figure 11 for pictures of the Fort Belknap Irrigation
Project.
Figure 11: Pictures of the Fort Belknap Irrigation Project (July 2005):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Operations and Maintenance Concerns Expressed During Our Site
Visit:
* Fees and appropriations are insufficient to cover the project
maintenance needs.
* Weeds and overgrowth of vegetation impair water flow.
* Canal erosion caused by cattle-crossings impairs water flow.
* Deteriorated and leaking irrigation structures impair water delivery.
* Additional equipment is needed to conduct maintenance on project.
* Deferred maintenance exacerbates problems of poor farming land and
low crop values.
Key Management Concerns Expressed During Our Site Visit:
* Poor communication and tense relations between BIA and water users.
* Staff turnover and difficulty finding qualified staff are
problematic.
* Some project staff lack adequate expertise and training to manage
project.
* Lack of transparency and water management plan limits BIA
accountability.
* Some water users want BIA to begin water delivery earlier in season.
Pine River Irrigation Project:
The Pine River Irrigation Project is the only one of BIA's 16 revenue-
generating irrigation projects located in the Southwest region, with
11,855 acres being assessed operations and maintenance fees.
Construction on the project was never completed. The project is located
in Ignacio, Colorado on the Southern Ute Reservation, home to the
Southern Ute Indian Tribe of the Southern Ute Reservation, Colorado.
About 85 percent of the land is owned by either the tribe or individual
tribal members, and about 15 percent is owned by individual non-
Indians. BIA currently estimates the project's total deferred
maintenance costs to be $20,133,950. See figure 12 for pictures of the
Pine River Irrigation Project.
Figure 12: Pictures of the Pine River Irrigation Project (August 2005):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Operations and Maintenance Concerns Expressed During Our Site
Visit:
* Collections from operations and maintenance fees do not provide
adequate funds to properly operate and maintain the project.
* The project's operations and maintenance fees have not been raised
since 1992. BIA has proposed doubling the fees from $8.50 per acre to
$17.00 per acre for the 2006 irrigation season.
* The project's cash reserves were depleted in 2004.
* The project has a number of old water delivery contracts, referred to
as "carriage contracts," from the 1930s that are at low fixed rates.
Under some of the contracts the water users only pay $1.00 per acre to
the project.
Key Management Concerns Expressed During Our Site Visit:
* The practice of subsidizing the project through other BIA programs,
such as Natural Resources, Roads Construction, Roads Maintenance and
Realty, was scheduled to end at the end of fiscal year 2005.
Alternative sources of funds must be found for the project manager and
clerk positions.
* "Crisis-style" management only, no preventive maintenance.
* Project staff does not formally meet with or provide information to
individual water users.
* A Bureau of Reclamation study in 1999 found that some of the water
users could not afford to pay fees of $8.50 to the project and operate
a profitable farming operation. BIA has not responded to the study.
* The former project manager stated that the BIA irrigation projects
should be turned over to the Bureau of Reclamation.
San Carlos Indian Works Irrigation Project (Pima):
The San Carlos Indian Works Irrigation Project was authorized for
construction in 1924, but construction was never completed. It is one
of the newest of BIA's 16 revenue-generating irrigation projects with
50,000 acres being assessed operations and maintenance fees (and 50,546
acres authorized for irrigation). The project, also referred to as
Pima, is located in Sacaton, Arizona on the Gila River Indian
Reservation, home of the Gila River Indian Community. It is served both
by its own infrastructure and by that of the San Carlos Joint Works
Irrigation Project. The project land is generally owned by the tribe or
tribal members, with about 99 percent of the land owned by either the
tribe or individual tribal members, and about 1 percent owned by
individual non-Indians. BIA currently estimates Pima's total deferred
maintenance costs to be $62,865,503. See figure 13 for pictures of the
San Carlos Indian Works Irrigation Project.
Figure 13: Pictures of the San Carlos Indian Works Irrigation Project
(June 2005):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Operations and Maintenance Concerns Expressed During Our Site
Visit:
* Inefficiency in water delivery results in fewer water users being
able to receive water, leading to idle acreage in some cases.
* Clearing tumbleweeds and other vegetation that can clog culverts are
a recurring problem and represents a large part of the project's
spending on operations and maintenance.
* Erosion is a continuing problem, in part, because the canal is used
for both water deliveries as well as drainage.
* BIA staff has a "wish list" of items that would bring the project
into top condition, extending beyond the basic deferred maintenance.
* Project infrastructure may not have the capacity to deliver water to
all potential water users.
Key Management Concerns Expressed During Our Site Visit:
* 2007 turnover to water users is still underway.
* Insufficient reserve funds means that project staff may not have
enough money to conduct needed maintenance towards the end of the year.
* Vacancies are a constant problem at the project, leaving too few
staff to conduct project maintenance.
* BIA is too slow to respond to water users' requests for repairs.
San Carlos Joint Works Irrigation Project (Coolidge):
The San Carlos Joint Works Irrigation Project was authorized for
construction in 1924, but construction was never completed. It provides
water to non-Indian irrigators as well as the San Carlos Indian Works
Irrigation Project. It consists of 100,000 acres being assessed
operations and maintenance fees (and 100,546 acres authorized for
irrigation), with 50 percent of the land owned by non-Indian irrigators
and 50 percent owned by Indian irrigators (in the form of the San
Carlos Indian Works Irrigation Project). The project is located in
Coolidge, Arizona. BIA currently estimates Coolidge's total deferred
maintenance costs to be $5,775,427. See figure 14 for pictures of the
San Carlos Joint Works Irrigation Project.
Figure 14: Pictures of the San Carlos Joint Works Irrigation Project
(June 2005):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Operations and Maintenance Concerns Expressed During Our Site
Visit:
* Lack of certainty in BIA's ability to deliver requested water to all
water users has led some to purchase additional water from outside of
the project.
* Silt removal from irrigation canals and ditches is a recurring
problem, leading BIA to purposefully over-excavate the main canal each
year in an attempt to catch excess silt that can clog culverts and
prevent water delivery impairments.
* Repair of China Wash Flume is an expensive undertaking, but the
flume's failure could jeopardize water deliveries for much of the
project.
* Removal of weeds to prevent clogged culverts is a recurring problem
for the project.
Key Management Concerns Expressed During Our Site Visit:
* 2007 turnover to water users is under way but not finalized.
* Lawsuit against BIA's increase in operations and maintenance fees
resulted in some water delivery delays while the lawsuit is pending.
* Contracting delays within BIA have resulted in postponed project
maintenance.
* Turnover of BIA staff and lack of water user inclusion in project
decisionmaking impedes effective communication.
* BIA lacks accountability to water users in terms of how it spends
operations and maintenance fees.
Wapato Irrigation Project:
The Wapato Irrigation Project is one of the oldest and largest of BIA's
16 revenue-generating irrigation projects with 96,443 acres being
assessed operations and maintenance fees (and 145,000 acres authorized
for irrigation). It was authorized for construction in 1904, but
construction was never completed. The project is located in Yakima,
Washington on the Yakama Reservation, home of the Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakama Nation. About 60 percent of the project land is
owned by either the tribe or individual tribal members, and about 40
percent is owned by individual non-Indians. BIA currently estimates the
project's total deferred maintenance costs to be $183,128,886. See
figure 15 for pictures of the Wapato Irrigation Project.
Figure 15: Pictures of the Wapato Irrigation Project (April 2005):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Operations and Maintenance Concerns Expressed During Our Site
Visit:
* Deterioration of project prevents some water users from receiving
water.
* Lack of regular project maintenance has led many water users to make
repairs on their own in order to irrigate crops.
* Water users claim that project staff performs inadequate or faulty
repairs, resulting in wasted operations and maintenance payments or the
need for water users to fix the sloppy repairs.
* Fees are insufficient because (a) rates have been set too low, and
(b) the tribe's appeal of BIA's operations and maintenance bills since
2001 has decreased income by at least $2 million annually because the
agency will not collect on these bills or issue subsequent bills until
the matters raised in the appeal are resolved.
* Fees are insufficient to cover both maintenance and administrative
costs, such as salaries and benefits, leading to suggestions that BIA
cover such costs.
Key Management Concerns Expressed During Our Site Visit:
* Understaffing due to inadequate funds and difficulty in finding
qualified staff has resulted in too few staff to operate and maintain
project.
* BIA relies on "crisis-style" management to manage project, resulting
in a lack of planning and preventive maintenance.
* Water users lack voice in project decisionmaking, resulting in
concerns about limited accountability of project staff to its water
users.
* Alleged errors with operations and maintenance billing--such as BIA
billing dead landowners and BIA overbilling living landowners--led the
tribe and its members to appeal BIA's billing of operations and
maintenance fees. Resolution of these appeals is still pending within
the agency. BIA will not collect on these bills or issue subsequent
bills until the matters raised in the appeal are resolved.
Wind River Irrigation Project:
The Wind River Irrigation Project was authorized for construction in
1905, but construction was never completed. It is one of BIA's 16
revenue-generating irrigation projects with 38,300 acres being assessed
operations and maintenance fees (and 51,000 acres authorized for
irrigation). The project is located in Fort Washakie, Wyoming on the
Wind River Reservation, home of the Arapaho Tribe of the Wind River
Reservation and the Shoshone Tribe of the Wind River Reservation. About
67 percent of the project land is owned by either the tribe or
individual tribal members, and about 33 percent is owned by individual
non-Indians. BIA currently estimates the project's total deferred
maintenance costs to be $84,956,546. See figure 16 for pictures of the
Wind River Irrigation Project.
Figure 16: Pictures of the Wind River Irrigation Project (July 2005):
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Key Operations and Maintenance Concerns Expressed During Our Site
Visit:
* Weeds and tree roots impair water flow and lead to seepage.
* Cattle-crossings erode canal banks and impair water flow.
* Deteriorating irrigation infrastructure impairs water delivery.
* Additional water storage and improved efficiency needed to meet
demand for water.
* Deferring maintenance undermines long-term sustainability of project.
* BIA financial management may limit ability of project staff to
conduct needed maintenance in short maintenance season.
Key Management Concerns Expressed During Our Site Visit:
* BIA relies on "crisis-style" management and "band-aid" solutions
rather than a long-term plan to manage project.
* Poor communication between BIA and water users.
* Water users are not involved enough in project decisionmaking.
* Supervision of project staff is insufficient and BIA is not
accountable to water users.
* Turnover of BIA staff is problematic.
* Some water users want to manage all or part of the project.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Robin M. Nazzaro, (202) 512-3841, [Hyperlink, nazzaror@gao.gov]:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those individuals named above, Jeffery D. Malcolm,
Assistant Director, Tama R. Weinberg, Rebecca A. Sandulli, and David A.
Noguera made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to the
report were Richard P. Johnson, Nancy L. Crothers, Stanley J. Kostyla,
Kim M. Raheb, and Jena Y. Sinkfield.
(360549):
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General,
Indian Irrigation Projects, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 96-I-641,
(Washington D.C.: March 1996); U.S. Department of the Interior, Office
of the Inspector General, Operations and Maintenance Assessments of
Indian Irrigation Projects, Bureau of Indian Affairs, W-IA-BIA-12-86,
(Washington D.C.: Feb. 1988).
[2] 25 C.F.R. § 171.1(c).
[3] 25 C.F.R. § 171.1(d).
[4] Act of July 4, 1884, 23 Stat. 76, 94 (1884).
[5] See 70 Fed. Reg. 57889 (Oct. 4, 2005) for the 2005 operations and
maintenance fees for the projects as well as the proposed fees for
2006.
[6] 25 C.F.R. § 171.1 (c), (d).
[7] GAO, Indian Programs: BIA's Management of the Wapato Irrigation
Project, GAO/RCED-97-124 (Washington D.C.: May 28, 1997); U.S.
Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General, Indian
Irrigation Projects, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 96-I-641, (Washington
D.C.: March 1996).
[8] BIA defines deferred maintenance as "maintenance that was not
performed when it should have been or when it was scheduled and which,
therefore, was put off or delayed for a future period (adapted from
[Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board Bulletin] No. 6). This
includes facility deficiencies where there is non-compliance to codes
(e.g., life safety, [Americans with Disabilities Act, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration], environmental, etc.) and other
regulatory or Executive Order compliance requirements."
[9] BIA implemented MAXIMO agencywide, not just for its irrigation
projects, to help identify and track deferred maintenance.
[10] This condition assessment, entitled Final Report: Engineering
Evaluation of Existing Conditions, Flathead Agency Irrigation Division
(FAID) was prepared by HKM Engineering for the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes. BIA did not fund this condition assessment.
[11] GAO, Internal Control Standards: Internal Control Management and
Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2001).
[12] Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States: Hearings
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. at 2219-20 (1930).
[13] 70 Fed. Reg. 57889, 57893 (Oct. 4, 2005).
[14] These funds were specifically appropriated for five irrigation
projects--Crow, Fort Peck, Fort Belknap, Blackfeet and Wind River--and
one irrigation system.
[15] GAO referred these allegations to the Department of the Interior's
Office of the Inspector General in August 2005.
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