Military Airlift
Management Controls Over Charter Airlift Need To Be Strengthened Gao ID: NSIAD-87-67 March 6, 1987Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed: (1) the Department of Defense's (DOD) policies and procedures for chartering commercial aircraft; (2) oversight procedures for monitoring carrier performance and compliance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) safety regulations; and (3) the investigation of the accident at Gander, Newfoundland, that resulted in the deaths of 248 U.S. military personnel.
GAO found that: (1) the Military Airlift Command (MAC) did not include appropriate safety clauses in its contracts with foreign airlines; (2) the ramp inspection program did not provide sufficient coverage of contractor aircraft or air taxi operators; (3) the safety clauses in current transportation agreements do not specifically charge contractors with the responsibility for flight safety; (4) in-flight quality checks were very limited; (5) DOD and FAA did not effectively communicate on charter oversight; (6) MAC did not include an evaluation of airline security programs in its airlift capability surveys; and (7) the December 1985 DC-8 accident was still under investigation to determine the aircraft's loaded weight and balance, the possible influence of ice buildup, and the aircraft's maintenance record.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
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