Business Systems Modernization
Internal Revenue Service Needs to Further Strengthen Program Management
Gao ID: GAO-04-438T February 12, 2004
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been grappling with modernizing its computer systems for many years. IRS's current program, commonly referred to as Business Systems Modernization (BSM), began in fiscal year 1999; about $1.4 billion has been reported spent on it to date. While progress has been made, the program continues to face significant challenges and risks. In recognition of these risks, IRS and a contractor recently completed several comprehensive assessments of BSM, including one of its Customer Account Data Engine (CADE) project, which is to modernize the agency's outdated data management system. At the request of the Subcommittee on Oversight, House Committee on Ways and Means, GAO's testimony will summarize (1) GAO's prior findings and recommendations, along with those of the recent assessments; and (2) actions IRS has taken or plans to take to address these issues.
Prior GAO reviews have disclosed numerous modernization management control deficiencies that have contributed to reported cost overruns and schedule delays. Costs and completion dates for ongoing projects have grown from their initial estimates. Reasons for such delays include inadequate definition of systems requirements, increases in project scope, and underestimation of project complexity. These impair IRS's ability to make future systems investment decisions and delay delivery of benefits to taxpayers. GAO has made a series of recommendations focusing on stronger program management--and limiting modernization activities until such management practices were in place. IRS has made important progress in implementing management controls, establishing infrastructure, delivering certain business applications, and balancing the pace of the program with the agency's ability to manage it. Nevertheless, IRS needs to further strengthen BSM program management, including fully implementing modernization management controls in such areas as cost and schedule estimating. The recent BSM assessments identified many weaknesses, consistent with prior GAO findings, that contributed to the cost overruns and schedule delays, and offered recommendations to address them. IRS has responded by identifying 46 discrete issues to be resolved; according to the agency, 27 of these have been completed. Commitment of appropriate resources, top management attention, and continuing oversight by Congress and others are critical to the success of BSM.
GAO-04-438T, Business Systems Modernization: Internal Revenue Service Needs to Further Strengthen Program Management
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means,
House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:00 a.m. EST:
Thursday, February 12, 2004:
Business Systems Modernization:
Internal Revenue Service Needs to Further Strengthen Program
Management:
Statement of Robert F. Dacey:
Director, Information Security Issues:
GAO-04-438T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-438T, testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight, House Committee on Ways and Means
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been grappling with modernizing
its computer systems for many years. IRS‘s current program, commonly
referred to as Business Systems Modernization (BSM), began in fiscal
year 1999; about $1.4 billion has been reported spent on it to date.
While progress has been made, the program continues to face
significant challenges and risks.
In recognition of these risks, IRS and a contractor recently completed
several comprehensive assessments of BSM, including one of its
Customer Account Data Engine (CADE) project, which is to modernize the
agency‘s outdated data management system.
At the request of the Subcommittee on Oversight, House Committee on
Ways and Means, GAO‘s testimony will summarize (1) GAO‘s prior
findings and recommendations, along with those of the recent
assessments; and (2) actions IRS has taken or plans to take to address
these issues.
What GAO Found:
Prior GAO reviews have disclosed numerous modernization management
control deficiencies that have contributed to reported cost overruns
and schedule delays. The table below illustrates the degree to which
costs and completion dates for ongoing projects have grown from their
initial estimates. Reasons for such delays include inadequate
definition of systems requirements, increases in project scope, and
underestimation of project complexity. These impair IRS‘s ability to
make future systems investment decisions and delay delivery of
benefits to taxpayers. GAO has made a series of recommendations
focusing on stronger program management”and limiting modernization
activities until such management practices were in place.
IRS BSM Project Cost/Schedule Variance Summary:
[See PDF for table]
[End of table]
IRS has made important progress in implementing management controls,
establishing infrastructure, delivering certain business applications,
and balancing the pace of the program with the agency‘s ability to
manage it. Nevertheless, IRS needs to further strengthen BSM program
management, including fully implementing modernization management
controls in such areas as cost and schedule estimating.
The recent BSM assessments identified many weaknesses, consistent with
prior GAO findings, that contributed to the cost overruns and schedule
delays, and offered recommendations to address them. IRS has responded
by identifying 46 discrete issues to be resolved; according to the
agency, 27 of these have been completed. Commitment of appropriate
resources, top management attention, and continuing oversight by
Congress and others are critical to the success of BSM.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-438T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Robert F. Dacey at
(202) 512-3317 or daceyr@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Internal Revenue Service's
(IRS) actions to modernize its computer systems. Although updated
through the years, IRS's set of computer systems is based on an
architecture that dates from the 1960s. This architecture has inhibited
IRS's ability to effectively and efficiently perform its mission of
providing service to taxpayers and enforcing the nation's tax laws.
However, IRS's attempts to modernize its computer systems and
underlying architecture now span three decades. Given the long history
of continuing delays and design difficulties, we previously designated
IRS's modernization program as a high-risk area in 1995.[Footnote 1] It
remains so today.[Footnote 2]
IRS's current multibillion-dollar effort, known as the Business Systems
Modernization (BSM) program, was initiated in fiscal year 1999. IRS
contracted with Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) as the prime
contractor to assist with designing, developing, and integrating a new
set of information systems that were intended to replace IRS's aging
business and tax processing systems. To date, about $1.7 billion has
been appropriated for the program, including about $388 million for
fiscal year 2004.[Footnote 3]
To facilitate congressional oversight of this program, annual
appropriations laws since fiscal year 1998 have mandated that
modernization funds not be available until IRS submits to the
congressional appropriations committees for approval a modernization
expenditure plan that satisfies six legislative conditions, including
that it be reviewed by us.[Footnote 4] We are currently reviewing the
fiscal year 2004 BSM expenditure plan. During our past reviews of such
plans, we have noted numerous modernization management control
deficiencies and made recommendations to correct them. Although IRS has
made progress in implementing our recommendations, BSM continues to
face significant challenges and serious risks. Recognizing these risks,
IRS and CSC recently completed several in-depth and more comprehensive
assessments on the health of the BSM program, including an independent
technical assessment of the Customer Account Data Engine (CADE)
project, a project critical to the success of BSM. IRS has developed an
action plan to address the assessments' recommendations, and has begun
to act on it.
In my testimony today I will summarize our prior findings and
recommendations and those of the recently completed program
assessments. I will also discuss the actions IRS reports it has taken
or plans to take to address issues raised by these assessments.
In preparing this testimony, we relied on our prior reports and
testimony on IRS's systems modernization activities and BSM expenditure
plans. We also reviewed and analyzed information contained in the BSM
expenditure plan for fiscal year 2004; Carnegie Mellon University
Software Engineering Institute's (SEI) independent technical
assessment of CADE; reports on the BSM program by the Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration and the IRS Oversight Board;
and IRS briefing materials (1) analyzing the root causes of BSM project
cost increases and schedule delays, (2) independent reviews of CSC's
business processes and IRS's procurement practices, and (3) IRS's
action plan to address issues identified by the reviews. We did not
independently validate planned projects' cost estimates or confirm,
through system and project management documentation, the validity of
IRS-provided information on the projects' content and progress. Our
work was performed during the past month, in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Background:
The tax administration system that collects about $2 trillion in
revenues each year is critically dependent on a collection of obsolete
computer systems developed by the IRS over the last 40 years. IRS
envisions a future in which its tax processing environment will be
virtually paper-free, and up-to-date taxpayer information will be
readily available to IRS employees to respond to taxpayer inquiries. To
accomplish this, IRS embarked on its ambitious BSM program. BSM
involves the development and delivery of a number of modernized
business, data, and core infrastructure projects that are intended to
provide improved and expanded service to taxpayers as well as IRS
internal business efficiencies. Recognizing the long-term commitment
needed to solve the problem of obsolete computer systems, Congress set
up a special BSM account in fiscal year 1998 to fund IRS's systems
modernization efforts.
IRS initiated CADE as part of BSM, to modernize the agency's outdated
and inefficient data management system.[Footnote 5] IRS also sees this
project as the corporate data source enabling future customer service
and financial management applications. CADE is therefore IRS's linchpin
modernization project. In light of the projects that depend on CADE, as
well as the many interrelationships that are to exist among CADE and
IRS's modernized applications and among CADE and current IRS
applications, the agency must manage this critical project effectively.
Without CADE, the business systems modernization program cannot
succeed.
IRS Has Made Improvements, But Systems Modernization Program Remains
High-Risk:
IRS's attempts to modernize its aging computer systems span several
decades. This long history of continuing delays and design difficulties
led to our designating IRS's Tax Systems Modernization program, BSM's
predecessor, as a high-risk area in 1995.[Footnote 6] During the mid-
1990s we reported on several technical and management weaknesses
associated with Tax Systems Modernization, a program that began in the
1980s. These weaknesses related to incomplete or inadequate strategic
information management practices; immature software development
capability; incomplete systems architecture, integration planning,
system testing, and test planning practices; and the lack of an
effective organizational structure to consistently manage and control
systems modernization organizationwide. We made a series of
recommendations for correcting these weaknesses and limiting
modernization activities until they were corrected.[Footnote 7] IRS
subsequently discontinued the program after the agency had spent about
$4 billion without receiving expected benefits. In fiscal year 1999,
IRS launched the BSM program. IRS contracted with CSC as its prime
systems integration services contractor for systems modernization,
helping it design new systems and identify other contractors to develop
software and perform other tasks.
In our reviews of IRS's BSM expenditure plans, we have identified
numerous deficiencies in the BSM program, including a continuation of
the weaknesses noted above. Also, a consistent challenge for IRS has
been to make sure that the pace of systems acquisition projects does
not exceed the agency's ability to manage them. In May and November
2000, we reported that projects were in fact getting ahead of the
modernization management capacity that needed to be in place to manage
them effectively.[Footnote 8] In February 2002 we reported that such an
imbalance was due to IRS's first priority and emphasis being on getting
the newer, more modern systems--with their anticipated benefits to
taxpayers--up and running.[Footnote 9] In so doing, however, management
controls had not been given equal attention and thus had not kept pace.
This emphasis on new systems added significant cost, schedule, and
performance risks that escalate as a program advances. Moreover, these
risks increased as IRS moved forward because of interdependencies among
projects, and the complexity of associated workload activities to be
performed increased dramatically as more systems projects were built
and deployed.
In addition, we identified other deficiencies in the BSM program,
including the need to establish processes that meet the level 2
requirements of the SEI's Software Acquisition Capability Maturity
Model',[Footnote 10] and to improve modernization management controls
and capabilities, such as those related to configuration management,
risk management, enterprise architecture implementation, human capital
strategic management, integrated program scheduling, and cost and
schedule estimating.
In response to our recommendations, IRS has made important progress.
First, significant progress has been made in establishing the
modernization management controls needed to effectively acquire and
implement information technology systems. For example, IRS has:
* invested incrementally in its modernization projects;
* defined a systems life cycle management methodology, which IRS refers
to as the Enterprise Life Cycle;
* developed and is using a modernization blueprint, commonly called an
enterprise architecture, to guide and constrain its modernization
projects; and:
* established processes that meet the level 2 requirements of the SEI's
Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model'.
Second, IRS has made progress in establishing the infrastructure
systems on which future business applications will run. For example,
IRS has delivered elements of the Security and Technology
Infrastructure Release to provide the hardware, software, and security
solutions for modernization projects. IRS has also built an enterprise
integration and test environment that provides the environment and
tools for multiple vendors associated with a release to perform
integration and testing activities.
Third, it has delivered certain business applications that are
producing benefits today. These applications include:
* Customer Communications 2001, to improve telephone call management,
call routing, and customer self-service applications;
* Customer Relationship Management Examination, to provide off-the-
shelf software to IRS revenue agents to allow them to accurately
compute complex corporate transactions; and:
* Internet Refund/Fact of Filing, to improve customer self-service by
providing to taxpayers via the Internet instant refund status
information and instructions for resolving refund problems.
Fourth, IRS took steps to align the pace of the program with the
maturity of IRS's controls and management capacity, including
reassessing its portfolio of planned projects.
Nevertheless, IRS continued to face challenges to fully develop and
implement its modernization management capacity. Last June we reported
that IRS had not yet fully implemented a strategic approach to ensuring
that it has sufficient human capital resources for implementing BSM,
nor had it fully implemented management controls in such areas as
configuration management, estimating costs and schedules, and employing
performance-based contracting methods.[Footnote 11] We made several
recommendations to address those issues. Our analysis has shown that
weak management controls contributed directly to the cost, schedule,
and/or performance shortfalls experienced by most projects. Given that
the tasks associated with those projects that are moving beyond design
and into development are by their nature more complex and risky and
that IRS's fiscal year 2004 BSM expenditure plan supports progress
toward the later phases of key projects and continued development of
other projects, systems modernization projects likely will encounter
additional cost and schedule shortfalls. IRS will need to continue to
assess the balance between the pace of the program and the agency's
ability to manage it.
Projects Continue to Incur Cost Increases and Schedule Delays:
Based on IRS's expenditure plans, BSM projects have consistently cost
more and taken longer to complete than originally estimated. Table 1
shows the life cycle variance in cost and schedule estimates for
completed and ongoing BSM projects. These variances are based on a
comparison of IRS's initial and revised cost and schedule estimates to
complete initial operation[Footnote 12] or full deployment[Footnote 13]
of the projects.
Table 1: IRS BSM Project Cost/Schedule Variance Summary:
Project: Completed Projects;
Security and Technology Infrastructure Release 1;
Cost variance (in thousands): +$7,553;
Reported/revised: estimated cost: (in thousands): $41,287;
Schedule variance (in months): +5;
Reported/revised estimated completion date: 1/31/02;
(initial operation).
Project: Completed Projects;
Customer Communications 2001;
Cost variance (in thousands): +5,310;
Reported/revised: estimated cost: (in thousands): 46,420;
Schedule variance (in months): +9;
Reported/revised estimated completion date: 2/26/02;
(full deployment).
Project: Completed Projects;
Customer Relationship Management Exam;
Cost variance (in thousands): -1,938;
Reported/revised: estimated cost: (in thousands): 7,375;
Schedule variance (in months): +3;
Reported/revised estimated completion date: 9/30/02;
(full deployment).
Project: Completed Projects;
Human Resources Connect Release 1;
Cost variance (in thousands): +200;
Reported/revised: estimated cost: (in thousands): 10,200;
Schedule variance (in months): 0;
Reported/revised estimated completion date: 12/31/02;
(initial operation).
Project: Completed Projects;
Internet Refund/Fact of Filing;
Cost variance (in thousands): +12,923;
Reported/revised: estimated cost: (in thousands): 26,432;
Schedule variance (in months): +14;
Reported/revised estimated completion date: 9/26/03;
(full deployment).
Project: Ongoing Projects[A];
Modernized e-File Release 1;
Cost variance (in thousands): +17,057;
Reported/revised: estimated cost: (in thousands): 46,303;
Schedule variance (in months): +4.5;
Reported/revised estimated completion date: 3/31/04;
(initial operation).
Project: Ongoing Projects[A];
e-Services;
Cost variance (in thousands): +86,236;
Reported/ revised: estimated cost: (in thousands): 130,281;
Schedule variance (in months): +18;
Reported/revised estimated completion date: 4/ 30/05;
(full deployment).
Project: Ongoing Projects[A];
CADE Release 1;
Cost variance (in thousands): +36,760;
Reported/revised: estimated cost: (in thousands): 97,905;
Schedule variance (in months): +30b;
Reported/revised estimated completion date: 6/30/05[B];
(full deployment).
Project: Ongoing Projects[A];
Integrated Financial System Release 1;
Cost variance (in thousands): +53,916;
Reported/revised: estimated cost: (in thousands): 153,786;
Schedule variance (in months): TBD[B];
Reported/ revised estimated completion date: TBD[B];
(full deployment).
Project: Ongoing Projects[A];
Custodial Accounting Project Release 1;
Cost variance (in thousands): +72,058;
Reported/revised: estimated cost: (in thousands): 119,219;
Schedule variance (in months): TBD[B];
Reported/ revised estimated completion date: TBD[B];
(full deployment).
Project: Ongoing Projects[A];
Customer Account Management Release 1;
Cost variance (in thousands): TBD[C];
Reported/revised: estimated cost: (in thousands): TBD[C];
Schedule variance (in months): TBD[C];
Reported/ revised estimated completion date: TBD[C].
Source: GAO analysis of data contained in IRS's BSM expenditure plans.
[A] Projects ongoing as of 9/30/03.
[B] Project schedules for CADE, the Integrated Financial System, and
the Custodial Accounting Project are currently under review.
[C] To be determined. Work on the Customer Account Management project
was suspended following the completion of preliminary design
activities. No further work is planned until at least fiscal year 2005.
[End of table]
As the table indicates, the cost and schedule estimates for full
deployment of the e-Services project have increased by just over $86
million and 18 months, respectively. In addition, the estimated cost
for the full deployment of CADE release 1 has increased by almost $37
million, and project completion has been delayed by 30 months. In
addition to the modernization management control deficiencies discussed
above, our work has shown that the increases and delays were caused, in
part, by:
* inadequate definitions of systems requirements. As a result,
additional requirements have been incorporated into ongoing projects.
* increases in project scope. For example, the e-Services project has
changed significantly since the original design. The scope was
broadened by IRS to provide additional benefits to internal and
external customers.
* cost and schedule estimating deficiencies. IRS has lacked the
capability to effectively develop reliable cost and schedule estimates.
* underestimating project complexity. This factor has contributed
directly to the significant delays in the CADE release 1 schedule.
* competing demands of projects for test facilities. Testing
infrastructure capacity is insufficient to accommodate multiple
projects when testing schedules overlap.
* project interdependencies. Delays with one project have had a
cascading effect and have caused delays in related projects.
These schedule delays and cost overruns impair IRS's ability to make
appropriate decisions about investing in new projects, delay delivery
of benefits to taxpayers, and postpone resolution of material
weaknesses affecting other program areas.
Producing reliable estimates of expected costs and schedules is
essential to determining a project's cost-effectiveness. In addition,
it is critical for budgeting, management, and oversight. Without this
information, the likelihood of poor investment decisions is increased.
Schedule slippages delay the provision of modernized systems' direct
benefits to the public. For example, slippages in CADE will delay IRS's
ability to provide faster refunds and respond to taxpayer inquiries on
a timely basis.
Delays in the delivery of modernized systems also affect the
remediation of material internal management weaknesses. For example,
IRS has reported a material weakness associated with the design of the
master files. CADE is to build the modernized database foundation that
will replace the master files. Continuing schedule delays will place
resolution of this material weakness further out into the future. In
addition, the Custodial Accounting Project is intended to address a
financial material weakness and permit the tracking from submission to
disbursement of all revenues received from individual taxpayers. This
release has yet to be implemented, and a revised schedule has not yet
been determined. Finally, the Integrated Financial System is intended
to address financial management weaknesses. When IRS submitted its
fiscal year 2003 BSM expenditure plan, release 1 of the Integrated
Financial System was scheduled for delivery on October 1, 2003.
However, it has yet to be implemented, and additional cost increases
are expected.
Internal and Independent Assessments of BSM Have Identified Significant
Weaknesses and Risks:
Given the continued cost overruns and schedule delays experienced by
these BSM projects, IRS and CSC launched internal and independent
assessments during 2003 of the health of BSM as whole, as well as CADE.
Table 2 describes these assessments.
Table 2: BSM Assessments Undertaken During 2003:
Subject: Root cause analysis;
Organization conducting assessment: IRS;
Purpose: To review data from historical documents and interviews to
determine root causes for schedule delays and cost increases.
Subject: PRIME review;
Organization conducting assessment: Bain and Company;
Purpose: To identify root causes of breakdown in CSC's business
processes and engagement model and provide recommended solutions.
Subject: IRS Office of Procurement Assessment;
Organization conducting assessment: Acquisition Solutions, Inc.;
Purpose: To assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the IRS
procurement organization structure, employment of best practices,
management and administration, staffing, and to briefly review BSM
contracting.
Subject: CADE assessment;
Organization conducting assessment: SEI;
Purpose: To provide an independent technical assessment of CADE
program history and the feasibility of future plans.
Source: IRS:
[End of table]
The IRS root cause analysis, PRIME review, and the Office of
Procurement assessment revealed several significant weaknesses that
have driven project cost overruns and schedule delays, and also
provided a number of actionable recommendations for IRS and CSC to
address the identified weaknesses and reduce the risk to BSM.
Deficiencies identified are consistent with our prior findings and
include:
* poorly defined requirements,
* low program productivity levels,
* project scope creep,
* IRS/PRIME role confusion,
* immature management processes,
* ineffective integration across IRS, and:
* insufficient applications and technology engineering.
As noted, CADE release 1 has experienced significant reported cost
overruns and schedule delays throughout its life cycle, and has yet to
be delivered. SEI's independent technical assessment of CADE pointed to
four primary factors that have caused the project to get off track and
resulted in such severe cost and schedule impairments: (1) the
complexity of CADE release 1 was not fully understood; (2) the initial
business rules engine effort stalled; (3) both IRS and PRIME technical
and program management were ineffective in key areas, including
significant breakdowns in developing and managing CADE requirements;
and (4) the initially contentious relationship between IRS and PRIME
hindered communications. SEI also warned that CADE runs the risk of
further trouble with later releases due to unexplored/unknown
requirements; security and privacy issues that have not been properly
evaluated (e.g., online transactions are different from the way IRS
does business today); dependence on an unproven business rules
engine[Footnote 14] software product; and the critical, expensive, and
lengthy business rules harvesting[Footnote 15] effort that has not yet
been started. SEI offered several recommendations to address current
CADE issues and reduce project risk in the future.
IRS Is Acting to Resolve Issues Identified in the BSM Assessments:
Based on these assessments, IRS identified a total of 46 specific
issues for resolution in the following six areas, and developed a BSM
action plan comprising individual action plans to address each issue:
* Organization and Roles. Immediate steps are needed to clarify IRS/
PRIME roles and responsibilities and clearly define decision-making
authorities.
* Key Skills & Strengthening the Team. Strengthened skills and
capabilities are needed in such key areas as project management and
systems engineering.
* Technology-Architecture & Engineering. More focus is needed to
improve current systems architecture integration.
* Technology-Software Development Productivity & Quality. Improvements
in product quality and productivity are essential to strengthening
software delivery performance.
* Acquisition. Contracting and procurement practices require major
streamlining to improve overall contract management.
* CADE. Delivery of CADE release 1 will require aggressive focus and
attention, and a business rules engine solution requires additional
evaluation.
These 46 issue action plans were assigned completion dates and an IRS
or PRIME owner was assigned to take the lead in implementing each plan.
IRS and PRIME each also assigned a senior-level executive to drive the
execution of the issue action plans, identify and help mitigate
implementation hindrances or roadblocks, and ensure successful
completion of all planned actions. To assess the efficacy of the BSM
action plan, MITRE was tasked with conducting an independent analysis
and provided feedback to IRS on the effectiveness of the specific issue
action plans to address the associated findings/recommendations and
correct any problems found.
IRS has reported making steady progress with implementing the BSM
action plan. According to the IRS BSM program office, as of late
January 2004, 27 of the 46 issue action plans have been completed.
Examples of completed actions include (1) making business owners and
program directors accountable for project success; (2) assigning teams
to investigate and resolve problem areas on key projects such as CADE,
the Integrated Financial System, and e-Services; (3) aligning critical
engineering talent to the most critical projects; (4) increasing the
frequency of CADE program reviews; and (5) issuing a firm fixed-price
contracting policy.
Significant further work remains to complete implementation of the
remaining 19 open issue action tasks. Bain & Company--which conducted
the independent review of PRIME--has been hired to facilitate the
implementation of various issue action plans within the Organization
and Roles challenge area, while IRS has also contracted with SEI to
conduct further periodic reviews of the CADE project.
Additionally, the IRS Oversight Board recently issued a report[Footnote
16] on its own independent analysis of the BSM program, which made
several observations and recommendations that are consistent with those
discussed here. IRS has conducted an analysis of this report to
reconcile the board's recommendations with those that are currently
being addressed in the BSM action plan. As a result, IRS plans to open
two additional issues and action plans to address (1) rationalizing and
streamlining oversight of the BSM program, and (2) determining and
maintaining a manageable portfolio of projects. IRS expects to complete
the majority of the BSM action plan by end of April of this year, and
fully implement any remaining open actions by the end of the calendar
year.
Further, during 2003, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration performed several reviews related to management of the
BSM program and for specific BSM projects. These reviews identified
several issues, including those related to compliance with the defined
management and project development processes, full implementation of
disciplined project testing processes and procedures, IRS's cost and
schedule estimation process, and contract management. IRS management
reaffirmed their commitment to fully implement key management and
project development processes.
Concluding Observations:
IRS's multibillion-dollar BSM program is critical to agency's
successful transformation of its manual, paper-intensive business
operations and fulfilling its restructuring activities. The agency has
made important progress in establishing long-overdue modernization
management capabilities and in acquiring foundational system
infrastructure and some applications that have benefited the agency and
the public. However, our reviews, those of the Treasury inspector
general, and the recently completed internal and independent
assessments of the BSM program clearly demonstrate that significant
challenges and serious risks remain. IRS acknowledges this and is
acting to address them.
To successfully address these challenges and risks and to modernize its
systems, IRS needs to continue to strengthen BSM program management by
continuing efforts to:
* balance the scope and pace of the program with the agency's capacity
to handle the workload, and:
* institutionalize the management processes and controls necessary to
resolve the deficiencies identified by the reviews and assessments.
Commitment of appropriate resources and top management attention are
critical to resolving the identified deficiencies. In addition,
continuing oversight by the Congress, OMB, and others, as well as
ongoing independent assessments of the program, can assist IRS in
strengthening the BSM program.
Meeting these challenges and improving performance are essential if IRS
and the PRIME contractor are to successfully deliver the BSM program
and ensure that BSM does not suffer the same fate as previous IRS
modernization efforts.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee
may have at this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For information about this testimony, please contact me at (202) 512-
3317 or by e-mail at daceyr@gao.gov. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony include Bernard R. Anderson, Michael P.
Fruitman, Timothy D. Hopkins, and Gregory C. Wilshusen.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Overview, GAO/
HR-95-1 (Washington, D.C.: February 1995).
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, High-Risk Series: An Update,
GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003).
[3] P.L. 108-199, Div. F, Title II, Jan. 23, 2004. IRS uses the
appropriated totals to cover contractor costs related to the BSM
program. IRS funds internal costs for managing BSM with another
appropriation. These costs are not tracked separately for BSM-related
activities.
[4] The other five legislative conditions are that the expenditure plan
(1) meets Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) capital planning and
investment control review requirements; (2) complies with IRS's
enterprise architecture; (3) conforms with IRS's enterprise life cycle
methodology; (4) is approved by IRS, Treasury, and OMB; and (5)
complies with federal acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and
system acquisition management practices.
[5] The current system--referred to by IRS as the master files--
contains taxpayer account and return data. There are master files for
individuals, businesses, and employer retirement plans. A nonmaster
file for taxpayer data also exists that cannot be stored in the other
master files due to data format and space limitations.
[6] GAO/HR-95-1.
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Tax Systems Modernization:
Management and Technical Weaknesses Must Be Corrected If Modernization
Is to Succeed, GAO/AIMD-95-156 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 1995) and
Tax Systems Modernization: Blueprint Is a Good Start, But Not Yet
Sufficiently Complete to Build or Acquire Systems, GAO/AIMD/GGD-98-54
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 24, 1998).
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Tax Systems Modernization: Results
of Review of IRS' March 7, 2000, Expenditure Plan, GAO/AIMD-00-175
(Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2000) and Tax Systems Modernization: Results
of Review of IRS' August 2000 Interim Spending Plan, GAO-01-91
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8, 2000).
[9] U.S. General Accounting Office, Business Systems Modernization: IRS
Needs to Better Balance Management Capacity with Systems Acquisition
Workload, GAO-02-356 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2002).
[10] Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute has
developed criteria, known as the Software Acquisition Capability
Maturity Model,' for determining organizations' software acquisition
management effectiveness or maturity. A Level 2 organization has
established its basic project management processes in the following key
process areas: acquisition planning, solicitation, requirements
development and management, project management, contract tracking and
oversight, evaluation, and transition to support.
[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, Business Systems Modernization:
IRS Has Made Significant Progress in Improving Its Management Controls,
but Risks Remain, GAO-03-768 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003)
[12] Initial operation refers to the point at which a project is
authorized to begin enterprisewide deployment.
[13] Full deployment refers to the point at which enterprisewide
deployment has been completed and a project is transitioned to
operations and support.
[14] A business rules engine translates business rules, or processing
criteria (e.g., income tax refunds of $x or more are held for
administrative review), into executable computer code which processes
transactions related to a tax form, and selects and executes correct
rules based on the tax year and tax form.
[15] Business rules harvesting refers to the process of extracting,
defining, and documenting tax processing criteria from a variety of
sources, including IRS subject matter experts, legacy system source
code, the tax code, and various other paper documents.
[16] IRS Oversight Board Special Report, Independent Analysis of IRS
Business Systems Modernization, December 2003.