Department of the Interior
Major Management Challenges Gao ID: GAO-07-502T February 16, 2007The Department of the Interior is responsible for managing much of the nation's vast natural resources. Its agencies implement an array of programs intended to protect these precious resources for future generations while also allowing certain uses of them, such as oil and gas development and recreation. In some cases, Interior is authorized to collect royalties and fees for these uses. Over the years, GAO has reported on challenges facing Interior as it implements its programs. In addition to basic program management issues, the department faces difficult choices in balancing its many responsibilities, and in improving the condition of the nation's natural resources and the department's infrastructure, in light of the federal deficit and long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation. This testimony highlights some of the major management challenges facing Interior today.
The Department of the Interior has made progress in addressing challenges that GAO has identified in such areas as developing and maintaining better data to manage the department's programs and strengthening internal controls. However, numerous important problems remain, as discussed below. Management of resource protection efforts needs to be strengthened. Interior has undertaken steps to improve some of its resource protection efforts, but it has yet to develop a cohesive national strategy to address wildland fire issues, as GAO has recommended. In addition, Interior agencies that manage hardrock mining and oil and gas production on their lands have not effectively carried out their environmental protection responsibilities. Management problems in Indian and island community programs persist. While Interior has implemented major reforms to address weaknesses in managing Indian trust funds and other assets, concerns remain about finalizing organizational changes and delays in decisions about land that the department will take into trust status. In addition, island community programs continue to lack accountability measures. Land appraisals continue to fall short of standards. While Interior has consolidated the land appraisal function into a departmental office to address serious problems with the quality of its appraisals and the millions of dollars that had been lost as a result, a large portion of appraisals that GAO reviewed still did not comply with recognized appraisal standards. Deferred maintenance backlog needs to be addressed. Interior has implemented improved inventory and asset management systems for some programs, but it is not clear how it will address the estimated $17 billion in deferred maintenance. Other programs continue to lack information required to accurately estimate needs. Revenue collection needs more management attention. Interior may not be collecting billions of dollars of revenue from oil and gas royalties; geothermal royalties; and fees from individual recreational uses, air tour operations in and around national parks, and commercial filming and still photography in national parks. Contract and grant management lack needed controls. Because it lacks adequate controls over management of grants and contracts, Interior cannot ensure that millions of dollars in grant and contract funding were used appropriately.
GAO-07-502T, Department of the Interior: Major Management Challenges
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Natural Resources, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Friday, February 16, 2007:
Department Of The Interior:
Major Management Challenges:
Statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-07-502T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-07-502T, testimony before the Committee on Natural
Resources, House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of the Interior is responsible for managing much of the
nation‘s vast natural resources. Its agencies implement an array of
programs intended to protect these precious resources for future
generations while also allowing certain uses of them, such as oil and
gas development and recreation. In some cases, Interior is authorized
to collect royalties and fees for these uses. Over the years, GAO has
reported on challenges facing Interior as it implements its programs.
In addition to basic program management issues, the department faces
difficult choices in balancing its many responsibilities, and in
improving the condition of the nation‘s natural resources and the
department‘s infrastructure, in light of the federal deficit and long-
term fiscal challenges facing the nation.
This testimony highlights some of the major management challenges
facing Interior today.
What GAO Found:
The Department of the Interior has made progress in addressing
challenges that GAO has identified in such areas as developing and
maintaining better data to manage the department‘s programs and
strengthening internal controls. However, numerous important problems
remain, as discussed below.
* Management of resource protection efforts needs to be strengthened.
Interior has undertaken steps to improve some of its resource
protection efforts, but it has yet to develop a cohesive national
strategy to address wildland fire issues, as GAO has recommended. In
addition, Interior agencies that manage hardrock mining and oil and gas
production on their lands have not effectively carried out their
environmental protection responsibilities.
* Management problems in Indian and island community programs persist.
While Interior has implemented major reforms to address weaknesses in
managing Indian trust funds and other assets, concerns remain about
finalizing organizational changes and delays in decisions about land
that the department will take into trust status. In addition, island
community programs continue to lack accountability measures.
* Land appraisals continue to fall short of standards. While Interior
has consolidated the land appraisal function into a departmental office
to address serious problems with the quality of its appraisals and the
millions of dollars that had been lost as a result, a large portion of
appraisals that GAO reviewed still did not comply with recognized
appraisal standards.
* Deferred maintenance backlog needs to be addressed. Interior has
implemented improved inventory and asset management systems for some
programs, but it is not clear how it will address the estimated $17
billion in deferred maintenance. Other programs continue to lack
information required to accurately estimate needs.
* Revenue collection needs more management attention. Interior may not
be collecting billions of dollars of revenue from oil and gas
royalties; geothermal royalties; and fees from individual recreational
uses, air tour operations in and around national parks, and commercial
filming and still photography in national parks.
* Contract and grant management lack needed controls. Because it lacks
adequate controls over management of grants and contracts, Interior
cannot ensure that millions of dollars in grant and contract funding
were used appropriately.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO has made a number of recommendations intended to improve Interior‘s
programs by enhancing the information it uses to manage its programs,
strengthening internal controls, and providing clearer guidance.
Interior has agreed with most of the recommendations and taken some
steps to implement them. However, the department has been slow to
implement other recommendations.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-502T].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Robin Nazzaro at (202)
512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work at the Department of
the Interior. As the stewards for more than 500 million acres of
federal land and 1.8 billion acres of the Outer Continental Shelf,
Interior agencies are responsible for a wide array of programs to
ensure that our nation's natural resources are adequately protected and
that access to and use of those resources is appropriately managed.
Difficult choices face this Congress and administration in fulfilling
the federal government's responsibilities as a steward of these
resources under increasing budgetary constraints. My testimony today
includes findings from a number of reports we have issued over the past
few years on some of Interior's natural resource management programs.
Specifically, I will discuss management challenges in six key areas:
(1) resource protection, (2) Indian and insular affairs, (3) land
appraisals, (4) deferred maintenance, (5) revenue collection, and (6)
contracts and grants.
Summary:
In summary, our reports indicate that while Interior agencies have
improved the management of some of the programs we have reported on
over the years, some issues remain problematic. Moreover, more recent
work has identified new problems that need to be addressed. In many
cases, Interior agencies have work underway or planned to address our
recommendations, but we have not evaluated these efforts.
* Management of resource protection efforts needs to be strengthened.
Our work on the challenges that Interior, working with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), faces in protecting the nation
against the threat of wildland fires has revealed a continued need for
several improvements. Despite concurrence with our previous
recommendations, Interior and USDA have yet to complete a cohesive
national strategy that identifies long-term options and associated
funding needs for responding to wildland fire issues. Nor have the
departments developed a tactical plan to inform the Congress about the
steps and time frames needed to develop such a strategy. And while they
have undertaken steps to improve upon the information they use to
assess and allocate resources for addressing wildland fire threats, it
remains unclear whether the agencies will successfully complete these
efforts. In addition, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS) have not been effectively carrying out their
important responsibilities for ensuring that hardrock mining, oil, and
gas operations occurring on their lands do not cause unnecessary
environmental harm. Specifically, we found that BLM was not ensuring
that hardrock mining operations had sufficient financial assurances to
provide for proper reclamation of disturbed lands and was not
effectively carrying out its environmental mitigation responsibilities
for oil and gas operations. Similarly, we reported that FWS was not
consistently inspecting oil and gas operations in national wildlife
refuges to ensure that environmental standards were being met.
* Management problems in Indian and island community programs persist.
While Interior has taken significant steps in the last 10 years to
address weaknesses in certain Indian programs, it is still in the
process of implementing key trust fund reforms, and several concerns
exist about the completion of these reforms. We have also reported on
serious delays in the Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) program for
determining whether the department will accept land in trust: over
1,000 land in trust applications from tribes and individual Indians are
currently pending. In addition, the department could be doing more to
assist seven island communities--four U.S. territories and three
sovereign island nations--with long-standing financial and program
management deficiencies.
* Land appraisals continue to fall short of standards. Over the years,
we and Interior's Inspector General (IG) have reported on the
difficulties BLM and other federal land management agencies have had in
managing land appraisals and the loss of millions of federal dollars
resulting from inadequate appraisals. While major program changes have
been made, significant problems continue. Specifically, we found that
appraisals still do not adhere to appraisal standards and, thus, the
federal government risks losing millions of dollars more if land is
undervalued. In addition, Interior does not have a process for setting
and meeting realistic deadlines for completing appraisals, which can be
particularly important for transactions in areas with changing land
values.
* Deferred maintenance backlog needs to be addressed. While Interior
has made progress addressing prior recommendations to improve
information on the deferred maintenance needs of National Park Service
facilities and BIA schools, its maintenance backlog continues to grow
substantially--the department's estimate increased from between $8.1
billion and $11.4 billion in 2003, to between $9.6 billion and $17.3
billion in 2006. It is not clear how the department will secure needed
funding to reduce this daunting backlog to a manageable level. In
addition, we recently reported that better information was needed on 16
BIA irrigation projects with an estimated $850 million in deferred
maintenance. Specifically, we found that some of the irrigation
projects classified items as deferred maintenance when they were
actually new construction, and some had incomplete information on their
deferred maintenance needs.
* Revenue collection needs more management attention. Recent work
indicates that the federal government may not be collecting all the
revenue that it could be and that some programs that receive revenue do
not have needed controls. For example, we reported that billions of
dollars in oil and gas royalties may be forgone because of a failure to
include important price limitations in leases during 1998 and 1999. We
also reported that while the department is required by law to continue
to collect a certain level of revenue from geothermal leases, it is not
collecting the necessary information to do so. Furthermore, the
National Park Service is authorized to collect fees from a number of
different types of uses of its lands, but has not done so in all cases.
Finally, should the Congress choose to authorize it to do so, BLM could
be collecting more in grazing revenue, thereby bringing its fees more
in line with the fees charged by other federal agencies.
* Contract and grant management lack needed controls. Interior's
management of contracts and grants has been identified as a management
challenge by Interior's IG for a number of years. Recent work we have
conducted echoes some of the IG's concerns, in particular with regard
to a lack of management controls. Specifically, we reported on
weaknesses in (1) management of two Interior interagency contracting
mechanisms that the Department of Defense (DOD) has used to obtain
services and (2) a program that provides grants to nonfederal entities
for activities related to the Chesapeake Bay.
Background:
The Department of the Interior has jurisdiction over more than 500
million acres of land--about one-fifth of the total U.S. landmass--and
over 1.8 billion acres of the Outer Continental Shelf. As the guardian
of these resources, the department is entrusted to preserve the
nation's most awe-inspiring landscapes, such as the wild beauty of the
Grand Canyon, Yosemite, and Denali national parks; our most historic
places, like Independence Hall and the Gettysburg battlefield; and such
revered national icons as the Statue of Liberty and the Washington
Monument. At the same time, Interior is to provide for the
environmentally sound production of oil, gas, minerals, and other
resources found on the nation's public lands; honor the nation's
obligations to American Indians and Alaskan Natives; protect habitat to
sustain fish and wildlife; help manage water resources in western
states; and provide scientific and technical information to allow for
sound decision-making about resources. In recent years, the Congress
has appropriated about $10 billion annually to meet these
responsibilities. With these resources, Interior employs about 73,000
people in eight major agencies and bureaus at over 2,400 locations
around the country to carry out its mission.
Interior's management of this vast federal estate is largely
characterized by the struggle to balance the demand for greater use of
its resources with the need to conserve and protect them for the
benefit of future generations. GAO, among others, have identified
management problems facing the department and have made many
recommendations to improve its agencies and programs. In some cases,
Interior has made significant improvements; in others, progress has
been slow. As a result, several major management challenges remain.
Management of Resource Protection Efforts Needs to Be Improved:
Although Interior, working with USDA's Forest Service, has taken steps
to help manage perhaps the most daunting challenge to its resource
protection mission--protecting lives, private property, and federal
resources from the threats of wildland fire--concerns remain. In
addition, Interior's programs for managing hardrock mining, oil, and
gas operations have not adequately protected federal resources from the
environmental effects of these activities.
Wildland Fire Management Challenges Persist:
The wildland fire problems facing our nation continue to grow. The
average number of acres burned by wildland fires annually from 2000 to
2005 was 70 percent greater than the average number burned annually
during the 1990s, and appropriations for the federal government's
wildland fire management activities tripled from about $1 billion in
fiscal year 1999 to nearly $3 billion in fiscal year 2005. Experts
believe that catastrophic damage from wildland fire will continue to
increase until an adequate long-term federal response is implemented
and has had time to take effect. While USDA's Forest Service receives
the majority of fire management resources, Interior agencies--the
National Park Service, BIA, FWS, and, particularly, BLM--are key
partners in responding to the threats of wildland fire. Consequently,
most of our work and recommendations on wildland fire management
address both departments.
The Interior agencies and the Forest Service have not yet developed a
cohesive strategy that identifies long-term options and associated
funding estimates for addressing wildland fire threats, as we first
recommended in 1999;[Footnote 1] nor have they developed a tactical
plan that outlines the critical steps and time frames needed to
complete such a strategy, as we recommended in 2005.[Footnote 2] While
the agencies together issued a document in February 2006 titled
Protecting People and Natural Resources: A Cohesive Fuels Treatment
Strategy, it does not identify long-term options or associated funding
estimates.[Footnote 3] Also, although the agencies have undertaken some
tasks over the past 7 years that they stated are important to
developing the cohesive strategy that we recommended, we have concerns
about when and whether such tasks will be completed as
planned.[Footnote 4] For example, the agencies began developing two
modeling systems to help them (1) allocate resources to respond to
wildland fires and (2) identify the extent, severity, and location of
wildland fire threats to our nation's communities and ecosystems; these
systems are slated for completion in 2008 and 2009, respectively. We
are concerned, however, that the agencies' recent endorsement of
significant, mid-course design changes to the resource allocation model
may not fulfill key project goals, including determining the most cost-
effective allocation of resources. In addition, the agencies currently
have no plans to routinely update data in the threat modeling system--
this would be necessary, for example, after major fires, hurricanes, or
other factors have significantly altered the landscape. Such updated
data are necessary to accurately capture the nature of wildland fire
threats and to optimize allocation of resources over time. For these
reasons, we continue to believe that a cohesive strategy and tactical
plan would be helpful to the Congress and the agencies in making
informed decisions about effective and affordable long-term approaches
to addressing the nation's wildland fire problems.
In addition, in 2006, we reported that the agencies needed to develop
better guidance on sharing the costs of suppressing fires among federal
and nonfederal entities.[Footnote 5] In some cases, these entities used
different cost-sharing methodologies for fires with similar
characteristics, which resulted in inconsistent sharing of costs among
federal and nonfederal entities. The cost-sharing method used can have
consequences in the millions of dollars for the entities involved. As
of January 2007, the agencies were updating their guidance on possible
cost-sharing methods and when each typically would be used, but it is
unclear how the agencies will ensure that the guidance is followed.
Finally, as we testified last month, preliminary findings from our
ongoing work indicate that the effectiveness of the agencies' efforts
to contain wildfire suppression costs may be limited because the
agencies have not clearly defined their cost-containment goals,
developed a strategy for achieving those goals, or developed related
performance measures.[Footnote 6] In addition, for efforts to contain
wildfire suppression costs to be effective, once the agencies have
defined their cost-containment goals, they need to integrate them with
other goals of the wildland fire program--such as protecting life and
property--and to recognize that trade-offs will be needed to meet
desired goals within the context of fiscal constraints.
Hardrock Mining Operations Lack Needed Financial Assurances:
Under BLM regulations, hardrock mining operators who extract gold,
silver, copper, and other valuable mineral deposits from land belonging
to the United States are required to provide financial assurances,
before they begin exploration or mining, to guarantee that the costs to
reclaim land disturbed by their operations are paid.[Footnote 7]
However, we reported in June 2005 that BLM did not have a process for
ensuring that adequate assurances were in place.[Footnote 8] As a
result, some assurances may not fully cover all future reclamation
costs, some operators do not have financial assurances, and some have
either outdated reclamation plans and cost estimates or none at all.
When operators with insufficient financial assurances fail to reclaim
BLM land disturbed by hardrock mining operations, BLM is left with
public land that poses risks to the environment and public health and
safety, and requires millions of federal dollars to reclaim. For
example, we reported that 48 hardrock operations had ceased to operate
and had not been reclaimed since the financial assurance requirement
began in 1981; for 43 of these sites, BLM identified a total of about
$56 million in unfunded reclamation costs. We also reported that BLM's
system for managing financial assurances did not have current
information or track certain information critical to managing the
program.
In response to our 2005 recommendations, BLM has taken substantial
steps to correct these problems. In 2006, the agency modified its
system for managing financial assurances to track key data. BLM also
began requiring its state office directors to use a newly created
report available from the system to ensure that adequate financial
assurances are in place, and to (1) develop corrective action plans to
address any financial assurance deficiencies with operators and (2)
certify that reclamation cost estimates are adequate. If implemented
properly, these efforts should ensure that appropriate financial
assurances are in place to pay for necessary reclamation of federal
lands.
Increases in Oil and Gas Permitting Activities Lessen BLM's Ability to
Meet Its Environmental Protection Responsibilities:
The number of oil and gas operations occurring on or under federal
lands and private lands for which the federal government retains
mineral rights that are permitted by BLM, has increased dramatically--
more than tripling from fiscal year 1999 to fiscal year 2004--in part
as a result of the desire to reduce the country's dependence on foreign
sources of oil and gas. In June 2005, we reported that BLM has
struggled to deal with this permitting workload increase while also
carrying out its responsibility to mitigate the impacts of oil and gas
development on land that it manages.[Footnote 9] Overall, BLM officials
told us that staff had to devote increasing amounts of time to
processing drilling permits, leaving less time to ensure mitigation of
the environmental impacts of oil and gas development. For example, two
field offices we visited that had the largest increases in permitting
activity were each able to meet their annual environmental inspection
goals only once in the past 6 years. BLM has authority to assess and
charge fees to cover its expenses for processing oil and gas permits,
which would enable it to supplement its program resources. While the
agency had not exercised this authority at the time of our report, it
had begun taking steps to develop a fee structure for these permits. To
help BLM better respond to its increased workload, we recommended that
the agency finalize and implement this fee structure to recover its
costs for processing applications for oil and gas drilling permits.
In response to our recommendation, BLM issued a proposed regulation in
July 2005 that included a $1,600 fee for processing oil and gas
permits.[Footnote 10] However, the next month, the Congress prohibited
Interior from initiating the new fee in the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
and the final regulation did not include the proposed fee.[Footnote 11]
Nevertheless, the department has continued to express interest in
initiating such a fee and has proposed that the Energy Policy Act be
amended to allow the fee to move forward.
FWS Oversight of Oil and Gas Activities in Wildlife Refuges Needs
Improvement:
Similar to the concerns we have about BLM's protection of environmental
resources from oil and gas activities, we reported in 2003 that FWS's
oversight of oil and gas operations on wildlife refuge lands was not
adequate.[Footnote 12] For example, we found that some refuge managers
took extensive measures to oversee operations and enforce environmental
standards, while others exercised little or no control. We found that
such disparities occurred for two primary reasons. First, FWS had not
officially determined its authority to require permits--which would
include environmental conditions to protect refuge resources--of all
oil and gas operations in refuges; we believe the agency has such
authority. Second, refuge managers lacked guidance, adequate staffing
levels, and training to properly oversee oil and gas activities. We
also found that FWS was not collecting complete and accurate
information on damage to refuge lands as a result of oil and gas
operations and what steps were needed to address that damage.
FWS has taken some steps to address recommendations we made to resolve
these problems. For example, the agency has implemented training for
staff overseeing oil and gas activities and has begun collecting better
data on the nature and extent of oil and gas activities. However, FWS
has not implemented two key recommendations that would strengthen its
ability to protect refuge resources.
* First, because FWS had not formally clarified its authority to
oversee all types of oil and gas operations on refuges, we recommended
that the agency (1) determine its authority to oversee such operations
and report that determination to the Congress and (2) seek from the
Congress any additional authority that might be needed to apply a
consistent and reasonable set of controls over all oil and gas
activities occurring on national wildlife refuges. To date, FWS has not
finalized its determination, but it has indicated that it does not
believe it has the authority to require permits of all oil and gas
operations that would include steps that must be taken to protect
refuge resources. Further, FWS has indicated that it does not believe
it needs additional authority to effectively manage oil and gas
operations on refuges. We continue to believe, however, that FWS does
have the authority to require such permits of all operators. Moreover,
because of the effects of oil and gas activities on refuge resources
that we previously reported, we also continue to believe that if FWS
ultimately determines that it does not have the authority to require
permits, it should seek this authority from the Congress in order to
adequately protect refuges.
* Second, although FWS has taken steps to identify the level of
staffing it needs to adequately oversee oil and gas activities
occurring on national wildlife refuges, it has not--as we recommended-
-sought the funding to meet those needs through appropriations, its
authority to assess fees, or other means.
Management Problems in Indian and Island Community Programs Persist:
GAO has reported on management weaknesses in Indian programs for a
number of years. While the department has taken significant steps in
the last 10 years to address these weaknesses, it is still in the
process of implementing key trust fund reforms, and several concerns
exist about the completion of these reforms. We have also reported on
serious delays in BIA's program for determining whether the department
will accept land in trust. In addition, the department could be doing
more to assist seven island communities--four U.S. territories and
three sovereign island nations--with long-standing financial and
program management deficiencies.
Indian Trust Funds and Assets Need to Be More Effectively Managed:
The Secretary of the Interior administers the government's trust
responsibilities to tribes and individual Indians, including
maintaining about 1,450 trust fund accounts for more than 250 tribal
entities with assets of about $2.9 billion and about 300,000 individual
Indian trust fund accounts with assets of about $400 million.
Management of Indian trust funds and assets has long been plagued by
inadequate financial management, such as poor accounting and
information systems; untrained and inexperienced staff; backlogs in
appraisals, determinations of ownership, and record-keeping; lack of a
master lease file or accounts-receivable system; inadequate written
policies and procedures; and poor internal controls.
In response to these problems, the Congress enacted the American Indian
Trust Fund Management Reform Act of 1994, which among other things,
established the Office of the Special Trustee (OST) to oversee and
coordinate the department's implementation of trust fund management
reforms.[Footnote 13] In December 2006, we reported that OST had made
progress implementing reforms, and it estimated that almost all key
reforms needed to develop an integrated trust management system and to
provide improved trust services would be completed by November
2007.[Footnote 14] However, OST also estimated that data verification
for leasing activities would not be completed for all Indian lands
until December 2009. Furthermore, OST's most recent strategic plan,
issued in 2003, did not include a timetable for implementing trust
reforms or a date for OST's termination, as required by the reform act.
As a result, we recommended, among other things, that the department
provide the Congress with a timetable for completing the trust fund
management reforms. The department agreed with our recommendation and
stated that it expects to have a timetable for implementing the
remaining trust reforms by late June 2007, including a date for the
proposed termination or eventual deposition of OST. Although the
department's consolidated financial statements for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 2006, received an unqualified audit opinion, the
management of Indian trust funds continued to be reported as a material
internal control weaknesses, and information security was reported as
an internal control weakness.
Improvements Needed in BIA's Processing of Land in Trust Applications:
BIA is the primary federal agency charged with implementing federal
Indian policy and administering the federal trust responsibility for
1.9 million American Indians and Alaska Natives. BIA provides basic
services to 561 federally recognized Indian tribes throughout the
United States, including social services, child welfare services, and
natural resources management on about 54 million acres of Indian trust
lands. Trust status means that the federal government holds title to
the land in trust for tribes or individual Indians; land taken in trust
is no longer subject to state and local property taxes and zoning
ordinances. Many Indians believe that having their land placed in trust
status is fundamental to safeguarding it against future loss and
ensuring their sovereignty. In 1980, the department established a
regulatory process intended to provide a uniform approach for taking
land in trust.[Footnote 15] While some state and local governments
support the federal government's taking additional land in trust for
tribes or individual Indians, others strongly oppose it because of
concerns about the impacts on their tax base and jurisdictional
control.
We reported in July 2006 that while BIA generally followed its
regulations for processing land in trust applications, it had no
deadlines for making decisions on them.[Footnote 16] Specifically, the
median processing time for the 87 land in trust applications with
decisions in fiscal year 2005 was 1.2 years--ranging from 58 days to
almost 19 years. We also found that while there was little opposition
to applications with decisions in fiscal year 2005 from state and local
governments, some state and local governments we contacted said (1)
they did not have access to sufficient information about the land in
trust applications and (2) the 30-day comment period was not
sufficient. We recommended, among other things, that the department
move forward with adopting revisions to the land in trust regulations
that include (1) specific time frames for BIA to make a decision once
an application is complete and (2) guidelines for providing state and
local governments more information on the applications and a longer
period of time to provide meaningful comments on the applications. The
department agreed with our recommendations, and BIA has developed a
corrective action plan to implement them by June 30, 2007.
Improve Effectiveness and Accountability for Island Programs:
The Secretary of the Interior has varying responsibilities to the
island communities of American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, all of which are
U.S. territories--as well as to the Federated States of Micronesia, the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau, which are
sovereign nations linked with the United States through Compacts of
Free Association. The Office of Insular Affairs (OIA) carries out the
department's responsibilities for the island communities. OIA's mission
is to assist the island communities in developing more efficient and
effective government by providing financial and technical assistance
and to help manage relations between the federal government and the
island governments by promoting appropriate federal policies. The
island governments have had long-standing financial and program
management deficiencies. Specifically, island governments experience
difficulties in accurately accounting for expenditures, collecting
taxes and other revenues, controlling the level of expenditures, and
delivering program services.
In December 2006, we reported on serious economic, fiscal, and
financial accountability challenges facing the U.S. insular areas of
American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands.[Footnote 17] The economic challenges stem
from dependence on a few key industries, scarce natural resources,
small domestic markets, limited infrastructure, shortages of skilled
labor, and reliance on federal grants to fund basic services. To help
diversify and strengthen their economies, OIA sponsors conferences and
business opportunities missions to the areas to attract U.S.
businesses; however, there has been little formal evaluation of these
efforts. In addition, efforts to meet formidable fiscal challenges and
build strong economies are hindered by financial reporting that does
not provide timely and complete information to management and oversight
officials for decision making. The insular area governments have also
submitted required audits late, received disclaimer or qualified audit
opinions, and had many serious internal control weaknesses identified.
As a result of these problems, numerous federal agencies have
designated these governments as "high-risk" grantees. Interior and
other federal agencies are working to help these governments improve
their financial accountability, but more should be done.
To increase the effectiveness of the federal government's assistance to
the U.S. insular areas, we recommended, among other things, that the
department (1) increase coordination activities with officials from
other federal grant-making agencies on issues of common concern
relating to the insular area governments, such as single audit reports,
high-risk designations, and deficiencies in financial management
systems and practices and (2) conduct formal periodic evaluations of
OIA's conferences and business opportunities missions, assessing their
impact on creating private sector jobs and increasing insular area
income. The department agreed with our recommendations, stating that
they were consistent with OIA's top priorities and ongoing activities.
We will continue to monitor OIA's actions on our recommendations.
Also in December 2006, we reported on challenges facing the Federated
States of Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands.[Footnote
18] In 2003, the United States amended a 1986 compact with the
countries by signing Compacts of Free Association with the two
governments. The amended compacts provide the countries with a combined
total of $3.6 billion from 2004 to 2023, with the annual grants
declining gradually. We found that for 2004 through 2006, compact
assistance to the respective governments was allocated largely to the
education, infrastructure, and health sectors, but that neither country
has planned for long-term sustainability of the grant programs, taking
into account the annual decreases in grant funding. In addition, both
countries' single audit reports for 2004 and 2005 indicated (1)
weaknesses in their ability to account for the use of compact funds and
(2) noncompliance with requirements for major federal programs. For
example, the Federated States of Micronesia's audit report for 2005
contained 57 findings of material weaknesses and reportable conditions
in the national and state governments' financial statements for sector
grants and 45 findings of noncompliance. We recommended, among other
things, that the department work with the countries to establish plans
to minimize the impact of declining assistance and to fully develop a
reliable mechanism for measuring progress towards program goals. The
department concurred with our recommendations.
Land Appraisals Continue to Fall Short of Standards:
Over the years, we and Interior's IG have reported on the difficulties
BLM and other federal land management agencies have had in managing
land appraisals. Conducting appraisals is an important function--
between November 2003 and May 2006, for example, Interior appraised
more than 6.5 million acres of land that was valued at over $7 billion.
Land appraisals are needed when Interior agencies are buying,
exchanging, or leasing land. Such transactions are an integral part of
Interior's land management in order to achieve specific purposes, such
as consolidating existing holdings, acquiring land deemed important for
wildlife habitat or recreational opportunities, and opening land to the
development of energy and mineral resources. Interior generally
requires land acquisitions to be based on market value and, thus,
objective land appraisals are essential. Past reports, however, have
identified serious problems with Interior agencies' appraisal programs,
particularly with regard to appraisal independence, and have identified
millions of dollars that the federal government had lost because of
inadequate appraisals.
While Interior has made major program changes, significant problems
continue. Specifically, to remedy decades of problems with the quality
and objectivity of its land appraisals, Interior removed the land
appraisal function from its land management agencies and consolidated
it into a departmental office--the Appraisal Services Directorate--in
November 2003. This was a substantial move in the right direction to
help ensure the independence of the appraisal function, and we reported
in September 2006 that the objectivity of appraisals has improved since
the directorate's inception.[Footnote 19] However, we also identified
two major remaining challenges.
* First, there is still wide variation in the quality of appraisals for
land transactions involving potentially billions of dollars. For
example, about 40 percent of Interior's appraisals for land
transactions that we reviewed did not comply with recognized appraisal
standards. This lack of compliance occurred, in large part, because
appraisers appeared not to apply the specialized skills needed to
perform their duties for certain appraisals. In addition, peer reviews
of appraisals were cursory, with reviewers approving appraisals without
considering property characteristics that can impact the value of land,
such as the presence of roads.
* Second, the directorate does not have a system for ensuring that it
sets and meets realistic time frames for appraisal delivery. Of the
3,500 appraisals completed since the directorate was created, over 70
percent missed their deadlines, with an average delay of 4 months.
Delays in delivery of appraisals can impact the ability of land
management agencies to carry out land acquisition missions, and some
land deals have been scuttled as a result.
Since our report last fall, Interior has taken encouraging steps to
address our recommendations. For example, Interior has stated that it
has implemented a compliance inspection program for appraisals that are
considered "high risk" to help ensure that such appraisals comply with
recognized appraisal standards. We will continue to monitor the
department's progress in this area. In addition, we currently we have a
review under way to evaluate Interior's management of land exchanges.
Deferred Maintenance Backlog Needs to Be Addressed:
In addition to the challenges the department faces in adequately
maintaining the natural resources under its stewardship, it also faces
a challenge in adequately maintaining its facilities and
infrastructure. The department owns, builds, purchases, and contracts
services for assets such as visitor centers, schools, office buildings,
roads, bridges, dams, irrigation systems, and reservoirs; however,
repairs and maintenance on these facilities have not been adequately
funded. The deterioration of facilities can adversely impact public
health and safety, reduce employees' morale and productivity, and
increase the need for costly major repairs or early replacement of
structures and equipment. In 2003, we reported that the department
estimated that the deferred maintenance backlog was between $8.1
billion and $11.4 billion. In November 2006, the department estimated
that the deferred maintenance backlog for fiscal year 2006 was between
$9.6 billion and $17.3 billion, an increase of between 18 to 51 percent
(see table 1).
Table 1: Department of the Interior's Estimate of Deferred Maintenance
for Fiscal Year 2006:
Dollars in billions.
Type of structures: Roads, bridges, and trails;
Estimated range of deferred maintenance: Low estimate: $4.80;
Estimated range of deferred maintenance: High estimate: $9.18.
Type of structures: Irrigation, dams, and other water structures;
Estimated range of deferred maintenance: Low estimate: 1.39;
Estimated range of deferred maintenance: High estimate: 1.85.
Type of structures: Buildings (e.g., administration, education,
housing, historic buildings);
Estimated range of deferred maintenance: Low estimate: 2.12;
Estimated range of deferred maintenance: High estimate: 3.70.
Type of structures: Other structures (e.g., recreation sites and fish
hatcheries);
Estimated range of deferred maintenance: Low estimate: 1.29;
Estimated range of deferred maintenance: High estimate: 2.57.
Type of structures: Total;
Estimated range of deferred maintenance: Low estimate: $9.60;
Estimated range of deferred maintenance: High estimate: $17.30.
Source: Department of the Interior.
[End of table]
Interior is not alone in facing daunting maintenance challenges. In
fact, we have identified the management of federal real property,
including deferred maintenance issues, as a governmentwide high-risk
area since 2003.[Footnote 20] While Interior has made progress
addressing prior recommendations to improve information on the
maintenance needs of Park Service facilities and BIA schools, the
challenge of how the department will secure the significant funding
needed to reduce this maintenance backlog to a manageable level
remains.
While some programs have improved information on their deferred
maintenance needs, in February 2006, we reported that similar
information is still needed for 16 BIA irrigation projects with an
estimated $850 million in deferred maintenance.[Footnote 21] For
example, we found that some of the irrigation projects classified items
as deferred maintenance when they were actually new construction, and
some had incomplete information on their deferred maintenance needs. To
further refine the deferred maintenance estimate for the 16 irrigation
projects, BIA plans to hire experts in engineering and irrigation to
conduct thorough condition assessments of all 16 irrigation projects
every 5 years. The first such assessment was completed in July 2005,
with all 16 assessments expected to be completed by 2010.
Revenue Collection Needs More Management Attention:
For many years, Interior's IG has identified revenue collection as a
top management challenge for the department because of the significant
potential for underpayments given that it collects, on average, over
$10 billion annually. Work we have conducted in the past 2 years also
raises questions about how and when Interior is collecting authorized
revenues from oil and gas leases, geothermal leases, recreational uses,
and grazing and whether funds are properly controlled and accounted
for.
Substantial Revenue May Be Forgone Because of Royalty Relief:
We testified in January 2007 on ongoing work investigating the Minerals
Management Service's (MMS) implementation of the Outer Continental
Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995 and other authorities for
granting royalty relief for oil and gas leases.[Footnote 22] We
reported that MMS had issued lease contracts in 1998 and 1999 that
failed to include price thresholds above which royalty relief would no
longer be applicable. As a result, large volumes of oil and natural gas
are exempt from royalties, which significantly reduces the amount of
royalty revenues that the federal government can collect. At least $1
billion in royalties has already been lost because of this failure to
include price thresholds. MMS has estimated that forgone royalties from
leases issued between 1996 and 2000 under the act could be as high as
$80 billion. However, there is much uncertainty in MMS's estimate as a
result of, for example, the inherent difficulties in estimating future
production and prices, as well as ongoing litigation addressing MMS's
authority to set price thresholds for some leases. Other authorities
for granting royalty relief may also affect future royalty revenues.
Specifically, under discretionary authority, the Secretary of the
Interior administers programs granting relief for certain deep water
leases issued after 2000, certain deep gas wells drilled in shallow
waters, and wells nearing the end of their productive lives. In
addition, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 mandates relief for leases
issued in the Gulf of Mexico during the 5 years following the act's
passage, provides relief for some gas wells that would not have
previously qualified for royalty relief, and would provide relief in
certain areas of Alaska where there currently is little or no
production.
The U.S. Comptroller General has highlighted royalty relief as an area
needing additional oversight by the 110th Congress.[Footnote 23]
Currently, we are assessing MMS's estimate of forgone royalties in
light of changing oil and gas prices, revised estimates of future oil
and gas production, and other factors. We are also seeking to identify
comprehensive studies that quantify the potential benefits of royalty
relief. We intend to issue a report on these issues later this year.
Revenue from Geothermal Leases May Change:
In May 2006, we reported that a change in how royalties on geothermal
leases are disbursed may result in a change in the amount of royalties
collected by the federal government.[Footnote 24] Specifically, while
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 included provisions to encourage
geothermal development, it also reduced the royalty percentage the
federal government receives. Despite this, the act directs the
Secretary of the Interior to seek, for most leases, to maintain the
same level of royalty revenues as before the act. This could be
accomplished by negotiating different royalty rates based on past
royalty history, provided that electricity prices remain constant.
Although it is impossible to predict with reasonable assurance how
these prices will change in the future, Interior must make its best
effort to mitigate the impact of changing prices if federal royalty
revenue is to remain the same. This mitigation can only be achieved if
there is timely and accurate knowledge of the revenues that lessees
collect when they sell electricity. However, we reported that MMS does
not routinely collect revenue data from electricity sales. Without such
knowledge, MMS will have difficulty collecting the same level of
royalties from lessees under the new royalty process. To demonstrate
its commitment to collect the same level of royalty revenues as prior
to passage of the act, we recommended that MMS routinely collect future
sales revenues for electricity when royalty payments are due. MMS has
plans to address these issues, and we will continue to monitor their
efforts.
Interior Has Not Maximized Revenue Collections from Recreational and
Other Uses:
Interior agencies are authorized--and in some cases required--to
collect fees for a variety of uses. For example, the Park Service
collects fees from air tour operators at selected national parks and
from individuals and companies conducting commercial filming. However,
we found that the agencies were not collecting such fees in the
following cases:
* In May 2006, we reported that the Park Service was not collecting all
required fees from companies conducting air tours in or around three
highly visited national parks because of (1) an inability to verify the
number of air tours conducted over the three national parks and,
therefore, to enforce compliance and (2) confusion resulting from
differing geographic applicability of legislation governing air tours
in national parks.[Footnote 25]
* In May 2005, we reported that the Park Service could be collecting
more revenue through the permits it issues for special park uses, such
as special events, but was not doing so because park units were not
consistently applying criteria for charging permit fees.[Footnote 26]
In addition, the Park Service had not implemented a May 2000 law that
required the collection of location fees for commercial filming and
still photography, resulting in significant annual forgone revenues. In
response to our recommendation, the Park Service began collecting
location fees in May 2006.
* In September 2006, we reported that Interior agencies have been slow
to implement authorities for charging fees for recreational uses of
federal lands and waters.[Footnote 27] We also reported that some
agencies lacked adequate controls and accounting procedures for
collecting fees.
Additional Revenue Could be Generated Through an Adjustment to BLM
Grazing Fees:
Ten federal agencies manage grazing on over 22 million acres, with BLM
and the Forest Service managing the vast majority of this
activity.[Footnote 28] In total, federal grazing revenue amounted to
about $21 million in fiscal year 2004, although grazing fees differ by
agency. For example, in 2004, BLM and the Forest Service charged $1.43
per animal unit month, while other federal agencies charged between
$0.29 and $112 per animal unit month.[Footnote 29] We reported in 2005
that while BLM and the Forest Service charged generally much lower fees
than other federal agencies and private entities, these fees reflect
legislative and executive branch policies to support local economies
and ranching communities.[Footnote 30] Specifically, BLM fees are set
by a formula that was originally established by a law that expired, but
use of the formula has been extended indefinitely by Executive Order
since 1986. This formula takes into account a rancher's ability to pay
and, therefore, the purpose is not primarily to recover the agencies'
costs or capture the fair market value of forage. Instead, the formula
is designed to set a fee that helps support ranchers and the western
livestock industry. Other federal agencies employ market-based
approaches to setting grazing fees.
Using this formula, BLM collected about $12 million in receipts in
fiscal year 2004, while its costs for implementing its grazing program,
including range improvement activities, were about $58 million. Were
BLM to implement approaches used by other agencies to set grazing fees,
it could help to close the gap between expenditures and receipts and
more closely align its fees with market prices. We recognize, however,
that the purpose and size of BLM's grazing fee are ultimately for the
Congress to decide.
Contract and Grant Management Lack Needed Controls:
Interior's management of contracts and grants has been identified as a
management challenge by Interior's IG for a number of years. Our recent
work echoes some of the department's IG's concerns, in particular with
regard to interagency contracting and grant management for the
Chesapeake Bay Gateways grant program.
Interior's Management of Interagency Contracting Activities Needs
Improvement:
The Department of Defense (DOD) has used interagency contracting to
help support the war in Iraq, including contracting with Interior.
Governmentwide, the use of interagency contracts to procure goods and
services has continued to increase over the past several years. Because
of this continued growth, limited expertise in using these contracts,
and unclear lines of responsibility, GAO has designated interagency
contracting as a governmentwide high-risk area.[Footnote 31] In our
review of 11 task orders Interior issued on behalf of DOD--amounting to
about $66 million--we found numerous breakdowns in management controls.
[Footnote 32] Specifically, we found that Interior:
* issued task orders that were beyond the scope of the contract, in
violation of federal competition rules;
* did not comply with additional DOD competition requirements when
issuing task orders for services on existing contracts;
* did not comply with ordering procedures meant to ensure the best
value for the government; and:
* inadequately monitored contractor performance.
Moreover, we found that the contractor was allowed to play a role in
the procurement process normally performed by the government because
the officials at Interior and DOD responsible for the orders did not
fully carry out their roles and responsibilities. In response to the
concerns identified, Interior and DOD initiated actions to strengthen
management controls. In our report, we made recommendations to further
refine their efforts.
In 2005, we also reported on weaknesses in Interior's GovWorks.
GovWorks is a government-run, fee-for-service organization that
provides various services, including contracting services, on which DOD
has relied.[Footnote 33] Specifically, Interior did not always ensure
that GovWorks contracts received fair and reasonable prices and may
have missed opportunities to achieve savings from millions of dollars
in purchases. In addition, GovWorks added substantial work--as much as
20 times above the original value of a particular order--without
determining that prices were fair and reasonable. We made
recommendations to Interior to improve the manner in which GovWorks
funds are used to ensure value and compliance with procurement
regulations. Interior concurred with our recommendations and identified
actions to take to address them. We will continue to monitor their
implementation of these actions.
Chesapeake Bay Gateways Grant Program Lacks Needed Controls:
In September 2006, we reported on weaknesses in the Park Service's
management of grants provided to nonfederal entities under its
Chesapeake Bay Gateways Program.[Footnote 34] In 1998, Congress passed
the Chesapeake Bay Initiative Act to establish (1) a network of
locations where the public can access and experience the bay and (2) a
grant program to accomplish this objective. From 2000 through 2005, the
Park Service awarded 189 grants totaling over $6 million to support the
network. However, our review revealed several accountability and
oversight weaknesses in the Park Service's management of these grants,
including (1) inadequate training of Park Service staff, (2) a lack of
timely grantee reporting on progress and finances, (3) continuing
awards to nonperforming grantees, and (4) a backlog of uncompleted
grants. To enhance accountability and oversight, we recommended that
the department:
* develop and implement a process to determine the extent to which
grants are effectively meeting program goals;
* ensure that staff responsible for grant management are adequately
trained;
* ensure that grantees submit progress and financial reports in a
timely manner; and:
* ensure that grants are awarded only to applicants who completed any
previous grants they received or to applicants who have demonstrated
the capacity for completing a grant on schedule.
Interior concurred with our recommendations and has plans to implement
them.
Concluding Observations:
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, I would like to note that in 1993, GAO
testified at a broad oversight hearing on Interior before this
Committee, similar to today's hearing. At that time, we testified that
Interior faced serious challenges to addressing the declining condition
of the nation's natural resources and related infrastructure under its
responsibility. Unfortunately, almost 15 years later, the message in my
testimony today is very similar. While some of the programs we
evaluated in the past have improved, evaluations of additional programs
reveal many of the same persistent management problems--a lack of
adequate data to understand the condition of its natural resources and
infrastructure and the actions necessary to improve them, a lack of
adequate controls and accountability to ensure federal resources are
properly used and accounted for, and a lack of adequate strategic
planning and guidance for program implementation. Clearly the
department needs to address management and control gaps in its programs
and ensure its activities are carried out in the most cost-effective
and efficient manner, but difficult choices remain for improving the
condition of the nation's natural resources and the department's
infrastructure in light of the federal deficit and long-term fiscal
challenges facing the nation. Either new sources of funding need to be
identified and pursued, or the department must determine the services
it can continue and the standards it will use for maintaining its
facilities and lands. As we stated in our testimony nearly 15 years
ago, we believe that in reaching these decisions, policy makers should
know the full extent of the resource shortfalls facing federal natural
resource management agencies. In addition, it is essential for the
department to identify the impacts on services and infrastructure that
would occur should serious cutbacks be necessary in order to maintain a
certain standard of quality.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Committee may
have at this time.
GAO Contact:
For further information about this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-3841 or nazzaror@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Performance and Accountability Series:
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-07-310. Washington, D.C.: January
2007.
Major Management Challenges at the Department of the Interior (2005 Web-
based Update--http://www.gao.gov/pas/2005/doi.htm).
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January
2005.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Interior. GAO-03-104. Washington, D.C.: January 2003.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119. Washington, D.C.: January
2003.
High-Risk Series: Federal Real Property. GAO-03-122. Washington, D.C.:
January 2003.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Interior. GAO-01-249. Washington, D.C.: January 2001.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-01-263. Washington, D.C.: January
2001.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Interior. GAO/OCG-99-9. Washington, D.C.: January 1999.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO/HR-99-1. Washington, D.C.: January
1999.
Resource Protection Efforts:
Wildland Fires:
Wildland Fire Management: Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies'
Cost-Containment Efforts. GAO-07-427T. Washington, D.C.: January 30,
2007.
Wildland Fire Suppression: Better Guidance Needed to Clarify Sharing of
Costs between Federal and Nonfederal Entities. GAO-06-896T. Washington,
D.C.: June 21, 2006.
Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises Concerns about
Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities. GAO-06-570.
Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2006.
Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to Develop a
Cohesive Wildland Fire Strategy. GAO-06-671R. Washington, D.C.: May 1,
2006.
Wildland Fire Management: Timely Identification of Long-Term Options
and Funding Needs Is Critical. GAO-05-923T. Washington, D.C.: July 14,
2005.
Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made, but
Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy. GAO-05-147.
Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2005.
Wildland Fires: Forest Service and BLM Need Better Information and a
Systematic Approach for Assessing the Risks of Environmental Effects.
GAO-04-705. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004.
Wildland Fire Management: Additional Actions Required to Better
Identify and Prioritize Lands Needing Fuels Reduction. GAO-03-805.
Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2003.
Wildland Fire Management: Reducing the Threat of Wildland Fires
Requires Sustained and Coordinated Effort. GAO-02-843T. Washington,
D.C.: June 13, 2002.
Severe Wildland Fires: Leadership and Accountability Needed to Reduce
Risks to Communities and Resources. GAO-02-259. Washington, D.C.:
January 31, 2002.
Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy is Needed to Address
Catastrophic Wildfire Threats. GAO/RCED-99-65. Washington, D.C.: April
2, 1999.
Other Resource Protection Products:
Endangered Species: Many Factors Affect the Length of Time to Recover
Select Species. GAO-06-730. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Endangered Species: Time and Costs Required to Recover Species Are
Largely Unknown. GAO-06-463R. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006.
Wind Power: Impacts on Wildlife and Government Responsibilities for
Regulating Development and Protecting Wildlife. GAO-05-906. Washington,
D.C.: September 16, 2005.
Hardrock Mining: BLM Needs to Better Manage Financial Assurances to
Guarantee Coverage of Reclamation Costs. GAO-05-377. Washington, D.C.:
June 20, 2005.
Oil and Gas Development: Increased Permitting Activity Has Lessened
BLM's Ability to Meet Its Environmental Protection Responsibilities.
GAO-05-418. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2005.
Oil and Gas Development: Challenges to Agency Decisions and
Opportunities for BLM to Standardize Data Collection. GAO-05-124.
Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2004.
Endangered Species: More Federal Management Attention Is Needed to
Improve the Consultation Process. GAO-04-93. Washington, D.C.: March
19, 2004.
National Wildlife Refuges: Opportunities to Improve the Management and
Oversight of Oil and Gas Activities on Federal Lands. GAO-03-517.
Washington, D.C.: August 28, 2003.
Invasive Species: Clearer Focus and Greater Commitment Needed to
Effectively Manage the Problem. GAO-03-1. Washington, D.C.: October 22,
2002.
Managing Indian Trust Responsibilities and Island Communities:
Indian Trust Funds:
Office of the Special Trustee for American Indians: Financial Statement
Audit Recommendations and the Audit Follow-up Process. GAO-07-295R.
Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.
Indian Issues: The Office of the Special Trustee Has Implemented
Several Key Trust Reforms Required by the 1994 Act, but Important
Decisions about Its Future Remain. GAO-07-104. Washington, D.C.:
December 8, 2006.
Indian Trust Funds: Individual Indian Accounts. GAO-02-970T.
Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2002.
Indian Trust Funds: Tribal Account Balances. GAO-02-420T. Washington,
D.C.: February 7, 2002.
Indian Land Management:
Indian Issues: BLM's Program for Issuing Individual Indian Allotments
on Public Lands Is No Longer Viable. GAO-07-23R. Washington, D.C.:
October 20, 2006.
Indian Issues: BIA's Efforts to Impose Time Frames and Collect Better
Data Should Improve the Processing of Land in Trust Applications. GAO-
06-781. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006.
Indian Irrigation: Numerous Issues Need to Be Addressed to Improve
Project Management and Financial Sustainability. GAO-06-314.
Washington, D.C.: February 24, 2006.
Alaska Native Allotments: Conflicts with Utility Rights-of-way Have Not
Been Resolved through Existing Remedies. GAO-04-923. Washington, D.C.:
September 7, 2004.
Columbia River Basin: A Multilayered Collection of Directives and Plans
Guides Federal Fish and Wildlife Plans. GAO-04-602. Washington, D.C.:
June 4, 2004.
Alaska Native Villages: Most Are Affected by Flooding and Erosion, but
Few Qualify for Federal Assistance. GAO-04-142. Washington, D.C.:
December 12, 2003.
Island Communities:
Compacts of Free Association: Micronesia and the Marshall Islands Face
Challenges in Planning for Sustainability, Measuring Progress, and
Ensuring Accountability. GAO-07-163. Washington, D.C.: December 15,
2006.
U.S. Insular Areas: Economic, Fiscal, and Financial Accountability
Challenges. GAO-07-119. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2006.
Compacts of Free Association: Development Prospects Remain Limited for
Micronesia and Marshall Islands. GAO-06-590. Washington, D.C.: June 27,
2006.
U.S. Insular Areas: Multiple Factors Affect Federal Health Care
Funding. GAO-06-75. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2005.
Compacts of Free Association: Implementation of New Funding and
Accountability Requirements Is Well Underway, but Planning Challenges
Remain. GAO-05-633. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2005.
American Samoa: Accountability for Key Federal Grants Needs
Improvement. GAO-05-41. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2004.
Compact of Free Association: Single Audits Demonstrate Accountability
Problems over Compact Funds. GAO-04-7. Washington, D.C.: October 7,
2003.
Compact of Free Association: An Assessment of the Amended Compacts and
Related Agreements. GAO-03-890T. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003.
Foreign Assistance: Effectiveness and Accountability Problems Common in
U.S. Programs to Assist Two Micronesian Nations. GAO-02-70. Washington,
D.C.: January 22, 2002.
Foreign Relations: Kwajalein Atoll Is the Key U.S. Defense Interest in
Two Micronesian Nations. GAO-02-119. Washington, D.C.: January 22,
2002.
Managing Federal Land Appraisals:
Interior's Land Appraisal Services: Action Needed to Improve Compliance
with Appraisal Standards, Increase Efficiency, and Broaden Oversight.
GAO-06-1050. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006.
Land Acquisitions: Agencies Generally Used Similar Standards and
Appraisal Methodologies in CALFED and CVPIA Transactions. GAO-02-278R.
Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2002.
Deferred Maintenance Backlog:
Indian Irrigation Projects: Numerous Issues Need to Be Addressed to
Improve Project Management and Financial Sustainability. GAO-06-314.
Washington, D.C.: February 24, 2006.
Recreation Fees: Comments on the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement
Act, H.R. 3283. GAO-04-745T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004.
National Park Service: Efforts Underway to Address Its Maintenance
Backlog. GAO-03-1177T. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2003.
Bureau of Indian Affairs Schools: Expenditures in Selected Schools Are
Comparable to Similar Public Schools, but Data Are Insufficient to
Judge Adequacy of Funding and Formulas. GAO-03-955. Washington, D.C.:
September 4, 2003.
Bureau of Indian Affairs Schools: New Facilities Management Information
System Promising, but Improved Data Accuracy Needed. GAO-03-692.
Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2003.
National Park Service: Status of Agency Efforts to Address Its
Maintenance Backlog. GAO-03-992T. Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2003.
National Park Service: Status of Efforts to Develop Better Deferred
Maintenance Data. GAO-02-568R. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2002.
Revenue Collection Opportunities:
Oil and Gas Royalties: Royalty Relief Will Likely Cost the Government
Billions, but the Final Costs Have Yet to Be Determined. GAO-07-369T.
Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2007.
Recreation Fees: Agencies Can Better Implement the Federal Lands
Recreation Enhancement Act and Account for Fee Revenues. GAO-06-1016.
Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2006.
Renewable Energy: Increased Geothermal Development Will Depend on
Overcoming Many Challenges. GAO-06-629. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2006.
National Parks Air Tour Fees: Effective Verification and Enforcement
Are Needed to Improve Compliance. GAO-06-468. Washington, D.C.: May 11,
2006.
Oil and Gas Development: Increased Permitting Activity Has Lessened
BLM's Ability to Meet Its Environmental Protection Responsibilities.
GAO-05-418. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2005.
National Park Service: Revenues Could Increase by Charging Allowed Fees
for Some Special Uses Permits. GAO-05-410. Washington, D.C.: May 6,
2005.
Weaknesses in Contracts and Grants Management:
Chesapeake Bay Gateways Program: National Park Service Needs Better
Accountability and Oversight of Grantees and Gateways. GAO-06-1049.
Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2006.
Interagency Contracting: Franchise Funds Provide Convenience, but Value
to DOD Is Not Demonstrated. GAO-05-456. Washington, D.C.: July 29,
2005.
Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's Orders to
Support Military Operations. GAO-05-201. Washington, D.C.: April 29,
2005.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy Is Needed to
Address Catastrophic Wildfire Threats, GAO/RCED-99-65 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 2, 1999).
[2] GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Important Progress Has Been Made,
but Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy, GAO-05-147
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005).
[3] GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to
Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats, GAO-06-
671R (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006).
[4] GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders
Agencies' Cost Containment Efforts, GAO-07-427T (Washington, D.C.: Jan.
30, 2007).
[5] GAO, Wildland Fire Suppression: Lack of Clear Guidance Raises
Concerns about Cost Sharing between Federal and Nonfederal Entities,
GAO-06-570 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2006).
[6] GAO-07-427T.
[7] Unlike operations that extract oil and gas from federal lands,
hardrock mining operations are not required to pay royalties on the
minerals they extract.
[8] GAO, Hardrock Mining: BLM Needs to Better Manage Financial
Assurances to Guarantee Coverage of Reclamation Costs, GAO-05-377
(Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2005).
[9] GAO, Oil and Gas Development: Increased Permitting Activity Has
Lessened BLM's Ability to Meet Its Environmental Protection
Responsibilities, GAO-05-418 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2005).
[10] 70 Fed. Reg. 41532, 41542 (July 19, 2005).
[11] Pub. L. No. 109-58, title III, subtitle F, § 365(i), 119 Stat.
594, 725 (2005) and 70 Fed. Reg. 58854 (Oct. 7, 2005).
[12] GAO, National Wildlife Refuges: Opportunities to Improve the
Management and Oversight of Oil and Gas Activities on Federal Lands,
GAO-03-517 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 28, 2003).
[13] Pub. L. No. 103-412, 108 Stat. 4239 (1994). Also, in 1996, a class
action lawsuit was filed by Elouise Cobell, a member of the Blackfeet
Tribe, and others against the federal government concerning the
department's management of Indian trust fund accounts (Cobell v.
Kempthorne). The lawsuit is still ongoing and the recent attempts
during the 109th Congress for a legislative settlement were not
enacted.
[14] GAO, Indian Issues: The Office of the Special Trustee Has
Implemented Several Key Trust Reforms Required by the 1994 Act, but
Important Decisions about Its Future Remain, GAO-07-104 (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 8, 2006).
[15] 25 C.F.R. pt. 151.
[16] GAO, Indian Issues: BIA's Efforts to Impose Time Frames and
Collect Better Data Should Improve the Processing of Land in Trust
Applications, GAO-06-781 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006).
[17] GAO, U.S. Insular Areas: Economic, Fiscal, and Financial
Accountability Challenges, GAO-07-119 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12,
2006).
[18] GAO, Compacts of Free Association: Micronesia and the Marshall
Islands Face Challenges in Planning for Sustainability, Measuring
Progress, and Ensuring Accountability, GAO-07-163 (Washington, D.C.:
Dec. 15, 2006).
[19] GAO, Interior's Land Appraisal Services: Actions Needed to Improve
Compliance with Appraisal Standards, Increase Efficiency, and Broaden
Oversight, GAO-06-1050 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006).
[20] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 2003); GAO, High-Risk Series: Federal Real Property, GAO-03-122
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-
207 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2005); GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update,
GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2007).
[21] GAO, Indian Irrigation Projects: Numerous Issues Need to Be
Addressed to Improve Project Management and Financial Sustainability,
GAO-06-314 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 2006).
[22] In order to promote oil and gas production, the federal government
has at times and in specific cases provided "royalty relief"--the
waiver or reduction of royalties that companies would otherwise be
obligated to pay. See GAO, Oil and Gas Royalties: Royalty Relief Will
Likely Cost the Government Billions, but the Final Costs Have Yet to Be
Determined, GAO-07-369T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2007).
[23] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress, GAO-07-
235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006).
[24] GAO, Renewable Energy: Increased Geothermal Development Will
Depend on Overcoming Many Challenges, GAO-06-629 (Washington, D.C.: May
24, 2006).
[25] GAO, National Park Air Tour Fees: Effective Verification and
Enforcement Are Needed to Improve Compliance, GAO-06-468 (Washington,
D.C.: May 11, 2006).
[26] GAO, National Park Service: Revenues Could Increase by Charging
Allowed Fees for Some Special Uses Permits, GAO-05-410 (Washington,
D.C.: May 6, 2005).
[27] Total fee collections in fiscal year 2004 were about $192 million.
See GAO, Recreation Fees: Agencies Can Better Implement the Federal
Lands Recreation Enhancement Act and Account for Fee Revenues, GAO-06-
1016 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2006).
[28] The 10 agencies are the BLM, FWS, Park Service, Bureau of
Reclamation, Forest Service, Department of Energy, Army Corps of
Engineers, Army, Air Force, and Navy. In addition, a number of other
federal agencies manage some minor grazing-related activities.
[29] An animal unit month is the amount of forage (vegetation such as
grass and shrubs) that a cow and her calf eat in a month (or one bull,
one steer, one horse, or five sheep).
[30] GAO, Livestock Grazing: Federal Expenditures and Receipts Vary,
Depending on the Agency and the Purpose of the Fee Charged, GAO-05-869
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2005).
[31] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 31, 2007).
[32] GAO, Interagency Contracting: Problems with DOD's and Interior's
Orders to Support Military Operations, GAO-05-201 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 29, 2005).
[33] Such organizations are referred to as "franchise funds." See GAO,
Interagency Contracting: Franchise Funds Provide Convenience, but Value
to DOD Is Not Demonstrated, GAO-05-456 (Washington, D.C.: July 29,
2005.)
[34] GAO, Chesapeake Bay Gateways Program: National Park Service Needs
Better Accountability and Oversight of Grantees and Gateways, GAO-06-
1049 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2006).
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