Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

Congress established Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the enterprises) with two key housing missions: (1) provide stability in the secondary market for residential mortgages (also in periods of economic stress) and (2) serve the mortgage credit needs of targeted groups such as low-income borrowers. To accomplish these goals, the enterprises issued debt and stock, purchased mortgages from lenders with the proceeds, and retained them in portfolio or pooled them into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) sold to investors. On September 6, 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) placed the enterprises into conservatorship out of concern that their deteriorating financial condition ($5.4 trillion in outstanding obligations) would destabilize the financial system. With estimates that the conservatorship will cost taxpayers nearly $400 billion, GAO initiated this report under the Comptroller General's authority to help inform the forthcoming congressional debate on the enterprises' future structures. It discusses the enterprises' performance in meeting mission requirements, identifies and analyzes options to revise their structures, and discusses key transition issues. GAO reviewed studies and data, and interviewed housing finance experts and officials from the enterprises, FHFA, Departments of the Treasury (Treasury) and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Federal Reserve, lenders, and community groups.

The enterprises have a mixed record in meeting their housing mission objectives, and both capital and risk management deficiencies have compromised their safety and soundness as follows: (1) The enterprises' secondary market activities are credited with helping create a liquid national mortgage market, lowering mortgage rates somewhat, and standardizing mortgage underwriting processes. However, their capacity to support housing finance during periods of economic stress has not been established, and they only have been able to do so during the current recession with substantial financial assistance from Treasury and the Federal Reserve. (2)There is limited evidence that a program established in 1992 that required the enterprises to meet annual goals for purchasing mortgages serving targeted groups materially benefited such groups. (3) The enterprises' structures (for-profit corporations with government sponsorship) undermined market discipline and provided them with incentives to engage in potentially profitable business practices that were risky and not necessarily supportive of their public missions. For example, the enterprises' retained mortgage portfolios are complex to manage and expose them to losses resulting from changes in interest rates. Further, the enterprises' substantial investments in assets collateralized by subprime and other questionable mortgages in recent years generated losses that likely precipitated the conservatorship. It will be necessary for Congress to reevaluate the roles, structures, and performance of the enterprises, and to consider options to facilitate mortgage finance while mitigating safety and soundness and systemic risk concerns. These options generally fall along a continuum with some overlap in key areas: (1)Reconstitute the enterprises as for-profit corporations with government sponsorship but place additional restrictions on them. While restoring the enterprises to their previous status, this option would add controls to minimize risk. As examples, it would eliminate or reduce mortgage portfolios, establish executive compensation limits, or convert the enterprises from shareholder-owned corporations to associations owned by lenders. (2) Establish the enterprises as government corporations or agencies. Under this option, the enterprises would focus on purchasing qualifying mortgages and issuing MBS but eliminate their mortgage portfolios. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which insures mortgages for low-income and first-time borrowers, could assume additional responsibilities for promoting homeownership for targeted groups. (3) Privatize or terminate them. This option would abolish the enterprises in their current form and disperse mortgage lending and risk management throughout the private sector. Some proposals involve the establishment of a federal mortgage insurer to help protect mortgage lenders against catastrophic mortgage losses. During the conservatorship, the federal government has tasked the enterprises to implement a variety of programs designed to help respond to the current housing crisis, such as helping borrowers forestall foreclosures. While these efforts may be necessary to help mitigate the effects of the housing crisis, they also might significantly affect the costs of the conservatorship and transition to a new structure. For example, investors might be unwilling to invest capital in reconstituted enterprises unless Treasury assumed responsibility for losses incurred during their conservatorship. Finally, any transition to a new structure would need to consider the enterprises' still-dominant position in housing finance and be implemented carefully (perhaps in phases) to ensure its success.