Customs Service
Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment Gao ID: GAO-03-235T October 17, 2002GAO reviewed the Customs Service's acquisition and deployment of radiation detection equipment and assistance provided by the United States to foreign countries to combat nuclear smuggling. GAO found that observations concerning the acquisition of radiation detection equipment have not changed. The Customs Service's primary radiation detection equipment--radiation pagers--have certain limitations and may be inappropriate for the task. Further, there is still no comprehensive plan in place for installing and using radiation detection equipment at all U.S. border crossings and ports of entry. Regarding U.S. efforts to help other countries combat smuggling, a number of U.S. agencies, including Customs, have provided assistance to foreign countries--mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. The agencies have provided a range of assistance including radiation detection equipment and training as well as other equipment and training to generally improve countries' ability to interdict nuclear smuggling.
GAO-03-235T, Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment
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United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 9:00 a.m.
Thursday, October 17, 2002:
Customs Service:
Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment:
Statement of (Ms.) Gary L. Jones, Director:
Natural Resources and Environment:
and:
Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director:
Tax Administration and Justice:
GAO-03-235T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss our ongoing
work related to Customs‘ acquisition and deployment of radiation
detection equipment, and our report related to assistance provided by
the United States to foreign countries to combat nuclear smuggling.
[Footnote 1] As you know, we have also been doing work for the
Committee, including visits to ports, concerning other aspects of
Customs‘ inspection of cargo at seaports. The Customs Service has
deemed the information we are collecting regarding that work as law
enforcement sensitive, which precludes us from discussing it in an open
hearing. We understand that a closed session for questions and answers
will follow this open session. We will be happy to share information
about this law enforcement sensitive work in that setting.
Our testimony focuses on (1) Customs‘ acquisition and deployment of
radiation detection equipment on U.S. borders and ports of entry and (2)
U.S. assistance to foreign countries to help them combat nuclear
smuggling. We shared our observations from visits to two major ports
with this Subcommittee during a closed hearing on July 9, 2002, and our
observations on the deployment of radiation detection equipment in a
letter to the full Committee on August 15, 2002. Our statement today
results from interviews with Customs and Department of Energy (DOE)
officials and draws upon our prior work on U.S. efforts to help other
countries combat nuclear smuggling.
Our observations concerning the acquisition of radiation detection
equipment have not changed from what we reported to you in August.
Specifically, the Customs Service‘s primary radiation detection
equipment”radiation pagers”have certain limitations and may be
inappropriate for the task. Further, we remain concerned that no
comprehensive plan is in place for installing and using radiation
detection equipment at all U.S. border crossings and ports of entry.
Regarding U.S. efforts to help other countries combat nuclear
smuggling, a number of U.S. agencies, including Customs, have provided
assistance to foreign countries”mostly in the former Soviet Union and
Central and Eastern Europe. The agencies have provided a range of
assistance including radiation detection equipment and training as well
as other equipment and training to generally improve countries‘ ability
to interdict nuclear smuggling.
Customs‘ Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment:
Based on our work with Customs and DOE officials and our review of U.S.
efforts to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling, we have
concerns that Customs has not yet deployed the best available
technologies for detecting radioactive and nuclear materials at U.S.
border crossings and ports of entry. Customs officials told us that its
approximately 7,500 inspectors rely primarily on personal radiation
detection pagers, worn on a belt. Since fiscal year 1998, Customs has
deployed about 4,200 pagers among its inspectors and expects to purchase
over 4,000 additional pagers to complete deployment by September 2003.
At that time, every inspector will have his or her own pager.
However, radiation detection pagers have limitations. DOE officials
told us that they do not view pagers as search instruments, but rather
as personal safety devices to protect against radiation exposure, and
that the pagers have a limited range and are not designed to detect
weapons-usable nuclear material. According to U.S. radiation detection
vendors and DOE laboratory specialists, pagers are more effectively
used in conjunction with other radiation detection equipment, such as
portal monitors similar to what DOE is providing to Russia for use at
its border crossings. Customs has deployed over 200 radiation detectors
on its x-ray systems for screening small packages, but it has not
deployed the larger portal monitors for screening pedestrians and
entire vehicles. Customs plans to install portal monitors at every U.S.
border crossing and port of entry, but so far has only deployed them at
one border crossing as a pilot project. Customs has told us that a
report on the pilot project would be issued by the middle of this
month, but according to a Customs official we spoke with the report is
not yet available. We will be reviewing, among other things, the
results of this pilot project in response to the Committee‘s recent
request to review the Customs Service‘s efforts to deploy radiation
detection equipment on U.S. borders and ports of entry. Customs
officials also told us that they plan to purchase up to 400 portal
monitors by the end of fiscal year 2003. While these purchases are a
step in the right direction, Customs officials told us that equipment
evaluation and testing could still take several years, and in the
meantime they do not have a time frame or specific plan for actually
deploying portal monitors.
We believe that it is important that Customs develop a comprehensive
plan for installing radiation detection equipment at all U.S. border
crossings and ports of entry, and in the near term, while the plan is
being developed, consider immediate steps to deploy currently available
radiation detection equipment. A comprehensive plan would address,
among other things, vulnerabilities and risks; identify the complement
of radiation detection equipment that should be used at each type of
border entry point”air, rail, land, and sea”and whether equipment could
be immediately deployed; identify longer-term radiation detection
needs; and develop measures to ensure that the equipment is adequately
maintained. However, it is not enough to simply deploy equipment.
Customs personnel must be effectively trained in radiation science, the
use of the equipment, and identifying and responding to alarms. The
plan would need to identify costs, annual budgetary needs, and
timeframes for all these activities. The plan would provide for an
integrated, systematic approach to Customs antiterrorism efforts and
provide the basis for setting priorities and for coordinating efforts
with other federal, state, and local agencies that would be involved
with these activities. While Customs officials told us that they have
developed the elements of a plan, including schedules to purchase
equipment and train personnel, these elements have not yet been
integrated into a comprehensive plan.
U.S. International Assistance to Combat Nuclear Smuggling:
U.S. assistance efforts to combat nuclear smuggling are divided among
six federal agencies”DOE and the Departments of State and Defense;
Customs; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the U.S. Coast
Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through 2001, the six agencies spent about
$86 million to help about 30 countries, mostly in the former Soviet
Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat the threat of smuggling of
nuclear and other materials that could be used in weapons of mass
destruction. The agencies have provided a range of assistance including
radiation detection equipment and training as well as other equipment
and training to generally improve countries‘ ability to interdict
nuclear smuggling. DOE has two programs to combat nuclear smuggling,
primarily focusing on Russia. The State Department has provided
radiation detection portal monitors, mobile vans equipped with
radiation detectors, handheld radiation detectors, and other assistance
to about 30 countries through two separate programs. The Department of
Defense has two programs that have provided radiation detection portal
monitors, handheld detectors, and other assistance to about 20
countries. With funding provided by the Departments of State and
Defense, Customs, the FBI, and the U.S. Coast Guard have provided a
variety of training and equipment to customs, border guard, and law
enforcement officials in numerous countries.
As part of U.S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling, DOE is
implementing the Second Line of Defense program to install radiation
detection portal monitors at Russian border crossings. From fiscal year
1997 through 2001, DOE installed 70 portal monitors at eight border
crossings in Russia”an airport in Moscow, six seaports and one railroad
crossing”at a cost of $11.2 million. The eight border crossings are the
first of close to 60 sites where DOE plans to install portal monitors
based on its assessment of over 300 border crossings in Russia. DOE
prioritized the border crossings based on factors that might increase
the risk that potential smugglers would use particular routes to
smuggle nuclear material out of Russia. According to DOE officials, the
portal monitors they provided to Russia have detected more than 275
cases involving radioactive material including contaminated scrap
metal, irradiated cargo, and other radioactive materials that could
pose a proliferation concern.
Russian customs officials told us that radiation detection equipment
funded by DOE‘s Second Line of Defense program has helped accelerate
Russia‘s plans to improve border security. According to these
officials, as of October 2001, DOE had financed the purchase of about
15 percent of Russia‘s 300 portal monitors. The U.S.-funded equipment
is manufactured in Russia to, among other things, facilitate
maintenance, and DOE national laboratory personnel test the portal
monitors to ensure that they are placed in an optimal configuration (to
maximize detection capability) and are being used as intended.
According to Russian officials, there is excellent cooperation with DOE
on ways to continually improve the performance of the equipment, and
DOE makes follow-up visits to inspect the equipment and ensure that it
is recalibrated as necessary to meet performance specifications.
During our visit to Russia, we observed several U.S.-funded pedestrian
portal monitors that were installed at Moscow‘s Sheremetyevo Airport as
well as a control room that included video equipment and a computerized
monitoring system, also funded by DOE, that was connected to the portal
monitors. Russian officials tested the equipment we saw at the airport
on our behalf. With our knowledge, they ’planted“ a radioactive source
in an attaché case that we carried past a pedestrian portal monitor,
which activated an alarm. A computer screen in the control room
displayed our movements past the portal monitor.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. We will be happy to
answer any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may
have at this time.
GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact Gary Jones
at (202) 512-3841 or Laurie E. Ekstrand at (202) 512-9110. Gene Aloise,
Seto Bagdoyan, Ryan T. Coles, Joseph Cook, and Glen Levis also made key
contributions to this testimony.
Footnote:
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S.
Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need
Strengthened Coordination and Planning, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-426], (Washington, D.C.: May
16, 2002).
[End of testimony]
