Container Security
Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and Challenges Gao ID: GAO-03-297T November 18, 2002After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, concerns intensified over the vulnerability of U.S. ports to acts of terrorism. One particular concern involves the possibility that terrorists would attempt to smuggle illegal fissile material or a tactical nuclear weapon into the country through a cargo container shipped from overseas. This testimony discusses the programs already in place to counter such attempts, new initiatives now under way to enhance the nation's security against such attempts, and the key challenges faced in implementing these various efforts.
U.S. ports have programs in place to detect illegal fissile material or nuclear weapons, but these programs are limited in several respects. They focus on screening a small portion of total cargo as it enters the country, and they are carried out without the use of adequate detection aids, such as equipment that can scan entire containers for radiation. Efforts to target cargo for screening are hampered by the quality of information regarding which cargo poses the greatest risk. New initiatives are under way to supplement these programs. The predominant focus of these initiatives has been to establish additional lines of security in the supply chain of international commerce. In essence, this means moving part of the security effort overseas, where goods are prepared for shipment into this country. These initiatives include such efforts as establishing international standards for ports, carriers, and maritime workers; stationing Customs personnel overseas; reducing security vulnerabilities all the way back to points of manufacture; and using new technology to monitor the contents and movement of containers from their point of origin. The nation faces three key challenges to implementing efforts to improve the security of ports and containers: creating and enforcing a set of security standards, ensuring the cooperation of diverse groups with competing interests when it comes to the specifics of how things are to be done, and paying the increased security bill. Such challenges exist both for strengthening domestic efforts and for developing new initiatives that expand security on an international basis. GAO is currently reviewing several aspects of port and container security, and will report as those efforts are completed.
GAO-03-297T, Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and Challenges
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 11:00 a.m. EST
in New York, New York,
Monday, November 18, 2002:
Container Security:
Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and
Challenges:
Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO-03-297T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-297T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations,
House Committee on Government Reform:
Why GAO Did This Study:
After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, concerns intensified over
the vulnerability of U.S. ports to acts of terrorism. One particular
concern involves the possibility that terrorists would attempt to
smuggle illegal fissile material or a tactical nuclear weapon into
the country through a cargo container shipped from overseas. This
testimony discusses the programs already in place to counter such a
ttempts, new initiatives now under way to enhance the nation‘s security
against such attempts, and the key challenges faced in implementing
these various efforts.
What GAO Found:
U.S. ports have programs in place to detect illegal fissile material
or nuclear weapons, but these programs are limited in several respects.
They focus on screening a small portion of total cargo as it enters the
country, and they are carried out without the use of adequate detection
aids, such as equipment that can scan entire containers for radiation.
Efforts to target cargo for screening are hampered by the quality of
information regarding which cargo poses the greatest risk.
New initiatives are under way to supplement these programs. The
predominant focus of these initiatives has been to establish additional
lines of security in the supply chain of international commerce. In
essence, this means moving part of the security effort overseas, where
goods are prepared for shipment into this country. These initiatives
include such efforts as establishing international standards for ports,
carriers, and maritime workers; stationing Customs personnel overseas;
reducing security vulnerabilities all the way back to points of
manufacture; and using new technology to monitor the contents and
movement
of containers from their point of origin.
The nation faces three key challenges to implementing efforts to
improve
the security of ports and containers: creating and enforcing a set of
security standards, ensuring the cooperation of diverse groups with
competing interests when it comes to the specifics of how things are to
be done, and paying the increased security bill. Such challenges exist
both for strengthening domestic efforts and for developing new
initiatives
that expand security on an international basis. GAO is currently
reviewing
several aspects of port and container security, and will report as
those
efforts are completed.
Figure: Overview of Supply Chain for Cargo Containers:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO, (c) Nova Development Corporation and Corbis Images
(DigitalStock).
[End of figure]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to be here in New York City to discuss our
work on efforts to address security risks related to U.S. ports. These
risks are clearly serious ones that pose national security concerns. We
have issued several reports and testimony statements related to nuclear
smuggling and port security in general.
My testimony focuses on (1) the programs in place to prevent illegal
fissile material or a tactical nuclear weapon from being smuggled into
the United States through our ports; (2) new efforts under way to
counter such smuggling, both domestically and abroad; and (3) the key
challenges faced in implementing these various efforts. We have
excluded information on these topics that has been deemed law-
enforcement sensitive by the U.S. Customs Service (Customs), which
precludes us from discussing it in an open hearing such as this. My
remarks are based on completed GAO work on Customs efforts to detect
hazardous materials at U.S. ports and federal efforts to secure U.S.
seaports, as well as challenges involved in implementing these
initiatives.[Footnote 1] We are also presenting information based on
ongoing work regarding new initiatives that address overseas supply
chain security. See the appendix for a more detailed explanation of our
scope and methodology.
In summary:
* The programs already in place at U.S. ports for detecting illegal
fissile material or nuclear weapons are limited in a number of
respects. They focus on screening a small portion of total cargo as it
enters U.S. ports, and they are carried out without the use of adequate
detection aids, such as radiation-detection equipment that can scan the
entire contents of cargo containers. Instead, Customs personnel rely on
small, handheld radiation pagers that have a limited range and
capability. Other screening programs designed more broadly to identify
any illegal or hazardous cargoes could potentially help identify such
nuclear material as well, but these programs rely heavily on the
availability of quality information for targeting those cargoes posing
the greatest risk. The Customs Service acknowledges that the accuracy
of such information still needs improvement.
* The predominant focus of most new initiatives has been to establish
additional lines of security in the supply chain of international
commerce. In essence, this means moving part of the effort overseas,
where goods are prepared for shipment into this country. These
initiatives include such efforts as establishing international
standards for ports, carriers, and maritime workers; stationing Customs
personnel overseas to identify high-risk containers before inspection
in foreign ports; reducing security vulnerabilities along the overseas
portion of the supply chain; and using new technology to monitor the
contents and movement of containers from their points of origin.
Because the United States functions in a global economy where
international organizations are addressing similar issues, current
U.S.-led efforts are evolving within that context.
* The United States faces considerable challenges to successfully
implement these existing and new efforts, both at home and abroad. Our
reviews of port security programs have shown that even on the domestic
front, the federal government faces challenges in creating and
enforcing a set of security standards, ensuring the cooperation of
diverse groups with competing interests when it comes to the specifics
of how things are to be done, and paying the increased security bill.
Our preliminary work indicates that these same challenges are likely to
exist in efforts to extend strong measures of security elsewhere. To
make its programs work, the United States is participating in and
seeking to achieve consensus through a variety of international
organizations, across many countries.
Background:
Seaports are critical gateways for the movement of international
commerce. More than 95 percent of our non-North American foreign trade
arrives by ship. In 2001, approximately 5,400 ships carrying
multinational crews and cargoes from around the globe made more than
60,000 U.S. port calls. More than 6 million containers (suitable for
truck-trailers) enter the country annually. Particularly with ’just-in-
time“ deliveries of goods, the expeditious flow of commerce through
these ports is so essential that the Coast Guard Commandant stated
after September 11th, ’even slowing the flow long enough to inspect
either all or a statistically significant random selection of imports
would be economically intolerable.“[Footnote 2]
As indispensable as the rapid flow of commerce is, the terrorist
attacks of September 11th have served to heighten awareness about the
supply system‘s vulnerability to terrorist actions. Drugs and illegal
aliens are routinely smuggled into this country, not only in small
boats but also hidden among otherwise legitimate cargoes on large
commercial ships. These same pathways are available for exploitation by
a terrorist organization or any nation or person wishing to attack us
surreptitiously. The Brookings Institution reported in 2002 that a
weapon of mass destruction shipped by container or mail could cause
damage and disruption costing the economy as much as $1
trillion.[Footnote 3] Port vulnerabilities stem from inadequate
security measures as well as from the challenge of monitoring the vast
and rapidly increasing volume of cargo, persons, and vessels passing
through the ports. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that
various assessments of national security have concluded that the
nation‘s ports are far more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than the
nation‘s aviation system, where most of the nation‘s efforts and
resources have been placed since September 11th.[Footnote 4]
Guarding against the introduction of nuclear or other dangerous cargo
into the United States involves having effective security measures at
numerous points along the supply chain. Transporting a shipping
container from its international point of origin to its final
destination is a complex process that involves many different
participants and many points of transfer. Many of these participants
carry out their roles in the exporting country (see fig. 1). The actual
materials in a container can potentially be affected not just by the
manufacturer or supplier of the material being shipped, but also by
carriers who are responsible for getting the material to a port and by
personnel who load containers onto the ships. Others who interact with
the cargo or have access to the records of the goods being shipped
include exporters who make arrangements for shipping and loading,
freight consolidators who package disparate shipments into containers,
and forwarders who manage and process the information about what is
being loaded onto the ship. Review by the Customs Service, which
traditionally comes once the ship arrives at its destination, is
likewise just one step in the transportation chain on the domestic
side.
Figure 1: Overview of Supply Chain for Cargo Containers:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO, (c) Nova Development Corporation and Corbis Images
(DigitalStock).
[End of figure]
Detecting smuggled fissile material that could be used to make a
nuclear weapon is a difficult task not just because it is a potential
needle in this vast haystack of international trade. It is also
difficult because one of the materials that is of greatest concern--
highly enriched uranium--has a relatively low level of radioactivity
and is therefore very difficult to find with radiation-detection
equipment. By contrast, radioactive materials that could be used in
conjunction with conventional explosives to create a so-called dirty
bomb are somewhat easier to detect, because they have much higher
levels of radioactivity. Because of the complexity of detecting nuclear
material, the Customs officers or border guards who are responsible for
operating the equipment must also be trained in using handheld
radiation detectors to pinpoint the source of an alarm, identifying
false alarms, and responding to cases of illicit nuclear smuggling.
Existing Programs for Countering Nuclear Smuggling at Domestic and
International Ports Are Limited:
Existing programs for detecting the smuggling of nuclear materials are
spearheaded by the Customs Service and are directed mainly at the
import side of the transportation chain. Some of these efforts focus
specifically on detecting nuclear materials, while others are directed
at the wider range of hazardous and illegal shipments. In addition,
several other federal agencies have efforts under way that are directed
at the export side of the transportation chain--that is, at detecting
and stopping shipments of nuclear materials before they leave the
country of origin. We and others have pointed out that these programs
lack many components, such as the best detection technology, for
providing a more effective deterrent.
Efforts Aimed Specifically at Detecting Nuclear Cargo Entering U.S.
Ports:
The Customs Service currently has some equipment in place for detecting
radioactive or nuclear materials in the nation‘s ports and has begun
training its agents to recognize and respond to radioactive materials.
However, this equipment has limited effectiveness, and the agency‘s
training programs, among other things, have not been integrated into a
comprehensive plan.[Footnote 5]
Customs‘ current screening program is based on several types of
radiation-screening technology, only some of which are up and running:
* Radiation-detection pagers. Customs acquired radiation-detection
pagers, which are worn on a belt, have limited range, and were not
designed to detect weapons-usable radioactive material. Customs has
deployed about 4,200 pagers among its 7,500 inspectors and expects
every inspector to have a pager by September 2003. According to experts
with whom we have spoken, these pagers are more effectively used in
conjunction with other detection equipment rather than as a primary
means of detection.
* X-ray-compatible detectors. These radiation detectors are installed
on X-ray machines that screen small packages. Customs has installed
about 200 such detectors nationwide at border crossings and ports of
entry. These detectors are not large enough to screen entire containers
or other large cargo, however.
* Portal monitors. These detectors, which are not yet in place in ports
or other points of entry, are larger than those on X-ray machines and
are capable of screening the entire contents of containers, cars, or
trucks. Customs is now completing a pilot test of such a monitor at one
border crossing, and Customs officials told us that they plan to
purchase up to 400 portal monitors by the end of fiscal year 2003.
According to Customs, about 5,000 of its approximately 7,500 inspectors
have been trained to identify materials and components associated with
the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. Customs also plans
to give specialized training in the detection of nuclear material to as
many as 140 of its inspectors, in cooperation with the Department of
Energy‘s national laboratories. However, Customs has not yet developed
an overall plan that coordinates equipment purchases and personnel
training. Such a plan would also address such things as vulnerabilities
and risks; identify the complement of radiation-detection equipment
that should be used at each type of border entry point--air, rail,
land, and sea--and determine whether equipment could be immediately
deployed; identify longer-term radiation-detection needs; and develop
measures to ensure that the equipment is adequately maintained.
Efforts Focused More Broadly on Detecting All Hazardous Cargoes in U.S.
Ports:
Customs has methods and machines that, although directed more broadly
at various types of hazardous or illegal cargoes, can be useful in
finding radioactive and nuclear materials. These efforts are based
largely on an approach of targeting a small percentage of containers
for in-depth screening. With more than 6 million containers a year
entering U.S. ports, examining them all has not been possible. Instead,
Customs has acknowledged that its approach relies on reviewing shipping
manifests, invoices and other commercial documents, and intelligence
leads to target approximately 2 percent of the containers that enter
the country nationwide for physical inspection, though the actual
percentage varies from port to port. To better address terrorist
threats, Customs is modifying its targeting approach, which was
originally designed for counter-narcotics efforts. Customs officials
told us that one of their greatest needs was for better information to
more accurately target shipments. In a separate effort, GAO is
conducting a review of Customs‘ processing of sea-borne containerized,
bulk, and break-bulk cargo bound for the United States,[Footnote 6]
focusing on targeting criteria, procedures, and the use of screening
technology. On the basis of our preliminary work, GAO has identified a
number of challenges related to the implementation and effectiveness of
Customs‘ initiatives to ensure the security of cargo entering U.S.
seaports. Customs has deemed the information we are collecting about
that work as law-enforcement sensitive, which precludes our discussing
it in an open hearing such as this.
To inspect the containers they target for closer scrutiny, Customs
inspectors use gamma ray and X-ray machines that are capable of
scanning the interior of a 40-foot container in less than a minute. The
Port of Newark has four such machines, called VACIS machines.[Footnote
7] Starting in the summer of 2002, Customs began deploying an
additional 20 mobile gamma ray imaging devices at U.S. ports to help
inspectors examine the contents of cargo containers and
vehicles.[Footnote 8] If necessary, containers can also be opened and
unloaded for a lengthy, more thorough item-by-item inspection.
Efforts in Nation‘s Ports Remain a Key Line of Defense:
Aside from Customs‘ efforts, the Coast Guard and other agencies are
undertaking a number of other fundamental actions domestically to
improve our line of defense. For example:
* The Coast Guard has its own screening process for identifying and
boarding vessels of special interest or concern. Shortly after the
September 11th terrorist attacks, the Coast Guard modified its ship
arrival notification requirement. The modification requires all vessels
over 300 gross tons to contact the Coast Guard 96 hours--up from 24
hours--before they are scheduled to arrive at a U.S. port. Each vessel
must provide information on its destination, its scheduled arrival, the
cargo it is carrying, and a roster of its crew members. The
information, which is processed and reviewed by the Coast Guard‘s
National Vessel Movement Center, is used in conjunction with data from
various intelligence agencies to identify ’high-interest“ vessels.
Decisions on appropriate actions to be taken with respect to such
vessels, such as whether to board, escort, or deny entry to them, are
made based on established criteria and procedures.
* Coast Guard officials are continuing to conduct vulnerability
assessments of the nation‘s ports. These assessments help identify
where local ports are most susceptible to security weaknesses and
provide a blueprint of actions that need to be taken to make the ports
more secure.
* Individual ports are taking a number of actions, often using newly
provided federal funding to help pay for them. Three Department of
Transportation (DOT) agencies--the Maritime Administration, the Coast
Guard, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)--recently
awarded grants to 51 U.S. ports for security enhancements and
assessments. For example, in 2002, the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey received $3.5 million for such activities as developing
devices for scanning containerized cargo for radioactivity, conducting
preparedness training, and installing camera surveillance
systems.[Footnote 9]
But actions such as these and the systems now in place at local ports
to effectively identify, intercept, examine, and deal with ships and
cargoes that arouse suspicion, or otherwise do not meet established
standards, remain a work in progress. The recent incidents at the Port
of New York and New Jersey involving the Palermo Senator and the
Mayview Maersk illustrate that basic questions remain about how actions
should be carried out at domestic ports. In both cases, the Coast Guard
had concerns about the vessels but allowed them to enter the port. In
the case of the Palermo Senator, the ship remained at the dock for 18
hours after testing showed high levels of radioactivity.[Footnote 10]
For the Mayview Maersk, the ship remained at the dock for 6 hours while
the Coast Guard checked for explosives.[Footnote 11] These incidents
illustrate the need for clearer definitions of responsibility and
procedure. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey officials, for
example, cited a need for clearer guidance on the conditions under
which ships can be denied entry into U.S. ports and the protocols for
where and how to examine and unload ships suspected of carrying
explosives or weapons of mass destruction.
Efforts Aimed at Intercepting Shipments before They Leave the Export
Country:
Finally, turning to efforts outside U.S. borders, our ongoing work
indicates that U.S. agencies have taken steps to address nuclear
smuggling by attempting to ensure that nuclear materials do not leave
some other countries, especially the former Soviet Union. Under its
Second Line of Defense program, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has
installed 70 portal monitors at 8 border crossings in Russia since
fiscal year 1997. These 8 crossings are the first of about 60 sites in
Russia where DOE plans to install such portal monitors. According to
DOE officials, the monitors provided to Russia have resulted in more
than 275 cases involving radioactive material, including contaminated
scrap metal, irradiated cargo, and other materials. The State
Department and Department of Defense (DOD) have also provided detection
equipment and other assistance primarily to former Soviet countries.
In our July 2002 report, we noted a lack of effective coordination
among the overseas assistance programs.[Footnote 12] That is, DOE, DOD,
and the State Department have pursued separate approaches to installing
radiation detection at border crossings, leaving some crossings more
vulnerable than others to nuclear smuggling. Moreover, according to
agency officials, U.S. assistance has sometimes lacked effective
follow-up to ensure that the equipment delivered was properly
maintained and used. Some equipment has sat idle for months or years
for want of final agreements, reliable power supplies, or appropriate
placement. For example, some equipment given to Estonia sat in an
embassy garage for 7 months while an agreement governing its release
was finalized; portal monitors sat in the U.S. embassy in Lithuania for
2 years because officials disagreed about whether a new $12,600 power
supply was needed to run them; and one portal monitor delivered to
Bulgaria was installed on an unused road. In many cases, countries that
have received U.S. radiation-detection equipment were not
systematically providing information to U.S. agencies about the nuclear
materials they detect, making it difficult to determine the equipment‘s
impact and effectiveness. DOE and other agencies providing the
equipment have identified these and other problems and are taking
actions to address them.
New Efforts Are Under Way to Address the Entire Supply Chain:
In responding to the ongoing challenges of preventing radioactive and
nuclear materials from entering the United States, the federal
government has recognized that it must take a multi-pronged approach,
including changes on the domestic as well as the international front.
Concentrating on a small percentage of all containers, even with
efforts to target high-risk cargoes, may not provide sufficient
coverage. To widen coverage without bringing international commerce to
a virtual halt, federal agencies are beginning to address those parts
of the overseas supply chain that have received relatively limited
attention, including country of origin. The main thrust of several new
initiatives has been to create multiple lines of defense by pushing
security beyond U.S. docks to include points of departure and,
ultimately, places of manufacture. This is a fundamental change that
involves viewing cargo security as an international effort rather than
a national effort. Recognizing the important role that international
organizations play in setting standards and procedures to facilitate
international trade and enhance the security of the global supply
chain, the United States is participating in these forums to help
achieve these dual goals. To develop such international efforts, part
of the federal government‘s effort must be on the diplomatic front as
it seeks to forge security-related agreements in international forums,
such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO). As the federal
government is engaged in this new approach, it is also attempting to
improve the lines of defense inside our nation‘s ports. Although
various efforts to do so are under way, these efforts are in their
preliminary stages. Currently, we are conducting a separate review for
the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Ways and
Means of Customs‘ Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) programs, focusing on their
efforts to address concerns about the vulnerabilities of the
international supply chain without impeding global commerce. We have
obtained data from Customs‘ headquarters and have begun foreign
fieldwork.
New Initiatives Focus on Enhancing Security of Overseas Supply Chain:
The fundamental shift in the approach to cargo security means that a
program must be developed to put in place the additional checkpoints
and procedures needed in the supply chain. The Customs Commissioner has
emphasized the importance of such an effort in testing for the cargoes,
stating, ’If a cargo container has been used to smuggle a weapon of
mass destruction set to go off upon arrival in the United States, it
may be too late to save American lives and the infrastructure of a
great seaport. Accordingly, we must change our focus and alter our
practice to the new reality.“:
On this front, three primary initiatives are under way. Although all
three initiatives focus on activities that affect the overseas supply
chain, they differ somewhat in their focus and application.[Footnote
13]
* The Container Security Initiative (CSI) focuses on placing U.S.
Customs inspectors at the ports of embarkation to target containers for
inspection.
* The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) focuses on
efforts by importers and others to enhance security procedures along
their supply chains.
* The Operation Safe Commerce (OSC) focuses more heavily on using new
technology, such as container seals, to help shippers ensure the
integrity of the cargo included in containers being sent to the United
States.
CSI Places U.S. Customs Personnel in Foreign Ports:
The CSI program that was announced in January 2002 is a new initiative
intended to detect and deter terrorists from smuggling weapons of mass
destruction via containers on ocean-going vessels before they reach the
United States. The United States is attempting to enter into bilateral
agreements with foreign governments to place U.S. Customs personnel at
key foreign seaports where, based on U.S. and foreign data, they will
work with their foreign counterparts to target and inspect high-risk
containers bound for the United States. By working at foreign ports
with local customs, this program is designed to facilitate the early
detection and examination of containers that are considered high-risk.
Other key elements of CSI include developing criteria intended to
enable Customs inspectors to better target high-risk containers
suspected of transporting weapons of mass destruction, using technology
to quickly screen high-risk containers at foreign ports, and developing
and using smart and secure containers.
Customs is currently working to put such agreements in place. Customs
has placed inspectors at 3 ports in Canada (Vancouver, Montreal, and
Halifax) and is now focusing on efforts to cover the 20 ports with the
highest volume of containers arriving into the United States. To date,
eight governments, representing 13 of the top 20 ports, have entered
into CSI agreements,[Footnote 14] and Customs has placed inspectors in
the Netherlands.[Footnote 15] Agreements are currently under
negotiation with six other governments, representing the remaining 7
ports. Customs also plans to expand the program to other ports deemed
to be strategically important.
C-TPAT Seeks to Improve Security Measures along the International
Supply Chain:
Another Customs initiative is the C-TPAT program, a partnership between
the business community and Customs designed to enhance the security of
international supply chains. Through this initiative, which began in
April 2002, importing businesses, freight forwarders, carriers, and
other logistics providers enter into agreements with Customs to
voluntarily undertake measures that will reduce security
vulnerabilities. Companies participating in the program must complete a
self-assessment of their supply chain and submit to Customs a profile
that describes their current security practices. Customs then reviews
these profiles, certifies applicants, and provides them with feedback
about security-related issues that need to be resolved. Once they are
certified, C-TPAT members must still address Customs concerns on these
issues. Customs plans to work jointly with companies to track their
progress in making security improvements along their supply chains, but
the emphasis is on self-policing rather than Customs verifications.
Overall, Customs views the C-TPAT program as an incremental means to
strengthen the international supply chain.
According to Customs, by participating in C-TPAT, certified importers
and their supply chain partners could benefit from a reduced likelihood
that Customs officials looking for weapons of mass destruction will
delay the movement of their containers for inspection. Furthermore, in
the event of an incident, C-TPAT members would likely be among the
first allowed to resume their import operations.
As of early November 2002, approximately 1,100 companies had agreed to
participate in C-TPAT, and Customs had certified 197 importers, 16
brokers, and 22 carriers. C-TPAT is currently open to all importers,
brokers, freight forwarders, and non-vessel-owning common carriers, as
well as most other types of carriers.[Footnote 16] Customs, in
consultation with private-sector partners, plans to expand the program
to port authorities, terminal operators, warehouse operators, and
foreign manufacturers.
OSC Applies New Technology to Provide Greater Assurance That Cargoes
Are Safe:
OSC was initiated by the private sector as an attempt to make the
supply chain more secure. OSC is administered by TSA within DOT and is
funded by $28 million appropriated by the Congress in July 2002. Like
the two Customs initiatives, OSC seeks to move the primary reliance
away from control systems at U.S. ports of entry and toward improved
controls at points of origin and along the way. OSC relies on using new
technology such as electronic container seals to strengthen the
security of cargo as it moves along the international supply chain.
Efforts center on the following:
* ensuring that containers are loaded in a secure environment at the
point of product origin, with 100 percent verification of their
contents;
* using such technology as pressure, light, or temperature sensors to
continually monitor containers throughout their overseas voyage to the
point of distribution in the United States; and
* using cargo-tracking technology to keep accurate track of containers
at all points in the supply chain, including distribution to their
ultimate destinations.
The nation‘s three largest container port regions (Los Angeles/Long
Beach, New York/New Jersey, and Seattle/Tacoma) are involved in the OSC
pilot project, which will address the security vulnerabilities posed by
containers entering these U.S. port regions. According to the port
officials, they are working together with federal agencies to determine
which procedures and technologies constitute the best practices in
supply chain security. According to TSA, the OSC final grant award
criteria will be contained in the Request for Applications, which is
expected to be released in December 2002.[Footnote 17]
International Approach Requires Consensus-Building Efforts:
According to the Associate Deputy Secretary of DOT, who serves as the
principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Transportation as well as
co-chair of the Operation Safe Commerce Executive Steering Committee,
meaningful improvement in global transportation security will involve
actions of many international organizations and governments. The
Administration, including various federal agencies, is working with
regional and global leaders and international organizations to further
this critically important transportation security agenda. Key
initiatives are being pursued in the International Maritime
Organization, the World Customs Organization, the International
Organization for Standardization, the International Labor
Organization, and the United Nations Sub-Committee of Experts on the
Transportation of Dangerous Goods.
Seeking Consensus with Regional and Global Leaders:
To encourage the broadest possible international consensus regarding
the importance of enhancing transportation security on a global basis,
the Administration has promoted a transport security agenda both at the
most recent G8 Summit in Canada (June 2002)[Footnote 18] and the recent
meeting of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders in Los Cabos,
Mexico (October 2002). DOT officials report that in both forums,
participants endorsed the importance of adopting aggressive measures to
combat the terrorist threat to transportation on a global basis--
notably, through the work of international organizations--and to
accelerate, where possible, the deadlines for implementation of
important new requirements.
Forming New Security Consensus through the International Maritime
Organization:
The International Maritime Organization is responsible for improving
maritime safety, including combating acts of violence or crime at sea.
The Coast Guard and DOT spearhead U.S. involvement in the IMO. Ninety-
eight percent of the world‘s international shipping fleet operates
under the agreements it promulgates. Following the September 11th
attacks, IMO started determining new regulations needed to enhance ship
and port security and to prevent shipping from becoming a target of
international terrorism. Consideration of these new regulations is
expected at a diplomatic conference scheduled for December of this
year. According to Coast Guard officials, the new regulations will
contain mandatory requirements for ships engaged in international
voyages and for port facilities that serve such ships. The structure of
the measures includes a family of plans. Port facilities and ships will
assess their vulnerabilities and then develop security plans to address
those vulnerabilities at specified threat levels. Port facilities and
ships will also assign personnel as security officers to ensure
development and implementation of these security plans.
According to a Coast Guard official participating in the IMO
negotiations, IMO‘s work is central to much of the international
strategy propounded by the administration and the Congress. For
example, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001,[Footnote 19] which
is being finalized in conference committee action, calls for the
Secretary of Transportation to assess the acceptability of foreign port
security ’based on the standards for port security and recommended
practices of the IMO and other appropriate international
organizations.“:
Establishing Stronger Customs Procedures through the World Customs
Organization:
The World Customs Organization (WCO) is an independent
intergovernmental body whose mission is to enhance the effectiveness
and efficiency of customs administrations. Among other things, WCO
establishes and maintains international instruments to make customs
procedures more uniform. In September 2002, WCO organized a task force
that is expected to be the first step in developing new guidelines for
supply chain security. The task force, which plans to complete its work
by June 2003, will examine numerous security-related topics, including
enhancement of import, export, and in-transit controls; improvement of
technology; and development of better data and techniques for selecting
which cargoes to inspect. The Customs Service is a participant on this
task force.
Developing New Security-Related Standards through the International
Organization for Standardization:
Although much of the framework for port security is established by
these first two agencies, the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) is another important international body involved
in improving international supply-chain security. ISO, a worldwide
nongovernmental federation of national standards bodies from more than
140 countries, attempts to standardize various activities and products
with a view toward facilitating the international exchange of goods and
services. In this role, ISO would be responsible for developing
standards for devices such as electronic container seals. ISO is
currently participating in a pilot project dealing with these
electronic seals.
International Labor Organization Sets Requirements for Persons Working
Aboard Ships:
The International Labor Organization (ILO), a United Nations agency, is
the agency that determines the requirements to be included in
identification documents for seafarers. Still another aspect of the
expanded security system involves checking on the background of crew
members aboard ships transporting cargo destined for the United States.
ILO and IMO have been working on the issue of seafarer documents since
February 2002. Also, ILO may consider standards for port worker
identification documentation.
U.N. Sub-Committee of Experts on Transportation of Dangerous Materials:
A senior DOT official reports that based on the G8 consensus of June
2002, the United Nations Sub-Committee of Experts on the Transport of
Dangerous Goods (U.N. Sub-Committee) considered steps it could take to
enhance security through international regulations on the transport of
dangerous goods (hazardous materials). At its July 2002 meeting, the
U.N. Sub-Committee agreed to consider specific measures for inclusion
in the United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous
Goods at its meeting in early December 2002. In preparation for the
December meeting, the DOT Research and Special Programs Administration,
which leads the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Sub-Committee, worked
collaboratively with other governments to gain consensus on security
requirements that could be accepted at the December meeting. These
proposed amendments have now been formally proposed to the U.N. Sub-
Committee through a United Kingdom submission.
The proposed amendments call for hazardous-materials employees to be
trained in security at a level commensurate with their
responsibilities, and it requires shippers and carriers of high-hazard
materials to assess their security vulnerabilities and develop a
security plan to address vulnerabilities identified. These requirements
mirror those proposed by the Research and Special Programs
Administration for inclusion in U.S. DOT Hazardous Materials
Transportation Regulations, which are expected to be finalized later
this year.
Key Challenges Include Creating and Implementing Standards, Ensuring
Cooperation of Diverse Groups, and Securing Resources:
In our August 2002 testimony on security actions being taken to improve
security within domestic ports, we found indications that there could
be considerable challenges.[Footnote 20] These include implementation
of standards defining what safeguards should be in place and how they
should operate, difficulties in establishing effective coordination
among the many entities that have a stake in port security, and
availability of sufficient funding to carry out the full range of
actions that may be needed. The attempts to improve existing nuclear-
detection programs and to implement the new initiatives now under way
could face challenges domestically and internationally in these three
areas as well. The United States is working through a variety of
international organizations, each with a certain set of
responsibilities, to establish consensus and to encourage compliance on
security issues.
Implementing Security Standards Could Prove Difficult:
Adequate standards, consistently applied, are important because lax
security at even a handful of ports could make them attractive targets
for terrorists interested in smuggling dangerous cargo, damaging port
infrastructure, or otherwise disrupting the flow of goods. On the
domestic front, development of a set of national standards that would
apply to all ports and all public and private facilities is well under
way. The Coast Guard, through a contractor, has been developing a set
of standards since May 2002 as part of its efforts to conduct
vulnerability assessments at 55 major U.S. ports. The standards will
cover such things as preventing unauthorized persons from accessing
sensitive areas, detecting and intercepting intrusions, checking
backgrounds of those whose jobs require access to port facilities, and
screening travelers and other visitors to port facilities. In the past,
the level of security has largely been a local issue, and practices
have varied greatly. The standards are to be performance-based, meaning
that they describe the desired outcome and leave the ports considerable
discretion in how to accomplish the task.
In our earlier work, we reported that effectively implementing such
standards in U.S. ports, even with the authority of the federal
government behind them, poses challenges. For example, at the Port of
Tampa some major employers, such as ship repair companies, hire
hundreds of workers for short-term projects as needs arise.
Historically, according to port authority officials, these workers have
included people with criminal records. However, new state requirements
for background checks, as part of the credentialing process, could deny
such persons access to restricted areas of the port.[Footnote 21] From
a security standpoint, excluding such persons may be advisable; but
from an economic standpoint, a company may have difficulty filling jobs
if it cannot include such people in the labor pool. Around the country,
ports will face many such issues, ranging from these credentialing
questions to deciding where employees and visitors may park their cars.
To the degree that stakeholders disagree on specific methods, or
believe that specific security actions are unnecessary or conflict with
other goals and interests, achieving consensus about what to do will be
difficult.
Developing and implementing standards across international lines is
likely to present a formidable challenge as well, but doing so is
essential to protecting the integrity of the international supply
chain. Efforts to develop international standards are under way on
several fronts, but much still remains to do. For example, security
procedures for loading and sealing a container at the manufacturer‘s or
consolidator‘s warehouse, or for transferring cargo from one mode of
conveyance to another, are still under development. Likewise,
international standards covering documentation on the contents of cargo
containers and the credentialing of cargo handlers and port workers are
still being discussed. Because of the number and diversity of nations
and stakeholders involved in the international supply chain, achieving
consensus on these and other standards could be difficult and time
consuming.
Shared Responsibilities Place a Premium on Effective Cooperation:
Effective cooperation is essential--and not ensured--even at the
domestic level. As we have reported, one challenge to achieving
national preparedness and response goals hinges on the federal
government‘s ability to form effective partnerships among many
entities.[Footnote 22] If such partnerships are not in place--and
equally important, if they do not work effectively--those who are
ultimately in charge cannot gain the resources, expertise, and
cooperation of the people who must implement security measures.
Our reviews of domestic seaports have found that such partnerships can
break down even when procedures are supposedly in place. For example,
at the Port of Honolulu, a security plan exists that calls for
notifying the Coast Guard and local law enforcement authorities about
serious incidents. One such incident took place in April 2002 when, as
cargo was being loaded onto a cruise ship, specially trained dogs
reacted to possible explosives in one of the loads, and the identified
pallet was set aside. Despite the notification policy, personnel
working for the shipping agent and the private company providing
security at the dock failed to notify either local law enforcement
officials or the Coast Guard about the incident. A few hours after the
incident took place, Coast Guard officials conducting a foot patrol
found the pallet, and, when told about the dogs‘ reaction, immediately
notified local emergency response agencies. Once again, however, the
procedure was less than successful because the various organizations
were all using radios that operated on different frequencies, making
coordination between agencies much more difficult. Fortunately, the
Honolulu incident did not result in any injuries or loss.
Just as efforts to enhance port security in the domestic environment
require the collaboration of many public and private parties, the
challenges internationally require cooperation and collaboration by a
wide array of stakeholders. Clearly, there are important initiatives
moving forward in the four major international institutions outlined
above--on port and carrier standards in the IMO, on customs procedures
in the WCO, on seafarer and port worker documentation in the ILO, and
on standards for electronic container seals in the ISO. Each
organization is made up of individual nations contributing different
levels of development, maritime activity, and economic capacity.
Admiral James M. Loy, former Commandant of the Coast Guard and current
Acting Director of TSA, has emphasized that reaching global agreements
is critical, noting that ’international and domestic cooperation, both
civil and military, is essential—because we can‘t hope to ensure our
security by working alone or by waiting until the threats have already
crossed the thresholds of our ports.“[Footnote 23] Although many
cooperative efforts are under way to address supply chain security,
achieving consensus among the diverse parties on a number of matters in
this area and forging comprehensive agreements to address them will be
challenging.
Funding Issues Are Pivotal:
Many of the planned security improvements at seaports will require
costly outlays for infrastructure, technology, and personnel. Even
before September 11th, the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security
in U.S. Seaports[Footnote 24] estimated that the costs for upgrading
security infrastructure at U.S. ports will range from $10 million to
$50 million per port.[Footnote 25] Officials at the Port of New York
and New Jersey estimate their capital costs for bringing the port‘s
security into compliance with the port‘s vulnerability assessment at
$73 million. The federal government has already stepped in with
additional funding for port security, but demand has far outstripped
the additional amounts made available.
International ports also may face funding challenges similar to those
faced by ports in the United States. Recently, at an Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation conference, Secretary of Transportation Norman Y.
Mineta echoed this sentiment, saying that implementation of security
measures to ensure safety of passengers and goods may challenge the
resources of foreign economies. However, the extent of any fiscal
challenges faced by specific foreign ports is unknown at this point.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, the nation‘s approach to dealing with nuclear
smuggling is both to develop entirely new lines of defense overseas and
to shore up those defenses that are already in place in the nation‘s
ports. The challenges domestically are well known and well chronicled:
ports remain susceptible to weapons of mass destruction, with neither
our best technology nor a set of clear standards and procedures in
place. The challenges overseas could be much the same. Just as
inconsistent standards and security vulnerabilities among domestic
ports could lead terrorists to seek the path of least resistance,
overseas ports that do not adopt strong security standards may attract
the attention of those hoping to inflict harm on America. At the
domestic level, the challenges faced can be mitigated somewhat by the
fact that stakeholders ultimately share the same goals of national
security. Although all countries involved in international commerce may
share the basic goal of secure trade and may share commitment, foreign
countries may vary greatly in their understanding of, vulnerabilities
to, and capabilities to address the threats involved.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For information about this testimony, please contact JayEtta Z. Hecker,
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, at (202) 512-2834.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Gene
Aloise, Jonathan Bachman, Seto Bagdoyan, Christine Broderick, Steven
Calvo, Howard Cott, Laurie E. Ekstrand, Etana Finkler, Gary Jones, Stan
Stenersen, Eric Wenner, Randy Williamson, and Loren Yager.
Scope and Methodology:
To determine the programs in place to prevent illegal fissile material
or a tactical nuclear weapon from being smuggled into the United States
through our ports, we relied on issues raised in a number of GAO-issued
products, as indicated in footnote 1.
To determine new efforts under way to improve port and container
security, both domestically and abroad, we talked with senior DOT, TSA,
and Coast Guard officials, including the Coast Guard representative to
the IMO on international initiatives, a senior TSA official regarding
the status of rulemaking to govern the Operation Safe Commerce pilot
program, and the Deputy Undersecretary of DOT who co-chairs the
Container Security Group on international initiatives to advance U.S.
recommendations for enhancing port and container security. We also met
with representatives from the Ports of Los Angeles, New York and New
Jersey, and Seattle--the three ports that are participating in the
Operation Safe Commerce pilot program--and discussed the new
international and domestic initiatives. We also obtained key documents
and ’white papers“ on initiatives from Coast Guard and DOT officials
and from the Coast Guard, Customs, IMO, WCO, ILO, and ISO Internet Web
sites.
To determine the key challenges to implementing these initiatives and
efforts, we met with senior DOT, TSA, and Coast Guard officials,
including the Coast Guard representative to the IMO on international
initiatives and the Deputy Undersecretary of DOT who co-chairs the
Container Security Group on international initiatives to advance U.S.
recommendations for enhancing port and container security. We also met
with representatives from the Ports of Los Angeles, New York and New
Jersey, and Seattle and discussed the new international and domestic
initiatives. We obtained key documents and ’white papers“ on
initiatives from Coast Guard and DOT officials and from the Coast
Guard, Customs, IMO, WCO, ILO, and ISO Internet Web sites. We also
relied on our previously issued product on port security, GAO-02-993T,
August 5, 2002.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Previous GAO reports and testimony statements on these issues
include Nuclear Proliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling
Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning, GAO-02-426 (Washington,
D.C.: May 16, 2002); Nuclear Proliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat
Nuclear Smuggling, GAO-02-989T (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002); Port
Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New Initiatives
Successful, GAO-02-993T (Tampa, FL: August 5, 2002); and Customs
Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection Equipment,
GAO-03-235T (Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002).
[2] Admiral James M. Loy and Captain Robert G. Ross, U.S. Coast Guard,
Global Trade: America‘s Achilles‘ Heel (February 2002); and Meeting the
Homeland Security Challenge: A Principled Strategy for a Balanced and
Practical Response (September 2001).
[3] Michael E. O‘Hanlon et al., Protecting the American Homeland: A
Preliminary Analysis, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
2002.
[4] Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations, America Still Unprepared--America Still in Danger, October
2002.
[5] Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection
Equipment, GAO-03-235T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2002). We are
continuing to conduct work on this issue.
[6] Bulk and break-bulk cargoes include liquid bulk (such as
petroleum), dry bulk (such as grain), and iron ore or steel.
[7] VACIS is a gamma ray imaging system that uses radiographic images
to help inspectors examine the contents of trucks, containers, cargo,
and passenger vehicles for hidden contraband. Gamma ray systems are
regarded as state-of-the-art for such applications.
[8] Major ports are scheduled to receive additional VACIS systems,
Mobile Truck Gamma Systems, Mobile Truck X-ray systems, High Energy Sea
Container X-ray systems, and Pallet Inspections Systems. Additional
deployments of equipment are planned over the next several years.
[9] More recently, Congress passed legislation authorizing an
additional $125 million for port security grants, including $20 million
for port incident training and exercises. According to a Maritime
Administration official, the grant application process has not begun,
but he expects that grant awards will be made in the April 2003 time
frame.
[10] The ship was subsequently towed to a security zone 6 miles
offshore, where inspectors found that the radiation was natural
radiation emanating from the ceramic cargo.
[11] The inspection showed that containers had previously held
explosive cargo, but no explosives were found aboard the ship.
[12] Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear
Smuggling, GAO-02-989T (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002).
[13] An additional effort, the outcome of which is classified as law-
enforcement sensitive, is an interagency Container Working Group
established by the Secretary of Transportation to address the security
issues surrounding the movement of marine cargo containers through the
international and intermodal transportation system. This effort is co-
chaired by the Departments of Transportation and of the Treasury.
According to DOT officials, the Container Working Group‘s activities
are focused on information technology, security, business practices,
and international affairs. On February 1, 2002, the group made
recommendations to the Office of Homeland Security on ensuring the
security of cargo container transportation. The recommendations
addressed improving the coordination of government and business
container security activities, enhancing cargo data collection, and
improving the physical security of containers. The recommendations also
support international container security efforts and the increased use
of advanced technologies to improve the profiling of containers. In
August 2002, a status report was forwarded to the Office of Homeland
Security that detailed the progress on the twenty-four action items
that were recommended in the original report.
[14] These ports are: Rotterdam in the Netherlands; Antwerp in Belgium;
Le Havre in France; Bremerhaven and Hamburg in Germany; La Spezia and
Genoa in Italy; Singapore; and Hong Kong. Japan has sealed the
declaration of principles to participate in CSI by stationing, on a
pilot basis, U.S. Customs officers at the ports of Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe,
and Yokohama. In addition, the Customs Service announced on October 25,
2002, that China is joining CSI, in principle.
[15] In December 2001, the Canadian Deputy Prime Minister and the U.S.
Homeland Security Director signed the ’Smart Border Declaration.“
[16] C-TPAT is open to carriers involved in air, rail, and sea
transportation as well as to U.S.-Canadian border highway carriers.
[17] Separately from the OSC effort, the world‘s three largest seaport
operators, representing 70 percent of the world‘s container traffic,
are collaborating to demonstrate and deploy automated tracking
detection and security technology for containers entering U.S. ports.
Driven and initially funded by industry, this initiative, called Smart
and Secure Tradelanes, is focused on container security and tracking
and will be built on existing infrastructure and technologies that are
proven, available for immediate deployment, and adaptable to emerging
new technologies.
[18] The G8 includes representatives from the governments of Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and the European Union.
[19] S. 1214, a bill introduced by Senator Ernest F. Hollings, was
aimed at amending the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to establish a
program to ensure greater security for U.S. seaports; it passed in the
Senate on December 20, 2001. The House version of S. 1214, the Maritime
Antiterrorism Act of 2002, does not contain a similar requirement.
[20] Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful, GAO-02-993T (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 2002)
[21] The House-passed version of S. 1214, the Maritime Transportation
Antiterrorism Act, contains a provision that requires transportation
security cards for entry to any secure area of a vessel or facility.
The bill requires the Secretary of Transportation to issue a card to an
individual who applies for one unless, after a background check, it is
found that this individual poses a terrorism security risk. The Senate-
passed version of this bill does not contain a similar provision, and
it is unclear how the conference committee will decide this issue.
[22] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security:
Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will Be Critical to
Success, GAO-02-899T (Washington D.C.: July 1, 2002); GAO-02-900T
(Washington D.C.: July 2, 2002); and GAO-02-901T (Washington D.C.: July
3, 2002).
[23] ’The Unique Challenges of Maritime Security,“ speech by Admiral
James M. Loy, Propeller Club of the United States, Washington, D.C.,
October 31, 2001.
[24] On April 27, 1999, the President established the Interagency
Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports. The Commission
issued its report on August 28, 2000.
[25] Estimated range varies on the basis of port size and cost of the
technology component of the security upgrade.
