Air Traffic Control

During the past decade, substantial cost growth and schedule delays have beset the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Advanced Automation System, a $5-billion project to replace and enhance the work stations and computer systems used by air traffic controllers. FAA originally estimated in 1983 that the automation system would cost $2.5 billion and be completed in 1996. Since then, completion costs have doubled and the schedule has slipped by six years because FAA underestimated the effort required to develop and implement the system. The upshot is that air traffic controllers continue to use 20-year-old equipment, a situation that reduces the margin of safety in the air traffic control system. Delays in implementing the automation system have also deferred benefits for users of the air traffic control system, such as savings in fuel cost for airlines arising from better routing capabilities. Although FAA has taken positive steps to improve the automation system, such as developing a demonstration facility to gain an early assessment of controllers' and technicians' concerns, the project still remains vulnerable to further cost increases and schedule delays.

GAO found that: (1) the estimated cost of the system has doubled since its inception in 1983; (2) cost increases since the contract's signing are due primarily to changing system requirements; (3) implementation and completion of the system have been delayed 5 and 6 years respectively; (4) delays have been caused by changes in system requirements and software development problems; (5) because of the delays, FAA must continue to rely on aging hardware and software that could malfunction and reduce the margin of safety, and FAA has also implemented costly interim projects to sustain the old air traffic control (ATC) system; (6) ultimate users of the ATC system are losing projected benefits in lower fuel costs and time savings; (7) unrealistic scheduling of system production has caused compressed testing activities and delayed software development until after production decisions have been made; (8) FAA is planning to test one component's work stations prior to its production decision in response to previous GAO recommendations, and has developed an AAS demonstration facility; (9) FAA has not yet decided on the number of facilities that will receive AAS, or delivered a facility consolidation plan to Congress, which is needed for funding estimates and a component's design; (10) user interface requirements have not been resolved and will affect the program's progress; (11) storage space for AAS equipment at facilities has not been established; and (12) packaging AAS as just one project limits oversight by the appropriate officials.