Drug Control

INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption Gao ID: T-GGD-99-86 April 21, 1999

The corruption of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs Service employees along the Southwest border by drug traffickers is a serious and continuing threat. Some of these employees have waved drug loads through ports of entry, coordinated the movement of drugs across the border, transported drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, sold drugs, and revealed drug intelligence information. Both INS and Customs have policies and procedures to help ensure the integrity of their employees. However, neither agency is taking full advantage of its policies, procedures, and the lessons to be learned from closed corruption cases to address the rising threat of employee corruption on the Southwest border. For example, although the agencies generally completed background investigations for new hires by the end of their first year on the job, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some cases by as much as three years. The Justice Department's Office of the Inspector General and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs, which deal with allegations of drug-related misconduct by INS and Customs employees, are required to formally report internal control weaknesses identified from closed corruption cases. However, GAO's review of 28 cases involving INS and Customs employees along the Southwest border who had been convicted of drug-related crimes between 1992 and 1997 found internal control weaknesses that were not formally reported or corrected. These weaknesses included instances where (1) drug smugglers chose the inspection lane at a port of entry, (2) INS and Customs employees did not recuse themselves from inspecting persons with whom they had close personal relationships, and (3) law enforcement personnel were allowed to cross the Southwest border or pass Border Control checkpoints without inspection. Also, INS and Customs have not formally evaluated their integrity procedures to determine their effectiveness. For example, GAO found that financial information required for background investigations and reinvestigations was either limited or not fully reviewed. This testimony summarizes the April 1999 report, GAO/GGD-99-31.

GAO noted that: (1) some INS and U.S. Customs Service employees on the Southwest Border have engaged in a variety of illegal drug-related activities, including waving drug loads through ports of entry, coordinating the movement of drugs across the Southwest Border, transporting drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, selling drugs, and disclosing drug intelligence information; (2) both INS and Customs have policies and procedures designed to help ensure the integrity of their employees; (3) however, neither agency is taking full advantage of its policies and procedures and the lessons to be learned from closed corruption-cases; (4) the policies and procedures consist mainly of mandatory background investigations for new staff and 5-year reinvestigations of employees, as well as basic integrity training; (5) while the agencies generally completed required background investigations for new hires by the end of their fist year on the job, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some instances by as many as 3 years; (6) both INS and Customs provided integrity training to new employees during basic training, but advanced integrity training was not required; (7) Justice and Treasury have different organizational structures but similar policies and procedures for handling allegations of drug-related misconduct; (8) at Justice, the Office of the Inspector General is generally responsible for investigating criminal allegations against INS employees; (9) GAO found that the Justice OIG generally complied with its policies and procedures for handling allegations of drug-related misconduct; (10) at Treasury, Customs' Office of Internal Affairs (OIA) is generally responsible for investigating both criminal and noncriminal allegations against Customs employees; (11) Customs' automated case management system and its investigative case files did not provide the necessary information to assess compliance with investigative procedures; (12) INS and Customs have missed opportunities to learn lessons and change their policies and procedures for preventing drug-related corruption of their employees; (13) the Justice OIG and Customs' OIA are required to formally report internal control weaknesses identified from closed corruption cases, but have not done so; (14) GAO's review of 28 cases involving INS and Customs employees assigned to the Southwest Border, who were convicted of drug-related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through 1997, revealed internal control weaknesses that were not formally reported; and (15) INS and Customs had not formally evaluated their integrity procedures to determine their effectiveness.



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